[Cite as Grippando-Wright v. Smith,
2026-Ohio-332.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TABETHA GRIPPANDO-WRIGHT Case No. 2025 CA 00068
Defendant - Appellant Opinion and Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Licking County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 24 CV 00996
TRENELL SMITH, ET AL.,
Judgment: Appeal Dismissed
Plaintiffs - Appellees
Date of Judgment Entry: February 2, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King, William B. Hoffman, Robert G. Montgomery, Appellate
Judges
APPEARANCES: Tabetha Grippando-Wright, Pro se, for Defendant-Appellant; Jeremy
R. Abrams, Korey M. Kidwell, Cynthia A. Cunningham, Kidwell & Cunningham, Ltd., for
Plaintiffs-Appellees
OPINION
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Tabetha Grippando appeals the August 15, 2025
Judgment Entry entered by the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, which granted
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees Trennell Smith, et al.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellant is the adopted daughter of Rex E. Wright. Wright had no other
children, biological or adopted. Wright owned real property located at 10550 Blacksnake
Road, Saint Louisville, Ohio 43701 (“the Property”). On May 1, 2014, Wright designated
Appellant as the transfer on death beneficiary of the Property. The Transfer on Death
Designation Affidavit was filed as Instrument No. 201405020007928, in the Licking
County, Ohio, Official Records on May 2, 2014.
{¶3} On October 22, 2021, Wright and Appellees entered into a Residential
Lease Agreement with Purchase Option (“the Lease Agreement”), which granted
Appellees the right to purchase the Property on or before October 31, 2026, for a
purchase price of $185,000. Pursuant to the terms of the Lease Agreement, Appellees
were to pay Wright $700.01/month and pay the bi-annual property taxes. Initially,
Appellees made the monthly payments to Wright. Then, in 2023, Wright requested
Appellees make the rental payments directly to CES Credit Union, his lender. Appellees
complied with Wright’s request and tendered all subsequent monthly payments to CES
Credit Union.
{¶4} Wright passed away on May 8, 2024, and the Property transferred to
Appellant. On July 31, 2024, Appellees sent to Appellant via UPS written notice of their
intent to exercise the option to purchase under the Lease Agreement. Appellant received
the notice on August 5, 2024. Appellant refused to comply with the purchase option set
forth in the Lease Agreement.
{¶5} On August 8, 2024, Appellees filed a complaint against Appellant for breach
of contract and declaratory judgment. Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim for
declaratory judgment on September 12, 2024. Appellees filed an answer to Appellant’s
counterclaim on September 19, 2024.
{¶6} On October 16, 2024, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.
Therein, Appellees argued the Lease Agreement was valid and enforceable and
Appellant’s interest in the Property was subject to the Lease Agreement. In support of
their motion, Appellees attached the affidavits of Appellee Hunter and Appellee Smith as
well as Justin Bell, Wright’s step-grandson; Bill Bell, Wright’s stepson; and Attorney
Jeremy R. Abrams, who witnessed Appellees and Wright sign the Lease Agreement on
October 22, 2021.
{¶7} Appellant filed a memorandum contra and her own motion for summary
judgment on November 12, 2024. In her memorandum contra Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment, Appellant asserted the Lease Agreement did not include an option
to purchase, the Lease Agreement terminated upon Wright’s death pursuant to its
express terms, and there was no legal basis for severing the provisions suggested by
Appellees. In her motion for summary judgment, Appellant maintained she was entitled
to declaratory judgment on her counterclaim, explaining, based upon the plain language
of the Lease Agreement, the Lease Agreement terminated because Appellees never took
possession of the Property and because Appellees recorded the Lease Agreement,
contrary to the terms thereof.1
{¶8} Appellees filed a reply to Appellant’s motion contra to Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment as well as a motion contra to Appellant’s motion for summary
judgment on December 11, 2024. Appellant filed a reply in support of her motion for
summary judgment on December 26, 2024.
{¶9} Via Judgment Entry filed August 15, 2025, the trial court granted Appellees’
motion for summary judgment. The trial court found neither Appellees nor Wright
terminated the Lease Agreement and the Lease Agreement had not automatically
terminated based upon specific events as Appellant maintained. The trial court further
found the Lease Agreement remained in force at the time Appellees notified Appellant of
their intent to exercise the purchase option and the purchase option itself was valid.
{¶10} It is from this judgment entry Appellant appeals.
{¶11} We begin by noting Appellant's Brief fails to comply with App. R. 16, which
provides, in relevant part:
(A) Brief of the Appellant. The appellant shall include in its brief,
under the headings and in the order indicated, all of the following:
(1) A table of contents, with page references.
(2) A table of cases alphabetically arranged, statutes, and other
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where cited.
1 Paragraph 24 of the Lease Agreement provides Appellees may not record the Lease Agreement “on the
Public Records of any public office” and, if Appellees violate that provision, “this [Lease] shall, at Landlord’s
option, terminate immediately[.]”
(3) A statement of the assignments of error presented for review, with
reference to the place in the record where each error is reflected.
(4) A statement of the issues presented for review, with references
to the assignments of error to which each issue relates.
(5) A statement of the case briefly describing the nature of the case,
the course of proceedings, and the disposition in the court below.
(6) A statement of facts relevant to the assignments of error
presented for review, with appropriate references to the record in
accordance with division (D) of this rule.
(7) An argument containing the contentions of the appellant with
respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons
in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record on which appellant relies. The argument may be
preceded by a summary.
(8) A conclusion briefly stating the precise relief sought.
{¶12} Appellant's brief fails to satisfy any of the requirements of App. 16(A);
therefore, the brief is noncompliant. Compliance with the above-stated rule is mandatory.
Zanesville v. Robinson, 2010-Ohio-4843, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). "It is not the function of this
court to construct a foundation for [an appellant's] claims; failure to comply with the rules
governing practice in the appellate court is a tactic which is ordinarily fatal." Musleve v.
Musleve,
2008-Ohio-3961, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.). Such deficiencies permit this Court to dismiss
Appellant's appeal. State v. Darby,
2019-Ohio-2186, ¶¶ 21-24 (5th Dist.).
{¶13} We understand Appellant has filed this appeal pro se. Nevertheless, "like
members of the bar, pro se litigants are required to comply with rules of practice and
procedure." Hardy v. Belmont Correctional Inst., 2006-Ohio-3316, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.).
Although "an appellate court will ordinarily indulge a pro se litigant where there is some
semblance of compliance with the appellate rules," Oyler v. Oyler,
2014-Ohio-3468, ¶¶
18-19 (5th Dist.), we find Appellant's noncompliance with the appellate rules is significant
and her brief lacks any cogent argument. "[F]airness and justice are best served when a
court disposes of a case on the merits"; however, we find Appellant's brief in the instant
case reflects a substantial disregard for the Court’s rules, which cannot be cured. DeHart
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
69 Ohio St.2d 189, 193 (1982). We "may not construct legal
arguments in support of an appellant's appeal." Whitehall v. Ruckman,
2007-Ohio-6780,
¶ 20 (10th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Petro v. Gold,
2006-Ohio-943, ¶ 94(10th Dist.).
{¶14} Because we find Appellant's brief so completely in derogation of App.R. 16,
we dismiss her appeal for want of prosecution pursuant to App.R. 18(C). Costs are
assessed to Appellant.
By: Hoffman, J.
King, P.J. and
Montgomery, J. concur
