This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2025 UT 5
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NATALIE R., a minor, by and through her guardian,
DANIELLE ROUSSEL, et al., ∗
Appellants,
v.
STATE OF UTAH, et al., ∗
Appellees.
No. 20230022
Heard September 4, 2024
Filed March 20, 2025
On Direct Appeal
Third District Court, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Robert P. Faust
No. 220901658
__________________________________________________________
∗ Additional appellants: Sedona M., a minor, by and through her
guardian, Creed Murdock; Otis W., a minor, by and through his
guardian, Paul Wickelson; Lydia M., a minor, by and through her
guardian, Heather May; Lola Maldonado; Emi S., a minor, by and
through her guardian, David Garbett; Dallin R., a minor, by and
through his guardian, Kyle Rima.
Additional appellees: Spencer Cox, Governor of the State of
Utah, in his official capacity; the Department of Natural Resources;
the Office of Energy Development; Thom Carter, State Energy
Advisor and Executive Director of the Office of Energy
Development, in his official capacity; the Board of Oil, Gas, and
Mining; the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and John R. Baza,
Director of the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining, in his official
capacity.
ROUSSEL v. STATE
Opinion of the Court
Attorneys∗:
Andrew G. Deiss, John Robinson Jr., Corey D. Riley,
Salt Lake City, Andrew L. Welle, Eugene, Or., for appellants
Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Erin T. Middleton, Asst. Solic. Gen.,
David N. Wolf, Michael Begley, Trevor Gruwell, Asst. Att’ys Gen.,
Jeffrey B. Teichert, Salt Lake City, for appellees
JUSTICE HAGEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE PETERSEN, JUSTICE POHLMAN, and
JUDGE HARRIS joined.
Having recused himself, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE does not
participate herein; COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS sat.
JUSTICE HAGEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Several young Utahns brought this lawsuit challenging
statutory provisions and government conduct relating to fossil fuel
development. The youth plaintiffs allege that the challenged
provisions and conduct are designed to maximize fossil fuel
development in Utah, which endangers their health and shortens
their lifespans by exacerbating the effects of climate change. Based
on this harm, the youth plaintiffs asked the district court to declare
that the provisions and conduct violate their rights under the Utah
Constitution.
¶2 In response to the lawsuit, the government defendants
moved to dismiss the case, arguing in part that the requested relief
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Additional attorneys: Jonathan G. Jemming, Catherine E. Lilly,
Salt Lake City, for amicus curiae Utah Chapter–American Academy
of Pediatrics, Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment, Utah
Moms for Clean Air, Voices for Utah Children, in support of
appellants; John Mejia, Salt Lake City, Robert A. Skinner, Sara E.
Berinhout, Andrew B. Cashmore, Nicole S. L. Pobre, Boston, Mass.,
for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties of Utah and American
Civil Liberties Union, in support of appellants; Jeffrey W. Appel,
Stephanie E. Hanawalt, Salt Lake City, Eric Laschever, Mercer
Island, Wash., for amicus curiae Law Professors, in support of
appellants.
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Opinion of the Court
would not redress the alleged injuries. The district court agreed and
dismissed the claims with prejudice.
¶3 We affirm on the ground that the district court does not
have subject-matter jurisdiction.
¶4 First, the youth plaintiffs may not proceed with their
challenges to the statutory provisions. One of their challenges is
now moot because the legislature has significantly changed the
statute since the complaint was filed. And they lack standing to
challenge the remaining statutory provisions because success on
those challenges would not provide relief that is likely to redress
their injuries. The challenged provisions do not—as the youth
plaintiffs claim—limit the government defendants’ discretion in
making decisions about fossil fuel development. Thus, even
accepting as true the allegation that less fossil fuel development
will ameliorate the adverse health effects of climate change, we can
only speculate that striking these specific provisions would lead to
less fossil fuel development in this state. The youth plaintiffs try to
address this deficiency by asking the court to instruct the
government defendants on how they must act “going forward,”
but such instruction would amount to an impermissible advisory
opinion.
¶5 Second, the challenges to the government defendants’
conduct are not justiciable because they are not supported by a
concrete set of facts. The youth plaintiffs identify general categories
of conduct without tying their claims to any specific government
actions.
¶6 When a district court does not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over a claim, ordinarily the proper course is for the
court to dismiss the claim without prejudice. Because we hold that
the district court here does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, we
instruct the district court to modify its ruling to reflect that the
dismissal is without prejudice.
BACKGROUND 1
¶7 Seven Utahns, ranging in age from nine to eighteen years
old, filed the declaratory judgment action that led to this appeal,
__________________________________________________________
1 When, as here, a defendant argues “that the allegations
currently included in the complaint are insufficient to establish
jurisdiction,” the jurisdictional challenge is a “facial” challenge. Salt
(continued . . .)
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Opinion of the Court
naming as defendants government entities and officials that
oversee fossil fuel development in Utah.2 In their complaint, the
youth plaintiffs explain the scientific link between fossil fuel
development and climate change. They also detail the harms they
endure due to climate change—including harms to their physical
and mental health—and allege that these harms stem from state
action promoting the use of fossil fuels. The youth plaintiffs’ legal
claims fall into two categories: challenges to statutory provisions
and challenges to government conduct.
¶8 With respect to the statutory challenges, the youth
plaintiffs identify five excerpts from the Utah Code that they claim
constitute Utah’s fossil fuel development policy. Although these
provisions are scattered throughout three chapters of the Utah
Code, the youth plaintiffs do not seek to invalidate the relevant acts
in their entireties; they challenge only the five “select provisions”
they identify. Each of the five provisions, they allege, “mandates or
directs” the government defendants “to administer state programs
in a manner to maximize, promote, and systematically authorize”
fossil fuel development in Utah.
¶9 First, the youth plaintiffs challenge a portion of a single
subsection from the section of the Utah Energy Act that describes
Utah’s energy policy. See UTAH CODE § 79-6-301. At the time the
complaint was filed, the challenged subsection provided, “Utah
will promote the development of . . . nonrenewable energy
resources, including natural gas, coal, oil, oil shale, and oil sands.”
Id. § 79-6-301(1)(b)(i) (2022). But after the district court issued its
decision dismissing the youth plaintiffs’ claims, the legislature
substantively amended the energy policy statute. See State Energy
Policy Amendments, H.B. 374 § 2, 2024 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2024)
(availableathttps://le.utah.gov/~2024/bills/static/HB0374.html).
The youth plaintiffs argue that the statutory changes are
“immaterial” because the new statute contains a provision similar
to the one challenged in their complaint. Specifically, the new
__________________________________________________________
Lake Cnty. v. State, 2020 UT 27, ¶ 26,
466 P.3d 158 (contrasting
“facial” and “factual” attacks on subject-matter jurisdiction under
rule 12(b)(1)). For these challenges, courts presume all
jurisdictional facts “to be true.”
Id. (cleaned up). We recite the facts
accordingly.
2 All but one of the plaintiffs are minors appearing through their
guardians.
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Opinion of the Court
statute provides, “Utah shall promote the development of a diverse
energy portfolio, including . . . dispatchable energy resources,
including natural gas, coal, oil, and hydroelectric.” UTAH CODE
§ 79-6-301(1)(b)(ii)(A) (2025).
¶10 Second, the youth plaintiffs challenge a snippet from one
of four legislative findings about coal mining, located in the Coal
Mining and Reclamation Act. See id. § 40-10-1. The challenged
finding provides that “it is . . . essential to the national interest to
insure the existence of an expanding and economically healthy
underground coal mining industry.” Id. § 40-10-1(1).
¶11 Third, the youth plaintiffs challenge one of roughly two
dozen “[g]eneral performance standards” that apply to surface coal
mining and reclamation operations. See id. § 40-10-17(2). The
challenged standard states that “all surface coal mining and
reclamation operations . . . shall . . . [c]onduct surface coal mining
operations so as to maximize the utilization and conservation of the
solid fuel resource being recovered so that reaffecting the land in
the future through surface coal mining can be minimized.” Id. § 40-
10-17(2)(a).
¶12 Fourth, the youth plaintiffs challenge part of the
“[d]eclaration of public interest” found in the Oil and Gas
Conservation Act, which reads:
It is declared to be in the public interest to foster,
encourage, and promote the development,
production, and utilization of natural resources of oil
and gas in the state of Utah in such a manner as will
prevent waste; to authorize and to provide for the
operation and development of oil and gas properties
in such a manner that a greater ultimate recovery of
oil and gas may be obtained . . . .
Id. § 40-6-1.
¶13 Fifth and finally, the youth plaintiffs challenge the rule of
construction found in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, under
which the act
shall never be construed to require, permit or
authorize the board or any court to make, enter or
enforce any order, rule, regulation, or judgment
requiring restriction of production of any pool or of
any well . . . to an amount less than the well or pool
can produce unless such restriction is necessary to
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Opinion of the Court
prevent waste and protect correlative rights, or the
operation of a well without sufficient oil or gas
production to cover current operating costs and
provide a reasonable return, without regard to
original drilling costs.
Id. § 40-6-13.
¶14 In addition to these challenges to statutory provisions, the
youth plaintiffs challenge government “conduct” related to fossil
fuel development, alleging that the government defendants
“engage in an ongoing pattern and practice of maximizing,
promoting, and systematically authorizing the development of
fossil fuels.” For support, the youth plaintiffs describe, in broad
terms, various types of actions in which the government
defendants participate relative to fossil fuel development:
• The Governor develops “goals and objectives” for energy
and mineral development, as well as “comprehensive
plans” for fossil fuel development.
• The Office of Energy Development (OED) creates “energy
plans,” “promotes energy and mineral development
workforce initiatives,” “supports research initiatives,” and
administers state fossil fuel energy programs.
• The Energy Advisor “advocates . . . for energy-related
infrastructure projects,” “coordinates . . . energy-related
regulatory processes,” and recommends “energy-related
executive or legislative actions.”
• The State and OED coordinate to support legal challenges to
programs and initiatives that would reduce fossil fuel
development.
¶15 The youth plaintiffs contend that their claims implicate
two fundamental rights protected by article I, sections 1 and 7 of
the Utah Constitution: the right “to life” and the right “to liberty.”3
__________________________________________________________
3 Article I, section 1 provides:
All persons have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according
to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for
(continued . . .)
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Opinion of the Court
In their first cause of action, the youth plaintiffs allege that the
government defendants’ promotion of fossil fuel development
infringes on their right to life by “substantially reducing their
lifespans and the number of healthy years in their lives.” In their
second cause of action, they allege that the right to liberty includes
a right “to be free from government conduct that substantially
endangers their health and safety” and that the government
defendants’ fossil fuel policies infringe on that right. And they
allege that the challenged provisions and conduct are not narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
¶16 Based on these claims, the youth plaintiffs seek a
declaratory judgment that the statutory provisions and
government conduct are unconstitutional. The youth plaintiffs
envision a declaration that would not only “invalidate the statutory
provisions” but also “instruct” the government defendants that
their ongoing conduct “is constitutionally impermissible.” The
desired declaration would thus force the government defendants
to “align their conduct with the Court’s ruling,” ushering an “end”
to the “ongoing pattern and practice of maximizing, promoting,
and systematically authorizing fossil fuel production and
development” in Utah.
¶17 The government defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint under rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (allowing motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); id. R. 12(b)(6)
(allowing motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted”). As relevant here, they argued that because
the challenged statutory provisions are nonoperative “policy
explanations,” the court declaring them unconstitutional would be
a mere “symbolic action” unlikely to redress the youth plaintiffs’
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redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the
abuse of that right.
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 1. And article I, section 7 provides, “No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.” Id. art. I, § 7.
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Opinion of the Court
injuries. In other words, they asserted that the youth plaintiffs do
not meet the redressability requirement for traditional standing. 4
¶18 The district court agreed with the government defendants
and granted the motion to dismiss. With respect to subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court ruled that the youth plaintiffs lacked
standing because their claims were not redressable. 5 Noting that
“all operative provisions” of the relevant statutes “would survive
the requested relief,” the court explained that the youth plaintiffs
had not shown that the relief they requested would “have any
effect on carbon emissions in Utah.” Despite having concluded that
subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking, the court proceeded to
address the merits of the claims and ultimately dismissed the
complaint with prejudice.
¶19 The youth plaintiffs appealed, and we exercise jurisdiction
under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶20 The youth plaintiffs ask that we review the district court’s
dismissal of their claims. This “presents a question of law that we
review for correctness.” Haik v. Jones, 2018 UT 39, ¶ 9,
427 P.3d 1155.
ANALYSIS
¶21 The district court reviewed and dismissed the youth
plaintiffs’ claims for “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,”
see UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), and for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted,” see id. R. 12(b)(6). But where
jurisdiction is lacking, “the court has authority to opine only on the
law and facts surrounding its own power.” Fundamentalist Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne,
2012 UT 66, ¶¶ 24–25,
289 P.3d 502. Because we conclude that the district court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint
under rule 12(b)(1).
¶22 Subject-matter jurisdiction comes in at least two stripes.
See Granite Sch. Dist. v. Young, 2023 UT 21, ¶¶ 25–27,
537 P.3d 225.
__________________________________________________________
4 “Simply put, traditional standing requires a claimant to show
injury, causation, and redressability.” Erda Cmty. Ass’n v.
Grantsville City,
2024 UT App 126, ¶ 23,
558 P.3d 91.
5 The district court also determined that the claims were not
justiciable under the political question doctrine. Because we affirm
on other grounds, it is unnecessary for us to reach that question.
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The first “involves whether the court has statutory authority to
hear a particular class of cases. A justice court, for example, lacks
jurisdiction to hear a felony case.” Id. ¶ 26 (cleaned up). The second
“embodies concepts of justiciability.” Id. ¶ 27. And justiciability, in
turn, “implicates various categories of cases and doctrines that
impose limits on our jurisdiction, including advisory opinions,
feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political
questions, and administrative questions.” Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT
6, ¶ 30,
323 P.3d 571.
¶23 Our decision in this case rests on the second category of
subject-matter jurisdiction—the category under which “the courts
are without jurisdiction” absent “any justiciable controversy
between adverse parties.” Williams v. Univ. of Utah, 626 P.2d 500,
503 (Utah 1981). Declaratory judgment actions must have “the
justiciable and jurisdictional elements requisite in ordinary
actions.” Salt Lake Cnty. v. Bangerter,
928 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1996)
(cleaned up). Our cases establish four requirements for declaratory
judgment actions: “(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the interests of the parties must be adverse; (3) the parties
seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issues between the parties must be ripe for
judicial determination.” Jenkins v. Swan,
675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah
1983) (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Bleazard v. City of Erda,
2024 UT 17,
¶ 40,
552 P.3d 183. Nested within the second and third
requirements are the traditional standing requirements—injury,
causation, and redressability. Jenkins,
675 P.2d at 1148; see also
Summit Cnty. v. Town of Hideout,
2024 UT 39, ¶ 33,
557 P.3d 574
(“[P]arties may bring actions under the Declaratory Judgment Act
only if they can show that the justiciable and jurisdictional elements
requisite in ordinary actions—including standing—are present.”
(cleaned up) (emphasis added)); S. Utah Wilderness All. v. San Juan
Cnty. Comm’n,
2021 UT 6, ¶ 14,
484 P.3d 1160 (describing “our
three-part test” for traditional standing).
¶24 We conclude that the district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over any of the youth plaintiffs’ claims, though
the jurisdictional deficiency varies depending on the nature of the
claim. First, their challenge to the energy policy provision is moot
because the legislature recently rehauled the statute, including the
provision at issue. Second, the youth plaintiffs lack standing to
challenge the remaining provisions for two reasons: striking the
provisions as unconstitutional would not redress their injuries, and
providing guidance on the “constitutional parameters” at play
9
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Opinion of the Court
would amount to an advisory opinion. Finally, the challenges to the
government defendants’ conduct are not justiciable because they
are not tied to any specific government actions.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
THE YOUTH PLAINTIFFS’ CHALLENGES TO THE STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
A. The Challenge to the Energy Policy Provision Is Moot
Because the Provision No Longer Exists in Its Challenged
Form
¶25 The youth plaintiffs challenge a provision of the energy
policy statute that—when the complaint was filed—provided,
“Utah will promote the development of . . . nonrenewable energy
resources, including natural gas, coal, oil, oil shale, and oil sands.”
UTAH CODE § 79-6-301(1)(b)(i) (2022). But the legislature removed
this language in 2024, when it amended the energy policy statute.
See State Energy Policy Amendments, H.B. 374 § 2, 2024 Leg., Gen.
Sess. (Utah 2024) (available at https://le.utah.gov
/~2024/bills/static/HB0374.html). That legislative amendment
creates a problem for the youth plaintiffs, whose challenge now
relies on defunct language. We conclude that the statutory
amendments make the challenge, as pleaded, moot.
¶26 An issue is moot if the requested relief becomes
“impossible or of no legal effect.” Grewal v. Junction Mkt. Fairview,
L.C., 2024 UT 20, ¶ 19,
554 P.3d 863 (cleaned up). One way this can
happen is if “the practical or legal relationship between the parties”
changes, such as through the “repeal or amendment of the law
under review.” Salt Lake City Corp. v. Utah Inland Port Auth.,
2022
UT 27, ¶ 21,
524 P.3d 573. That is what happened here: the
legislature’s amendment of the energy policy statute rendered the
requested relief—a declaration that the now-repealed challenged
language is unconstitutional—legally ineffective.
¶27 Even if the district court declared the outdated language
unconstitutional, that declaration would have no effect on the
validity of the current statute. The youth plaintiffs’ complaint
identifies language from the 2022 version of the energy policy
provision, which they interpret to be a “mandate[]” under which
the government defendants must “maximize, promote, and
systematically authorize” fossil fuel development. But the current
version does not impose any such mandate; it expresses a policy of
promoting “the development of a diverse energy portfolio.” UTAH
CODE § 79-6-301(1)(b)(ii) (2025). Given the discrepancy between the
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Opinion of the Court
challenge as it was pleaded and the law as it stands, the court can
no longer “order a remedy that will have a meaningful impact on
the practical positions of the parties.” See Salt Lake City Corp., 2022
UT 27, ¶ 21 (cleaned up).
¶28 And the legislative changes are not “immaterial,” as the
youth plaintiffs claim, simply because the energy policy statute still
mentions natural gas, coal, and oil. As mentioned, the statute now
endorses promoting “a diverse energy portfolio”—an endorsement
that was previously absent. Compare UTAH CODE § 79-6-301 (2022),
with id. (2025). That diverse energy portfolio includes “clean energy
sources,” assessing “the environmental impact, including
emissions, of an energy resource throughout the entire life cycle of
the energy resource.” Id. § 79-6-301(b)(ii)(D) (2025). Those
considerations were not mentioned in the prior statute. See generally
id. § 79-6-301 (2022). Further, in its 2024 amendment, the legislature
created a new state policy of developing energy resources and
planning an energy future “with a focus on human well-being and
quality of life.” Id. § 79-6-301(1)(a)(i) (2025). These changes are
material to the youth plaintiffs’ legal challenge and render that
challenge moot as it is currently pleaded in the complaint.
B. The Youth Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing to Challenge
the Remaining Statutory Provisions Because Declaring
Those Provisions Unconstitutional Is Not Substantially
Likely to Redress the Alleged Injuries
¶29 The youth plaintiffs contend that a favorable court
judgment would “invalidate . . . unconstitutional statutory
directives, removing the mandates under which” the government
defendants are harming them through unrestrained fossil fuel
development. Although we agree that a favorable judgment would
invalidate the challenged provisions, we disagree with the premise
that the challenged provisions impose “directives” or “mandates”
on the government defendants. In context, the provisions are part
of larger statutory schemes under which the government
defendants have leeway in making decisions concerning fossil fuel
development.
¶30 As in other types of actions, plaintiffs in declaratory
judgment actions must establish standing. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d
1145, 1148 (Utah 1983); see also Summit Cnty. v. Town of Hideout,
2024
UT 39, ¶ 33,
557 P.3d 574. And plaintiffs cannot establish standing
unless the requested relief is “substantially likely to redress the
injury claimed.” Jenkins,
675 P.2d at 1150. When, as here, a plaintiff
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Opinion of the Court
asks the court to declare statutory provisions unconstitutional, the
court must determine whether “the adverse impact on [the
plaintiff] will be relieved.” Id. at 1153. At the motion-to-dismiss
stage, a plaintiff’s claims are redressable if, assuming the plaintiff
“prevails on the merits of its claims, the district court could redress,
at least in part, the harm [the plaintiff] suffered.” S. Utah Wilderness
All. v. Kane Cnty. Comm’n,
2021 UT 7, ¶ 34,
484 P.3d 1146.
¶31 Here, the youth plaintiffs maintain that if the court were to
declare the challenged statutory provisions unconstitutional, it
would reduce fossil fuel development in Utah and thus partially
redress the harms they have alleged. For purposes of the motion to
dismiss, we accept as true that reducing fossil fuel development
would slow climate change and thereby reduce its adverse health
impact on the youth plaintiffs. Even so, we conclude, as a legal
matter, that declaring the challenged provisions unconstitutional
would not limit the government defendants’ ability to promote
fossil fuel development and therefore is not substantially likely to
produce the desired effect of redressing their injuries in whole or
in part.
¶32 To determine whether declaring the challenged provisions
unconstitutional would reduce fossil fuel development in Utah, we
must look at the provisions not “in isolation,” but in “the relevant
context.” See McKitrick v. Gibson, 2021 UT 48, ¶ 19,
496 P.3d 147
(cleaned up). So viewed, the provisions do not—individually or
collectively—“mandate and direct” the government defendants “to
administer state programs in a manner to maximize, promote, and
systematically authorize fossil fuel development.” Rather, the
relevant statutes allow the government defendants to consider
various factors in their decision-making. We address each of the
four remaining challenged provisions in turn.
1. Legislative Finding on Coal Mining
¶33 The youth plaintiffs target a legislative finding on coal
mining, which they claim “directs” the government defendants “in
their conduct with respect to coal mining operations to ‘insure the
existence of an expanding and economically healthy’ coal mining
industry.” (Quoting UTAH CODE § 40-10-1(1).) The youth plaintiffs
accurately quote a portion of a legislative finding on coal mining,
which provides in full:
The Utah Legislature finds that . . . [c]oal mining
operations presently contribute significantly to the
nation’s energy requirements; surface coal mining
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constitutes one method of extraction of the resource;
the overwhelming percentage of Utah’s coal reserves
can only be extracted by underground mining
methods; and it is, therefore, essential to the national
interest to insure the existence of an expanding and
economically healthy underground coal mining
industry.
UTAH CODE § 40-10-1(1).
¶34 But, properly understood, this finding does not “direct”
the government defendants to do (or not do) anything “in their
conduct with respect to coal mining operations.” Instead, it merely
evinces a legislative belief from 1979 about the United States’
interest in a healthy underground coal mining industry. This
understanding is reinforced by the unchallenged legislative
findings that follow. Among those counterbalancing findings, for
example, is a statement about the “urgent” need for “appropriate
standards to minimize damage to the environment and to
productivity of the soil and to protect the health and safety of the
public.” Id. § 40-10-1(2).
¶35 At bottom, the challenged finding leaves the government
defendants with discretion in overseeing state coal mining
operations; it does not compel or prohibit any particular action
related to coal mining. As such, its removal from the Coal Mining
and Reclamation Act is not substantially likely to result in less coal
mining in the state.
2. Coal Mining Performance Standard
¶36 The youth plaintiffs identify another statutory provision
that, in their view, “mandates that in exercising authority over the
permitting of coal mining,” the government defendants “‘shall
require’ all ‘coal mining operations’ to maximize coal extraction.”
(Quoting id. § 40-10-17(2)(a).) The provision imposes a
“performance standard[]” for all approved surface coal mining
operations, requiring those operations to be conducted “so as to
maximize the utilization and conservation of the solid fuel resource
being recovered so that reaffecting the land in the future through
surface coal mining can be minimized.” Id. § 40-10-17(2)(a). But this
performance standard comes into play only after a coal mining
operation receives a permit; it does not dictate whether a permit
application must be approved or denied in the first instance. See id.
§ 40-10-17(1)–(2). If the government defendants were to decide that,
due to the threat of climate change, it would be in the public’s best
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Opinion of the Court
interest to phase out coal mining in the state by denying all new
coal-mine-operation permit applications, the challenged
performance standard would not stand in their way.
¶37 And even without the challenged performance standard, a
permitted coal mining operation would not be prohibited from
“maximiz[ing] the utilization and conservation of the solid fuel
resource being recovered.” Id. § 40-10-17(2)(a). Stated differently,
striking the challenged performance standard would not impose a
new performance standard requiring coal operations to recover less
than the maximum amount of a resource.
¶38 Therefore, declaring the challenged performance standard
unconstitutional is not substantially likely to reduce coal mining in
the state, as the government defendants would still have the same
permit-granting discretion, and permit holders could conduct their
operations in the same way without the standard.
3. Declaration of Public Interest
¶39 Next, the youth plaintiffs challenge part of the declaration
of public interest in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, which they
contend is a “statutory directive” that binds the government
defendants “in the exercise of their authority.” The relevant
language declares that it is
in the public interest to foster, encourage, and
promote the development, production, and
utilization of natural resources of oil and gas in the
state of Utah in such a manner as will prevent waste;
to authorize and to provide for the operation and
development of oil and gas properties in such a
manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas
may be obtained and that the correlative rights of all
owners may be fully protected.
Id. § 40-6-1.
¶40 The government defendants respond that this declaration
of public interest is more “guidance” than “directive.” But the
youth plaintiffs resist this interpretation, arguing that we said
otherwise in Bennion v. ANR Production Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah
1991). The youth plaintiffs have something of a point. In Bennion,
we considered whether an order from the Utah State Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining contravened the declaration of public interest. See
id. at 346. And in describing the plaintiff’s argument, we did—as
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the youth plaintiffs here highlight—refer to the declaration of
public interest as a “statutory directive.” Id.
¶41 Regardless of whether the declaration of public interest is
best characterized as guidance or directive, however, fossil fuel
development in Utah would not change in any way if the provision
were declared unconstitutional. In the absence of the challenged
language, the government defendants would not be obliged to
carry out the operative provisions of the Oil and Gas Conservation
Act differently. The challenged language does not, for example,
require the government defendants to authorize a particular oil
well, nor does it dictate the criteria used to review permit
applications. For this reason, we cannot say that striking the
challenged language is substantially likely to redress the youth
plaintiffs’ injuries.
4. Rule of Construction
¶42 We reach the same conclusion as to the final challenged
statutory provision, under which the Oil and Gas Act
shall never be construed to require, permit or
authorize the board or any court to make, enter or
enforce any order, rule, regulation, or judgment
requiring restriction of production of any pool or of
any well (except a well drilled in violation of Section
40-6-6 hereof) to an amount less than the well or pool
can produce unless such restriction is necessary to
prevent waste and protect correlative rights, or the
operation of a well without sufficient oil or gas
production to cover current operating costs and
provide a reasonable return, without regard to
original drilling costs.
UTAH CODE § 40-6-13.
¶43 As with the challenged performance standard provision,
see supra ¶ 36–38, this rule of construction does not require the
government defendants to authorize or deny permit applications
in the first instance. Nor does it require the government defendants
to insist that permitholders act or refrain from acting in any specific
way. Thus, we conclude that it is not substantially likely that the
youth plaintiffs’ injuries would be relieved if the court were to
declare the rule of construction unconstitutional.
¶44 In sum, the youth plaintiffs’ challenges to the statutory
provisions all share the same defect: they are not redressable
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Opinion of the Court
because declaring the provisions unconstitutional would not
require the government defendants to curb fossil fuel development
in Utah. As a result, the requested relief is not substantially likely
to redress the youth plaintiffs’ injuries, even in part. Because the
youth plaintiffs do not have standing, we affirm the dismissal of
their statutory challenges for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 6
C. The Youth Plaintiffs’ Desired Declaration Would Be an
Advisory Opinion
¶45 The youth plaintiffs assert that their challenges to the
statutory provisions ought to move forward even if we conclude
that striking the provisions would not redress their injuries. They
ask the court for “guidance as to the constitutional parameters
governing” the government defendants’ “subsequent conduct.”
__________________________________________________________
6 The youth plaintiffs have alerted us to a Montana Supreme
Court decision that was issued after we heard oral argument in this
case. See Held v. State, 560 P.3d 1235 (Mont. 2024). There, the
Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that a
limitation found in the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA
limitation) violates the Montana Constitution,
id. at 1261, which—
unlike the Utah Constitution—expressly endows Montanans with
a fundamental right to a “clean and healthful environment,” MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 3; id. art. IX, § 1(1). Under the MEPA limitation,
environmental reviews could not, “except for narrowly defined
exceptions, . . . include an evaluation of greenhouse gas emissions
and corresponding impacts to the climate in the state or beyond the
state’s borders.” Held,
560 P.3d at 1244 (cleaned up). The limitation
was a categorical, “blanket prohibition,” banning governmental
consideration of climate change in the environmental review
process.
Id. at 1258.
In contrast, the provisions that the youth plaintiffs challenge
here do not prohibit the government defendants from considering
climate change or otherwise limit their discretion in a manner that
is likely to impact fossil fuel development. To the contrary, the
relevant statutes give the government defendants broad latitude in
carrying out their duties and expressly contemplate that state
officials will consider “the environmental impact” and the effect on
“human well-being and quality of life” in exercising that discretion.
UTAH CODE § 79-6-301(1)(a)(i), (b)(ii)(D) (2025). Thus, declaring the
provisions unconstitutional would not require the government
defendants to change their decision-making process in a way that
is likely to reduce fossil fuel development.
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But this request does not revive their challenges to the statutory
provisions; it merely substitutes a redressability problem with an
advisory-opinion problem.
¶46 Courts “are not supposed to be a forum for hearing
academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions.” Lyon v.
Bateman, 228 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah 1951). This principle applies
equally to claims brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Baird v. State,
574 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1978) (explaining that in
adjudicating a “declaratory action,” a court may not “pass upon the
constitutionality of [a] statute” where the plaintiff seeks “an
advisory opinion” or presents “a non-justiciable controversy”). The
Declaratory Judgment Act “cannot be so construed as to authorize
the courts to deliver advisory opinions or pronounce judgments on
abstract questions.”
Id. Instead, “there must be the invariable
justiciable controversy present in such cases.”
Id.
¶47 By definition, a justiciable controversy cannot be resolved
through an advisory opinion, for a justiciable controversy is “one
that is appropriate for judicial determination . . . as distinct from an
opinion or advice of what the law would be on a hypothetical state
of facts.” Lyon, 228 P.2d at 821 (cleaned up). In recognition of this
distinction, “our case law has firmly established that courts should
not render advisory opinions, or, in other words, answer abstract
questions”—which are questions that are “to be considered apart
from application to or association with a particular instance.” Salt
Lake Cnty. v. State,
2020 UT 27, ¶¶ 38, 47,
466 P.3d 158 (cleaned up).
This means, in short, that a court must dismiss claims that “are
better characterized as requests for advisory opinions regarding the
constitutionality of” a challenged statute. Id. ¶ 47.
¶48 By asking the court for judicial guidance about the
constitutionality of the government defendants’ subsequent
conduct, the youth plaintiffs ask the court to look past the concrete
question of whether the challenged statutory provisions are
constitutional and instead to pronounce judgment on the
hypothetical question of whether the government defendants’
future actions would be so. This we cannot do because answering
such a hypothetical question would require the court to divorce the
question from the facts. Because future conduct is necessarily
hypothetical, the youth plaintiffs’ request is better characterized as
a request for an advisory opinion. The district court is therefore
without subject-matter jurisdiction to opine on the question that the
youth plaintiffs want it to answer.
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT DOES NOT HAVE SUBJECT-MATTER
JURISDICTION OVER THE YOUTH PLAINTIFFS’ CHALLENGES TO THE
GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS’ CONDUCT BECAUSE THE CLAIMS ARE
NOT TIED TO ANY SPECIFIC STATE ACTION
¶49 The youth plaintiffs’ challenges to the government
defendants’ conduct fail for a different reason. Before a Utah court
can hear a declaratory judgment action, “there must be a justiciable
controversy.” Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983)
(cleaned up). In challenging the government defendants’ conduct,
the youth plaintiffs do not allege a concrete set of facts that would
give rise to a justiciable controversy. Without a justiciable
controversy, the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
those challenges.
¶50 For a controversy to be justiciable, it “must be definite and
concrete, touching the legal relation of the parties in adverse legal
interest, and must be a real and substantial controversy admitting
of specific relief through a decree conclusive in character.” Lyon v.
Bateman, 228 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1951) (cleaned up). A controversy
is not justiciable, then, if the parties hold merely “a difference or
dispute of hypothetical or abstract character.”
Id. (cleaned up). Nor
is a controversy justiciable if the “resulting legal rule” cannot “be
applied to a specific set of facts, thereby resolving a specific
controversy.” Salt Lake Cnty. v. State,
2020 UT 27, ¶ 2,
466 P.3d 158;
see also Salt Lake Cnty. v. Bangerter,
928 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1996)
(“[O]ur hands are tied because a justiciable controversy necessarily
involves an accrued state of facts . . . .” (cleaned up)).
¶51 This means that “to plead a justiciable controversy,
plaintiffs must plead concrete facts indicating a specific injury
sustained or threatened to the plaintiffs.” Salt Lake Cnty., 2020 UT
27, ¶ 42 (cleaned up). This concreteness requirement makes sense,
given that “courts are most competent in the exercise of their
function when they have a concrete factual context conducive to a
realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”
Jenkins,
675 P.2d at 1149 (cleaned up). The doctrine serves a number
of important functions, including “blocking the court from
rendering advisory opinions on matters that may not impact the
parties to a case, requiring a clear factual record prior to
adjudication, facilitating informed decisions that fit the
circumstances of individual cases, and preventing the court from
intruding on legislative functions by unnecessarily ruling on
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sensitive constitutional questions.” 7 Salt Lake Cnty., 2020 UT 27,
¶ 18 (cleaned up).
¶52 Applied here, these principles strip the district court of
subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on the youth plaintiffs’
challenges to the government defendants’ conduct. The youth
plaintiffs allege broadly that (1) the Governor develops goals,
objectives, and plans; (2) OED oversees plans, initiatives, and
programs; (3) the Energy Advisor advocates for projects,
coordinates regulatory processes, and recommends executive and
legislative actions; and (4) the State and OED coordinate to
challenge programs and initiatives that would reduce fossil fuel
development. But the challenges to the government defendants’
conduct are insufficiently concrete for the district court to make an
informed decision that fits the circumstances of the case or to
appreciate the consequences that would flow from the requested
relief. The youth plaintiffs have not challenged the constitutionality
of any specific state action, such as a granted permit or other
regulatory decision. As a result, the district court cannot apply the
law to a set of facts to determine whether such action is
unconstitutional.
¶53 To be sure, the youth plaintiffs are not vague in describing
the total effect of the government defendants’ actions. As to Utah’s
historical output of oil, natural gas, and coal, the youth plaintiffs
are quite specific, in fact. They allege that from 1960 to 2021,
government-sanctioned operations generated approximately
• 1,709,140,620 barrels of crude oil,
• 14,386,078,152,000 cubic feet of natural gas, and
• 931,247,641 short tons of coal.
And fossil fuel production in Utah is speeding up, not slowing
down, according to the youth plaintiffs. They allege that annual oil
production in Utah has more than doubled since 2003, that annual
natural-gas production has nearly quadrupled since 1960, and that
annual coal production has roughly tripled since 1960.
__________________________________________________________
7 Although we have listed these policy considerations as those
underlying the ripeness doctrine, see Salt Lake Cnty. v. State, 2020
UT 27, ¶ 18,
466 P.3d 158, “the policies underlying the ripeness
doctrine also underlie the advisory opinion rule,”
id. ¶ 18 n.13.
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Opinion of the Court
¶54 We do not discount these production estimates as being
vague, of course. Indeed, as with the link between adverse health
effects and climate change, we accept them as true. See supra ¶ 31.
But specific allegations about the cumulative result of Utah’s fossil
fuel operations do not make up for nondescript allegations about
the unconstitutional actions taken by the government defendants.
¶55 The youth plaintiffs maintain that they have brought a
facial challenge that does not require them to connect their claims
to any “particular circumstances.” They support this position by
referencing Held v. State, 560 P.3d 1235 (Mont. 2024), in which the
Montana Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not need to
identify “a specific permit” to challenge a statutory provision
under which environmental reviews could not, “except for
narrowly defined exceptions, . . . include an evaluation of
greenhouse gas emissions and corresponding impacts to the
climate in the state or beyond the state’s borders.”
Id. at 1244, 1255–
56 (cleaned up). The court explained that such specificity would be
required for an “‘as applied’ constitutional challenge,” but was
unnecessary for a facial challenge.
Id. at 1255–56. Because the
plaintiffs had “alleged the statute was facially unconstitutional—
that no set of circumstances exists where the State could prohibit
state agencies from analyzing [greenhouse gas] emissions in all
permitting actions”—it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to bring
their challenge “within the context of a particular permit.”
Id.
¶56 We agree with the youth plaintiffs that their challenges to
the statutory provisions are facial challenges, which, by definition,
are not tied to any particular circumstances because they require a
plaintiff “to establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the statute would be valid.” In re Adoption of K.T.B., 2020 UT
51, ¶ 3 n.2,
472 P.3d 843 (cleaned up). As we understand their
complaint, however, the youth plaintiffs—unlike the plaintiffs in
Held—challenge not only statutes, but also government conduct,
specifically, the “historic and ongoing systematic authorization of
fossil fuel development.” Unlike a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute, a constitutional challenge to
government conduct must be tied to a concrete set of facts. A court
cannot declare conduct unconstitutional unless it can define the
unconstitutional conduct clearly, and a court cannot define
unconstitutional conduct clearly unless the plaintiffs first “frame
their constitutional challenges in the context of a specific factual
dispute.” Salt Lake Cnty.,
2020 UT 27, ¶ 42. Without that framing,
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the youth plaintiffs’ conduct challenges “are merely requests for
advisory opinions” and are not justiciable. 8 See id.
III. THE YOUTH PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE
¶57 Having concluded that the district court does not have
subject-matter jurisdiction over the youth plaintiffs’ claims as
pleaded, we now consider whether the claims should be dismissed
with or without prejudice. The youth plaintiffs object to the district
court’s decision to dismiss the claims with prejudice. And the
government defendants appear to concede that if we affirm on
subject-matter-jurisdiction grounds, the claims should be
dismissed without prejudice. We agree.
¶58 When a district court determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction based on a complaint’s allegations, it may
“direct the plaintiff to amend the pleading,” or it may “dismiss
without prejudice so that the plaintiff can later file an amended
complaint.” Salt Lake Cnty. v. State, 2020 UT 27, ¶ 27,
466 P.3d 158
(cleaned up). In the proceedings below, the youth plaintiffs did not
seek leave to amend their complaint. So once the district court
determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, it should have
dismissed the complaint without prejudice, providing the youth
plaintiffs an opportunity to cure the jurisdictional deficiencies in a
repleaded complaint.
CONCLUSION
¶59 Because the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
we affirm the dismissal of the complaint under rule 12(b)(1) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The challenge to the energy policy
provision is moot. And the youth plaintiffs lack standing to
challenge the remaining statutory provisions because there is no
substantial likelihood that declaring the provisions
__________________________________________________________
8 The youth plaintiffs also contend that the district court’s
decision deprived them of their right to their “day in court” under
the Open Courts Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Utah
Constitution. (Quoting Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, ¶ 38,
44 P.3d 663.) But any constitutional right to a day in court cannot
extend to claims the court is barred from adjudicating. See Miller,
2002 UT 6, ¶ 38 (“Parties to a suit . . . are constitutionally entitled to
litigate any justiciable controversy between them, i.e., they are
entitled to their day in court.” (emphasis added)).
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Opinion of the Court
unconstitutional would redress the youth plaintiffs’ injuries.
Although the youth plaintiffs invite a broader declaration outlining
the parameters of their asserted rights, the court does not issue such
advisory opinions. And the challenges to government conduct are
not justiciable because they are not based on a specific set of facts.
But because the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should not have
resulted in a dismissal with prejudice, we vacate the order and
judgment and remand for the district court to enter a dismissal
without prejudice.
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