ERDA Community v. Baugh

                This opinion is subject to revision before final
                     publication in the Pacific Reporter
                                

                                   IN THE

      SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

     ERDA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC., TERRY MATHEWS,
            KALEM SESSIONS, and RYAN SORENSEN,
                                Appellants,
                                      v.
BRAYDEE BAUGH and LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR DEIDRE HENDERSON,
                        Appellees.

                            No. 20230804
                      Heard December 13, 2024
                      Filed November 20, 2025

                           On Direct Appeal

               Third District Court, Tooele County
                 The Honorable Teresa L. Welch
                         No. 220301344

                                Attorneys:
       Timothy C. Houpt, C. Michael Judd, Salt Lake City,
          Janet M. Conway, Wanship, for appellants
Robert E. Mansfield, Megan E. Garrett, Salt Lake City, for appellee
                        Braydee Baugh
  Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Scott Cheney, Brook McCarrick,
Lance Sorenson, David N. Wolf, Asst. Att’ys Gen., Salt Lake City,
      for appellee Lieutenant Governor Deidre Henderson

   JUSTICE HAGEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
       ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE, JUSTICE PETERSEN,
           JUSTICE POHLMAN, and JUDGE BEAN joined.
   Having recused himself, CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT does not
  participate herein; DISTRICT COURT JUDGE JOSEPH M. BEAN sat.
                    ERDA COMMUNITY v. BAUGH
                       Opinion of the Court

   JUSTICE HAGEN, opinion of the Court:
                        INTRODUCTION
   ¶1 The sponsors who led the campaign to incorporate the
City of Erda want to keep the young city’s boundaries intact. In this
case, they hope to prevent nearly 8,000 acres from being annexed
out of Erda and into Grantsville City.
    ¶2 When the attempted annexation neared completion, the
sponsors petitioned the district court for extraordinary relief
pursuant to rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Specifically, they asked the court to invalidate Grantsville’s
annexation ordinance and prevent the Lieutenant Governor from
certifying the annexation based on alleged statutory and
constitutional violations.
   ¶3 The district court dismissed the case, concluding among
other things that the sponsors need but lack statutory standing.
    ¶4 We affirm, but on other grounds. The sponsors pursue
both statutory and constitutional claims under rule 65B. Their
statutory claims seek review of whether Grantsville’s City Recorder
correctly determined that the annexation petition complied with
statutory requirements. The sponsors concede that they do not
have so-called “statutory standing” to bring these claims because
they do not fall within the class of parties that the legislature has
authorized to sue to enforce the statute. Instead, they seek to invoke
the district court’s constitutional writ authority reflected in rule
65B(d)(2)(B), which provides relief where a “person has failed to
perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station.”
They have not persuaded us that rule 65B(d)(2)(B) applies where
the public official has performed the act, but has allegedly done so
incorrectly, nor have they attempted to show that the relief they
seek is otherwise within the judiciary’s constitutional writ
authority.
    ¶5 As for the constitutional claims, the sponsors cannot
obtain relief under rule 65B because that rule offers relief only
“[w]here no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available.”
As recent decisions from this court and the court of appeals make
clear, the sponsors may seek adjudication of their constitutional
claims despite lacking statutory standing.




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                       Opinion of the Court

                         BACKGROUND
   ¶6 This dispute revolves around a pair of connected events:
the incorporation of the City of Erda, and an endeavor to annex
property into Grantsville City. The appellants, whom we refer to as
the sponsors, supported Erda’s incorporation and now challenge
the annexation.
   ¶7 In late 2018, the sponsors began the process of
incorporating Erda. Their professed goal was to “stop the
onslaught of high-density development projects” by preserving the
area’s “existing agricultural and rural zoning.” Erda’s
incorporation took effect just over three years later, after a
feasibility study confirmed the proposed city’s viability, a
successful election approved the incorporation, and the Lieutenant
Governor certified it.1
   ¶8 But while Erda’s incorporation was still underway, efforts
had begun to annex property from inside the proposed city’s
boundaries. On August 4, 2020—after the Lieutenant Governor
approved the incorporation ballot measure but before the citizens
voted on it—an entity called Six Mile Ranch filed a notice of intent
to annex roughly 5,900 acres into Grantsville City. In November
2021—after the citizens voted to approve Erda’s incorporation but
before the Lieutenant Governor certified it—Six Mile Ranch
submitted an annexation petition, which it then amended the next
month.
   ¶9 When Erda’s incorporation entered its final stages,
Grantsville’s City Recorder reviewed and certified Six Mile Ranch’s
annexation petition. And about nine months after Erda’s
incorporation took effect, Grantsville approved the annexation by
ordinance. Along with the ordinance, Grantsville entered into a
master development agreement to rezone the area for industrial,
commercial, and high-density residential use.
   ¶10 Both before and after the annexation got off the ground,
Utah’s annexation code was in flux. In late March 2020, it
prohibited filing an annexation petition for an area within a
pending incorporation that had been approved for a feasibility
study. UTAH CODE § 10-2-403(5) (Mar. 24, 2020). But in June 2020,
the annexation code changed to create a window during which a

__________________________________________________________
   1 For a more complete description of Erda’s incorporation, see

Bleazard v. City of Erda, 

, ¶¶ 14–19, 

.

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                    ERDA COMMUNITY v. BAUGH
                        Opinion of the Court

petition to annex such an area could be filed in non-first-class
counties like Tooele County, so long as the notice of intent to file an
annexation petition was filed “on or before August 5, 2020.” 

§ 10-2-403(5)(c)(i) (June 29, 2020). Six Mile Ranch filed its notice of
intent on August 4, 2020—one day before the window for filing
such notices closed. In March 2021, the annexation code changed
again to prohibit annexation of an area proposed for incorporation
if certain conditions were met. Id. § 10-2-402(8)(a) (Mar. 16, 2021).
    ¶11 After the Grantsville City Recorder certified the
annexation, but before the Lieutenant Governor did so, the
sponsors filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the district court
under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, naming the
City Recorder and the Lieutenant Governor as respondents. Rule
65B offers relief “[w]here no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is available.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(a). When they filed the
petition, the sponsors claimed not to have another remedy because
in two similar cases, the district court dismissed their declaratory
judgment actions for lack of statutory standing. 2
    ¶12 The sponsors allege that the annexation violated statutory
requirements and that a provision of the annexation code is
unconstitutional. In their statutory challenges, they assert that Six
Mile Ranch’s annexation petition lacked written permission from
certain landowners, violating Utah Code section 10-2-403(3), and
included more property than was listed in the previously filed
notice of intent, violating Utah Code section 10-2-403(5)(c). In their
constitutional challenges, they assert that the June 2020 annexation
code provision allowing annexation of an area proposed for
incorporation is unconstitutional, both as applied and on its face.
Based on these purported statutory and constitutional violations,
the sponsors seek to compel Grantsville’s repeal of its annexation
ordinance and to prevent the Lieutenant Governor’s certification of
the annexation.
    ¶13 The City Recorder moved to dismiss the petition, asserting
that the sponsors, as challengers of the annexation, qualify as
 __________________________________________________________
   2 As we explain in more detail below, infra ¶¶ 43–48, the
sponsors appealed the decisions in those two cases. The court of
appeals reversed each dismissal in part, remanding the cases for
further proceedings. See Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City, 

, 

; Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City,

, 

.

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                       Opinion of the Court

statutory claimants and must meet the requirements for statutory
standing—a burden they had failed to satisfy. (Citing McKitrick v.
Gibson, 

, 

.) And in any event, the City
Recorder added, the sponsors had not shown either traditional or
alternative standing. 3
    ¶14 The sponsors responded that while the City Recorder’s
argument about statutory standing might hold true in other
situations, rule 65B is different and gives relief even when statutory
standing is absent. According to the sponsors, they need only show
traditional or alternative standing, which they argued they had
done.
   ¶15 The district court also fielded motions from the sponsors
and the Lieutenant Governor. The sponsors moved to amend their
petition to add a claim against Grantsville City, and the Lieutenant
Governor moved for a declaration about how the changes to the
annexation code affected the annexation.
    ¶16 On all these motions, the district court ruled in favor of the
City Recorder. The court granted the City Recorder’s motion to
dismiss, concluding that the claims were barred because the
sponsors lack statutory, traditional, and alternative standing.
Given its standing decision, the court denied the sponsors’ motion
to amend the petition—concluding that the proposed amendment
would be futile—as well as the Lieutenant Governor’s motion for a
judicial declaration—concluding that the declaration would be an
impermissible advisory opinion.
   ¶17 This appeal followed.
                            ANALYSIS
   ¶18 The sponsors petitioned the district court for
extraordinary relief under rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 65B allows a petition for extraordinary relief only
when “no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available.”


__________________________________________________________
   3 “[T]raditional standing requires a claimant to show injury,

causation, and redressability.” Erda Cmty. Ass’n, 

. Alternative standing permits the court to “grant standing
where matters of great public interest and societal impact are
concerned.” Gregory v. Shurtleff, 

, 

(cleaned up).

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                    ERDA COMMUNITY v. BAUGH
                       Opinion of the Court

UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(a). In other words, if another remedy is
available, then rule 65B is not.
    ¶19 The sponsors’ petition includes two types of legal claims:
statutory and constitutional. The statutory claims allege that the
annexation petition violates statutory requirements because it
“(1) does not contain [certain] owners[’] written permission, as
required by Utah Code [section] 10-2-403(3),” and “(2) includes
well in excess of property contained in the Six Mile notice of intent,
in violation of Utah Code [section] 10-2-403(5)(c).” The
constitutional claims allege that the statute allowing annexation of
areas proposed for incorporation—the version of Utah Code
section 10-2-403(5) enacted June 29, 2020—is unconstitutional to the
extent it allows an annexation petition “to be submitted after [a]
petition for incorporation is pending on the ballot.” According to
the sponsors, this statute must either be construed to avoid that
interpretation or be declared unconstitutional under article I,
section 7 and article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
   ¶20 The district court dismissed the petition, ruling that the
sponsors lack standing. We affirm on the alternative ground that
the sponsors have not shown an entitlement to relief under rule
65B.
    ¶21 As for the statutory claims, we conclude that because the
sponsors do not have statutory standing, they indeed have no other
remedy available to them. We then turn to whether the sponsors
can seek an extraordinary writ pursuant to rule 65B(d)(2)(B) in the
absence of statutory standing. Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) applies where a
“person has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of
office, trust or station.” We conclude that the sponsors have not
shown that the rule applies where, as here, the public official has
performed the required act but has allegedly done so incorrectly.
And they have not attempted to show that the relief they seek is
nonetheless within the scope of the judiciary’s constitutional writ
authority.
   ¶22 As for the constitutional claims, we conclude that there is
another “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” available.
Specifically, the sponsors can seek relief through a declaratory
judgment action. Because the sponsors’ path to another remedy is
open, the path to relief under rule 65B is closed.




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                        Opinion of the Court

I. WE AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF THE SPONSORS’ STATUTORY CLAIMS
    ¶23 The sponsors concede that their challenges to the
annexation petition would ordinarily require them to have
statutory standing. And they do not claim to have statutory
standing to bring those challenges. Because they do not have
statutory standing, they reason that they have no other adequate
remedy, and thus they can present their challenges to the court
through a petition for extraordinary relief under rule 65B.
    ¶24 We agree that, due to their lack of statutory standing, the
sponsors do not have another remedy. But the sponsors have not
convinced us that they can invoke the judiciary’s writ powers to
avoid the limits set by the legislature on who can sue to enforce the
legislature’s own statutory requirements.
   A. The Sponsors Have No Other Remedy for Their Statutory
      Claims Because They Do Not Have Statutory Standing
    ¶25 The concept of statutory standing is built around the idea
that when “the legislature creates statutory requirements,” it may
“designate, as it sees fit, how those requirements are to be
enforced.” Bleazard v. City of Erda, 

, 

(cleaned up). In line with this principle, we treat statutory claims
differently from other types of claims. As its label suggests, a
statutory claim springs from statute, either because a statute offers
the desired relief, or because the party bringing the claim alleges
that a statute was violated. See McKitrick v. Gibson, 

,

 (“[Appellant] is a statutory claimant, relying on
provisions of GRAMA to seek judicial review . . . .”); Bleazard, 

 (requiring statutory standing where plaintiffs’ “suit
[was] based entirely on the defendants’ alleged noncompliance
with the incorporation code”). A claim is not statutory, and thus
statutory standing is not required, if the party’s grievance is
anchored in a non-statutory source, such as common law or the
constitution. See Bleazard, 

; accord Erda Cmty. Ass’n
v. Grantsville City, 

, 

.
    ¶26 For statutory claims, “statutory standing is mandatory.”
Bleazard, 

 (quoting McKitrick, 

). In
other words, parties bringing statutory claims must show that
“they fall within the class of parties that the legislature authorized
to file suit.” Id. ¶ 37 (cleaned up). The most common way statutory
claimants make this showing is by pointing to a relevant statutory
provision in which the legislature expressly grants them the ability
to bring suit (i.e., an “express . . . right of action”). See id. ¶ 44.

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                    ERDA COMMUNITY v. BAUGH
                        Opinion of the Court

Statutory claimants may also point to a statutory provision in
which the legislature clearly implied such an ability (i.e., an
“implied right of action”), see id., but “Utah courts have rarely, if
ever, found a Utah statute to grant an implied private right of
action,” Buckner v. Kennard, 

, 

.
    ¶27 In addition to showing statutory standing, we have held
that statutory claimants must also show either traditional or
alternative standing. Bleazard, 

; McKitrick, 

; see also Erda, 

. Even if a plaintiff has
traditional or alternative standing, that does not “excuse a lack of
statutory standing where the [plaintiff] is a statutory claimant.”
McKitrick, 

.
    ¶28 These principles apply not only when parties seek relief
under the terms of a statute directly, but also when they seek to
vindicate statutory violations through a declaratory judgment
action. Among other requirements, a plaintiff seeking a declaratory
judgment must have a “legally protectible interest in the
controversy.” Summit County v. Town of Hideout, 

, ¶ 33,

 (cleaned up). When a “declaratory judgment claim is
rooted in statute, not the constitution or common law,” this
requirement is fulfilled only if the legislature has given the plaintiff
“an express or implied statutory right of action.” Id. ¶ 35. If not, the
plaintiff has no “legally protectible interest” in the controversy and
“may not proceed with their claim for declaratory relief.” Bleazard,

.
    ¶29 Here, the sponsors do not claim to fall within the class of
parties that the legislature authorized to sue to challenge the
annexation. Indeed, they do not dispute the district court’s
determinations in related cases that they fall outside that class of
parties. This means they do not have statutory standing to bring a
statutory claim under the terms of the annexation code directly. It
also means they do not have a legally protectible interest in the
annexation under the Declaratory Judgment Act. We therefore
agree with the sponsors that for their statutory claims, they have
“no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy . . . available.” UTAH
R. CIV. P. 65B(a).




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   B. The Sponsors Have Not Shown That the Relief They Seek
      Falls Within the Plain Language of Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) or Is
      Otherwise Within the Scope of the Judiciary’s
      Constitutional Writ Authority
    ¶30 Having determined that the sponsors are without another
remedy for their statutory claims, we now turn to their argument
that a party may use rule 65B to compel compliance with a statute
when, as here, the party is not among those statutorily authorized
to enforce the statute. The sponsors rely on the language in rule
65B(d)(2)(B) that provides, “Appropriate relief may be granted . . .
where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or
person has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of
office, trust or station.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(d)(2)(B). The sponsors
argue that this language “create[s] a right of action” even when a
party would otherwise lack statutory standing.
    ¶31 This court’s rules of civil procedure do not create private
rights of action. The Utah Constitution gives this court the power
to “adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts
of the state.” UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4. “Procedural rules prescribe
the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by which the
substantive law is made effective.” State v. Rippey, 

(cleaned up). But the power to make substantive law is reserved to
the legislature. 

 “Substantive laws are laws that create, destroy,
or alter the rights and duties of parties and which may give rise to
a cause of action.” 

 (cleaned up).
    ¶32 Yet not all private rights of action are created by the
legislature. A plaintiff may also assert a constitutional claim or a
common law right of action. See Bleazard, 

.
    ¶33 The ability to seek an extraordinary writ is rooted in the
constitution. Although rule 65B does not create a right of action, it
does reflect the judiciary’s constitutional power to issue
extraordinary writs—power that has existed since the Utah
Constitution’s adoption in 1895. Patterson v. State, 

, 

. “Not long after statehood, we recognized
that the Utah Constitution ‘expressly conferred upon the courts
and reserved unto them the power to issue the writs mentioned in
the Constitution.’” 

 ¶ 81 (quoting State v. Durand, 

(Utah 1908)). Today, the Utah Constitution endows this court with
“original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs.” UTAH
CONST. art. VIII, § 3. It likewise empowers district courts “to issue
all extraordinary writs.” Id. art. VIII, § 5.


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                    ERDA COMMUNITY v. BAUGH
                       Opinion of the Court

    ¶34 Rule 65B is a procedural rule for managing the judiciary’s
constitutional writ authority. The rule “outlines the general
mechanics of an extraordinary relief proceeding and designates the
types of situations in which extraordinary relief may be
attainable.” State v. Barrett, 

, 

. Once the
people of Utah constitutionalized the judiciary’s writ authority and
we adopted rule 65B, “the common law forms and pleadings for
extraordinary writs” were “abolished.” 

 ¶ 7 n.4 (cleaned up). But
those developments “did not diminish the availability of
extraordinary relief.” 

 The rule remains “a repository of all the
extraordinary writs that, in the past, were envisioned as separate
and distinct proceedings.” Id. ¶ 11. Thus, the remedies once
provided by common law writs “remain available” through rule
65B. Id.
   ¶35 Subsection (d)(2) of rule 65B “is the equivalent of a
common law petition for a writ of mandamus and provides the
equivalent remedy.” Hogs R Us v. Town of Fairfield, 

,

. Under the common law, the “writ of mandamus was
designed to compel a person to perform a legal duty incumbent on
him by virtue of his office or as required by law.” Renn v. Utah State
Bd. of Pardons, 

 (Utah 1995). Subsection (d)(2)
describes four situations in which such a writ may be appropriate:
       (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or
       officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its
       jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an
       inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or
       person has failed to perform an act required by law
       as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an
       inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or
       person has refused the petitioner the use or
       enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner
       is entitled; or (D) where the Board of Pardons and
       Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to
       perform an act required by constitutional or statutory
       law.
UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(d)(2).
   ¶36 In their petition for extraordinary relief, the sponsors
sought the relief described in subsection (d)(2)(B). But the City
Recorder argues that relief under that subsection is limited to a writ
compelling an official to perform a non-discretionary duty or “to
direct the exercise of discretion[ary] action, but not to direct the


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exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way.” (Quoting
State v. Stirba, 

 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), abrogated on
other grounds by Barrett, 

.) The City Recorder also argued
that (d)(2)(B) could not be used to undo an action that had already
been performed.
    ¶37 The sponsors assert that the City Recorder’s argument that
“this Court may not issue a writ to undo actions” is “contrary to a
number of this Court’s decisions including Walker Bank, 

, where this Court did exactly that.” But Walker Bank did not
involve a petition for an extraordinary writ; it was before the court
on a direct appeal from a declaratory judgment action. See Walker
Bank & Tr. Co. v. Taylor, 

 (Utah 1964). The sponsors
also included a string cite to five additional cases, but none of those
cases involve a petition under rule 65B(d)(2)(B) either. See Olson v.
Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 

 (Utah 1986) (direct appeal
from a permanent injunction); Cox v. Laycock, 

, 

 (writ sought under subsection (d)(2)(A), which
contemplates that a writ may issue where a court or quasi-judicial
body has “abused its discretion” (cleaned up)); Walker v. Weber
County, 

 (Utah 1998) (writ sought under subsection
(c), which contemplates that a writ may issue where “a public
official has ‘unlawfully’ exercised the authority of their office”),
abrogated on other grounds by Burr v. City of Orem, 

, 

; Gallivan v. Walker, 

, 

 (writ
sought under Utah Code section 20A-7-207(4), which authorizes
judicial review of the lieutenant governor’s refusal to certify an
initiative petition).
    ¶38 Nor have the sponsors engaged with the language of the
rule they invoke. Rule 65B(d)(2)(B), by its plain terms, applies
where a “person has failed to perform an act required by law as a
duty of office, trust or station.” But the sponsors do not seek a writ
directing the City Recorder to perform her statutory duty, which is
to determine whether the annexation petition met the statutory
requirements and to certify or reject the petition accordingly. 4 See
UTAH CODE § 10-2-405(2)–(3) (Mar. 16, 2021). She already
performed those duties when she determined that the petition was
sufficient and certified it. Instead, the sponsors allege that she
 __________________________________________________________
   4 The sponsors also seek a writ compelling the Lieutenant
Governor to certify the measure for placement on the ballot, but
unless the City Recorder is first ordered to approve the petition,
there is nothing to certify.

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                       Opinion of the Court

misinterpreted or misapplied the statutory requirements, and they
seek a writ compelling her to withdraw the certification and reject
the petition. The sponsors have not demonstrated that subsection
(d)(2)(B) applies not only when a recalcitrant official refuses to
perform an act required by law, but also when the official has
allegedly performed the act incorrectly.
    ¶39 Still, we have recognized that the judiciary’s constitutional
writ authority may well be broader than what is reflected in our
rules. See generally Patterson v. State, 

, 

.
Because they have not demonstrated that the relief they seek falls
within the plain terms of rule 65B(d)(2)(B), the sponsors needed to
show that the writ authority enshrined in our constitution would
permit such relief. Specifically, they needed to show that the
judiciary’s constitutional writ authority empowers courts to review
whether a public official, charged with determining whether
certain statutory requirements are met, correctly interpreted and
applied those requirements, even though the legislature has chosen
not to include petitioners within the class of persons authorized to
enforce the statute.
    ¶40 The sponsors have not made that showing. It was
incumbent upon the sponsors to address whether the relief they
seek was available at common law when the people of Utah
constitutionalized the judiciary’s writ power in 1895 and whether
“the people of Utah would have understood the term ‘all
extraordinary writs’ to include” a writ compelling a public official
to perform a duty in a particular way “when they inserted that
phrase into the constitution” in 1984. See id. ¶ 131. But the sponsors
have not “delved into the historical record to provide information
on how the people of Utah would have understood the writ power
at various times in our history,” id. ¶ 69, nor have they “engaged
with the original understanding of the constitutional language”
adopted as part of article VIII in 1984, id. ¶ 73. In short, they have
not given us the tools necessary to rule in their favor.
    ¶41 Once the City Recorder raised the scope of rule
65B(d)(2)(B) as an alternative ground for affirming the district
court’s ruling, the sponsors needed to convince us that the relief
they seek either fell within the plain language of rule 65B(d)(2)(B)
or that it was otherwise within the judiciary’s constitutional writ
authority. Our rules of appellate procedure require an argument to
“explain, with reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal
authority and the record, why the party should prevail on appeal.”


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UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(8). A “conclusory argument is not the type of
‘reasoned analysis’ that allows us to rule in a party’s favor.” Pinder
v. Duchesne Cnty. Sherriff, 

, 

 (quoting
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(8)). “An appellant that fails to devote
adequate attention to an issue is almost certainly going to fail to
meet its burden of persuasion.” Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 

, 

.
    ¶42 We do not foreclose the possibility that the judiciary’s writ
authority can be used in this manner. We simply hold that the
sponsors have not carried their burden of persuasion in this case.
On that basis, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of their
statutory claims. 5
II. WE AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
    BECAUSE A PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IS AVAILABLE
    ¶43 Turning now to the sponsors’ constitutional claims, we
consider whether another “plain, speedy and adequate remedy”
exists for those claims. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(a). Because we
answer that question in the affirmative, we hold that the sponsors
cannot proceed with their constitutional claims under rule 65B.
    ¶44 As mentioned, “statutory standing is mandatory for
statutory claims.” Bleazard v. City of Erda, 

, 

 (quoting McKitrick v. Gibson, 

, 

).
But the same is not true for non-statutory claims, as we indicated
in Bleazard. There, we held that certain landowners could not move
forward with their claims challenging Erda’s incorporation. Id.
¶ 57. In doing so, however, we emphasized that the landowners
relied “only on the incorporation code itself” and did not hook their
claims to any “common law right or constitutional provision.” Id.
¶ 3. The rule we set out in that case was therefore limited to the
following: “Plaintiffs who seek a declaration that statutorily
created requirements have been violated—and who do not invoke
legal rights protected elsewhere, such as in the common law or the
 __________________________________________________________
   5 The sponsors separately argue that “[i]f the annexation code’s

limitations abrogate [their] claims, it violates the Open Courts
Doctrine.” See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11. The sponsors reason that if
“the Legislature abrogated [their] common law right to challenge a
municipality’s compliance with governing statutes through
extraordinary writs, it violates the Open Courts Doctrine.” But the
sponsors have not convinced us that the extraordinary writ they
seek was available at common law.

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                    ERDA COMMUNITY v. BAUGH
                       Opinion of the Court

constitution—must show that they have . . . ‘statutory standing.’”
Id. ¶ 37.
    ¶45 Here, the sponsors contend that they have no other
remedy for their claims because in two other cases, the district court
dismissed similar claims after concluding the annexation code does
not authorize them to file suit. But since the time the sponsors filed
the petition in this case, the court of appeals has reversed those
rulings.
   ¶46 In Erda Community Ass’n v. Grantsville City, 

, 

, the appellants—including some of the sponsors
here—sought to undo an annexation of property into Grantsville,
as the sponsors seek to do in this case. See 

 ¶¶ 1–2. Like the
sponsors here, the appellants in Erda brought both statutory and
constitutional claims. Id. ¶ 18. The constitutional claims there also
challenge aspects of the annexation code and overlap with the
constitutional claims here. Id. ¶¶ 47–48.
    ¶47 The court of appeals reversed the district court’s dismissal
of the constitutional claims. Id. ¶ 61. Based on this court’s holding
in Bleazard, the court of appeals explained that “statutory standing
is a concept that applies only to claims that seek redress under a
statute; it does not apply to other types of claims, including
common-law claims and constitutional claims, and claimants who
bring these other types of claims do not need to demonstrate
statutory standing.” Id. ¶ 32. The court went on to explain that “the
traditional standing test—and not the statutory standing test—is
applicable where a party raises a challenge to the constitutionality
of a state statute.” Id. ¶ 33. The court of appeals conducted the same
analysis and reached the same result in the second case. See
generally Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City, 

, 

. In both cases, the court of appeals remanded the
constitutional claims to the district court for further proceedings.
Id. ¶ 29; Erda Cmty. Ass’n, 

.
    ¶48 To the extent that the constitutional claims raised in this
writ action are the same as those in the declaratory relief actions
now pending in the district court, the sponsors have a “plain,
speedy and adequate remedy” available. And to the extent that the
claims differ, the sponsors have not shown why they could not
pursue additional constitutional claims in the same manner.
Because they have another remedy, they may not bring a petition
for extraordinary relief. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(a). We thus affirm



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                       Opinion of the Court

the dismissal of the petition on that basis without deciding whether
the sponsors have traditional standing.
                          CONCLUSION
    ¶49 The sponsors may not pursue extraordinary relief in this
case under rule 65B. Because they lack statutory standing to
directly challenge the City Recorder’s interpretation and
application of the annexation code, they sought a writ under rule
65B(d)(2)(B). But they have not persuaded us that rule 65B(d)(2)(B)
applies or that the relief they seek is nevertheless within the
judiciary’s constitutional writ authority. They have also sought a
writ to challenge the constitutionality of the annexation code. But
because statutory standing is not required for constitutional claims,
they have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy and are not entitled
to relief under rule 65B. On these grounds, we affirm the dismissal
of the sponsors’ petition for extraordinary relief.




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