State v. Blake

                This opinion is subject to revision before final
                     publication in the Pacific Reporter

                                

                                   IN THE

      SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

                             STATE OF UTAH,
                                Appellee,
                                      v.
                          SHON BRIAN BLAKE,
                              Appellant.

                             No. 20230435
                          Heard April 7, 2025
                          Filed July 25, 2025

           On Certification from the Court of Appeals

                    Fourth District Court, Provo
                    The Honorable Kraig Powell
                          No. 191400656

                                Attorneys:
   Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Daniel L. Day, Asst. Solic. Gen.,
        Salt Lake City, Stephen Jones, Provo, for appellee
    Dallas B. Young, Jennifer L. Foresta, Douglas Thompson,
                      Provo, for appellant

  CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in
   which ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE, JUSTICE PETERSEN,
            JUSTICE HAGEN, and JUDGE LUTHY joined.
  Having recused herself, JUSTICE POHLMAN does not participate
      herein; COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY sat.


   CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:
                          INTRODUCTION
   ¶1 Shon Brian Blake shot a man twice in the arm during an
argument. The victim required medical treatment to remove a
bullet and repair his arm. The Utah Office for Victims of Crime
                           STATE v. BLAKE
                       Opinion of the Court

(UOVC) paid those medical expenses. The State charged Blake with
several crimes, and Blake pled guilty. As part of his sentence, the
State asked for a restitution order to reimburse UOVC for the
victim’s medical expenses.
   ¶2 The district court entered a restitution order requiring
Blake to repay UOVC for part of the medical expenses. The court of
appeals reversed the district court’s restitution order, concluding
the order was not supported by sufficient evidence.1 Neither the
opinion nor the remittitur that accompanied it used the word
remand or otherwise stated whether additional proceedings were
required in the district court. When the case returned to the district
court, the court determined, over Blake’s objection, that it had the
authority to hold a second restitution hearing. At the conclusion of
that hearing, the district court entered a new restitution order.
    ¶3 Blake appealed again, asserting that the district court
could not enter a new restitution order and that the new order was
not supported by sufficient evidence. The court of appeals certified
the appeal to us to decide whether the district court was prohibited
under the law of the case doctrine from holding a second restitution
hearing given that (1) the court of appeals reversed the restitution
order for insufficient evidence and (2) that court did not expressly
remand the case. We conclude that the district court was not
prohibited from holding a second restitution hearing based on
either of these grounds or the other preclusion doctrines Blake
presents to us. We further conclude that the new restitution order
was supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm the district court’s
second restitution order.
                         BACKGROUND
   ¶4 One evening in February 2019, a rock came through a
woman’s third-story apartment window. Suspecting that her exboyfriend, Blake, threw the rock, she and her new boyfriend called
and texted Blake and asked him to come over. When the couple
stepped outside, they noticed the new tires on the girlfriend’s car
were flat.
    ¶5 When Blake arrived, the couple accused him of throwing
the rock and deflating the tires. During the argument that followed,
Blake briefly pulled out a gun from his pants, then put it away. As
the argument continued, Blake pulled out the gun again, pointed it
__________________________________________________________
   1 State v. Blake, 

, 

.



                                  2
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                         Opinion of the Court

at the woman’s car, and fired it five times. He then turned and
walked away, but her new boyfriend followed him. Blake turned
again and fired the gun at the new boyfriend three times, hitting
him twice in the arm.
    ¶6 When the police arrived, officers arranged for the injured
boyfriend to go to the hospital for medical treatment. Medical
providers removed a bullet and repaired his damaged arm. Those
medical expenses totaled $36,701.56. Because the boyfriend was the
victim of a crime, UOVC paid those expenses.
   ¶7 Blake was later apprehended by the police, and the State
charged him with several offenses. He pled guilty pursuant to a
plea agreement.
    ¶8 The district court entered a sentence that included $500 of
restitution for damage to the girlfriend’s car, but the court left the
restitution portion of the sentence open for one year, as the
restitution statute allowed, for the State to submit other expenses.2
Eight months later, the State submitted evidence of the injured
boyfriend’s medical expenses and moved to amend the restitution
order to include those damages. After a restitution proceeding,
which the district court later characterized as a “quasi-hearing” and
where no testimony was provided, the court entered a restitution
order based on a discussion that occurred with the attorneys at that
proceeding and a two-page redacted list of payments. Applying the
two-part restitution structure that was required at that time, the
court set complete restitution at $36,701.56, and it ordered a lesser




__________________________________________________________
   2 See UTAH CODE § 77-38a-302(5)(d) (2019) (“The prosecuting

agency shall submit all requests for complete restitution and court-ordered restitution to the court at the time of sentencing if feasible,
otherwise within one year after sentencing.”). The legislature
amended the restitution statutes in 2021 to extend the time for
seeking restitution. See Criminal Justice Modifications, H.B. 260,
2021 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2021). But the statute in effect at the time
of sentencing governs. See State v. Clark, 

, ¶¶ 12–14, 

 (holding that “[t]he law governing [a] procedural
occurrence is . . . the law in effect at the time of the procedural act”).

                                    3
                           STATE v. BLAKE
                        Opinion of the Court

amount of court-ordered restitution, $17,848.50.3 Blake appealed
that decision.
    ¶9 The court of appeals reversed the restitution order,
concluding that while there was no question that the shooting
caused some medical expenses, the evidence provided by the State
was insufficient to establish causation between the shooting and
the medical expenses requested.4 The court concluded that the
limited documentation of the medical expenses on the redacted list
was generic and conclusory.5 It further determined that without
either providing more detail or making impermissible assumptions
about UOVC’s process when reviewing medical expenses, the
evidence of causation was limited to the dates of the services in
relation to the date of the shooting.6 The court filed its opinion and
a remittitur that sent the matter back to the district court. Neither
document included an express directive for additional district
court proceedings.
   ¶10 The district court set a review hearing and allowed the
State an opportunity to file a motion to amend its restitution
request. Blake opposed the renewed request for restitution. He
asked that the court of appeals’ opinion become the final order on
__________________________________________________________
   3  The restitution statutes no longer distinguish between
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution. Compare UTAH
CODE § 77-38b-205(1) (2025), with UTAH CODE § 77-38a-302(2) (2019)
(defining “complete restitution” and “court-ordered restitution”).
The distinctions between the two types of restitution played a
substantive role in our jurisprudence in restitution matters, and
that jurisprudence provides context for our analysis under the
older restitution statute. See State v. Ogden, 

, ¶¶ 27–28, 

 (comparing “complete restitution”—the total amount of
the victim’s pecuniary damages—with “court-ordered” restitution
which could be a lower amount after the court considered the
impact the amount of restitution would have on the defendant); see
also State v. Laycock, 

, 

 (“We find the
plain language of this subsection to be a clear directive that district
courts are to make two separate restitution determinations, one for
complete restitution and a second for court-ordered restitution.”).
   4 State v. Blake, 

, 

.

   5 

 ¶¶ 12–14.

   6 Id. ¶ 13.



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                        Opinion of the Court

restitution, without allowing for a new restitution order. The
district court determined it still had jurisdiction to consider the
amended restitution request and later held an evidentiary hearing.
After that hearing, the district court entered a new restitution order,
again finding complete restitution to be $36,701.56 but ordering
$18,350.78 in court-ordered restitution.
    ¶11 The district court stayed that new restitution order
pending the outcome of any appeals. Blake timely appealed the
second restitution order. The court of appeals certified this matter
to us for our review.7
            ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶12 Blake presents four issues on appeal. He first asks us to
review whether the doctrine of res judicata barred the district court
from hearing new evidence in a second restitution hearing. Second,
he asks us to review whether the mandate rule should have
prevented the second hearing. His third issue is whether the State’s
request for a second restitution hearing was untimely under the
restitution statute. We review these three issues for correctness.8
    ¶13 As his final issue, Blake asserts that the new restitution
order is not supported by sufficient evidence. The general standard
reflected in our precedent when reviewing restitution orders is that
we will not disturb a district court’s restitution determination
unless the court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses
its discretion.9 But a closer examination reveals a more variable
standard of review depending on whether the issue is legal or
factual.10 The court of appeals aptly recognizes the same, namely
 __________________________________________________________
   7 See generally UTAH CODE § 78A-4-103(4); UTAH R. APP. P. 43.

   8 Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp., 

, ¶ 7, 

(reviewing whether res judicata barred a civil action for
correctness); Brady v. Park, 

, 

(reviewing a district court’s holdings regarding the mandate rule
for correctness); State v. Lovell, 

, 

(reviewing an issue of timeliness for correctness).
   9 State v. Ogden, 

, 

; State v. Laycock,

, 

.
   10 Compare State v. Laycock, 

, ¶¶ 20–24, 

(evaluating legal questions about language used in the restitution
statute), with State v. Weeks, 

, ¶¶ 20–21, 

                                                   (continued . . .)

                                  5
                           STATE v. BLAKE
                        Opinion of the Court

that we review legal determinations associated with a restitution
analysis for correctness and review sufficiency of the evidence
challenges for clear error.11 We agree.12 When an appellant
challenges a restitution order for insufficient evidence, we review
whether the clear weight of the evidence contradicts the district
court’s ruling.13 Under clear error review, disputes in the evidence
are resolved in the light most favorable to the district court’s
determination.14
                            ANALYSIS
   ¶14 Utah’s Crime Victims Restitution Act requires district
courts to determine restitution for any pecuniary damages
proximately caused by a defendant’s criminal conduct. 15 If UOVC
pays for a victim’s expenses caused by a crime, then the defendant
pays restitution to UOVC for those expenses.16
    ¶15 Blake’s principal dispute is whether the reversal of the first
restitution order by the court of appeals, without an express

__________________________________________________________
(evaluating the factual question of whether a restitution amount
was supported by sufficient evidence).
   11 State v. Murray, 

, 

.

   12  See State v. Levin, 

, ¶¶ 19–24, 

(discussing standards of review and the spectrum of deference in
relation to the types of issues—legal, factual, and mixed—
presented on appeal).
   13 Murray, 

 (citing State v. Chadwick, 

, 

); see Ogden, 

, ¶¶ 53–54
(requiring evidence supporting a restitution order be “firmly
established” in the record).
   14 State v. Perea, 

, 

.

   15 UTAH CODE § 77-38a-302(1) (2019); see also State v. Ogden, 

, ¶¶ 29–48, 

 (determining the legislature intended
to employ the proximate cause standard to find a defendant’s
“criminal activity . . . has resulted in pecuniary damages” (cleaned
up)).
   16 See UTAH CODE § 77-38a-102(14)(a) (2019) (“’Victim’ means

any person or entity, including the Utah Office for Victims of
Crime, who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages
as a result of the defendant’s criminal activities.”).

                                  6
                         Cite as: 

                        Opinion of the Court

remand instruction, allowed a second restitution hearing and the
new restitution order.
    ¶16 As a preliminary matter, we briefly address whether
reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence, which the court of
appeals noted in its certification order, implicates double jeopardy.
Restitution orders are unique components of criminal sentencing.17
The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions
protect defendants from multiple prosecutions or sentences for the
same offense, and Utah Code sections 76-1-402 and -403 can extend
those protections for different offenses during the same criminal
episode.18 Where insufficient evidence is the basis for a reversal of
a conviction, the Double Jeopardy Clauses might be a legal barrier
prohibiting a second trial based on evidence the prosecutor could
have presented at the first trial.19 But where the insufficiency of the
evidence requires resentencing, double jeopardy might not bar
additional proceedings, and we have articulated some of the legal
 __________________________________________________________
   17 State v. Mooers, 

, 

 (“Restitution orders

are a unique animal, existing at the convergence of the civil and
criminal worlds . . . .”).
   18 U.S. CONST. amend. V; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12; UTAH CODE

§§ 76-1-402 to -403; State v. Ririe, 

, 

(“The Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution insulates a
defendant from multiple prosecutions or multiple sentences for the
same offense. The single criminal episode statute, Utah Code
[section] 76-1-403, takes the matter a step further. It adopts a species
of res judicata or claim preclusion for criminal cases—barring
prosecutions for different offenses committed as part of a single
criminal episode and otherwise meeting the terms of the statute.”
(cleaned up)).
   19 Compare State v. Steed, 

, 

 (“The

Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of
affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence
which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.” (quoting Burks v.
United States, 

 (1978)), with State v. Hummel, 

, ¶ 65 n.23, 

 (“In rejecting Hummel’s approach we
also avoid another line-drawing problem of constitutional
magnitude—whether reversal on the basis of insufficient evidence
of one [or] more theories of a crime bars retrial under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. This is an important, complex question without a
clear answer.”)

                                   7
                           STATE v. BLAKE
                        Opinion of the Court

issues to analyze in such instances.20 Moreover, we established in
Monson v. Carver that restitution orders, at least when ordered by
the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, are remedial civil penalties,
not criminal punishments for double jeopardy purposes.21
    ¶17 Neither party relies on the more complex principles of
double jeopardy as a basis to decide the primary issue in this
appeal, and we focus instead on their arguments as they were
presented. Blake relies on three doctrines of preclusion to support
his argument—res judicata, law of the case, and timeliness. He also
contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support the new
restitution order. We address each issue in turn.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY WITHIN THE
   SAME ACTION
    ¶18 The doctrine of res judicata prohibits relitigation of claims
and issues that were litigated, or could have been litigated, in a
prior action.22 Res judicata has two branches: issue preclusion and
claim preclusion.23 Blake asserts that the claim preclusion branch
applies here. Claim preclusion has three elements: (1) both cases
involve the same parties or people in privity with the same parties;
(2) the claim was presented in the first case or could and should
have been raised in that first action; and (3) the first case resulted
in a final judgment on the merits.24
    ¶19 Blake invites us to rely on our discussion in State v. Garner,
applying the doctrine of res judicata in a criminal case.25 But we
later clarified in IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc.,

__________________________________________________________
   20 State v. Prion, 

, ¶¶ 30–62, 

; see also State

v. Rodrigues, 

, ¶¶ 36–39, 

 (discussing the role
of legitimate expectations of finality when evaluating the
application of double jeopardy to restitution orders revised after a
remand).
   21 

 (Utah 1996); see also Rodrigues, 

,

¶¶ 37–39 (declining to extend double jeopardy protection to a
restitution order that was amended to correct a clerical error).
   22 State v. Garner, 

, 

.

   23 Gressman v. State, 

, 

.

   24 Garner, 

.

   25 

 ¶¶ 8–10.



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                        Opinion of the Court

that our discussion of res judicata in Garner erroneously conflated
various related preclusion doctrines.26 We expressly clarified in
IHC that res judicata does not apply to claims or issues relitigated
in the same case.27 Instead, the law of the case doctrine is the
appropriate doctrine to apply within the same case.28
    ¶20 Since Blake’s new restitution order arose in the same
criminal prosecution as the original restitution order, we decline to
evaluate the doctrine of res judicata and look instead at his second
issue, which regards the law of the case.
II. AN APPELLATE DECISION MAY MANDATE THAT A TRIAL COURT
    ADDRESS MATTERS THAT WERE REVERSED
     ¶21 Blake asserts that the mandate rule precluded the district
court from revisiting its first restitution order. The mandate rule is
one of several rules inside the larger umbrella of the law of the case
doctrine. While that umbrella covers distinct types of legal
problems, each with a separate type of analysis, the doctrine
generally provides that, prior to an appeal, parties are bound by the
decisions of the trial court made within that case, although the trial
court may have discretion to change those decisions until it enters
its final judgment.29
   ¶22 The “mandate rule,” on the other hand, applies after a case
has been appealed.30 Once an appellate court issues its decision,
both the appellate court’s pronouncements on legal issues and the
prior decisions of the trial court generally become mandatory,


__________________________________________________________
   26 

, ¶ 26 n.20, 

 (expressly overruling the

interchangeable use of the concepts of res judicata and law of the
case in Garner).
   27 Id.; see also In re Discipline of Rasmussen, 

, 

 (“Res judicata and its companion, collateral estoppel, do
not operate within a single case. They are used to describe the
binding effect of a decision in a prior case on a second case.”
(cleaned up)).
   28 IHC Health Servs., 

.

   29 Brady v. Park, 

, 

; IHC Health Servs.,

.
   30 IHC Health Servs., 

.



                                   9
                           STATE v. BLAKE
                        Opinion of the Court

although the mandate rule is not inflexible.31 The purpose of the
rule is to protect against reargument of settled issues and to assure
adherence of the trial courts to appellate decisions.32
    ¶23 Blake relies on the court of appeals’ decision in State v.
MacNeill to assert that the mandate rule bars subsequent
evidentiary hearings, but we conclude that such reliance is
misplaced.33 In MacNeill, the court of appeals declined to consider
a speedy trial issue in an interlocutory appeal because the issue was
inadequately briefed.34 The case was remanded to the trial court
and then appealed again.35 In that next appeal, the appellant
attempted to brief the speedy trial issue again and asserted it could
be considered through an exception to the mandate rule because
new evidence had become available.36 The court of appeals
determined that the exception to the mandate rule did not apply
because the purported new evidence was for a different issue, not
the speedy trial issue, and the briefing was still inadequate.37
__________________________________________________________
   31 Brady, 

; Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of

Utah, 

, 

 (discussing exceptions to the
mandate rule to avoid “unjust results or unwise precedent”).
   32 Brady, 

; see also Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Ivers,

, 

 (“The mandate rule is justified.
Without it, considerable inefficiencies would result if parties were
free to relitigate after remand issues decided in an earlier ruling of
this court.” (cleaned up)); Thurston v. Box Elder Cnty., 

 (Utah 1995) (“[The mandate rule] serves the dual purpose of
protecting against the reargument of settled issues and of assuring
adherence of lower courts to the decisions of higher courts.”).
   33 See 

, ¶¶ 37–39, 

.

   34 Id. ¶ 39.

   35 Id. ¶¶ 8, 37.

   36 Id. ¶ 37–41; IHC Health Servs., 

 (“There are

three exceptional circumstances in which the law of the case
doctrine does not apply: (1) when there has been an intervening
change of controlling authority; (2) when new evidence has become
available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision
was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”
(cleaned up)).
   37 MacNeill, 

.



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                            Opinion of the Court

     ¶24 The case before us is much different. Here, no party sought
any exception to the mandate rule before the district court. Rather,
after the first appeal, the district court was left with a vacated
restitution order, but it was required by statute to provide
restitution as part of sentencing. So the mandate rule is not a square
fit for this case. Instead, the unique context of restitution is central
to resolving whether the district court had the authority to hold a
second evidentiary hearing.38
    ¶25 Before moving on to that central issue, we briefly
acknowledge the State’s argument that applying the mandate rule
would prohibit the district court from addressing the error the
appellate court identified. The mandate rule prohibits the district
court from reconsidering legal issues after an appeal,39 which,
according to the State, means a court may reconsider factual issues.
The law may be more nuanced than that. While not cited to by
either party, there is a developed body of law in federal courts
prescribing how to evaluate alleged violations of the mandate rule,
by looking first at whether an appellate court’s directives were
general or limited, which then impacts whether the trial court can
approach additional proceedings de novo or within prescribed
limits.40 We are not invited to, nor do we need to, consider or adopt
that body of law today.
    ¶26 Our existing precedent about reversals without remand
instructions, coupled with the unique nature of restitution
proceedings, resolves this appeal on narrower grounds, which we
address with Blake’s third issue.




__________________________________________________________
   38 See infra part III.

   39 Brady, 

; Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1037–38.

   40 See 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED.

PRAC. & PROC. § 4478.3 (3d ed. May 2025 update); Monroe v. FTS
USA, LLC, 

, 669 (6th Cir. 2021). Under this body of law,
if a remand has specific instructions, the scope of what the trial
court can address must stay within those boundaries; if there are
no specific instructions, it is a general remand, and the district court
can consider all matters de novo as long as the court “remains
consistent with the appellate court’s opinion.” See 

                                    11
                          STATE v. BLAKE
                       Opinion of the Court

III. WITHOUT AN EXPRESS REMAND, A TRIAL COURT CONSIDERS THE
     CONTEXT OF THE PRIOR DECISION TO DETERMINE FURTHER
     PROCEEDINGS
    ¶27 Blake contests whether the second request to modify
restitution was timely, and in doing so, he illuminates the central
issue in the case—whether the district court can hold a second
restitution hearing after an appellate court reverses a restitution
order but remains silent about remand proceedings. Our precedent
establishes that, even without express instructions, further
proceedings can follow a reversal unless the reversal included
express language to the contrary. These further proceedings
depend on the context of the case, which here includes the unique
nature of restitution. We first evaluate our precedent on reversals
and the distinctiveness of restitution proceedings and then address
the statutory timeliness issue Blake asserts.
   A. Precedent Establishes What Trial Courts Must Consider
      Following Reversals Without Remand Instructions
    ¶28 If the court of appeals had included the word “remand” in
its opinion, it would be clear that the district court needed to have
a new restitution hearing and enter a new restitution order.41
Sometimes in restitution cases the appellate courts reverse and
remand, often including instructions with the remand.42 But at
times appellate courts have entered opinions reversing a trial
court’s decision without using the word remand or otherwise
instructing the trial court on what to do next.43


__________________________________________________________
   41 Compare State v. Blake, 

, 

(reversing a restitution order), with State v. Sevastopoulos, 

, ¶¶ 20–21, 

 (remanding for the district court to enter
a new restitution order).
   42 See, e.g., State v. Ogden, 

, 

(directing the trial court on remand to ensure the restitution
calculation rested on non-speculative evidence); State v. Mooers,

, 

 (vacating a restitution order
and remanding to the trial court to enter an order to include only
certain pecuniary losses).
   43 See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n of Utah, 

 (Utah 1993); Cobb v. Snow (Cobb II), 

(Utah 1963).

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                          Cite as: 

                        Opinion of the Court

    ¶29 Blake’s appeal allows us to reiterate how, under our
precedent, we approach reversals without instructions. A reversal
of a trial court order invalidates that order but does not prohibit
further proceedings unless the reversing court expressly states
otherwise.44 In State v. Cobb (Cobb I), a defendant appealed his
conviction, and this court reversed the decision of the trial court.45
He then appealed a second time, asserting that a reversal meant he
was entitled to an “absolute discharge” of the matter.46 Our
decision in Cobb II declined to adopt that approach.47 Nevertheless,
Blake asserts that is the approach that should control this case: in
other words, that the remittitur after the reversal conferred
jurisdiction to the district court only to vacate the first restitution
order. But that is not the law.
    ¶30 Reversal usually requires further action by the trial court.48
Though an appellate court has authority to fully and finally dispose
of a matter, it “will only do so expressly, noting specifically that no
further action is required by the trial court.”49 “In the absence of
[an] express mandate, it is both necessary and proper to consider
the entire context of the prior decision to determine what further
proceedings the interests of justice require.”50
   B. Restitution Orders Are Unique and Are Required Parts of
      the Sentencing Process
   ¶31 The distinct characteristics of restitution are part of the
“entire context” the district court had to consider here. “Restitution
orders are a unique animal, existing at the convergence of the civil

__________________________________________________________
   44 Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 

, 

; Cobb II, 

 (“It is well established that
where the defendant has complained that errors vitiate the
judgment and it is nullified at his request, he cannot also claim that
there is a judgment which precludes further proceedings against
him.”).
   45 

 (Utah 1962).

   46 Cobb II, 

.

   47 

   48 Chase Manhattan Bank, 

; Cobb II, 

.

   49 Chase Manhattan Bank, 

.

   50 Cobb II, 

.



                                   13
                             STATE v. BLAKE
                        Opinion of the Court

and criminal worlds . . . .”51 While restitution is part of the criminal
sentencing process, a restitution order becomes a civil judgment,52
which removes it from the realm of double jeopardy and gives it a
special timeline for appeal, independent of the rest of a criminal
case.53
   ¶32 As part of the criminal sentencing process, restitution has
three purposes.54 One is remedial, to compensate the victim.55
Another is to rehabilitate the defendant.56 The third is to deter the
defendant (and others) from future illegal behavior.57
     ¶33 To serve the compensatory purpose, the restitution
proceeding aims to determine the victim’s pecuniary damages.58 It
is, by design, a somewhat informal proceeding. The trial courts are
required to determine the pecuniary damages based on the best
information available, but without the benefits of discovery that
exist in civil litigation.59 The rules of evidence, including
restrictions on the use of hearsay, do not apply at restitution
proceedings.60 A restitution order “may be based on
approximations” and “some degree of uncertainty,” as long as the
order is based on “reasonable assumptions or projections” with

__________________________________________________________
   51 State v. Mooers, 

, 

.

   52 UTAH CODE § 77-38a-401(1), (2) (2019); State v. Laycock, 

, 

.
   53 Monson v. Carver, 

 (Utah 1996) (establishing

that restitution orders are not subject to double jeopardy); Mooers,

, ¶¶ 13–17 (describing the special appeal deadlines for
restitution orders).
   54 Laycock, 

 (discussing the multiple purposes of

restitution).
   55 Monson, 928 P.2d at 1027–28 (evaluating the remedial purpose

of restitution).
   56 Laycock, 

.

   57 

   58 See UTAH CODE § 77-38a-302 (2019); Laycock, 

, ¶ 18

& n.1.
   59 See Laycock, 

.

   60 State v. Weeks, 

, 

.



                                   14
                          Cite as: 

                          Opinion of the Court

some indicia of reliability, rather than purely speculative or
ballpark figures.61
    ¶34 We have endorsed this limited evidentiary structure for
restitution in part because of the careful balancing trial courts
conduct at sentencing.62 We have also acknowledged that this
limited evidentiary structure is well suited for simple restitution
cases, where the victim’s losses are “simple and clear cut,” but that
the structure is less well suited to cases where there are difficult
issues of causation or a need to determine future damages.63
    ¶35 However tempting it may be to focus on the compensatory
purpose of restitution, we are unable to overlook its two
noncompensatory purposes—rehabilitation and deterrence. We
noted in State v. Laycock that “[r]estitution is an effective
rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to confront,
in concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.”64 We went on
to note that “the direct relation between the harm and the
punishment gives restitution a more precise deterrent effect than a
traditional fine.”65
    ¶36 In short, determining the compensation amount is only
one part of the restitution component of sentencing. 66 And
restitution is only one part of the trial court’s more complex
balancing process at sentencing.67


__________________________________________________________
   61 Ogden, 

, ¶¶ 52–53 (cleaned up).

   62 Weeks, 

 (“There is wisdom in not applying the

evidentiary rules to restitution hearings. Specifically, at the time of
sentencing, a judge balances a number of different considerations
and needs flexibility in issuing punishment. . . . The need for
imposing the same evidentiary strictures required in a full-blown
trial is therefore diminished because the sentencing judge may
have imposed the restitution amount in place of a greater fine or
incarceration term.”).
   63 Ogden, 

, ¶ 27 n.5.

   64 Laycock, 

 (cleaned up).

   65 

 (cleaned up).

   66 

   67 Id.; Weeks, 

.



                                    15
                            STATE v. BLAKE
                         Opinion of the Court

   C. A Second Restitution Order Was Both Timely and
      Necessary to Complete the Sentencing Process
    ¶37 Against that backdrop of the unique nature of
restitution—and its multiple purposes in the sentencing realm—we
evaluate the procedural posture of this case at the time the court of
appeals reversed the original restitution order. By statute, the
district court was required to order restitution to complete the
sentencing process—”in addition to any other sentence . . . the
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of
crime . . . .”68 “Shall” is presumed to indicate a mandatory act,69 and
no party asserts that presumption does not apply. Had the district
court declined to re-evaluate restitution here, where restitution was
requested, it would have risked an incomplete sentence, contrary
to that legislative mandate.
     ¶38 The district court concluded that once a decision is
reversed, it is as if that decision never existed and the parties are in
the same position as if that decision never occurred.70 Once the
district court’s restitution order was reversed, that court was
required to “proceed to a determination of the case . . . as if no such
previous decision by it had been rendered.”71 When the court of
appeals reversed the first restitution order, the district court was
left with a newly-unresolved motion by the State for restitution, as
if the first restitution order had never been entered. It was also left
with an incomplete sentence because the restitution component of
sentencing was no longer in effect. This leads us to consider Blake’s
assertion that the request for restitution after the first appeal was
untimely.
   ¶39 The State’s initial motion for restitution was timely filed
within the statutory one-year period following sentencing.72 Both

__________________________________________________________
   68 UTAH CODE § 77-38a-302(1) (2019).

   69 Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 

 (Utah 1983).
   70 Phebus v. Dunford, 

 (Utah 1948) (“A reversal

of a judgment or decision of a lower court . . . places the case in the
position it was before the lower court rendered that judgment or
decision . . . .”).
   71 

   72 See UTAH CODE § 77-38a-302(5)(d)(i) (2019).



                                   16
                         Cite as: 

                        Opinion of the Court

parties agree that “once a prosecuting entity submits a timely
request for restitution, the sentencing court maintains jurisdiction
until the timely restitution request is finally resolved.” With that
timely restitution request still pending—or perhaps more
accurately stated, reverted to a pending request after the court of
appeals’ decision—the State moved to amend the restitution order.
As noted above, the court needed to resolve that motion to
complete Blake’s sentence, and it appropriately held a second
hearing to do so. We find no error in the court’s decision to hold a
hearing and enter a new order.
IV. THE TESTIMONY AT THE SECOND RESTITUTION HEARING PROVIDED
    SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THE RESTITUTION AMOUNT
    ¶40 Blake also asserts the new restitution order was not
supported by substantial evidence. Unlike the previous three issues
that we reviewed for correctness, we review the record to
determine whether the clear weight of the evidence contradicts the
district court’s ruling.73 A district court abuses its discretion if “no
reasonable person would take the view adopted” by that court.74
    ¶41 Blake correctly states that the criminal conduct must
proximately cause the pecuniary damages ordered in restitution.75
He does not contest that firing a gun at the victim caused the
victim’s injuries. Instead, he disputes whether the evidence was
sufficient to show that the medical expenses were reasonable and
necessary to treat those injuries. He points in large part to civil tort
cases where expert testimony is used to establish medical expenses.
    ¶42 We have looked at the quantum of proof required and the
lower evidentiary standards for restitution cases in the past. A
restitution award must have a sufficient evidentiary basis, but it is
“by nature an inexact science.”76 Some degree of uncertainty in the
__________________________________________________________
   73 State v. Ogden, 

, ¶¶ 53–54, 

 (requiring

restitution expenses to be “firmly established” in the record); State
v. Murray, 

, 

 (requiring a party
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a restitution
order to “demonstrate that the clear weight of the evidence
contradicts the court’s ruling”).
   74 State v. Maestas, 

, 

 (cleaned up).

   75 Ogden, 

.

   76 Id. ¶ 53 (cleaned up).



                                  17
                           STATE v. BLAKE
                       Opinion of the Court

evidence can still sustain the amount of compensation due to a
victim, but purely speculative calculations or ballpark amounts are
insufficient.77
    ¶43 Here, the district court accepted into evidence the same
two-page document listing the medical expenses that it accepted at
the first restitution hearing, but this time that exhibit was
unredacted. It also accepted additional, more detailed records that
provided billing codes, provider information, and notes about the
various diagnoses and procedures. The court also accepted an
updated declaration from a UOVC witness regarding those
materials. Then, unlike in the first restitution hearing—which the
district court later characterized as a “quasi-hearing” rather than an
evidentiary hearing—it heard testimony from a UOVC
representative explaining the expenses listed in the exhibits. While
Blake asserts some of that testimony was insufficient, primarily
related to specific billing codes in the statements, the witness did
testify about the nature of care provided, the procedures, the
amounts billed for the victim’s medical care, discounts applied, and
his work confirming that the billing codes aligned with treatment
for the gunshot wounds.
   ¶44 After reviewing the hearing transcript and district court
findings, we conclude that the second restitution order is
supported by sufficient evidence.
                          CONCLUSION
    ¶45 We appreciate the challenges that arise when an appellate
court does not include express instructions about what is to follow
a reversal. But unless the appellate court expressly terminates a
matter, trial courts have the ability and expertise to evaluate the
context of the appellate opinion with the rest of the case and discern
what appropriate next steps follow. In the unique context of
restitution—which is required as part of sentencing—holding a
second restitution hearing in this case was the appropriate next
step.
   ¶46 The district court correctly concluded the doctrine of res
judicata did not apply within the same case. And it correctly held
that, in light of the fact that the court of appeals did not say
otherwise, the mandate rule did not prohibit it from addressing its
__________________________________________________________
   77 Id. ¶¶ 52–53 (cleaned up); see also State v. Weeks, 

, 

.

                                 18
                         Cite as: 

                        Opinion of the Court

previous error in the context of restitution. Once the first restitution
order was reversed, the district court faced an unresolved motion
for restitution. It correctly decided to hold a second restitution
hearing to complete its sentencing, and it entered an order
supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm the decision of the
district court.




                                  19