This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2025 UT 29
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JENNIFER LONG,
Petitioner,
v.
UTAH STATE BAR,
Respondent.
No. 20240737
Heard April 7, 2025
Filed August 7, 2025
On Petition for Review of the Utah State Bar’s Decision on
Attorney Applicant Application
Attorneys:
Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, Bountiful, for petitioner
Maribeth LeHoux, Emily Lee, Salt Lake City, for respondent
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE authored the opinion of the
Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE PETERSEN,
JUSTICE HAGEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Jennifer Long has taken the bar exam twelve times across
three jurisdictions. She has yet to achieve a passing score and now
wishes to take the test again. Our rules limit applicants to six
attempts unless they can show good cause why they should be
permitted to exceed that cap. The Utah State Bar denied Long’s
request to retake the exam, prompting her to seek review in this
Court. We agree that she has failed to demonstrate good cause and
deny her relief.
LONG v. UTAH STATE BAR
Opinion of the Court
BACKGROUND
¶2 Long was born without a right hand and has attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). With accommodations for
ADHD (additional time and an isolated or reduced-distraction
room during examinations), she earned a bachelor’s degree in 2001
and a Juris Doctor in 2004.
¶3 For a few years following her law school graduation, Long
took the bar exam each time it was offered, for a total of nine
attempts across three states—Utah, Missouri, and Kansas.
¶4 Long did not receive accommodations for her first six
attempts, in Utah and Missouri. She requested accommodations for
four of the six. But, for reasons not appearing in the record, Utah
and Missouri denied her requests. For the remaining two attempts,
Long did not request accommodations, later explaining that prior
denials had discouraged her from doing so.
¶5 Long did receive accommodations for her next three
attempts, all of which took place in Kansas. The accommodations
she received were typical for someone with ADHD: extra time and
a distraction-free environment. Long did not request any other
accommodations. In fact, she told the Kansas Bar that she did “not
need any special accommodations for [her] physical condition.”
¶6 Long did not attempt to take the exam again for fifteen
years. She then applied to take the July 2023 exam in Utah. The
Utah State Bar (the Bar) denied her request, explaining that she had
exceeded the six attempts permitted by rule to all applicants.
(Citing SUP. CT. R. PRO. PRAC. 14-711(f).) The Bar further informed
Long that she might be permitted to exceed that cap if she filed a
petition showing “good cause” to retake the test.
¶7 Long filed such a petition. In it, she argued, among other
things, that she had never previously asked for accommodations
for both her ADHD and her physical disability. For the July 2023
exam, she asked for double time, frequent breaks, a separate room,
and the ability to handwrite her responses to the essay portion. This
mélange of accommodations would, Long believed, provide her
with a fair opportunity to succeed on the exam. Long accepted
responsibility for her failure to request these accommodations
previously, but she maintained that she “should not be denied the
opportunity to sit for the bar exam merely because [she] did not
have the understanding of [her] disabilities” she had since come to
possess.
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Opinion for the Court
¶8 The Bar’s Admissions Committee granted Long’s petition
and gave her each accommodation she requested. Long, however,
did not pass.
¶9 Long petitioned to take the February 2024 exam with the
same accommodations. The Admissions Committee again granted
her request, but it “expressed hesitation about granting further
requests.” Long again did not log a passing score.
¶10 Long next requested permission to sit for the July 2024
exam. In her petition, she explained that she had experienced
“significant pain and swelling” in her hand during the February
2024 exam. She now believed that her ability to use her only hand
was “deteriorating over time and with overuse” and wished to
return to typing the written portions of the test.
¶11 This time, the Admissions Committee denied Long’s
request. The Committee expressed sympathy for Long’s situation
but stated that it did not agree that “establishing the need for
different accommodation [was] sufficient good cause to grant
[Long’s] petition,” especially since it had granted Long “each
accommodation [she] requested” for her previous two attempts.
¶12 Long appealed the Bar’s decision. A review panel of the
Admissions Committee affirmed the denial of her petition.
¶13 Long next appealed to this court. Before us, she argued
that she should receive an additional opportunity to take the exam
with accommodations because she would then have had the
opportunity to take six accommodated exams. Long contended that
since the rules permit every applicant to take the bar examination
six times, good cause existed for her request for a sixth
accommodated administration.
¶14 After oral argument, this court notified the parties, in an
order, that a majority of the court concluded that Long had
established good cause to be permitted to take the bar exam for a
twelfth, and sixth accommodated, time.
¶15 Later in the day after the order issued, Long’s counsel sent
the court a letter. That letter recounted that “[u]pon contacting Ms.
Long to inform her” of the court’s order, Long “informed counsel
that she did not pass the Missouri bar exam that she took in
February 2025.” The letter also noted that Long received
accommodations and was permitted to type the essay portion. This
was the first time the court learned that Long had already taken the
bar for a twelfth time, including a sixth time with accommodations.
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LONG v. UTAH STATE BAR
Opinion of the Court
Counsel acknowledged that the “number of times that Ms. Long
has received accommodated attempts was key to counsel’s
argument.” Counsel predicted, accurately, that “this information
may affect the Court’s determination about whether Ms. Long has
shown good cause to take the Utah Bar again.”
¶16 In light of the new information, the court rescinded its
order and the instruction that Long be permitted another
opportunity to take the bar exam. The court notified the parties that
it would reconference on the case.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶17 Long asks us to review the Admissions Committee’s
denial of her petition and to permit her to retake the bar exam. The
Utah Constitution “empower[s] [us] to govern the practice of law
in Utah, including the admission to practice.” Spencer v. Utah State
Bar, 2012 UT 92, ¶ 7,
293 P.3d 360 (cleaned up) (discussing article
VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution). On review of the Bar’s
admissions decisions, we have “generally chosen to indulge some
deference to [its] findings and judgments.”
Id. (cleaned up). But
because the ultimate responsibility to oversee the practice of law is
ours, we retain discretion to “exercise judgment independent of the
Bar whenever we deem it appropriate.”
Id. (cleaned up). Below, we
clarify this standard of review and explain why we choose to
exercise our own judgment in this case.
ANALYSIS
¶18 In briefing and at oral argument, Long advanced several
reasons why she should be permitted to retake the bar exam. By her
own description, her “key” argument was that she should be
afforded six accommodated attempts to “put her on an even
playing field with other applicants.” She also argued that her
disabilities and her understanding of the accommodations her
disabilities require largely fall outside of her control.
¶19 Although Long’s primary argument was not without merit
when made, it fails when we take into account Long’s most recent
attempt to pass the bar exam. In resting our decision on that
attempt, which postdated the Bar’s petition and appeals process,
our analysis stands on grounds independent of the Bar’s. To
explain the reason for that departure, we first review and clarify
the applicable standard of review. We then turn to Long’s
arguments.
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Opinion for the Court
¶20 As we survey our jurisprudence, it becomes apparent that
we have been less than clear about the standard of review that
applies to appeals such as Long’s. We have established that we do
not owe the Bar’s findings or judgments deference as a matter of
obligation or constitutional structure—as we might owe those of an
administrative agency or trial court. See In re Admission of Thorne,
635 P.2d 22, 23 (Utah 1981) (per curiam). This anchors our repeated
pronouncement that “we may exercise judgment independent of
the Bar whenever we deem it appropriate.” See Spencer v. Utah State
Bar,
2012 UT 92, ¶ 7,
293 P.3d 360 (cleaned up); see also McBride v.
Utah State Bar,
2010 UT 60, ¶ 12,
242 P.3d 769; In re Arnovick,
2002
UT 71, ¶ 5,
52 P.3d 1246.
¶21 And yet we have also stated that we “generally” choose to
“indulge some deference to the Bar’s findings and judgments.” See
Spencer, 2012 UT 92, ¶ 7 (cleaned up); McBride,
2010 UT 60, ¶ 12
(cleaned up); see also In re Arnovick,
2002 UT 71, ¶ 5. We often recite
these two declarations side by side, without elaborating the
circumstances under which we will choose to exercise our
independent judgment and those under which we will choose to
defer. See Spencer,
2012 UT 92, ¶ 7; see also McBride,
2010 UT 60, ¶ 12.
This case does not require us to discuss every single type of appeal
that might arise from a decision the Bar makes using the authority
we have delegated to it. But we lay out a few general principles to
explain why we choose to exercise judgment independent of the
Bar’s in this case.
¶22 Our present iteration of the standard of review for appeals
of Bar decisions dates back to a 1981 case, In re Thorne, 635 P.2d 22.
In that case, we were asked to admit Thorne to practice because of
irregularities in the administration of the bar exam, which he
argued had caused him to fail. See
id. at 22–24. Thorne asked this
court to re-grade his test responses.
Id. We, not surprisingly, did
not jump at the chance. 1 See
id. at 23.
¶23 We first noted that the Bar functions “in a sense as an arm
of the Court.” Id. The Bar acts with delegated authority to carry out
our constitutional responsibility to “govern the practice of law,
__________________________________________________________
1 It feels appropriate to publicly declare our immense gratitude
to the volunteers who take time out of their busy lives and practices
to grade the bar exam. We are often amazed at the willingness of so
many to dedicate their time and energy to the betterment of our
profession, and we are never ungrateful.
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LONG v. UTAH STATE BAR
Opinion of the Court
including admission to practice law.” UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
Because the authority the Bar exercises is ultimately our own, our
review of its judgments “is not necessarily on exactly the same
footing as the review of a judgment of a trial court, nor an
administrative agency,” and we “exercise [our] judgment
independent of that of the Bar” when we deem it appropriate. In re
Thorne, 635 P.2d at 23. Nevertheless, we choose to “repose some
confidence and trust in [the Bar’s] actions by indulging some
deference to its findings and judgments.”
Id.
¶24 We offered two reasons why we should afford the Bar
some deference. See id. We first explained that it is “neither practical
nor desirable for this Court to devote its time and energies in the
re-grading of examination papers.”
Id. This reason was somewhat
particular to Thorne’s facts. But, stated at a higher level of
abstraction, it retains a broader relevance: some decisions we ask
the Bar to make require application of specialized knowledge to a
high volume of material. Those tasks, especially at scale, are not
particularly suited to this court’s de novo review. We next
explained that we deputized the Bar for good reason—because we
trust that it will capably carry out the responsibilities assigned to it.
See
id.
¶25 With these principles in mind, Thorne announced a
standard of review for “controversies such as that involved here”:
“the Court should not disturb what the [Bar] has done unless the
petitioner clearly demonstrates that he has been treated in an
unfair, unreasonable or arbitrary manner.”
Id. (emphasis added).
We repeated this standard in subsequent cases without explaining
why they came close enough to Thorne’s facts to warrant
application of Thorne’s standard. See, e.g., Spencer,
2012 UT 92, ¶ 7;
McBride,
2010 UT 60, ¶ 12.
¶26 In re Arnovick extended the Thorne standard to “the actions
of the Bar and the Bar examination process” generally. 2002 UT 71,
¶ 5. Taken at face value, this language would remove any room for
us to exercise our independent judgment, rendering nugatory the
constitutional principles Thorne described. But because Arnovick
itself invoked these constitutional principles and dealt with a
similar scenario to Thorne’s (a fact-intensive challenge to a specific
exam administration), we assume it did not mean to subject all
“actions of the Bar” to this deferential standard of review. See id.
¶¶ 2, 5–6. Instead, we read Arnovick to have left open the possibility
that the Thorne standard does not always apply to the review of Bar
decisions. The Thorne standard is best thought of as “a general
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Opinion for the Court
proposition,” from which we “reserve the right” to depart where
circumstances warrant. Cf. In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah
1990) (characterizing an older standard of review for attorney
discipline cases).
¶27 This case presents a scenario where it serves no purpose to
defer to the Bar’s reasoning: a material event has intervened
between the Bar’s process and the decision of this court. This is the
sort of case where our unique structural relationship to the Bar
enables us to take note of evidence that might escape analysis or
require a remand to a lower body in another context. When we hear
an appeal from a district court, our review is generally limited to
the record of proceedings before that body. See Montes v. Nat’l Buick
GMC, Inc., 2024 UT 42, ¶ 39 n.8,
562 P.3d 688 (“We do not consider
documents that fall outside the appellate record, no matter how
much they might pique our interest.”). But Bar proceedings do not
necessarily demand the same treatment.
¶28 Long’s dilatorily disclosed February 2025 attempt at the
Missouri exam changed our view of this case. Before we learned of
it, a majority of the court granted Long’s petition because we
agreed that she deserved six accommodated attempts to be put on
the same playing field as applicants without disabilities. But Long
has been afforded a sixth accommodated opportunity. This
eliminates the factual premise of her primary argument before us
and robs it of the persuasive value it once had.
¶29 Long’s remaining argument is equally unpersuasive in
light of the new Missouri attempt. We are genuinely sympathetic
to the challenges Long faces when taking the bar exam and her
evolving understanding of the accommodations that might assist
her. But we must note that Long has received precisely the
accommodations she requested for each of her six accommodated
attempts. Indeed, Missouri granted Long the specific change in
accommodations Long requested of our Bar—a return to typed
exams. We admire Long’s tenacity, but we cannot conclude, on the
briefing before us, that she has demonstrated the good cause our
rule requires to again retake the exam.
CONCLUSION
¶30 Long argues that she has shown good cause to exceed our
limit of six attempts at the bar exam. In light of developments
subsequent to the Bar’s decision, we affirm its denial of Long’s
petition.
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