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2025 Pa. Super. 271

Com. v. Walker, J.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Decided December 9, 2025

Superior Court of Pennsylvania · decided 2025-12-09

Relies on 2006 Pa. Super. 170 - Commonwealth v. Preston · Com. v. Lucas · 2007 Pa. Super. 165 - Commonwealth v. Martz

Decided 2025-12-09

J-S32045-25

                                   
2025 PA Super 271


    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JARREN S. WALKER                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 289 MDA 2025

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 10, 2024
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-CR-0000368-2022


BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                         FILED DECEMBER 09, 2025

       Jarren S. Walker appeals from the December 10, 2024 aggregate

judgment of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

imposed after a jury found him guilty of second-degree murder, aggravated

assault, burglary, robbery, criminal trespass, and five counts of criminal

conspiracy.1 After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

       The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

              On Monday, May 8, 2019, shortly after 10 p.m., police
              were summoned to 10 Birchwood Road, Wyomissing,
              Berks County, Pennsylvania, to investigate a homeinvasion robbery in which Nail Salamov (“Mr.
              Salamov”) had been shot. Mr. Salamov was the
              individual who phoned 911 to report the incident and
              he did briefly speak with the police before being
____________________________________________


* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.


1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 2702(a)(1), 3502(a)(1)(i), 3701(a)(1)(i),
3503(a)(1)(ii), and 903(a)(1), respectively.
J-S32045-25


          transported to Reading Hospital. While being treated
          at the hospital, Mr. Salamov succumbed to his
          injuries.

          Prior to being transported to the hospital, Mr. Salamov
          conveyed to the police that two men (unknown to
          him) had entered his home and forced the door of his
          bedroom open (where Mr. Salamov had retired for the
          evening). One of the invaders sprayed Mr. Salamov
          with mace. Mr. Salamov struggled with the two
          individuals, and during the struggle he was shot in the
          torso. Mr. Salamov provided a basic description of the
          two invaders as being male with dark skin
          complexions, one of which had a dreadlock hairstyle.

          Neil Hoffman, M.D., qualified as an expert in the field
          of forensic pathology, testified that an autopsy of Mr.
          Salamov confirmed he died as a result of a single
          gunshot wound to the trunk of the body. Mr.
          Salamov’s death was ruled a homicide, with the cause
          of death being a gunshot wound.

          Police investigators obtained a search warrant for
          service upon Google asking for information on any
          devices captured within the geographic property
          confines of 10 Birchwood Road during a narrow
          window of time leading up to and shortly after the
          home invasion. As a result of that warrant, one device
          was discovered as having been at or near the location
          at the time of the home invasion — a cellular
          telephone purportedly owned by Appellant with an
          email account of “[email protected]” and an
          assigned phone number of “484-219-7538.”

          Jurors heard testimony that investigators were able to
          connect the phone number in question to Appellant
          through information obtained through a warrant
          showing he was the account holder for the associated
          cellphone number. Investigators secured various
          photos of Appellant during their investigation,
          including one posted to Instagram on May 6, 2019, in
          which Appellant had a dreadlock hairstyle.
          Investigators, utilizing Google location history for the
          phone, were able to place it at 117 Walnut Street,

                                   -2-
J-S32045-25


              Reading, Berks County, Pennsylvania, a few days prior
              to the home invasion. The jury heard that address was
              a location associated with Appellant. The jury also
              heard testimony that the device was recorded to be at
              or near the local Social Security office at a time when
              Appellant was listed as signing into the visitor’s log for
              the office, thereby further associating Appellant with
              the phone/account in question.

              Prosecutors presented the testimony of Noel Rivera
              (“Mr. Rivera”), who was currently being held in the
              Berks County Jail on unrelated drug charges. Mr.
              Rivera testified that his mother dated Appellant from
              2012 until Appellant was arrested for the murder in
              2021. Mr. Rivera further testified Appellant admitted
              to him he was part of the home invasion that resulted
              in the death of Mr. Salamov.

Trial court opinion, 5/5/25 at 3-4 (footnote and headings omitted).

       On September 13, 2024, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion to

suppress electronic evidence seized pursuant to June 19, 2019 geofence2


____________________________________________


2 We note that,



       [un]like a warrant authorizing surveillance of a known suspect,
       geofencing is a technique law enforcement has increasingly
       utilized when the crime location is known but the identities of
       suspects are not. Thus, geofence warrants effectively work in
       reverse from traditional search warrants. In requesting a geofence
       warrant, law enforcement simply specifies a location and period of
       time, and, after judicial approval, companies conduct sweeping
       searches of their location databases and provide a list of cell
       phones and affiliated users found at or near a specific area during
       a given timeframe, both defined by law enforcement.

United States v. Smith, 
110 F.4th 817, 822
 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks,
brackets, and citations omitted), cert. denied, __ S.Ct. __, 
2025 WL 3131804
(U.S. November 10, 2025).



                                           -3-
J-S32045-25


warrant signed by Berks County Court of Common Pleas Judge Paul M. Yatron.

This warrant directed Google to disclose certain location history information

for devices that connected to its services from a specific geographic area

corresponding to the property at 10 Birchwood Drive, where the homicide took

place, and during the specific time window of 30 minutes before Salamov

called 911. The suppression court held a hearing on Appellant’s suppression

motion on September 27, 2024, at the conclusion of which the court denied

the motion without prejudice.

       Thereafter, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on October 15, 2024.

Following a six-day trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of second-degree

murder, aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, criminal trespass, and five

counts of criminal conspiracy on October 22, 2024. As noted, on December

10, 2024, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant filed a timely post-

sentence motion that was denied by the trial court on February 13, 2025. This

timely appeal followed on March 3, 2025.3

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

              1.     Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s
                     motion to suppress the geofence warrants and
                     all the evidence derived therefrom?




____________________________________________


3 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.




                                           -4-
J-S32045-25


            2.    Was the evidence as to each element of the
                  offense of murder in the second degree
                  insufficient as a matter of law?

Appellant’s brief at 9 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

      Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the geofence warrants and all the evidence derived therefrom. Id.

at 15-28.

      Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a denial of a

suppression motion is well settled.

            [Our] standard of review in addressing a challenge to
            the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
            determining whether the suppression court's factual
            findings are supported by the record and whether the
            legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
            Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
            suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
            of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
            for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
            in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
            suppression court's factual findings are supported by
            the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
            findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
            conclusions are erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Dewald, 
317 A.3d 1020
, 1030 (Pa.Super. 2024)

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 
333 A.3d 647
 (Pa. 2025).

      “[I]t is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass

on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.

The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the evidence

presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Byrd, 
185 A.3d 1015, 1019
 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

                                      -5-
J-S32045-25


      Prior to any discussion of the merits of Appellant’s first claim, we must

determine whether the record is sufficiently complete to enable our review.

Appellant’s claim requires consideration of the testimony presented during the

September 27, 2024 suppression hearing.         An examination of the certified

record indicates that on April 29, 2025, Appellant filed a request for transcripts

from his October 15-22, 2024 jury trial and December 10, 2024 sentencing.

Appellant, however, failed to ensure that the notes of testimony from the

September 27, 2024 suppression hearing were transcribed nor made part of

the certified record. See “Motion for Transcripts,” 4/29/25 at 1.

      This court has long recognized that “[w]hen the appellant ... fails to

conform to the requirements of [Pa.R.A.P.] 1911 [relating to transcript

requests], any claims that cannot be resolved in the absence of the necessary

transcript or transcripts must be deemed waived for the purpose of appellate

review.”   Commonwealth v. Preston, 
904 A.2d 1, 7
 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 
916 A.2d 632
 (Pa. 2007).              It is an

appellant’s responsibility to make certain that the certified record contains all

items necessary to ensure that this court is able to review his claims. See

Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 
959 A.2d 362, 372
 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).

This court has stated:

            It is black letter law in this jurisdiction that an
            appellate court cannot consider anything which is not
            part of the record in the case. It is also well-settled in
            this jurisdiction that it is Appellant’s responsibility to
            supply this Court with a complete record for purposes
            of review. A failure by appellant to insure that the

                                      -6-
J-S32045-25


              original record certified for appeal contains sufficient
              information to conduct a proper review constitutes
              waiver of the issue sought to be examined.

Commonwealth v. Martz, 
926 A.2d 514, 524-525
 (Pa.Super. 2007)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 
940 A.2d 363
 (Pa. 2008). As the suppression hearing transcript is necessary to conduct

our appellate review, we find Appellant’s first issue is waived.

       Appellant next contends that the Commonwealth presented insufficient

evidence to sustain his conviction for second-degree murder.4            Appellant’s

brief at 29-34.

       Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence is well settled.

              We must determine whether the evidence admitted at
              trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
              when viewed in a light most favorable to the
              Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the
              conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is
              sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find
              every element of the crime has been established
              beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the
              evidence claim must fail.

              The evidence established at trial need not preclude
              every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is
              free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
              presented. It is not within the province of this Court
              to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment
____________________________________________


4  Notably, Appellant does not specifically challenge whether the
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for
aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, criminal trespass, or criminal
conspiracy. Accordingly, we will limit our analysis to his second-degree
murder conviction.

                                           -7-
J-S32045-25


             for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s
             burden may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence
             and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be
             resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so
             weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no
             probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
             circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Cahill, 
324 A.3d 516, 526
 (Pa.Super. 2024) (citations

omitted).

        Second-degree murder, or felony murder, is a homicide committed

“while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the

perpetration of a felony.”     18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b). Section 2502 of the

Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the “perpetration of a felony” as “[t]he act

of the defendant in engaging in or being an accomplice in the commission of,

or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit

robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson,

burglary or kidnapping.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(d).

        Preliminarily, we must determine whether Appellant has properly

preserved his sufficiency claim for appellate review.      Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure 1925(b) provides, inter alia, that “[i]ssues not included

in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this

paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”      Pa.R.A.P.1925(b)(4)(vii).   It is well settled

that,

             [i]n order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of
             the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Rule
             1925(b) statement must state with specificity
             the element or elements upon which the

                                      -8-
J-S32045-25


            appellant alleges that the evidence was
            insufficient. Such specificity is of particular
            importance in cases where, as here, the appellant was
            convicted of multiple crimes each of which contains
            numerous elements that the Commonwealth must
            prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Garland, 
63 A.3d 339, 344
 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations

and   internal   quotation   marks   omitted;   emphasis   added);   see   also

Commonwealth v. LeClair, 
236 A.3d 71, 76
 (Pa.Super. 2020) (same),

appeal denied, 
244 A.3d 1222
 (Pa. 2021).

      Here, our review establishes that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement

fails to specifically identify any of the elements of second-degree murder that

the Commonwealth allegedly failed to prove.        On the contrary, Appellant

presented the following bald, “catch-all” sufficiency argument in his Rule

1925(b) statement:

            Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of
            law as to each element of the offense of Murder of the
            Second Degree.

Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 4/28/25 at 1.

      Accordingly, because Appellant has failed to identify the specific

elements of second-degree murder that he is challenging on appeal, we could

find his sufficiency claim waived.

      In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we agree with the trial court that there

was ample evidence to support the jury’s determination that Appellant was

guilty of second-degree murder. Our review of the record establishes that –

                                      -9-
J-S32045-25


based on the testimony from law enforcement and their conversation with

Salamov before he succumbed to his injuries, Appellant’s own social media

posts, and the testimony of his former cellmate, Noel Rivera, that Appellant

had confessed the crime to him – there was sufficient evidence that Appellant

or his co-conspirator shot and killed Salamov during the course of a home

invasion robbery. Additionally, the record demonstrates that the electronic

evidence seized from the geofence warrants placed Appellant’s phone in the

home of Salamov during the time that the crime was committed, via his email

address and phone number registered with Google.

      As the trial court recognized in its opinion,

            The jury was presented with evidence that Mr.
            Salamov was shot in his home and died as a result of
            that gunshot wound. The jury heard that Mr. Salamov
            himself, prior to dying, told the police two individuals
            entered his home, forced their way into his bedroom,
            and fought with him. There is no question predicate
            information to find that a Murder in the Second Degree
            occurred. . . . Regarding the identification of the
            perpetrator, the jury heard from police investigators
            that Mr. Salamov’s description of one of the assailants
            matched Appellant’s physical description. The jury
            heard that investigators were able to trace a mobile
            phone registered to the Appellant to the time and
            place of the murder. The jury heard from investigators
            that they were able to put the location of that phone
            in proximity of the Appellant on other occasions and
            in other locations within a few days of the murder.
            The jury also heard from Mr. Rivera that the Appellant
            admitted to having been involved in the home
            invasion and murder.

Trial court opinion, 5/5/25 at 9.




                                     - 10 -
J-S32045-25


     Based on all of the foregoing, Appellant’s sufficiency claim warrants no

relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s December 10, 2024 judgment

of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.




Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary



Date: 12/09/2025




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