State v. Martin

#30654-a-SRJ

                             IN THE SUPREME COURT
                                     OF THE
                            STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

                                    …

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA,                       Plaintiff and Appellee,

      v.

CHAD DALE MARTIN,                            Defendant and Appellant.

                                    …

                  APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
                     THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
                  MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

                                    …

                  THE HONORABLE SANDRA H. HANSON
                              Judge

                                    …


CHRISTOPHER MILES of
Minnehaha County Public
   Defender’s Office
Sioux Falls, South Dakota                    Attorneys for defendant and
                                             appellant.


MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General

JENNIFER M. JORGENSON
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota                         Attorneys for plaintiff and
                                             appellee.

                                    …

                                             CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
                                             JANUARY 13, 2025
                                             OPINION FILED 03/12/25
#30654

JENSEN, Chief Justice

[¶1.]        Chad Martin was indicted on multiple felony and misdemeanor

charges following a high-speed chase during which he struck another vehicle,

injuring one of its occupants. Martin pleaded guilty to one count of vehicular

battery and one count of aggravated eluding. He also admitted to a part II habitual

offender information. The circuit court sentenced Martin to twenty years in the

state penitentiary with eight years suspended on the vehicular battery conviction

and imposed a suspended two-year sentence on the aggravated eluding conviction.

Martin appeals, claiming the circuit court abused its discretion by considering

uncharged conduct at sentencing. We affirm.

                       Factual and Procedural Background

[¶2.]        On August 25, 2023, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Sioux Falls police

officers on patrol near 14th Street and South Phillips Avenue observed a blue

Saturn Outlook matching the description in a “be on the lookout” (BOLO) bulletin

issued by law enforcement. The BOLO stated the vehicle had been stolen from its

registered owner earlier in the afternoon while the owner was standing nearby.

The vehicle’s owner approached the vehicle and attempted to remove the suspect by

reaching into the vehicle to strike him. With the owner still partially inside the

vehicle, the suspect then attempted to flee in the vehicle and struck a woman on

foot near the scene.

[¶3.]        When officers observed the vehicle later that evening, they ran the

vehicle’s plates, which confirmed it as stolen. They followed the vehicle as it turned

southbound onto South Cliff Avenue. The officers activated their emergency lights


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to initiate a traffic stop, but the vehicle accelerated and turned westbound onto East

16th Street in an apparent attempt to evade law enforcement. Given the

circumstances of the vehicle’s theft, the officers notified Metro Communications that

they were initiating a pursuit.

[¶4.]        A high-speed chase ensued through residential areas, during which the

suspect vehicle ran multiple stop signs and traffic lights. The vehicle eventually

returned to Cliff Avenue, reaching speeds of approximately 75 miles per hour. At

the intersection of East 12th Street and Cliff Avenue, the vehicle nearly crashed,

clipping another vehicle, but regained control. At the intersection of 10th Street

and Cliff Avenue, the vehicle ran a red light and collided with another vehicle

lawfully proceeding through a green light, disabling both vehicles. S.A.R., an

occupant of the vehicle struck during the collision, sustained injuries and was

transported to a local hospital, where she was diagnosed with a broken collarbone.

[¶5.]        The driver exited the stolen vehicle and fled on foot. After a brief

pursuit, officers apprehended and identified him as Chad Martin. Officers observed

Martin’s bloodshot, glossy eyes, suggesting impairment. Standard field sobriety

tests were not performed due to the nature of the incident and Martin’s flight risk.

[¶6.]        A Minnehaha County grand jury returned an indictment charging

Martin with several felony and misdemeanor offenses including vehicular battery in

violation of SDCL 22-18-36, a Class 4 felony, and aggravated eluding in violation of

SDCL 32-33-18.2, a Class 6 felony. All the charges were based on the events

surrounding the high-speed pursuit with law enforcement that resulted in the




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collision with S.A.R.’s vehicle. The State did not charge Martin for the events

involving the theft of the vehicle earlier that same day.

[¶7.]         The State also filed a part II information pursuant to SDCL 22-7-8

alleging Martin had been convicted in South Dakota of three or more prior felony

offenses, including one or more crimes of violence. 1 Martin was arraigned on

September 11, 2023, and entered a not guilty plea to all of the charges.

[¶8.]         On October 30, 2023, the parties appeared and presented a plea

agreement on the record. Under the agreement, Martin would plead guilty to

vehicular battery and aggravated eluding and admit to the part II information. In

exchange, the State dismissed the remaining charges and agreed to recommend

that penitentiary time be capped at a maximum of twelve years for both charges,

with any additional suspended time left to the circuit court’s discretion.

[¶9.]         After Martin entered his guilty pleas, the State provided a factual

basis, detailing law enforcement’s high-speed pursuit of the stolen vehicle and the

injuries sustained by S.A.R. when Martin ran a red light during the pursuit. The

State did not describe the events surrounding the initial theft of the vehicle but

referenced it stating: “The officers that were attempting to do the stop were able to

get authorization to pursue the vehicle. While that is not the normal police

department policy, the circumstances under which this vehicle had been stolen

made it a higher risk so they were able to get authorization to pursue.”



1.      The part II information alleged Martin had been convicted of seven prior
        felonies between 2015 and 2022. One of these prior felonies was a crime of
        violence, enhancing the potential punishment to the level of a Class C felony
        under SDCL 22-7-8, carrying a maximum sentence of life in prison. See
        SDCL 22-6-1.
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[¶10.]       Martin agreed the factual basis supported his pleas but denied stealing

the vehicle earlier in the day. His counsel further stated that Martin believed he

had permission to use the vehicle from someone he knew and denied knowing that

it was stolen. The circuit court accepted Martin’s pleas, and at Martin’s request,

sentencing was delayed. The court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) to be

prepared for sentencing.

[¶11.]       The PSI included the police reports, which described in detail both the

high-speed pursuit and the initial theft of the vehicle earlier in the afternoon, as the

official version of the offense. Martin also provided his version of the offense, in

which he admitted to driving the stolen vehicle during the high-speed pursuit but

denied involvement in the initial theft of the vehicle. Although he claimed during

his plea hearing that he believed he had permission to use the vehicle, his version of

the offense in the PSI stated that he observed the vehicle running and unoccupied

for twenty minutes, and then took it. Martin admitted he had a bloody lip when

apprehended, but claimed this occurred during the collision with S.A.R.’s vehicle.

[¶12.]       According to the police reports of the initial theft, at approximately

4:30 p.m. on August 25, 2023, Sioux Falls police were dispatched to the area of West

1st Street and North Prairie Avenue following reports of a stolen vehicle and a

woman struck by the vehicle. The owner, A.C., told police he had left his vehicle

running with the keys in the ignition while speaking to M.A., a woman walking

with her child in a stroller. A.C. observed an unknown man enter his vehicle and he

attempted to stop him by striking the suspect through the open window. A.C.

described the suspect as a Native American male with a crew cut, wearing a maroon


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shirt, possibly in his 30s, and of stocky build. 2 The suspect put the vehicle in drive,

briefly dragging A.C. before he fell to the ground.

[¶13.]         In an attempt to assist, M.A. positioned herself approximately twenty

feet in front of the vehicle. Without swerving, the suspect drove forward, striking

M.A. and sending her airborne over the hood of the vehicle. M.A., having landed in

the middle of the street, suffered a sore wrist, a noticeable bump on her head, and

road rash, while A.C. sustained scrapes to his arms and knees.

[¶14.]         The responding officers interviewed four other witnesses who

corroborated the description of the incident provided by A.C. and M.A. One of these

witnesses was a nearby resident with exterior cameras that captured the incident.

While the footage confirmed the sequence of events, officers were unable to obtain a

clear description of the driver beyond what had been provided by A.C.

[¶15.]         The police reports of the subsequent high-speed pursuit indicate that

at approximately 10:34 p.m. that same day, law enforcement located Martin driving

the stolen vehicle. The rest of the information in these reports is consistent with

the events detailed in the State’s factual basis during the plea hearing.

[¶16.]         In addition to the details of the offense, the PSI provided Martin’s

personal history, including his unstable upbringing and home life. It revealed a

significant criminal record beginning in his youth, with seven prior felonies and

ongoing supervision by the Department of Corrections at the time of the current



2.       The PSI report indicates that Martin is a Native American male and 26 years
         old. During Martin’s initial appearance on August 28, the State
         acknowledged that it did “not have enough information right now to know if
         this defendant is the same suspect who originally took the vehicle,” but noted
         that “he does match the general description[.]”
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offense. Martin reported frequent institutionalization since his teenage years. The

PSI also highlighted a history of substance abuse, with Martin admitting to

consuming alcohol several times a week, marijuana daily, and methamphetamine

weekly. Martin did not object to any of the information in the PSI report.

[¶17.]       During sentencing, the State recounted Martin’s possession of the

stolen vehicle, high-speed flight from law enforcement, collisions with multiple

vehicles, and subsequent attempt to flee on foot. The State also noted Martin’s

blood test results taken a few hours after his arrest, which showed a BAC of .03 and

the presence of methamphetamine, amphetamine, carboxy THC,

dextromethorphan, and Delta-9 THC. The State emphasized Martin’s extensive

criminal history, substance abuse, and repeated poor decisions. Based on this and

the other sentencing factors, the State requested a twelve-year sentence with

additional suspended time.

[¶18.]       Martin’s counsel requested a lesser sentence, highlighting Martin’s

remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and his challenging upbringing. His counsel

noted that “it is quite clear through his PSI that he did not have a stable home” and

“[h]e didn’t grow up with positive influences[.]” Martin’s counsel argued the

sentence should consider Martin’s difficult background and allow for personal

growth. Martin also addressed the court, expressing remorse for the high-speed

chase that resulted in another person’s injury.

[¶19.]       The circuit court advised that it had considered all relevant factors and

in pronouncing the sentence, the court also stated it was considering uncharged

conduct set forth in the police reports, which it described as:


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             [W]hen the events that led to all of these circumstances started,
             there was an incident where it looked like [Martin] entered a
             vehicle while the victim was distracted and drove away with the
             victim hanging out of the car window, trying to hit at him, and
             that person got injuries while doing that. Then while [Martin]
             was driving away, there was a woman . . . the vehicle struck her
             . . . sen[ding] her airborne over the hood of the vehicle and she
             got significant injuries to her head, wrist, hip, and other road
             rash[.]

[¶20.]       The court also addressed Martin’s criminal history, noting that at least

one of his prior seven felonies involved a violent crime and expressing concern about

his parole violations, substance abuse, and inability to maintain employment or

housing. The court characterized the recent events as an escalation, stating:

             There is repeated criminal offenses, especially in terms of taking
             cars from people, and this last one, basically, an active
             carjacking with someone trying to hang onto the car to prevent
             him from getting away with it, at least that is what the report
             indicates to me. And so even though Mr. Martin may not want
             to act like a bad person, his actions do present a danger to the
             public.

[¶21.]       At this point, Martin’s counsel interjected, reiterating that Martin

denied involvement in the vehicle theft and the woman’s injury, stating: “[T]he

allegations regarding taking the vehicle, we have never entered any sort of facts

that support that. . . . [W]e do admit to the taking of the vehicle when it was parked

idling, but do dispute the allegations regarding hours prior.”

[¶22.]       The court acknowledged the denial but emphasized its reliance on the

PSI, and the statements from counsel and Martin, stating: “I understand that is not

what Mr. Martin agrees occurred, but the [c]ourt is not limited to what he stipulates

to in support of a guilty plea when the [c]ourt renders a sentence.” The court

further explained that a PSI is generally a reliable source of information, noting


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“that there was quite a distinction between what [Martin] described as the events

that led up to these circumstances” and what the official reports indicated about

how this all began. Additionally, the court reiterated its concerns regarding

Martin’s criminal history, viewing this most recent event as an escalation and a

threat to public safety.

[¶23.]       The circuit court sentenced Martin to twenty years in the state

penitentiary with eight years suspended on the vehicular battery conviction and a

suspended two-year sentence on the aggravated eluding conviction. The court

ordered the sentences to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to a prior

sentence for which Martin was on parole at the time.

[¶24.]       At the end of the sentencing hearing, Martin asked the circuit court,

“[w]ell, was I just -- was I just sentenced on -- like, a -- what was -- what was the

basis of where I was just sentenced? You brought up something totally different

from what I am facing and what I am charged with.” After an off-the-record

discussion occurred between Martin and his counsel, Martin’s counsel informed the

court that they did not have any other questions.

[¶25.]       Martin appeals his sentence, arguing the circuit court abused its

discretion in considering the uncharged conduct at sentencing.

                                Standard of Review

[¶26.]       “[W]e review the sentencing court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.”

State v. Peltier, 

, 

 (alteration in original)

(citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is a fundamental error of judgment, a

choice outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full


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consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable.” State v. Lanpher, 

, 

, 317 (citation omitted). “This Court . . . will not overturn the circuit

court’s abuse of discretion unless that ‘error is demonstrated and shown to be

prejudicial error.’” State v. Mitchell, 

, 

(quoting State v. Klinetobe, 

, 

).

                                       Analysis

[¶27.]       “Sentencing courts possess broad discretion ‘[w]ithin constitutional and

statutory limits’ to determine ‘the extent and kind of punishment to be imposed.’”

Id. ¶ 28, 

 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Rice, 

, 

). “The circuit court should weigh, on a case-by-case

basis, the traditional sentencing factors of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation,

and incapacitation without giving any particular factor preeminence[.]” State v.

Black Cloud, 

, 

, 686 (citation omitted). The court

“must consider sentencing evidence tending to mitigate or aggravate the severity of

a defendant’s conduct and its impact on others. Sentencing courts are often

required, in this regard, to accurately assess the ‘true nature of the offense.’” State

v. Banks, 

, 

 (citation omitted).

[¶28.]       In assessing the nature of the offense, a sentencing court has “wide

discretion with respect to the type of information used as well as its source.” State

v. Arabie, 

, ¶ 21, 

 (citation omitted). “This broad

range of information may include evidence that would be inadmissible at trial, as

the rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings.” Banks, 

, 

. Thus, a court may rely on an extensive sentencing record


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and is not confined “to the information contained in a stipulated factual basis

statement used to support a defendant’s guilty plea.” State v. Caffee, 

, 

, 360 (citation omitted). Courts may also consider uncharged

conduct if the State proves it by a preponderance of the evidence and the defendant

has an opportunity to contest it. See State v. McKinney, 

, ¶ 18, 

 (“[A] defendant must have the opportunity to contest the

uncharged conduct.”); and Mitchell, 

, 

 (“Courts

may even consider conduct that was uncharged . . . as long as the State proves the

conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.”). See also Wabasha v. Leapley, 

 (S.D. 1992) (“Due process requires a defendant who contests the

accuracy of factual information relied upon by a sentencing court be given an

opportunity to rebut or explain that information.”).

[¶29.]       Martin contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in

considering the uncharged conduct relating to the initial theft of the vehicle without

an express finding that the conduct was proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Martin argues that, despite his denial of the uncharged conduct, the circuit court

considered and relied upon the uncharged conduct in making its sentencing

decision, and the court therefore should have made explicit findings that the State

had proven the uncharged conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.

[¶30.]       Yet, this Court has “never required detailed findings of fact to justify a

sentence.” State v. Bear Robe, 

, 

, 466. Further, we

have also recognized that when a court does not explicitly state the standard of

proof it applied, there is a rebuttable presumption it used the appropriate standard.


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Hoffman v. Hollow Horn, 

, ¶ 15 n.6, 

, 327 n.6.

Accordingly, even if a sentencing court considers uncharged conduct without

explicitly finding it was proven by a preponderance of the evidence, this Court will

not disturb a sentence within the statutory maximum if the record contains

sufficient evidence to support such a finding and the defendant had an opportunity

to contest it.

[¶31.]           The record reflects that the circuit court received three accounts of how

Martin came to possess the stolen vehicle—one from the police reports attached to

the PSI and two conflicting accounts from Martin. We have never required

sentencing courts to accept implausible accounts or conduct “mini-trials” to prove or

disprove a defendant’s version of events. See State v. Carsten, 

,

709–10 (S.D. 1978). 3 The record also shows that Martin had an opportunity to

contest the uncharged conduct and his denial was explicitly noted by his counsel. 4

The circuit court “was well within the proper sphere of its sentencing discretion


3.       Indeed, this Court has upheld sentences where the court considered the
         defendant’s truthfulness about the convicted offense. See State v. Miles, 

, ¶¶ 20–21, 

, 67–68 (holding that the sentencing court
         properly considered the defendant’s lack of remorse and refusal to accept
         responsibility when it rejected his “incredulous” explanation in the PSI that
         he may have accidentally downloaded child pornography while intoxicated).
         See also State v. Murphy, 

 (S.D. 1993); and State v.
         Garber, 

, ¶ 33, 

.

4.       Martin briefly states that “the circuit court did not provide a meaningful
         opportunity for [him] to contest the uncharged conduct[,]” but he neither
         develops this argument in his brief nor cites any supporting authority. See
         Duerre v. Hepler, 

, ¶ 28, 

 (“It is well-settled
         that the failure to brief an issue and support an argument with authority
         waives the right to have this Court review it.”). Martin does not claim the
         PSI was withheld or that he and his counsel did not have an opportunity to
         review it prior to the sentencing hearing.
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when it elected to reject” Martin’s account and his disavowal of any connection to

the vehicle’s theft earlier in the day. Carsten, 

. In finding Martin

perpetrated the original theft, the court clearly credited the detailed police reports

and other information available to the court over Martin’s version of events, and

determined that he had engaged in the uncharged conduct earlier in the afternoon.

[¶32.]         While there was no direct evidence identifying Martin as the

perpetrator, the totality of the evidence—including his undisputed possession of the

recently stolen vehicle, reckless flight from law enforcement, and conflicting

explanations as to how he obtained the vehicle—provided a sufficient evidentiary

basis for the court to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he

committed the theft detailed in the police reports. See State v. Podzimek, 

, ¶¶ 32–33, 

 (recognizing that the identity of the offender can

be proven by circumstantial evidence); State v. Deubler, 

 (S.D.

1984) (holding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support conviction of

grand theft when it included proof that defendant was apprehended driving the

stolen vehicle, and that he gave contradicting stories as to how he came into

possession); and State v. Dowty, 

, ¶ 19 n.9, 

, 827 n.9

(quoting State v. Larkin, 

, 

 (1972)) (“[P]ossession

of recently stolen property is, in itself, a circumstance from which guilt may be

presumed.”).

[¶33.]         Martin relies on United States v. Schaefer, 

, 938–39 (7th

Cir. 2002), to support his claim that the circuit court erred in failing to make a

specific finding that the uncharged conduct relied upon by the court was proven by


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a preponderance of the evidence. He notes that this Court has itself relied on

Schaefer to recognize that sentencing courts may consider uncharged conduct in

order to familiarize themselves with a defendant. See Arabie, 

, ¶ 21,

; State v. McCrary, 

, ¶ 8, 

;

McKinney, 

, ¶ 18, 

. However, the nature of the

uncharged conduct in Schaefer and its significance under the federal sentencing

guidelines is entirely distinct from the uncharged conduct at issue in this case. 5

[¶34.]         Martin also contends that specific fact finding is required under our

recent decision in State v. Feucht, 

, 

, 570. In Feucht,

we vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing because the

circuit court did not explicitly list the aggravating factors supporting a departure

from presumptive probation under SDCL 22-6-11. As we noted in that case, when

SDCL 22-6-11 was enacted “it imposed new sentencing requirements on circuit

courts for offenders convicted of certain offenses.” Id. ¶ 18, 5 N.W.3d at 567.

[¶35.]         However, beyond such legislative mandate, this Court has “never

required a sentencing court to file detailed findings of fact to justify a sentence[,]” or




5.       Schaefer relied upon the federal sentencing guidelines, which were
         mandatory at the time. See United States v. Booker, 

, 

, 

 (2005) (subsequently holding the federal sentencing
         guidelines to be advisory rather than mandatory.) Schaefer vacated the
         federal district court’s enhanced sentence for wire fraud because the
         sentencing court failed to make the necessary factual findings that other
         alleged uncharged conduct, in the form of other prior financial transactions,
         involved unlawful wire fraud. Unlike in Schaefer, where multiple
         transactions over a substantial period complicated the loss calculation for a
         specific enhancement under the federal sentencing guidelines, the uncharged
         conduct here was considered by the circuit court in exercising its discretion to
         fashion an indeterminate sentence.
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to consider uncharged conduct. State v. Deleon, 

, 

 (quoting State v. Bult, 

, ¶ 12, 

). While

Martin’s conviction for aggravated eluding is a Class 6 felony subject to the

sentencing presumption in SDCL 22-6-11, the circuit court was not required to find

aggravating circumstances because it imposed a fully suspended sentence for that

conviction.

[¶36.]        The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by considering the

uncharged conduct at sentencing without making explicit findings. Further, its

sentencing decision was not based solely on the uncharged conduct. The court also

considered Martin’s extensive criminal history, parole violations, and substance

abuse. The court emphasized Martin’s past conviction for a violent felony and the

circumstances of his most recent offense—a high-speed pursuit with law

enforcement through residential areas that ended in a collision with another

vehicle—concluding that his behavior posed a danger to the public. The court

imposed a sentence “within the statutory maximum, and there is no indication that

the sentence was outside the range of permissible choices.” State v. Henry, 

, 

, 913–14. The circuit court appropriately considered

multiple sentencing factors beyond the uncharged conduct, reflecting a proper

exercise of its discretion.

[¶37.]        We affirm.

[¶38.]        KERN, SALTER, DEVANEY, and MYREN, Justices, concur.




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