In This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2025 UT 8
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of E.M.,
a person under eighteen years of age.
E.M.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
No. 20220968
Heard September 9, 2024
Filed April 3, 2025
On Certification from the Court of Appeals
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Susan H. Eisenman
No. 1199717
Attorneys:
Monica Maio, Hilary S. Forbush, William R. Russell,
Hannah Welch, Salt Lake City, for appellant
Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Andrew F. Peterson, Deputy Solic.
Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in
which ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE, JUSTICE PETERSEN,
JUSTICE HAGEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 E.M. was fifteen years old when he allegedly killed
twenty-year-old S.A. and wounded four other people in a racially
In re E.M.
Opinion of the Court
motivated shooting. He was arrested shortly after the shooting, and
the State filed charges against him for multiple crimes, including
murder, in juvenile court. The issue before us is whether the
juvenile court abused its discretion in transferring E.M.’s case to
district court.
¶2 Our analysis is centered in Utah Code sections 80-6-503
and -504 (the Transfer Statute). 1 In 2020, the legislature amended
Utah Code section 80-6-503, significantly limiting the number of
fifteen-year-olds charged with crimes in juvenile court who are
eligible for transfer consideration. And in those few qualifying
cases where a fifteen-year-old is eligible for transfer consideration,
the juvenile court has broad discretion to retain jurisdiction.
Because of the complicated nature of these determinations, the
legislature directed juvenile courts to individually and holistically
approach each juvenile and their specific set of circumstances to
decide whether transfer is ultimately in the best interests of the
juvenile and the public. To effectuate the Transfer Statute’s
purposes, that analysis is not and cannot be a formulaic calculation.
¶3 We hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
when it concluded that E.M.’s case is one where transferring a
fifteen-year-old to district court is appropriate.
BACKGROUND 2
¶4 In June of 2021, F.N. held a high school graduation party
at Trolley Square. The party ended around 12:30 a.m. the following
morning when a fight broke out and shots were fired. F.N. and five
others, including S.A., left Trolley Square and went to S.A.’s house
to continue to hang out. Around 1:40 a.m., a drive-by shooting
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1The Juvenile Court Act (Utah Code §§ 80-6-501 to -508) was
recodified during the 2021 legislative session, and the numbering
changes went into effect on September 1, 2021. Juvenile
Recodification, H.B. 285 §§ 161 to 167, 2021 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah
2021) (available at https://le.utah.gov/~2021/bills/static/HB02
5.html). Other sections have since been amended, but the relevant
provisions remain substantively the same. We use the current
statutory citations for ease of reference.
2 These alleged facts are taken from record documents related to
E.M.’s preliminary hearing in the juvenile court. We emphasize that
E.M. has not yet been tried and that these remain unproven
allegations at this stage.
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Opinion of the Court
occurred outside of S.A.’s house, killing S.A. and wounding four
others. E.M., who was fifteen years old at the time, was arrested in
connection with the incident.
¶5 The State filed an information in juvenile court, charging
E.M. with sixteen felony counts, including one count of murder, six
counts of felony discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily
injury, one count of obstruction of justice, and eight additional
counts of felony discharge of a firearm. The State then asked the
juvenile court to transfer E.M.’s case to the district court.
¶6 The juvenile court held a preliminary hearing as
contemplated by the Transfer Statute. 3 Eight witnesses testified at
that hearing. After the hearing, the juvenile court issued findings
of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately transferring E.M.’s case
to the district court. The juvenile court found that the State had
established probable cause that E.M. was a principal actor in the
transfer-qualifying offense of murder. 4 After finding E.M.’s charge
eligible for transfer, the juvenile court went on to analyze under the
Transfer Statute’s five retention factors whether it was “contrary to
the best interests of the minor and the public for the juvenile court
to retain jurisdiction over the offense.” 5
¶7 The juvenile court made detailed findings about E.M.’s
life, the circumstances that led up to and followed the shooting, and
the alleged racial motivation that fueled the offenses. It first
discussed the seriousness of the qualifying crime and whether it
was allegedly committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated,
or willful manner. It highlighted that “[t]he crimes alleged here
were exceedingly dangerous and could have resulted in the deaths
of several people. . . . But for what seems to be miraculous luck, five
people could have died.” The juvenile court also noted the
allegation that “[t]he shootings and the murder were racially
motivated by a desire to kill persons of Polynesian descent,” which
the juvenile court considered to be more serious than a murder that
was not racially motivated because “it shows extreme depravity
and callousness toward human life.”
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3 See id. § 80-6-504(1).
4 See id. § 80-6-504(2)(a). E.M. does not challenge the juvenile
court’s probable cause determination on appeal.
5 See id. § 80-6-504(2)(b), (3).
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Opinion of the Court
¶8 Regarding whether the crime was committed in an
aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner, the juvenile
court highlighted the weapon allegedly used in the commission of
the crime: “The rifle used was a rifle built for long range firing, and
has a higher capacity for over-penetration (i.e. the ability to go
through walls) than a gun like a pistol.” Based on testimony from
three people in the car, the group likely also had a pistol with them.
“But they chose to use the rifle, which is capable of shooting more
bullets and causing more damage.” The juvenile court found that
choice to be “extremely violent and aggressive.” It also highlighted
the premeditated nature of the alleged crimes, describing them as
“retaliation for the shooting that had occurred earlier at Trolley
Square,” a “retaliation that was truly aimed at hurting people who
had been at the graduation party, or even just random Polynesian
people.”
¶9 Next, the juvenile court dove deeply into E.M.’s social
history, discussing his “very difficult childhood, marked with
extreme loss and trauma.” E.M. was born in South Sudan. When he
was a young child, war broke out in the city where he and his
family lived. E.M.’s father was a soldier, and his family’s home was
often the target of gun violence. E.M. witnessed his grandmother
being beaten to death and his sister being gang raped. After being
shot in the leg and left for dead, E.M. fled with his sister to a refugee
camp in Kenya. Life in the refugee camp was focused on survival;
E.M. and his sister lived in constant fear of people coming to take
them and hurt them.
¶10 After E.M. and his sister resettled in the United States, life
continued to be a struggle. E.M. was bullied in school for his
immigrant status and skin color. He struggled with trauma from
his experiences in South Sudan and Kenya and would wake up
screaming at night. E.M. had little education before arriving in
Utah, and he had not received any sort of therapy or treatment to
address his trauma.
¶11 Last, the juvenile court noted that E.M. had no prior
criminal record and evaluated the likelihood of E.M.’s
rehabilitation “by use of services available in the juvenile court.”
Citing E.M.’s forensic mental health evaluation, the juvenile court
noted that E.M. is “experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder and
significant emotional distress related to his previous life
experiences and present situation.” It also highlighted that E.M.
had “not received any mental health services prior to” entering
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custody. The juvenile court noted E.M.’s progress in detention, and
that “he has shown increased maturity, and social growth.” But it
determined incidents of assault E.M. committed while in detention
showed “E.M. continues to be triggered to racially motivated
violence.”
¶12 Based on the juvenile court’s findings on each retention
factor, it ultimately held “that the State has met its burden to show
that retention of [E.M.] in the [j]uvenile [c]ourt is contrary to both
the best interest of the public and to [E.M.]’s best interest.” E.M.
sought interlocutory review of the juvenile court’s transfer order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13 The sole issue before us is whether the juvenile court erred
in transferring E.M.’s case to the district court. When a court has
“discretion to weigh factors, balance competing interests, or
otherwise choose among a range of permissible approaches or
outcomes, those discretionary determinations must rest upon
sound legal principles.” 6 Whether the juvenile court properly
interpreted the Transfer Statute is a “question of law that we review
for correctness.” 7 We review the juvenile court’s application of the
Transfer Statute for abuse of discretion. 8
ANALYSIS
¶14 Under Utah law, cases involving juveniles accused of
serious crimes are ordinarily adjudicated in juvenile court. 9 After
receiving a referral from law enforcement, a prosecuting attorney
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6 Id. ¶ 21.
7 State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ¶ 8,
84 P.3d 1171 (cleaned up).
8 See State v. Boyden,
2019 UT 11, ¶ 16,
441 P.3d 737. We note that
in In re I.R.C.,
2010 UT 41,
232 P.3d 1040, we analyzed a challenge
to application of a prior version of the Transfer Statute under the
mixed question of law and fact standard. See id. ¶ 12. The
legislature has since amended the Transfer Statute, which now
emphasizes it is up to the juvenile court’s discretion to determine
how to weigh the statute’s factors. See infra Part I. This change
makes abuse of discretion the appropriate standard of review for
the question of whether the juvenile court properly applied the
current version of the Transfer Statute.
9 See UTAH CODE §§ 80-6-301, -601.
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Opinion of the Court
files a petition in juvenile court. 10 In a limited set of cases, a
prosecuting attorney may then seek to transfer a juvenile to district
court by filing a criminal information in the juvenile court. 11 Minors
may be considered for transfer only if they are charged with a
qualifying offense. 12 For fifteen-year-olds like E.M., that includes
murder, aggravated murder, attempted murder, or attempted
aggravated murder. 13 To secure transfer, the prosecuting attorney
must first establish “probable cause to believe that a qualifying
offense was committed and the minor committed that offense.” 14
Then the juvenile court must find “by a preponderance of the
evidence, that it is contrary to the best interests of the minor and
the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over the
offense.” 15
¶15 In making this best interests determination, the juvenile
court must “consider and make findings on” several retention
factors:
(a) the seriousness of the qualifying offense and
whether the protection of the community requires
that the minor is detained beyond the amount of time
allowed under Subsection 80-6-802(1), or beyond the
age of continuing jurisdiction that the juvenile court
may exercise under Section 80-6-605; (b) the extent to
which the minor’s actions in the qualifying offense
were committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner; (c) the minor’s
mental, physical, educational, trauma, and social
history; (d) the criminal record or history of the
minor; and (e) the likelihood of the minor’s
rehabilitation by the use of services and facilities that
are available to the juvenile court. 16
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10 Id. §§ 80-6-301, -304.5, -305.
11 Id. § 80-6-503.
12 Id.
13 Id. §§ 80-6-503(1)(b)(ii), -504.
14 Id. § 80-6-504(2)(a).
15 Id. § 80-6-504(2)(b).
16 Id. § 80-6-504(3).
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The legislature left the determination of how much weight to give
each of these factors up to “the juvenile court’s discretion.” 17
¶16 E.M. argues the juvenile court misapplied the Transfer
Statute’s retention factors because it considered facts that went
beyond the elements of the transfer-qualifying crime, and because
it determined elements of E.M.’s social history ultimately weighed
in favor of transfer. We first look to the Transfer Statute’s text to
assess how the legislature intended the juvenile court to apply the
best interests framework. We then address each of E.M.’s
misapplication arguments in turn.
I. THE TRANSFER STATUTE INSTRUCTS JUVENILE COURTS TO
HOLISTICALLY APPROACH JUVENILE TRANSFER DETERMINATIONS
¶17 “We have repeatedly affirmed our commitment to
interpreting statutes according to the plain meaning of their text.” 18
And “[w]hen the meaning of a statute can be discerned from its
language, no other interpretive tools are needed.” 19 Any
“speculation as to a contrary legislative purpose cannot quash our
construction of the plain language.” 20 The Transfer Statute’s text
provides clear and complete instruction on how the legislature
intended the juvenile court to apply the statute, and so we need not
wade any further in search of additional meaning.
¶18 The Transfer Statute lays out five retention factors for the
juvenile court to “consider and make findings on” in the course of
“making a determination” about whether retention of the case in
juvenile court is “contrary to the best interests of the minor and the
public.” 21 Each factor is broad, with some listing multiple sub-factors. 22 The Transfer Statute also states that “[t]he amount of
__________________________________________________________
17 Id. § 80-6-504(4).
18 Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City,
2011 UT 10, ¶ 9,
248 P.3d 465
(cleaned up).
19 Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship,
2011 UT 50, ¶ 15,
267
P.3d 863 (cleaned up).
20 See Olsen,
2011 UT 10, ¶ 23.
21 UTAH CODE § 80-6-504(2)(b), (3).
22 See, e.g., id. § 80-6-504(3)(a) (stating the juvenile court shall
consider “the seriousness of the qualifying offense and whether the
protection of the community requires that the minor is detained
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weight that each factor in Subsection (3) is given is in the juvenile
court’s discretion.” 23
¶19 Here, the direction to “consider” the factors on the way to
some ultimate determination suggests the court’s analysis is meant
to be a holistic evaluation, not a mechanical calculation. 24 Though
the statute directs the court to make “findings” on each factor, the
nested nature of the sub-factors suggests that a juvenile court need
not make findings on every listed item, but should consider
evidence related to each general category before deciding whether
retention is contrary to a juvenile’s and the public’s best interests. 25
The statute gives the juvenile court wide discretion when weighing
each factor, prescribing no set formula of how facts should be
weighed, nor how much weight they should be given. 26 Taking the
section as a whole, we conclude that the legislature intended
juvenile courts to undertake a holistic analysis, not to treat each
factor as a bucket with a final score to be added or subtracted
against the other categories of evidence.
¶20 This holistic approach to the retention factor analysis is
consistent with the legislature’s 2020 amendments to the Transfer
Statute, narrowing its application to a more limited set of
juveniles. 27 Previously, fifteen-year-olds like E.M. were eligible for
transfer to the district court if the juvenile committed any felony. 28
Now, those juveniles are eligible for transfer consideration only if
__________________________________________________________
beyond the” ordinary time for juvenile jurisdiction (emphasis
added)); id. § 80-6-504(3)(c) (stating the juvenile court shall consider
“the minor’s mental, physical, educational, trauma, and social
history” (emphasis added)).
23 Id. § 80-6-504(4).
24 See id. § 80-6-504(3).
25 Id. § 80-6-504(2), (3).
26 Id. § 80-6-504(4).
27 Juvenile Justice Amendments, H.B. 384, 2020 Leg., Gen. Sess.
(Utah 2020) (available at https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/
HB0384.html).
28 UTAH CODE § 78A-6-703(1) (2019).
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the juvenile commits one of four specific felonies: murder,
aggravated murder, or attempt of either. 29
¶21 E.M. argues that the legislature’s decision to decrease the
number of offenses that qualify a juvenile for transfer consideration
implies a broader principle “that juvenile courts must apply the
transfer statute and its retention factors narrowly and with the
presumption that fourteen- and fifteen-year-old youth should
remain in the juvenile system except in the most extreme
situations.” But this argument implies a command that is not in the
text of the statute. And “[w]here statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine
legislative intent.” 30
¶22 The Transfer Statute instructs that no fourteen- or fifteen-year-old may be tried in the district court unless the juvenile is
alleged to have committed murder, aggravated murder, or attempt
of either. 31 This tells us the legislature intended to narrow the types
of offenses that qualify a juvenile for transfer, a change that would
inherently reduce the number of younger juveniles transferred to
district court. This amendment does not then also imply that the
legislature intended to put a thumb on the scale in the retention
factor analysis to always weigh toward retention.
¶23 The legislature was clear that it intended for juvenile
courts to exercise their discretion in conducting an individual
evaluation of each juvenile case being considered for transfer to
district court. 32 In some instances, the retention factors will
ultimately weigh in favor of retention, and in others, they will
weigh against. That the juvenile court concluded that the holistic
approach weighs against retention for this particular defendant
does not mean that it will weigh against retention for every
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29 Id. § 80-6-503(1)(b).
30 Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth,
779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); see also
Hooban v. Unicity Int’l, Inc.,
2012 UT 40, ¶ 17,
285 P.3d 766 (“Where
the statute’s language marks its reach in clear and unambiguous
terms, it is our role to enforce a legislative purpose that matches
those terms, not to supplant it with a narrower or broader one that
we might infer from the legislative history.”(cleaned up)).
31 UTAH CODE § 80-6-503(1)(b); id. § 80-6-504(1), (2).
32 Id. § 80-6-504(4).
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Opinion of the Court
defendant. This lack of predictability may be unsatisfying, but the
statutory text demands freedom for a juvenile court to consider all
the circumstances relevant to any given juvenile’s transfer
determination. Interpreting the Transfer Statute with any less
flexibility would undermine the legislature’s decision to vest
juvenile courts with that decision-making power.
¶24 Having addressed how the retention factors must be
applied, we now turn to E.M.’s arguments regarding whether the
juvenile court erred in evaluating any individual factor.
A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err When Evaluating the
Seriousness of E.M.’s Offense
¶25 First, E.M. argues the juvenile court erred by considering,
as part of the seriousness factor analysis, the non-qualifying
offenses E.M. allegedly committed during the same criminal
episode as the qualifying offense. The first retention factor requires
the juvenile court to consider “the seriousness of the qualifying
offense and whether the protection of the community requires that
the minor is detained beyond the amount of time allowed under
Subsection 80-6-802(1), or beyond the age of continuing jurisdiction
that the juvenile court may exercise under Section 80-6-605.” 33 E.M.
argues that this factor only allows the juvenile court to consider the
seriousness of the qualifying offense in isolation, and that facts and
circumstances falling outside the qualifying offense cannot be
considered to inform “the level of seriousness as contemplated” in
the seriousness retention factor.
¶26 Here, in the context of an alleged drive-by shooting, E.M.’s
approach would mean the juvenile court could consider only the
seriousness of actions that gave rise to the qualifying offense of
murder and could not consider any facts related to non-qualifying
offenses that occurred during the same criminal episode. This
would mean the juvenile court could consider only the firing of the
two bullets that killed S.A., and it would be forced to ignore “the
four other people [who were] shot multiple times and [who were]
grievously wounded,” and the alleged racial motivation behind the
shooting.
¶27 A juvenile court cannot fully comply with the
requirements of the retention factors if it must look through a
pinhole to try to comprehend an entire picture. Understanding
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33 Id. § 80-6-504(3)(a).
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seriousness requires context. Consistent with the holistic approach
to the retention factors, juvenile courts must be able to consider all
the interrelated circumstances that accompany a qualifying crime,
not just the discrete facts required to convict the minor of that
qualifying crime. 34 If we were to take E.M.’s sterilized approach,
the natural conclusion would be that all murders are serious. 35
¶28 What makes one murder more—or less—serious than
another is circumstantial and requires examining the surrounding
facts. For example: What motivated the act? Who else did the
assailant put at risk in the commission of the act? Was the act
targeted or random? Limiting the universe of what a juvenile court
can consider to only the very few facts that meet the elements of the
charged offense—the facts that speak only to whether E.M.
“intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death of another
individual” 36—paints an incomplete picture of the qualifying
offense, a picture insufficient to flesh out the personalized analysis
the retention factors require.
¶29 We thus conclude the juvenile court did not err in its
seriousness analysis when it considered facts, circumstances, and
non-qualifying offenses that provided context to assess the
seriousness of the qualifying offense.
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34 The parties engage in some discussion about whether the
retention factors are exhaustive categories. See id. § 80-6-504(3). But
neither party argued any facts that fell outside the list of factors,
and it is difficult to imagine a fact that would. This forecloses the
need for us to address whether the factors are exhaustive. We
instead wait for the case where someone argues that the court
considered, or should have considered, evidence outside of those
retention factors to address whether they are exhaustive categories.
35See State v. Bishop,
717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986) (“It is
generally accepted that murder is more serious than other
crimes.”).
36 UTAH CODE § 76-5-203(2)(a). While this subsection of the code
provides several other definitions of murder, the “intentional and
knowing” definition applies because the juvenile court indicated in
its Preliminary Hearing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
that “there is probable cause to establish that [E.M.] intentionally
or knowingly caused the death of S.A.”
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B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err When Evaluating Whether
E.M.’s Actions Were Committed in an Aggressive, Violent,
Premeditated, or Willful Manner
¶30 Next, we turn to E.M.’s related argument that the juvenile
court erred in considering the context of the qualifying crime when
it evaluated whether E.M. committed the crime in an “aggressive,
violent, premeditated, or willful manner.” 37 E.M. argues the
juvenile court should not have considered non-qualifying offenses
as part of its analysis on this factor. But whether an act is
aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful, again, requires
context. Zeroing in on whether a bullet killed a victim and whether
the shooter intended that bullet to kill that victim does not provide
facts that this factor is aimed at: not just if, but how, the crime was
committed.
¶31 Nothing in the statute dictates that this analysis must be
cabined to facts that directly prove an element of the qualifying
crime. And the text of this factor in particular, “the extent to which
the minor’s actions in the qualifying offense were committed in an
aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner,” requires a
juvenile court to consider facts that necessarily go beyond the
elements. 38 The manner in which the qualifying offense was
committed—how it was committed—is a different inquiry from
whether the qualifying offense was committed.
¶32 We conclude that looking to the surrounding
circumstances of the qualifying crime to determine whether it was
committed in an “aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful
manner” is not only appropriate but imperative to meet the
mandates of the Transfer Statute.
C. The Transfer Statute Does Not Dictate That Trauma
History Can Weigh Only in Favor of Retention
¶33 Regarding the juvenile court’s analysis of E.M.’s “mental,
physical, educational, trauma, and social history,” 39 E.M. argues
the juvenile court erred in considering his trauma to be an
aggravating factor instead of a mitigating one. In its evaluation of
this factor, the court cited E.M.’s forensic mental health evaluation
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37 See id. § 80-6-504(3)(b).
38 Id.
39 Id. § 80-6-504(3)(c).
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noting that “[t]rends in research indicate adolescents exposed to
and involved in traumatic incidents have a higher rate of
involvement in delinquent behavior.” The report continued that
“[E.M.]’s exposure to and history of trauma is important to
consider as it likely contributed to his current situations as children
exposed to trauma are typically less resilient . . . and are more
prone to . . . lifelong health, mental health, and substance abuse
problems.” 40
¶34 Citing this forensic evaluation, the juvenile court found it
“extremely concerning” that E.M. was accused of committing the
same sort of violence and depravity he witnessed as a child in
South Sudan. And it found that E.M.’s history “may explain why
he would be involved in delinquent behavior or why he would lack
regard for human life.” Ultimately the juvenile court concluded
that, in light of E.M.’s “extremely traumatic childhood,”
rehabilitation might take longer than the nine years of
rehabilitation services he would receive if he were not transferred
to district court, and that this trauma history factor weighed in
favor of transfer.
¶35 E.M. cites Roper v. Simmons for the proposition that minors
are “categorically less culpable than the average criminal,” and so
“it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those
of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character
deficiencies will be reformed.” 41 While this is an accurate recitation
of Roper, it is inapplicable to the retention factor analysis. Roper
focused on culpability and advised courts not to punish minors as
severely as adults when their criminal missteps are the result of
“transient immaturity.” 42 Here, the juvenile court did not use
E.M.’s traumatic history to determine culpability, nor did it imply
that E.M.’s youth was to blame for his criminal decisions. Instead,
the juvenile court asked whether E.M.’s unique, personal traumatic
history that created the lens through which he sees the world is
something he can easily overcome. E.M. suffered a bitterly unfair
and difficult childhood “marked with extreme loss and trauma”
that has left deep and lasting wounds. Ultimately, the juvenile
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40 (Emphasis added.)
41 543 U.S. 551, 567, 570 (2005) (cleaned up).
42
Id. at 573; see also Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
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Opinion of the Court
court determined that if these wounds are not adequately treated,
they may negatively influence E.M.’s behavior for a lifetime.
¶36 E.M. argues it was inappropriate for the juvenile court to
use his trauma history “against him” to support a finding that
transfer is in his best interests. But on review of the statutory text,
we find no reason that a juvenile’s trauma must weigh against his
transfer.
¶37 We acknowledge the difficult position this puts defense
counsel in: by introducing social history, any defendant likely
hopes to provide explanation for his qualifying crime and
potentially mitigate the possibility of transfer. But there is no
formula that tells us when any particular traumatic experience will
weigh for or against a juvenile being retained or transferred.
Ultimately, the Transfer Statute seeks to guide the juvenile court to
the outcome that is in the best interests of both the minor and of the
public, with the hope of helping each minor rehabilitate and
recover from the individual circumstances that informed his
alleged choice to commit a very serious crime. Here, the fullest
picture of E.M.’s life provided the best opportunity for the juvenile
court to reach the best possible outcome for E.M. and the public.
And the juvenile court had the discretion to take in all the available
information about E.M.’s life, to listen to experts, and ultimately to
weigh everything in front of it to determine whether transfer was
appropriate.
II. THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
APPLYING THE TRANSFER STATUTE
¶38 Having addressed E.M.’s arguments about how individual
factors are to be interpreted, we now turn to the broader question
of whether the juvenile court correctly applied the Transfer Statute
when determining that it was in E.M.’s and the public’s best
interests to transfer his case to district court.
¶39 Here, the juvenile court considered and made findings on
all the Transfer Statute’s retention factors. It recited specific facts
and made additional factual findings in support of its decision to
transfer. And, as discussed above, it did not err in its approach to
any one factor.
¶40 First, the juvenile court made specific findings “related to
[the] seriousness of the offense and the extent to which [E.M.]’s
actions were committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or
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Opinion of the Court
willful manner,” factors (a) and (b). 43 It also made specific findings
regarding “facts related to [E.M.’s] social history,” factor (c). 44 The
juvenile court then acknowledged that “[t]he parties stipulated that
[E.M.] had no delinquency history prior to the filing of this criminal
information,” satisfying consideration of factor (d), whether the
minor had any criminal record or history. 45 Last, the juvenile court
made findings “related to the likelihood of rehabilitation by use of
services available in the juvenile court,” the final factor (e). 46
¶41 After making findings on each factor, the juvenile court
discussed in detail how those findings supported transferring E.M.
to district court. It summarized,
There are a lot of unknowns. This is only a
preliminary decision that sets the course of the case
going forward. But, given the seriousness of the
offense, the evidence at this stage of the proceeding,
and the retention factors weighted in favor of
community safety, the Court finds that the State has
met its burden to show retention of [E.M.] in the
[j]uvenile [c]ourt is contrary to both the best interest
of the public and to [E.M.]’s best interest.
The juvenile court made all appropriate findings and thoughtfully
and thoroughly weighed the evidence in front of it. We hold that
the juvenile court acted within its discretion in transferring E.M.’s
case to district court.
CONCLUSION
¶42 The weight of transfer is not lost on this court. Nor was it
lost on the juvenile court. As E.M. notes, “[t]he Utah Legislature has
continually narrowed which youth and what offenses may be
transferred to the criminal legal system,” and “only those youth
who commit the most heinous offenses” are ever to be considered
for transfer. It is alleged that E.M. committed one of those “most
heinous offenses,” and the legislature entrusted the decision of
whether transfer was appropriate to the juvenile court’s discretion.
Discerning no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s analysis,
__________________________________________________________
43 UTAH CODE § 80-6-504(3)(a), (b).
44 Id. § 80-6-504(3)(c).
45 Id. § 80-6-504(3)(d).
46 Id. § 80-6-504(3)(e).
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In re E.M.
Opinion of the Court
we uphold the juvenile court’s decision that transfer is in the best
interests of E.M. and the public.
16
