This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2025 UT 45
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
JAMISON SMITH,
Appellant.
No. 20230442
Heard April 9, 2025
Filed October 23, 2025
On Appeal of Interlocutory Order
Third District Court, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Vernice S. Trease
No. 221902900
Attorneys:
Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Michael Palumbo, Asst. Solic. Gen.,
Salt Lake City, for appellee
Ann M. Taliaferro, Salt Lake City, for appellant
JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,
JUSTICE HAGEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.
JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 C.R. alleges that Defendant Jamison Smith sexually abused
her between 1988 and 1990. In 2022, the State charged Smith with
two counts of sexual abuse of a child based on C.R.’s allegations.
During the investigation of these charges, C.R. told a detective that
when she was in seventh grade, she was “pulled out of class” and
“asked about the sexual abuse.”
STATE v. SMITH
Opinion of the Court
¶2 Smith moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the
statute of limitations had run. His argument turned on whether
C.R.’s communication about the abuse in seventh grade constitutes
a “report of the offense to law enforcement officials” under the
relevant statute of limitations. UTAH CODE § 76-1-303 (1983).
¶3 The district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine
the matter, but it found that the facts were disputed and reserved
the issue for the jury at trial. However, Utah Code section 76-1-306
requires statute of limitations issues in criminal cases to be
determined by “the judge” by a preponderance of the evidence.
¶4 Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for
the court to complete the section 76-1-306 analysis.
BACKGROUND
¶5 In 2021, Smith’s daughter, G.R., reported to West Jordan
Police that Smith had been abusing her since 2012, when she was
twelve or thirteen. After she disclosed the alleged abuse, two of
Smith’s sisters, H.R. and C.R., reported that Smith had similarly
abused them while they were growing up. The West Valley City
Police Department handled the investigation of the sisters’ claims.
During the investigation, Detective Carolyn Franco interviewed
C.R. over Zoom, and C.R. stated that Smith had abused her from
when she was about ten years old until she was about twelve years
old. This would have been between the years of 1988 and 1990.
During the interview, C.R. said that she “remember[ed] being
pulled out of class when she was in the 7th grade and being asked
about the sexual abuse.” C.R. was “in seventh grade in roughly
1988.”
¶6 On March 25, 2022, the State charged Smith with thirtythree felony counts based on the sexual abuse claims, including two
counts of sexual abuse of a child related to C.R. The Information
alleged that the two offenses against C.R. took place “on or between
November 27, 1988 and December 31, 1990.” Smith filed several
pretrial motions, including a motion to dismiss the charges related
to C.R.—counts 20 and 21—on statute of limitations grounds.
Statutory History
¶7 We first provide a chronology of the relevant statutes of
limitations that have been in place since Smith’s alleged abuse of
C.R. Before 1983, the Utah Criminal Code did not specifically
address sexual offenses against children. So “sexual crimes against
children had to be charged under the general statutory crimes of
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rape, sodomy, or sexual abuse” and “were covered by the four-year
catchall statute of limitations . . . applicable to all felonies that were
not otherwise covered by a crime-specific limitations period.” State
v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, ¶ 13,
37 P.3d 1103 (cleaned up).
¶8 In 1983, the legislature defined the crime of “sexual abuse
of a child” and enacted a statute of limitations specific to that
offense. UTAH CODE §§ 76-1-303(c), 76-5-404.1 (1983). The statute
required a prosecution of sexual abuse of a child to be commenced
within one year of a “report of the offense to law enforcement
officials, so long as no more than eight years elapsed since the
alleged commission of the offense.” Id. § 76-1-303(c) (1983). This
was the statute of limitations in place at the time of Smith’s alleged
abuse of C.R.
¶9 But the statute of limitations has changed since then. In
1991, the legislature amended section 76-1-303 and replaced the
existing timelines with a limitations period permitting prosecution
of sexual abuse of a child any time “within four years after the
report of the offense to a law enforcement agency.” Id. § 76–1–
303(3) (1991). Then, in 2008, the legislature repealed the limitations
period entirely, allowing this offense to be prosecuted “at any
time.” Id. § 76-1-301(14) (2008). This remains the state of the law
today. Id. § 76-1-301(2)(n) (2025).
Pretrial Motions
¶10 Before trial, Smith moved to dismiss the two counts of
sexual abuse of a child involving C.R. (counts 20 and 21), arguing
that the statute of limitations had expired. Smith contended that
when C.R. was taken out of class in seventh grade and asked about
the abuse, it constituted a “report of the offense to law enforcement
officials.” UTAH CODE § 76-1-303(c) (1983). And because the statute
of limitations in place at the time required any prosecution of the
offenses she reported to commence within one year, Smith argued
that the statute of limitations had expired in 1989, and consequently
the longer limitations period enacted in 1991 could not resuscitate
the charges.
¶11 The State opposed Smith’s motion. It argued that C.R.’s
communication about the abuse in seventh grade was not a “report
of the offense to law enforcement officials.” Id. Consequently, the
State reasoned that in the absence of any such report, the eight-year
limitations period applied at the outset. See id. Then, it asserted that
because the statute of limitations would not have run before the
limitations period was enlarged in 1991, C.R.’s claims would have
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Opinion of the Court
been subject to the 1991 amendment’s longer limitation period
permitting prosecution any time within four years after a report to
law enforcement. And finally, the State contended that C.R. did not
trigger the running of the limitations period by reporting her claim
at any point before the 2008 amendment abolished the statute of
limitations entirely. Thus, by the State’s calculations, the statute of
limitations on C.R.’s claims had not expired when the State brought
these charges.
Pretrial Hearings
¶12 The district court held a hearing on Smith’s motion to
dismiss. It first identified two sources of law that it viewed as
controlling the statute of limitations issue: State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d
194 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and Utah Code section 76-1-306.
¶13 Decided by the court of appeals in 1989, State v. Pierce held
that the State “bears the burden of proving that a criminal action is
not barred by the statute of limitations, whenever that issue is
properly raised.” 782 P.2d at 196. And it concluded the State’s
burden of proof was “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. The Pierce
court contemplated that the district court could hold an evidentiary
hearing on the matter if necessary, and it directed district courts to
rule on statute of limitations questions “as a matter of law” if “the
evidence is sufficiently clear.”
Id. But it instructed that if “it cannot
be said that as a matter of law the statutory period has run, the issue
is a question of fact” that the district court should submit to the
jury.
Id. (cleaned up).
¶14 In 1998, nine years after Pierce was published, the
legislature enacted section 76-1-306. It provides: “When an issue
concerning the statute of limitations is raised, the judge shall
determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the
prosecution is barred by the limitations in this part.” UTAH CODE
§ 76-1-306. The district court read section 76-1-306 as narrowly
superseding Pierce as to the evidentiary burden—changing it from
“beyond a reasonable doubt” to “a preponderance of the
evidence.” But otherwise, it understood Pierce to be controlling.
¶15 At the pretrial hearing, the court concluded that Smith had
“raised” a statute of limitations issue by offering the probable cause
affidavit as evidence and relying on the following statement within
it: “C.R. also explained that she also remembers being pulled out of
class when she was in 7th grade and being asked about the sexual
abuse.” The court explained that since Smith had raised the issue,
the State would need “to put on something to satisfy the
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preponderance of the evidence requirement” in order to survive
dismissal.
¶16 The State called Detective Franco as its only witness.
Detective Franco worked for the West Valley City Police
Department and had been assigned to investigate C.R.’s case. She
testified that as part of her investigation, she contacted the Utah
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) to find out whether
it had any record of a report being made in relation to C.R. around
the time she was in seventh grade. DCFS told her that “they didn’t
have record of a report ever being made.” But DCFS also told her
that they do not keep records that old; so even if a report was made
at the time, it would no longer be in their system. Detective Franco
testified that she searched local law enforcement records but found
no report. However, she added that she was unsure whether
records of that age would still be retained.
¶17 When asked about her interview with C.R., Detective
Franco stated, “From what I recall, she never told me who she
spoke to, but she did tell me she felt ashamed, and she told me that
she didn’t remember lying about what was happening.”
¶18 After Detective Franco’s testimony, Smith argued that the
State had failed to meet its burden to prove that the statute of
limitations had not expired. He urged the court to dismiss the
charges, arguing that: “If nobody can actually remember now, then
that means that they didn’t bear their -- their burden . . . they have
to prove that it wasn’t reported to -- to law enforcement. I don’t
have to prove that it was.”
¶19 But the district court declined to dismiss the case. Citing
Pierce, it explained that even if the State’s evidence was insufficient
for the court to conclude as a matter of law that the prosecution was
not time-barred, the result would not be dismissal but sending the
issue to the jury at trial.
¶20 Grappling with the difficulty of proving a negative—that
C.R. did not make a report to law enforcement in the seventh
grade—the State requested a continuance to present additional
evidence. The district court granted the continuance over Smith’s
objection.
First Continued Hearing
¶21 At the continued hearing, the State moved to admit a letter
from West Valley City’s records keeper. But the defense objected
that the letter was hearsay and that the State had failed to lay a
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STATE v. SMITH
Opinion of the Court
proper foundation. The court sustained the objections. With no
other evidence or witnesses to put on that day, the State requested
another continuance, emphasizing again the difficulty inherent in
attempting to prove a negative: “We’re trying to show an absence
of a record.” The district court granted the State’s request for a
continuance “one more time.”
Second Continued Hearing
¶22 At the second continued hearing, the State called Ashley
LeClaire, the records director for the West Valley City Police
Department. LeClaire testified that she assisted detectives in
searching for records concerning Smith or C.R. In sum, she testified
that records from the relevant period were not digitized and were
stored on aging microfiche, making them difficult to access and
requiring a search that “could take months.”
¶23 Smith then called two witnesses—Scott Miller and
Christopher Bertram, both former law enforcement officers with
experience investigating juvenile cases. Miller testified that “if a
student was pulled out of class, they would likely be sequestered
in an administrative office by the [] principal or assistant principal
and then held there until some type of investigation could occur.”
He clarified that “standard operating procedure at that time” was
for the investigation to be conducted by a law enforcement officer.
He also testified that investigators would usually take handwritten
notes in a small notebook, and that it was “not uncommon” for a
case that was deemed a “no case” to not be documented. Thus, he
felt it was possible that, even if C.R. reported the alleged abuse, the
record may have never made it into the official recording system.
¶24 Bertram, who worked as an officer in a “school unit” from
1992 to 1995, confirmed that in school units “not everything was
recorded.” He explained that “there were items that as an
investigator, and especially a school resource officer . . . that you
would take information in but not necessarily write a sheriff’s office
report.” He indicated this was especially the case if you thought the
information “didn’t rise to the level of a criminal [sic] that would
be able to be prosecuted.”
¶25 After Smith’s witnesses finished testifying, the State
sought to introduce testimony from C.R. in rebuttal. The State
proffered that C.R. would testify that when she was pulled out of
class in seventh grade, “she spoke to two individuals, who seemed
like child service employees” and that “there was nothing about
them that made her believe they were police of any kind.” Smith
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objected to the proffer, arguing that C.R.’s testimony was
inappropriate as rebuttal evidence. The court agreed and excluded
C.R.’s testimony.
¶26 The court then orally ruled on Smith’s motion to dismiss.
It first reiterated that it was operating under the framework set out
by State v. Pierce:
[It] is not an all or nothing . . . [Pierce] also provides
that if the evidence is not sufficiently clear on the
issue, and the issue cannot be resolved as a matter of
law, then the issue should be presented or the
question should be presented to the trier of fact.
The court then explained that there was still an open “question of
fact as to whether or not, when C.R. was pulled out of her class in
seventh grade, that there was an actual report made to law
enforcement.” And because there was “still a disputed issue as to
whether a report was made,” the court concluded that “the issue
cannot be resolved as a matter of law and, therefore, is an issue or
a question of fact for the jury to decide.”
¶27 The court later incorporated this oral ruling into a written
order with findings of fact and conclusions of law. There, the court
stated that “due to the lack of proper and reliable record keeping
by law enforcement during the relevant period, it cannot be said as
a matter of law that the statute has run or not run. Therefore, this
issue is a question of fact that should be determined by the jury.”
The district court denied Smith’s motion to dismiss, leaving the
issue for the jury to decide at trial.
¶28 Smith petitioned for interlocutory review, to which the
State stipulated. We granted the petition. We have jurisdiction
under Utah Code subsection 78A-3-102(3)(h).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶29 We review questions of statutory interpretation for
correctness, affording no deference to the district court’s legal
conclusions. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50,
¶ 12,
267 P.3d 863. We similarly review a district court’s
interpretation of caselaw for correctness. Univ. of Utah v. Tullis,
2025
UT 17, ¶ 13,
570 P.3d 367.
ANALYSIS
¶30 The parties both agree that it was error for the district court
to leave the statute of limitations question for the jury rather than
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Opinion of the Court
resolving the issue itself. They disagree, however, about what the
court should have done and how we should resolve the statute of
limitations issue on appeal.
¶31 Smith argues that the State failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the two counts related to C.R.
are not barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, Smith
contends that the prosecution must be dismissed.
¶32 On the other hand, the State argues that we should clarify
the applicable law and remand for the district court to apply the
correct legal standard.
¶33 We agree with the parties that the district court erred in
reserving the statute of limitations question for the jury instead of
deciding it. The district court followed guidance from State v. Pierce
that has been superseded by statute. 782 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). Section 76-1-306 requires a district court to act as a
factfinder, and to determine by a preponderance of the evidence
whether a prosecution is time-barred as a matter of fact and law.
But, applying Pierce, the district court concluded it could rule on
the statute of limitations question only if the evidence was clear
enough to allow it to decide the issue as a matter of law. This was
incorrect.
¶34 However, we decline Smith’s invitation to make a final
determination on appeal about whether the State met its burden.
The district court did not resolve disputes of fact nor make the
findings necessary to answer that question, as section 306 requires.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the district court to make
additional factual findings as necessary and apply the correct legal
standard. We leave to the district court’s discretion whether to take
additional evidence.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RESERVED THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS ISSUE FOR THE JURY INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE ISSUE
ITSELF
¶35 We begin our analysis by looking to the controlling statute.
Section 76-1-306 of the criminal code states: “When an issue
concerning the statute of limitations is raised, the judge shall
determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the
prosecution is barred by the limitations in this part.”
¶36 Thus, section 306 is implicated in a criminal case when “an
issue concerning the statute of limitations is raised.” UTAH CODE
§ 76-1-306. It is implicit in this language that a district court must
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determine whether a party—presumably the defendant, although
this provision is written in the passive voice—has sufficiently
“raised” an issue concerning the statute of limitations.
¶37 If so, section 306 requires “the judge” to decide whether
the prosecution is barred by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus,
the district court is tasked with deciding whether the statute of
limitations has run both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law.
¶38 In addition to this statute, the district court relied on
precedent from the court of appeals addressing how trial courts
should decide statute of limitations disputes in criminal cases. See
State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). But
importantly, Pierce pre-dated section 76–1–306. And when section
306 was enacted, it superseded Pierce to the extent that Pierce
conflicted with the statute. See Patterson v. Patterson,
2011 UT 68,
¶ 37,
266 P.3d 828.
¶39 Thus, section 306 controls when an issue concerning the
statute of limitations is raised in a criminal case. Judicial precedent
on the topic may also apply, as long as it is not in conflict with
section 306.
A. Smith Raised an Issue Concerning the Statute of Limitations
¶40 Here, the district court concluded that Smith had
sufficiently “raised an issue concerning the statute of limitations by
presenting the statement of C.R. to Det[ective] Franco that when
she was in seventh grade she was taken out of class and asked
about sexual abuse.” The State does not contest, for purposes of this
appeal, that this evidence raised a statute of limitations issue.1
Because there is no dispute before us on that point, we do not
address it further. We also observe that the district court and the
parties appear to assume that if the seventh-grade communication
is deemed to be a report to law enforcement, the timing of the
alleged offense and the timing of C.R.’s report are such that the
statute of limitations would have run by the end of 1989.
Accordingly, we make this assumption for purposes of this appeal.
__________________________________________________________
1 We note that section 306 does not define what it means to
“raise” a statute of limitations issue. However, the State has
assumed, for purposes of this appeal, that Smith has done enough
to raise the issue here. So there is no dispute about the precise
meaning of the term “raise” before us.
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Opinion of the Court
B. Section 306 Required the District Court to Decide the
Statute of Limitations Issue by a Preponderance of the
Evidence
¶41 Because the district court concluded that Smith had
sufficiently raised a statute of limitations issue, section 306 required
the district court to decide whether the prosecution was time-barred by a preponderance of the evidence.
¶42 To do this, a court must first identify the applicable statute
of limitations for the offense. Both parties agree that we begin with
the statute of limitations in effect at the time of the alleged criminal
conduct. See State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, ¶ 18,
37 P.3d 1103. Here, the
Information alleges that Smith sexually abused C.R. “on or between
November 27, 1988 and December 31, 1990.” See UTAH CODE § 76-
5-404.1(2). And as discussed, the applicable statute of limitations at
the time required a prosecution of sexual abuse of a child to
commence within one year after “the report of the offense to law
enforcement officials,” as long as no more than eight years had
elapsed from the time of the alleged offense. UTAH CODE § 76–1–
303 (1983).
¶43 Accordingly, if C.R. did not report the alleged sexual abuse
to law enforcement officials in the seventh grade—and assuming
that C.R. did not report the sexual abuse until 2021 in connection
with this case—the statute of limitations would not have expired
before the State charged Smith with counts 20 and 21. With no
report, the initial statute of limitations was eight years—which
would have expired sometime between November 27, 1996, and
December 31, 1998, depending on when the alleged abuse took
place. See supra ¶¶ 7–9; UTAH CODE § 76-1-303 (1983). And because
the limitations period would not have expired before the
subsequent enlargements of the statute of limitations for sexual
abuse of a child in 1991 and 2008, those enlargements would have
applied to the charges here. See supra ¶ 9. “A statutory amendment
enlarging a statute of limitations will extend the limitations period
applicable to a crime already committed . . . if the amendment
becomes effective before the previously applicable statute of
limitations has run.” State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, ¶ 20,
108 P.3d 710
(cleaned up). Thus, in 1991, the applicable statute of limitations
would have been extended to allow prosecution “within four years
after the report of the offense to a law enforcement agency.” UTAH
CODE § 76-1-303 (1991); see supra ¶ 9. And in 2008, the applicable
limitations period would have been eliminated, allowing this
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prosecution to be “commenced at any time.” UTAH CODE § 76-1-
301(14) (2008); see supra ¶ 9.
¶44 On the other hand, if C.R. made a communication in
seventh grade that is deemed to be a “report of the offense to law
enforcement officials,” UTAH CODE § 76–1–303 (1983), then the
limitations period would have run one year later, in 1989, see supra
¶ 40. And neither the 1991 amendment nor the 2008 amendment
would have had any effect because “no subsequent amendment of
a statute that enlarges a limitations period can resurrect the State’s
ability to prosecute a crime already barred because of the running
of the statute of limitations.” Lusk, 2001 UT 102, ¶ 26.
¶45 Thus, while the ultimate question before the district court
was whether counts 20 and 21 were time-barred, the answer to that
question depended on whether C.R.’s recollection of being “pulled
out of class” and “asked about the sexual abuse” in “roughly 1988”
was a “report of the offense to law enforcement officials.” And
section 306 establishes that the statute of limitations issue must be
determined (1) by “the judge” and (2) by a “preponderance of the
evidence.”2
¶46 Although the district court did apply parts of section 306,
it did not resolve the question of whether C.R. made a report to law
enforcement in the seventh grade, and it did not make an ultimate
determination as to whether counts 20 and 21 were time-barred.
This was because, in addition to section 306, the district court also
relied upon Pierce.
¶47 As discussed, see supra ¶ 13, in that case the court of
appeals held that the State has the burden to prove that the
prosecution is not time-barred “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pierce,
782 P.2d at 196. It further instructed that “a trial court has the
discretion to consider evidence concerning [the] running of a
statute of limitations in pre-trial proceedings,” and if “the evidence
is sufficiently clear, the issue may be resolved as a matter of law.”
Id. But if “it cannot be said that as a matter of law the statutory
__________________________________________________________
2 Appellate precedent prior to the enactment of section 76-1-306
placed the burden of proof on the State. See State v. Pierce,
782 P.2d
194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that “the State bears the
burden of proving that a criminal action is not barred by the statute
of limitations, whenever that issue is properly raised”). That
caselaw has not been superseded because section 76-1-306 does not
address which party bears the burden of proof.
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period has run, the issue is a question of fact for the trier of fact.”
Id. (cleaned up).
¶48 The district court recognized that some of Pierce’s
guidance had been superseded by section 306. For example, it
applied the preponderance standard from section 306 instead of the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard identified in Pierce.
¶49 But it did not recognize that Pierce’s procedure allowing
for statute of limitations questions to be sent to the jury, id.,
conflicted with section 306’s directive that the issue must be
decided by “the judge,” UTAH CODE § 76-1-306. Consequently, on
this point, section 306 controls and mandates that the judge must
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the
prosecution is barred, as a matter of fact and law.
¶50 Accordingly, the district court erred in reserving the issue
of the statute of limitations for the jury.
II. A REMAND TO APPLY SECTION 306 IS APPROPRIATE
¶51 While the parties agree that the district court should have
decided whether the prosecution of counts 20 and 21 was time-barred, they disagree about the consequences of this error.
¶52 Smith urges us to remand the case with instructions for the
district court to dismiss counts 20 and 21. He argues that it was the
State’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
prosecution of these charges was not barred. And according to
Smith, the district court’s conclusion that “it cannot be said as a
matter of law, that the statute has run or not run,” equates to the
court determining that the State did not meet its burden.
Consequently, Smith argues that the district court erred in not
dismissing the counts at that point.
¶53 The State disagrees. It asks us to remand the case to the
district court with instructions to apply section 306. We agree that
this is the proper course.
¶54 The district court’s ruling does not equate to a
determination that the State failed to meet its burden of proof.
Rather, it is the result of the court following Pierce’s nowsuperseded guidance that a court could resolve a statute of
limitations issue in a criminal case only if the evidence was
“sufficiently clear” and the issue could be decided “as a matter of
law.” State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Following these instructions, the district court ended its inquiry
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when it determined that there were disputes of material fact. And
rather than resolving these disputes, the court concluded that they
prevented it from resolving whether C.R. had made a report to a
law enforcement official. Thus, in this posture, the district court’s
conclusion that it could not determine as a matter of law whether
the limitations period had run does not mean that the State failed
to prove by a preponderance that the charges were not time-barred.
It just means that the court followed Pierce and therefore did not
complete the analysis that section 306 requires.
¶55 Section 306 contemplates that the district court will act not
only as a judge, but also as a factfinder. Disputes of material fact do
not end the court’s inquiry. Rather, the court must find any facts
necessary to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence,
whether the charges are time-barred.
¶56 Accordingly, the proper course is not dismissal of the
charges, but a remand to the district court with instructions to
apply section 306 and determine whether the charges are time-barred by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith argues that the
State should not be permitted to provide the court with any
additional evidence on remand. We leave this decision to the
discretion of the district court.
CONCLUSION
¶57 When a party raises an issue concerning the statute of
limitations in a criminal case, section 76-1-306 controls. And that
provision requires the district court to determine, as a matter of fact
and law, whether the charges are time-barred by a preponderance
of the evidence. We reverse and remand for the district court to
complete that determination.
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