State v. Hunt

                This opinion is subject to revision before final
                     publication in the Pacific Reporter

                                

                                   IN THE

      SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

                             STATE OF UTAH,
                                Appellee,
                                      v.
                           JONATHAN HUNT,
                              Appellant.

                            No. 20240092
                         Heard May 7, 2025
                      Filed November 13, 2025

                           On Direct Appeal

              Third District Court, Salt Lake County
               The Honorable William K. Kendall
                          No. 181403657

                          Attorneys:
  Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Connor Nelson, Asst. Solic. Gen.,
                  Salt Lake City, for appellee
         Nathalie S. Skibine, Salt Lake City, for appellant

  JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,
          JUSTICE HAGEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.


   JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:
                          INTRODUCTION
   ¶1 A jury convicted Jonathan Hunt of murder. At trial, Hunt
admitted to the shooting, but claimed that he acted in self-defense.
Hunt testified that when he fired, he believed the man he shot was
reaching for a weapon. But in reality, the man was unarmed.
   ¶2 The district court instructed the jury on both perfect and
imperfect self-defense. Additionally, Hunt asked the court to give
                           STATE v. HUNT
                       Opinion of the Court

another instruction specifically advising the jury that actual danger
is not an element of self-defense; apparent danger is enough. The
trial court declined to do so, concluding that this concept was
already covered by the other self-defense instructions. But the court
assured Hunt’s counsel that he was free to make this argument in
closing. Counsel did so, but the jury still convicted Hunt of murder.
Hunt now appeals the trial court’s refusal to include his proposed
jury instruction.
    ¶3 Hunt also raises two claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. First, he argues that his counsel should have objected
when some witnesses used the word “victim” during their
testimony to refer to the man Hunt shot. Second, Hunt argues that
his counsel should have objected when the State played portions of
a 911 call that he asserts were unduly prejudicial.
   ¶4 We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
deciding not to give Hunt’s proposed jury instruction, and Hunt
did not receive ineffective assistance from his counsel.
Accordingly, we affirm.
                         BACKGROUND1
    ¶5 Shortly after entering a Rancherito’s Mexican Food
restaurant in West Valley, defendant Jonathan Hunt shot a man,
who we will refer to as N.L.2 N.L. was unarmed and died from the
two gunshot wounds he sustained.
   ¶6 The events leading to the shooting began about four
months prior, when Hunt’s friend Jackson* had a falling out with
N.L. Jackson’s girlfriend at the time had confided in N.L., telling
him that she was unhappy in her relationship with Jackson. When
N.L. tried to relay this message to Jackson, he did not take it well.
Jackson thought N.L. was trying to interfere in his relationship and

__________________________________________________________
   1 “When reviewing a jury verdict, we examine the evidence and

all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the verdict,
reciting the facts accordingly. We present conflicting evidence only
when necessary to understand issues raised on appeal.” State v.
Heaps, 

, 

 (cleaned up).
   2 Consistent with the prosecution’s filings, we refer to the victim

by his initials to protect his privacy. All other names marked with
an asterisk are pseudonyms used to preserve the privacy of
witnesses and other individuals.

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Jackson “cut him off” completely. The two did not speak again until
the day of the shooting.
   ¶7 On that day, Jackson went to a coffee shop with Hunt and
Hunt’s girlfriend, Anne.* When they arrived, N.L. was there.
Jackson was “astonished to see him,” still hurt from the way things
had ended between them. Given their history, Jackson, Hunt, and
Anne “left almost immediately.”
    ¶8 After leaving the coffee shop, Jackson messaged N.L. on
Snapchat and said, “You got me fucked up. Don’t ever look at me
or try to talk to [my ex-girlfriend] ever again. If you ever see me
again, do not approach me or try to make eye contact with me
again.” N.L. replied, “[Jackson], you need to calm down, honestly.
I’m sorry I tried to help. I only ever wanted to help.” Jackson
responded, “Laugh my ducking fucking ass off. You’re lucky I
didn’t come smash on you when you did this shit. I’m not mad
about what happened between us. You stepped out of line. You
fucked that shit up. That’s what you have the answer for.”
   ¶9 Later that night, Jackson looked up N.L.’s location on
Snapchat. N.L. was at Rancherito’s. Jackson, Hunt, and Anne drove
there together. Hunt got out of the car first to see if N.L. was inside.
After confirming he was, Hunt signaled to Jackson to join him
outside the Rancherito’s. Anne stayed in the car.
    ¶10 According to Hunt, at this point Jackson turned around,
“lift[ed] up his shirt and pull[ed] out a gun,” handing it to him.
Hunt described it “like a complete hot potato moment,” saying that
Jackson just “tossed” the gun into his hands. Hunt claimed that he
then hid the gun under his shirt, went inside the Rancherito’s, and
walked straight to the bathroom. Inside, Hunt tucked the gun into
his waistband, tightened his belt, and covered the gun with his
shirt.
   ¶11 Jackson denied this account. According to Jackson, not
only did he not give the gun to Hunt that night, but he had never
seen the gun before Hunt used it to shoot N.L.
   ¶12 When Hunt left the bathroom, he saw Jackson already
seated at a table with N.L. and N.L.’s friend, Brian.* Hunt
approached the table and sensed that tensions were high between
Jackson and N.L. Brian testified that Jackson was “super
aggressive” and that he started “yelling at [N.L.] about some
bullshit.” From this point forward, Hunt’s account of what
happened differs from the other witnesses’.


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                           STATE v. HUNT
                       Opinion of the Court

    ¶13 According to Jackson, Hunt joined the argument and
punched N.L.’s head from behind. N.L. then turned in his seat and
began to rise. Brian testified that N.L. appeared surprised and said,
“You hit me for no reason.” He stated that N.L. seemed to take a
defensive stance, with his feet “square[d] up” and his fists raised,
“prepared to duke it out and fight like a man.” But before N.L.
could fully stand, Hunt shot him twice. Corroborating this account,
a bystander testified that Hunt drew his gun as N.L. was standing
and that N.L. “never made it to a standing position before” Hunt
fired.
    ¶14 Hunt tells the story differently, claiming, “I shot [N.L.] to
defend my life. I did not murder him.” According to Hunt, while
he was standing at the table, N.L. looked at him and asked him
“what the fuck [he] was looking at and told [him] to mind [his] own
business.” Hunt claims he then heard N.L. say, “You’re dead,
bitches.” At this point, Hunt says that N.L. “shot up” out of his seat
and “reached for a gun.” Hunt admitted that he never saw a
weapon. But he testified at trial that, “In that moment, sir, I knew
he had a gun.”
   ¶15 No gun was found in N.L.’s possession.
    ¶16 When asked whether he shot N.L. twice, Hunt responded,
“I now know that he had two bullet wounds. But at the moment, I
was only aware of pulling the trigger once. But I did know I shot
him because of how he fell.” Jackson, too, described N.L. falling to
the floor after being shot “like someone cut the strings of a puppet,
straight down.” Jackson and Hunt then ran out of the restaurant,
back to the car, and drove away.
    ¶17 Still inside the restaurant, Brian began applying pressure
to N.L.’s wounds and called 911 to report the shooting. The 911
operator walked Brian through the steps of performing CPR until
emergency medical services personnel arrived. But despite these
lifesaving efforts, N.L. succumbed to his injuries and was later
pronounced dead at the hospital. Meanwhile, Hunt, Jackson, and
Anne drove back to Jackson’s apartment.
    ¶18 Hunt was arrested the following morning. The State
charged Hunt with murder and felony discharge of a firearm with
serious bodily injury, both first degree felonies.
                                Trial
   ¶19 Hunt’s case proceeded to trial, and he testified in his own
defense. Hunt admitted to shooting N.L, but argued that he had

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acted in self-defense. Hunt’s version of events relied primarily on
his own testimony and his stated belief that N.L. was armed and
reaching for a weapon. The State contested this narrative. We focus
on the portions of the trial that are relevant to this appeal.
                     Use of the Term “Victim”
  ¶20 During the State’s case in chief, five witnesses used the
word “victim” to refer to N.L. at some point in their testimony. And
Hunt’s counsel did not object.
    ¶21 Three of the witnesses to the incident referred to N.L. as
the “victim” at times. Jackson used the word “victim” twice: once
to identify N.L. as the person he saw in the coffee shop that day,
and again when he explained that after Hunt punched N.L. in the
head, “the victim turned and got out of his chair.” Brian used the
term once in cross-examination to refer to N.L. and twice when
recalling and reading aloud a report of statements he had made to
a detective on the night of the shooting. And a Rancherito’s
employee used the word “victim” four times to identify N.L.
generally, noting that he saw “the victim and his buddy sitting” in
the restaurant, that he saw two men “walk[] over to the victim’s
direction,” again that he saw “two guys . . . walk[] over to the
victim,” and that he looked to “where the victim was sitting. And
[] noticed that he was on the floor already.” The employee also used
the word twice when explaining that police officers asked over the
phone to see “if the victim was still breathing.”
   ¶22 And two of the responding officers also used the term
during their testimony. A police officer who arrived at the scene
before N.L. was taken to the hospital recounted that he had seen
“the victim” lying on the ground unresponsive. And another officer
who arrived later used “victim” twice: to identify the person who
had been taken to the hospital, and to identify the person to whom
another officer had rendered first aid.
   ¶23 In total, N.L. was referred to as the “victim” fourteen times
by witnesses, without objection from the defense.
                           911 Recording
   ¶24 During the State’s direct examination of Brian, it played a
recording of the full 911 call that Brian made on the night of the
shooting. Hunt’s counsel did not object to any portion of the
recording being played for the jury.




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                           STATE v. HUNT
                       Opinion of the Court

    ¶25 The call began with Brian reporting the general facts of the
shooting, such as the address of the restaurant and a description of
what had happened: “two guys walked in. They were just talking
shit. I don’t know what the fuck was going on between them. It
sounded like a girl dispute. My friend got shot—my friend got
punched right in the face, and they pulled out a gun . . . and shot
him. Yeah, I’m with him now. He’s on the ground bleeding.”
    ¶26 As the call continued, Brian explained to the operator that
N.L. was beginning to lose consciousness and had “blood coming
out of his mouth.” The operator instructed him to find a clean towel
to use in applying pressure to the wound. Brian confirmed: “I have
a clean rag, and I’m shoving it on the wound.” The operator then
told Brian that he needed to perform CPR and talked him through
the steps: “Just make sure he’s flat on his back, place the heel of
your hand on the breastbone in the center of the chest . . . .” Brian
followed these instructions and performed CPR, counting aloud
with the operator over the phone.
                          Jury Instructions
   ¶27 At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury on the law
governing the case—including instructions on perfect and
imperfect self-defense. These instructions were largely taken from
the Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition (MUJI). See
MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS CR531–33, CR1451–52.3
   ¶28 Unsatisfied with the MUJI instructions alone, Hunt’s
counsel requested an additional instruction specifically informing
the jury that, for purposes of self-defense, it does not matter
whether there was “real” danger, as long as there was an
“appearance of peril.” Counsel argued that this instruction was
important to Hunt’s defense, because Hunt claimed it appeared to
him that N.L. was reaching for a gun, even though it turned out
that he was wrong. The proposed instruction read:
       You are instructed that actual danger is not necessary
       to establish self-defense. If one is confronted by the
       appearance of peril which arouses in his mind, as a
       reasonable person, and he believes that he is about to
__________________________________________________________
   3 The MUJI instructions are drafted by a committee of the Utah

Judicial Council with the aim of accurately stating the law “using
simple structure and, where possible, words of ordinary meaning.”
UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 3-418.

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       suffer death or serious bodily injury, or is about to be
       the victim of a forcible felony, and if a reasonable
       person in a like situation, seeing and knowing the
       same facts, would be justified in believing himself or
       another in danger, his right to self-defense is the same
       whether such danger is real or merely apparent.
This language was drawn from an almost identical instruction
found in State v. Starks, 

, 91 n.2 (Utah 1981).4
    ¶29 The court decided not to include Hunt’s proposed
instruction, reasoning that it was “duplicative” of the MUJI
instructions. And it noted that counsel could “still make the same
arguments based upon” the instructions the court would give.
   ¶30 And during closing arguments, trial counsel did argue this
apparent-danger-versus-real-danger distinction to the jury:
       And this idea that no gun was found, no gun was
       seen—nowhere did you hear in any evidence—the
       judge didn’t tell you that [N.L.] must have been
       armed, and he must have been shot at before he has a
       right to defend himself. You have the right to defend
       yourself if it was—from the circumstances that you
       all have to look at. Put yourself in the situation there,
       and what was presented? You’re dead, bitches, stand
       up in an angry, aggressive manner. And he said
       nothing about putting his hand in his pocket. He said
       he reached around his back, and he believed he was
       grabbing a weapon. Was that reasonable? Based on
       his experiences of TV and movies, that’s a
       threatening, hostile manner.
       If someone did that to a police officer after
       threatening a police officer, that police officer is not
       going to wait for that person to pull his hand around,
       because then their partners will be going to their
       house and saying, “We’re sorry. Your husband is
       dead. He hesitated.” Nothing in the law requires that.
       Nothing in the law requires that they prove there was
       an actual gun, because real danger isn’t required. It
__________________________________________________________
   4  We identify some differences between Hunt’s proposed
instruction and the one quoted in State v. Starks later in this opinion.
See infra ¶ 62 n.11.

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                            STATE v. HUNT
                        Opinion of the Court

       only needs to be apparent—if it appeared that his life
       was in danger, if it was reasonable for him to believe
       after being told “You’re dead, bitches” and being
       stood up in an angry manner, an aggressive manner,
       and reaching behind his back like he’s grabbing a
       weapon.
       Even if he was grabbing a comb, it would not change
       the fact that at that particular moment, that furtive
       movement was consistent with making someone
       believe that they were endangered. And that’s what
       happened. And the conduct afterwards—they would
       have you believe that somehow he was this coldblooded killer who just went in there and decided to
       do this.
   ¶31 After deliberation, the jury found Hunt guilty of murder
and felony discharge of a firearm. Hunt appeals his convictions.
   ¶32 We have jurisdiction under Utah Code subsection 78A-3-
102(3)(i).
                     STANDARD OF REVIEW
   ¶33 Hunt raises three issues for our consideration.
    ¶34 First, Hunt challenges the district court’s refusal to give his
proposed jury instruction. Our precedent regarding the standard
of review for a district court’s refusal to give jury instructions has
caused some confusion. We discuss this issue more fully below. See
infra ¶¶ 39–42. Here, we review the district court’s rejection of
Hunt’s requested supplemental instruction for an abuse of
discretion. This is because Hunt’s challenge to the court’s refusal is
not a legal one—he does not argue that the instructions given were
legally incorrect or that he was legally entitled to an instruction that
the court refused to give. He argues only that his proposed
instruction would have made the law clearer to the jury on an issue
that was already covered in other jury instructions. This type of
decision falls within the district court’s discretion. See infra ¶ 47.
   ¶35 Second, Hunt makes two claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Because these claims are raised for the first time on appeal,
there is no standard of review.
   ¶36 Third, Hunt argues that these errors, together, prejudiced
him. Under the cumulative error doctrine, appellate courts apply
“the standard of review applicable to each underlying claim of


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error.” State v. Perea, 

, 

 (cleaned up).
We reverse only if the cumulative effect of multiple errors
undermines our confidence that a fair trial was had. State v.
Martinez-Castellanos, 

, 

.
                             ANALYSIS
    ¶37 We first address Hunt’s argument that the district court
should have given his proposed apparent-danger jury instruction.
We begin by clarifying the applicable standard of review. We then
turn to the merits and conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in declining to give the proposed instruction.
    ¶38 We then consider Hunt’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. Because both are unsuccessful, we then dispose of Hunt’s
remaining claim of cumulative error because there are no errors to
accumulate.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING
   TO GIVE HUNT’S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL JURY INSTRUCTION

   A. The Applicable Standard of Review
    ¶39 There has been some confusion about the standard of
review for a district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction. About
thirteen years ago, in Miller v. Utah Department of Transportation, this
court addressed this topic and held that “we review a district
court’s refusal to give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. But
in certain circumstances, the court’s discretion will be strictly
cabined.” 

, 

 (cleaned up). We gave
some examples of when a court’s discretion would be “strictly
cabined,” observing that “a criminal defendant is generally entitled
to have the charged offense defined for the jury,” and “parties are
entitled to have their theories of the case submitted to the jury in
the court’s instructions, provided there is competent evidence to
support them.” 

 (cleaned up). And we explained that in those
circumstances, “refusal constitutes an error of law, and an error of
law always constitutes an abuse of discretion.” 

 ¶ 13 n.1.
    ¶40 However, the court of appeals recently observed that,
“there remains confusion as to when the trial court’s discretion will
be narrowly constrained such that the refusal to give a jury
instruction constitutes an error of law.” State v. Smith, 

, ¶ 17 n.3, 

 (cleaned up) (collecting cases in which
the court of appeals reviewed a district court’s refusal to give a
requested jury instruction for correctness without mention of Miller



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                           STATE v. HUNT
                        Opinion of the Court

or the abuse of discretion standard).5 The court of appeals
“flag[ged] the issue for consideration in a future case, noting the
apparent lack of clarity in Utah law as to the appropriate standard
of review for the refusal to give a requested jury instruction.” 

(cleaned up). We take the court of appeals’ point.
    ¶41 A district court might refuse to give a jury instruction in a
variety of contexts, for a variety of reasons. And while we have
expounded upon how Miller should be applied in various settings,6
we concede that in a good number of cases involving a district
court’s refusal to give a jury instruction, we have simply applied
the standard of review that corresponds with the nature of the issue
presented, without reference to Miller or the abuse of discretion
standard. See, e.g., State v. Reece, 

, 

 (“A
trial court’s refusal to grant a lesser included offense instruction is
a question of law, which we review for correctness.”(cleaned up));
State v. Lambdin, 

, 

 (noting “we review

__________________________________________________________
   5 The court of appeals listed the following cases: “State v. Rivera,

, 

 (reviewing ‘a trial court’s
refusal to give a requested jury instruction for correctness’ with no
mention of the abuse of discretion standard set forth
in Miller (cleaned up)); State v. Dozah, 

, 

 (same); State v. Karren, 

, 

 (identifying the standard of review for refusal to give a jury
instruction as abuse of discretion, but concluding that ‘the district
court did not err’ in denying to give the requested jury
instruction).”
   6 See State v. Berriel, 

, 

 (“‘The refusal

to give a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of
discretion . . . .’ The precise amount of deference we afford on
review depends on the type of issue presented.” (quoting Miller,

)); USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 

, ¶ 75
& n.82, 

 (noting that “in certain circumstances the
court’s discretion in declining to give jury instructions ‘will be
strictly cabined’” (quoting Miller, 

) and including
footnote providing two specific instances where discretion would
be strictly cabined (quoting Miller, 

)); Arnold v.
Grigsby, 

, 

 (reviewing contested jury
instruction and noting that a “trial court abuses its discretion when
it ‘relie[s] on an erroneous conclusion of law’” (quoting USA Power,

)).

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a court’s ruling on a proposed jury instruction for correctness”
(cleaned up)); Jensen v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 

,

 (“We review a trial court’s ruling concerning a jury
instruction for correctness without deference to its interpretation of
the law.” (cleaned up)).
    ¶42 While this is inconsistent with our guidance in Miller, it is
consistent with the evolution of our treatment of standards of
review more generally. For over a decade, we have trended toward
assigning standards of review more categorically based on the
nature of the issue on appeal—be it factual, legal, mixed, or subject
to the district court’s discretion. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Dep’t of Workforce
Servs., 

, ¶ 11, 

 (“[I]n our more recent cases
we have applied a binary method for determining the appropriate
standard of review for mixed questions.”); Randolph v. State, 

, 

 (noting the move away from this court’s
previous “broad spectrum approach” to determining the
appropriate standard of review because of “its tendency to produce
indefinite standards that prove difficult to describe and even more
difficult to predict and apply” (cleaned up)); Smith v. Volkswagen
SouthTowne, Inc., 

, ¶ 40 n.10, 

 (abrogating an
earlier case’s holding regarding the applicable standard of review
because it had been “overtaken by our streamlining of our
standards of review”). And while we stand by the general
principles enunciated in Miller, any confusion caused by our use of
the “strictly cabined” terminology can be avoided by bringing
those principles in line with our more categorical, streamlined
approach.
    ¶43 We clarify that the applicable standard of review for jury
instruction issues should be determined as it is for any other issue
on appeal. In general, the standard of review is based on the nature
of the issue on appeal. State ex rel. E.R., 

, 

 (“The appropriate standard of review for a lower court’s
decision is dependent upon the nature of the issue.” (cleaned up)).
We ask whether the issue presents a legal question, a factual
question, a mixed question, or whether it falls in an area over which
district courts generally exercise discretion. And the answer to this
question determines the standard of review. See Monarrez v. Utah
Dep’t of Transp., 

, 

 (purely “legal
questions,” such as statutory interpretation and the grant of
summary judgment, are “reviewed for correctness”); State ex rel.
E.R., 

 (“We review determinations of fact with a
highly deferential standard, overturning the lower court only when

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                            STATE v. HUNT
                        Opinion of the Court

clearly erroneous.” (cleaned up)); Randolph, 

(explaining that law-like mixed questions are “reviewed de novo”
and fact-like mixed questions are reviewed deferentially and
overturned only when they are “clearly erroneous”); Goggin v.
Goggin, 

, 

 (“The trial court in a divorce
action is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the
financial and property interests of the parties . . . .Accordingly, we
will not disturb a district court’s appointment of marital property
unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion.” (cleaned
up)); Volkswagen SouthTowne, Inc., 

 (“We apply an
abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a [district court’s]
decision to grant or deny a new trial.” (cleaned up)). The same is
true for jury instructions. And we clarify that this court’s past
“broad spectrum approach,” Randolph v. State, 

(cleaned up), characterized by various degrees of discretion—be it
“strictly cabin[ed]” or “narrowly constrained”—has been
overtaken by our current practices.
    ¶44 Generally, appellate issues involving jury instructions will
be subject to either an abuse of discretion or a correctness standard
of review.
     ¶45 A district court generally has discretion in deciding how it
will instruct a jury at trial, as “jury instructions require no
particular form so long as they accurately convey the law.” Meeks
v. Peng, 

, 

 (cleaned up). If the jury
instructions are legally correct, “the precise wording and specificity
of jury instructions is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”

 (cleaned up). In other words, parties are entitled to have the jury
instructed accurately on the law, but they are “not entitled to have
the jury instructed with any particular wording.” State v. Marchet,

, 

 (cleaned up). And a trial court
may refuse to give a proposed instruction “if the point is properly
covered in other instructions.” State v. Maestas, 

,

 (cleaned up). Jury instruction issues that fall within
the district court’s discretion will, of course, be subject to an abuse
of discretion standard. See, e.g., Smith, 

.
    ¶46 Other jury instruction issues will present a question of law,
subject to a correctness standard. See, e.g., Monarrez, 

.
For example, if a criminal defendant asserts that the district court
did not provide an instruction to which the defendant was legally
entitled (like an instruction on a lesser-included offense or an
affirmative defense for which there was an evidentiary basis), or


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gave a legally incorrect instruction, the applicable standard of
review would be correctness.7 See Reece, 

 (lesser-included offense); State v. Dozah, 

, 

 (affirmative defense); State v. Eyre, 

, 

 (legally erroneous jury instructions).
    ¶47 With this in mind, we review the district court’s decision
not to give Hunt’s proposed apparent-danger instruction for an
abuse of discretion. Hunt does not argue that the jury instructions
were legally incorrect without his proposed instruction. Nor does
he argue that he was legally entitled to the instruction. Rather, he
asserts that self-defense and imperfect self-defense are confusing
concepts, and that his proposed instruction would have clarified
that actual danger is not necessary in a self-defense claim. Whether
to give an additional clarifying instruction is the type of decision
that falls within a district court’s discretion.
    ¶48 Thus, we review this issue for an abuse of discretion. And
we will affirm if the jury instructions, taken as a whole, accurately
instruct the jury on the applicable law.
   B. Hunt’s Proposed Jury Instruction
    ¶49 Hunt argues that the district court abused its discretion by
declining to supplement the perfect and imperfect self-defense
instructions with his proposed apparent-danger instruction.
   ¶50 With respect to perfect self-defense, a person is justified in
using force “likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if”
the person “reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent
death or serious bodily injury to the individual or another
individual as a result of imminent use of unlawful force, or to
prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-
402(2)(b). A person acts in imperfect self-defense, which reduces a
murder conviction to manslaughter, when the person “caused the
death of another individual . . . under a reasonable belief that the
__________________________________________________________
   7 When the Miller court described a district court’s discretion as

being “strictly cabined,” 

, the examples it gave
indicate that it was essentially referring to legal requirements that
must be met when instructing a jury, 

 ¶ 13 & n.1 (explaining, for
example, that “a criminal defendant is generally entitled to have
the charged offense defined for the jury,” and failure to do so
“constitutes an error of law, and an error of law always constitutes
an abuse of discretion”).

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circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for the
conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or
excusable under the existing circumstances.” 

 § 76-5-203(4)(a),
(c). Thus, in a trial where self-defense is at issue, the “ultimate
question before the trier of fact remains the reasonableness of a
defendant’s belief that force was necessary to defend against
another’s imminent use of unlawful force.” State v. Walker, 

, 

.
    ¶51 Here, the district court instructed the jury on both self-defense and imperfect self-defense with language that mirrored the
applicable statutes. The court’s self-defense instruction stated in
relevant part:
       You must decide whether the defense of Defense-ofSelf applies in this case. Under that defense, the
       defendant is justified in using force against another
       person when and to the extent that the defendant
       reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend
       himself against another person’s imminent use of
       unlawful force. The defendant is justified in using
       force intended or likely to cause death or serious
       bodily injury only if the defendant reasonably
       believes that, (1), force is necessary to prevent death
       or serious bodily injury to the defendant or a third
       person as a result of another person’s imminent use
       of unlawful force; or, (2), to prevent the commission
       of a forcible felony, such as aggravated assault.8
    ¶52 The court provided additional instructions to further
explain some of the terms used in the self-defense instruction. To
expand on what it meant for a defendant to have a “reasonabl[e]
belie[f] that force is necessary,” the court provided a definition of
“reasonableness.” The instruction stated, “Reasonableness shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the
then existing circumstances.”
   ¶53 The court also instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense, stating in relevant part:
       You must consider imperfect self-defense only if you
       find the defendant guilty of murder. Imperfect self-defense is a partial defense to murder. It applies when
__________________________________________________________
   8 “Forcible felony” was defined in another instruction.



                                 14
                         Cite as: 

                        Opinion of the Court

       the defendant caused the death of another while
       incorrectly, but reasonably, believing that his conduct
       was legally justified or excused. The effect of the
       defense is to reduce the level of the offense.
       ....
       In considering the matter of acting with imperfect
       self-defense, you are instructed that the defendant
       does not have to establish such a defense by any
       burden of proof. Rather, if there is some evidence
       which tends to show that the defendant acted under
       circumstances where he believed he was entitled to
       defend himself, although under the law he was not
       entitled to use deadly force, the State must prove
       beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
       act under such circumstances.
    ¶54 The instructions also made clear that the burden lies with
the State to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that perfect self-defense does not apply.” They likewise explained that the
defendant bore no burden to prove imperfect self-defense; instead,
“the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that imperfect
self-defense does not apply.”
   ¶55 Hunt asked the court to supplement these instructions
with an additional one that covered much of the same ground, but
emphasized that “actual danger” is not necessary for self-defense:
       You are instructed that actual danger is not necessary
       to establish self-defense. If one is confronted by the
       appearance of peril which arouses in his mind, as a
       reasonable person, and he believes that he is about to
       suffer death or serious bodily injury, or is about to be
       the victim of a forcible felony, and if a reasonable
       person in a like situation, seeing and knowing the
       same facts, would be justified in believing himself or
       another in danger, his right to self-defense is the same
       whether such danger is real or apparent.
   ¶56 This instruction was drawn nearly verbatim from a 1981
case, State v. Starks, 

, 91 n.2 (Utah 1981). We say “nearly”
verbatim because the second sentence of the proposed instruction
modifies some of the language from the Starks instruction. See infra
¶ 62 n.11.



                                  15
                           STATE v. HUNT
                        Opinion of the Court

    ¶57 The district court declined to give the requested
instruction. It concluded that the requested instruction was
duplicative of the perfect and imperfect self-defense instructions
the parties had agreed upon, and that those instructions adequately
conveyed the point Hunt wanted to make.9
   ¶58 Hunt argues that this was an abuse of discretion. He first
contends that his proposed instruction “was a correct statement of
law.”10 But the issue here is not whether his proposed instruction


__________________________________________________________
   9 The district court also correctly observed that in State v. Starks,

this court did not opine on the general correctness of the
instruction. In that case, the defendant was charged with seconddegree murder and claimed self-defense at trial. 

(Utah 1981). The district court gave jury instructions on self-defense
that were “worded in the exact terms of the statute” in place at the
time. 

. The defendant asked the court to give an additional
instruction that “would have apprised the jury that it could
consider defendant’s prior knowledge of the violent propensities of
the victim in evaluating the reasonableness of defendant’s
apprehension at the time of the fatal encounter.” 

. The
district court refused the defendant’s requested instruction and
instead gave the instruction that Hunt draws upon here. 

 at 91
n.2. On appeal, the Starks court concluded that “although the
instruction given properly informed the jury that defendant must
have reasonably believed that the force he used against decedent
was necessary to defend himself against decedent’s imminent use
of unlawful force,” the district court had erred in giving it instead
of the requested instruction because the given instruction “did not
expressly focus the jury’s attention on the prior violent acts of the
victim which may reasonably have colored defendant’s attitude at
the time of the encounter.” 

 (cleaned up). Thus, in this case,
the district court was correct that in Starks this court did not opine
on the general correctness of Hunt’s requested instruction.
   10  Hunt argues that “the court’s analysis of the proposed
instruction suggested the court disagreed with the principle the
instruction articulated.” We disagree. At no point did the court say
anything suggesting that it thought actual danger was a required
element of self-defense, or that the point Hunt wanted to make was
legally incorrect. Rather, it ultimately concluded that the point was
adequately covered in the other self-defense instructions.

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                         Cite as: 

                        Opinion of the Court

was legally correct. The real question is whether the district court
was required to give it.
   ¶59 Hunt further argues that his proposed instruction was
necessary to clarify that actual danger is not a prerequisite for self-defense. He does not argue that the court’s instructions erroneously
suggested that actual danger was an element of self-defense—just
that his additional instruction was necessary to avoid confusion.
    ¶60 “A party is not entitled to have the jury instructed with any
particular wording.” Marchet, 

 (cleaned up).
“So long as they correctly state the law, the precise wording and
specificity of jury instructions is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court.” Meeks, 

 (cleaned up). Moreover, “a
district court does not necessarily abuse its discretion when it
refuses to give every instruction requested by a party.” State v.
Devan, 

, 

, cert. denied, 

 (Utah 2025). To the contrary, “if the point is properly covered
in other instructions,” Maestas, 

 (cleaned up), and
“the instructions, read as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on
applicable law,” Marchet, 

 (cleaned up), the
court has discretion to refuse a request for a particular jury
instruction. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing the instruction Hunt requested.
    ¶61 First, the court’s instructions on self-defense and imperfect
self-defense adequately communicated that actual danger is not an
element of self-defense. The jury instructions explained that the
defendant need only show that he “reasonably believe[d] that force
was necessary to defend himself.” (Emphasis added.) And in line
with this instruction, defense counsel was able to argue in closing
that a reasonable belief can be based on apparent danger and does
not require actual danger.
    ¶62 Second, much of Hunt’s proposed instruction overlapped
with the existing self-defense instructions. While Hunt’s
instruction differed in that it explicitly stated that “actual danger is
not necessary to establish self-defense” and that a person’s “right
to self-defense is the same whether such danger is real or merely
apparent,” the rest of it duplicated the court’s other instructions.11

__________________________________________________________
   11 We also note that the language used in the proposed
instruction was difficult to follow. The instruction is written in
                                                   (continued . . .)

                                  17
                           STATE v. HUNT
                        Opinion of the Court

    ¶63 In sum, we conclude that the jury instructions, when read
as a whole, fairly instructed the jury on the law of self-defense, both
perfect and imperfect. They did not mislead the jury as to the
relevant legal standard, nor was the jury insufficiently or
erroneously advised on the law. And the instructions adequately
conveyed the concepts contained in Hunt’s proposed instruction,
allowing defense counsel to argue that actual danger is not
necessary in a self-defense claim. Beyond that, the court was not
required to use the specific phrasing that Hunt requested—
especially where the proposed instruction was duplicative of other
instructions and not written in particularly clear language.
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
give the instruction Hunt requested.
II. TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT PROVIDE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
    ¶64 Hunt argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial. The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the effective
assistance of counsel. And we evaluate claims of ineffective
assistance under the standard articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 

, 687–96
(1984). See State v. Sessions, 

, 

.


__________________________________________________________
long, run-on sentences, rather than the clear language for which the
MUJI committee strives. And the second sentence of the proposed
instruction changes the language from Starks in a way that does not
make sense. The Starks instruction says, “If one is confronted by the
appearance of peril which arouses in his mind, as a reasonable
person, an honest conviction that he is about to suffer death or
serious bodily injury . . . .” 

 n.2 (emphasis added). But
the second sentence of the proposed instruction was modified to
say: “If one is confronted by the appearance of peril which arouses
in his mind, as a reasonable person, and he believes that he is about
to suffer death or serious bodily injury . . . .” (Emphasis added.) In
the original language from Starks, “the appearance of peril” is the
subject, “arouses” is the verb, and the direct object is “an honest
conviction.” But in Hunt’s proposed instruction, the direct object of
the verb is missing. The sentence is incomplete, because it does not
say what the “appearance of peril” arouses. Thus, Hunt’s
instruction would have repeated much of the other self-defense
instructions, but in confusing language.

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                        Opinion of the Court

    ¶65 To prevail on this claim, Hunt must demonstrate that
(1) his counsel’s performance was deficient in that it “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88.
A defendant’s inability to establish either element defeats a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 700; see also Honie v.
State, 

, 

.
   ¶66 Hunt raises two claims of ineffective assistance. He
contends that his counsel performed deficiently by (1) failing to
object when multiple witnesses used the word “victim” to refer to
N.L. during their trial testimony, and (2) failing to object under
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 to a portion of the 911 call that was
played to the jury, which he argues was especially emotionally
charged. We address both issues and conclude that neither
amounts to ineffective assistance.
   A. Witnesses’ Use of the Term “Victim”
    ¶67 Hunt argues that his trial counsel performed deficiently by
failing to object when witnesses referred to N.L. as the “victim,”
because it “undermine[d] the presumption of innocence by
habituating the jury to the idea that [N.L.] was the victim before the
jury had heard all the evidence.”
    ¶68 To prove deficiency under the first part of the Strickland
test, a defendant must “show that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 

.
Aware of the benefits of hindsight, the United States Supreme
Court cautioned reviewing courts to keep in mind “the variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel” and “the range of
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant” when assessing counsel’s performance. 

.
   ¶69 Hunt argues that his trial counsel should have objected
when the first witness to use the word “victim”—the Rancherito’s
employee—used it a second time. The employee first testified that
“the victim and his buddy” were seated in the restaurant when two
men, later identified as Hunt and Jackson, “walked in.” Then, he
used the term again in explaining that the two men “just walked
over to the victim’s direction.” Hunt contends that when the
witness used the term “victim” for the second time, trial counsel
should have objected. He reasons that failing to do so was
unreasonable because objecting “would have put the State and the
court on notice to warn future witnesses not to use the term and to
provide a curative instruction if they did.” The employee went on

                                  19
                           STATE v. HUNT
                        Opinion of the Court

to say “victim” a few more times: he testified that he “looked to
where the victim was sitting. And . . . noticed that he was on the
floor already;” and that police officers asked him over the phone to
see “if the victim was still breathing.”
    ¶70 As the trial progressed, four additional witnesses used the
term “victim” to refer to N.L. And Hunt argues it was similarly
unreasonable for his trial counsel “to fail to object to each instance,
or in the alternative, to [fail] to request a curative instruction from
the court at the end of trial.” Jackson used the word “victim” to
identify N.L. as the person he saw in the coffee shop that day, and
again when he explained that after Hunt punched N.L. in the head,
“the victim turned and got out of his chair.” Brian used the term
once in cross-examination to refer to N.L. and twice when recalling
and reading aloud a report of his statements to a detective on the
night of the shooting. A police officer testified that he observed “the
victim” lying on the ground unresponsive. And a second officer
testified that the “victim” had been taken to the hospital and had
received first aid.
    ¶71 We have previously “recognize[d] the gravity of referring
to witnesses as victims during a trial.” State v. Vallejo, 

, 

. But the meaning of the word, and its potential
impact on a trial, varies depending on how and under what
circumstances it is used.
    ¶72 For example, our concern about the use of the word
“victim” is heightened when a defendant contends that the charged
conduct did not occur at all. See State v. Arce, 

,

. Similarly, in a sexual assault case, referring to the
complaining witness as a “victim” can create prejudice when the
defense is consent because “it has not yet been conclusively
established, prior to the verdict, that there is in fact a victim, and
because use of that term might imply that a crime has been
committed.” State v. Carrera, 

, 

(cleaned up). In circumstances like these, “victim” is used in a
manner that conflicts with the presumption of innocence or at least
the defendant’s theory of the case.
   ¶73 But in this case, our concern about the witnesses’ use of the
term is somewhat lessened because none of the witnesses used the
term to describe N.L. in relation to Hunt—with Hunt as the
aggressor and N.L. as his “victim.” Rather, the witnesses generally
used “victim” to indicate the person who had been shot.



                                  20
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                        Opinion of the Court

    ¶74 Under these circumstances, we conclude it was not
objectively unreasonable for defense counsel to forgo an objection.
In context, the witnesses’ references to N.L. as the “victim” did not
necessarily conflict with Hunt’s defense of justification. And just
because counsel could have decided to make an objection “does not
mean counsel must make an objection to avoid rendering
ineffective assistance.” State v. Hart, 

, 

; see also State v. Ray, 

, 

 (explaining
that a lawyer is free to “pick his battles”).
    ¶75 Accordingly, because Hunt has not carried his burden of
showing that trial counsel performed deficiently, he has failed to
satisfy the first part of the Strickland test. We therefore reject Hunt’s
first ineffective assistance claim.
   B. 911 Call
    ¶76 Next, Hunt claims that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance in failing to object, on rule 403 grounds, to the recording
of a 911 operator leading N.L.’s friend Brian through the process of
applying pressure to N.L.’s wound and administering CPR. Hunt
argues that a rule 403 objection would have excluded a portion of
this call, as it was substantially more prejudicial than probative.
   ¶77 But even if we assume, without deciding, that the 911 call
was more prejudicial than probative and Hunt’s counsel was
deficient in failing to object to it, Hunt has nevertheless failed to
show that the error prejudiced him. So he has not met the second
prong of the Strickland analysis.
    ¶78 The second part of the Strickland test requires a defendant
to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.
Prejudice exists when there is a reasonable probability that the case
would have had a different outcome had trial counsel not
performed deficiently. State v. Samora, 

, 

.
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome” of the proceeding. Strickland, 

. In assessing prejudice, we “consider the totality of the
evidence before the judge or jury and then ask if the defendant has
met the burden of showing that the decision reached would
reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.” State v.
Garcia, 

, 

 (cleaned up).
   ¶79 Hunt’s argument is that, had trial counsel objected to the
prejudicial portion of the 911 recording being played for the jury,
there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have found


                                   21
                           STATE v. HUNT
                       Opinion of the Court

that Hunt acted in self-defense and, therefore, would not have
convicted him of murder. But the exclusion of this evidence would
not have tipped the scales in his favor.
   ¶80 Jackson and Hunt sought out N.L. They went to the
Rancherito’s that night, armed with a gun, because they knew N.L.
was there. When they arrived at the restaurant, Hunt was the one
carrying the weapon, and he was the initial aggressor. Hunt
became heated, shouted profanities, and punched N.L. in the head.
N.L. stood up, and Hunt immediately shot him dead.
    ¶81 The only evidence supporting Hunt’s theory of the case
was Hunt’s own testimony. At trial, he claimed that N.L. said,
“You’re dead, bitches,” then shot up out of his seat, and reached to
his back for a gun. But no other witnesses heard N.L. make this
statement. Similarly, no one else saw N.L. reach behind his back.
And the bystander testified that Hunt shot N.L. as he was in the
process of standing up, and that he “never made it to a standing
position before” the shots were fired. Finally, N.L. did not have a
gun in his possession.
    ¶82 In light of this evidence, we ultimately conclude that even
if the jury had not heard the portion of the 911 recording in which
Brian rendered first aid to N.L., there is no reasonable probability
that the outcome of Hunt’s trial would have been different.
Although the 911 recording was emotional, we are not persuaded
that it evoked such an emotional response that it—as opposed to
the other evidence—persuaded the jury to convict. Accordingly,
even assuming that Hunt’s counsel was deficient in not objecting
to that portion of the recording, Hunt cannot establish prejudice
and this claim fails. See Strickland, 

. “An error by
counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had
no effect on the judgment.” State v. Scott, 

, 

 (quoting Strickland, 

).
III. CUMULATIVE ERROR
   ¶83 Hunt argues that the trial court’s refusal to include his
proposed jury instruction, combined with trial counsel’s failure to
object to the use of the word “victim” and to the 911 recording,
created prejudice when considered together. But because Hunt has
not successfully demonstrated multiple errors on appeal, there are
no errors to accumulate, and “the doctrine is inapplicable.” State v.
Centeno, 

, ¶ 85 n.10, 

.


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                      Opinion of the Court

                         CONCLUSION
    ¶84 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to include Hunt’s proposed jury instruction.
We further conclude that Hunt has failed to prove that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. For these reasons, we
affirm.




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