This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2025 UT 48
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOFFER ALAN HARRIS,
Appellant.
No. 20250138
Heard July 16, 2025
Filed October 30, 2025
On Direct Appeal
First District Court, Logan
The Honorable Brian G. Cannell
No. 231101518
Attorneys:
David Drake, Midvale, for appellant
Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Hwa Sung Doucette, Asst. Solic. Gen.,
Salt Lake City, for appellee
JUSTICE HAGEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE PETERSEN and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored a dissenting opinion, in which
JUDGE BLANCH joined.
Due to his pending retirement, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE
does not participate herein; DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
JAMES T. BLANCH sat.
STATE v. HARRIS
Opinion of the Court
JUSTICE HAGEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Christoffer Alan Harris is currently detained without bail
while he awaits trial on charges of sexual assault involving a minor.
Shortly after his arrest, Harris filed a motion for pretrial release.
The district court denied the motion, finding that there was
substantial evidence to support the charges and that Harris posed
both a danger and a flight risk. Harris chose not to appeal that
decision.
¶2 Several months later, Harris moved to modify the pretrial
order, arguing that evidence had come to light that weakened the
State’s case and that this development constituted a material
change in circumstances. The court found that there was no
material change in circumstances and denied the motion to modify,
thereby allowing Harris’s detention to continue. Harris appealed
from the denial of his motion to modify. But the State argues that
we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal because a criminal
defendant has no right to an immediate appeal from the denial of a
motion to modify.
¶3 By statute, a criminal defendant has the right to an
immediate, expedited appeal from “a pretrial status order that
orders the individual be detained during the time the individual
awaits trial or other resolution of criminal charges.” UTAH CODE
§ 77-20-209. We hold that this statute applies to an order denying a
motion for pretrial release as well as an order granting a motion to
modify that results in ordering the defendant be detained. But it
does not apply to the denial of a motion to modify an existing order
of detention because such a ruling is not “a pretrial status order that
orders the individual be detained.”
¶4 Because Harris did not appeal the ruling that ordered his
detention, he lost his opportunity to an expedited appeal as of right.
The denial of a motion to modify a pretrial order, like most other
interlocutory rulings, can still be appealed if an appellate court
exercises its discretion to grant interlocutory review.1 But because
Harris did not petition for interlocutory review of the modification
__________________________________________________________
1 Certain nonfinal rulings may be subject to our writ authority
as well, see UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B; UTAH R. APP. P. 19, but neither party
suggests that a writ would be appropriate here and no petition for
a writ was filed.
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Opinion of the Court
ruling within the time allowed by statute, he missed out on that
opportunity as well. We are left with no basis on which to exercise
jurisdiction over this appeal and must therefore dismiss.
BACKGROUND2
¶5 In December 2023, law enforcement received a report that
seventeen-year-old Claire3 was missing without her cellphone or a
change of clothes. During the month leading up to her
disappearance, Claire sent over a thousand texts to an unknown
number. She also had a conversation over her family’s gaming
device in which she and another player discussed the possibility of
“liv[ing] together or be[ing] together.” Police traced both the
unknown number and the other player’s account to Christoffer
Alan Harris, a thirty-nine-year-old man.
¶6 Just over a week later, police located and apprehended
Harris and Claire together in rural Oregon. While still in Oregon,
Claire received a medical exam and participated in several
interviews including one with the Oregon Children’s Justice
Center. Claire said that Harris had visited her in Utah around the
end of October and that “sexual intercourse first occurred between
[Claire] and [Harris] sometime before [Harris] took [Claire]” to
Oregon. Claire also indicated that she and Harris “had been
sexually active or had engaged in sexual intercourse recently,”
anywhere from three to seven days before she was interviewed by
police. At the time of the Oregon interview, Claire claimed that she
had lied to Harris about her age and had not revealed that she was
seventeen until shortly before police arrived.
¶7 Based on the statements Claire made in Oregon, the state
of Utah initially charged Harris with one count of kidnapping (a
second-degree felony) and one count of unlawful sexual conduct
with a sixteen- to seventeen-year-old (a third-degree felony). But
the State later amended those charges based on statements Claire
made during a follow-up interview at the Utah Children’s Justice
Center.
¶8 In her Utah interview, Claire said that Harris initially told
her he was twenty-three or “possibly a little older.” She also said
__________________________________________________________
2 We recite the facts as alleged by the State but emphasize that
because the case has not yet gone to trial, the facts remain unproven
allegations.
3 A pseudonym.
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STATE v. HARRIS
Opinion of the Court
that Harris knew all along that she was only seventeen. Claire said
that she had made her intention clear to Harris that she intended to
leave with him for “possibly only one night,” not permanently. She
also said that she left in part because of his “persistent coaxing” and
out of fear “due to his threats to simply kidnap her.” Claire
described Harris repeatedly raping her and forcing her to perform
other sexual acts. She said Harris threatened her, forced her to
smoke marijuana and methamphetamine, and “detain[ed] her
against her will.”
¶9 In response to the new information Claire provided, the
State filed an amended information charging Harris with fifty
felonies, twelve of them first-degree felony offenses, including
aggravated human trafficking, aggravated kidnapping, rape,
forcible sodomy, and aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor.
¶10 After the charges were amended, a magistrate issued a no-bail warrant for Harris’s arrest. The magistrate found that
detention pending Harris’s initial appearance was warranted
“[d]ue to extensive additional charges and supporting
substantial/clear and convincing evidence, risk to the alleged
victim and public, and flight risk.”
¶11 Harris was arrested and brought before a judge for an
initial appearance. The State argued that Harris should be held
without bail pending trial due to the nature of the charges, the
potential risk he presented to the community, and the risk of flight.
Defense counsel reserved the right to argue bail after speaking with
Harris. The district court ordered that Harris would continue to be
held without bail in the interim.
¶12 Harris then filed a motion for pretrial release. Harris
argued that he posed “no danger to [Claire]” because she was “not
injured nor harmed in any way” during her time with Harris, she
“advocated for him” while outside his presence, she admitted that
she went to Oregon with him voluntarily, and she told police in
Oregon “that she initiated all physical intimacy with him.” Harris
also filed the transcript of Claire’s Oregon interview to argue that
the contradictions in her statements undermined the evidence
against him.
¶13 At the pretrial detention hearing, the district court
considered the parties’ briefing, proffered testimony, and
documentary evidence consisting of Claire’s text messages, Claire’s
medical assessment, the Oregon interview, an incident report, and
an Oregon judgment against Harris following a guilty plea. On
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Opinion of the Court
October 15, 2024, the court denied Harris’s motion after
determining that the State had “demonstrated substantial evidence
to support the charge” and that Harris was “a risk to the victim, to
himself and to young women in the public.” The court also
concluded that Harris was a flight risk because he had taken Claire,
a minor, across state lines and had fled from police in Oregon.
Harris did not appeal that decision.
¶14 Several months later, Harris filed a motion to modify his
pretrial release based on what he argued was a material change of
circumstances.4 Harris identified the material change in
circumstances as the receipt of the DNA test results from Claire’s
medical exam. According to Harris, the vaginal/cervical swabs
collected during Claire’s examination tested negative for the
presence of male DNA, “thus, clearing [Harris] from the accusation
of rape.” In the motion, Harris repeated his earlier argument that
the discrepancies between Claire’s interviews in Oregon and Utah
did not amount to substantial evidence to support the charges and
argued that the lack of any male DNA evidence underscored that
argument.
¶15 On March 20, 2025, the district court denied Harris’s
request, determining that there was no material change in
circumstances. The court reasoned that “DNA or lack of DNA is
not an element of any of these particular crimes and is an issue” for
trial. The court concluded that Harris would “continue to be held
consistent with the [c]ourt’s prior ruling.”
¶16 Harris filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s
denial of the motion to modify. Our court initially transferred the
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, see UTAH R. APP. P. 42(a),
before vacating the transfer order and recalling the appeal back to
our court.
__________________________________________________________
4 Harris, and in turn the district court, called the motion a
“Second Motion for Pretrial Release,” but “it is the substance, not
the labeling, of a motion that is dispositive in determining the
character of the motion.” Bishop v. GenTec Inc., 2002 UT 36, ¶ 28,
48
P.3d 218 (cleaned up). Because we conclude that the substance and
purpose of Harris’s second motion was to modify the pretrial status
order that ordered him detained pending trial, we will refer to his
second motion as a motion to modify. Harris acknowledges as
much in his briefing, stating that the motion “was brought as a
modification.”
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STATE v. HARRIS
Opinion of the Court
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶17 The parties debate whether this court has jurisdiction to
hear Harris’s appeal, arguing over whether defendants have a right
to appeal a denied motion to modify. See UTAH CODE § 77-20-209
(2024).5 “Whether this court has jurisdiction over an appeal is a
question of law that can be raised for the first time on appeal . . . .”
Weber County v. Ogden Trece, 2013 UT 62, ¶ 21,
321 P.3d 1067
(cleaned up). If we determine that we lack jurisdiction, we “retain[]
only the authority to dismiss the appeal.”
Id. (cleaned up).6
ANALYSIS
¶18 In Utah, when an individual is arrested, a magistrate must
issue a “temporary pretrial status order.” UTAH CODE § 77-20-
205(1)(a) (2024). That temporary order can do one of three things:
(1) release the defendant on the defendant’s “own recognizance,”
(2) impose “terms and conditions” on the defendant’s release, or
(3) order the defendant be “detained.” Id. § 77-20-102(21)(a)–(c)
(2024). That order stays in place until a “pretrial status order” is
issued. See id. § 77-20-205(2) (2024).
¶19 Thereafter, a defendant must be brought before a judge for
an initial appearance. At the first appearance the judge normally
issues a pretrial status order. Id. The judge may delay the issuance
of the order if the prosecutor moves for detention, thereby
necessitating a pretrial detention hearing, “if a party requests a
delay,” or “if there is good cause to delay.” Id. § 77-20-205(2)(b)(ii),
(iii) (2024). If there is a delay, the judge must extend the temporary
__________________________________________________________
5 The parties disagree as to which version of the Utah Code
applies. When faced with this conundrum, “we apply the law as it
exists at the time of the event regulated by the law in question.”
State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 13,
251 P.3d 829. Concerning a party’s
“procedural rights and responsibilities,” the event regulated “is the
underlying procedural act (e.g., filing a motion or seeking an
appeal).” Id. ¶ 14 (cleaned up). Here, there are two underlying
procedural acts: the court’s denial of Harris’s motion to modify on
January 23, 2025, and Harris’s notice of appeal filed on February 7,
2025. Because the 2024 version of the code was in effect at the time
of both events, we apply that version throughout this opinion.
6 Harris raises two other issues on appeal but because we
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we do not have authority
to address those issues.
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Opinion of the Court
pretrial status order until a pretrial status order is issued. Id. § 77-
20-205(2)(c) (2024).
¶20 Much like its temporary counterpart, a pretrial status
order does one of three things while a defendant “awaits trial or
other resolution of criminal charges”: (1) releases the defendant on
the defendant’s “own recognizance,” (2) “sets the terms and
conditions” of the defendant’s release, or (3) “denies pretrial
release” and orders the defendant “be detained.” Id. § 77-20-
102(17)(a)–(c) (2024). A judge may choose the third option—
detaining the defendant without bail—only under specific
circumstances. See id. § 77-20-201(1) (2024). Relevant here, a judge
may detain a defendant without bail if there is “substantial
evidence to support the [felony] charge and the court finds, by clear
and convincing evidence, that” the defendant is either “a
substantial danger to any other individual or to the community” or
“likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. § 77-20-201(1)(c)(i)–
(ii) (2024).
¶21 If detained without bail, the defendant has the right to
appeal that decision. The statute granting the right to appeal states:
If a magistrate or judge issues a pretrial status order
that orders the individual be detained during the
time the individual awaits trial or other resolution of
criminal charges, the individual has the right to an
expedited appeal of the pretrial status order.
Id. § 77-20-209 (2024); see also id. § 77-18a-1(1)(d) (2024) (“A
defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from . . . an order
denying bail under Chapter 20, Bail.”). The defendant must file a
notice of the appeal within thirty days after the judge enters the
order. UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a).
¶22 Once a pretrial status order is in place, either party may
later file a motion to modify that order. UTAH CODE § 77-20-207(1)
(2024). To succeed, the moving party must show “that there has
been a material change in circumstances.” Id. As defined by statute,
a “[m]aterial change in circumstances” includes:
(i) an unreasonable delay in prosecution that is not
attributable to the defendant;
(ii) a material change in the risk that an individual
poses to a victim, a witness, or the public if
released due to the passage of time or any other
relevant factor;
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STATE v. HARRIS
Opinion of the Court
(iii) a material change in the conditions of release or
the services that are reasonably available to the
defendant if released;
(iv) a willful or repeated failure by the defendant to
appear at required court appearances; or
(v) any other material change related to the
defendant’s risk of flight or danger to any other
individual or to the community if released.
Id. § 77-20-102(10)(a) (2024). A “‘[m]aterial change in
circumstances’ does not include any fact or consideration that is
known at the time that the pretrial status order is issued.” Id. § 77-
20-102(10)(b) (2024).
¶23 The court may grant the motion and “modify the pretrial
status order, including the conditions of release,” only if the court
finds “that there has been a material change in circumstances.” Id.
§ 77-20-207(4)(c)(i) (2024). If the judge grants a party’s motion, the
new order is referred to as a “modified pretrial status order.” See
id. § 77-20-207(5)–(6) (2024).
¶24 In this case, the no-bail arrest warrant constituted a
temporary pretrial status order that ordered Harris detained
pending his initial appearance. At that hearing, the court delayed
the issuance of a pretrial status order at Harris’s request. Once
Harris filed a motion for pretrial release, the court held an
evidentiary hearing and issued a pretrial status order ordering that
Harris be detained pending trial. Harris did not appeal that order.
Later, Harris filed a motion to modify his pretrial detention, but the
court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing because
Harris had not demonstrated a material change in circumstances.
As a result, no modified pretrial status order was issued.
¶25 The question before us is whether the denial of a motion to
modify is immediately appealable as of right under section 77-20-
209. The answer lies in the plain language of the statute. When
interpreting a statute, “our primary goal is to evince the true intent
and purpose of the legislature,” the best evidence of which “is the
plain language of the statute itself.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch
P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14,
267 P.3d 863 (cleaned up). Thus, our
analysis begins with the statute’s text. McKitrick v. Gibson,
2021 UT
48, ¶ 19,
496 P.3d 147. In our analysis, “we presume, absent a
contrary indication, that the legislature used each term advisedly.”
Id. (cleaned up). And where a plain text analysis reveals an answer
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Opinion of the Court
to the statutory interpretation question before us, we need not
make use of other interpretative tools. See id.
¶26 Under section 77-20-209, a defendant has a right to appeal
when the court “issues a pretrial status order that orders the
individual be detained during the time the individual awaits trial
or other resolution of criminal charges.” The October 2024 order
denying Harris’s motion for pretrial release fell within the terms of
the statute because it was a pretrial status order that ordered Harris
detained pending trial. Unquestionably, Harris had a right to an
expedited appeal of that order but chose not to exercise that right.
¶27 In contrast, the denial of Harris’s motion to modify in
March 2025 does not fit within the terms of the statute. The denial
of a motion to modify does not result in a pretrial status order that
“orders the individual be detained.” UTAH CODE § 77-20-209 (2024).
Because there is an existing pretrial status order in place that the
court has declined to modify, the original pretrial status order
remains in effect. A defendant cannot restart the clock by bringing
an unsuccessful motion to modify an order for which the time to
appeal has already expired.
¶28 Our conclusion does not mean that a motion to modify can
never result in a pretrial detention order that a defendant can
appeal as of right. If, for example, a defendant had been previously
released, the State could file a motion to modify seeking detention.
If the court granted that motion, it would result in a modified
pretrial status order that “order[ed] the individual be detained.” Id.
In that circumstance, that defendant would have the right to appeal
the order granting the motion to modify.
¶29 But the court’s denial of a motion to modify a pretrial
status order will never be immediately appealable as of right. Such
a ruling does not result in a modified pretrial status order nor does
it detain the defendant. Rather, the denial of such a motion merely
maintains the status quo.
¶30 Our dissenting colleagues read our interpretation of
section 77-20-209 as “exclud[ing] continued detention under a
preexisting order” and thereby “suggesting the only appealable
pretrial status order is the one when a defendant shifts from being
released to being in custody.” Infra ¶ 44. And because a defendant
may be “detained originally through the temporary pretrial status
order, the first pretrial status order may continue that detention.”
Infra ¶ 48. Thus, the dissent contends that under our reading of the
statute “only Harris’s temporary pretrial status order should be
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STATE v. HARRIS
Opinion of the Court
appealable, since that is the first instance when the judge moved
him into pretrial detention.” Infra ¶ 48.
¶31 But our reading of the statute’s plain language does not
produce that result. Section 77-20-209 allows for a right to an
expedited appeal from “a pretrial status order that orders the
individual be detained during the time the individual awaits trial or
other resolution of criminal charges.” UTAH CODE § 77-20-209 (2024)
(emphasis added). A temporary pretrial status order—like a no-bail
warrant—can only order “that the individual be detained until a
pretrial status order is issued.” Id. § 77-20-(21)(c) (2024). And the
pretrial status order is not issued until the court holds a detention
hearing. Id. § 77-20-206(4)(c) (2024). So, while the defendant may
already be in custody under the terms of a temporary pretrial status
order, the pretrial status order is the only one that detains the
defendant “during the time the individual awaits trial.” Id. § 77-20-
209 (2024); see also id. § 77-20-102(17) (2024). Thus, it is not until the
detention hearing that the court issues a pretrial status order within
the meaning of section 77-20-209.
¶32 Moreover, our interpretation of section 77-20-209 does not
render the denial of a motion to modify unreviewable. As with
other non-final orders, a defendant may petition for interlocutory
review. See id. § 77-18a-1(2); UTAH R. APP. P. 5(a). Here, Harris did
not seek an interlocutory appeal but instead attempted to directly
appeal the denied motion, which he has no statutory right to do.7
¶33 This conclusion abrogates in part State v. Groce, 2024 UT
App 166,
560 P.3d 200, and State v. Stubbs,
2025 UT App 48,
569 P.3d
250, in which the court of appeals held that defendants have an
appeal as of right from a ruling denying a motion to modify pretrial
detention. In Groce, that court held that “a defendant may appeal
not only the original pretrial detention order, but also subsequent
orders in which the court keeps the defendant in pretrial
detention.”
2024 UT App 166, ¶ 36. But the statute, by its terms,
does not apply to any subsequent ruling that “keeps the defendant
in pretrial detention.”
Id. (emphasis added). It applies only when
__________________________________________________________
7 When the availability of an appeal as of right is in doubt,
parties may wish to timely file both a notice of appeal and a petition
seeking interlocutory review of the same ruling. This is a common
practice to protect a party’s right to seek discretionary review if the
appellate court concludes that the party is not entitled to a direct
appeal.
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Opinion of the Court
the district court “issues a pretrial status order that orders the
individual be detained.” UTAH CODE § 77-20-209 (2024). When the
court finds that there has been no material change in circumstances
that justifies revisiting an existing pretrial status order, that ruling
may have the effect of keeping the defendant in detention, but it
does not result in “a pretrial status order that orders the individual
be detained.” By holding that any subsequent order that “keeps the
defendant in pretrial detention” is appealable, the court of appeals
in Groce expanded the statute beyond its express terms. 2024 UT
App 166, ¶ 36
¶34 Both parties make persuasive policy arguments about why
a defendant should or should not have a right to immediately
appeal a denial of a motion to modify. But we are not deciding
whether it is preferable, as a policy matter, to allow a defendant to
immediately appeal under these circumstances. Such policy
concerns might come into play if we were being asked to exercise
our discretion to hear an interlocutory appeal. But because Harris
filed only a direct appeal, we are presented with a nondiscretionary
legal question: whether the legislature has granted defendants a
right to an immediate appeal that would vest this court with
jurisdiction.
¶35 When we interpret a statute like section 77-20-209, “what
the legislature should do is not the question. Rather it is what the
legislature has done.” See Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, ¶ 23,
61
P.3d 989 (cleaned up). Our job is not to reweigh the relevant policy
considerations, but to interpret the intent of the legislature from the
statutory language they have given us. The statutory language at
issue here gives a defendant an immediate appeal as of right only
in very specific circumstances—when the court “issues a pretrial
status order that orders the individual be detained.” UTAH CODE
§ 77-20-209 (2024). The legislature could have enacted statutory
language granting a right to appeal any ruling regarding pretrial
detention, but it chose not to do so.
¶36 Even if we were to agree with Harris that the better policy
would be to allow an appeal as of right from the denial of a motion
to modify, this court cannot manufacture its own jurisdiction. See
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“The Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as
provided by statute . . . .”). In the absence of a constitutional
challenge, we are bound by the statutory language enacted by the
legislature. And the language in section 77-20-209 is not broad
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STATE v. HARRIS
Opinion of the Court
enough to grant defendants an immediate appeal as of right from
an order denying a motion to modify pretrial detention.
CONCLUSION
¶37 A defendant has a statutory right to immediately appeal a
pretrial status order that orders the defendant be detained pending
trial. Under the statute, Harris could have appealed the district
court’s pretrial status order that ordered him detained. He did not.
When the district court denied Harris’s motion to modify that
pretrial status order, he could have sought permission to file an
interlocutory appeal. He did not. Instead, he filed only a direct
appeal from the denial of his motion to modify. But that ruling did
not result in a modified pretrial status order ordering that he be
detained; it merely left his pre-existing and un-appealed pretrial
status order intact. Because the legislature has not granted
defendants an immediate appeal as of right in these circumstances,
we lack jurisdiction and dismiss Harris’s appeal.
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, dissenting:
¶38 Pretrial status orders may be appealed on an expedited
basis when they (1) deny pretrial release and (2) order a person be
detained.8 The order Harris seeks to appeal does both. The majority
concludes that the order at issue here did not order that Harris “be
detained” because he was already detained.9 I disagree. The
language “be detained” is inclusive of continued detention. I
therefore conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider Harris’s
appeal.10
¶39 In so concluding, I rely on the plain language of the
governing statute. And while that plain language is unambiguous,
the statutory scheme for pretrial release bolsters my conclusion,
particularly the provisions that define the multiple opportunities
provided trial courts to reevaluate a defendant’s pretrial release
status.
__________________________________________________________
8 UTAH CODE § 77-20-209 (2024).
9 Supra ¶ 37.
10 I dissent only on the issue of our jurisdiction to consider
Harris’s appeal. I offer no opinion on the merits of his appeal or
otherwise consider the propriety of the district court’s detention
decision.
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DURRANT, C.J., dissenting
¶40 As recounted in the majority opinion, the right to appeal a
pretrial status order is provided by Utah Code section 77-20-209.
This is a relatively new statute, adopted in 2023,11 that we have not
yet interpreted. It reads: “If a magistrate or judge issues a pretrial
status order that orders the individual be detained during the time the
individual awaits trial or other resolution of criminal charges, the
individual has the right to an expedited appeal of the pretrial status
order.”12
¶41 I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the new
statute. I see it this way. “Pretrial release” and “pretrial status
order” are defined terms in the pretrial release statutes. “Pretrial
release” is the release of a person from custody while that person
awaits trial or other resolution of criminal charges.13 A “pretrial
status order” is an order in which the judge does one of three
things: (1) releases a person on the person’s own recognizance,
(2) sets terms for pretrial release, or (3) “denies pretrial release and
orders that the individual be detained while the individual awaits
trial or other resolution of criminal charges.”14 The expedited right
to appeal is triggered by the third option.
¶42 The legislature did not include language limiting,
distinguishing, or otherwise specifying that the appeal is available
only for the first pretrial status order that places a defendant in
detention.15 The legislature imposed only two criteria necessary to
a right to appeal: that the pretrial status order (1) “den[y] pretrial
__________________________________________________________
11 Pretrial Release Modifications, H.B. 317 § 9, 2023 Leg., Gen.
Sess. (available at https://le.utah.gov/av/committeeArchive.jsp?
timelineID=223655).
12 UTAH CODE § 77-20-209 (emphasis added).
13 Id. § 77-20-102(14).
14 Id. § 77-20-102(17) (emphasis added).
15 See generally State v. Groce, 2024 UT App 166, ¶ 36,
560 P.3d
200 (relying on the indefinite article “a” in section 77-20-209—“a
pretrial status order”—to mean “any” pretrial status order could be
appealed, as opposed to an original or first pretrial status order);
State v. Stubbs,
2025 UT App 48, ¶ 17,
569 P.3d 250 (concluding the
same).
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DURRANT, C.J., dissenting
release,” and (2) ”order[] that the individual be detained while the
individual awaits trial or other resolution of criminal charges.”16
¶43 The order Harris appeals meets both these criteria, as
explained below. Harris filed a document entitled “Second Motion
for Pretrial Release,” relying on Utah Code section 77-20-207, which
allows parties to seek modification of a pretrial status order. The
court held an evidentiary hearing. Ruling from the bench, the court
denied the motion for pretrial release and ordered that “the
defendant will continue to be held consistent with the Court’s prior
ruling.” While the majority characterizes the court’s order as one
denying a motion to modify,17 I see it as the district court did: as an
order denying Harris’s Second Motion for Pretrial Release. The
district court’s order meets the definition of a “pretrial status
order” because it denied pretrial release and ordered that Harris
continue to be held in detention.18
¶44 This leads to the crux of my disagreement with the
majority on our respective interpretations—whether “be detained”
used in section 77-20-209 includes continued detention. The
majority interprets “be detained” to exclude continued detention
under a preexisting order, suggesting the only appealable pretrial
status order is the one when a defendant shifts from being released
to being in custody.19 I disagree.
¶45 “Detain” is a verb that references both an initial action and
a continued action. Merriam-Webster defines the verb “detain” as
“to hold or keep in or as if in custody,” and “to restrain especially
from proceeding.”20 Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines the
verb “detain” as “[t]he act or an instance of holding a person in
custody; confinement or compulsory delay.”21 Applying those
definitions, an order that a person “be detained” necessarily
includes orders that begin or that continue the act of being held,
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16 UTAH CODE § 77-20-102(17) (defining “pretrial status order”).
17 See supra ¶¶ 17, 29.
18 See UTAH CODE § 77-20-102(17).
19 See supra ¶¶ 26–27.
20 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, detain (2025 ed.).
21 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, detention (12th ed. 2024) (including
the definition of the verb “detain”).
14
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DURRANT, C.J., dissenting
kept in, or restrained from proceeding. Our court of appeals has
consistently reached that result in interpreting section 77-20-209.22
¶46 My conclusion is reinforced by a broader examination of
the pretrial release statutory scheme as a whole.23 The majority’s
conclusion is inconsistent with that scheme.
¶47 As the majority aptly explained, pretrial detention
decisions begin first with the arrest warrant or criminal summons.24
Based only on probable cause, or in some instances information
reasonably available to the judge, the judge can include with the
arrest warrant a temporary pretrial status order that orders
detention at that early stage of a criminal case.25 A “temporary
pretrial status order” is another defined term, limited to the time
“until a pretrial status order is issued.”26
¶48 While “temporary pretrial status orders” and “pretrial
status orders” have some distinctions,27 and the majority notes the
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22 Since the 2023 amendments to the pretrial release statutes,
there have been three appeals of motions modifying pretrial status
orders in the court of appeals: Groce and Stubbs, which the majority
abrogates in part, supra ¶ 31, and one other decided shortly before
oral argument in this case. See generally State v. Dowhaniuk, 2025 UT
App 100, ¶¶ 8–9,
574 P.3d 1000 (allowing an appeal of a “Second
Modification Order” which continued the pretrial detention
ordered through a preceding pretrial status order).
23 Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards & Training Council,
2025 UT
7, ¶ 36,
567 P.3d 576 (“[W]hen our court engages in statutory
interpretation, we do not look at the pertinent provision in
isolation. We instead examine the statute’s plain language in light
of the relevant context of the statute.” (cleaned up)); Sunstone Realty
Partners X LLC v. Bodell Constr. Co.,
2024 UT 9, ¶ 11,
545 P.3d 260
(“This process [of statutory interpretation] does not look at
statutory language in isolation; instead, “each section must be read
in the context of the entire act.” (cleaned up)).
24 UTAH CODE § 77-20-205(1)(a)–(b) (2024).
25 Id. § 77-20-205(1)(a)(iii), (c); cf. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 9A(b)(1), (d).
26 UTAH CODE § 77-20-102(22).
27 State v. Seat,
2022 UT App 143, ¶¶ 28–29, 37,
523 P.3d 724
(examining the “variety of substantive changes” made to the
(continued . . .)
15
STATE v. HARRIS
DURRANT, C.J., dissenting
difference in the duration of a temporary order,28 the fact remains
that when a defendant is detained originally through the
temporary pretrial status order, the first pretrial status order may
continue that detention. That is what occurred here. The judge first
ordered Harris be detained through the arrest warrant, which
included a temporary pretrial status order.29 Applying the
majority’s logic, only Harris’s temporary pretrial status order
should be appealable, since that is the first instance when the judge
moved him into pretrial detention.
¶49 I decline to interpret the pretrial release statutes in a way
that supports that result.30 Under the current statutory scheme,
pretrial release is a continuing issue that trial courts must
reconsider throughout the life of a criminal case based on the
available information and changing circumstances.
¶50 The statutory scheme provides ongoing opportunities to
evaluate, reevaluate, and potentially change a defendant’s pretrial
detention status at various points. The first point is in conjunction
with the arrest warrant or summons.31 The next point is at the initial
appearance, where pretrial detention is either continued from a
temporary pretrial status order; ordered where it was not ordered
before; or not ordered at all, with or without conditions for
release.32 The next point of reevaluation is in response to a motion
to modify,33 or a modification can be made on the court’s own
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pretrial release statutes in 2021 and recognizing the new distinction
between a temporary pretrial status order, which can be ordered
without a hearing, and a pretrial status order, which requires a
hearing).
28 See supra ¶ 30.
29 See supra ¶ 24.
30 See Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, ¶ 21,
70 P.3d 78 (“[S]tatutory
enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof
relevant and meaningful, and interpretations are to be avoided
which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.”).
31 UTAH CODE § 77-20-205(1) (2024).
32 Id. § 77-20-205(2); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
33 UTAH CODE § 77-20-207; UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2)–(4).
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DURRANT, C.J., dissenting
motion.34 Again, pretrial detention might be continued, ordered, or
changed to conditional or unconditional release.35
¶51 In this statutory context, characterized by multiple points
to reevaluate whether a person should remain in detention, an
order that “denies pretrial release and orders that the individual be
detained” necessarily includes orders that mandate detention to
continue. Section 77-20-209 anticipates the shifting landscape of
pretrial detention, by allowing the direct and expedited appeal of
pretrial status orders as they are issued. To hold otherwise limits
the right to appeal to the first order placing a person in detention
and runs contrary to a statutory scheme that mandates continued
reevaluation, inclusive of the opportunity to appeal.
¶52 As a final note, I briefly address Harris’s direct right to
appeal through a related statute, section 77-18a-1(1)(d).36 Utah
Code section 77-18a-1(1)(d) predated section 77-20-209 and now
exists concurrent with it. Section 77-18a-1(1)(d) provides the direct
right to appeal “an order denying bail under Chapter 20, Bail.”37
The legislature redefined “bail” in 2023 as “pretrial release.”38 In
many instances, an appeal of a pretrial release order becomes moot
because of the short timeline in criminal cases or because cases
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34 UTAH CODE § 77-20-207.
35 Id.
36 See Croft v. Morgan Cnty., 2021 UT 46, ¶ 15,
496 P.3d 83 (“Our
object in interpreting a statute is to determine the intent of the
legislature. To do so, we first look to the text of the statute and seek
to interpret it ‘in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter
and related chapters.’”(cleaned up)). The majority concludes Harris
has only an interlocutory right to appeal. See supra ¶ 32.
37 Before the 2021 pretrial release reforms, this subsection read,
“A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from: . . . (d) an
order denying bail, as provided in Subsection 77-20-1(9).” Utah
Code § 77-18a-1(d) (2020).
38 UTAH CODE § 77-20-102(a)(1); see also Pretrial Release
Modifications, H.B. 317 § 9, 2023 Leg., Gen. Sess. (available at
https://le.utah.gov/av/committeeArchive.jsp?timelineID=22365
5).
17
STATE v. HARRIS
DURRANT, C.J., dissenting
resolve by plea agreement.39 But the direct right to appeal
remained, even if only appearing periodically in our
jurisprudence.40
¶53 The newer statute, section 77-20-209, provides for an
expedited appeal. The only criteria that must be met in order to be
entitled to expedited review is that the trial court deny pretrial
release and order a person detained. As I have noted throughout,
the order Harris appeals meets these two criteria because an order
that a person “be detained” plainly includes an order that
continues detention.
CONCLUSION
¶54 In conclusion, section 77-20-209 provides an expedited
right to appeal a pretrial status order that (1) denies pretrial release
and (2) orders the individual be detained while the individual
awaits trial or other resolution of criminal charges. An order that a
person “be detained” necessarily includes an order that continues
detention. To hold otherwise runs contrary to the statutory scheme
that prescribes various points to reevaluate pretrial detention.
Neither the plain language nor the overall statutory scheme for
pretrial release supports the majority’s result. I conclude we do
have jurisdiction to consider Harris’s appeal because the district
court’s order meets these two criteria; it denied his request for
pretrial release and continued his detention.
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39 Seat, 2022 UT App 143, ¶ 40 (discussing the direct right to
appeal.
40
Id. ¶¶ 40–46.
18
