State v. Cooke

                This opinion is subject to revision before final
                     publication in the Pacific Reporter
                                

                                   IN THE

      SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

                             STATE OF UTAH,
                                Appellee,
                                      v.
                           MONTE K. COOKE,
                             Appellant.

                           No. 20230419
                      Heard December 9, 2024
                       Filed March 20, 2025

                On Appeal of Interlocutory Order

                    Fourth District Court, Provo
                    The Honorable Kraig Powell
                          No. 171400242

                                Attorneys:
 Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Daniel W. Boyer, Asst. Solic. Gen.,
                  Salt Lake City, for appellee
     Jennifer L. Foresta, Dustin Parmley, Provo, for appellant

  JUSTICE POHLMAN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,
           JUSTICE PETERSEN, and JUSTICE HAGEN joined.


   JUSTICE POHLMAN, opinion of the Court:
                          INTRODUCTION
   ¶1 In 2016, Monte Cooke was involved in a traffic collision
that killed one person and seriously injured another. Cooke was
charged with two second-degree felony counts of negligently
driving with a measurable amount of a controlled substance in the
body and causing death or serious bodily injury. But shortly before
his trial was set to begin, the Utah Legislature repealed and
replaced the statute under which Cooke had been charged.
                           STATE v. COOKE
                        Opinion of the Court

    ¶2 Cooke filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him,
arguing that he could not be prosecuted under a statute that had
been repealed. The district court ultimately denied Cooke’s motion,
ruling that the State could proceed under the original statute. The
court concluded that Utah’s general saving statute, Utah Code
section 68-3-5, protects from abatement criminal prosecutions
initiated before a statute’s repeal.
    ¶3 The Utah Court of Appeals granted Cooke’s petition to
appeal the district court’s interlocutory order and then certified the
matter to this court. We are now tasked with deciding whether
Utah’s general saving statute permits a prosecution to proceed
unabated when the statutory basis for the charge is repealed before
trial. We hold that it does, because the plain language of the saving
statute says as much: it states that a statute’s repeal does not affect
actions already commenced under that statute, and that includes
criminal actions. We also hold that our decisions in Belt v. Turner,

 (Utah), aff’d on reh’g, 

 (Utah 1971), and its
progeny do not preclude this result.
   ¶4 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision
ordering Cooke to stand trial on the charges brought under the
since-repealed statute and remand for further proceedings.
                         BACKGROUND 1
   ¶5 In 2016, Monte Cooke was driving a semitruck
southbound on I-15 in Utah County. While driving in the
right-hand lane, the semitruck drifted to the right side of the road
and struck the guardrail. Cooke then lost control of the semitruck,
and it came to a stop diagonally across all lanes of travel.
   ¶6 A pickup truck traveling southbound was unable to brake
quickly enough to avoid impact and collided with the side of the
semitruck. The passenger in the pickup truck was killed on impact,
and the driver sustained several serious injuries to his back,
shoulder, and head.
   ¶7 After the collision, officers investigated its cause. Data
from the semitruck’s onboard computer showed that the semitruck
deescalated from 70 mph seconds before the crash to 0 mph one

__________________________________________________________
   1  Like the parties, we draw the background facts from the
amended information and the preliminary hearing transcript. At
this stage of the proceeding, these facts have not been proved.

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                       Opinion of the Court

second afterward, and that Cooke did not apply the brakes or
engage the clutch system at any point.
    ¶8 Officers at the scene did not find the logbook to Cooke’s
semitruck. But by examining the logbook for a companion
semitruck, officers concluded that Cooke had been on duty for too
many hours without adequate rest, in violation of federal law. And
when Cooke submitted to a routine blood draw, he tested positive
for methamphetamine. Based on their investigation into the cause
of the collision, officers theorized that Cooke fell asleep and lost
control of the semitruck.
    ¶9 Cooke was subsequently charged with two second-degree
felony counts of negligently driving with a measurable amount of
a controlled substance in his body and causing death or serious
bodily injury to another, in violation of Utah Code
section 58-37-8(2)(g) (2016). Under the 2016 version of the statute, a
defendant is guilty of a second-degree felony if the defendant
(1) “knowingly and intentionally” has “any measurable amount of
a controlled substance” in the defendant’s body and (2) “operates
a motor vehicle . . . in a negligent manner,” (3) “causing serious
bodily injury . . . or the death of another.” UTAH CODE § 58-37-
8(2)(g), (h)(i) (2016).
   ¶10 In 2019, Cooke was bound over on both counts. Over the
next three years, the district court set numerous trial dates and
granted several continuances. Most recently, Cooke’s seven-day
jury trial was scheduled to begin in June 2022.
    ¶11 Shortly before trial, the legislature repealed and replaced
the statute under which Cooke was charged, Utah Code section 58-
37-8(2)(g) (the repealed statute). See Driving Offenses
Amendments, H.B. 29, 2022 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2022) (available
at https://le.utah.gov/~2022/bills/static/HB0029.html). The
legislature removed the offense relating to the negligent operation
of a vehicle from the Utah Controlled Substances Act in Utah Code,
Title 58, Chapter 37, and housed it in the Utah Criminal Code’s
offenses against the individual in Title 76, Chapter 5.
    ¶12 Under the new articulation, the legislature separated the
previous offense into two distinct offenses: a second-degree felony
for automobile homicide, UTAH CODE § 76-5-207(2)–(3) (2025), and
a third-degree felony for negligently operating a vehicle resulting




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                          STATE v. COOKE
                       Opinion of the Court

in serious bodily injury to another, id. § 76-5-102.1(2)–(3). 2 The
legislature also modified the elements. In the revised articulation,
the legislature increased the mental state requirement for operating
a motor vehicle from simple negligence to criminal negligence, but
it removed the “knowing[] or intentional[]” mental state
requirement for having a controlled substance in one’s body. See
H.B. 29. 3 So, under section 76-5-207, a person now commits
automobile homicide if the person “operates a vehicle in a
criminally negligent manner causing death to another; and . . . has
in the actor’s body any measurable amount of a controlled
substance.” UTAH CODE § 76-5-207(2)(b). Similarly, under section
76-5-102.1, a person now commits the offense of negligently
operating a vehicle resulting in serious bodily injury if the person
“operates a vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing bodily
injury to another; and . . . has in the actor’s body any measurable
amount of a controlled substance.” Id. § 76-5-102.1(2)(b), (3)(iv).
    ¶13 Two days before trial, Cooke moved to dismiss the charges
against him on the basis that the statute under which he was
charged had been repealed. He asserted that dismissal was
required because he could not be properly tried for an offense that
no longer exists. The district court agreed with Cooke and granted
his motion. But it also granted the State’s request for leave to amend
the information to charge Cooke under the newly adopted statutes.
   ¶14 In an amended information, the State charged Cooke with
one count of automobile homicide, a second-degree felony, in
violation of subsection 76-5-207(2)(b), and one count of driving
with a controlled substance and causing serious bodily injury to
another, a third-degree felony, in violation of subsection 76-5-
102.1(2)(b). Cooke again moved to dismiss, this time on the basis
that the charges violate our constitutional prohibitions against ex

__________________________________________________________
   2 Sections 76-5-207 and 76-5-102.1 have been amended since

2022. Because the recent amendments involved no changes
material to our decision, we cite the current version of the statutes.
   3 With the 2022 legislative changes, a defendant who operates a

motor vehicle with simple negligence and causes death or serious
bodily injury to another may still be found guilty under the statutes
if the defendant was under the influence of a drug “to a degree that
renders the actor incapable of safely operating a vehicle.” UTAH
CODE §§ 76-5-207(2)(a), -102.1(2)(a).

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                         Opinion of the Court

post facto laws. 4 In opposition, the State argued that the district
court erred in ruling that the State was barred from prosecuting
Cooke under the repealed statute, arguing that Utah’s general
saving statute, Utah Code section 68-3-5, “plainly states that
repeals do not apply to pending matters.”
    ¶15 The district court did not immediately rule on Cooke’s
second motion to dismiss; it instead ordered supplemental briefing
on the question of whether the saving statute allows the State to
proceed with its prosecution of Cooke under the repealed statute.
In response, Cooke argued that the general saving statute does not
apply to criminal prosecutions, and that this court’s decisions in
Belt v. Turner, 

 (Utah), aff’d on reh’g, 

 (Utah
1971), and its progeny require the dismissal of a pending criminal
prosecution once the underlying criminal statute has been
repealed.
    ¶16 The district court reconsidered its prior ruling dismissing
the case and ordered Cooke to stand trial on the charges brought
against him under the repealed statute. It rejected Cooke’s
arguments and reasoned that the general saving statute was
“enacted for the express purpose of continuing in force proceedings
that are founded on a repealed statute if those proceedings were
commenced prior to the repeal.” So “despite the 2022 repeal of the
offenses described in the 2016 version of Section 58-37-8(2)(g),” the
court held that Cooke “may nevertheless be charged with and
prosecuted for those alleged offenses because, at the time of the
repeal, he was the subject of an ‘action or proceeding commenced
under or by virtue of the statute repealed.’” (Quoting UTAH CODE
§ 68-3-5.)


__________________________________________________________
   4 Article I, section 18 of the Utah Constitution and article I,

section 10 of the United States Constitution both prohibit ex post
facto laws. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 18 (“No . . . ex post facto law . . .
shall be passed.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . .
pass any . . . ex post facto Law . . . .”). An ex post facto law is one
that “punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was
innocent when done[,] which makes more burdensome the
punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives
one charged with a crime of any defense available according to law
at the time when the act was committed.” Monson v. Carver, 

 (Utah 1996) (plurality opinion) (cleaned up).

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                           STATE v. COOKE
                        Opinion of the Court

    ¶17 The district court also distinguished this court’s precedent
in Belt and State v. Tapp, 

 (Utah 1971), two cases that
explored the application of the saving statute in situations when
the legislature passed an ameliorative sentencing statute before the
defendant was sentenced. The district court explained that these
cases “addressed the proper sentence to be imposed, not the actual
prosecution and trial of the alleged crime.” Because “[t]he penalty
for any of [Cooke’s] alleged crimes [was] not the question facing
the Court,” it concluded that Belt and Tapp’s analysis of the general
saving statute was inapposite.
    ¶18 Cooke sought interlocutory review of the district court’s
order, which the court of appeals granted. The court of appeals then
certified the matter to this court. See UTAH CODE § 78A-4-103(4).
             ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶19 The sole issue in this case is whether the district court erred
in interpreting Utah’s general saving statute to permit Cooke’s
prosecution to proceed after the statute under which he was
charged was repealed and replaced before trial. This issue requires
us to interpret the saving statute and our caselaw applying it. A
district court’s interpretation of a statute and our caselaw presents
questions of law that we review for correctness. Ellis v. Estate of
Ellis, 

, 

.
                             ANALYSIS
    ¶20 Cooke disagrees with the district court’s construction of
the general saving statute. He first argues that by its plain language,
the statute does not apply to pending criminal prosecutions for
conduct that has been decriminalized and that, therefore, the
common law doctrine of abatement requires dismissal of the
charges against him. Cooke next contends that even if the plain
language of the general saving statute suggests otherwise, this
court’s holdings in Belt v. Turner, 

 (Utah), aff’d on reh’g,

 (Utah 1971), and its progeny require courts to apply
any ameliorative statutory changes that take effect prior to
sentencing. This means, according to Cooke, that because the
statutory basis for his criminal charges was repealed, the charges
against him must be dismissed.
   ¶21 We address both of Cooke’s arguments in turn and
conclude that the district court correctly interpreted both the
general saving statute and our precedent to conclude that Cooke
may be tried under the repealed statute.


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                       Opinion of the Court

I. UTAH’S GENERAL SAVING STATUTE PERMITS COOKE’S
   PROSECUTION UNDER THE REPEALED STATUTE TO PROCEED
   UNABATED
    ¶22 The statute we are called on to interpret in this case, Utah
Code section 68-3-5, is at times referred to as Utah’s general saving
statute. See, e.g., Buttrey v. Guaranteed Sec. Co., 

(Utah 1931) (applying the version of Utah’s general saving statute
codified as section 5842, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917). 5 It provides:
“The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously
repealed, or affect any right which has accrued, any duty imposed,
any penalty incurred, or any action or proceeding commenced
under or by virtue of the statute repealed.” UTAH CODE § 68-3-5.
   ¶23 Historically, under the common law doctrine of
abatement, repeals and amendments of criminal statutes were
applied retroactively, “abating every prosecution which had not
yet resulted in final conviction . . . unless a special provision had
been enacted to save prosecutions under the repealed statute.”
Holiday v. United States, 

 (D.C. 1996). The doctrine of
abatement caused all pending criminal prosecutions to cease
“whether the legislation was an outright repeal or merely an
amendment or reenactment of the substantive crime, since any
such revision effectively repealed the statute underlying the
prosecution.” 

__________________________________________________________
   5 Section 68-3-5 traces its inception to a statute first adopted in

1898, which provided: “The repeal of a statute does not revive a
statute previously repealed, nor affect any right which has accrued,
any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, nor any action or
proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed.”
See UTAH REV. STAT. § 2492 (1898). This statute was recodified in
1907 and 1917 without any changes to its language. See UTAH COMP.
LAWS § 2492 (1907); id. § 5842 (1917). In 1933, the legislature
recodified the statute with a minor revision, replacing the word
“nor” with “or.” See UTAH REV. STAT. § 88-2-5 (1933) (“The repeal
of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, or affect
any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty
incurred, or any action or proceeding commenced under or by
virtue of the statute repealed.”). Subsequent amendments have
recodified the statute but have made no changes to its language.
Compare id. with UTAH CODE § 88-2-5 (1943) and id. § 68-3-5 (1953).

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                            STATE v. COOKE
                         Opinion of the Court

    ¶24 To prevent such results, state legislatures often included
specific saving clauses in new legislation “stating that prosecutions
of offenses under the repealed statute were not to be abated.”
Bradley v. United States, 

 (1973). Then, to avoid the
abatement of prosecutions in the absence of a specific saving clause,
legislatures began adopting general saving statutes applicable “to
all repeals, amendments, and reenactments of criminal and civil
liabilities,” which had the effect of “shift[ing] the legislative
presumption from one of abatement unless otherwise specified to
one of non-abatement in the absence of contrary legislative
direction.” Holiday, 683 A.2d at 66–67 (cleaned up); see also State v.
Bischoff, 

, 22 (Conn. 2021) (general saving statutes “were
enacted to counter the effect of the common-law abatement
doctrine” (cleaned up)).
    ¶25 Courts in states where legislatures have adopted general
saving statutes recognize that the statutes reflect “a strong
legislative intent that the law in effect at the time of the commission
of a crime governs the prosecution of criminal offenses.” See, e.g.,
State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Washoe, 

 (Nev. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam). Consequently, these courts
apply general saving statutes to “save pending or future
prosecutions of crimes committed under a repealed or amended
statute from being abated” unless “the legislature has
unambiguously expressed an intent contrary to the statutory
‘default’ position” of non-abatement. See, e.g., State v. Carpentino, 

, 910–11 (N.H. 2014) (cleaned up); see also United States v.
Dixon, 

, 199–200 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that the
federal general saving statute prevents the repeal of a criminal
statute from abating pending criminal prosecutions, unless the
repealing act provides for abatement “by express declaration or
necessary implication” (cleaned up)).
    ¶26 Utah’s general saving statute appears to follow this model.
It states, in relevant part, that “[t]he repeal of a statute does not . . .
affect . . . any action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue
of the statute repealed.” UTAH CODE § 68-3-5. Thus, by its terms, the
statute makes plain that the repeal of a statute has no effect on an
action or proceeding already begun. And, as applied here, that
means the legislature’s 2022 repeal of the statute under which
Cooke was charged has no effect on his pending prosecution. In
other words, the statute saves Cooke’s prosecution from
abatement.



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                         Opinion of the Court

    ¶27 Still, Cooke resists this conclusion, arguing that the general
saving statute does not apply to criminal actions. He acknowledges
that the statute has been applied to save a private right of action
after a legislative repeal of a civil statute. See Buttrey, 

(concluding that the general saving statute saved plaintiff’s civil
claim for damages arising out of a repealed statute); Indus. Comm’n
v. Agee, 

 (Utah 1920) (relying on the general saving
statute to conclude legislature intended that claimants could
continue to prosecute their rights under a statute that was repealed
while their cases were pending). But because words like
“prosecution” and “criminal” do not appear in the general saving
statute, Cooke argues that the legislature did not intend for it to
save all criminal prosecutions from abatement. 6
   ¶28 We disagree. In interpreting statutes, our goal “is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature, the best evidence of which is
the plain language of the statute itself.” State v. Miller, 

, 

 (cleaned up). And here, the terms the legislature
chose evince an intent that the general saving statute apply to civil
and criminal actions alike.
   ¶29 To begin, the terms “action” and “proceeding” are
naturally broad. That was true in 1898, when the statute was first
enacted. And it’s still true today. The first edition of Black’s Law
Dictionary, published in 1891, defined “action” as “an ordinary
proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or
prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense.”
Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891). The definition
expressly included both civil and criminal proceedings. 

 The
same edition defined “proceeding” as “regular and orderly
progress in form of law; including all possible steps in an action
from its commencement to the execution of judgment,” or “[i]n a
more particular sense, any application to a court of justice, however

__________________________________________________________
   6 Cooke concedes that the statute “could act to save” some, but

not all, criminal prosecutions from abatement. For example, those
where the legislature recodifies the same criminal statute
“word-for-word” in a different part of the code, or where the
legislature “expand[s] the reach of the offense” or increases the
associated penalties. But Cooke’s argument appears to be based in
a policy choice; he does not explain how the language of the general
saving statute supports the distinction he draws.

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                          STATE v. COOKE
                       Opinion of the Court

made, for aid in the enforcement of rights, . . . or for any remedial
object.” Proceeding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891).
    ¶30 The current edition of Black’s Law Dictionary maintains
similar definitions for the two terms. It defines an “action” as “[a]
civil or criminal judicial proceeding,” Action, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024), and a “proceeding” as “[t]he regular
and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events
between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment” or
“[a]ny procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or
agency,” Proceeding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).
    ¶31 Because both the historical and present-day meanings of
“action” and “proceeding” encompass both civil lawsuits and
criminal prosecutions, we read Utah’s general saving statute to
apply to actions arising under both civil and criminal law. The fact
that the statute does not include words like “prosecution” or
“criminal” does not change that result. The statute refers to actions
and proceedings without any qualification. That shows a clear
legislative intent that the statute apply to all actions and
proceedings, no matter the type.
    ¶32 And, under Utah law, a criminal action is usually
“commenced” by filing a criminal information. See UTAH R. CRIM.
P. 4(a); State v. Christiansen, 

, ¶¶ 1, 25, 

.
Thus, by its plain meaning, the saving statute allows criminal
actions to proceed unabated if a criminal information was filed
before the repeal of the statute underlying the charges, unless the
legislature indicates otherwise. UTAH CODE § 68-3-5.
    ¶33 Here, when the legislature repealed and replaced the
original 2016 statute with amended statutes, it made no indication
that the 2022 repeal and amendment should abate pending
prosecutions under the original statute. Because the State
commenced its prosecution against Cooke by filing an information
against him prior to the repeal of section 58-37-8(2)(g), the saving
statute applies by its plain terms and protects the prosecution from
abatement.
II. THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT DOES NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF
    CRIMINAL CHARGES WHEN THE STATUTE UNDERLYING THE
    CHARGES IS REPEALED
   ¶34 Cooke next argues that this court’s decisions in Belt v.
Turner, 

 (Utah), aff’d on reh’g, 

 (Utah 1971),
and its progeny require dismissal of the pending criminal charges


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                        Opinion of the Court

against him. He contends that despite what the saving statute says,
our precedent requires that we retroactively apply any statutory
changes that may benefit a defendant who has not yet been
sentenced. So, in situations where the elements of a criminal offense
are modified prior to sentencing in a way that could benefit the
defendant, as is the case here, Cooke argues that our caselaw
compels the dismissal of the pending charges brought under the
original statute.
    ¶35 But our caselaw does not demand this result. On the
contrary, our holdings in Belt and its progeny are narrow, confined
to circumstances in which the legislature enacts an ameliorative
sentencing amendment to a law after a charge has been filed but
before sentencing. In these limited circumstances, we have held
that courts should apply the ameliorative sentencing amendment
at the time of sentencing. See Belt, 479 P.2d at 792–93; see also Smith
v. Cook, 

 (Utah 1990) (stating Belt’s rule “is
applicable only to situations in which [an] amendment that lessens
the criminal penalty becomes effective prior to the time a criminal
defendant is sentenced”).
    ¶36 Specifically, in Belt, a criminal defendant pleaded guilty to
the charge of issuing a fraudulent check. 

. Initially,
the trial court placed Belt on probation without imposing a
sentence. 

 But when Belt violated his probation, he was brought
back before the court to be sentenced. 

 At the time the charge
against Belt was filed, the offense of issuing a fraudulent check
carried a penalty of imprisonment in county jail for up to one year
or in state prison for up to five years. 

 But before Belt returned to
the court for sentencing, the legislature had amended the statute to
reduce the penalty to a fine or imprisonment in the county jail for
up to six months. 

 The trial court sentenced Belt to a term of up
to five years at the state prison, consistent with the sentencing
scheme that had since been repealed. 

      ¶37 In a split decision, this court vacated the sentence, holding
that Belt was entitled to the benefit of the ameliorative sentencing
amendment. Id at 792–93. The court reasoned that the saving
statute, which provides that a statute’s repeal “does not . . . affect
. . . any penalty incurred,” did not apply because “no penalty was




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                           STATE v. COOKE
                        Opinion of the Court

incurred until [Belt’s] sentence was pronounced.” 7 

(cleaned up). Thus, the court concluded that sentencing courts
must give defendants the benefit of a reduced penalty when the
statute is amended before sentencing. 

 at 792–93.
    ¶38 Similarly, that same year, a split court again affirmed that
the saving statute does not apply to ameliorative sentencing
amendments adopted before a defendant is sentenced. State v. Tapp,

, 335–36 (Utah 1971). The court reiterated that because
a penalty is not “incurred” until sentencing, if the legislature passes
an ameliorative sentencing amendment before sentencing, the
“defendant is entitled to the lesser penalty.” 

. Applying
this rule, the court allowed a defendant convicted of possessing
marijuana to benefit from an amendment reducing the penalty for
his offense when that amendment became effective before his
sentencing. 

 at 335–36.
    ¶39 Cooke argues that regardless of how we may now
interpret the plain language of the saving statute, this line of cases
controls and requires the dismissal of the charges against him. But
Cooke’s case differs materially from Belt and Tapp. As explained,
the court in those cases was tasked with deciding whether the
general saving statute applies to ameliorative sentencing
amendments. And to resolve that question, we interpreted the part
of the general saving statute that uniquely applies to penalties. But
we did not address the question now before us: whether the repeal
of a statute effectively terminates prosecutions that were
commenced before the statute’s repeal. Thus, Belt and its progeny




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   7 The Belt court suggested in dicta that it was “doubtful whether

the general language of [the saving statute] was intended to apply
to criminal statutes” at all. 

. But this court implicitly
disavowed these musings when it applied the general saving
statute to conclude that “any amendment to [a criminal] statute that
becomes effective after a sentence has been imposed has no effect
on that sentence.” Smith, 

. But to the extent the doubt
expressed in Belt survived Smith, we expressly disavow it today.
See State v. Hummel, 

, 

 (explaining that
this court retains flexibility to repudiate “points of law reflected
only in the broad dicta of our prior decisions”).

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                        Opinion of the Court

do not control. 8 Rather, the plain language of the general saving
statute dictates our result. And, as we’ve shown, see supra ¶¶ 26–
33, the language of the statute clearly reflects a legislative intent to
permit such prosecutions to continue unabated. 9
    ¶40 Further, contrary to Cooke’s suggestion, this is not an
unusual result. Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed this
issue and reached the conclusion that ameliorative sentencing
amendments are viewed differently from the repeal or amendment
of a criminal offense. For example, in People v. Oliver, 

 (N.Y. 1956), the authority relied upon by this court in Belt, New
York’s highest court drew a clear distinction between ameliorative
sentencing amendments and the repeal of a criminal offense
statute. The court explained that an amendment that falls “within
the category of legislation reducing penalties for criminal activity”
is “[o]bviously . . . quite different from a change in law abolishing

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   8  The State has invited us to overrule Belt and its progeny,
arguing that this precedent “grew out of a profound misreading of
Utah’s saving statute.” Because we conclude that our holding in
Belt is limited to ameliorative sentencing amendments and does not
control in the present case, see supra ¶¶ 34–39, we need not consider
whether Belt and its progeny should be overruled. Yet our decision
declining to address that question in this case should not be read as
an endorsement of the reasoning in Belt.
   9 Cooke also contends that even if Belt alone does not require

dismissal of the charges against him, Belt’s holding in combination
with the rule of lenity will require application of ameliorative
statutory changes if he is convicted. Cooke argues that no sentence
could legally be imposed and it would be absurd to convict him if
he can’t be sentenced. These arguments are underdeveloped.
Among other things, it is far from clear that Cooke cannot be
sentenced under the original statute if he’s convicted in this case. It
is also not apparent from Cooke’s argument how the rule of
lenity—a rule of statutory construction applicable to ambiguous
penal statutes—applies here. See State v. Badikyan, 

, ¶ 33
n.48, 

 (explaining that “the rule of lenity applies only
to the construction of ambiguous penal laws”). But we do not
resolve these questions now. Whether Cooke, who has yet to be
tried, would be entitled to any ameliorative sentencing benefits
under the revised articulation is a separate matter not currently
before us.

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                            STATE v. COOKE
                        Opinion of the Court

a crime, or altering its definition, where the State may prefer to
retain the right to prosecute for the act previously committed in
deliberate defiance of the law as it then existed.” 

 at 202 & n.3; see
also State v. Carpentino, 

 (N.H. 2014) (explaining that
the line of cases holding that ameliorative sentencing statutes
should be applied retroactively applies to amendments that
“reduce the penalty for a pre-existing crime,” but not to
amendments that “effectively eliminate[]” a crime).
    ¶41 So too here. The Utah Legislature has, through the saving
statute, expressed its general view that a defendant can be
convicted for conduct that was criminal when charged—even if the
legislature subsequently amends the relevant statute. If the
legislature had expressed an intent contrary to the default position
it established under the general saving statute, we would give
effect to that intent. But where it has manifested no intent to remove
the conduct at issue from the reach of the general saving statute, we
apply the statute as written.
    ¶42 Lastly, Cooke argues that “[w]hen a legislative act
completely decriminalizes what was once criminal, any existing
prosecution should be terminated, regardless of the existence of a
saving clause.” Cooke’s argument invites us to disregard the
general saving statute—something we cannot do. But we also reject
the premise of his argument—that the legislature “completely
decriminalize[d] what was once criminal.” By reenacting a
modified version of the repealed statute, the legislature did not
manifest an intent to completely decriminalize the act of
negligently causing death or serious bodily injury while driving
with methamphetamine in one’s system. To be sure, the legislature
modified the elements of the relevant crimes. But the legislature’s
action does not suggest that it viewed Cooke’s conduct as
unworthy of criminal accountability.
                           CONCLUSION
    ¶43 We hold that the district court correctly determined that
the prosecution of Cooke may continue unabated despite the repeal
of the statute under which he was initially charged. The plain
language of Utah’s general saving statute, Utah Code
section 68-3-5, permits a pending criminal prosecution to continue
unaffected by the repeal of the underlying criminal offense.
Additionally, this court’s precedent originating with Belt v. Turner,

 (Utah), aff’d on reh’g, 

 (Utah 1971), applies



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                        Cite as: 

                       Opinion of the Court

only to ameliorative sentencing amendments, not to repeals of the
underlying criminal offense.
    ¶44 In this case, the State initiated its prosecution of Cooke
before the legislature repealed the criminal statute underlying the
charges, so the general saving statute protects the prosecution from
abatement. And, because the question of whether the saving statute
applies to ameliorative sentencing amendments is not before us,
Belt and its progeny have no application here. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s order denying Cooke’s motion to dismiss
and remand for further proceedings under the original statute.




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