Slip opinions decided 2026 — Ohio Public Domain Citations

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellee and in dismissing appellant's counterclaim. Appellee provided appropriate and authenticated information to substantiate its claim for recovery on appellant's unpaid credit card account. Appellant failed to respond to appellee's summary judgment motion and failed to submit any proper Civ.R. 56 materials. Under a plain error analysis, no error or plain error occurred. Appellant's asserted defenses to the complaint and his counterclaim were also purely frivolous. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court properly overruled the appellant's motion to suppress statements that were not the product of a custodial interrogation. The trial court did not err in refusing to order separate trials where the evidence supporting two separate indictments was simple and distinct. The appellant's convictions are supported by legally sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's sentence is not contrary to law because it is within the statutory range, and the trial court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12. Judgment affirmed.

Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion or violate mother's right to due process by denying her oral motion for a continuance to allow her to attend the permanent custody hearing virtually from prison. Judgment affirmed.

On remand, the trial court correctly decided that appellee owed appellant interest on $1,770.46, with this amount being the difference between the marital assets awarded appellant and appellee. This result was equitable and compliant with R.C. 1343.03(A). Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in failing to impose the sentence the parties jointly recommended in their plea agreement. The court informed appellant that it was not bound by the agreement and informed appellant of the possible range of sentences he could receive. In addition, the sentence is not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

Probate court did not err in finding that Mother had justifiable cause for failing to contact her child during the year preceding the filing of Stepmother's adoption petition.

Juvenile court did not err in terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody where parents failed to substantially remedy concerns causing removal and could not provide legally secure permanent placement.

Permanent custody-Trial court's judgment placing child in the agency's permanent custody was not against the manifest weight of the evidence-Judgment affirmed.

Repeat-Violent-Offender Specification; R.C. 2924.149; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; Evid.R. 611(A); Constitutional Right to Testify. The trial court did not err by determining the defendant-appellant's status as a repeat violent offender after the jury found him guilty of the underlying criminal charge. The defendant-appellant's trial counsel was not was not ineffective because the trial court reasonably controlled the mode and manner of the presentation of evidence of the defendant-appellant's prior convictions. Nothing in the record suggests that the defendant-appellant wished to testify and was denied the opportunity to do so.

Denial of motion to supress; Search warrant affidavit

Appellant's assignments of error, which challenged the trial court's determination that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies because he did not allege in his charge to the Ohio Civil Rights Commission that he had been constructively discharged, were moot because appellant did not assign as error the trial court's independent determination that his claims of discrimination and retaliation predicated on constructive discharge were time-barred under R.C. 4112.052(C). Trial court's judgment is affirmed on that unchallenged basis.

Trial court properly granted summary judgments to appellees because appellees are entitled to judgments as a matter of law where there are no genuine issues of material fact. Judgments affirmed. Osowik.

Officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain appellant because he did not match vague description of suspect. Court did not err by denying motion to suppress because evidence would have been inevitably discovered during search incident to lawful arrest. Officers' testimony authenticated videos because they viewed videos on surveillance system at store. Court erred by sentencing appellant to three mandatory firearm specifications when statute requires only two mandatory sentences. Duhart

Per Mayle, J., trial court did not err by admitting 911 calls. Statements in the calls were made to get help during an ongoing emergency, so they were nontestimonial and their admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court's inclusion of all possible terms of postrelease control in sentencing entry did not reflect notice that it gave at sentencing hearing, which can be corrected with nunc pro tunc entry.

CIV.R. 12(C) — INJUNCTIONS — SEVERABILITY — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: Where plaintiffs' complaint sought to enjoin all provisions enacted or amended by S.B. 23, but where the complaint alleged that only one provision of S.B. 23 was substantively unconstitutional, the trial court did not commit reversible error by addressing the severability of those provisions of S.B. 23 not alleged to be unconstitutional when entering judgment on the pleadings, despite plaintiffs' failure to substantively address the issue of severability in their initial Civ.R. 12(C) motion. The trial court abused its discretion by enjoining enforcement of provisions whose constitutionality had not been challenged, on the grounds that those provisions were substantively unconstitutional; the trial court should have presumed those provisions' constitutionality and asked only if they were severable from the challenged provision.

EVIDENCE — BIAS — EVID.R. 616 — HARMLESS ERROR — DOMESTIC VIOLENCE — REASONABLE PARENTAL DISCIPLINE: The trial court's erroneous exclusion of evidence admissible to prove witnesses' biases and motivations to lie under Evid.R. 616 was harmless where the jury saw photographic evidence of the victim's injuries that proved defendant's parental discipline was unreasonable.

legal custody – manifest weight of the evidence – best interest of the child

permanent custody, reopening of prior dependency case that closed with child in the legal custody of one parent, R.C. 2151.42(B)

burglary – intent – any criminal offense – unanimity – substantial evidence – plain error – alternative means

Best interests, permanent custody, kinship placement, legally secure placement

Misdemeanor Domestic Violence

Admission of evidence of child pornography; Imposition of consecutive sentences

Appellant's second assignment of error was not rendered moot by virtue of our determination regarding his first assignment of error and remand to the trial court. Thus, upon remand, in addition to conducting the proper review as set forth in R.C. 119 in the first instance as instructed in our prior decision, the trial court is hereby instructed to consider and rule upon the assignments of error asserted by appellant in the trial court. Application for reconsideration granted.

The trial court did not err in finding appellant guilty of one count of gross sexual imposition and three counts of rape. Appellant fails to show that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to secure expert testimony, present a sufficient opening statement, and properly cross-examine witness J.B. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in granting appellee's request for a civil stalking protection order against appellant. The record contained no competent, credible evidence to support the order. Judgment reversed; cause remanded.

Companionship; visitation; custody; adoption; grandparents; mother; juvenile; best interest; Juv.R. 40(D); R.C. 3109.12; R.C. 2505.02; de novo; abuse of discretion; sexual offenses; stay; Lorain; therapy. A parent's fundamental interest in the care, custody, and control of a child is a substantial right; therefore, an order resolving a statutorily created companionship claim under R.C. 3109.12 is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 when it fully disposes of the grandparents' request and the parent's objections. A juvenile court satisfies Juv.R. 40(D)(4)'s independent review requirement when, after timely objections, it conducts its own evaluation of the record and modifies a magistrate's decision to narrow companionship time, incorporating Troxel's "special weight" for a fit parent's wishes. In the absence of an abuse of discretion, a trial court does not err by granting limited, structured virtual companionship to grandparents when the record demonstrates the trial court balanced the best interest of the child and the parent's wishes under R.C. 3109.

Workers' compensation; default judgment; sanction; case-management conference; abuse of discretion; failure to appear. The trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte entering default judgment for the plaintiff when defense counsel failed to appear for the initial case-management conference.

Nursing home malpractice; admitted liability; jury instructions; jury interrogatories; punitive damages; R.C. 2315.21; invited error; plain error; wavier; judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"); de novo; ratification; corporate entity; scope of employment; actual malice; damages cap; noneconomic damages; R.C. 2315.18; $250,000; separate incident; nursing home resident's bill of rights ("NHRBR"); abuse of discretion; attorney fees; reconstructed hours; expenses; lodestar; prejudgment interest; R.C. 1343.04; good-faith settlement. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying defendants' JNOV motion as to punitive damages in Plaintiffs' nursing home malpractice case. In the instant case, there is no dispute that Defendants drafted the jury instructions that it complains of on appeal. The trial court adopted the jury instructions verbatim, and the Defendants' did not object at trial. Because defendants invited this error by providing the court with jury instructions and never objected to the instructions, it may not now seek to use the instruction to its advantage on appeal. In addition, Defendants' failure to object to the interrogatory constituted waiver of any error on appeal. Furthermore, trial court did not apply the wrong standard for punitive damages against a corporate entity as Defendants contend. Defendants failed to raise ratification in its JNOV motion and, therefore, waived the issue on appeal, but for plain error. We do not find plain error because Plaintiffs established ratification at trial. Plaintiffs adduced evidence demonstrating that the nurse's job responsibilities included decedent's trach care and the Defendants ratified the nurse's conduct when Defendants failed to terminate or discipline the nurse. The evidence at trial also demonstrated actual malice. The Defendants' staff nurse ignored the Plaintiff's cries for help. A reasonable person could conclude that the staff's conduct amounted to a conscious disregard for the decedent's rights, health, and safety, which had great probability of causing substantial harm. The trial court did not err in permitting the Estate to recover $250,000 in noneconomic damages for decedent's pain and suffering as a result of the failures in care on August 1, 2020. The trial court was also correct in permitting the Estate to recover $250,000 in noneconomic damages for the decedent's NHRBR claim, which related to a separate incident on July 23, 2020. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees and expenses. The trial court was in the best position to determine if Plaintiffs' reconstructed fee request was accurate. The beginning point for determining the award of attorney fees is the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours worked, a calculation that is sometimes referred to as lodestar. Here, the trial court considered the factors such as the fee customarily charged in the locality, the injuries and damages involved in the case, the results obtained, the fact that Plaintiffs' counsel was not paid during the litigation and that they advanced litigation expenses, as well as the fact that the fee was contingent. The court found that a multiplier of 2.65 was an appropriate modification to the lodestar. Lastly, the trial court did not err in awarding pre-judgment interest because the evidence indicates that Defendants made no effort to consider the risk of an adverse verdict at trial and did not negotiate in good faith.

Guilty plea; motion to withdraw; Crim.R. 32.1; res judicata; manifest injustice; newly discovered evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. Because the exhibits appellant attached to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea are not newly discovered, res judicata bars his claims. Furthermore, appellant fails to demonstrate that a manifest injustice has occurred, particularly because he was aware of these exhibits before his guilty plea and trial counsel was not ineffective. This is not the case where "an extraordinary and fundamental flaw in the plea proceeding" occurred. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's motion to withdraw his plea.

Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; evidence; age discrimination; direct evidence; discriminatory intent; prima facie case. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for employer where employee presented direct evidence of discriminatory intent in his age-discrimination suit. This evidence created a genuine issue of material fact.

Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; workers' compensation claim; R.C. 4123.01(C)(5); preexisting condition; substantially aggravated; clear and unambiguous statute; and objective pre-injury medical evidence. The trial court erred when it granted an employer's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff-appellant worker provided, pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C)(5), objective clinical findings, objective test results, and subjective complaints to support his claim that his work incident caused a substantial aggravation of preexisting conditions.

APPELLATE REVIEW - appellate courts have jurisdiction over judgments and final orders; R.C. 2505.03; final appealable order; R.C. 2505.02(B)(1); multiple claims at issue in a civil action; Civ.R. 54(B) language; "no just reason for delay"; oral directed verdict not reduced to writing; Civ.R. 50(E); court speaks only through journal entries; claims remain pending; lack of jurisdiction; appeal must be dismissed sua sponte.

Leave to file motion for new trial

Suppression and request for continuance

Public-records requests—R.C. 149.43—Respondents' delay in producing records responsive to two of relator's public-records requests was unreasonable—Request for statutory damages granted in part.

Judges—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Professional Conduct—Two-year suspension with one year conditionally stayed.

R.C. 2506, R.C. 5571.14; subject matter jurisdiction; legislative act; resolutions; public nuisance; administrative appeal; R.C. 2506.03; non quasi-judicial act; separate actions

Magistrate decision; Default judgment; damages; damages hearing; evidence of damages; abuse of discretion; de novo review; competent, credible evidence; punitive damages; joint and several liability

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Judgment affirmed.

SECOND AMENDMENT — OHIO CONSTITUTION — FIREARMS — HAVING WEAPONS WHILE UNDER DISABILITY — R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) — MURDER — DISCOVERY SANCTIONS — CRIM.R. 16 — BRADY OBLIGATIONS — HEARSAY — EVID.R. 801(C) — VENUE — JUDICIAL NOTICE — BENCH VIEW — MANIFEST WEIGHT: The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution did not bar the State from prosecuting defendant for having a weapon while under a disability, where that disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) was based on a prior conviction for aggravated assault involving a firearm. The trial court did not err in rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss his weapons-under-disability charges under the Ohio Constitution, because defendant developed no argument as to why the statute was not "a reasonable regulation, promoting the welfare and safety of the people," as that phrase was used in Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 48 (1993). Where the State failed to disclose police interview recordings until shortly before the trial was to begin, but where the trial court determined that this nondisclosure was not the result of willful or bad-faith conduct, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Crim.R. 16 by denying defendant's motion to compel police to disclose their file to prosecutors, and then to compel prosecutors to review that file and certify that they had provided defendant with all the materials to which defendant was entitled. Where a police officer testified that, after interviewing an eyewitness, he suspected that defendant had shot the victim, but where the officer did not actually describe the statements that the eyewitness made, the police officer's testimony did not contain hearsay under Evid.R. 801(C) and State v. Smith, 2022 Ohio 2592 (1st Dist.), and therefore, that testimony was not barred by Evid.R. 802. Evidence supporting venue for defendant's prosecution in Hamilton County was sufficient where witness testimony established that a nearby apartment complex was in Hamilton County, and where the trial judge, sitting without a jury, had visited the site of the murder as part of a bench view and thereafter took "judicial notice that the entire action took place in Hamilton County, Ohio."Defendant's conviction for murder was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where an eyewitness testified she saw a man she identified as defendant shoot the victim, and where that testimony was circumstantially corroborated by the coroner's testimony, by surrounding surveillance video, and by the testimony of defendant's romantic partner who saw defendant fleeing the scene. Defendant's conviction for having a weapon while under a disability was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant's conviction for murder was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where it was undisputed that the murder was committed with a firearm, and where defendant conceded the existence of his prior conviction for a felony offense of violence giving rise to a disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2).

CIV.R. 12(B)(6) — AGENCY — SIGNATURES — CORPORATIONS — CONTRACTS — FRAUD — THEFT — R.C. 2307.60 — UNJUST ENRICHMENT: The trial court did not err in dismissing appellants' breach-of-contract claim against appellees where appellees' letter of engagement unambiguously manifested an intent to bind only appellees' corporate principal, where the corporation was not a party defendant, and where the complaint furnished no basis for holding appellees liable for the corporation's debts. The trial court erred by dismissing appellants' claims for fraudulent inducement to contract and civil theft because the complaint alleged that appellees falsely represented to appellants that they intended to perform under the contract, because that false representation reasonably and foreseeably induced appellants to retain appellees' corporation to appellants' detriment, and because the legal duties breached in doing so existed independent of and prior to the appellants' contract with appellees' corporate principal. The trial court erred by dismissing appellants' claim for restitution on a theory of unjust enrichment because, even though the subject matter was covered by an express contract, appellants alleged that appellees were enriched by means of fraud, illegality, or bad faith.

SENTENCING — MULTIPLE SENTENCES — CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — MISDEMEANOR AND FELONY SENTENCES: The trial court abused its discretion in ordering a 180-day jail term imposed on defendant in the instant misdemeanor case to run consecutively to a 30-month prison term imposed against defendant in a related felony case because the consecutive nature of the misdemeanor sentence was not authorized under R.C. 2929.41(B).

Appellant has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial attorney's stipulation to the admissibility of a competency examination report and failure to request a second opinion. Appellant's sentence of 30 years to life in prison is not subject to vacation or modification under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law because it was within the statutory range, and the trial court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity is supported by sufficient evidence. Appellant was not prejudiced by the State's amendment to the indictment. Judgment affirmed.

sufficient evidence of aggravated drug trafficking despite Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation ("BCI") decision to test only some baggies; not against the manifest weight; defendant admitted what substances he carried on his person; one of three baggies of similar drugs in the hidden compartment by driver position in defendant's own van that he was driving.

Per Mayle, J., Trial court erred in admitting document produced in discovery by defendant and offered by State because it was not properly authenticated. Implied authentication not appropriate under circumstances of this criminal case where rules of evidence apply. Even excising improper evidence, error was harmless because remaining evidence established defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's ineffective assistance claim relating to same evidence fails second element of Strickland.

In this reopened appeal, the trial court committed plain error by admitting the laboratory report identifying the controlled substance allegedly possessed by appellant because the procedural requirements of R.C. 2925.51 to admit the report had not been satisfied. Appellant's claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence lacks merit because all evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted evidence, must be considered in reviewing such a claim. Based on the resolution of appellant's claim regarding the lab report, his claim regarding the ineffective assistance of trial counsel is moot. The inadmissible lab report was essential to appellant's aggravated possession of drugs conviction, so prior appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the report on appellant's direct appeal. Prior appellate judgment vacated. Trial court judgment reversed and remanded. (Huffman, J., dissenting.)

By failing to renew his Crim.R. 29 motion at the close of evidence, appellant waived his argument that his conviction for murder of the female victim is not supported by sufficient evidence. Even considering the merits, sufficient evidence supports appellant's murder conviction. Appellant's conviction for murder of the male victim is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court's judgment is affirmed where an appellate court, as a matter of law, is prohibited from reviewing the court's compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 at sentencing. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729.

The defendant-appellant's sentence is contrary to law because the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory sex offender registration notification requirements of R.C. 2929.19 and R.C. 2950.03 at the time of sentencing.

Summary Judgment; Breach of Contract; Action on an Account; Evid.R. 803(6); Civ.R. 37; Civ.R. 56(F). The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee on its claim for unpaid credit card debt. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant-appellant's motion to compel discovery or failing to impose sanctions.

Administrative Search Warrant; Trespass; R.C. 2506.04; Appellate record. A person who enters onto a property with the authorization of the landowner does not commit trespass. R.C. 2506.04 provides the standards of review for decisions or orders that are subject to R.C. 2506.01(A). Appellate review is limited to the matters in the record.

original action; petition for writ of mandamus; pro se relator; motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); standard of review; court may consider evidence outside petition when subsequent event renders case moot; relief sought to compel trial court to rule on pending motions sounds more appropriately in procedendo than mandamus; elements of procedendo; clear legal right to require respondent to proceed; clear legal duty to proceed; lack of adequate remedy in ordinary course of law; mootness; procedendo and mandamus claims become moot when respondent performs duty requested; trial court ruled on all pending motions during pendency of petition; neither mandamus nor procedendo will compel performance of duty already performed; extraordinary writs not appropriate to control judicial discretion or challenge substance of rulings; availability of appeal precludes mandamus relief; R.C. 2731.05; request for sanctions under Civ.R. 11; subjective bad-faith standard; record did not support finding of willful misrepresentation where relator not served with judgment entry pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B); sanctions denied; proper disposition when writ claim is moot is to deny writ rather than dismiss petition; motion to dismiss denied in part as moot; motion to dismiss denied as to sanctions; writ denied.

CRIMINAL – Aggravated Murder; R.C. 2903.01; unlawful termination of pregnancy; Aggravated Burglary; R.C. 2911.11; hearsay; testimonial statements; Confrontation Clause; Evid.R. 901; Evid.R. 902; Evid.R. 803; Evid.R. 601; plain error; jury instructions; lesser included offense; R.C. 2945.74; prosecutorial misconduct; closing arguments; expression of personal belief or opinion; manifest weight of the evidence; cumulative error.

APPELLATE REVIEW - appellate courts have jurisdiction over judgments and final orders; R.C. 2505.03; final appealable order; R.C. 2505.02(B)(1); multiple claims at issue in a civil action; Civ.R. 54(B) language; "no just reason for delay"; oral directed verdict not reduced to writing; Civ.R. 50(E); court speaks only through journal entries; claims remain pending; lack of jurisdiction; appeal must be dismissed sua sponte.

CIVIL - wrongful death; negligence; summary judgment; statutory interpretation; political subdivision tort immunity; wanton or reckless conduct; R.C. 2744.03(A)(6); proximate cause; statutory immunity; R.C. 128.96; physical defects on or within government property; duty to protect; R.C. 737.11; operation of a 9-1-1 system; deprivation of rights under the Ohio Constitution; intentional infliction of emotional distress; loss of consortium

Kidnapping counts associated with two of the victims suffered from duplicity in the charge because the State did not prove appellant committed a particularized act of kidnapping sufficient to verify jury unanimity. The State presented sufficient evidence to support multiple convictions for gross sexual imposition involving the victims. However, some counts are unsupported by the evidence and must be vacated. In addition, there was no plain error regarding the admission of victim-impact testimony. The testimony regarding the impact of the abuse was relevant to assess the victims' credibility and to rebut the defense theory. Moreover, the testimony was brief and not overly emotional or inflammatory.

A probate court has exceptionally broad discretion to determine the equitable distribution of the proceeds. In this case, the award did not amount to an abuse of discretion because the probate court did not act in a way that was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable under current Ohio law.

The issuance of a DVCPO against father was improper because the trial court did not analyze whether the children were "endangered" or "abused" under Ohio law. The DVCPO proceedings were improperly treated as a substitute for child custody proceedings among quarreling parents. However, the trial court's denial of father's DVCPO petition against stepfather was not against the manifest weight of the evidence after presuming—with father not overcoming that presumption—the trial court's determination that one of the children's testimony against stepfather was not credible.

The State presented sufficient evidence to support the R.C. 2905.01(A)(1) conviction of a father for kidnapping his infant child. The short-form indictment and bill of particulars put the defendant on notice that the State was prosecuting him for removing the child from his truck to hold her as a shield.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of spousal support to award Wife. The trial court reasonably imputed income to Wife after consideration of evidence, including her education, work and life experience, and the income she historically earned, nor did the trial court abuse its direction with regard to the duration of said support. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to the value of the marital residence, as both sides presented appraisal values separated by only $10,000. Even if evidence of a higher value existed, the trial court acted within its discretion by selecting its valuation of the property.

Taxation—Commercial-activity tax ("CAT")—Situs of gross receipts—Corporation failed to provide documentary evidence that established the amount of gross receipts for merchandise transported out of Ohio and thus failed to meet evidentiary burden to prove entitlement to CAT refund—Board of Tax Appeals' decision affirmed.

Public utilities—Prohibition—Subject-matter jurisdiction—Under Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. and R.C. 4905.26, court of appeals did not err in concluding that Public Utilities Commission has exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted by natural-gas producers in their class action against public utility or in ordering common-pleas-court judge to cease exercising jurisdiction over the class action and vacate the orders that she previously issued in that case—Court of appeals' order granting summary judgment in favor of public utility affirmed.

On certification of default.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Sufficiency; Manifest Weight of the Evidence; Rape; R.C. R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b); Confrontation Clause; Evid.R. 803(4); Child Competency; Evid.R. 807; Remote Testimony; R.C. 2152.81; Harmless Error; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The adjudicated delinquent child-appellant's rape adjudications are based on sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because the child victim's statements in a Child Advocacy Center ("CAC") interview were primarily for medical diagnosis, they were admissible under Evid.R. 803(4) and were nontestimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. As to the admission of any arguably testimonial evidence, since it was a bench trial, it is presumed that the trial court did not consider any inadmissible evidence for any purpose. Because the child victim's CAC interview was admissible under Evid.R. 803(4), no separate competency determination was required under Evid.R. 807. The trial court erred by concluding that R.C. 2152.81 automatically requires remote testimony based on the age of the witness; however, such error was harmless. The adjudicated delinquent child-appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective.

Evid.R. 611(A); Abuse of Discretion; Manifest Weight of the Evidence; Consecutive Sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to recall the victim for the limited purpose of identifying the appellant-defendant in the courtroom. The defendant-appellant's rape conviction in count three is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because it is well within the province of the jury to find the testimony of the victim more credible than that of the appellant-defendant. The trial court made the appropriate R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings necessary to impose consecutive sentences and the record supports the trial court's findings.

Dismiss for lack of final appealable order

Legal Custody - Grandparent Visitation - Guardian ad litem Report - Statutory Notice

Self-Defense/bolstering/plain error/harmless error

Prosecutorial misconduct; Mandatory sentencing

Saving statute—R.C. 2305.19—To comply with R.C. 2305.19, a claim must be filed within one year, or by the anniversary, of the date that it was dismissed—Court of appeals' judgment reversed.

Attorneys—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Paying companies to solicit and refer clients and failing to supervise the companies' nonlawyers representing his firm—One-year license suspension conditionally stayed.

Habeas corpus—The evidence attached to inmate's petition demonstrates that he is imprisoned on two valid criminal judgments and that he has not yet served his maximum term under those judgments—Court of appeals' judgment granting warden's motion to dismiss affirmed.

The trial court erred in dismissing appellee's indictment based on Double Jeopardy and Allied Offense grounds.

Judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, nor did the trial court commit plain error in its decision to allow S.L. to claim K.L. for tax benefits.

A judgment entered against a deceased plaintiff is void due to the trial court's lack of personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff. Because a void judgment is not a final, appealable order, the appeal is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Per Mayle, J., despite defendant's claims to the contrary, under a manifest-weight review, we must extend deference to the fact-finder's credibility determinations and assign an interpretation of the evidence that is most consistent with the verdict. Applying this standard, we conclude that defendant's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority consecutive sentences not contrary to law as cruel and unusual punishment, with the record demonstrating the imposition of consecutive sentences is not without support, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

Per Mayle, J., State presented sufficient evidence of "trespass" and "purpose to commit a theft offense" elements of breaking and entering, and convictions were not against manifest weight of evidence. As to first count, defendant was apprehended in victim's locked parking lot with various items that people commonly keep in vehicles. As to second count, electronic monitoring placed defendant in locked lot and video showed person matching his description rifling through vehicles.

Modification of custody; Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in finding change of circumstances warranting modification; best interest of child to modify custody; and harm outweighed by benefit

CRIM.R. 44 – CONCEALED CARRY – DANGEROUS ORDNANCE – SUFFICIENCY – WAIVER OF COUNSEL – WEAPONS UNDER DISABILITY – R.C. 2923.12 – R.C. 2923.13 – R.C. 2923.17: The trial court erred by failing to ensure that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, despite defendant's apparent unwillingness to engage in any good-faith discussion regarding his representation. Where the State charged defendant under the improper subsection of R.C. 2923.12, there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for carrying concealed weapons: defendant's weapon was a dangerous ordnance, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient to convict him under R.C. 2913.12(A)(2) of carrying a firearm other than a dangerous ordnance.

INVITED ERROR — CRIM.R. 48(B): The State invited error where it informed the trial court that it believed it would be unable to meet its burden of proof at trial based on the State's reading of precedent and requested the trial court to dismiss the complaint under Crim.R. 48(B), and the trial court complied with the State's request by dismissing the complaint under Crim.R. 48(B).

R.C. 2945.71-Speedy trial-Motion to dismiss-Triple-count provisions did not apply to multiple indictments that arose out of different criminal incidents-Judgment affirmed.

CIVIL – breach of contract, Consumer Sales Practices Act; assignability of contract; assignment of contract; failure to honor express warranty; consumer transaction; home construction service contract; small claims court; some reliable evidence.

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF – pro se "Motion To Correct Sentence Entry; third pro se petition for postconviction relief; denied without a hearing. RES JUDICATA – judgment affirmed.

Zmuda, writing for the majority affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court which determined termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children based on facts that included Mother's criminal conviction for child endangering involving her children and Mother's prison term that extended beyond the reasonable time contemplated for reunification.

affirming the denial of application to seal a juvenile record; appellate deficiencies; lack of transcript from magistrate's hearing; current federal parole status does not automatically make juvenile applicant ineligible but is a factor to consider; no abuse of discretion in weighing the factors.

Original action; writ of mandamus; public records; R.C. 149.43(C)(1); pre-filing requirements for public records mandamus actions; Sub. H.B. 265, 2024 Ohio Laws 86; motion to strike; Loc.App.R. 101(A) and (B)(1); filing of dispositive motion before issuance of alternative writ permitted under local rules; service of post-complaint filings by regular mail under Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(c); motion to strike overruled; service of pre-filing complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 4 required by statute; Civ.R. 4.4(A)(2); Civ.R. 4.6(D); service on political subdivision; email not an authorized method of service under Civ.R. 4; actual notice does not cure defective service where statute expressly requires service pursuant to Civ.R. 4; mandatory pre-filing requirements; failure to satisfy statutory condition precedent; merits not reached; petition for writ of mandamus dismissed.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—R.C. 149.43—Respondent has provided all records that relator requested except for one that does not exist but failed to provide them in a reasonable time—Relator's public-records requests constitute a single request because they concern the same subject matter and were sent to the same person on the same day—Writ denied as moot and relator awarded $1,000 in statutory damages.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—R.C. 149.43(G)—A defendant's public-records request for documents from unrelated criminal case is not a request related to defendant's action for purposes of R.C. 149.43(G), and public office therefore cannot treat request as a discovery demand—Public office's purported good-faith belief that request was a discovery demand under R.C. 149.43(G) does not change that reasonableness of response time is measured by date of request, not date that public office's motion for judgment on pleadings was denied—Multiple emails sent on the same calendar day to the same office all concerning docket items in cases filed in city's municipal court relate to the same general subject matter, thus constituting one transmission for purposes of statutory damages—Public office failed to establish that its reliance on R.C. 149.43(G) warranted reducing or denying statutory-damages award—Writ denied as moot and relator awarded $1,000 in statutory damages.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Soliciting sexual activity with a client and stating or implying an ability to improperly influence a government agency or official to achieve results—One-year suspension with six months conditionally stayed.

Racing Commission order imposing penalties for violating its regulations based on a positive blood test result for D-methamphetamine in a racehorse was not in accordance with law because the Commission failed to establish that it had promulgated a rule or issued an order classifying D-methamphetamine as a prohibited foreign substance. Common pleas court decision affirming Racing Commission order reversed and remanded.

CRIM.R. 32.1 – POSTSENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA – RES JUDICATA: The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas under Crim.R. 32.1 without a hearing. Because defendant's challenge raised issues that could have been raised on direct appeal and was not based on evidence outside of the record, res judicata applied. Judgment affirmed.

Reconsideration; App.R. 26(A)(1)(a); error of law; contract; breach of contract; conspiracy to commit fraud; fraud; consumer sales practices act ("CSPA"); permit; employee; employer; relevant evidence; Evid.R. 401; Evid.R. 403; damages; insufficient evidence; manifest weight; unfair or deceptive acts; piercing the corporate veil; alter ego; apparent authority; principal; agent; attorney fees. The trial court's journal entry following a bench trial is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The evidence presented at trial supported the trial court's finding that the defendant-appellant LLC contracted with the plaintiff-appellee to do HVAC work through the apparent authority of its employee/agent and that the LLC breached the contract and violated the CSPA. However, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the owner of the LLC was individually liable on these claims. There was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of a civil conspiracy to commit fraud and, therefore, the award of punitive damages and the award of statutory damages are vacated; however, the trial court's award of attorney fees was supported by sufficient evidence.

Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; strangulation; domestic violence; endangering children; discovery; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Crim.R. 16. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Defendant-appellant's convictions for strangulation and domestic violence are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, there is insufficient evidence to support his endangering-children conviction; we cannot say that a substantial risk to the child's health or safety was created based on the child's witnessing of the incident alone. Moreover, we find that the State's allegedly delayed disclosure of a cassette-tape recording did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or Crim.R. 16.

Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act; supplier; purchaser; consumer transaction; personal purposes; breach of contract; existence of a contract. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. The trial court committed reversible error when it determined that the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act did not apply to the transaction between appellant and appellee as a matter of law. The trial court also committed reversible error when it determined that appellant failed to substantially perform the obligations he owed to appellee under their contract. The trial court misidentified the documents that constitute the parties' contract.

Objections to magistrate's decision; failure to file transcript; raising issues for the first time on appeal; Juv.R. 40; subject-matter jurisdiction. Appellant's failure to file the transcript with the juvenile court precludes our review of the lower court's factual findings related to granting father legal custody, granting the grandparents visitation, and in allowing expert testimony. Because appellant's arguments are based on the court's factual findings, or were not made at the trial-court level, and because appellant's objections were not stated with sufficient specificity, we are unable to review these arguments. Appellant also raised the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, for which we do not need the transcript to determine. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to award attorney or expert fees for work done in another court on another case. Award of attorney fees is void and issue of expert fees is remanded for the court to calculate the amount of fees relating to the juvenile case.

Motion for sanctions; hearing; R.C. 2323.51; Civ.R. 11; frivolous conduct; abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motions for sanctions without a hearing. The mere fact that plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims is not enough to warrant sanctions, especially when the record is devoid of any evidence of frivolous conduct throughout the litigation.

Marsy's Law; restitution; guilty plea; sentencing; innocence; affirmative defenses. Reversed and remanded. The trial court erred by denying the victim restitution based on the defendant's protestations of innocence raised for the first time at sentencing following a guilty plea.

Domestic-violence civil protection order ("DVCPO"); abuse of discretion; domestic violence; Civ.R. 65.1; R.C. 3113.31; sufficient credible evidence; competency of a minor; R.C. 2317.01; motion to strike. The domestic relations court issued a DVCPO in favor of petitioner-appellee ("Petitioner") against Respondent-appellant ("Respondent.") Respondent appealed claiming (1) the court abused its discretion in overruling his objections to the magistrate's order and adopting the DVCPO issued by the magistrate, and (2) the magistrate erred in denying Respondent's motion to strike the testimony of his seven-year-old daughter S.A. The lower court's issuance of the DVCPO was supported by sufficient credible evidence. Petitioner testified with respect to multiple instances of physical abuse from Respondent towards herself and S.A. Respondent also testified at the full hearing, claiming that he was never physically abusive towards Petitioner or S.A. The trial court was in the best position to consider the contradictory testimony between Petitioner and Respondent. As such, the reviewing court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the lower court. Respondent and Petitioner's seven year old daughter S.A. testified at the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the magistrate conducted an in camera voir dire of S.A., which neither party objected to. The magistrate concluded that S.A. was competent to testify. Following S.A.'s testimony, Respondent filed a motion to strike S.A.'s testimony that was denied by the magistrate. Respondent claims that S.A.'s testimony at the hearing demonstrate that she was incompetent to testify because she did not recall certain facts concerning the abuse. However, the court determined that even if S.A. may not have remembered the date the assault occurred or of certain particulars of the assault does not relate so much to her competency to testify, but rather to S.A.'s credibility as a witness.

Conceded error; nunc pro tunc. The trial court erred by issuing a sentencing journal entry that stated the appellant was sentenced on Count 185, when the appellant was not. The State conceded the error, and the trial court must issue a nunc pro tunc to correct the sentencing entry.

Separation-of-powers doctrine; prosecutor; court; pretrial diversion program. Trial court violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by referring defendant to a pretrial diversion program over the prosecutor's objection.

Permanent custody; motion to continue; R.C. 2151.353(A)(3); Juv.Loc.R. 35(C); Juv.R. 23; manifest weight; sufficiency of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence; R.C. 2151.353(A)(4); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E). Judgment affirmed. Weighing the potential prejudice to appellant-mother against the juvenile court's right to control its docket, the public's interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of justice, and the minor child's best interests and need for stability and permanency, we find that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant-mother's motion for continuance. Moreover, clear and convincing evidence supports each of the juvenile court's R.C. 2151.414(E) and (D)(1) findings. Accordingly, the juvenile court's award of permanent custody to Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS") is supported by sufficient evidence within the record and is not contrary to that evidence's manifest weight.

Foreclosure; summary judgment; objections to magistrate's decision; statute of limitations; quiet title; mortgage; retroactive application of statute; constitutionality. The trial court's judgment adopting the magistrate's decision entering summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's foreclosure action is affirmed. All necessary parties were joined to the action and the trial court had jurisdiction to issue its decision. Furthermore, application of an eight-year statute of limitations on the foreclosure action was proper and not an unconstitutionally retroactive application of the law.

App.R. 9; record on appeal; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; appellate brief requirements; pro se party. Judgment affirmed. Appellant's assignments of error are overruled for noncompliance with App.R. 9 and 16. Appellant's failure to identify errors with reference to the record and to present an argument containing his contentions with respect to the claimed errors permit this court to disregard his assignments of error under App.R. 12. Further, we must presume the regularity of the proceedings below because of appellant's failure to provide us with a transcript.

Parental rights; motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody; incarcerated parent; manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review; sufficiency-of-the-evidence review; motion for continuance.

Conceded error; driver's license suspension; motion to modify or terminate; R.C. 4510.54(B); hearing. The trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing under R.C. 4510.54(B) prior to granting the defendant's motion to vacate or modify his driver's license suspension and reinstating his driving privileges.

Absolute immunity; Malicious prosecution; Summary judgment; Judgment on the pleadings; Civ.R. 12; Judicial proceedings; Quasi-judicial proceeding

Admissibility of blood test results at trial where sample was withdrawn beyond 3 hours

Default judgment damages hearing

Concealment, power of attorney & constructive trust

CRIMINAL LAW – aggravated possession of drugs (methamphetamine); jury trial; prison sentence; sufficient evidence; constructive possession; the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion; manifest weight; the jury did not clearly lose its way in finding Appellant guilty; judgments affirmed

CRIMINAL – pandering obscenity involving a minor or impaired person; illegal use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented material; consecutive sentences; ineffective assistance of counsel; defense counsel's arguments at sentencing.

Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act; attorney's fees; Ohio Construction Services Supplies Act; knowingly; workmanlike manner; negligent; manifest weight.

Trial court did not err in granting permanent custody of children to the Agency. The court appropriately declined to assign legal custody of the children to their maternal grandparents where no such motion for legal custody was filed and the grandparents supported a grant of permanent custody to the Agency. Father's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance as she was not obligated to make futile requests or motions.

JUVENILE COURT — ADJUDICATION — NEGLECT — DEPENDENCY — REMOVAL — CLEAR AND CONVINCING — MENTAL HEALTH — SUICIDE HOTLINE: The juvenile court's adjudication of Mother's newborn twins as neglected was not supported by clear and convincing evidence because Mother's phone call to a suicide hotline after the twins were removed from her custody and her subsequent short-term hospitalization for a psychological evaluation did not establish that Mother abandoned the babies, that they lacked adequate parental care due to her faults or habits, or that Mother refused to provide subsistence, education, or medical treatment to them. The juvenile court's adjudication of Mother's six children as dependent was not supported by clear and convincing evidence where that determination was based on a neglect finding involving Mother's twins that was also unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.

The trial court did not err in imposing a 12-month prison sentence upon revoking community control because appellant's violations were not "technical violations," as provided by R.C. 2929.15(E). The trial court was not required to abide by the parties' joint sentencing recommendation in sentencing appellant. Judgment affirmed.

The records submitted in support of appellee bank's motion for summary judgment were properly authenticated as business records and appropriately considered by the trial court. The records established appellee's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the balance appellant owed on a delinquent credit card account. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for violating a protection order was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence supported the conclusions that appellant was informed of the protection order and that he was served with it before the alleged violation. The trial court appropriately acted within its discretion to credit the complainant's testimony that appellant was the helmeted motorcyclist who followed and gestured toward the complainant. Judgment affirmed.

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Mother's objections to a magistrate's decision that found her infant son to be an abused child. The court did not err in admitting a drug screen record. Counsel for Mother stipulated to the authenticity of the record, and it was authenticated pursuant to R.C. 2317.422(A). Mother's child was a per se abused child given that at birth, a drug screen of the child revealed the presence of cocaine. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the drugs found in her vehicle following an alert by a drug-detecting dog. The testimony of the K-9 handler established that the dog was trained and certified in the detection of methamphetamine prior to the traffic stop. Appellant's conviction for aggravated possession of drugs (methamphetamine) was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

On remand, the trial court correctly advised appellant of his presumed duty to enroll in the violent offender database and his right to file a motion to rebut the presumption. The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's motion to rebut the presumed duty to enroll in the violent offender database. Because appellant's convictions were affirmed on his first appeal, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider appellant's motions requesting vacation of his guilty plea. Appellant's cumulative error argument is without merit. Finally, the trial court did not resentence appellant. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for assault, a first-degree misdemeanor, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although appellant produced evidence that he acted in self-defense, the jury reasonably credited the State's evidence disproving the self-defense claim. Judgment affirmed.

Application for reconsideration; App.R. 26; no obvious error; no issue not fully considered.

Criminal law—A defendant's failure to obtain leave to file an untimely Crim.R. 33 motion for new trial is a sufficient reason to affirm the trial court's denial of the motion—Appellant failed to obtain leave to file his untimely Crim.R. 33 motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed and cause remanded to trial court to address appellant's pending motion for leave to file a motion for new trial.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—R.C. 101.30 does not violate Article II, Section 13 of Ohio Constitution—Relator failed to establish clear legal right to receive the records he requested because they are not public records for purposes of Public Records Act—Writ denied.

Habeas corpus—Appellant is incarcerated on a validly imposed sentence of 20 years to life in prison—A validly imposed indeterminate sentence does not guarantee that an offender will be released once he has served his minimum sentence but, rather, guarantees only that he will become eligible for parole once he has completed the minimum terms, considering any credits or other diminutions—Court of appeals' judgment granting warden's motion to dismiss petition affirmed.

Per Mayle, J., State presented sufficient evidence of complicity in shooting-related offenses and gang participation. Convictions were not against manifest weight of evidence. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to gang and cell phone experts' testimony, social-media evidence, and competency of ten-year-old witness. Trial court committed plain error in sentences imposed for certain specifications but not in admitting supposed other-acts evidence.

The trial court had jurisdiction to enforce contempt sanctions it imposed against a nonparty prior to the dismissal of the underlying action. The court did not abuse its discretion by imposing additional sanctions in the dismissal order that related to the original contempt.

Request to hold hearing for community service to pay costs properly denied; R.C. 2947.23(B)

Appellant's 36-month sentence for failing to comply with the order or signal of a police officer was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the court considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, considered the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposed postrelease control, and sentenced appellant within the permissible statutory range for a third-degree felony.

The trial court committed no error in its divorce decree. Husband failed to support and document that (1) a shared bank account was his separate property and (2) that wife "double dipped" on rental income when the trial court ordered husband to pay temporary spousal support to wife and later ordered rental income to be split between the parties. In addition, the trial court was not bound by the parties' "temporary agreed order" when determining the value of the husband's post-marital home (purchased with marital funds) for purposes of equitably dividing the parties' marital assets. Finally, wife's arguments on appeal provide no reason to question the domestic relation court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over accounts made for the benefit of the parties' (now adult) children. Such jurisdiction is typically exercised by probate courts.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including neglect of client legal matters, misappropriation of client funds, unauthorized practice of law in another jurisdiction, and use of misleading firm name—Conditionally stayed two-year suspension.

Mandamus—Court of appeals did not err in sua sponte dismissing appellant's complaint for failure to submit with his complaint a statement under R.C. 2969.25(C)(1) setting forth balance in his inmate account for each of preceding six months as certified by institutional cashier—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Defendant-appellant's postconviction motions to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate or set aside his sentence for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as they raised issues he either did litigate previously or could have litigated previously. Trial court's judgment affirmed.

Public-records requests—Mandamus—E-mail distribution list that relator requested is a public record as defined in R.C. 149.011(G) because it is an item created by school district that documents its functions and procedures—State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson distinguished—School district failed to satisfy its burden to prove that list falls squarely within "state or federal law" exemption from disclosure requirement of Public Records Act—Writ granted and relator awarded court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and $1,000 in statutory damages.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including lack of diligent representation and prompt communication, trust-account mishandling, and failure to withdraw from representation so that client's interests are protected—Six-month suspension, fully stayed on conditions.

Community control; Review of findings that community control was violated; Termination of community control; Imposition of prison sentences for violations of community control. The trial court did not err in finding that defendant-appellant had violated the terms of community control and in imposing incarceration as a result.

Law-Of-The-Case Doctrine. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the decision of an appellate court in a prior appeal will ordinarily be followed in a later appeal in the same case and court absent extraordinary circumstances. Since the issue of double jeopardy was fully briefed, argued, and decided in the defendant-appellant's interlocutory appeal, we adhere to the law-of-the-case doctrine and decline to revisit our prior decision.

Felonious Assault; Self-Defense; Manifest Weight of the Evidence; Verdict Form; Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel. The jury did not lose its way in rejecting the defendant-appellant's claim of self-defense. There is no requirement for a separate jury finding or verdict form regarding self-defense. The defendant-appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective in his handling of the verdict forms or in failing to request an instruction on the inferior degree offense of aggravated assault.

The trial judge's response to a written question from jurors during deliberations was correct and not misleading, and the defendant's conviction on a felony domestic-violence charge was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Manifest weight; sufficiency; ineffective assistance of trial counsel; sentencing

Defense counsel's decision not to object at the client's jury trial appears to have been a reasonable tactical choice rather than ineffective assistance of counsel, and the defendant's strangulation and assault convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. At sentencing, the trial court did not commit plain error by imposing community-control conditions barring the defendant from using illegal drugs or alcohol and barring him from entering liquor stores and bars.

CHILD ENDANGERING — R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) — RECKLESSNESS — SUFFICIENCY: Defendant's conviction for child endangering was not supported by sufficient evidence where the State failed to put forth any evidence that defendant acted recklessly; the State failed to show that there was a strong possibility that a child would be harmed as a result of defendant's conduct.

R.C. 2505.02(B)(3) — FINAL, APPEALABLE ORDER — AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT — CIV.R. 10(D) — DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE — JURISDICTION — CIV.R. 54(B) — MOOT — APP.R. 12: Where the order appealed from vacated a prior final judgment issued by the trial court, it was a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(3). Where the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the case, the trial court erred in sua sponte vacating that judgment and granting plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. An appellate court will not rule on assignments of error that are rendered moot by another decision rendered by the court in the appeal.

Anders; Sentencing; Guilty plea; Crim.R. 43; Plain error

Decertification of class action

Hearing on Motion to suppress; jurisdiction of trial court after appeal is filed

original action; procedendo; alleged trial court delay in ruling upon self-represented prison inmate's post-sentence motion; action rendered moot when Respondent ruled upon Relator's pending application following Relator's seeking a writ of procedendo

Juvenile court; jurisdiction; bindover; indictment. When a juvenile is bound over to adult court, the State may pursue charges for any crime that was bound over by the juvenile court, in addition to any crimes that were not presented to the juvenile court but were rooted in the underlying crimes.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, res judicata, prosecutorial misconduct. The appellant's App.R. 26(B) application for reopening is denied because appellate counsel was not ineffective on appeal. The issues raised in support of the application for reopening are barred from further review by the doctrine of res judicata. The appellant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel on appeal. Application for reopening is denied.

Conviction; sufficiency; manifest weight; investigation; preparation; trial tactics; strategy, appellate counsel; ineffective-assistance claim; colorable; joinder; severance; selective prosecution; prosecutorial misconduct; expert. Appellant's application to reopen his appeal under App.R. 26(B) is denied because he failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; unopposed; issue of fact; hearsay; App.R. 12(A)(2); defamation; fact or opinion; jury interrogatory; invited error. Affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying the unopposed motion for summary judgment leading to a jury trial in which the defendant presented questions of fact as to the truth of the alleged defamatory statements in an online review of plaintiff's services and the amount of damages. Further, the plaintiff failed to identify the place in the record where the jury was presented newspaper articles in violation of hearsay principles, such that evidentiary errors cannot be reviewed. And finally, plaintiff's claim that the jury considered a legal question of whether the alleged defamatory statement was an opinion was invited error.

App.R. 16; App.R. 12; marital property; separate property; clerical errors. Trial court's finding that the marital residence was wholly marital property was supported by clear and convincing evidence where the sole evidence of a gift was appellant's testimony and there was contradictory testimony that appellant paid consideration for the property in the past. Accordingly, the trial court's decision was not an abuse of discretion. Although the trial court's entry designates appellee as the health insurance obligor, a clerical error in the entry suggests appellant is responsible; accordingly, the case is remanded for the trial court to correct its entry. The court of appeals may disregard any assignment of error where the party fails to comply with App.R. 16. Where assigned errors are not supported by citations to legal authority, the brief is out of compliance with the rule.

Unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance, firearm specifications, ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Crim.R. 11, guilty plea, "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Appellant appealed conviction for unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance. Appellant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because plea agreement guaranteed that he would be sentenced on the greater of two firearm specifications. However, the record did not indicate that appellant's plea was less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the court engaged in a full Crim.R. 11 colloquy. Further, nothing in the record indicated that, absent the plea agreement, appellant would have been sentenced to the lesser firearm specification.

Temporary custody; case plan; Juv.R. 40; failure to file objections to magistrate's decision; transcript; App.R. 12; effective assistance of trial counsel; abuse of discretion; disposition; adjudication; statutory time limit. The trial court did not err when it placed the children in the agency's temporary custody. Father failed to file objections to the magistrate's decision finding the children dependent and recommending they be placed in the agency's temporary custody. Because father failed to file objections to the magistrate's decision he has waived all but plain error on appeal. Although father filed a transcript of the dispositional hearing with this court, he did not file a transcript of the adjudicatory hearing. Even if he had filed the proper transcript, we cannot consider the transcript because it was not filed in the trial court. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the timing of the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings. The dispositional hearing was held within the statutory timeframe and the statute governing adjudicatory hearings in not jurisdictional. Father's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the magistrate's decision. The record shows that a case plan was developed with the goal of returning the children to father's custody but father failed to follow the case plan recommendations and requirements.

Felonious assault; self-defense; jury instructions; manifest weight of the evidence. Jury verdict finding defendant guilty of felonious assault affirmed. Surveillance videos show defendant assaulting the victim in a car repair shop, including her punching him in the face, pushing him multiple times and hitting him with a baseball bat. Her claim of self-defense failed. A defendant's belief that she was in immediate danger must be objectively reasonable, and as shown by the videos, the victim did nothing to cause the defendant to fear for her life.

Adjudication; abused; neglected; temporary custody; injury; Brittle Bone Disease. - Juvenile court's decision adjudicating the child abused and neglected was based on sufficient clear and convincing evidence because the evidence showed that the child suffered from several unexplained multiple leg fractures while in the care and custody of Mother. Medical testing and testimony revealed that the child did not suffer from Brittle Bone Disease. Temporary custody was in the child's best interest and properly granted to the agency.

Motion to compel payment of expert witness deposition fees; abuse of discretion. The court's granting the appellee's motion to compel payment of expert witness deposition fees is affirmed. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the court's ruling was an abuse of discretion when she knew of the fees prior to taking the deposition.

Procedendo, moot, Civ.R. 58(B), petition for postconviction relief is civil in nature. The relator's complaint for procedendo, to require the respondent-judge to issue a ruling with regard to a pending successive petition for postconviction relief, is moot. The respondent-judge rendered a judgment that denied the relator's successive petition for postconviction relief. However, the respondent-judge failed to comply with Civ.R. 58(B). Thus, the respondent-judge must comply with Civ.R. 58(B) and reissue any judgment, that denied a petition for postconviction relief, with language that directs the clerk of courts to serve upon all parties notice of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.

Petitioner has not shown he is entitled to either a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition. Accordingly, we adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and the conclusions of law therein, and grant respondents' motion to dismiss and dismiss petitioner's action in its entirety.

On application for reinstatement.

Criminal defendant's request that his sentencing entry be corrected was not proper under Criminal Rule 36, where the requested change would have altered the initial decision by the trial judge rather than simply ensuring that the entry reflected what the judge had in face decided.

Appellate review of felony sentence

Denial of motion to seal records after not guilty finding was not an abuse of discretion.

Conviction for arson; copies of video and audio files taken from a digital video recorder ("DVR") machine in the apartment building where the fire occurred satisfy the best evidence rule, Evid.R. 1002; fire marshal who testified as an expert concluded that the fire was an incendiary fire that was intentionally set; credibility of the expert witness was a matter for the jury to decide; no plain error allowing the testimony of the expert witness, and the remaining record fully supports the conviction; judgment affirmed.

Untimely filed application for reconsideration; App.R. 26(A); appellant merely disagrees with our opinion and does not raise any obvious errors or point to matters that were either not considered or not fully considered; application dismissed.

Appellant's motion to preserve biological evidence is not necessary or justiciable, and it is barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion to suppress because the arresting officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop appellant for a red-light violation. Appellant's argument regarding her ALS appeal—which the trial court never ruled on—is moot because upon reversal and remand for the suppression issue, this matter is restored to its pre-plea status. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err by failing to provide analysis in support of its summary judgment ruling in favor of appellee. The record does not reflect that the trial court did anything to preclude appellant from conducting discovery or being heard in opposition to summary judgment. A Dayton ordinance limiting the late fees that a landlord may charge had no applicability to appellant's lease of an apartment in Moraine. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in finding that appellant had fraudulently induced appellee to sign a settlement agreement. The agreement was ambiguous, and therefore the court was allowed to hear extrinsic evidence. Upon consideration of that evidence, the court found that appellant acted maliciously and violated her fiduciary duty by failing to disclose that the items for which appellee had bargained under the agreement were wholly meaningless, worthless, or non-existent. No error occurred in that regard. The court also did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages and attorney fees to appellee. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to dismiss his indictment on statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's claim that he is redeeming real estate subject to foreclosure proceedings is unrelated to the judgment on appeal, which granted foreclosure on the subject property. Although appellant may redeem the property by paying delinquent taxes after foreclosure but prior to confirmation of a sheriff's sale, the post-foreclosure redemption process is separate from the foreclosure order itself. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee-hospital on appellant's respondeat superior claim in her medical negligence action. Expert testimony is not required in a negligence action involving conduct within the common knowledge and experience of jurors, which includes a hospital staff member failing to follow orders of a physician. Genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment remained where there was evidence that defendant-surgeon had instructed defendant-surgical scrub technician not to place a particular instrument on his surgical tray, and the surgical scrub technician failed to follow the order, ultimately handing the wrong instrument to the surgeon during appellant's surgery. The surgeon used the instrument, and appellant was injured. Judgment reversed and remanded.

AMENDMENT – DISCOVERY – MEDIATION – PRIVILEGE – PROTECTIVE ORDER – R.C. 2710.04 – R.C. 2710.05 – WAIVER: The trial court's refusal to allow plaintiffs-appellants to amend their complaint was not an abuse of discretion because the motion to amend was not timely, and the information plaintiffs-appellants sought to amend was information that the trial judge relied on in granting a protective order. Where the fact that an informal mediation had occurred was a pleaded to and admitted fact, and where plaintiffs did not sufficiently preserve their open court argument for appellate review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a protective order on the grounds that the mediation privilege protected certain statements from discovery. The trial court did not err in finding that defendants-appellees did not waive the mediation privilege where defendants-appellees did not expressly waive the privilege.

CIV.R. 50(B) — JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT — CIV.R. 59(A) — MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL — CONSOLIDATED TRIALS — CIV.R. 42 — COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT — EXPERT TESTIMONY — EVID.R. 601 — EVID.R. 1002(Y) — HEARSAY — EVID.R. 702 — HARMLESS ERROR — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — FUTURE MEDICAL DAMAGES — SETOFF — PREJUDGMENT INTEREST: The trial court did not abuse its discretion under Civ.R. 42 by joining plaintiffs' medical claims for trial where plaintiffs proceeded under similar legal theories, underwent similar surgeries by defendant doctor, and presented identical expert witnesses, thus creating common questions of law and fact. [See CONCURRENCE: Concurring in the majority's opinion on this issue but adding a postjudgment assessment of prejudice from the joinder of trials that reveals no reversible error.] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted plaintiffs and plaintiffs' experts to testify about prior surgeries performed on each plaintiff by defendant doctor, even though those prior surgeries were not at issue in the cases, because the testimony was in line with the court's limiting instruction and any deviation from that instruction was harmless error. While the trial court erred by admitting hearsay expert testimony, the error was harmless where if the challenged testimony was excised the record still supported the jury's verdicts. The trial court did not err in admitting testimonial evidence from plaintiffs' experts as defendants' various challenges concerning whether an expert was qualified to provide testimony under Evid.R 601, whether an expert's testimony was admissible under Evid.R. 702, and alleged irrelevant evidence were meritless. The trial court did not err when it denied defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because defendants failed to demonstrate that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the jury's future-damages awards. The trial court erred in denying defendants' request for a setoff where this court held that intentional tortfeasors are entitled to a setoff under R.C. 2307.28(A). The trial court did not err when it awarded plaintiffs prejudgment interest, and the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that defendants had failed to make a good-faith effort to settle the cases.

No trial court error calculating jail-time credit. Judgment affirmed. Osowik.

No juvenile court error adjudicating minor children dependent and neglected and granting temporary custody to a maternal relative. Judgments affirmed. Osowik.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded $9,000 in compensatory damages for noneconomic loss and no punitive damages where plaintiffs did not present compelling evidence of the extent of their injuries caused by the defendant's conduct in shooting the plaintiff in the leg following a heated and racially charged confrontation over following Covid protocols.

Appellant failed to appear at the small claims hearing despite notice. Appellant has no basis to contest that the trial court's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court judgment is affirmed.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the trial court's denial of petition for post-conviction relief as untimely.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, find that trial court did not err in denying appellant's request for continuance to hire new counsel or excluding appellant's alibi testimony. The record does not support appellant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The state presented sufficient evidence for each of appellant's convictions and they were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court erred when it failed to give appellant an indefinite sentence on his second-degree felony offense.

Sulek, J. Trial court errs when it declines to review merits of motion to dismiss criminal indictment that asserts the criminal statutes are unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. This court will not usurp the role of the trial court and decide the issue for the first time on appeal.

Final appealable order, unresolved or hanging charges preclude an order from being final, a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to consider a non-final order

Unjust enrichment; Breach of contract

Trial court did not err in awarding Husband the entirety of winery property and business. Wife failed to prove that any appreciation in the property's value was attributable to any renovations or contributions she made. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Husband the entirety of the winery business as compensation for Wife's misconduct, which caused the loss of product and damage to the winery's vines and equipment.

The trial court committed no error in accepting the defendant's guilty plea for aggravated possession of drugs. The trial court was not required under Crim. R. 11 to notify the defendant—who was not then serving postrelease control for another offense—that if he committed another felony while on postrelease control for the aggravated possession offense, the court could terminate the postrelease control and impose an additional, consecutive prison term to that of the subsequently committed felony.

The trial court properly denied the appellant's motion to suppress. Officers lawfully conducted a search incident to arrest after observing the appellant operating a vehicle without a functioning rear license plate light and displaying clear signs of alcohol impairment. Appellant's conviction for improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's arguments to the contrary are not supported by the record and the jury did not lose its way in finding appellant guilty.

The trial court did not err by sentencing appellant to serve a mandatory minimum of 10 years in prison after pleading guilty to one count of first-degree felony possession of a fentanyl-related compound where the trial court's sentencing decision was not contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) because the trial court considered all relevant statutory factors outlined in R.C. 2929.11 before issuing its sentencing decision, properly imposed postrelease control, and sentenced appellant within the permissible statutory range for the offense.

The trial court did not err in applying R.C. 5122.34 to the plaintiff's claims where each of the allegations concerned a mental health professional's assistance in the hospitalization or discharge of a person subject to hospitalization pursuant to R.C. 5122.01(B)(3). The plain language of R.C. 5122.34 applies to such claims. The trial court did not err in awarding summary judgment to the defendant-physician where he presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie showing that he acted in good faith in his treatment and discharge of the patient, and the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut that showing. WITH DISSENTING OPINION.

community control violation, R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), sentencing, Marsy's law, resentencing, reconsideration, final order

CRIMINAL LAW – community control violation; conditions; second stage proceedings; the trial court abused its discretion regarding the second condition, i.e., that Appellant may not utilize social media in any capacity; judgment is reversed in part and the matter is remanded for the trial court to vacate that improper community control condition.

CIVIL – administrative appeal; zoning; ordinance; conditional use; question of law; statutory interpretation; apartment building; apartment; garden apartment.

CIVIL - foreclosure; motion to vacate; default judgment; personal jurisdiction; service by publication; R.C. 2307.24; Civ.R. 4.4(A)(1); reasonable diligence; in rem proceeding; land bank program; constitutional taking

CRIMINAL - double jeopardy; allied offenses; R.C. 2941.25; plain error; Domestic Violence; Attempted Abduction; felony sentencing; sentence contrary to law; consecutive, maximum sentences

CRIMINAL - felony sentencing; contrary to law; consideration of factors; remorse; criminal record; R.C. 2929.11 and .12; appellate court cannot independently weigh the evidence

Offenses were not allied offenses; Community control; Sanctions overly broad

Civil protection order

Consecutive sentences; Appellate review of sentence; Record must support consecutive sentence findings

The trial court properly declined to merge charges of felonious assault and discharging a firearm on or near prohibited premises.

Arson/Daubert/Expert testimony/Lay witness testimony/Rebuttal witness/Ineffective assistance/Prosecutorial misconduct

Respondeat superior; Cause of action under Patient Bill of Rights R.C. 3721.17

due process, contempt, sufficiency of the evidence

sufficiency, manifest weight, ineffective assistance of counsel

PARENTAL VISITATION — R.C. 3109.05 — BEST INTEREST: The juvenile court's judgment awarding father limited supervised visitation with his son was not an abuse of discretion where the juvenile court's factual findings are supported by competent credible evidence in the record and father's conduct directed towards mother supported the juvenile court's conclusion that father would struggle to coparent with mother.

RESTITUTION — MARSY'S LAW — R.C. 2929.28 — ECONOMIC LOSS — ABILITY TO PAY : The trial court erred in denying victims-appellants' restitution request based on defendant's inability to pay where the trial court lacked any evidence of defendant's inability to pay and victims have a right to restitution under the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2929.28.

involuntary manslaughter; manifest weight of the evidence; jury instructions; invited error; defense of another; deadly and non-deadly force; sufficiency of the evidence

Per Mayle, J., trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying father's request for a cognitive assessment. Father's counsel was not ineffective by failing to request a continuance for father to undergo a cognitive assessment. Trial court was not required to make R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) finding on the record; finding in its judgment entry was sufficient. Trial court's findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Fourth Amendment; search of a third-party's purse within an automobile; the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment does not permit search of passenger's purse where there is no evidence of a crime; consent given to search vehicle does not apply to passenger's purse where driver did not have mutual use and joint control; searches and statements made after an improper search excluded under the doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree.

Sufficiency; Manifest weight; Admission of testimony of prior domestic violence convictions

Manifest weight of the evidence; Ineffective assistance of counsel

Manifest weight of the evidence; Ineffective assistance of counsel

R.C. 2950.02(B); R.C. 2950.021(B)(4); R.C. 2950.09; R.C. 2950.021(B)(1); R.C. 2950.021(B)(3); Megan's Law; the law of the case; sexual predator; aggravated sexually oriented offender; sexual-offender classification; Tier offender; Adam Walsh Act; de novo evidentiary hearing; res judicata; reporting requirements. Affirmed in part; remanded in part. This court previously affirmed appellant's classification as a sexual predator pursuant to former R.C. 2950.09, Ohio's version of the federal Megan's Law ("Megan's Law"), in State v. Hilton, 2008-Ohio-3010 (8th Dist.) ("Hilton I"). The Hilton I decision remains the law of the case. The trial court's entry did not comply with R.C. 2950.021(B)(4); therefore, we remand and direct the trial court to issue an entry that complies with the statute. We also find that the trial court did not err when it classified Hilton as both a sexual predator and an aggravated sexually oriented offender because the reporting requirements are the same for both classifications.

Res judicata; final, appealable order; interlocutory; attorney-client relationship; legal malpractice; pro se litigant. Trial court properly dismissed legal-malpractice claim brought by a nonattorney because a nonattorney cannot represent the interests of a corporation. Trial court properly dismissed legal-malpractice claim where there was no evidence or allegation of an attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and defendant law firm.

Victim-impact testimony; plain error; prejudicial; ineffective assistance of counsel; self-defense; consecutive sentences. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not plainly err in allowing the family of the decedent to give a victim-impact statement at sentencing where the record demonstrates that the trial court considered numerous factors aside from the victim's testimony. Since there was no error in receiving the testimony, defendant has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences.

Abuse of discretion, de novo review, competent credible evidence, R.C. 3127.16, continuing jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, intent to relocate, R.C. 3109.05(G)(1), change of circumstances, best interest, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), alienation, terminating spousal support, child support, imputed income, R.C. 3119.01, R.C. 3119.02, attorney fees, R.C. 3105.73(B). Judgment affirmed. We find that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties even though none of the parties resided in Ohio because once Ohio courts obtained jurisdiction over a child-custody determination, it retains continuing jurisdiction, even when the parties no longer reside in Ohio, so long as no other court has asserted jurisdiction. Further, a notice of relocation does not strip the trial court of jurisdiction to modify parental rights and responsibilities when a motion is pending before the court. There was competent, credible evidence of a change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the children to modify custody. In addition, spousal support was properly terminated. Moreover, ordering appellant to pay child support was not an abuse of discretion, and imputing income to appellant was proper when she was voluntarily unemployed. Finally, the trial court is not required to consider appellant's income when awarding attorney fees.

Sexual-predator classification; sexual-predator hearing; Megan's Law; manifest weight of the evidence; insufficient record for review. Appellant pleaded guilty to sexual battery, a felony of the third degree. Prior to sentencing, the trial court held a sexual-predator hearing pursuant to Megan's Law. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court classified appellant as a sexual predator. On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial court's decision to classify him as a sexual predator. The appellate court held that when pronouncing its decision to classify appellant as a sexual predator, the trial court failed to have a discussion on the record to explain its decision, nor did the trial court discuss the relevant evidence, facts, or statutory factors it considered or relied upon in coming to its decision. As a result, the appellate court vacated the sexual-predator designation and remanded the case to the trial court to hold a new sexual-predator hearing consistent with its opinion.

Receivership; R.C. 2735.04; notice; sale of personal property; subject-matter jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction, venue. Judgment affirmed. The trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the receivership proceedings. Although the subject assets were out of the county, courts of common pleas are courts of general jurisdiction and have original jurisdiction in all civil suits that fall within the monetary requirements of a common pleas court. The trial court did not enter a judgment against the nonparty appellants; personal jurisdiction was not implicated. Venue was not raised in the trial court and therefore is waived on appeal. The pipeline was personal property, and under R.C. 2735.04(D), the receiver was not required to provide notice to the appellants prior to selling it. Further, under R.C. 2735.04, the trial court had the authority to authorize the receiver to sell the personal property free and clear of any liens.

Contempt; final appealable order; untimely; purge; first time on appeal. Appellants appealed from the trial court's order finding that two nonparty witnesses remained in contempt of court, stemming from a previously issued contempt order. Neither of appellants' arguments are properly before the court. The trial court's initial contempt order finding the nonparty witnesses in contempt was a final appealable order from which appellants could have appealed but chose not to do so. As such, appellants were precluded from challenging the court's finding of contempt in this later appeal. Also, appellants never moved the trial court to purge the contempt order and the trial court never made any determination whether nonparty witnesses had complied with the purge conditions set forth in the initial contempt order. As such, we will not determine, for the first time on appeal, whether the purge conditions had been met. The court further held that one of the appellants that had not been found in contempt was precluded from intervening in a matter between the contemnor and the court. The court therefore dismissed the appeal that had been filed by the appellant that was not subject to the trial court's contempt order.

Successive; petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.23; hearing; jurisdiction; de novo; abuse of discretion; unavoidably prevented; evidence outside the record; res judicata. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain defendant's successive petition for postconviction relief as a matter of law and did not abuse its discretion by dismissing it without a hearing. Appellant failed to meet the requirements of R.C. 2953.23 by failing to demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering any evidence. Furthermore, because appellant raised his sentencing issue in his direct appeal, and has failed to demonstrate evidence outside of the record, this issue is barred by res judicata. While Ohio law permits the filing of multiple petitions, a petitioner does not have carte blanche to file successive petitions endlessly.

Political-subdivision immunity; statute of limitations; motion to dismiss. The trial court did not err in granting the appellees' motion to dismiss because the appellant's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

R.C. 3119.96, et seq.; paternity; motion for relief from paternity; genetic-test results; willfully failed to comply. The trial court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant's motion for relief from paternity because he did not provide timely genetic-test results. While the court could not grant relief without the proper results, the submission of such results was not a jurisdictional impediment. Where appellant argued that the mother of the child had refused to submit the child to genetic testing, the trial court was required under R.C. 3119.963 to determine whether the mother had "willfully" failed to submit the child to genetic testing.

R.C. 2711.03; enforcement of arbitration provision; oral hearing unequivocally and specifically requested is mandatory; abuse of discretion. Appellants appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to stay and enforce an arbitration agreement before conducting an oral hearing as requested in their motion. We find that while an oral hearing is not always required to satisfy the "hearing" mandate of R.C. 2711.03, an oral hearing is required and shall be granted when unequivocally and specifically requested by a party pursuant to R.C. 2711.03. As such the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to stay and enforce arbitration before conducting an oral hearing. The matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court to conduct an oral hearing to determine whether the validity of the arbitration agreement is at issue.

Parental rights; motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody; abandon; failure to remedy; incarcerated parent; manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review; sufficiency-of-the-evidence review. - The juvenile court did not err in placing the child in the permanent custody of the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services because its decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence demonstrated that mother abandoned the child by failing to visit the child for almost two years and that she failed to present verifiable documentation that she completed any of her case-plan objectives, remedying the reasons for removal.

Permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; best interest of the child; legal custody; permanent planned living arrangement. The juvenile court's judgments awarding permanent custody of three children to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services ("CCDCFS"), granting legal custody of two children to their respective caregivers, and placing one child in a permanent planned living arrangement ("PPLA") are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

Motion for continuance; abuse of discretion. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's request for a continuance. Appellant's attorney made the request at the dispositional hearing when appellant failed to show for the proceeding. Appellant had notice of the hearing and offered no reason for his failure to appear.

Petition for writ of mandamus; dismissal; sua sponte; jail-time credit; moot; adequate remedy at law. Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed, sua sponte, where trial court had already awarded relator jail-time credit in sentencing journal entry and had already ruled on all motions for jail-time credit before relator filed his petition, such that to the extent relator sought to compel a ruling on his motions for jail-time credit, his petition was moot. Further, alleged errors regarding jail-time credit are not cognizable in mandamus because relator has or had an adequate remedy at law to address the issue.

Fleeing and Eluding - Insufficient Evidence - Lesser Included Offense Instruction - Admission of Evidence of Prior Convictions

Post-conviction relief; Hearings on post-conviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; R.C. 2953.23

Failure to Remove Trial Judge's Mother from Jury - Structural Error - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Manifest weight; Sufficiency of evidence; Ineffective assistance of counsel

Summary judgment granted to employer on workers' compensation claim; "qualifying chemical test"

Motion to retain jurisdiction

CIV.R. 12(B)(6) – STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS – R.C. 2743.16: The Court of Claims of Ohio did not err in dismissing plaintiff's complaint against the Ohio Department of Commerce for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion regarding unclaimed funds paid to a third party because it was filed more than two years after plaintiff learned that the department's unclaimed funds division paid the funds at issue to someone else. Pursuant to R.C. 2743.16(A), the statute of limitations for all civil actions against the state is two years. Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of pleading facts establishing the discovery rule or equitable tolling should have applied as an exception to the department's statute-of-limitations defense. Judgment affirmed.

The magistrate recommends granting respondent's motion to dismiss relator's original action pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Finding no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate's decision, this court adopts the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law. In accordance with the magistrate's decision, we grant the motion and dismiss the action.

Realtor filed for a Writ of Mandamus ordering Respondent to dismiss his case. Realtor has not proven he has a clear legal right to this relief. Mandamus denied. Respondent's motion to dismiss granted.

Per Mayle, J., trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. Even if counsel failed to discuss defense with petitioner before allowing him to enter plea of guilty, petitioner offered no evidence showing that defense was applicable.

In this successive post-conviction petition, the appellant failed to establish that the common pleas court had jurisdiction to consider his petition because he failed to establish the requirements set forth in both prongs of R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b). Per Osowik, J., trial court judgment is affirmed.

The trial court erred by making credibility determinations in its decision granting summary judgment in favor of the State on appellant's wrongful imprisonment claim. Judgment reversed.

Res judicata precludes appellant from arguing that the judgment on her legal separation, parts of which were incorporated into the divorce judgment on appeal in this case, was void where she failed to prosecute her appeal in the separation action. The trial court's alleged denial of appellant's post-judgment motion requesting a transcript of the final divorce hearing at the State's expense is not properly before this court. Judgment affirmed.

In this appeal concerning the trial court's decision overruling appellant's motion to dismiss his indictment, Appellant forfeited his only argument on appeal by not raising it in the trial court. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in awarding the appellee, a public children services agency, permanent custody of appellant's child without finding that the child could not or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. The child had been in appellee's temporary custody for 12 or more months of a 22-month period, so by statute, the trial court was not required to render a finding on the child's placement with either parent. Likewise, the trial court did not err in failing to make a factual finding that would have supported a determination regarding the child not being placed with either parent within a reasonable time. Because the trial court was not obligated to make a finding regarding the child's placement with either parent, the alleged absence of admissible evidence to support such a finding is immaterial. Finally, appellant cannot demonstrate entitlement to reunification with her child absent any reversible error in the trial court's determination that awarding permanent custody to appellee was in the child's best interest. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's sentence to community control sanctions is not contrary to law, and the court complied with R.C. 2929.11 in imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed.

DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE – FAILURE TO FOLLOW COURT ORDERS – CONTEMPT – SANCTIONS – CIV.R. 41(B)(1): The trial court did not abuse its discretion is dismissing plaintiff's complaint against condominium owners' association and other defendants in which plaintiff claimed defendants failed to properly maintain and repair condominiums in a 175-unit high-rise building. Defendants counterclaimed, claiming plaintiff interfered with the association's vendors and contractors, breached a restrictive covenant, and had a well-documented history of harassing and wrongfully interfering with vendor and contractor work in the building. Trial court correctly found that plaintiff had engaged in persistent, flagrant, and substantial disregard for the trial court's multiple rules and orders not to interfere with repair work. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against the defendants with prejudice was within the trial court's discretion under Civ. R. 41(B)(1), and the court was not required – as plaintiff claimed – to first apply progressive disciplinary procedures before dismissal, or to consider plaintiff's status as a pro se party. Plaintiff's due process rights also were not violated by the trial court's failure to wait 14 days after the filing of a show cause order to allow plaintiff to file a response since plaintiff failed to raise the issue before the trial court and was present and had the opportunity to present a defense during the show cause hearing.

POSTCONVICTION — R.C. 2953.21 — FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW — PROCEDURE — AMENDMENT OF PETITIONS The trial court erred by denying petitioner's timely, amended first petition for postconviction relief without making findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by R.C. 2953.21(D) and (H).

Sulek. In a civil forfeiture proceeding, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the State. Admissions deemed admitted; judicial bias.

Foreclosure; summary judgment; bank proved standing as holder of note indorsed in blank and by assignment of the mortgage; wife who did not sign promissory note has no separate right to file loan mitigation application or obtain separate judgment in foreclosure; affidavit relied on by bank to support summary judgment not properly filed; genuine issues of material fact.

Appellant passed away prior to oral argument, no substitution of party made.

Operating a Vehicle Impaired ("OVI"); Manifest weight and sufficiency

Summary judgment; Final appealable order

R.C. 2929.19(B) - Trial Court has statutory duty to provide notice of post release control at the sentencing hearing. To validly impose post release control, a Trial Court must advise the Defendant 1) whether post release control is mandatory or discretionary, 2) the duration; 3) notice of Adult Parole Authority will administer the post release control and any violation will subject the defendant to the consequences set forth in the statute

Manifest Weight of the Evidence; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; Trial Strategy. The verdicts were supported by the evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Counsel's assistance was not ineffective despite picking a trial strategy that was not successful. Trial strategy is not the basis for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Best Interest; Shared Parenting Plan; R.C. 3109.04; Contempt of Court; Impossibility of Performance; Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel; Retained Counsel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating the parties' shared parenting plan and designating plaintiff-appellee as the residential parent and legal custodian of the parties' minor children. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the defendant-appellee in contempt of court for failing to facilitate parenting time. Defendant-appellant did not have a constitutional right to counsel and is not entitled to claim ineffective assistance of retained counsel.

Consecutive Sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c). The trial court's decision to run the sentences for the convictions consecutively was not contrary to law.

The defendant's convictions for strangulation, abduction, and rape were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence and testimony presented at trial did not preclude the jury from finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

permanent custody, error not preserved for appellate review, best interest

Reviewing courts will presume the trial court performed its duty to independently review a Magistrate's Decision. The party asserting error bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the trial court's failure to perform its duty of independent analysis. In this case, Father has not satisfied this burden. The trial court expressly stated in its decision that it conducted an independent review of all factual and legal issues addressed by the magistrate in ruling on Mother's objections. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the parenting time order. Contrary to Father's position, Mother was not required to show a change in circumstances. The court was only required to consider the statutory factors in R.C. 3109.051(D), with the child's best interest as the guiding principle. However, there is merit to Father's argument regarding the court's treatment of Mother's work schedule.

Defendant's 8 to 12-year indefinite prison term sentence was supported by the record and not contrary to law. Despite the defendant's limited criminal history and words of support from his family members as to the defendant's character, the trial court weighed that against the fact that the victim lost his life. Ohio precedent expressly forbids the substitution of the appeal court's judgment (or that of the defendant) for that of the trial court's when weighing the relevant sentencing factors.

The domestic relations court's decisions to deny appellant's request for spousal support, reject appellant's proposed shared parenting plan, and award appellant with less than equal parenting time with his two unemancipated children were not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable so as to constitute an abuse of discretion where appellant's arguments established nothing more than his disagreement with the domestic relations court's decisions and the weight that the domestic relations court gave the enumerated statutory factors the court was required to consider.

Trial court did not violate mother's First Amendment rights by terminating shared parenting where decision rested on mother's failure to communicate and cooperate with father about unilateral changes affecting child, not on content of mother's religious beliefs. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing annual income to mother for child support where mother voluntarily quit employment to pursue self-sufficient lifestyle with new husband and made no job search efforts. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on guardian ad litem's report where GAL failed to physically visit mother's home because Superintendence Rule 48 creates only administrative directives, not enforceable procedural rights.

The trial court erred in violation of the appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause by admitting the victim's cell phone records without prior authentication by a custodian or other qualified witness. Due to the State's failure to authenticate the records as a business record, it is impossible to determine whether they are nontestimonial. However, any error in the trial court's admission of the cell phone records was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where, even when excluding the improperly admitted cell phone records, overwhelming evidence of the appellant's guilt remained.

CIVIL - contract; summary judgment; mechanic's lien; 1311.06(A); affidavit; jurat; notarial certificate; R.C. 147.011(C) and (D); R.C. 147.542(D); Home Solicitation Sales Act (HSSA); R.C. 1345.21; failure to cancel and/or rescind; objections to magistrate's decision; Civ.R. 53(D)

CRIMINAL LAW - Robbery; Misdemeanor Theft; manifest weight of the evidence; in-court identifications; credibility and persuasiveness; Repeat Violent Offender; R.C. 2929.14(B); not clearly and convincingly contrary to law; merger of allied offenses; plain error; separate and identifiable harm; separate victims.

APPELLATE REVIEW – App.R. 5(A); delayed appeal; untimely; non-defendant; only a defendant may file a motion for delayed appeal.

APPELLATE REVIEW – App.R. 5(A); delayed appeal; untimely; non-defendant; only a defendant may file a motion for delayed appeal.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A); delayed appeal; fails to set forth valid reason for delay; reasons do not justify delay of over one year to initiate appeal; appellant not diligent in protecting her own rights.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A); delayed appeal; fails to set forth valid reason for delay; reasons do not justify delay of over one year to initiate appeal; appellant not diligent in protecting her own rights.

CRIMINAL LAW - plea agreement; joint sentencing recommendation; not binding on the court; imposition of harsher sentence; Crim.R. 11 advisements; maximum penalty; knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily.

R.C. 2907.231(B), engaging in prostitution; void for vagueness; overbreadth; due process rights; motion to dismiss; de novo; fundamental right; narrowly tailored statute; presumption of constitutionality; rational basis

R.C. 2907.231(B), engaging in prostitution; void for vagueness; overbreadth; due process rights; motion to dismiss; de novo; fundamental right; narrowly tailored statute; presumption of constitutionality; rational basis

Inmate Assault, Rape, Negligence, Damages, Stipulation. Defendant stipulated that its employees breached their duty of care towards plaintiff after eight inmates entered plaintiff's cell, then assaulted and raped plaintiff for approximately 90 minutes before staff intervention. A trial was held on the issue of damages. The magistrate found that the testimony of plaintiff's treating physician, who also served as defendant's medical expert, was credible in that plaintiff's hip injuries were consistent with normal wear and tear, not an acute injury from the attack. The magistrate further found that plaintiff had proven pain and suffering damages from the attack and recommended an award of $175,000.00 in compensatory damages.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the judgment, finding proper colloquy pursuant to Crim.R. 11 with no support for argument of an unknowing plea based on failure to mention written stipulation that merger did not apply during the plea hearing considering the acknowledged facts precluded merger, and any error in failing to reference the plea stipulation or to provide information regarding right of appeal was harmless based the facts and on timely appeal.

The trial court erred by requiring proof of success in the underlying claim, and the decision with regard to the amount of damages is reversed. The some-evidence standard is appropriate where an attorney's grievous conduct has prevented a plaintiff from proving the underlying case. An attorney's representation of the value of a case is relevant in a malpractice action against that attorney under such circumstances. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err when granting appellee's motion to dismiss appellant's complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Appellant purported to assert a civil rights violation arising from allegations of threatening behavior by appellee's employee in a convenience store, but such a claim is not cognizable against a non-state actor for private conduct. Even if appellant's allegations are construed as a claim for an intentional tort such as battery, appellee could not be held vicariously liable for acts of an employee that fall outside the scope of employment.

The trial court erred in denying intervenor's motion to vacate based on the mootness doctrine. Because the trial court could grant intervenor an effectual, meaningful remedy if it determined plaintiff obtained the underlying judgment through fraud, the case and motion to vacate are not moot. Also, the trial court erred in determining that intervenor had not timely filed her motion for sanctions pursuant to R.C. 2323.51. Intervenor filed her motion within 30 days of the judgment granting the writ of execution, which is a final judgment.

Attorneys at law—Reciprocal discipline from the Supreme Court of Colorado—Six-month suspension fully stayed on conditions—Gov.Bar R. V(11)(F)(4).

App.R. 16(A) - Appellant's Failure to Comply Warrants Dismissal

Physical injury; Introduction of documents

Sufficiency; Weight of the evidence; Jury view; Jury instructions

Sufficiency; Weight of the evidence; Jury view; Jury instructions

The trial court properly awarded permanent custody of mother's two children to a county children's services agency.

The trial court properly awarded permanent custody of mother's two children to a county children's services agency.

felonious assault, manifest weight, self-defense

ABUSE OF DISCRETION – ATTORNEY FEES – CONTEMPT – JUVENILE – SERVICE – WAIVER: Where Mother's testimony indicated that she understood that the juvenile court's shared parenting order required her to afford Father a 30-minute grace period when picking up the child for visitation, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding Mother in contempt for failing to wait the entire 30 minutes. Where Mother failed to assert her unclean hands argument in the juvenile court, she has waived the argument for appellate review. Where Mother failed to provide a transcript of the hearing where the juvenile court determined she did not perfect service of her objections, and the determination of the sufficiency of service is within the juvenile court's discretion, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding Mother failed to perfect service. Where the juvenile court awarded Father $1,000 in attorney's fees, which was less than the requested $4,025, the juvenile court's award was not an abuse of discretion.

NORWOOD COD.ORD. 1331.10 — SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE: Testimony from a code official that he intended for the placard posted by the Board of Health to remain on defendant's property and that no person, other than the code official, was to remove the placard, was sufficient to establish that defendant did not have permission to remove the placard and to support a conviction for a violation of Norwood Cod.Ord. 1331.10(c), which prohibits the removal of a placard posted by an official responsible for enforcing the Norwood Property Maintenance Code.

Defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim falls short where that claim is grounded on defense counsel's change in strategy after delivering an opening statement. Tactical adjustments in the course of a trial typically do not reflect deficient performance, and nothing in the record suggests that the shift in strategy after the opening statement led to a worse outcome for the defendant.

Pro se; civil contempt; moot; App.R. 12; App.R. 16; Traf.R. 11(A); not guilty plea; Double Jeopardy Clause; allied offenses; R.C. 2941.25(A); plain error; constitutionality of a statute; new arguments on appeal; waiver. Appellant appealed various aspects of the trial court's proceedings concerning three traffic citations she was found guilty of, raising five assignments of error. Her first assignment of error raised issues with the trial court's finding of contempt for her behavior during her arraignment; however, the issues related to the contempt are moot once she complied with the court's order which was purged. Her second assignment of error alleged the trial court violated her due-process rights by accepting her not guilty plea because it was not knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily made and that the trial court violated Traf.R. 11(A). Appellant pled not guilty at her arraignment and the case went to trial where the court found her guilty of all charges. As such the trial court did not accept a guilty or no contest plea from her and these requirements do not apply. Similarly, the trial court did not violate Traf.R. 11(A) since appellant was given an opportunity to present a motion to dismiss prior to trial and she did in fact make such a motion, which the trial court denied. Appellant's third assignment of error alleged the trial court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, committing plain error, by entering two convictions under the same ordinance for the same expired plates and that these offenses should have been merged as allied offenses. Both of these arguments fail because appellant's two convictions for driving with expired plates occurred on two separate days and therefore constitute separate offenses such that she was not being punished for the same offense twice nor were they allied offenses of a similar import. Appellant's fourth assignment of error alleged the local ordinance at issue was unconstitutional, but she failed to raise this issue in the trial court and we decline to exercise discretion to review it for plain error. Appellant's fifth assignment of error made several arguments that were not raised in the trial court, not supported by any case law and contradicted the record. These new issues on appeal were waived. All assignments of error were overruled and judgment affirmed.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; lesser-included offense; reckless homicide; murder; Bruton; Confrontation Clause; hearsay; prosecutorial misconduct; joinder; severance; jury instructions; transferred intent; cumulative error; sufficiency of the evidence. Trial counsel was not ineffective even though he did not request a lesser-included offense instruction and did not object to out-of-court statements of the defendant's coconspirators where the evidence did not support the lesser-included offense instruction and the out-of-court statements were not hearsay and did not violate Bruton or the Confrontation Clause. The State did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct and because there were no errors, there was no cumulative error. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of accomplice liability.

Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; circumstantial evidence; accomplice testimony; jury credibility determinations; ShotSpotter technology; surveillance video; GPS ankle-monitor data; ballistics evidence; forensic expert testimony; Confrontation Clause; plain-error review; Crim.R. 29 motion; joint jury trial; firearm specifications; murder conviction; attempted murder conviction; allied offenses; jury instructions; rational trier of fact; appellate standard of review; corroborating evidence; shooting; affirmed judgment. In a joint jury trial arising from a shooting that resulted in the death of a three-year-old child and injuries to another victim, appellant was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and related offenses. The evidence established that a black Mercedes-Benz transported the shooter to and from the scene, that surveillance footage and ShotSpotter data placed the vehicle and gunfire at the precise location and time of the offenses, and that GPS ankle-monitor records corroborated the movements of those involved. An accomplice testified that the defendant exited the vehicle armed with a handgun and fired multiple shots toward the victims' location, and ballistics testing linked the recovered firearm to the fatal projectile. Although the accomplice admitted prior false statements and testified pursuant to a plea agreement, the jury was instructed to view such testimony with grave suspicion. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find that appellant purposefully shot into a moving vehicle. The essential elements of the offenses were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury did not clearly lose its way in resolving credibility issues. The admission of forensic evidence through expert testimony did not constitute plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel under the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, the convictions are affirmed.

Guilty plea; knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made; Crim.R. 11(C); maximum penalty; consecutive sentences; trial court advisement. Under Ohio law, a trial court is not required to advise a defendant of the possibility that each individual sentence may be imposed consecutively. The trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11(C), and appellant failed to demonstrate that his pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.

Engaging in pattern of corrupt activity, predicate offenses, enterprise, R.C. 2923.32, theft, R.C. 2913.02, sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence. Ford appealed three felony theft convictions, arguing that the State did not provide credible evidence about the value of the stolen items as required to determine the classification of each theft. The manifest weight of the evidence supported all three theft convictions where the State's witnesses testified as to the value of the stolen merchandise, their basis of knowledge thereof, and where Ford did not introduce contradictory evidence or identify substantial inconsistencies in the estimates of value provided by the State's witnesses. Ford also appealed the sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence regarding his conviction for engaging in pattern of corrupt activity, which was based on these same thefts. Evidence supported this conviction where record, including surveillance video, showed that Ford and codefendant stole cigarettes together in the same manner, arriving together in the same vehicle, at least three times in less than five months. That Ford's codefendant had been charged, in other incidents, with stealing items other than cigarettes with individuals other than Ford did not preclude a finding that an enterprise existed between Ford and codefendant.

Expungement; record sealing; R.C. 2953.32; R.C. 2953.34; R.C. 2953.31; R.C. Ch. 2953. - Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in finding that restitution had been paid and that final discharge occurred, thus allowing the court to grant appellee's motion to seal his conviction.

Expungement; seal; eligible; former R.C. 2953.32; de novo; felony conviction; fifth-degree felony; fourth-degree felony; third-degree felony. Vacated the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for expungement and remanded the matter to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether T.T. has been rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the court. The trial court erred in finding appellant is not an eligible offender for expungement in this case when the plain and unambiguous language of former R.C. 2953.32 does not exclude fourth- or fifth-degree felony convictions from expungement eligibility based on the existence of a third-degree felony conviction in a different case.

Community-control sanctions; nonresidential; jail time; R.C. 2929.15; R.C. 2929.16; monitored time. - Defendant's sentence was not contrary to law because R.C. 2929.15 provides that the trial can impose both residential and nonresidential sanctions, which include a jail sentence and monitored time.

Civil stalking protection order; menacing by stalking; R.C. 2903.214; R.C. 2903.11; abuse of discretion; pattern of conduct; knowingly; R.C. 2901.22; First Amendment. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a civil stalking protection order to petitioner. Appellant repeatedly harassed and made inappropriate comments to petitioner, leading her to be in fear for her life. There was competent and credible evidence in the record that appellant acted knowingly. Appellant's actions and words are not protected speech under the First Amendment.

Motion to compel discovery; traffic encounter; police officer; investigation of police officer relative to other traffic encounters; indictment of police officer; Crim.R. 16; pretrial discovery; exculpatory material; favorable to defense; law-enforcement privilege; in camera review. Judgment affirmed, with instructions for trial court to conduct an in camera review on remand. The defendant was entitled to pretrial discovery of investigative materials of a police officer who was indicted for his actions in other traffic encounters. This case involves a traffic encounter with the defendant and therefore the investigatory material of the officer relative to the other incidents is favorable to the defense. The law-enforcement privilege is not an absolute bar to the material—the trial court must conduct an in camera review of the material to determine whether the public interest in confidentiality of the material is outweighed by the defendant's specific need for the evidence.

examination; expert witness; expert report; psychologist; mental-health diagnoses; learning disability; adjudication; disposition; hearing; admission; colloquy; voluntary; knowing; intelligent; rebuttable presumption; allocution; plain error; sufficient indicia of incompetence; R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); R.C. 2152.51; R.C. 2152.52; R.C. 2152.10(8); R.C. 2152.12(E)(6); R.C. 2152.12(E)(7); Juv.R. 30; App.R. 16(A)(4). Judgment affirmed. The juvenile court did not err by accepting appellant's admission without further exploring his competency. Neither appellant's counsel nor the State ever raised the issue of appellant's competency or requested a competency evaluation, and the juvenile court had the opportunity to observe and interact with appellant extensively over the course of several hearings. Nothing in the record suggests sufficient indicia of incompetence requiring the juvenile court to inquire into appellant's competence sua sponte. In addition, nothing in the record suggested appellant had ever been found incompetent or that competency issues were even raised, in previous juvenile proceedings. Testimony at the amenability hearing, along with the testifying psychologist's report, established that appellant was of average intelligence, that he could identify risks and address potential outcomes, that his thinking was logical, and that he displayed adequate insight. Further, appellant's behavior at every hearing indicated he understood the nature and objective of the proceedings and could assist in his own defense. This included his right to remain silent because he immediately sought clarification from the court when it asked him to speak about the offense in allocution. Appellant's statements in allocution were articulate and rational. Appellant's responses to the juvenile court during previous hearings likewise reflected his understanding of the court process. Furthermore, appellant's mental-health history and learning disability did not render him incompetent or require further inquiry into his competence.

Pro se; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16; failure to make and support arguments for why trial court's judgment was wrong; assignment of error disregarded. Pro se appellant appeals the trial court's judgment entry granting the appellees' motions to dismiss, alleging the dismissal failed to satisfy the notice requirements of Civ.R. 41(B). This argument is without merit since the trial court's dismissal was pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), which does not have notice requirements. Appellant fails to make and support any arguments for why the trial court's dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is wrong. The burden is on the appellant to make and substantiate one's argument pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2). It is not an appellate court's job to make arguments for an appellant. Assignment of error is disregarded and the judgment is affirmed.

Dismissal; jurisdiction; untimely; App.R. 4(B)(3)(d); Crim.R. 19(D)(3)(a)(ii); trial judge; magistrate. - Appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Defendant attempted to use App.R. 4(B)(3)(d) to resurrect an otherwise untimely appeal. Crim.R. 19(D)(3)(a)(ii) only applies to magistrates; the trial judge conducted the trial. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were required.

Permanent custody; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a); best interest; R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E); clear and convincing; sufficiency; manifest weight. Affirmed the juvenile court's judgment granting permanent custody of the minor children to the agency and terminating all parental rights. The juvenile court engaged in the proper analysis and made the requisite determinations under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), (D)(1), and (E). The juvenile court's judgment was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Procedendo, mootness, and postconviction-relief petition. - Procedendo action to compel a ruling on a postconviction-relief petition was rendered moot by the respondent judge denying the subject petition.

CRIMINAL LAW – trafficking in cocaine; possession of cocaine; aggravated trafficking in drugs (methamphetamine); aggravated possession of drugs (methamphetamine); jury trial; consecutive prison sentence; speedy trial; motion to suppress; manifest weight; live video witness testimony; judgment affirmed.

promoting prostitution conviction affirmed; appellant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to subpoena other prostitute whose services she offered to undercover officer; sufficient evidence on elements related to the operation of an enterprise; jury verdict was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

credit card company's summary judgment motion met initial burden on existence of the account, an amount representing an "account stated" followed by a year's worth of account statements showing purchases and payments, and a cardmember agreement attached to the account that explained the account holders accepted the agreement if they failed to cancel the account within 30 days of receiving the card or if they (or an authorized user) used the account; nonmovant submitted no evidence in response and failed to meet reciprocal burden.

Appellant's convictions for gross sexual imposition and attempted rape were not against the manifest weight of the evidence; appellant's convictions and sentence affirmed, but matter remanded to trial court for limited purpose of properly calculating appellant's jail-time credit.

MANDAMUS – SENTENCE COMPUTATION: On petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the Bureau of Sentence Computation to modify petitioner's aggregate prison sentence imposed in six different cases from three different counties, the magistrate properly found that petitioner must serve all definite prison sentences before he can begin serving the indefinite prison sentence. As such, petitioner has not established a clear legal right to the requested relief or that the bureau was under a clear legal duty to provide it. Writ denied.

On appeal from a conviction and 36-month prison term for domestic violence, as well as the revocation of community control and consecutive 16-month prison term from two prior domestic violence convictions. Appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; the jury did not lose its way in believing the victim's account, which was supported by physical evidence and first responders' testimony. The state did not commit prosecutorial misconduct by suggesting inferences about credibility that could be drawn from specific evidence and testimony at trial. The trial court's failure to include consecutive-sentencing findings in its judgment entry was a clerical error that could be cured by a nunc pro tunc entry. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Cause remanded for a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry.

Petition for writ of mandamus is denied. Magistrate did not err in his determination that OneSource failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief or that the commission was under a clear legal duty to provide it.

R.C. 3113.31 — DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER — APPELLATE REVIEW: Because the transcript from the full hearing on appellee's petition for a domestic violence civil protection order was not included in the record under App.R. 9, and in the absence of any apparent procedural error by the trial court or cognizable argument or legal authority supporting appellant's assignments of error, we must presume the regularity of the proceedings and affirm the trial court's judgment issuing a protection order against appellant pursuant to R.C. 3113.31. Judgment affirmed.

On certification of default.

Appellant's convictions for failure to stop at a railroad grade crossing and endangering children are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court properly applied R.C. 4511.63 in convicting appellant of failure to stop at a railroad grade crossing. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were not violated. The trial court did not commit plain error by failing to remove two jurors for cause on grounds of bias, and appellant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the jurors in question. Appellant's convictions for attempted rape, kidnapping, and strangulation were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court violated Evid.R. 404(B) by allowing the State to present other-acts evidence of appellant's prior juvenile adjudication for attempted rape. That error was harmless as to appellant's convictions for kidnapping and strangulation, but not as to appellant's attempted rape conviction. Because the other-acts evidence error was reversible error as to appellant's attempted rape conviction, the sexually violent predator specification attached to that conviction must be reversed. The issue of whether appellant was guilty of the sexual motivation specification attached to his kidnapping offense should have been determined by the jury as opposed to the trial court; however, that error was invited by appellant and did not amount to plain error. The sexually violent predator specification attached to appellant's kidnapping offense was supported by sufficient evidence and was not based on inadmissible hearsay. Appellant's claim that the trial court erred by failing to merge his attempted rape and kidnapping convictions at sentencing is moot by virtue of the attempted rape conviction being reversed. Appellant's claim that he was denied a fair trial due to the cumulative error committed during his trial lacks merit. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The trial court abused its discretion by denying the State's motion for access to recorded phone calls at a juvenile detention center where the juvenile failed to raise any expectation of privacy in the recorded phone calls and the trial court found that it was in the interest of public safety to locate the stolen firearms. Judgment reversed to the extent that it overruled the State's motion but affirmed in all other respects.

The trial court erred in sentencing appellee to serve a four-month jail term for fifth-degree felony aggravated possession of drugs. Absent the imposition of community control sanctions, the sentence is below the prescribed statutory range for fifth-degree felonies, and by imposing a sentence contrary to law, the trial court committed plain error. Appellee's completion of the four-month jail sentence did not render the appeal moot because the appeal was timely filed by the State, and the State has an effective remedy through the resentencing of appellee on remand. Judgment vacated as to appellee's sentence and remanded for resentencing. (Huffman, J., concurring.)

Appellant's convictions for three counts of felonious assault on a peace officer and one count of aggravated possession of drugs were based on sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury reasonably concluded that appellant knowingly attempted to cause physical harm when he shot in the direction of officers parked along the highway median, that appellant was conscious and had acted voluntarily when he drove his pickup truck into an occupied police cruiser, and that he knowingly possessed the methamphetamine found in his truck. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to provide, sua sponte, a "blackout" jury instruction and in denying appellant's request for an instruction on aggravated menacing as to the shooting. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant entered a valid guilty plea under Crim.R. 11, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling his motion to withdraw it. Appellant's sentence is contrary to law, however, insofar as the trial court disapproved shock incarceration or placement in an intensive program prison without providing factual reasons for its disapproval. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and case remanded for resentencing.

Appellant contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney did not inform her that upon her guilty pleas, she forfeited her right to appeal the trial court's motion to suppress decision. Because the appellate record does not include the discussions between appellant and counsel concerning the guilty plea and the record is otherwise silent on the issue, a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel is not possible. Judgment affirmed.

COMMERCIAL LITIGATION — BREACH OF CONTRACT — BREACH OF LEASE — LANDLORD TENANT — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — DISCOVERY — ABUSE OF DISCRETION: The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a landlord leasing a commercial gym space where no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the tenant's breach of the lease by failing to pay rent for several months. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the landlord's request to reopen discovery for 90 days and in affording leave for the landlord to file dispositive motions despite the fact that the tenant's motion for summary judgment was timely filed and already fully briefed.

PROCEDURE/CRIMINAL — CRIM.R. 47 — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — ABUSE OF DISCRETION — NOTICE — FOURTH AMENDMENT: Where defendant's supplemental motion to suppress focused almost exclusively on the stop of a vehicle and did not allege that the search of that vehicle had been conducted without a warrant, and where the State's bill of particulars had alleged that defendant had admitted to possessing contraband prior to the search, defendant's supplemental motion to suppress failed to provide the State with adequate notice that defendant challenged the allegedly unconstitutional search and so did not adequately raise that issue under Crim.R. 47. Where defendant's supplemental motion to suppress failed to provide the State with adequate prehearing notice of defendant's challenge to the warrantless search, and where the State, in reliance on its understanding of the motion's scope, offered no witnesses to testify about the search's legality, and where the State was given no opportunity to call those necessary officers as witnesses after it learned that defendant sought to challenge the search, the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that the State had not met its burden to justify the warrantless search.

SENTENCING — R.C. 2929.13(B) — COMPLICITY —AIDING OR ABETTING — THEFT: Defendant's 12-month prison sentence for a nonviolent fifth-degree felony is not contrary to law because defendant violated the terms of her bond when she failed to appear at a pretrial hearing and that violation triggered the trial court's discretionary authority under R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(iii) to sentence defendant to a prison term. Defendant's conviction for aiding or abetting a retail theft was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the record shows that defendant drove the principal actors to the retail store, brought merchandise to the principal actors in the store, and reconvened with the principal actors following the theft.

CRIMINAL – R.C. 2929.025; serious mental illness; clinical diagnosis; forensic diagnosis; Bipolar Disorder; Schizoaffective Disorder; abuse of discretion; conflicting reasonable interpretations; admissibility of expert opinion; uncontroverted expert testimony; successive petition.

Judge Zmuda, writing for the majority, affirms the judgment, finding the trial court did not impose nonmandatory costs, either at the sentencing hearing or in the judgment entry, with "costs of this action" referring only to the mandatory costs permitted under R.C. 2929.18(A)(4); despite the state conceding error, in the absence of the trial court specifying additional, nonmandatory costs in the entry or at hearing, "costs of this action" imposes only mandatory costs.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the trial court's denial of appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion seeking relief from order modifying spousal support.

Per Mayle, J., trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were not court's judgment, so appellant filed motion for new trial more than 28 days after court issued its judgment, making new trial motion untimely, which did not toll time for filing notice of appeal under App.R. 4(B). Because notice of appeal was untimely as to trial judgment, appeals court lacks jurisdiction to review trial judgment. Trial court properly denied motion for new trial as untimely.

REOPENING – App.R. 26(B); timely pro se application to reopen direct appeal; Appellant fails to meet the standard under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); assignments of error; jury waiver; sufficiency; weight of the evidence; Appellant fails to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel warranting a reopening; application denied.

Grandmother appeals order granting domestic violence civil protection order (DVCPO) prohibiting contact with granddaughter. Granddaughter experienced suicidal thoughts under grandmother's care. Civ.R. 65.1, not Civ.R. 53 applies in DVCPO hearings and does not require specificity in objections. Social worker who conducted psychosocial assessment on granddaughter could offer opinion as to the cause of the granddaughter's mental health issues. Civ.R 65.1 governs discovery in DVCPO proceedings and does not require exchange of expert reports prior to the full hearing. Grant of DVCPO supported by evidence that Grandmother caused granddaughter to suffer mental injury rendering her an "abused child" under the DVCPO statute.

Trial court erred in granting motion to suppress where driver failed to signal continuously during last 100 feet before turning as required by ordinance. Turn-signal requirement is absolute and not conditioned on traffic conditions or safety concerns. WITH CONCURRING OPINION

Appellant's conviction resulting from a jury finding him guilty of felonious assault, discharging a firearm on a public roadway, and improper handling of a firearm while in a motor vehicle was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where there existed overwhelming competent and credible evidence in the record establishing appellant as the individual who fired multiple shots at the victim during a road-rage incident while both he and the victim were traveling northbound on a local two-lane freeway.

negligence, App.R. 16(A)(7), failure to develop argument, proximate cause, manifest weight of the evidence

The municipal court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case with prejudice for lack of prosecution under the court's local rules where the plaintiff prosecuted the case, appearing before a magistrate and presenting evidence on behalf of his conversion claim, which arose following a dispute over legal fees.

CRIMINAL LAW – motion to suppress; mixed questions of law and fact; traffic stop; probable cause to stop the vehicle; traffic violation; failure to use turn signal; consent to search vehicle; K-9 sniff; narcotics found inside vehicle; additional drugs found on defendant; traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged, officer was still conducting initial investigation when defendant gave consent to search the vehicle; sufficiency of evidence; possession of drugs; trafficking of drugs; R.C. 2925.11; R.C. 2925.03; R.C. 2925.01; constructive possession; receipt of proceeds; R.C. 2927.21; hidden compartment; R.C. 2923.241; insufficient evidence to support conviction of designing or operating a vehicle with a hidden compartment used to transport a controlled substance.

CRIMINAL LAW - Pandering Sexually-Oriented Matter Involving a Minor; Unlawful Sexual Conduct with a Minor; ineffective assistance of counsel; timing of motion to dismiss; speedy trial; R.C. 2945.71, 2945.72, 2945.73; trial tactics; no deficient performance; no prejudice; indictment was constitutionally sufficient; due process; double jeopardy; failure to adequately distinguish multiple counts; plain error; nonbinding legal authority; factually distinguishable; sufficiency of the evidence; four separate counts.

APPELLATE REVIEW - appellate jurisdiction; judgments and final orders; R.C. 2505.02; administrative order; no trial court proceedings.

APPELLATE REVIEW – R.C. 2505.02(B); Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(a); magistrate's decision has not been adopted by the trial court and remains interlocutory; no final order exists until all claims are resolved.

Speedy Trial; R.C. 2945.71; R.C. 2945.72; R.C. 2945.73; Sufficiency of Evidence; Manifest Weight; Possession of Drugs. Defendant-appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. Defendant-appellant's possession-of-drugs convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Permanent Custody. Trial court did not err by granting permanent custody of the parties' children to children's services agency.

Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs; Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity; Sufficiency of the evidence; Manifest weight of the evidence; Warrantless search of vehicle; Cross-examination of witness; Qualifying a witness as an expert. The judgment of conviction and sentence is affirmed.

R.C. 121.22; Open Meetings Act; Remedies for Open Meetings Act violations. Trial court did not err by determining that Trustees violated Open Meetings Act in some respects but not others. Trial court properly issued limited injunction.

Calculation of Child Support; Abuse of Discretion; Contempt; Void Purge Condition; R.C. 3105.171(I); Allocation of Tax Exemption; R.C. 3119.82. In this post-decree proceeding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the calculation of child support. The mother-appellee was employed to full capacity and a deviation was warranted after consideration of the factors set forth in R.C. 3119.23. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the father-appellant in contempt and imposing penalties for the contempt. The trial court's award of attorney fees in excess of $400 is an abuse of discretion. A local rule of court limits reasonable fees to $400 in the absence of professional testimony post-decree actions involving contempt. The trial court's purge condition requiring the father-appellant to comply with all court orders in the future is void because it does not properly allow the contemnor to purge the contempt. The trial court did not modify the terms of the parties' divorce decree in violation of R.C. 3105.171(I). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence that was properly authenticated. The trial court's allocation of the tax emption to the nonresidential parent without any consideration of the child's best interest and the factors set forth in R.C. 3119.82 is an abuse of discretion.

Contrary to Law; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); Clear and Convincing Evidence. The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined the phrase "contrary to law" in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) to mean "in violation of statute or legal regulatoins at a given time." Clear and convincing evidence is that which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established. On appeal, reviewing courts are not permitted to substitute their judgment for that of the trial court in weighing the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12 and principles listed in R.C. 2929.11.

Community Control; Tolling; R.C. 2929.15(A)(1). The trial court acted within its authority when it ordered the termination of defendant-appellant's community-control supervision and the imposition of a prison sentence on the original charges despite the five-year period of supervision having ended.

Community Control Violations; Consecutive Sentences. The trial court did not err in imposing a twelve month prison term for violating of community control by committing a new third degree felony. The trial court erred by ordering the prison term for the violation to be served consecutive to the new conviction in a new county when no notice was given that the sentence could be ordered to be served consecutively.

OVI; Strict liability offense; Sufficiency of evidence; Manifest weight of evidence; Harmful intoxicants; R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)

Arbitration Agreement - Procedurally and Substantively Unconscionable

Anders; Crim.R. 11; Guilty plea; Sentencing

The trial court properly awarded permanent custody of father's two children to a county children's services agency.

Res judicata; Post-conviction

guilty plea to aggravated trafficking in drugs; plea entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; Crim.R. 11(C)(2); no ineffective assistance of counsel

notice to abate nuisance of deteriorating retaining wall; board of nuisance appeals; R.C. 2506.04; administrative appeal; public nuisance; no abuse of discretion by trial court

The trial court's decision to not dismiss two jurors that overheard an outburst from appellant's mother did not constitute plain error. Appellant's convictions for robbery, kidnapping, and rape was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight. Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel. The trial court's sentencing entry incorrectly reflects a plea rather than a jury verdict. Judgment affirmed. Cause remanded to correct clerical error.

The trial court did not commit plain error by conducting its Indian Child Welfare Act manner in the way that it did. The decision to grant Franklin County Children Service's motion for permanent custody was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Based on the totality of the evidence before it, the trial court did not commit plain error in determining that the child was unable to express his wishes. It was not plain error to admit the caseworker's testimony regarding appellant's drug screen results because the decision to grant permanent custody was supported by substantial other admissible evidence.

Trial court order compelling plaintiff to submit to an independent medical examination and imposing sanctions for noncompliance with a prior court order is not a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).

The magistrate did not err in finding that relator's noncompliance with R.C. 2969.25(C) warranted dismissal of this action. Objections overruled. Motion to dismiss granted; action dismissed.

Trial court's finding of a community control violation for committing a secure continuous remote alcohol monitor ("SCRAM") violation is supported by competent, credible evidence where appellant admits to being out with friends who were drinking and the appellant's transdermal alcohol concentration levels are consistent with alcohol consumption.

Trial court did not err in dismissing appellants' claim regarding vehicle sale

Trial court did not err in dismissing appellants' claims regarding payment of attorney fees for legal services rendered.

Self-defense; Manifest weight; 404(B) evidence; Prosecutorial misconduct; Discovery

Anders - Guilty Plea - Sentencing - Theft - Passing Bad Checks

motion to withdraw guilty plea, Crim.R. 32.1, res judicata, post-release control, ineffective assistance of counsel

Prohibition, motion to dismiss, sui juris

Crim.R. 43(A), guilty plea, continuance, abuse of discretion, Crim.R. 52(B), Civ.R. 11(C)(2)(a), substantial compliance

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), Reagan Tokes Law, post-release control, notification requirements, sentencing hearing, contrary to law, nunc pro tunc, clerical error

Prohibition, criminal indictment, dismissed, moot, compel, positive action

consecutive sentences, presentence investigation, presume regularity, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

DEFAMATION PER SE – TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE – BREACH OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT – QUALIFED PRIVILEGE – ACTUAL MALICE – JURY INSTRUCTIONS – DERIVATIVE CLAIMS – NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL: Where plaintiff former employee sued his former employer for defamation, the trial court erred in finding that the former employer's statements were protected under qualified privilege where the court improperly determined that the privilege applied based on the employer-employee relationship and did not fully consider the remaining elements of the qualified-privilege standard, and the court erred in instructing the jury that it had to find actual malice in order to find in favor of plaintiff on his defamation claim. The trial court erred in determining that plaintiff former employee's breach-of-contract claim against his former employer was derivative of his defamation claim where the contract claim fell under a separate settlement contract between the parties. Where plaintiffs' witness lacked firsthand knowledge of the statements about which he sought to testify, he lacked the personal knowledge required by Evid.R. 602. Where plaintiff could not definitively identify the caller, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence about a phone call. Where defendant-appellee failed to file a notice of cross-appeal but sought to assert a cross-assignment of error to change the trial court's judgment, the cross-assignment of error must be dismissed.

MOTION TO SUPRESS — MIRANDA WARNINGS — CUSTODY—JURY WAIVER — BENCH TRIAL – JURISDICTION: The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress statements she made to a police officer when placed in a store's loss-prevention room after being accused of theft where defendant was not in custody under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, the door to the loss-prevention room was unlocked and open, and the officer made no threatening or coercive actions. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold a bench trial on defendant's misdemeanor theft charge where defendant previously filed a jury demand and the trial court never obtained a written jury waiver from defendant.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS — CIV.R.12(C) — COMMON LAW WRONGFUL DISCHARGE — R.C. CH. 4112 — EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION — WORKERS' COMPENSATION RETALIATION — R.C. 4123.90: The trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff-employee's common-law wrongful-discharge claim in violation of Ohio's public policy against employment discrimination on the basis of a person's disability based on plaintiff-employee's failure to allege facts that would satisfy the statutory definition of an employer because R.C. Ch. 4112's definitional section does not inform the basis of the public policy announced in R.C. 4112.02(A). The trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff-employee's statutory claim for workers' compensation retaliation under R.C. 4123.90 based on the "coming and going" rule because a workers' compensation retaliation claim does not depend on a workplace injury or successful workers' compensation claim. The trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff-employee's common-law wrongful-discharge claim in violation of Ohio's public policy against workers' compensation retaliation under R.C. 4123.90, because such claims are available to plaintiffs-employees who were terminated before they filed for workers' compensation and regardless of whether their workers' compensation claims would have been successful.

custody – magistrate's decision – objections – Civ.R. 53

Complicity to aggravated burglary, tampering with drugs, failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer - manifest weight and sufficiency of evidence - ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error in sentencing - consecutive sentencing

Failure to advise guilty plea is complete admission of guilt and failure to advise court could immediately proceed to sentence non-prejudicial

Allied Offenses - Failure to Comply - Merger

Visitation; additional evidence; Civ. R. 53

Petition for Postconviction Relief; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel; Res judicata; Evidence de hors the Record

Mandatory fine; felony conviction; waive; appointed counsel; ownership of real property; indigent; appointment of trial counsel.

application for reconsideration; no obvious error; en banc consideration; intradistrict conflict; dispositive issue.

de novo review; res judicata; issue preclusion; Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss; affidavit of disqualification; consumers sales practices act.

criminal trespass; with a 4th-degree misdemeanor, a law enforcement officer has discretion whether to the defendant a summons or arrest him or her; motion to suppress evidence; mixed question of law and fact; de novo; competent credible evidence; 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution; Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution; warrantless search; exclusionary rule; handcuffing; investigative detention; arrest; elements of arrest include: (1) intent to arrest, (2) real or pretended authority, (3) accompanied by actual or constructive seizure, and (4) person under arrest understood he or she was under arrest; when an arrest occurs may be determined by: (1) whether the officers touched the individual; (2) whether the officers displayed a weapon; (3) whether the officers handcuffed the individual; and (4) the type of words spoken by the police officer; determining when an arrest occurs requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances under an objective standard; inventory search

App.R. 26; application to reopen an appeal; Murnahan; ineffective assistance of counsel; untimely filing; good cause. An appellant's application to reopen his appeal is denied where the appellant filed his application outside the 90-day requirement specified in App.R. 26, and appellant failed to provide good cause for his untimely filing.

Motion to suppress; consent to search/inspect; criminal penalties for organizations; community-control sanctions; fines; R.C. 2929.31. Trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress where there was competent, credible evidence in the record to establish that the inspector obtained consent from persons with common and/or apparent authority. Trial court abused its discretion in imposing fines well over the statutory maximum. Trial court was permitted to impose community-control sanctions on an organization where R.C. 2929.31 applied to organizational fines but did not preclude the court from imposing penalties under R.C. 2929.24-2929.28. However, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing community- control conditions that were overbroad and did not meet the misdemeanor sentencing requirements of rehabilitation and preventing future crime.

Divorce; marital property division; valuation dates; financial accounts; retirement accounts; posttrial evidence; spousal support; temporary spousal support; temporary support; economic misconduct; distributive award; attorney's fees; R.C. 3105.171(A)(2); R.C. 3105.171(E)(4); R.C. 3105.18(C)(1); R.C. 3105.73(A); App.R. 16(A)(7). Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The trial court, which determined that the marriage terminated on the first day of trial (August 4, 2020), abused its discretion by dividing the parties' marital financial accounts using February 2023 balances while dividing marital retirement accounts as of August 4, 2020, without an adequate explanation, logically related to the facts of the case, for the inconsistent valuation dates. On remand, the court must divide the financial accounts as of August 4, 2020, based on testimony and admitted exhibits, without reopening trial or rebalancing equities elsewhere. The court also erred to the extent it relied on posttrial, nonadmitted materials to assign a $148,025 value to appellant's Thrift Savings Account. The decree must be corrected to the only value supported by the evidence, $77,219, though no broader recalculation of the defined-contribution retirement division is required because the decree divides those accounts as of August 4, 2020, plus earnings/gains/losses. The trial court's spousal support determinations are affirmed. The award of $4,000 per month for 44 months from appellant to appellee commencing August 1, 2023, was within the court's discretion under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), and appellant was not entitled to a credit that would shorten the permanent-support duration based on temporary support previously paid. The trial court also acted within its discretion in finding that appellee was not entitled to her request of $12,000 per month indefinitely with the trial court to retain jurisdiction. Appellee's economic misconduct claim, through which she sought a distributive award, failed for lack of proof of the requisite wrongful intent under R.C. 3105.171(E)(4). Finally, the attorney's fee award to appellee of $35,000 is affirmed as equitable under R.C. 3105.73(A) given the parties' income disparity and the stipulation to the reasonableness of appellee's fees.

Rape; kidnapping; gross sexual imposition; hearsay; abuse of discretion; prior consistent statement; merger; allied offenses of similar import; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the victim's prior consistent statement to rebut the charge that she was fabricating allegations against the defendant-appellant. The rape and gross sexual imposition offenses were committed separately and were not allied offenses of similar import. The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Misdemeanor sentencing; definite jail term; suspended sentence; community control; R.C. 2929.24; R.C. 2929.25; R.C. 2929.41(A); concurrency; felony prison term; contrary to law; sentencing error; illegal sentence; jail-time credit; remand for resentencing; statutory authority; ripeness; cross-appeal; jurisdiction. When a trial court imposes a definite misdemeanor jail term under R.C. 2929.24, it may not suspend that jail term unless it also imposes community-control sanctions in accordance with R.C. 2929.25; a sentence that imposes definite misdemeanor jail terms but suspends them without community control is contrary to law. Further, absent a statutory exception, R.C. 2929.41(A) requires misdemeanor jail terms to be run concurrently with a felony prison term imposed in the same case, and a sentencing entry that suspends the misdemeanor jail terms rather than imposing a lawful concurrent disposition is subject to correction on direct appeal.

Subject-matter jurisdiction; R.C. 3109.051; R.C. 3107.15; visitation and companionship rights post-adoption; final appealable orders. Judgment vacated, in part, remanded in part and dismissed in part. Ohio's adoption statute R.C. 3101.15 divests a trial court of its subject-matter jurisdiction under R.C. 3109.051 to grant visitation rights to relatives of biological parents whose rights have been terminated by an adoption decree. Thus, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear appellant's motion to intervene in the underlying action. Accordingly, the trial court's order dismissing appellant's motion to intervene is vacated and this matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss appellant's motion to intervene for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to issue its order denying appellant's motion for relief from judgment and, therefore, this order is void. A void order is not a final appealable order. The appeal from this order is dismissed.

Postrelease control; res judicata; voidable. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to terminate postrelease control. Any challenge to appellant's sentence should have been brought up on direct appeal, and appellant's untimely argument is barred by res judicata.

Codified ordinances; minor misdemeanor; right to counsel; venue; plain error; R.C. 2901.12; Ohio Const., art. X, § 12; manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's conviction for a violation of Village of Highland Hills Cod.Ord. 331.08 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant was not entitled to assigned counsel because he was cited with a minor misdemeanor and the right to counsel does not apply to minor misdemeanors that have no possibility of jail time. Appellant did not challenge venue at the trial court level; therefore, we review appellant's claim that the city did not establish venue for plain error. We find no plain error — venue was clearly established by witness testimony.

Application; expungement; minor misdemeanor; conviction; de novo; expunge; R.C. 2953.31(B)(1); R.C. 2953.32; former R.C. 2953.32; R.C. 2953.32(D)(2); R.C. 2953.32(D)(5); Ohio Rules of Superintendence; guidelines; public policy. Vacated the trial court's denial of appellant's application to expunge the record of his minor-misdemeanor conviction and remanded the matter to the trial court to engage in the required analysis under R.C. 2953.32. The trial court erred in finding R.C. 2953.32 does not permit the physical destruction of records, in finding the records at issue may not be expunged pursuant to the Ohio Rules of Superintendence, and in finding an expungement of appellant's record would be per se against public policy.

Support; spousal; child; impute income; minimum wage; voluntarily underemployed; abuse of discretion; R.C. 3105.18 factors; R.C. 3119.01 factors; pending appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court; mandate; subject-matter jurisdiction; S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.04(D). Judgment affirmed. The trial court had jurisdiction to proceed with the case following the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to decline Husband's jurisdictional appeal on May 27, 2025, and issue an amended judgment entry, two days later on May 29, 2025. S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.04(D) does not require a mandate as Husband contends. Therefore, May 27, 2025, the day the decision was issued, guides us. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing minimum wage income to Wife, declining to award spousal support, and ordering Husband to pay child support. Husband reargues the same facts and issues we considered in the previous appeal, referencing the gifts Wife received from B.T. (her father), her monthly expenses, and the money in B.T.'s trust account that Wife receives as a beneficiary. However, we found that the trial court's consideration of these gift was improper. As a result, the trial court and this court cannot consider B.T.'s gifts to Wife when determining Wife's income. When reviewing the other evidence in the record, it is clear that Wife did not have any source of income in her own name. The court found the testimony established that Wife is voluntarily underemployed based upon her education, work history, and potential employment. Notably, other than referring to the gifts Wife received from B.T., which we previously found was improper for the trial court to consider, Husband can point to no evidence of Wife's income. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that Wife was voluntarily underemployed and imputing an annual minimum wage income of $22,256 was not an abuse of discretion.

Attorney fees; mandate rule; guardian ad litem fees; R.C. 3105.73(A); Ohio Sup.R. 48.02(H)(3). Reversed and remanded. The trial court's award of attorney fees to appellee is reversed and remanded because the trial court was considering financial support appellant received from her father when making determinations, the award of attorney fees was not supported by the record, and the trial court failed to follow the mandate of the appellate court on remand. The trial court's allocation of guardian ad litem fees is reversed and remanded because it is not supported by the record and does not follow Ohio Sup.R. 48.02(H)(3).

Separation agreement; divorce; contract; duress. The parties entered into a separation agreement regarding all matters involved in their divorce. Defendant stated on the record that he read the agreement, that he voluntarily signed it, and that he was not forced or coerced to sign it. Thus, defendant's assigned errors were overruled, and the trial court's judgment entry of divorce was affirmed.

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss; fraud claim; tort claim; contract claim; economic-loss rule; separate and distinct damages; piercing-the-corporate-veil claim. Where the plaintiff-appellant's fraud claim failed to seek damages separate and distinct from damages awarded under a breach-of-contract claim, the trial court properly dismissed the fraud complaint and its related piercing-the-corporate-veil claim.

Denial of pro hac vice motion; Gov.Bar R. XII; factors for trial court to review; decision to deny the motion lacked any rationale; failure to apply factors; abuse of discretion; judgment reversed and remanded. Appellants appealed the trial court's denial of their three motions for pro hac vice admission. Upon review we find the trial court failed to support its decision with any rationale and failed to apply any the nine factors appellate courts instruct trial courts to use when reviewing motions for pro hac vice. The trial court's failure to support its decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Judgment reversed and matter remanded.

Breach of contract; unjust enrichment; void; R.C. 4735.02; weight of the evidence; damages; R.C. 2323.51; frivolous conduct. Affirmed. The trial court did not err by concluding that an enforceable contract existed based on the claims asserted in the complaint and at trial for damages stemming from a breach of the agreement, and the trial court's determination that the plaintiff failed to prove damages was not against the weight of the evidence. And finally, because the plaintiff failed to file a motion for attorney fees under R.C. 2323.51, no claim for fees was preserved.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; trial strategy; prejudice; mistrial; discovery irregularity; evidentiary irregularity; cross-examination; impeachment; bench trial; operating a vehicle while intoxicated; ("OVI"); speeding; seatbelt violation; R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a); R.C. 4511.21(D)(5); R.C. 4513.263(B)(1); Crim.R. 29; body-camera footage; impaired-driver report. Judgment affirmed. Appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel where, during cross-examination of state trooper, it emerged that defense counsel and the trooper had different versions of the trooper's impaired-driver report (a draft used by defense counsel lacking language that the trooper smelled alcohol on appellant's person versus a final report adding that detail). The record was adequately preserved because the transcript and trial video detailed the discrepancy and the trial court itself explored the differences on the record. Counsel's decision not to seek a mistrial or extend cross-examination was reasonable trial strategy, particularly in a bench trial where the judge was plainly aware of the inconsistency. There was no showing of prejudice because the City's case rested on live testimony and body-camera evidence, not the report, the report discrepancy did not meaningfully undercut the trooper's testimony, and nothing suggested a mistrial would have been granted or the outcome would probably have changed.

Pro se litigant; Loc.App.R. 3(B)(1); presume regularity; transcript of lower court proceedings; wishes of minor's parents; special weight accorded to parent's wishes. This court has discretion to consider an appeal even if the defendant-appellant failed to affix a judgment entry to his or her notice of appeal. Where the defendant-appellant failed to file a copy of the transcript of the lower court proceedings, the court of appeals must presume regularity of those proceedings and overrule the assigned errors. Additionally, language in the lower court's judgment entry that the court considered the parents' wishes and concerns as expressed by them to the court — coupled with the absence of a trial transcript — indicated that the lower court applied the correct standard and accorded special weight to the Father's wishes.

Motion for sanctions; contempt; jurisdiction; agreed judgment entry; consent decree; retention of jurisdiction after final judgment; inherent authority to enforce judgments; contempt; R.C. 2705.02. Because the terms of the parties' settlement were outlined in an agreed judgment entry, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the judgment and address a party's failure to comply. The trial court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant's motion for sanctions.

Permanent custody, parental rights, best interest of the child, motion to continue, abuse of discretion, R.C. 2151.352, Unger factors, R.C. 2151.414, unconstitutional as applied, abandonment, R.C. 2151.011(C), manifest weight, clear and convincing evidence. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother's motion to continue when she was properly notified and failed to appear on numerous occasions. The trial court's finding that Mother abandoned the child was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when Mother had not visited or supported the child in two years. Finally, it was in the best interest of the child to terminate Mother's parental rights and grant permanent custody to the agency.

Permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence; best interests; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(D)(1); R.C. 2151.415(D)(4). Affirmed. We affirm the juvenile court's decision granting the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services' motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody and terminating appellant's parental rights where the record supports the juvenile court's finding that permanent custody was in the child's best interests pursuant to both R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

Accelerated appeal; traffic citations; motion to dismiss; speedy trial; tolling; reasonable; R.C. 2945.72(H). - Trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for violating speedy trial. The record did not demonstrate that the trial court's setting of trial beyond the speedy-trial time frame was reasonable for this court to conclude that it qualified as a tolling provision under R.C. 2945.72(H).

Mandamus; Civ.R. 10(A); R.C. 2731.04; R.C. 2969.25(A); R.C. 2969.25(C). The respondent-judge's motion to dismiss is granted. The complaint for mandamus does not comply with Civ.R. 10(A) that requires the caption of a complaint must include the names and addresses of all the parties. The relator has failed to comply with R.C. 2731.04 that requires an application for a writ of mandamus must be by petition and in the name of the state in the relation of the person applying. In addition, the relator's complaint for mandamus complaint fails to contain a sworn affidavit that contains a description of each civil action or appeal filed in the previous five years as required by R.C. 2969.25(A). The complaint also fails to contain a statement certified by the institutional cashier setting forth the balance in the inmate's account for the preceding six months as required by R.C. 2969.25(C). The requirements of R.C. 2969.25 are mandatory and failure to comply with them requires dismissal. Motion to dismiss is granted.

Mandamus, pending motions, issue ruling on pending motions, moot. The complaint for a writ of mandamus, to compel the trial court judge to render rulings with regard to pending motions, is moot. The trial court judge has rendered rulings with regard to the claimed pending motions in the underlying consolidated civil actions.

Public records request by inmate

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority reverses the trial court's judgment, granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint, finding issues of fact regarding the statutory due date and no statute of limitations created by the directory language of R.C. 131.02 regarding the certification of the amount due the state agency; trial court's failure to note disposition of counterclaim did not render the judgment interlocutory where the record demonstrated either implicit withdrawal of the counterclaim or dismissal of the counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Trial court properly denied appellant's Crim.R. 12(C)(2) motion to dismiss as untimely, and did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state's expert witness to testify. Appellant's conviction of endangering children, in violation of R.C. 2919.22, a felony of the third degree, was supported by sufficient evidence, and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgement affirmed

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — SECOND AMENDMENT — GUNS — MOTION TO DISMISS — IMPROPERLY HANDLING FIREARMS IN A MOTOR VEHICLE — R.C. 2923.16 — QUALIFYING ADULTS — R.C. 2923.111 Where defendant was charged with improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), and where defendant had not been a qualifying adult at the time of the offense due to a pending violent-misdemeanor charge, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds under this court's precedents upholding other improper-handling prosecutions, see State v. Stonewall, 2025-Ohio-4974 (1st Dist.); State v. Baxter, 2025-Ohio-5722 (1st Dist.), and upholding a concealed-carry conviction of an individual disqualified based on a pending violent-misdemeanor charge, see State v. Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644 (1st Dist.). [See CONCURRENCE by KINSLEY, P.J.: If Hall and subsequent precedents did not control this case, the constitutionality of the R.C. 2923.16(B) charge would be suspect for the reasons set forth in the dissent in Stonewall.] [See CONCURRENCE by CROUSE, J.: Because the State may prohibit carrying concealed weapons, and because the purpose, history, and most frequent application of R.C. 2923.16(B) demonstrate that it functions as a prohibition on concealing usable firearms in motor vehicles, the State may constitutionally apply R.C. 2923.16(B) to individuals who, like defendant, have weapons actually concealed from outside view within their motor vehicle, although the State may not be able to apply it to individuals whose weapons are not, in fact, concealed.] [But see DISSENT: The trial court should have granted defendant's motion to dismiss because this court has not resolved whether R.C. 2923.16(B) is constitutional as applied to an individual disqualified because of a pending violent-misdemeanor charge, and because the application of R.C. 2923.16(B) to such an individual is inconsistent with this court's holdings in State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-8 (1st Dist.), and State v. Barber, 2025 Ohio-1193 (1st Dist.).]

judgment of conviction; final appealable order; hanging charge

Attorney fees—$400 an hour determined to be reasonable rate given respondents' concession and the absence of satisfactory evidence submitted by relator in support of $690 rate billed by relator's attorneys—Respondents invoked "good-faith exception" too late because former R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(c) does not provide a basis for reducing an award of attorney fees but, rather, applies only to the court's initial determination of whether to award fees to a prevailing relator—Relator's attorney-fee application granted in amount of $28,120.

Appellant was convicted of assault based on punching the victim at a party. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to present an 11-second video of the assault as it was properly authenticated, was not precluded by the best evidence rule, was relevant, and was not unduly prejudicial. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court should have permitted appellant to present evidence of specific prior interactions between the appellant and the victim as proof of the appellant's state of mind for purposes of a self-defense claim, the trial court did not commit reversible error. The evidence demonstrated that appellant was the initial aggressor when the assault occurred. Judgment affirmed.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—A public office has no obligation to produce records that it does not have—Relator failed to show entitlement to statutory damages by failing to analyze how facts and circumstances demonstrate an unreasonable delay in producing public-records; merely identifying the passage of time is not enough—Writ and relator's request for statutory damages denied.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee-creditor on its action to collect the credit card debt of appellant-debtor. Evidentiary documents submitted to support creditor's motion for summary judgment were not properly authenticated, so genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment remained. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Appellant's convictions for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer and assault were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence at trial supported the conclusions that appellant's operation of his vehicle caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property and that he kicked the trooper voluntarily. Judgment affirmed.

The record does not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court's consecutive-sentence findings. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's untimely motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Appellant failed to seek leave to file his untimely motion and did not show that he was unavoidably prevented from filing a timely motion for a new trial or discovering the new evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant entered into a contract to purchase real estate, but before closing, the seller died. Upon the seller's death, appellant was an estate creditor and was required to present its claim for specific performance of the purchase contract in accordance with the presentment requirements of R.C. 2117.06. Appellant did not properly present its claim against the estate in accordance with the statute, so the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to appellees. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court abused its discretion by ordering appellant to pay restitution where the evidence did not establish that appellant's act of driving without a license was a direct and proximate cause of any economic loss. Judgment reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Unauthorized practice of law—Holding one's self out as an attorney in purporting to represent a beneficiary in a probate matter, preparing deeds for transfer of real property, and notarizing the deeds as an "attorney"—Respondent committed five acts of unauthorized practice of law and did so knowingly and deliberately despite her knowledge that she had been permanently disbarred from practice of law—Respondent enjoined from engaging in additional acts constituting unauthorized practice of law, enjoined from performing notarial acts unless and until she is properly appointed and commissioned as a notary by Ohio Secretary of State, and ordered to pay civil penalty of $30,000.

On Requester's objections, the Court overruled the objections to a Report and Recommendation and adopted the Report and Recommendation. The Court ordered Respondent to provide certain records, subject to redaction, to Requester. The Court determined that Requester was entitled to recover from Respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by Requester, excepting attorney fees.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Sentencing—Misdemeanor probation—Abuse of discretion—Three-part test under State v. Jones does not apply to a condition of probation expressly authorized by R.C. 2929.27—Judgment reversed.

On certified entry of felony conviction.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Writ granted for requested documents that remain unaccounted for—Writ denied as moot as to documents already provided—Statutory damages awarded.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Relator abandoned several requests for public records that he did not argue in support of in brief—Correctional institution prohibited from denying inmate's request for his master file based on the file not being stored at the institution; if Department of Rehabilitation and Correction possesses the master file, it must be produced, subject to redactions permitted by law—Public office established that correction officers' work schedules and posts are security records exempt from production under R.C. 149.433—A public office does not have a duty to create new records to satisfy a public-records request—Limited writ granted, relator's request for statutory damages deferred until public office complies with limited writ, and relator's request for court costs denied.

Prohibition—Prior restraint on media publication—To impose prior restraint, respondent trial-court judge must hold a hearing, receive evidence, and permit those affected to be heard—Respondent may not prevent reporting of proceedings in open court—Peremptory writ granted.

The juvenile court's decision to grant permanent custody of the minor child to a children services agency was in the child's best interest, was supported by sufficient evidence, and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where neither parent had stable income or housing, the mother had failed to maintain sobriety or complete a substance abuse treatment program, and father had failed to accept responsibility for his role in the child's removal and failed to demonstrate his ability to handle the child's significant behavioral issues.

The domestic relations court did not err by adopting a magistrate's decision denying appellant's motion for a domestic violence civil protection order against appellee naming both himself and the parties' non-verbal, autistic son as protected persons where appellant failed to provide the necessary hearing transcript to the domestic relations court as required by Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iv), thereby limiting both the domestic relations and appellate courts' review to the magistrate's findings set forth in the magistrate's order, which included the magistrate's finding the evidence insufficient to support appellant's allegation that appellee had engaged in an act of domestic violence against their son.

medical negligence, manifest weight of the evidence, exclusion of witness

felony sentencing, R.C. 2929.11, seriousness and recidivism factors, R.C. 2929.12, operator's license, suspension, lifetime suspension

CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G); consecutive sentences; abuse of discretion; plain error; revocation of judicial release; R.C. 2929.20(K); imposition of consecutive sentence; R.C. 2929.14(C)(10); definite sentence required to be served prior to indefinite sentence.

CRIMINAL LAW - Crim.R. 19; objection to magistrate's decision; failure to provide transcript or affidavit of evidence; timely appeal; App.R. 4(A)(1).

CIVIL - magistrate's decision; breach of contract; damages; reimbursement testimony; abuse of discretion; sufficiency and weight of the evidence; credibility.

CIVIL - summary judgment; decree of foreclosure; due process; Civ.R. 56; Civ.R. 6; local rules; motion to vacate; motion to strike; appellate jurisdiction; standing; holder in due course; burden-shifting.

Felonious Assault; Self-Defense; Manifest Weight of the Evidence. The jury did not lose its way in rejecting the defendant-appellant's claim of self-defense and the felonious-assault conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Manifest Weight; Aggravated Murder; Prior Calculation and Design. Defendant-appellant's aggravated murder conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Legal Custody; Manifest Weight; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Trial court's decision to grant legal custody of A.D. to the paternal aunt was supported by the evidence and was reasonably in the best interest of the child. Counsel for father was not ineffective when there is nothing to show that the outcome would have been different if counsel had presented the evidence father wanted.

Declaratory judgment; summary judgment; choice of law; single vs. multiple occurrences. The trial court did not err in determining that Ohio law was applicable to the contract dispute between the parties, nor did the trial court err in holding that the underlying asbestos claims constituted multiple occurrences.

Former R.C. 2953.32(A)(1)(b), as applied to indigent offenders, does not violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution or the Equal Protection and Due Course of Law Clauses of the Ohio Constitution.

PRODUCT LIABILITY – CIV.R. 12(B)(6) – NOTICE PLEADING – CIV.R. 8: Because plaintiff pled sufficient facts to support her manufacturing-defect and design-defect claims under the Ohio Product Liability Act, R.C. 2307.71 et seq., the trial court erred by applying the heightened federal pleading standard and granting defendant-manufacturers' motion to dismiss plaintiff's product liability claims. However, because plaintiff failed to articulate facts that would provide defendants with adequate notice of her nonconformance with representations and inadequate warning or instructions claims, the trial court did not error in dismissing these claims under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Furthermore, plaintiff's failure to sufficiently allege facts relevant to some of the defendants named in her complaint supported dismissal of all product liability claims against these parties. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

The magistrate correctly found relator has failed to comply with the requirements of R.C. 149.43(C)(1) and (2). Specifically, relator did not file, in conjunction with his petition, a written affirmation affirming that he completed the three requirements in R.C. 149.43(C)(2). Accordingly, this court grants the motion to dismiss filed by respondent and dismisses relator's action. Writ of mandamus denied; complaint dismissed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct by engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law—Two-year suspension with 18 months conditionally stayed.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—R.C. 2969.25's requirements do not apply to original actions filed in Supreme Court of Ohio—Existence of particular record in public office's records schedule does not necessarily mean that public office possesses that record—Mandamus claim regarding record produced by public office is moot, but relator is entitled to statutory damages because public office's failure to produce record for nearly three months constitutes a failure to produce within reasonable time—Writ denied, relator awarded $700 in statutory damages, and relator's request for court costs denied.

Standing—Class actions—Mortgage-release statute—R.C. 5301.36 comports with Ohio's constitutional standing requirement—Trial court erred in certifying class because a class action was not, at that time, a superior method to adjudicate the controversy—Court of appeals erred by not applying the amended statute, which was in effect at time of its decision and which precluded the class-wide collection of damages that appellee sought—Amended R.C. 5301.36(C) applies retroactively in this case to prohibit the class-wide collection of damages that appellee seeks—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part and cause remanded to trial court to decertify the class.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Writ and relator's requests for statutory damages, attorney's fees, and court costs denied.

Prosecutorial misconduct; Admissibility of evidence; Stacking of inferences; Sufficiency and manifest weight; Cumulative errors

Community control violation; Sentencing

Creditor's claim that a debtor committed fraud is barred by the claim-preclusion doctrine where the same fraud claim was addressed on the merits in a different case between the same parties. A prior default judgment can be given preclusive effect in a later suit if the trial court in the default judgment made findings of fact and conclusions of law on the merits of the claim. The trial court in the current case properly found that a homeowner can invoke the R.C. 2329.66 homestead exemption, though the exemption amount is less than the homeowner's interest in the property, so a sale of the home is not barred.

Trial court's finding that an attorney's conduct in a civil case was frivolous under R.C. 2323.51 was correct on one issue but incorrect on two others, and the trial court's award of attorney's fees as a sanction for the frivolous conduct lacked the necessary specificity.

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF – pro se Appellant; "Motion for Trial Counsel to be Deemed Ineffective"; "Motion to Vacate Sentence and Release Defendant"; fourth and fifth petitions for postconviction relief; denied without a hearing; untimely filed; no exception entitling him to relief was demonstrated; no substantive, supporting grounds. RES JUDICATA – judgment affirmed.

contempt, insufficient evidence, App. R. 12(A)(1)(c)

permanent custody – manifest weight of the evidence – clear and convincing evidence – cannot or should not be returned to either parent – best interest of the child

Prohibition, sua sponte dismissal

Habeas, verification, commitment papers, immediate release from confinement

Confrontation Clause; Due Process; Juvenile Bindover Hearing. The trial court did not violate defendant-appellant's right to confront witnesses by admitting hearsay testimony at the juvenile bindover hearing.

POSTCONVICTION — DNA TESTING — OUTCOME DETERMINATIVE — COMPLICITY — R.C. 2953.74: The court of appeals could not say the trial court erred by failing to consider defendant's October application for postconviction DNA testing when ruling on his November application, because the October application was never made part of the record; because the trial court did not deny the November application as second, successive, or res judicata; and because the State was not arguing for affirmance on such a ground. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that a result excluding defendant as a contributor of biological material deposited under the victim's fingernails and on various items found on or around the victim's body would not be outcome determinative under R.C. 2953.71(L) and R.C. 2953.74(C)(4) and (C)(5), where (1) defendant had been convicted on a complicity theory, (2) trial testimony did not clearly suggest defendant had touched the items at issue, (3) any unidentified DNA could plausibly have come from defendant's accomplice or an innocuous contributor, (4) defendant had no other evidence corroborating the affidavit in which his accomplice averred that an alternative suspect was misidentified as defendant, (5) defendant's original statement to police on which he originally relied was in tension with his alternative-suspect theory, and (6) four eyewitnesses familiar with the area and defendant's face identified defendant as one of the assailants during his original trial.

R.C. 2151.414 – PARENTAL TERMINATION – BEST INTEREST: The juvenile court's grant of permanent custody of Mother's children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was supported by sufficient evidence and was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the record showed Mother failed to manage her bipolar disorder and failed to remedy the cause that prompted the children's removal.

R.C. 2152.12(G); Juv.R. 30(D); guilty plea; waive; plain error; restitution; R.C. 2929.18(A)(1); hearing

public records request; claim asserting the prosecutor destroyed public records; summary judgment; new argument raised in reply to summary judgment; no opportunity to respond; Civ.R. 6(C)(1)

CERTIFICATION – App.R. 25(A); pro se motion to certify a conflict untimely filed; no specified issue proposed for certification; motion denied.

RECONSIDERATION – App.R. 26(A); pro se application for reconsideration untimely filed; no "extraordinary circumstances" established; Appellant has not demonstrated any obvious errors or raised any issues that were not adequately addressed in our previous opinion; this court is not persuaded that we erred as a matter of law; application denied.

Remand from Ohio Supreme Court; admissibility of police body-camera video; victim's out-of-court statements; victim does not testify at trial; Confrontation Clause; hearsay; harmless error; medical treatment or diagnosis exception to rule against hearsay. On remand from the Ohio Supreme Court we were instructed to review the nontestimonial out-of-court statements a victim, who did not testify at trial, made to EMTs that were captured by a police officer's body camera. Upon review, we found that the statements were admissible as hearsay under the medical treatment or diagnosis exception. We were further instructed to revisit our harmless error analysis of the admissible evidence, excluding the inadmissible out-of-court statements the victim made to the police officers, which violated the Confrontation Clause. Upon review, we found insufficient evidence to identify the defendant as the person who assaulted the victim.

Community-control sanctions; probation; termination; revocation; authority; absconding; tolling; R.C. 2929.15(A)(1); initiated; arrest warrant; State v. Rue, 2020-Ohio-6706; de novo; misapplication. Trial court erred when it terminated the defendant's community-control sanctions by misapplying State v. Rue, 2020-Ohio-6706. The trial court issued an arrest warrant before the stated expiration of the defendant's community-control sanctions, thus initiating a revocation proceeding. The trial court did not determine whether the defendant received notice of the violations that would allow the trial court to retain the authority to determine whether any tolling event occurred and what effect that had on the community-control term.

Evid.R. 608; Evid.R. 404; impeachment; extrinsic evidence. The trial court erred by precluding the defendant from testifying as to the victim's prior conduct for the purposes of establishing the defendant's state of mind as it related to the claim of self-defense and, in addition, erred by precluding the defense from questioning the victim about that prior conduct after the victim opened the door to the question by making a contradictory statement during trial.

Civ.R. 60(B)(4); postconviction-relief petition; intellectual disability; capital; death penalty; successive petitions. - Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Lott's motion as a successive petition for postconviction relief because it was properly filed pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). Res judicata should not bar Lott from challenging his capital sentence when the reason for the Civ.R. 60(B) did not exist at the time Lott filed his previous petitions and postconviction appeals.

Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(1); due process. Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court erred by prematurely ruling on appellee's objections to a magistrate's decision prior to the ten-day extension established by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(1), depriving appellant of the opportunity to file his own objections or respond to appellee's objection.

Class certification; subject-matter jurisdiction; R.C. 5160.37(L)(3). Appeal dismissed; case remanded for the trial court to address the question of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 5160.37(L)(3), which went into effect on September 30, 2025, and potentially divests the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.

Lay opinion testimony; abuse of discretion; Evid.R. 701; sufficient evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; tampering with records; obstruction of official business; tampering with evidence; dereliction of duty; telecommunications fraud; felony sentence; contrary to law; excessive sentence. Judgment affirmed. Law enforcement officials testified as lay, not expert witnesses. The officials testified based on their law enforcement experiences, previous investigations, and perceptions of the evidence at issue. Their testimonies were permissible lay opinion testimonies under Evid.R. 701. The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The sentence was neither contrary to law nor excessive.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; self-defense; mental-health evaluations; competency to stand trial; sanity at the time of the act; prejudice; expert. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel failed to revisit the trial court's referral for an examination for sanity at the time of the act after the defendant was restored to competency. Counsel's strategic decision to advance a self-defense argument at trial necessarily required a complete investigation into the defendant's mental-health condition, including ensuring all evaluations were completed and potentially retaining an expert.

Withdrawal of guilty plea; presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992); Crim.R. 32.1; nine-factor test. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cox's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Cox failed to demonstrate a reasonable and legitimate basis for withdrawing his plea.

Joinder; sever; simple and direct evidence; hearsay; police report; harmless error; manifest weight of the evidence; prosecutorial misconduct; effective assistance of counsel; statute of limitations; tolling; John Doe indictment; cumulative error. Judgment affirmed. Appellant's convictions for rape and kidnapping are affirmed. The State's evidence at trial was simple and direct and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to sever. The State also satisfied its burden of persuasion, and the convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did abuse its discretion in allowing a portion of the police report at issue to be read to the jury because it was inadmissible hearsay and did not fall into any recognized exception to hearsay. This error, however, was harmless. Additionally, the court's review of the record demonstrates that there was no prosecutorial misconduct and appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel because of the failure of his defense counsel to object during closing arguments. The appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his defense counsel failed to argue that his offenses were barred by the statute of limitations because the State's filing of a John Doe indictment appropriately tolled the statute of limitations. The cumulative-error doctrine did not apply to this case.

Motion to show cause; civil contempt; abuse of discretion; agreed order; consent order; due process; pro se. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found appellant in contempt of court. Appellant did not present any testimony or evidence that his attorney was not authorized to enter into an interim agreement with appellee at a status conference; challenge the allegation that he failed to comply with the terms of the resulting agreed order; or otherwise rebut appellee's initial showing of contempt. Nor were appellant's due-process rights violated based on the record. Appellant — who was initially represented by counsel but elected to proceed pro se — had notice of appellee's motion to show cause; a reasonable opportunity to defend against or explain the allegations raised therein, both in writing and at the show-cause hearing; and the opportunity to testify and to call other witnesses in his defense or to offer an explanation for his failure to comply with the agreed order.

Public utilities—Public Utilities Commission gave provider of competitive retail electric service and competitive retail natural-gas service sufficient notice of allegations lodged against it for unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable acts or practices under Adm.Code 4901:1-21-05-(B)(8)(a) and Adm.Code 4901:1-29-05(D)(8)(a) before rescinding the provider's Ohio operating certificates under R.C. 4928.08(D) and 4929.20(C)(1) for committing statutory and rule violations—Commission failed to sufficiently explain basis of its forfeiture order in violation of R.C. 4903.09 and ordered consumer rerating for contradictory periods, necessitating remand so it may explain and clarify those decisions—Order affirmed in part and reversed in part and cause remanded to commission.

Voluntary plea; de novo review; Crim.R. 11(C); Dangler; maximum penalty; presumption of prison; R.C. 2929.12; sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); postrelease control; separation-of-powers doctrine; definite term. Judgment affirmed. Appellant's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. A trial court is not required to advise defendant at the time of the plea that there is a presumption of prison. Although a trial court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12, findings are not required. Finally, postrelease control does not violate the separation-of- powers doctrine.

Bail; bond; R.C. 2937.222; clear and convincing evidence. The court did not err by denying the defendant bail after he allegedly raped a 14-year-old at gunpoint. The court held a hearing and evidence was presented that the defendant committed the offense, that he posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the community and that no release conditions would assure the safety of the community.

Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; writ of prohibition; patently and unambiguously lacked personal jurisdiction; waiver; guilty pleas; R.C. 2969.25(C)(1). Complaint for a writ of prohibition alleging that trial court patently and unambiguously lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant in underlying criminal cases dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Relator waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction by entering guilty pleas. Complaint was also subject to dismissal for failure to strictly comply with R.C. 2969.25(C)(1).

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Inmate not entitled to writ for public records that he has already been provided, records that he has failed to show exist and are maintained by the public office, records that he made a duplicate request for, or records that he has failed to pay the copying cost for—Inmate entitled to writ for public records he requested that public office failed to provide and that public office does not deny it maintains—Writ granted in part and denied in part—Court costs and statutory damages awarded.

Procedendo—Appellee-trial judge's judgment denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief rendered moot appellant's request for a writ ordering a "journalization" of judge's previous ruling allegedly granting two motions—Appellant forfeited argument that judgment was not a final, appealable order by failing to raise argument in court of appeals—The failure to raise an argument in response to a summary-judgment motion forfeits that argument for purposes of appellate review—Court of appeals' order granting judge's motion for summary judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. The trial court did not err in finding that appellant violated the terms of the agreed entry and failed to plead a meritorious defense to each violation. Judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. The trial court erred by granting the state's motion for summary judgment, but properly denied the claimant's motion for summary judgment, in the claimant's action to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual. The trial court concluded the claimant failed to establish his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence, but the court failed to consider whether the claimant satisfied his reciprocal summary judgment burden to demonstrate there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding his innocence. The summary judgment evidence demonstrated there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the claimant's innocence, because both of the eyewitnesses to the shooting recanted their trial testimony and averred that the claimant was not the shooter. As such, the court could not award summary judgment in favor of either party.

The trial court erred in granting appellee's motions for summary judgment and denying appellant's partial motion for summary judgment. The auto policy's use of the undefined term "rated driver" on the declarations page created an ambiguity that must be construed in favor of underinsured motorist coverage for appellant. Additionally, appellee did not submit evidence in support of its claim that it was prejudiced by appellant's lack of cooperation. Judgment reversed; cause remanded.

On appeal of municipal court decision overruling plaintiff-appellant's objections and adopting decision of magistrate following trial of small claims complaint against auto repair business. Trial court adopted magistrate's conclusion that plaintiff-appellant had failed to present a preponderance of evidence to establish claims of negligence. Plaintiff-appellant argues that magistrate erred in receiving testimony from defendant's owner, that testimony of defendant 's agents who performed work on her automobile was required but not presented at trial, that magistrate disregarded evidence plaintiff-appellant argues established damages and causation, that magistrate erred by relying on negligence caselaw that did not involve auto repairs, and that magistrate's conclusion that air conditioner in plaintiff's car had been repaired was against the manifest weight of the evidence. On review of record, exhibits, and orders, trial court acted well within its discretion by concluding that the plaintiff-appellant failed to present sufficient evidence of causation, by overruling objections, and by adopting magistrate's decision, as exhibits and record fully supported the magistrate's conclusions. Plaintiff's assignments of error overruled and judgment of trial court affirmed.

Appellant, Carline Curry, a vexatious litigator, violated R.C. 2323.52(D)(3) by initiating legal proceedings with this court without first obtaining leave to proceed under R.C. 2323.52(F)(2). Pursuant to R.C. 2323.52(I), Curry's appeal is dismissed for failure to obtain leave of this court to proceed under the statute. Appeal dismissed.

Remand for issuance of a nunc pro tunc judgment entry on sentencing.

Felonious Assault - Failure to Remove Juror Who Knew Witness - Manifest Weight - Self Defense

Manifest weight of the evidence; having weapons while under disability; credibility; inconsistent statements; split sentences; no-contact order; prison term. Appellant was convicted of two counts of having weapons while under disability and one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle. Appellant's convictions arose from a dispute he had with the victim, his ex-girlfriend. The victim testified that he drove to her work and threatened to kill her. When he left, she followed him in her car. When she stopped at a stop sign, she testified that he pointed a gun at her. Appellant alleged that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, alleging that the testimony of the victim was not credible because of her inconsistent statements she made to police and her testimony at trial. The State responded directing the appellate court to the credibility of appellant's mother who also testified at trial. The appellate court held that credibility issues are primarily for the finder of fact and that the finder of fact is in the best position to judge a witness's credibility. The court also noted that a trier of fact is free to accept or reject any or all testimony of any witness. The court held that appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant also challenged the trial court's imposition of a no-contact order. The State conceded that the trial court's no-contact order was improper. The appellate court agreed, recognizing that when person is sentenced to prison on an offense, the trial court is precluded from imposing a community-control sanction, such as a no-contact order, on the same offense. As a result, the appellate court vacated the no-contact order.

Mandamus—Prohibition—Appellee-trial judge did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to sentence appellant or to issue nunc pro tunc order, and appellant had adequate remedies in ordinary course of law to challenge sentencing entry—A trial court does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to correct a judgment entry by issuing a nunc pro tunc order under Crim.R. 36 while an appeal from the judgment is pending—Court of appeals' judgment granting appellee's motion to dismiss affirmed.

Annexation; R.C. 709.033(A); where a road is owned by a municipality rather than a property owner, that road does not automatically follow the property into annexation unless that municipality agrees to the annexation of its property; the contiguous requirement is not met; annexation will create an island where significant confusion will result, a road maintenance issue created where ownership of a single road is fragmented in a manner that would cause confusion as to emergency service response and road maintenance.

The trial court erred in imposing a four-month term of incarceration for appellee's fifth-degree felony conviction. The sentence is contrary to law because it falls outside the statutory range for the offense. The trial court possesses jurisdiction to impose a lawful sentence on remand despite appellee's completion of his four-month sentence. Judgment partially reversed, sentence vacated, and case remanded for resentencing.

The trial court did not err in dismissing a carrying concealed weapons charge. R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) is unconstitutional as applied to appellee, a 19-year-old who did not have a concealed handgun license. See State v. Matosky, 2025-Ohio-5658 (2d Dist.). Judgment affirmed, and the cause is remanded to proceed with the remaining counts in the indictment.

Appellant's appeals from maximum sentences imposed for contempt findings are moot. The imposed sentences have been completed, and appellant failed to provide evidence from which an inference can be drawn that he will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights from the judgments. Appeals dismissed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified father's parenting time with his son to the Standard Order of Parenting Time. The standard order remedied the parties' shared concern regarding the consistency of parenting time, and the trial court appropriately considered the statutory best interest factors of R.C. 3109.051(D). The trial court abused its discretion when it limited father's parenting time with his daughter to therapy sessions only, with modifications within the therapist's sole discretion. The record does not reflect that this would be in the child's best interest. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Because the civil stalking protection order expired while the appeal was pending, the appeal is moot. Appeal dismissed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief and overruling his motion for leave to file a delayed new-trial motion without holding an evidentiary hearing on the petition or motion. Judgment affirmed.

MURDER — WEAPON UNDER A DISABILITY — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT — OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE — PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT — GRUESOME PHOTOS —CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES — DUE PROCESS — POSTRELEASE CONTROL: Defendant's murder conviction was supported by the evidence and not contrary to the weight of the evidence where the State established defendant had an altercation with his stepfather, had a key to the home where his stepfather was murdered, had gunshot residue on his sweatshirt, had a gunshot wound on his hand, left a trail of blood from the body to the back porch, the blood trail ended at the woods, and a video depicted defendant running out of the woods after the murder. The weapon-while-under-a-disability conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the weight of the evidence where the State proved that the loaded firearm contained defendant's DNA and was operable, and DNA evidence linked defendant to the bullet fired from the unrecovered murder weapon. Assuming that the witness's testimony that defendant had threatened her was other-acts testimony, defendant failed to establish he was prejudiced where the testimony was minor, the court instructed the jury to disregard it, the prosecution did not mention it in closing, and the remaining evidence was sufficient to overcome any prejudice. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct by eliciting the testimony where the witness volunteered the testimony, and the prosecutor asserted he was not trying to elicit the testimony, immediately ceased the questioning, did not object to the curative instruction, or mention the evidence in closing, and defendant failed to demonstrate any prejudice. The trial court did not err in admitting two photos from the crime scene because the probative value of the photos outweighed any prejudice where the photos depicted the crime scene, were relevant to show the position of the body and the blood drops, and illustrated the testimony of the forensic biologist who conducted DNA testing of the blood drops. The record supported consecutive sentences where the trial court considered defendant's criminal history, which included a firearm conviction and prior incarceration, the victim's relatives' statements, the harm to the community from the offenses, the seriousness of the offenses, and the necessity of protecting the public. Defendant was not deprived of due process at the sentencing hearing where the court properly considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing, the seriousness and recidivism factors, and the isolated religious reference did not affect the fundamental fairness of the sentencing. The trial court correctly informed defendant that postrelease control was not imposed on the murder conviction, but the cause must be remanded for the court to correct the sentencing entry nunc pro tunc to remove the imposition of postrelease control.

DISORDERLY CONDUCT — EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY: Defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct was not supported by sufficient evidence where the State did not establish that defendant uttered fighting words likely to provoke a violent response by insulting a police officer or that the officer was annoyed, inconvenienced or alarmed by the insults.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, reverses the judgment granting forfeiture based on application of incorrect law, as conceded error noted by the state, but affirms as to restitution, finding appellant failed to file a timely appeal of his judgment of conviction, including an order of restitution.

Per Mayle, J., the trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11(B)(1) and (E) by telling appellant that a guilty plea is a complete admission of appellant's guilt in one of appellant's cases but failed to do so in appellant's other case. Appellant failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's incomplete compliance with Crim.R. 11, so he is not entitled to have his plea vacated./Zmuda, J., concurring with the majority, would find appellant's failure to alleged prejudice precludes review of his argument that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

On application for reinstatement.

Consecutive sentence was properly imposed

Denial of motion to suppress

Zoning—Appeals—Powers of township zoning boards under R.C. 519.15—An email sent to one of a property's owners was not a "decision" that triggered deadlines for owner to pursue his rights in his property's use—Board of Zoning Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain appeal—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Habeas corpus—Notice of change of address filed by appellant and "Offender Search" webpage of Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction establish that appellant is no longer incarcerated—Appeal from court of appeals' dismissal of petition dismissed as moot.

Workers' compensation—Mandamus—Adm. 4123-17-02 (successor-in-interest rule) and 4123-17-13 (coverage-initiation rule)—Appellant failed to establish that Bureau of Workers' Compensation abused its discretion in transferring defunct driving school's experience rating and outstanding financial obligations to appellant after appellant applied for workers' compensation coverage—Court of appeals' denial of writ affirmed.

Mandamus—Appellant had adequate remedy in ordinary course of law to challenge voluntariness of his guilty plea in that all arguments made in his petition could have been made on direct appeal from his conviction—Court of appeals' judgment granting clerk's motion to dismiss granted.

CRIMINAL - Rape; R.C. 2907.02; Unlawful sexual conduct with a Minor; R.C. 2907.04; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14; R.C. 2953.08; trial court's statement on the record reflects required findings to impose consecutive sentences; aggregate sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment.

CIVIL - foreclosure; summary judgment; homeowners association; restrictive covenants; preliminary judicial report; sheriff's deed; constructive notice; chain of title; planned community law; R.C. 5312.02; encumbrances

CIVIL - summary judgment; purported findings of fact; harmless error; invasion of privacy; libel; slander; opinion; vicarious liability; negligence; intentional infliction of emotional distress; failure to establish reversible error.

CIVIL - foreclosure; summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); discovery; additional time for discovery; Civ.R. 56(F); continuance; affidavit; failure to provide affidavit; abuse of discretion; sale of tax certificate; 5721.31 and .32; written notice; treasurer

APPELLATE REVIEW – Separate sentence for each offense; no final appealable order; lack of jurisdiction.

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF - Irregular motion may be recast as a petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; trial court may dismiss petition without hearing; trial court must issue findings of fact and conclusions of law; trial court found appellant had previously filed a direct appeal in which he could have appealed issues raised in his present motion.

CIVIL - Open Meetings Act; R.C. 121.22; any person may bring claim to enforce R.C. 121.22; mandamus seeking to enforce compliance with Open Meetings Act must be brought ex rel. the State; R.C.2731.04.

APPELLATE REVIEW - R.C. 2505.02; denial of motion for new trial; no entry disposing of all claims; no final appealable order.

ORIGINAL ACTION - Mandamus; postconviction relief; motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); adequate remedy at law; direct appeal.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The trial court properly determined that a valid lease existed on property purchased by plaintiff. However, summary judgment on the plaintiff's fraud claims was inappropriate where there was a material issue of fact over whether the plaintiff justifiably relied on a defendants' representations that no tenant rights existed on the property when the purchaser knew about a third party's presence on the property. In addition, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees in multiple respects, including not assessing whether tasks described in block-billed entries and the total time expended on all tasks were reasonable.

theft, sufficiency, manifest weight, witness competency, dementia

sufficiency, manifest weight, confidential informant, drug trafficking, possession, Crim.R. 29

permanent custody, 12 of 22, abandonment as a best interest factor under R.C. 2151.414(E)(10)

legal custody – manifest weight of the evidence – best interest of the child – second six-month extension of temporary custody – in camera interview – discretion – harmless error

motion to suppress, particularity requirement, OVI, Crim.R. 47, sufficiency

Prisoner's right to a speedy trial under R.C. 2941.401 was not violated where delays occasioned by his discovery motion and his failure to respond to the State's discovery motion, and his unavailability for arraignment brought the case within the requisite 180-day speedy-trial time limit under R.C. 2941.401.

consecutive sentences, rape, force, sufficiency, manifest weight

Contract Formation; Oral Contract; Implied-in-Fact Contract; Meeting of the Minds; Breach of Contract; Manifest Weight of the Evidence; Foreclosure; Promissory Note; Want of Consideration; Attorney Fees; Segregation of Fees. The trial court properly granted judgment in foreclosure on the plaintiffs' promissory note because there is some competent, credible evidence that the defendants failed to carry their burden to prove a want of consideration. The trial court did not err by determining that no enforceable contract existed regarding the sale of a hauling business—either express or implied-in-fact—because some competent, credible evidence demonstrated that the parties formed an enforceable contract. The trial court abused its discretion by awarding the plaintiffs the full amount of their requested attorney fees without segregating the costs associated with the fee-shifting foreclosure claim from those incurred in litigating the unrelated contract disputes.

Suppression; No Contest Plea; PRC. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a more comprehensive suppression motion. Appellant did not demonstrate plea was in violation of Crim.R. 11, but trial court did fail to mention PRC at sentencing hearing.

A motion for relief from judgment cannot be used to attack the evidence that supported the trial court's judgment, and the trial court in this case properly denied a Civil Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment where the only issue raised in that motion was one that could have been raised before the initial judgment had been entered.

Enforce settlement agreement; Contract principles; Motion to enforce; Essential terms of contract; Oral settlement is enforceable; Meeting of the minds; Law favors settlement; A party cannot unilaterally repudiate agreement

Attorney-client privilege—Work-product doctrine—Court orders granting motions to compel insurance companies to produce claims files protected by attorney-client privilege based on allegations of bad faith, fraud, or criminal misconduct must comply with R.C. 2317.02(A)(2)—Civ.R. 26(B)(4) presumptively protects work product, which may be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause—Judgment reversed and cause remanded to trial court to comply with R.C. 2317.02(A)(2) and Civ.R. 26(B)(4).

Mandamus—Appellant's complaint makes clear that he did not lack an adequate remedy in ordinary course of law to challenge trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct judgment of conviction without holding second resentencing hearing—State ex rel. Hess v. Kessler distinguished—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaint affirmed.

Habeas corpus—Appellant-inmate had an adequate remedy in ordinary course of law by way of direct appeal to challenge assignment of judge who accepted his guilty pleas and sentenced him—Court of appeals' judgment granting warden's motion to dismiss affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Conditionally stayed six-month suspension.

On report of the commission on continuing legal education.

Trial court consolidated judgment granting appellee's motion to vacate arbitration award and denying appellants' motion to confirm arbitration award is reversed, and the arbitration award is reinstated and confirmed. Osowik

Duhart. Evidence was sufficient to establish convictions on all charges. Jury instructions were proper. Defense counsel was not ineffective. The cumulative error doctrine does not apply.

Administrative appeal-State Medical Board of Ohio-The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported the board's decision to revoke appellant's license, and the board's decision was in accordance with the law-Appellant issued approximately 40 prescriptions for schedule II controlled substances in violation of R.C. 4730.411(A), and no exceptions applied to those prescriptions-Judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL-POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant failed to establish that key witness's testimony was actually false or that the State knew that the testimony was false where nothing in the record or affidavit in support of postconviction petition substantiates these claims; trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find deficient performance that affected the outcome of appellant's trial where trial counsel did not choose to attempt impeachment of key witness with recorded statement; key witness was shown to be a convicted felon and liar via other impeachment; transcription of key witness's earlier interview demonstrated only potentially damaging statements; and it was mere speculation to conclude that had counsel impeached key witness with earlier statement that jurors would somehow have reached a different conclusion.

Judge Duhart. Pleas were entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Trial court failed to properly incorporate findings regarding consecutive sentences made at sentencing hearing into sentencing entries, requiring remand for the issuance of nunc pro tunc orders.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Relator failed to show that the only named respondent, a mail-room employee, had a clear legal duty to provide requested public records—Court of appeals improperly dismissed complaint after granting summary judgment to respondent—Court of appeals' judgment modified, and writ and request for statutory damages denied.

REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM AMENDMENT – SENATE BILL 27 – ABORTION – SEVERANCE: The trial court did not err in granting a judgment on the pleadings in favor of abortion providers who challenged a state law requiring fetal tissue from procedural abortions to be disposed of by cremation or interment, because Article I, Section 22 of the Ohio Constitution—the Reproductive Freedom Amendment—applies to laws regulating conduct occurring after an abortion. The trial court did not err in determining that provisions in a state law which cross-reference and give meaning to the unconstitutional requirement that fetal tissue from procedural abortion be disposed of by cremation or interment could not be severed. The trial court erred in failing to sever portions of a state law that added the terms "zygote" and "blastocyte" to preexisting abortion regulations from its injunction barring enforcement of the requirement that fetal tissue from procedural abortions be disposed of by cremation or interment, and the trial court's judgment is modified to sever those provisions from the permanent injunction issued by the trial court.

probable cause – suppression – marijuana – community control

jury instructions – duress – aggravated murder – ineffective assistance – trial strategy

Crim.R. 29 – ineffective assistance – manifest weight – ineffective assistance – felonious assault

petition for post-conviction relief – direct appeal – untimely – unavoidably prevented – R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)

permanent custody – R.C. 2151.415(D)(4) – unconstitutional

permanent custody, best interest

object, magistrate's decision, plain error, civil trespass

R.C. 2953.32, sealing, rehabilitation

Crim.R. 33(B), motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial; hearing; newly discovered evidence; unavoidable delay

Prohibition—Writ sought to compel board of elections to remove referendum on zoning amendment from May 2026 primary-election ballot—Board of elections did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law by denying protest to zoning-referendum petition, because petition included an appropriate map when filed with township board of trustees and board of elections could reasonably conclude that petition's brief summary of zoning amendment's contents accurately described where one of the affected properties is located—Writ denied.

Abuse of discretion; present and future ability to pay. Trial court abused its discretion in imposing a total of $40,000 in fines when it relied on a year-old post-sentence-investigation report that reported the appellant had two jobs and was financially comfortable when at the time of sentencing the appellant had spent the last year in jail under a $100,000 bond. Further, the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that appellant had the future ability to pay based primarily on his potential to earn disregarding his lengthy prison term and status as a convicted felon with serious felony convictions.

Magistrate's decision; failure to file objections; failure to file transcript; Civ.R. 53; plain error; waiver; App.R. 9; App.R. 16; App.R. 12; pro se litigant. Judgment affirmed. Appellant failed to file a transcript and objections to the magistrate's decision granting appellee's eviction action. If a party fails to follow the procedures set forth in Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) and (iv) by failing to object to a magistrate's decision and failing to provide a transcript to the trial court, that party waives any appeal as to those findings other than claims of plain error. Appellant failed to argue and demonstrate that this is an "extremely rare case" in which exceptional circumstances exist warranting application of the plain-error doctrine in order to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Additionally, appellant failed to make any references to the record identifying the alleged errors in violation of App.R. 16(A)(3), failed to provide any arguments supporting the contentions she presented for our review in violation of App.R. 16(A)(7), and failed to provide this court with the transcript from the housing court proceedings below as set forth in App.R. 9(B). Under App.R. 12(A)(2), we may disregard appellant's assignment of error on these grounds alone.

Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); de novo; breach of contract; legal services; payment; pro bono; friends and family matter; standard billable matter; dispute; agreement; whole; handwritten notation; email exchange; incorporated; language; unclear; circumstances; extrinsic evidence; parties' intention; triable issues. Reversed the trial court's decision granting plaintiff-appellee's motion for summary judgment on a claim for breach of contract alleging defendant-appellant failed to pay for legal services rendered. Because appellant did not raise a choice-of-law argument in the trial court, it was not addressed on appeal. The terms of the engagement agreement included a handwritten notation that incorporated exceptions noted in an email exchange. The parties disputed whether the matter was to be handled as a pro bono or friends-and-family matter or as a standard billable matter. Because the language of the agreement was unclear, and it appeared that the circumstances surrounding the agreement invested the language of the contract with a special meaning, extrinsic evidence could be considered in an effort to give effect to the parties' intention. Triable issues of fact remained, and the case was remanded.

Guilty plea; indefinite sentence; Reagan Tokes Law; presentence motion to withdraw plea. Judgment affirmed. Appellant's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into. Although the trial court did not explain to appellant how it arrived at its calculations under the Reagan Tokes Law, it nonetheless informed appellant of the minimum and maximum times he could receive. Thus, the trial court did not completely fail to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and the appellant was required to show that he was prejudiced, which he failed to do. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his plea. Although appellant's motion was timely made, the record demonstrates that appellant was (1) represented by competent counsel, (2) given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing prior to entering his guilty plea at which he indicated that he understood the nature of the charges and possible penalties, and (3) given full and fair consideration on his request to withdraw his plea. Further, the record did not demonstrate that appellant had a plausible defense, and moreover, the State would be prejudiced by allowing him to withdraw his plea.

Sufficiency; manifest weight; tampering with evidence. Defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Arbitration; arbitrability; motion to compel arbitration; motion to stay; Ohio Arbitration Act; Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"); interstate commerce; Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 ("EFAA"); Franken Amendment; sexual harassment; hostile environment; employment discrimination; sexual-harassment dispute; standard of review; notice pleading; 9 U.S.C. 3; 9 U.S.C. 4; 9 U.S.C. 401; 9 U.S.C. 402; 48 C.F.R. 222.7402; R.C. 2711.02; R.C. 2711.03; R.C. 4112.01; R.C. 4112.02; Civ.R. 8; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); App.R. 3(C)(2); App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Judgment affirmed and remanded. The trial court correctly denied defendants-appellants' motion to stay and compel arbitration. The EFAA barred arbitration of plaintiff-appellee's entire case against his former law firm and the managing attorney of the firm's Cleveland, Ohio office. Reviewing the complaint de novo under Ohio's notice-pleading standard, plaintiff-appellee alleged facts occurring after the effective date of the EFAA that, if true, would support a claim of sexual harassment under Ohio law. In addition to some post-EFAA remarks being sexual in nature, hostile environment sexual harassment under Ohio law does not require comments and behavior to be explicitly sexual in nature and can occur when abuse is directed at an employee because of that employee's sex. The trial court also correctly concluded that if the EFAA renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable, the bar to arbitration applies to the entire case, not merely claims of sexual assault or sexual harassment. Plaintiff-appellee's argument in the alternative, that defendants-appellants had waived their right to seek an order compelling arbitration by coupling their motion to compel with a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, was moot.

Juvenile court; mandatory bindover; probable cause; aggravated robbery; gun; final, appealable order; category-two offense; R.C. 2152.02(BB)(1); R.C. 2152.10; R.C. 2152.12; R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(b); 2152.12(A)(1)(b)(ii); Juv.R. 30(A); actual possession; firearm; reasonable belief. Reversed the juvenile court's decision denying the State's request for a mandatory bindover to adult court. In relation to an alleged category-two offense of aggravated robbery, the State presented evidence that raises more than a mere suspicion and provides a reasonable belief that A.M. was in actual possession of a firearm and brandished that firearm in furtherance of the acts charged, and which was sufficient to demonstrate probable cause. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to enter a finding of probable cause and, pursuant to R.C. 2152.12, order the case transferred to the General Division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court.

The trial court did not err in admitting a portion of the 9-1-1 call despite the caller not testifying. The statements were nontestimonial because their primary purpose were to assist law enforcement in addressing an ongoing emergency. The trial court did not err in overruling objections to certain other-acts testimony. Under Evid.R. 404(B), the other-acts evidence was relevant and admissible for purposes other than proving appellant's character and his conformity therewith. Appellant failed to demonstrate bias or partiality in favor of the state in the trial court's interrogation of witnesses. Even if the court were to assume trial counsel's performance was deficient, appellant failed to demonstrate that trial counsel's performance was prejudicial.

On petitioner's appeal of juvenile court's dismissal of his uncontested petition for custody over his minor half-brother. The trial court erred by failing to comply with rules of court regarding magistrate decisions without cause to do so or proper notice to petitioner. Trial court's explanation that the magistrate's decision was incomplete and missing information it deemed to be crucial was not justified, where the trial court wholly failed to identify what that information was, failed to notify counsel that any such information was required, and failed to respond to counsel's inquiries about the status of the case. Trial court's decision to informally reserve magistrate's decision for nearly six months without notifying counsel, and without approving or rejecting the decision on the record was prejudicial to the petitioner and the juvenile. Trial court's terse explanation that it was "overburdened" and had a "congested docket" is not a sufficient reason for the lengthy delay where the case was uncontested, the facts were undisputed, and the legal relief sought was uncomplicated. Judgment reversed and cause remanded with instructions

JUVENILE - termination of parental rights; termination of father's rights; one child; R.C. 2151.414; manifest weight of the evidence; best interest of child; guardian ad litem ("GAL"); R.C. 2151.281; Sup.R. 48.03; Sup.R. 48.06; deficient GAL report; harmless; recommendation; permanent custody to agency.

JUVENILE - termination of parental rights; termination of mother's rights; one child; R.C. 2151.414; manifest weight of the evidence; best interest of child; guardian ad litem; recommendation; permanent custody to agency.

Choice of Law; Language of Settlement Agreement

R.C. 2907.21(A)(2)(a); Compelling prostitution; R.C. 2907.31(A)(1); Disseminating matter harmful to juveniles; R.C. 2925.03(A)(1); Trafficking in marijuana; Sexual activity for hire; Obscene; Harmful to juveniles; Offer definition pertaining to trafficking; Selling or sale definition pertaining to trafficking; Hearsay; Explanation of investigatory steps and hearsay

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it extended the deadline for appellees to file a record of the proceedings before the magistrate in connection with their objections to the magistrate's decision. There was good cause for the extension, which was authorized under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in taking her guilty plea without properly advising her about merger should have been raised on direct appeal from her original judgment of conviction, as opposed to after her resentencing upon the revocation of her community control sanctions. Res judicata applies. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate mother's due process rights when it held the permanent custody hearing concerning her child in her absence due to her incarceration. Nor did the court abuse its discretion or violate mother's due process rights when it denied her motion to continue the permanent custody hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate mother's due process rights when it denied her motions for legal custody to a relative or a nonrelative because, among other reasons, neither proposed legal custodian signed a statement of understanding for legal custody that contained the statutorily required provisions of R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(a) through (d).

On appeal from default judgment on a tax foreclosure claim, appellant cannot raise issues and present evidence that he did not previously provide to the trial court. Trial court did not deny appellant adequate time and opportunity to respond to the complaint. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in dismissing the indictment against appellee that alleged one count of carrying a concealed weapon. R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) is unconstitutional as applied to appellee, a 20-year-old who did not have a concealed handgun license. State v. Matosky, 2025-Ohio-5658 (2d Dist.). Judgment affirmed.

The issue of appellee's standing to bring its foreclosure action against appellants was previously determined to be moot, and therefore this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the issue. The trial court did not err in finding that the charges sought by appellee in its foreclosure action against appellants were not Fair Debt Collections Practice Act ("FDCPA") violations. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's motion for relief from judgment, which was brought under Civ.R. 60(B)(4). The parties' separation agreement did not provide for continuing jurisdiction over the case or modification of the agreement other than for matters involving the minor children, such as custody and parenting time. Although appellant asked the court to vacate the dissolution decree rather than modify it, she did not claim that the basis for the agreement was invalid due to grounds upon which relief could be granted, such as mutual mistake or fraud. Instead, appellant claimed relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(4), which was not allowed under prevailing authority. Judgment affirmed.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION — AMENDING A CLAIM — FLOW THROUGH CONDITION — CREDIBILITY: The trial court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof to amend his previous workers' compensation claim where defendant's expert witness testified that plaintiff did not even have the alleged injury.

HAVING WEAPONS UNDER A DISABILITY — SELF-DEFENSE ACTUAL POSSESSION — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: Defendant's conviction for having a weapon while under a disability was supported by sufficient evidence and not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where eyewitness testimony and statements to police describing defendant's flight with "his" firearm after shooting the victim in self-defense, combined with the absence of anyone seeing the firearm at the scene before the shooting, created an inference that defendant possessed the firearm before using it in self-defense.

R.C. 2744.02 — POLITICAL-SUBDIVISION IMMUNITY — PHYSICAL DEFECT: The trial court did not err in denying defendant landlord political subdivision's motion for summary judgment on the issue of immunity from a negligence claim where defendant approved plaintiff tenant's accommodation request for a grab-bar in her shower due to plaintiff's disability, and defendant's failure to install a shower grab-bar constituted a physical defect in the property.

Per Mayle, J., municipal court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider motion for relief from its own final judgment. Its decision to transfer case to common-pleas court had no effect because defendant filed pleadings after final judgment was entered on plaintiff's complaint. Because no case existed to transfer, common-pleas court judgment also had no effect. Even if valid, common-pleas court judgment did not disturb finality of municipal court's judgment.

Per Mayle, J., the jury's finding that the State disproved one of the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt is not against the manifest weight of the evidence

Per Mayle, J., while the trial court erred when it failed to re-assign a Guardian ad Litem ("GAL") after the original GAL withdrew one month prior to the permanency proceeding, it was not plain error given that the GAL filed a final report and recommendation in addition to the evidence supporting the termination decision. Additionally, father's right to cross-examine the GAL was not violated because he had the opportunity to cross-examine her and decided not to subpoena the former-GAL to testify.

Sulek, J., affirming trial court's judgment. Discovery limitations were within trial court's discretion. Search warrant was not defective, but even if it were, the good faith exception to exclusionary rule applies. R.C. 959.132 hearing did not result in a due process violation and bond imposed did not constitute an excessive in personam criminal penalty.

Duhart. By refusing to decide whether to testify, appellant forfeited the right to testify and was properly considered to have exercised his right to remain silent. Trial counsel was not ineffective. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Osowik, Trial court properly convicted appellant, a Tier III sex offender, of failure to provide notice of change of address, in violation of R.C. 2950.05(F)(1). Conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgement affirmed.

writ of prohibition, judicial power, unauthorized by law, adequate remedy, jurisdiction, affirm, modify, reverse, aid of appeal

Sentencing; Revocation of community control

Manifest Weight; Sufficiency

Participation in criminal gang

Sufficiency - Manifest Weight

Appellant, receiver, brought breach of fiduciary claims on behalf of trade association against directors who rejected no-cost settlement offer in jury trial. Receiver failed to meet burden to demonstrate that directors acted disloyally. Interests of the association and directors were aligned, and not conflicted. Directors had a rational basis to reject the settlement offer.

The trial court did not err by denying the motion for relief from judgment where there were no grounds for relief as set forth in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)-(5).

The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel claims against defendant. Assuming the allegations of plaintiff's amended complaint and attached exhibits are true (as required when reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim), plaintiff's assertion that defendant "accepted" plaintiff's bid for concrete pouring work and gave plaintiff "formal notice to proceed" with that work despite no contract being in hand set forth an actionable claim for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel.

Conclusory assertions that alternate jurors should not have been seated and that counsel should have moved for mistrial are inadequate. Bare assertion that testimony was incendiary does not support a claim for prosecutorial misconduct or a claim that counsel should have moved for a mistrial. Bare assertion that sentence was excessive insufficient to demonstrate that sentence is contrary to law.

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it found appellant to be an unsuitable parent where there was credible evidence presented that an award of custody to appellant would have been detrimental to the well-being of the children.

Trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the pending matter. Appellants' multiple, overlapping arguments are without merit. Ohio courts have consistently recognized that the automatic stay applies only to the debtor and does not extend to non-bankrupt co-defendants. Moreover, the automatic stay was no longer in effect when the trial court rendered its decision.

Juvenile court did not err in terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody of the parents' autistic child to a children services agency where mother was incarcerated after pleading guilty to child endangering for abusing the child and where father could not provide legally secure permanent placement. WITH CONCURRING OPINION.

motion to suppress – factual findings – competent, credible evidence – Crim.R. 11(C) – no contest plea – possible penalties

motion to suppress, consensual encounter, investigatory stop

no contest plea – Crim.R. 11 – petty offense – Marsy's Law

felony sentencing, R.C. 2929.11, seriousness and recidivism factors, R.C. 2929.12, license suspension, clear and convincing

felonious assault, manifest weight

assault, felonious assault, sufficiency, manifest weight, ineffective assistance, cumulative error, excessive sentence, App.R. 16(A)(7), Brady claim

sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, violation of civil stalking protection order, ineffective assistance of counsel.

Marsy's Law – victim rights – allied offenses – forfeiture

consecutive sentences, R.C. 2929.14, R.C. 2953.08

public nuisance – abatement – stipulated entry – R.C. 3767.41(C)(3)(a) – R.C. 3767.41(D)

Permanent Custody; R.C. 2151.414. Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's finding that the children cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with either parent, and that it was in the children's best interest that the agency be granted permanent custody.

Felony sentencing review; R.C. 2953.08; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. Defendant-appellant's prison sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

CRIMINAL LAW - motion in limine; no contest plea; explanation of circumstances; factual basis; Crim.R. 11; effect of the plea; aggravated vehicular homicide; R.C. 2903.06(A)(2); aggravated vehicular assault; R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a); marijuana metabolite; urine; blood; abuse of discretion; factual basis as presented did not negate any element of the charged offense; plain error; bill of particulars; trial court complied with Crim.R. 11; written plea agreement.

CUSTODY - termination of parental rights; permanent custody; manifest weight of the evidence; sufficiency of the evidence; R.C. 2151.414; continuance; motion to continue; abuse of discretion; Indian or Native American ancestry; trial court inquiry; plain error review.

APPELLATE REVIEW – App.R. 4(A)(1); untimely criminal appeal; has not sought leave to appeal under App.R. 5(A); appeal dismissed.

APPELLATE REVIEW – App.R. 4(A)(1); untimely criminal appeal; has not sought leave to appeal under App.R. 5(A); appeal dismissed.

JURISDICTION -notice of appeal; untimely; motion to dismiss; lack of jurisdiction; App.R. 4; appeal dismissed.

The trial court properly accepted the defendant's guilty plea to a felony charge and properly imposed a sentence in the case.

Contempt, Motion to modify visitation

Marsy's Law – subpoena duces tecum – Crim.R. 17(C) – motion to quash – hearing

The trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment and denying as moot appellant's motion for summary judgment. In this legal malpractice action, appellant presented no evidence supporting the causation element of appellant's underlying claim. Thus, appellees were entitled to summary judgment. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court, did not err in granting the motion of appellee, Franklin County Children Services ("FCCS"), for permanent custody of appellant's minor child. The trial court properly found, both previously and in its decision granting permanent custody, that FCCS made reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for the continued removal of the child from appellant's custody. In particular, contrary to appellant's assertion, the trial court appropriately found that FCCS made reasonable efforts to link appellant with a provider for a court-ordered parenting abilities psychological evaluation. Further, the trial court's determination that an award of permanent custody was in the child's best interest was supported by competent, credible evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

In accordance with the magistrate's recommendation, based on relator's failure to comply with the captioning requirement of R.C. 2731.04 we sua sponte dismiss relator's requested writ of mandamus; objection overruled, and remaining objections rendered moot.

A defendant who pointed and fired an unloaded handgun could properly be convicted on charges including felonious assault and improper handling of a firearm, and her trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress the results of a urine test did not equate to ineffective assistance.

Marital residence equity payment; Child support under shared parenting plan; Retirement accounts

Domestic violence-R.C. 2919.25(C)-Manifest weight of the evidence-Appellant's domestic-violence conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when the record contained substantial evidence that the victim believed that appellant would cause imminent physical harm to the victim-Plain error-Evid.R. 404(B)-Appellant did not establish circumstances that warranted applying the plain-error doctrine to the trial court's admission of the victim's statement that appellant had been "very violent to others in the past"-Judgment affirmed.

frozen embryos, law of the case, potential life, remand instructions, final appealable order

guilty plea; knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a); mandatory post-release control; ineffective assistance of counsel; waiver of court costs; prejudice

SECOND AMENDMENT — MOTION TO DISMISS — WEAPON UNDER A DISABILITY — CONCEALED CARRY — IMPROPER HANDLING OF FIREARMS IN A MOTOR VEHICLE: The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss firearm charges based on Second Amendment grounds where the trial court found that defendant was a currently dangerous former felon, and the Second Amendment permits the disarmament of dangerous individuals.

Withdrawal of guilty plea

An appeal from a trial-court order denying a motion for reconsideration is not a final and appealable order.

Civ.R. 60(B) - Movant failed to present meritorious defense and failed to establish entitled to relief due to excusable neglect

Based on the circumstances surrounding appellant's request to continue the permanent custody hearing, it cannot be concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying that request.

APPELLATE REVIEW – DIVORCE: Because the transcript from the uncontested divorce hearing was not included in the record under App.R. 9, and in the absence of any apparent procedural error by the trial court or cognizable argument or legal authority supporting appellant's assignment of error, we must presume the regularity of the proceedings and affirm the trial court's judgment granting appellee a divorce on the grounds of incompatibility. Judgment affirmed.

Public nuisance; receiver; R.C. 3767.41; Civ.R. 65(B)(2). The court did not err by finding that the defendant's property was a public nuisance. Evidence in the record established that the property was not fit for human habitation as well as being a fire hazard, which are two ways that a property can be deemed a public nuisance. Furthermore, despite the defendant's arguments to the contrary, ample evidence in the record established the property's condition at the time of trial. Additionally, the court did not err by appointing a receiver to clean out the property prior to submitting a viable estimate to repair the property, because a complete repair estimate could not be provided until a clean-out of the property was completed.

Burden of proof; affirmative defense; qualified immunity; police; excessive force; expert testimony; lay opinion testimony; sufficiency; manifest weight; Graham v. Connor; confrontation; Garrity statements; Garrity v. New Jersey; grand-jury transcript; sentencing. Trial court properly placed burden of proving affirmative defense of reasonableness on the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Trial court properly admitted lay opinion testimony from three police officers where the opinion testimony was based on the rational perception of the witnesses and the testimony was helpful to clear understanding of the use of force under the circumstances. Defendant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and by the manifest weight of the evidence where the witnesses' testimony regarding the defendant's use of excessive force was corroborated by body-camera and other video evidence. Defendant's right of confrontation was not violated by the absence of one of the victims from trial because no statements by the absent witness were admitted into evidence and all other witnesses were subject to cross-examination. Even though defendant's supervisor asked him to complete a use-of-force report, there were no Garrity violations because there was no evidence that the defendant was coerced into completing the report. Trial court's denial of defendant's request for grand-jury transcripts was not an abuse of discretion where the defendant failed to establish a particularized need for the transcripts. Defendant's sentence was not contrary to law where the trial court considered applicable sentencing statutes and his sentence was within the statutory range of penalties for his convictions. Defendant's sentence was also supported by the record.

R.C. 2711.13; confirmation or arbitration award; opposing arbitration award; Civ.R. 60(B). - Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court erred in vacating its confirmation of an arbitration award based on a Civ.R. 60(B) filing that was intended to circumvent the requirements under R.C. 2711.13 and the reason R.C. 2711.13 was not timely filed is only addressed vaguely.

Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; tampering with records; telecommunications fraud; verdict form; enhancing element; R.C. 2945.75(A)(2); plain error; ineffective assistance; motion to compel; medical records; discovery; privilege; joinder; simple and direct; Crim.R. 8(A); Crim.R. 14; jury instructions; data; R.C. 2913.01(R); R.C. 2913.47(A)(1); jury unanimity; alternative means; multiple acts; merger; allied offenses; R.C. 2941.25. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support appellant's convictions for interfering with civil rights, dereliction of duty, tampering with records, and telecommunications fraud. Appellant's convictions for interfering with civil rights, dereliction of duty, tampering with records, and telecommunications fraud were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The verdict form for appellant's conviction for tampering with records was improper in order to enhance his conviction to a felony of the third degree since it did not state the degree of the offense, the additional elements necessary to enhance the offense, or even a cite to the statutory provision mandating that the appellant be convicted of the higher-level offense. However, appellant failed to demonstrate that the conviction would have been any different absent the error and, therefore, appellant failed to demonstrate plain error. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to compel the victim's mental-health records without first holding an in camera inspection since appellant failed to demonstrate the victim's mental-health report from the mental-health court contained any evidence that would have aided or furthered his impeachment efforts of the victim to the extent that it would have affected the trial. The trial court did not err in joining appellant's case with that of his codefendant's for the purposes of trial the evidence supporting appellant's convictions was simple and direct. The trial court erred in providing the jury with a broadened definition of the word "data," but the improper instruction did not affect the outcome of the trial. Appellant was not entitled to an amendment to the telecommunications fraud statute exempting certain law enforcement from prosecution under this statute since it did not go into effect until after the commission of the offense and it was not retroactive. Appellant's right to a unanimous jury verdict was not violated since the indictment included alternative means in which appellant could have committed tampering with records, rather than separate acts. The trial court did not err in failing to merge his convictions of tampering with records and telecommunications fraud prior to sentencing.

Motion for leave to dismiss case; abuse of discretion; Crim.R. 48(A); R.C. 2941.33. The housing court abused its discretion when it denied the City's motion for leave to file a dismissal entry because the court refused to allow the City to argue any facts on the record, applied only part of the test for good cause, and ignored the City's substantial reason behind its decision to file for leave to dismiss, which was that the defendant substantially complied with the housing code.

Motion to withdraw guilty plea; principles of felony sentencing; sentencing factors; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. Appellant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea is outside the scope of this appeal where motion was filed in a related trial court case, rather than the case underlying this appeal. Court did not err in imposing the maximum sentence for second-degree robbery where the court imposed a sentence within the statutory range, considered the factors required in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 both at hearing and in its journal entry, and where the record included information indicating that appellant's conduct inflicted both physical and financial harm on an elderly victim.

Traffic violation; R.C. 4511.34, oath of office; R.C. 3.23, jurisdiction; due process; abuse of discretion; Crim.R. 16; discovery violation; discovery sanction. Judgment reversed and remanded. The trial court had jurisdiction over appellant's minor-misdemeanor-traffic violation. However, the trial court abused its discretion by expecting the appellant to proceed to trial without discovery. In addition, the trial court abused its discretion by not compelling the appellee to provide discovery to appellant in accordance with Crim.R. 16.

Statute of limitations; R.C. 2901.13(A)(4); John Doe indictment; rape; kidnapping. Appellant challenged convictions for two counts of rape and one count of kidnapping based on events that occurred in 1995, arguing that the State commenced its prosecution outside the applicable limitations period and that law enforcement did not act with reasonable diligence as to toll the statute of limitations. The State filed a John Doe indictment in 2014 and did not move to amend the indictment to name a defendant until 2023. However, appellant failed to raise a statute-of-limitations defense before the trial court, waiving the defense. Convictions affirmed.

Crim.R. 29; sufficiency of the evidence; R.C. 2919.22(A); substantial risk. State failed to establish appellant created a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child where the evidence at most established the possibility of a risk or the possibility of significant risk but failed to establish the type of substantial risk under R.C. 2919.22(A), i.e., an inexcusable failure to act in discharge of one's duty to protect a child where such failure to act results in a substantial risk to the child's health or safety.

Summary judgment; third-party claims; Civ.R. 14(A); transaction or occurrence; derivative; primary claims; vacated; moot. Vacated the trial court's decision granting the third-party defendant's motion for summary judgment and remanded the matter with instructions for the trial court to issue a journal entry deeming the third-party claims moot and the motion for summary judgment on those claims moot. Once summary judgment was rendered in favor of the third-party plaintiff on the primary claims asserted against it, the third-party claims, which were derivative claims, were implicitly rendered moot.

Civ.R. 60(B); child-support order; jurisdiction; bootstrapping. This court did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Appellant did not appeal the trial court's initial denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Instead, he filed a second Civ.R. 60(B) motion and is challenging the denial of that motion. Appellant is improperly trying to "bootstrap" the denial of his second Civ.R. 60(B) motion to indirectly and untimely appeal the denial of his first Civ.R. 60(B) motion.

Production of documents; depositions; corporate designee; motion to compel; motion to show cause; new arguments on appeal; summary judgment; de novo review; App.R. 9; Civ.R. 26; Civ.R. 34; Civ.R. 30; Civ.R. 30(B)(5); Civ.R. 37; Civ.R. 56(F); Civ.R. 56. Affirmed. The trial court's orders granting appellees' motions for summary judgment are affirmed because appellants demand a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review. In addition, appellants did not properly raise discovery disputes with the trial court.

Pro se litigants; traffic violations; discovery disputes; failure to file transcript; presume regularity; party cannot raise new issue for first time on appeal. Defendant was found guilty of two traffic violations after a trial by the municipal court. Defendant appealed alleging discovery violations. Defendant failed to file a transcript of any proceedings in the trial court and there is no evidence in the record that he brought this alleged discovery violation to the attention of the trial court. No discovery motions were filed and no discovery rulings were made. A party cannot raise a new issue for the first time on appeal.

No juvenile court error terminating appellant-mother's parental rights to the minor children and granting permanent custody to appellee. Judgments affirmed. Osowik

pro se appeal; transcript of proceedings App.R. 9(B); accept the trial court's factual determinations as true; validity of land installment contract; substantial compliance with R.C. 5313.02; equitable interest; advisory opinion; waiver doctrine.

The trial court erred in denying Mr. Gill's Crim.R. 29(A) motion for judgment of acquittal on the weapons under disability charge. The state formally rested its case without making exception for the having weapons under disability charge and failed to present any evidence of Mr. Gill's alleged disability when it closed its case in chief. Additionally, the state presented insufficient evidence to find Mr. Gill guilty of tampering with evidence. The state offered evidence only that Mr. Gill possessed a gun, law enforcement did not recover the gun, and Mr. Gill was not present at the scene when law enforcement arrived. However, the state did not present any evidence that Mr. Gill engaged in an act to alter, destroy, conceal, or remove the gun with the purpose of impairing an investigation. We reverse the judgment of conviction of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and enter a judgment of acquittal.

Child support calculation; Spousal support calculation

trial court lacks statutory authority to impose a minor misdemeanor sentence that included probation (with no contact provisions); sentence contrary to law; a sentencing option on a minor misdemeanor includes suspending a portion of the fine on the condition of community service; remand for further proceedings, including but not limited to resentencing

Felonious assault; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Rules of evidence; Cumulative error analysis; Prosecutorial misconduct; Speedy trial; Separation of witnesses; Prejudicial evidence; Authentication of evidence

MOTION TO SUPPRESS — OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE INTOXICATED — PROBABLE CAUSE — REASONABLE SUSPICION — CRIM.R. 7(D) — AMENDMENT OF CHARGE: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to amend the statutory subsection that formed the basis of its operating a motor vehicle while under the influence charge from R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) to R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d) as the amendment did not change the name or identity of the crime, nor did it prejudice defendant. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress, as reasonable suspicion supported the officer's traffic stop of defendant's vehicle where the license plate inquiry indicated that the car was not registered to a licensed driver, and the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence where defendant smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, and was swaying during his interactions with the officer.

Neither appellant's statutory nor his constitutional speedy trial rights were violated. Appellant's due process rights were not violated by the delay between his criminal activity and the indictment. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not commit plain error by ordering appellant to pay restitution of $265.92 after her dog bit a neighbor and attacked the neighbor's dog. Judgments affirmed in the three consolidated appeals.

Appellant has already served the jail sentence imposed by the judgment on appeal, so his appeal is moot. Appeal dismissed.

In allowing the child victims to testify outside of appellant's presence without making any of the factual findings regarding necessity required under the child victim testimony statute, the trial court violated appellant's right to confrontation. The trial court's error was not harmless because without the children's testimony, insufficient evidence supported appellant's convictions as to the children for aggravated menacing and domestic violence (threats). Insufficient evidence supported appellant's conviction of aggravated menacing in relation to his ex-wife, so the trial court erred in overruling his motion for acquittal. Judgment reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a new trial on the charges pertaining to the child victims.

Per Osowik, J., trial court judgment is reversed on the imposition of a consecutive sentence to another unsentenced case in another court. Remanded for the limited purpose of post release control notification.

Per Osowik, J., trial court judgment is affirmed. Plea of No Contest was voluntarily and knowingly made. Under oath, appellant stated that he was satisfied with the representation of his lawyer.

Judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Appellant failed to present objections to the magistrate decision and did not argue plain error. Appellant did not file a transcript and a reviewing court is unable to evaluate the merits of appellant's arguments.

Conceded error. The trial court failed to provide the notifications required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) at sentencing. Judgment reversed and remanded for resentencing in accordance with the Reagan Tokes Act and affirmed in all other respects.

Per Osowik, J., trial court judgment is affirmed. This court cannot find that the record does not clearly and convincingly support the trial court's findings

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motions for public records. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the information he sought was necessary to support a justiciable claim, and his motions were barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

Presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea. Crim.R. 32.1. The trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant-appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas without conducting a hearing.

Bench Trial; Manifest Weight of the Evidence; Pro Se Appellant; App.R. 16(A)(3). The defendant-appellant's brief is deficient in that it fails to set forth a statement of the assignments of error presented for review as required by App.R. 16(A)(3). Additionally, many of the arguments contained in the defendant-appellant's brief are indecipherable and unsupported by any basis in the law. In the interest of resolving cases on the merits, we will construe the defendant-appellant's arguments as a requests that we reverse the trial court's decision as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's decision to grant, in part, the plaintiff-appellee's complaint for declaratory relief is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We further conclude that the trial court had competent, credible evidence before it on which to base its decision.

Consecutive Sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court made the appropriate R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings necessary to impose consecutive sentences and the record supports the trial court's findings.

Manifest Weight; Possession of Drugs; Credibility of Witnesses; Prosecutorial Misconduct; Right to a Fair Trial; Due Process of Law; Plain Error; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Defendant-appellant's possession-of-drugs convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Even assuming the prosecutor's comments during opening statements and closing arguments were inappropriate, the trial court did not commit plain error in allowing them. Defendant-appellant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

motion to dismiss, res judicata, party-presentation principle

plea agreement; motion to enforce; App.R. 16(A)(7); alternative bases

Trial court did not err in refusing to merge defendant's theft and attempted extortion convictions as allied offenses under R.C. 2941.25 where defendant threatened to kill the victim to establish ongoing coerced surrender of property and then took specific items during the same confrontation.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Civ.R. 60(B) relief on standing grounds where original credit-card issuer demonstrated standing at filing and defendant-debtor's standing challenge constituted an improper collateral attack on the judgment rather than a timely direct appeal. Claim of nonservice of summary-judgment motion was waived where defendant raised the issue for the first time on appeal. Alleged due-process violations at garnishment hearing were not reviewable where no funds were recovered and the order did not affect a substantial right, rendering the issues moot. Challenges to the sufficiency of credit-card issuer's summary-judgment evidence cannot be raised through Civ.R. 60(B) where non-movant failed to timely appeal and failed to respond to the motion with controverting evidence. Trial court properly struck defendant's counterclaims where they were filed for the first time after final summary judgment had been entered and defendant never filed a responsive pleading. Alleged recordkeeping irregularities did not warrant relief where defendant failed to invoke App.R. 9(E) to correct the record and demonstrated no prejudice to substantial rights. Federal statutory claims were forfeited where defendant raised them only in post-judgment filings rather than in a timely responsive pleading, and neutral state procedural rules apply equally to federal claims.

The trial court did not provide the defendant with the necessary notifications required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) regarding the indefinite nature of his sentence, which resulted in reversible error and the matter was remanded for resentencing on this limited issue. WITH DISSENTING OPINION.

Defendant's convictions and sentence for, among other crimes, aggravated arson, are affirmed. The trial court was not required to advise defendant regarding the possible merger of offenses for sentencing, and defendant's aggravated arson charges did not merge because the single fire posed a risk to multiple victims. Consecutive sentences were supported by the record despite the defendant's lack of criminal history. Finally, the trial court's amended sentencing order corrected a typographical error and had no effect on issues that were contested at the trial level, meaning it was a permissible nunc pro tunc order despite coming after a notice of appeal.

CIVIL - spouse; loan; promissory note; mortgage; proof of debt; subsequent agreement; parol evidence; contract integration; fully integrated contract; partially integrated contract; attorney-client privilege; R.C. 2317.02; R.C. 2317.021; intent; manifest weight of the evidence; expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

CRIMINAL LAW - felonious assault; firearm specification; having weapons under disability; alleged ineffective assistance of counsel; motions for continuance; alleged lack of preparation; motions for continuance not uncommon in a criminal matter; no argument relating to prejudice; opening statement; no evidence or argument regarding counsel's alleged deficiency; admission of facts by defense of self-defense; no prejudice for calling witnesses; defendant has a right to testify; recalling victim and police officer assisted in defense; defense counsel effectively cross-examined state's witnesses; standing order to testify regarding victim's prior actions against defendant's mother; no ineffectiveness for failing to object to admission of defendant's police interview; no ineffectiveness for making a motion to dismiss; no ineffectiveness in closing argument; no ineffectiveness for conduct or omissions during sentencing; no ineffectiveness regarding alleged failure to advise defendant to accept plea deal; voluntary decision; no obvious prejudice due to counsel's prior representation of state's witness; no error in excusing one juror but not another; sufficient, credible evidence of physical harm via a deadly weapon; felony sentence not contrary to law; convictions supported by manifest weight of the evidence; sufficient, credible evidence that defendant acted knowingly.

CRIMINAL LAW - guilty plea; waiver; knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; Crim.R. 11; showing of prejudice; Alford plea.

CRIMINAL LAW – guilty plea; misdemeanors; petty offense; Crim.R. 11; de novo; effect of guilty plea; failure to comply; reversed and remanded.

CRIMINAL LAW - having weapons under disability; possession of cocaine; misdemeanor soliciting; no sentence entered on soliciting guilty verdict; no final judgment; manifest weight of the evidence; soliciting verdict is only argument on appeal; no objection to failure to sentence; no final appealable order.

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF - void; personal jurisdiction; postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; R.C. 2953.23; untimely or successive petition; res judicata.

CRIMINAL - OVI; felony; no contest plea; knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea; Crim.R. 11; uncounseled convictions; enhancement of offense; demonstration of facts; prejudice

CRIMINAL LAW - jail-time credit; abuse of discretion; R.C. 2967.191; consecutive sentences; trial court appropriately calculated jail time credit.

CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing; R.C. 2953.08; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; consistency in sentencing; judicial bias; R.C. 2701.03; due process; ineffective assistance of counsel.

ORIGINAL ACTION - procedendo; delay in ruling on motions; motion to dismiss; judgments rendered; duty already performed; moot

CIVIL - Enforcement of settlement agreement; contract law; corporation may only act through its agents; R.C. 1702.12; indemnity of directors/trustees.

CRIMINAL LAW - felonious assault; firearm specification; having weapons under disability; alleged ineffective assistance of counsel; motions for continuance; alleged lack of preparation; motions for continuance not uncommon in a criminal matter; no argument relating to prejudice; opening statement; no evidence or argument regarding counsel's alleged deficiency; admission of facts by defense of self-defense; no prejudice for calling witnesses; defendant has a right to testify; recalling victim and police officer assisted in defense; defense counsel effectively cross-examined state's witnesses; standing order to testify regarding victim's prior actions against defendant's mother; no ineffectiveness for failing to object to admission of defendant's police interview; no ineffectiveness for making a motion to dismiss; no ineffectiveness in closing argument; no ineffectiveness for conduct or omissions during sentencing; no ineffectiveness regarding alleged failure to advise defendant to accept plea deal; voluntary decision; no obvious prejudice due to counsel's prior representation of state's witness; no error in excusing one juror but not another; sufficient, credible evidence of physical harm via a deadly weapon; felony sentence not contrary to law; convictions supported by manifest weight of the evidence; sufficient, credible evidence that defendant acted knowingly.

Inmate; dog bite; damages. Plaintiff, an inmate, was bitten on the hand by a dog that was part of the canine training program at the institution. Defendant admitted liability but disputed the amount of plaintiff's damages. Judgment for plaintiff.

Negligence; emergency call; public duty; proximate cause. Plaintiff was driving a semi-trailer while stopped at a traffic light. Defendant's employee, a state trooper, negligently drove his vehicle into plaintiff's trailer. The evidence did not support defendant's argument that the trooper was on an emergency call at the time of the incident. The public duty rule also did not apply in this situation. However, plaintiff failed to prove that the minor traffic incident was the proximate cause of his personal injury and request for damages. Judgment for defendant.

Reconsideration of the court's recent opinion in 2026-Ohio-537 (5th Dist.) is granted, and a new opinion is issued affirming the trial court's judgment in a foreclosure case because the homeowner's statutory exemption under R.C. 2329.66 exceeds the judgment creditor's stautory lien under R.C. 2329.02. The judgment debtor owned an undivided one-half interest in the real property, so the judgment creditor's lien attached solely to that half interest rather than to the entire property.

As applied constitutional challenge

Criminal defendant who did not raise a merger argument in his direct appeal is barred by the claim-preclusion doctrine from arguing years later that his offenses were allied offenses that should have been merged at sentencing.

motion to suppress; search warrant; probable cause; fruit of the poisonous tree, Crim R. 41(C)(1); R.C. 2933.23

Per Mayle, J., trial court lacked jurisdiction to try appellant's case without a jury because appellant properly demanded a jury trial for her petty offense but there is no evidence in the record that she waived her right to a jury trial in a signed writing that was filed, made part of the record, and made in open court, as required by R.C. 2945.05.

Consecutive sentences; Allied offenses

Texting while driving

SUMMARY JUDGMENT — SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS — STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS — COMMENCEMENT — CAPACITY — WAIVER — TRUST: Defendant trust waived the defense of lack of capacity to be sued by not asserting the defense in its answer and the trial court accordingly erred in granting the trust summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims based on plaintiffs' failure to perfect service where plaintiffs served the trustee of the trust within the statute-of-limitations period and plaintiffs' naming the trust rather than the trustee as the defendant did not cause service to be insufficient because the trust waived the defense of lack of capacity. Plaintiffs' challenge to the trial court's denial of their motion for relief from judgment was moot where the appellate court reversed the trial court's summary judgment from which plaintiffs sought relief.

MOTION TO DISMISS — CHILD ENDANGERMENT — CINCINNATI MUN.CODE 915-3 — R.C. 9.68 — FIREARM: The trial court erred in granting defendant's motions to dismiss three charges of child endangerment in violation of Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3 where the dismissals were based on the trial court's erroneous determination that that this provision was preempted by R.C. 9.68. Following this court's opinion in State v. West, 2024-Ohio-1951 (1st Dist.), the State may continue to charge offenders under Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3, and where the charges relate to the offender's storage of firearms, the trier of fact must decide, based on the individual facts of each case, whether the offender's storage of the firearm created a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child. [But see DISSENT: The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaints where the complaints charged a violation of Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3(b), which was nullified in State v. West, 2024-Ohio-1951 (1st Dist.), because it redefined the element of substantial risk to include the negligent storage of firearms.]

ABUSE OF DISCRETION – R.C. 2929.28 – RESTITUTION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay $6,341.43 in restitution after a two-day restitution hearing because the testimony and evidence presented by the State supported the award, and the trial court's decision to deduct some charges, and not others, was within the trial court's discretion.

MOTION TO DISMISS — CREDIT-CARD APPLICATION — IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT — UNJUST ENRICHMENT — CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD — BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY — DECLARATORY JUDGMENT: Plaintiff's breach-of-implied-contract claim based on defendant bank's retention of plaintiff's personal information included in a denied credit-card application was properly dismissed where the processing of a credit-card application does not form a contract and plaintiff pleaded no facts supporting an inference that the bank agreed to enter into contract with plaintiff. Plaintiff's unjust-enrichment claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff alleged no facts supporting an inference that she conferred a benefit on defendant through the submission of a credit-card application that included her personal information and did not allege that her information had monetary value or that the bank sold the information for a profit. Plaintiff's conversion claim was properly dismissed where her complaint alleged that defendant came into possession of her property lawfully and did not allege that plaintiff demanded the return of the property and defendant refused to return the property. Plaintiff's breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff's submission of a credit-card application to defendant bank did not establish a fiduciary relationship between the two. Plaintiff's constructive-fraud claim was properly dismissed where defendant bank owed no duty to disclose facts to plaintiff as it did not stand in any special relationship that would result in defendant owing plaintiff a duty to disclose. Plaintiff's challenge to the trial court's dismissal of her declaratory-judgment claim is overruled where plaintiff failed to comply with App.R. 16 by not citing to any relevant law.

CRIMINAL DAMAGING — WITHOUT CONSENT — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — CLERICAL ERROR — RESTITUTION: Defendant's conviction for criminal damaging was supported by sufficient evidence because a rational trier of fact could infer that defendant damaged the victim's property without the victim's consent based on tension preceding the damaging, the victim involving the police in the dispute, and the victim's pursuit of repair estimates. Defendant's conviction for criminal damaging was not contrary to the weight of the evidence because the trier of fact was entitled to find the victim's testimony credible despite minor inconsistencies in the victim's account. The trial court did not commit plain error when it relied on excluded testimony and information from the State to determine restitution because evidentiary rules are inapplicable at sentencing proceedings and the restitution statute allows the trial court to consider information provided by the State.

PARENTAL TERMINATION — PERMANENT CUSTODY — EVIDENCE — MANIFEST WEIGHT — BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD — LEGALLY SECURE PLACEMENT — ABANDONMENT: Where Mother failed to assert in her objection to the magistrate's decision that the magistrate's decision was not supported by sufficient evidence, and she did not advance a plain-error argument on appeal, she has failed to preserve this argument for appeal. The juvenile court's decision to commit the children to the permanent custody of the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence demonstrated that permanent custody was in the children's best interest where the record and testimony showed that the children had been in the agency's care for approximately 16 consecutive months, and Mother (1) failed to visit the children for nearly three years, (2) refused to sign a release of information so that she could be referred for services, including making a referral so that Mother could continue supervised visits, (3) failed to remedy the concerns regarding her housing, including having working utilities, and (4) failed to verify her income. The juvenile court's finding that the children could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with Mother was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence demonstrated that she did not remedy the issues that initially caused the children to be removed from her care.

employer intentional tort, R.C. 2745.01, summary judgment, de novo, intent to injure, equipment safety guard, active participation, critical

CRIMINAL – misdemeanor sentences; guilty plea; R.C. 2937.07; explanation of the circumstances of the offense; statutory violation; harmless error; abuse of discretion; consecutive sentences.

JUVENILE – guilty of sexual imposition; adjudicated a delinquent child; sentenced to probation; contested hearing; sufficient evidence; the trier of fact could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the elements of sexual imposition were proven; manifest weight; the trier of fact did not clearly lose its way in finding Appellant guilty; judgment affirmed.

The trial court properly admitted some trial testimony under the excited-utterance hearsay exception, properly declined to merge kidnapping and murder charges, and properly imposed prison terms for two firearm specifications in accordance with R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g).

Mother's appeal on permanent custody

Review of plea; Sentence; Ineffective assistance of counsel

The commission did not abuse its discretion in determining claimant's TTD compensation terminated as of the date of the examining physician's report opining she had reached MMI. However, the commission abused its discretion in ordering recoupment of any overpayment of TTD compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.511(K) because the procedural posture of this case does not fall within R.C. 4123.511(K). We grant claimant a limited writ of mandamus and remand the matter to the commission for further proceedings.

The magistrate correctly held that relator has not demonstrated that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in making its findings regarding his "vocational potential" since some evidence supported those findings. We also agree with the magistrate that these facts provide adequate assurances that the staff hearing officer appropriately considered the psychological condition in conjunction with the physical conditions when reaching the decision that relator's permanent total disability application should be denied. Objections overruled. Writ of mandamus denied.

The Court of Claims of Ohio did not err in granting appellee's summary judgment motion. Appellant failed to satisfy her burden on summary judgment as to her sex discrimination and FMLA retaliation claims, she waived her hostile work environment claim, and she failed to adequately brief her race discrimination claim. Judgment affirmed.

Termination of shared-parenting; visitation; custody; legal custodian; residential parent; modification of terms in a shared-parenting plan; change in circumstances; best-interest factors; R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c); R.C. 3109.051; R.C 3109.04(E)(2)(b); R.C. 3109.04(F)(1); R.C. 3109.051(D). Affirmed. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion to terminate shared parenting, reduced his parenting time, and placed new restrictions on his parenting time. The juvenile court reviewed the relevant best-interest factors and did not abuse its discretion when making its determination.

Medical malpractice; causation; Civ.R. 26(E); discovery violation; expert report; invited error; harmless error. Affirmed. The trial court did not err by denying a motion for new trial or to declare a mistrial based on new theories of causation being elicited or explored on cross-examination by the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not object to the initial unsolicited statement and, thereafter, asked for additional answers in an effort to impeach the treating physicians. In addition, even if there was error in the introduction of that evidence, it was harmless as a matter of law since the plaintiff's theory of causation was not impacted by the testimony.

Statute of limitations; medical claims; R.C. 2305.113(B); motion in limine, medical negligence; survivorship; loss of chance, Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(b); expert report. Court did not err in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment, resulting in dismissal of appellant's medical-negligence survivorship claim. Claim was filed more than a year after the events that gave rise to this case; therefore, the dismissed claim was commenced outside the limitations period for medical claims. Appellant's counsel failed to extend the limitations period under R.C. 2305.113(B) by sending appellee email notice that he was investigating potential claims, rather than required notice by certified mail. Court did not abuse its discretion in granting appellee's motion in limine, precluding appellant's testimony regarding a loss-of-chance theory, where report of appellant's expert never provided that decedent had a less-than-even chance of the surviving cardiac arrest that caused his death.

Postconviction relief; jurisdiction; timeliness; trial transcript; 365-day deadline; leap year; juvenile court; bindover; hearing; probable cause; direct appeal; equitable tolling; anniversary date; subject-matter jurisdiction; statutory construction; filing date; supplemental transcript; de novo review. The trial court dismissed appellant's petition for postconviction relief, which was denied for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of untimeliness. The central dispute involves the calculation of the mandatory 365-day filing period established by R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a). The appellant contends that the filing was timely because the statutory clock should have been triggered by the later filing of juvenile bindover transcripts rather than the initial trial transcripts. Furthermore, the appellant argues that the "anniversary date" of the transcript filing should control the deadline, effectively asserting that the occurrence of a leap year should not result in a filing period that is one day shorter than a full calendar year. The filing of a postconviction petition is a jurisdictional act. Because the appellant filed the petition on the 366th day following the filing of the trial transcript, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the claims, and the application of equitable tolling is prohibited in the context of this jurisdictional bar.

Crim.R. 43(A)(1); consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.41; R.C. 2929.14; courses of conduct. Appellant contested term of imprisonment arising from guilty plea. Case remanded for resentencing where court failed to sentence appellant for one of the charged offenses at hearing, attempting to do so only in a subsequent sentencing entry, in violation of Crim.R. 43(A)(1). Court also erred in announcing at hearing that it was running all prison terms consecutively, violating R.C. 2929.41 where appellant's convictions included both felonies and misdemeanors. Court also failed to make a complete "courses of conduct" finding at hearing under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) to support its imposition of consecutive sentences. On remand, court instructed to make consecutive-sentencing findings in accordance with R.C. 2929.41 and 2929.14, as merited by the record.

Rape of a child under the age of ten; joinder; Crim.R. 8(A); Crim.R. 14; ineffective assistance of counsel; "joinder test"; forensic interview; Evid.R. 803(4); manifest weight of the evidence. Affirmed. The failure to file a motion to sever the separate offenses committed against separate victims was not ineffective assistance of counsel because the motion would not have been successful in light of simple and direct evidence the jury was capable of segregating; the defendant failed to demonstrate the inapplicability of Evid.R. 803(4) with respect to the admission of the forensic worker's interview with the victim; and the convictions were not against the weight of the evidence.

Felony sentence; R.C. 2953.08; not reviewable; agreed sentence; range; indefinite sentence. Where the trial court imposed a base sentence within the recommended sentencing range set forth by the parties in the plea agreement, the sentence was not reviewable on appeal.

Small claims action; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; conversion; manifest-weight review; cross-appeal; App.R. 3. Affirmed. The trial court adopted the magistrate's general verdict following a bench trial, in which the plaintiff was awarded $1,200 dollars on her claims generally based on breach of contract, unjust enrichment, or conversion. That verdict is not against the weight of the evidence merely because the judgment was for less than the $6,000 sought. And finally, because the appellee did not file a cross-appeal, the judgment in favor of the appellant cannot be challenged in this appeal.

Marsy's Law; subpoena; electronic devices; compulsory process; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10a; Ohio Const. art. I, § 10. Affirmed, modified, and remanded. The trial court did not err in denying the victim's motion to quash a subpoena issued by the defendant because the victim's right to refuse discovery requests or depositions is expressly subordinate to the defendant's right to compulsory process arising under Ohio Const. art. I, § 10.

Abuse of discretion; board of revision. The trial court did not abuse its discretion finding, without a hearing, the appellant did not establish reliable evidence that the decision of the board of revision is in error.

Vexatious litigator; R.C. 2323.52; saving statute; R.C. 2305.19; summary judgment; statute of limitations. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee where plaintiff-appellant's complaint was filed outside of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff-appellant's attempted initial filing of the action was done without first obtaining leave as he was required to do pursuant to his status as a vexatious litigator under R.C. 2323.52. The saving statute did not apply to extend the statute of limitations more than the several days between when plaintiff-appellant filed an application for leave and when he obtained leave.

Murder; felonious assault; sufficiency; manifest weight; ineffective assistance of counsel; cumulative error. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where eyewitnesses testified that they observed appellant shoot and kill the victim. Appellant failed to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The cumulative-error doctrine was inapplicable where appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of any error.

Adoption of magistrate's decision; abuse of discretion; summary judgment; default judgment; unknown spouse; pro se litigant; foreclosure. Judgment affirmed. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate's decision granting summary judgment against defendant-appellant and default judgment against defendant unknown spouse. Specifically, summary judgment was appropriate because appellant failed to file any opposition brief or to properly present any defenses or counterclaims to the foreclosure action pursuant to the rules of civil procedure. A pro se litigant is held to the same standard as all other litigants, and they must comply with the rules of civil procedure as well as accept the consequences of their own mistakes. Default judgment against unknown spouse was also appropriate because they did not file an answer to the complaint.

Default judgment; final, appealable order; certificate of judgment; Civ.R. 54(B); Ohio Const., art. IV, § 3(B)(2). The appellant filed an appeal from a trial court's order denying the appellant's motion to vacate the trial court's judgment entry. The motion to vacate requested the trial court to vacate a certificate of judgment that certified a default judgment issued by the trial court. The appeal was dismissed for lack of a final appealable order. A denial of a motion to vacate filed pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) is a final, appealable order. However, where the motion to vacate seeks to vacate a nonfinal order, the trial court's judgment denying the motion is not a final order. The default judgment entry was not a final order because there were multiple defendants and claims that had not been disposed of in that entry and the entry lacked the mandatory Civ.R. 54(B) language that there was "no just reason for delay." As such, the trial court's judgment entry denying appellant's motion to vacate was not a final order. On June 17, 2025, the trial court dismissed the case "without prejudice" for "failure to prosecute." The trial court's dismissal was not a final order, and therefore, all interlocutory orders dissolved upon the dismissal of the case. Absent a final order from which appellant appealed, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

Motion to modify legal custody, prior court decree, R.C. 3109.04(E)(1), R.C. 2151.42(B), changed circumstances, best interest of the child. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's ("Father") motion to modify legal custody of his child ("the Child"). Father identified no changed circumstances where evidence of abuse pertained only to events that occurred before the prior decree granting the Child's grandmother ("Grandmother") legal custody. As a matter of law, Father's improved conduct was no basis for a changed-circumstances finding under either R.C. 3109.04(E)(1) or 2151.42(B), neither of which address changed circumstances of a biological parent. To the extent that the Child's enrollment in several schools constituted changed circumstances, the record did not demonstrate that granting Father's request for legal custody was in the Child's best interest where Grandmother explained that the Child was enrolled in different schools because of his behavioral and mental-health issues, where the record included evidence of Grandmother's significant efforts to connect the Child with resources related to those issues, and where evidence existed of Father's ongoing criminal conduct.

Ineffective assistance of counsel

Permanent custody; Best interest of child factors; Clear and convincing evidence; Case plan objectives; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1); R.C. 2151.414(E)

An appellant's failure to include in the record on appeal several key parts of the trial transcript hampers an appellate court's ability to grant the relief sought by the appellant. The trial court did not err by imposing linmits on a pro se party's ability to view and copy R.C. 3109.04(C) reports prepared by a psychologist for that party's divorce case.

Domestic violence civil protection order ("DVCPO"); R.C. 3113.31; challenge to weight of the evidence as to whether victim was afraid of the defendant, and to trial court's decision to sustain objections to magistrate's decision and to grant the DVCPO; victim testified that she was afraid, and evidence showed that defendant has a history of suicidal thoughts, was distraught, took a gun and bullets outside his house, hid the gun behind his back, told victim to take the gun away from him, and said he was going to do something stupid; trial court properly reviewed objections under Civ.R. 65.1; judgment affirmed.

summary judgment affirmed; appellant claimed the trial court failed to consider important filings and erred in striking untimely expert report; initial summary judgment burden established by defense in action on medical claim where plaintiff failed to disclose expert report prior to deadlines and reciprocal burden could not be met.

reconsideration denied.

petition for postconviction relief; finding of fact; conclusions of law; timely; delayed appeal

CRIM.R. 33(B) — UNAVOIDABLY PREVENTED — NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE: Although the trial court, when ruling on defendant's Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a new-trial motion, improperly considered the merits of defendant's new-trial motion and whether defendant had delayed seeking leave after discovering the new evidence on which his new-trial motion was based, this did not result in prejudicial error nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion for leave where the court also conducted the proper inquiry and determined that defendant was not unavoidably prevented from discovering his codefendant's confession within 120-days of the jury's verdict.

IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT – OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS – PLAIN ERROR – RESISTING ARREST – R.C. 1.51 – R.C. 2921.31 – R.C. 2921.33: The trial court did not commit plain error in convicting defendant of obstructing official business under R.C. 2921.31, because R.C. 2921.31 is not in irreconcilable conflict with R.C. 2921.33, the resisting arrest statute, and the State had discretion in determining under which statute to charge defendant.

The trial court erred in designating appellant a sex offender where his misdemeanor conviction of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor did not qualify as a sexually oriented offense under R.C. 2950.01. Prior appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise the issue. This court's prior judgment affirming the trial court's judgment is vacated. The trial court's judgment is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded for the vacation of appellant's sex offender designation.

The trial court abused its discretion by ordering appellant to pay $41,850 in restitution for property damage in connection with appellant's hit-skip conviction where the property damage was not a direct and proximate result of the hit-skip offense. Under R.C. 4549.02(B)(4) and/or R.C. 4549.03(B), the trial court had authority to impose restitution in an amount not exceeding $5,000 for damage that was the direct and proximate result of appellant operating his vehicle before, during, or after he committed the hit-skip offense. The trial court erred by finding that the $5,000 statutory cap on restitution was superseded by Marsy's Law and by failing to apply the statutory cap. Judgment reversed and matter remanded to the trial court for the purpose of reimposing restitution in accordance with the law. (Huffman, J., concurring.)

The probate court erred in vacating a 2003 judgment determining heirship under its inherent authority where the judgment was potentially voidable, not void. Appellant-heir's claim that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to determine the heirs of a non-resident decedent was not ripe for review. Heir's claim that the probate court had improperly attempted to divest a deceased heir's vested rights was moot. Judgment reversed.

The trial court's dismissal without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) of appellant's civil action was not a final appealable order. Although the trial court should not have dismissed due to appellant's failure to obtain substitute counsel, any error in the court's dismissal was rendered harmless by the parties' ability to refile their claims. Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

Appellant failed to establish that he did not receive proper notice of the final divorce hearing. The trial court's order providing notice of the hearing stated that a copy of it was sent to appellant's last-known address by regular U.S. mail, as required by Civ.R. 75(L). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by dividing the parties' property in half where the trial court relied on appellee's proposed divorce decree and appellant failed to appear at the final hearing. Judgment affirmed.

In this felony sentencing appeal, the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in imposing sentence, and appellant's sentence is not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

An administrative suspension of appellant's driver's license was beyond the scope of his aggravated drug possession case. Assuming that his driver's license was suspended for failure to consent to a chemical test in connection with a traffic stop, the present case was not the proper forum for appellant to challenge the suspension. Even if appellant could challenge the license suspension in this case, his attorney's failure to file a timely appeal of the suspension below did not constitute ineffective assistance. The record also does not indicate that the suspension was appealed orally at appellant's initial appearance on the drug charge. Finally, the trial court's failure to hold a hearing on the suspension within five days of appellant's arrest did not deprive him of due process. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in sustaining in part appellee's motion to suppress based on its conclusion that appellee was unlawfully detained beyond the scope of a traffic stop. Seconds after appellee was removed from his vehicle and patted down for officer safety, he fled the scene on foot, which terminated the stop before it was ever prolonged. Judgment reversed and remanded.

Judge Duhart. Trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) and plea was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Trial court improperly imposed post-release control at sentencing hearing.

Trial court properly granted appellant's motion to enforce settlement agreement in collection action upon finding that the mutually agreed upon terms were reasonably certain and clear, and as such, a contract was created. Judgment affirmed.

Per Mayle, J., trial court did not commit plain error when it failed to merge convictions of theft of cash and receiving stolen property, a credit card. Although cash and credit card were stolen at same time when defendant took victim's bag, his later use of credit card caused separate harm. For these same reasons, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue merger.

Motion to suppress; Fourth Amendment; protective sweep; reasonable, articulable suspicion; jointly recommended sentence

Convictions affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a detective's lay testimony regarding the frequency of delayed disclosures in child abuse cases because he was trained and experienced in investigating child abuse. In addition, the trial court properly limited questioning on the victim's purported prior and false allegation of sexual assault by her father because such questioning was based on inadmissible extrinsic evidence that, at best, tangentially referred to the issue. Finally, the prosecutor's sarcastic and pointed comments about Zink's counsel and mother during closing arguments were made as parts of larger, permissible arguments and were not prejudicial to the overall fairness of the trial.

The trial court did not err by imposing four separate contempt sanctions. The contempt sanctions were civil in nature. As a result, neither R.C. 2941.25(A), nor the Double Jeopardy Clause are implicated. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 240-day jail term. The record demonstrates that Father has a long-standing pattern of failing to comply with his support obligations and repeatedly failing to appear for court proceedings. The trial court expressly warned Father that it would impose the 240-day sentence if he failed to comply with the purge conditions set forth in its entry. When Father did not meet those conditions, the court imposed the previously announced sentence.

Homeowners appeal summary judgment decision granting foreclosure in favor of bank. Homeowners argued summary judgment evidence insufficient to establish bank's right to enforce note and mortgage. Homeowners raised issues with chain-of-title between bank and original lender. Homeowners disputed balance owed. Bank supported motion with affidavit establishing right to enforce note and mortgage. Homeowners lacked standing to challenge assignments of note and mortgage. Homeowners failed to present material facts disputing balance owed on mortgage.

Appellant's plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Although appellant argues she suffers from anxiety and other mental health conditions, nothing in the record suggests that she lacked an understanding of the nature of her plea and the proceedings, the rights she was waiving, or the consequences of entering a no contest plea.

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25(C), statement of prisoner account, six months immediately preceding

felonious assault, community control, consecutive jail sentence, moot, effective assistance of counsel, prejudice, expert

R.C. 3106.04(G), shared parenting plan, due process, marital property, valuation, motion for new trial

CRIMINAL - Rape; R.C. 2907.02(A)(1); substitute counsel; attorney-client relationship; manifest weight of the evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; consecutive sentences; future crime; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

CRIMINAL - Aggravated Possession of Drugs; motion to suppress; Fourth Amendment; probable cause; reasonable suspicion; traffic stop; vehicle search; totality of the circumstances; scope of stop.

CRIMINAL - misdemeanor sentencing; restitution; mandate on remand; postjudgment interest; R.C. 1343.03(A)

Inmate Assault, Negligence, Notice. Plaintiff failed to prove that defendant had notice of an impending assault on him by another inmate. The magistrate further found that plaintiff's arguments regarding inadequate staffing levels and Covid-era partitions were barred by discretionary immunity. Plaintiff's argument regarding post-order violations was unsubstantiated, but even if proven it would not have put defendant on notice of the impending assault. The magistrate recommended judgment be entered in favor of defendant.

Marital Residence; Equalization Payment; Spousal Support; Child Support; Exclusion of Evidence. A trial court's classification of property as marital or separate is a factual determination and is reviewed under a manifest weight standard. R.C. 3105.18 directs trial courts to consider the matter of spousal support after determining the division of property between the parties. A separation agreement is a contract between two parties. However, once a separation agreement is incorporated into a court order, the obligations therein are not imposed by contract but by decree. R.C. 3105.171(F) contains factors that a trial court is to consider in dividing marital property.

Sufficiency; Manifest Weight. Defendant properly convicted of Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity and Trafficking offenses. Errors during sentencing require new sentencing hearing.

Oil and Gas Lease - Breach of Contract - Summary Judgment - Voluntary Unitization - Statutory Unitization - R.C. 1509.28

Manifest Weight/Sufficiency of Evidence - Expert Medical Testimony not Necessary to Establish Rape - Plain Error

Premises liability; Directed verdict

The Court of Claims did not exceed the scope of our remand from the direct appeal in this matter. The judgment entry issued by the Court of Claims on remand was limited to the issue of Family Education Rights and Privacy Act redactions. Despite appellant's claims to the contrary, the Court of Claims judgment entry issued after our remand did not vacate prior binding rulings. Additionally, any of appellant's claims regarding unresolved issues could have been raised in the direct appeal and therefore are barred by res judicata. Appellant failed to establish that the Court of Claims erred in entering final judgment prior to appellee's full production of public records. By the plain language of R.C. 2743.75(F)(3), the cost recovery provision in subsection (b) did not apply because an appeal was taken from the Court of Claims final order. Appellant's claim that the trial court permitted improper redactions could not be considered because it relied upon appellee's record productions that occurred after the judgment entry at issue, and were therefore outside of the record on appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Absent a showing of inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability under R.C. 2725.04, Teresa Peters may not litigate a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of her brother, petitioner David Peters. Teresa Peters did not make this showing, and so the Tenth District Court of Appeals strikes the objections to the magistrate's decision. Finding no error or other defect on the face of the magistrate's decision, this court adopts the magistrate's decision as our own. Petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissed; action dismissed.

Trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of veterinary medical facility on claims related to treatment of appellant's dog. The gist of appellant's claims sounded in veterinary malpractice and appellant did not name any of the individual veterinarians as defendants. The veterinary medical facility did not practice veterinary medicine and could not be directly liable for veterinary malpractice.

Per Osowik, J., the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for respondent, Vermillion Local School District Board of Education and denying relator, Brian Ames summary judgment. Additionally, it did not err in denying Ames' motion for leave to file a surreply. Accordingly, we affirm the May 14, 2025 Judgment Entry of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas.

Judge Duhart, consecutive sentences, R.C. 2929.13(B), post-release control notification.

Mandamus, R.C. 2731.04, verified by affidavit, dismissed, cost deposit

OVI — CHEMICAL TEST — REFUSAL — R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) — MOTION TO SUPPRESS — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT: In an OVI prosecution, the trial court did not err in denying a motion to dismiss where officer observation that defendant smelled strongly of alcohol, had bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred his speech, was acting strangely, and refused to participate in field sobriety tests supported a finding of probable cause to arrest for OVI. Defendant's conviction for refusing to take a chemical test under R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the jury considered testimony from the arresting officers that defendant strongly smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred his speech, acted strangely, and refused to participate in field sobriety testing, and could observe footage from an officer's body-worn camera showing defendant's actions.

R.C. 4513.70 — STORAGE FACILITY — TOWING SERVICE — FOR-HIRE MOTOR CARRIER — REASONABLE CHARGES — EVIDENCE: Defendant car repair shop is not a "towing service" under R.C. 4513.70 where the shop was hired to facilitate having the insured's car towed by a third-party towing company but did not itself carry or transport the insured's car. Defendant car repair shop is a "storage facility" under R.C. 4513.70 where nothing in R.C. 4513.70 prevents the shop from functioning as both a "storage facility" and a "repair facility" under R.C. Ch. 4513 and where the evidence shows that the shop charged storage fees from the first day that the insured's vehicle arrived at the shop, included storage fees as a part of the repair costs in the contract for repairs, and accepted vehicles that were "an obvious total loss" from plaintiff insurer on other claims. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that storage charges for ten days was reasonable under the circumstances where the testimony established that storage is typically not charged until there is a total-loss determination and plaintiff insurer presented evidence that the ten days of storage arises from the date the insured's vehicle was determined to be a total loss with a "few extra days" covered in the beginning.

Civ.R. 65.1, objections, domestic violence civil protection order

permanent custody, first prong finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and 2151.414(E), specific (E) factor need not be cited

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25(A), R.C. 2969.25(C), statement of prisoner account, affidavit of prior civil actions

Not guilty by reason of insanity defense

Prosecutor did not engage in misconduct when questioning witnesses or vouch for witnesses during closing argument, so defense counsel's failure to object was not ineffective assistance.

Writ of mandamus and procedendo

Permananet Custody - UCCJEA - Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Reasoanble Efforts to Reunify - Best Interest of the Child

Objection to Magistrate's Decision overruled. Limited writ of mandamus granted ordering respondent to provide three records sought by relator in public records request; relator's request for statutory damages denied.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS – VISITATION – termination of visitation rights; abuse of discretion standard of review; the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of extraordinary circumstances that would justify terminating Appellant's visitation rights, namely that visitation with Appellant would cause harm to the minor child; the court reviewed the factors in R.C. 3109.051(D) and concluded it was in the minor child's best interest to terminate Appellant's visitation; judgment affirmed.

Appellant failed to demonstrate reversible error in the probate court's decision to overrule all objections and adopt the magistrate's decision, resulting in the appointment of Steven Fogle as administrator of Helen Fogle's estate. All five assignments of error overruled; judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial. Appellant failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the grounds upon which he relied for his proposed motion for new trial. Judgment affirmed.

Special master recommended additional production of records. The public office did not appropriately redact certain records pursuant to student privacy exceptions (R.C. 3319.21 and 20 U.S.C. §1232g (FERPA)). The public office incorrectly withheld records as medical records (R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(a)). The public office did not introduce evidence to justify withholding a record as a security record (R.C. 149.433). The public office incorrectly withheld certain records as non-record (R.C. 149.011(G)). Requester did not carry his burden on all other claims for additional production or unreasonable delay.

Special master recommended additional production of records. Public office did not meet its burden to establish that withheld records clearly fell under the Confidential Law Enforcement Investigatory Records ("CLEIR") work product exception (R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h) and 149.43(A)(2)(b)). Public office correctly withheld grand jury records (Crim.R. 6(E)).

App.R. 26; application to reopen an appeal; Murnahan; ineffective assistance of counsel; untimely filing; good cause. An appellant's application to reopen his appeal is denied where the appellant filed his application outside the 90-day requirement specified in App.R. 26, and appellant failed to provide good cause for his untimely filing.

R.C. 2923.02; R.C. 2903.02; attempted felony murder; void conviction. Attempted felony murder is not a cognizable crime in Ohio, and appellant's conviction must be vacated.

Employment discrimination; R.C. Ch. 4112; Employment Law Uniformity Act; time-barred; statute of limitations; choice of law; conflict of law; employment agreement. The trial court erred in determining that a contractually agreed upon one-year statute of limitations in an employment agreement controlled the statute of limitations on plaintiff's employment-discrimination claim, where that determination could not be made absent the court first making a threshold determination about choice of law — that is whether Michigan or Ohio law applied to the substantive employment-discrimination claim.

R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) substantial impairment rape; Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination; right to remain silent prearrest and pre-Miranda rights being read; prosecutorial misconduct; cross-examination of defendant; direct examination of police officer; State's closing argument; failure to object; plain error; exclusion of irrelevant evidence; abuse of discretion. Appellant-defendant appealed the trial court's various rulings regarding prosecutorial questions and comments as well as rulings regarding the admissibility and use of various exhibits at trial. The first assignment of error concerned prosecutorial misconduct regarding questions asked during the direct examination of a police officer, the cross-examination of the defendant and during the State's closing argument. We find that there were only three objected-to questions by the prosecutor during the defendant's cross-examination that while they were improper questions they did not substantially prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial. As to the remaining questions asked by the prosecutor during cross-examination of the defendant, the State's direct examination of the arresting police officer and the comments made during State's closing argument these were not objected to and were therefore reviewed under the plain-error analysis. But for their admission it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt the trial outcome would have been different and therefore no plain error was found. First assignment of error is overruled. The second assignment of error concerned the exclusion of three demonstrative exhibits. Upon review we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these exhibits because they were not relevant to the issue in this case. Second assignment of error is overruled.

Settlement agreement; contract law; final order; attorney's fees; reasonableness; compensatory damages; mitigation. The trial court did not err when it granted appellee's motion to enforce settlement agreement where the terms of the agreement were unambiguous and did not allow appellants to deduct expenses from the settlement amount. Further, because the terms were unambiguous the trial court correctly determined that it was not allowed to consider extrinsic evidence to understand the settlement agreement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the attorney's fees submitted by appellee were reasonable, where both parties' witnesses agreed the fee was reasonable, but only disagreed about whether it was proper for the appellee to charge a discounted rate to the insurance company and increase that rate when the insurance company withdrew coverage. The trial court did not err in reconsidering an interlocutory order where the calculation of prejudgment interest was not merely ministerial and where the decision regarding prejudgment interest was unlikely to prevent further appeals. Further the trial court properly determined that appellants had breached the settlement agreement when it withheld expenses contrary to the parties' agreement. However, the appellants presented evidence that the appellee had an opportunity to mitigate its damages. Because it is unclear whether the trial court considered appellants' mitigation argument, the award of attorney's fees is reversed pending further review by the trial court.

Vacate; sentence; plea agreement; violated; agreed sentence; jointly recommended sentence; sentencing range; greater sentence; withdraw; due process; ineffective assistance; resentencing. Vacated appellant's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. The State failed to fully set forth the jointly recommended sentence at the time of sentencing and arguably violated the plea agreement. The trial court did not expressly indicate whether it was accepting or rejecting the jointly recommended sentencing range, and it is unclear what occurred. Appellant was not given the opportunity to withdraw her guilty pleas, her due-process rights were violated, and ineffective assistance of counsel was shown.

Motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12; subject-matter jurisdiction; Court of Claims; unemployment benefits; administrative appeals; App.R. 16(A); App.R. 12(A); R.C. 4141.282. Judgment affirmed. The trial court's dismissal of Temethy's case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper — the Ohio Court of Claims cannot be sued and appellant's claim for money damages against the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services can only be brought in the Ohio Court of Claims because unemployment compensation claims are governed by a special statutory proceeding.

Curative instruction; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. In response to defense counsel's potentially misleading comments during closing statements, the trial court properly provided a curative instruction and included the instruction in the written jury instructions. Defendant-appellant's trafficking conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Maximum sentence; R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); clearly and convincingly; gross sexual imposition; different victims; minor children. - Maximum sentence on one count charging gross sexual imposition involving a ten-year-old victim affirmed where the record supports that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Consecutive sentences affirmed because this court did not have a firm conviction or belief that the trial court's R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings were not clearly and convincingly supported by the record.

Rape; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); remote testimony; Confrontation Clause; harmless error; duplicative testimony; Crim.R. 16(I); witness lists; plain error; cumulative error; manifest weight; credibility; sentencing factors; life terms; R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b). Affirmed. Although the trial court erred by permitting the forensic interviewer to testify remotely, that error was harmless based on the remaining evidence and the duplication of testimony from the investigating detective. Because the defendant did not object to a statement made to the venire before the jury was picked and failed to object to any testimony encroaching on victim-impact territory, and because the appellant failed to discuss plain error, there is no reversible error. The defendant's claim that the defendant's father's absence from trial was commented on by the prosecutor is not supported by the record and none of the convictions are against the weight of the evidence solely based on the inconsistencies in the testimony heard by the jury. And finally, a trial court has authority to impose indefinite life sentences consecutively, which are statutorily required under R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(b).

Pro se litigant; motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(1); Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion for judgment on the pleadings; Civ.R. 12(C); de novo; political subdivision immunity; R.C. Ch. 2744; intentional tort; App.R. 12; App.R. 16. Judgment affirmed. Appellant's intentional tort claim for money damages against the State was properly dismissed because money damages against the State belong in the Court of Claims. Appellant's claims against the County and City were also properly dismissed because appellant failed to overcome statutory immunity. Appellant could not demonstrate that one of the five exceptions contained in R.C. 2744.02(B) applies. Appellant failed to comply with the Ohio Appellate Rules by failing to reference the record identifying the alleged errors made in the trial court; reference the assignment of error to which the statement of the issues relates; and include an argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies. App.R. 12(A)(2) permits the court to disregard an assignment of error if the party raising it fails to comply with the requirements of App.R. 16(A).

Motion for relief from judgment; Civ.R. 60(B); evidentiary hearing; agreed order; bootstrapping. Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant has not established that she is entitled to Civ.R. 60(B) relief or an evidentiary hearing on her motion. The trial court merely adopted a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO") based on the express terms of an agreed judgment entry executed by the parties ("agreed entry"). The appeal — in effect — bootstraps challenges to the agreed entry, where conditions resolving defendant-appellant's contempt were established, and the QDRO, one of the conditions established in the agreed entry, after she failed to timely contest or appeal either.

Summary judgment; common carrier; negligence; open-and-obvious doctrine; static condition; dynamic condition; sudden stop; unusual stop; forceful stop; violent stop; excessive speed; political-subdivision immunity; affidavit; deposition; experts; R.C. 2744.02(B)(1); R.C. 2744.02(B)(2); R.C. 2744.03(A)(3); R.C. 2744.03(A)(5); Civ.R. 30(B)(5); Civ.R. 56. Judgment reversed and remanded. Although plaintiff-appellant admitted he observed the wet bus floor, he did not bring a premises-liability claim based on a static condition. He also alleged active negligence in the driver's operation of the bus. The evidence, construed in the plaintiff-appellant's favor, created genuine issues of material fact as to whether the bus was traveling above the speed limit and came to an unusually sudden, forceful, and violent stop, causing plaintiff-appellant to fall and tear his quadriceps tendon. Plaintiff's affidavit describing the violent stop did not contradict his deposition, both lay and expert evidence supported his theory that the bus was traveling at an excessive speed, and defendant-appellee's internal rules and representative testimony were relevant to negligence. Defendant-appellee could not restore immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) or (A)(5) because ordinary bus-driving negligence is not protected policymaking or high-level discretionary conduct, and no evidence of an emergency stop rebutted the inference of negligence arising from the purportedly unusual sudden stop.

Mandamus, petition for postconviction relief, sentence reduction, new trial, evidentiary hearing. To be granted mandamus, the relator must establish (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent-judge, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The Ohio Supreme Court has held "[t]he availability of an appeal is an adequate remedy sufficient to preclude a writ." The availability of an appeal is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law even if the relator fails to pursue an appeal. Herein, the relator has failed to establish that he possesses the right to sentence reduction, a new trial, or an evidentiary hearing because vague allegations of various violations of constitutional and statutory rights, such as the denial of due process or equal protection, cannot be addressed through mandamus.

Procedendo, petition for postconviction relief; motion for leave to file a motion for new trial; and mootness. Procedendo action to compel rulings on motions for leave to file a motion for new trial and a postconviction-relief petition was rendered moot when the respondent judge ruled on the outstanding matters.

Permanent custody; best interests of the child; clear and convincing evidence; temporary custody; juvenile court; substance abuse; mental health; housing; parenting; sufficiency; manifest weight; extension; abuse of discretion; dependent. The juvenile court's award of permanent custody to the agency is supported by clear and convincing evidence and is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother's motion to extend temporary custody.

Successive petition for postconviction relief; res judicata; newly discovered evidence; bootstrapping; bootstrap; App.R. 4(A)(1). Dismissed. Appellant's appeal of a successive petition for postconviction relief is dismissed because the petition was res judicata and the appeal is an impermissible attempt at bootstrapping.

Civ.R. 12(B)(6); motion to dismiss; without prejudice; not a final appealable order; lack of jurisdiction; appeal dismissed. Appellant appeals the trial court's granting of appellee's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss without prejudice. Because a dismissal of a complaint "without prejudice" is generally not a final appealable order, and this case does not fall under the exception to the rule as the appellant can restate his claims, this is not a final appealable order and we do not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Appeal dismissed.

R.C. 4123.512(F); workers' compensation; attorney fees; appellate-attorney fees; App.R. 24. The trial court's $4,200 award of attorney fees, inclusive of appellate-attorney fees, was a proper application of the unambiguous statutory cap in R.C. 4123.512(F).

Small claims; Civ.R. 60(B); relief from judgment; denied; abuse of discretion; change of address; notice; duty; check; docket; hearing date. Affirmed the trial court's denial of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no excusable neglect was shown when appellant and its counsel failed to file a change-of-address notice and failed to check the docket and stay informed of the status of a motion for continuance and of the small-claims hearing date.

On certification of default.

On certification of default.

The juvenile court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting permanent custody to the Agency. The decision was in the best interests of the child because there was evidence that Mother continuously neglected the child's educational, physical, and mental health needs. Moreover, Father minimally engaged in the case plan and was later removed. Likewise, the juvenile court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting permanent custody to the Agency because the child adamantly expressed her wish to be adopted by her current placement which desired to adopt her.

Appellant's arguments that the trial court failed to comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) and 2929.15(B)(3) at his disposition hearings are barred by res judicata, and even if the merits could be considered, in the absence of a transcript of those proceedings, we presume regularity. Appellant's violation of the relocation requirement of his community control sanctions was nontechnical, and he was subject to revocation and incarceration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to continue his community control violation hearing. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's public records request pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(8). Appellant failed to identify a pending proceeding to which the records would be material and how the records would be material to any justiciable claim. Appellant's right to due process was not violated where he received notice and an opportunity to be heard in both the trial court and on appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant, who was a 17-year-old juvenile, was charged in juvenile court with conduct that if committed by an adult would have constituted the offense of felonious assault (serious physical harm). Appellee filed a motion that requested transfer of the case to the common pleas court's general division so that appellant could have been tried as an adult. Appellant, through a bill of information, was charged with felonious assault (serious physical harm) along with a serious youthful offender specification under R.C. 2152.13. The juvenile court imposed a juvenile adjudication and an adult sentence, which was stayed pending appellant's successful completion of the juvenile adjudication. Because the case remained at all times in the juvenile court, the court erred by stating in its judgment entry that appellant pleaded guilty to felonious assault (serious physical harm), that the court accepted the guilty plea, and that appellant was convicted of felonious assault (serious physical harm). Judgment reversed and remanded.

The probate court erred in granting appellee-intervenor's motion to intervene in an adoption proceeding and concluding that appellee was entitled to notice and to withhold his consent in the adoption. Appellee was not entitled to notice of the adoption petition under R.C. 3107.11, nor was his consent required under R.C. 3107.06(B) or 3107.06(A)(3). Appellee had not timely registered with the Ohio Putative Father Registry as required under R.C. 3107.07(B)(1). And although appellee filed a parentage action in the juvenile court nine days before the adoption petition was filed, prior to the petition's filing, no judicial proceeding had determined that a parent-child relationship existed between appellee and the child. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress methamphetamine found in his parked car. The community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution authorized a police officer to open appellant's car door, exposing the drugs to plain view. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions against appellant for pursuing an oral motion for Spanish-language interpreter on the morning of trial. The record does not support a reasonable conclusion that the motion was brought for purposes of delay and had caused a delay. Judgment reversed.

The trial court erred in accepting appellant's Alford plea to attempted murder. The trial court did not inquire into the State's evidence supporting the charge. The trial court also did not inquire about defense counsel's investigation into the strength of the State's case or counsel's recommendations to appellant. The trial court received merely a recitation of appellant's indictment, which is not a sufficient factual basis for a defendant to enter an Alford plea. Absent a proper Alford plea hearing, appellant's plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Appellant's plea vacated, trial court judgment reversed, and matter remanded.

The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion to vacate postrelease control where the argument raised in the motion is barred by res judicata and otherwise lacks merit. Judgment affirmed and matter remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of amending the sentencing entry nunc pro tunc to delete certain language that was mistakenly added to the entry when it was amended in 2011.

CRIMINAL-POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant failed to establish that key witness's testimony was actually false or that the State knew that the testimony was false where nothing in the record or affidavit in support of postconviction petition substantiates these claims; trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find deficient performance that affected the outcome of appellant's trial where trial counsel did not choose to attempt impeachment of key witness with recorded statement; key witness was shown to be a convicted felon and liar via other impeachment; transcription of key witness's earlier interview demonstrated only potentially damaging statements; and it was mere speculation to conclude that had counsel impeached key witness with earlier statement that jurors would somehow have reached a different conclusion.

Per Mayle, J., there is sufficient evidence to convict defendant-appellant, Michael Cowgill of rape. Additionally, the conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Per Mayle, J., trial court erroneously imposed consecutive sentences as if they were mandatory under R.C. 2921.331(D). Because consecutive sentences were not mandatory, court was not required to inform appellant at plea hearing of the possibility of imposing consecutive sentences. Trial court's inclusion of all possible terms of postrelease control in sentencing entry did not reflect notice it gave at sentencing hearing. Court previously dismissed count so did not need to include it in sentencing entry.

Per Mayle, J., although Hills claims that his plea was not knowingly or intelligently made because the trial court failed to inform him of potential consequences, our review of the record establishes that the trial court complied with the constitutional and procedural safeguards set out in Crim.R. 11 to ensure that his plea was knowingly and intelligently entered. As such, we find Hills' assignment of error not well-taken and affirm the Judgement Entry of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, reverses appellant's conviction for [hit and skip]

Sulek, J., affirms the trial court's order imposing civil penalties and injunctive relief for open dumping of solid waste and public nuisance as not against the weight of evidence and supported by sufficient evidence. Appellants failed to file complete transcripts. Appellants' claim of judicial bias was forfeited by failure to file affidavit of disqualification with Ohio Supreme Court.

Per Osowik, J., Appeal is dismissed. The merits of appellant's assignments cannot be addressed because the completion of his prison sentence sanction renders his appeal moot.

Per Mayle, J., appellant cannot show that negligent misrepresentation applies to his claim because he was not involved in a business transaction. Assuming that real estate sale was a business transaction, trial court did not abuse its discretion by adopting magistrate's finding that appellant failed to prove justifiable reliance on statement appellee made in real estate listing document.

Per Mayle, J., although framed as contract claims, plaintiff's complaint alleges conduct that, if proven, constitutes an unfair labor practice specifically enumerated in R.C. 4117.11. State Employee Relations Board ("SERB") has exclusive jurisdiction over her claims. Plaintiff has not been deprived of a forum in which to bring her claims. R.C. Chapter 4117 vests SERB with jurisdiction in the first instance and redress may be sought in the courts depending on SERB's disposition of her claims.

CIVIL - sanctions; attorney representing criminal defendant in application to reopen; use of hallucinated artificial intelligence quotes from transcript; fabricated quotations; public artificial intelligence platform; ChatGPT; quotes do not exist; hearing held before appellate panel; admission of misconduct; staff member; paralegal; use of improper artificial intelligence tools; failure to review submission; impugn prosecutor; improper challenge to appellate counsel's effectiveness; claimed remedial measures; continuing education; intra-firm policy; policy had hallmarks of artificial intelligence; appeal to Supreme Court; after sanction hearing respondent used artificial intelligence in a Cuyahoga County criminal case; prosecutor identified improper use; alleged inadvertence; post-hoc action of similar misconduct; inherent judicial authority; control abuse of judicial process; constitutional authority; statutory authority to guard against contempt; Ohio App.R. 23; Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct; candor toward the tribunal; false statements of fact; responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistance; dishonesty; fraud; misrepresentation; deceit; conduct prejudicial to administration of justice; failure to take corrective action; court not bound by private settlement agreement; court need not defer only to disciplinary process; service of judgment upon courts; verification requirements for future filings; mandatory continuing legal education requirements; strike original application to reopen; removal of respondent as counsel; written apologies to those defamed by fabricated filing; compliance and enforcement conditions.

Elections—Prohibition—R.C. 3513.05—Writ sought to prevent board of elections from placing candidate on May 2026 primary-election ballot for Republican Party nomination for office of U.S. Representative for Sixth Ohio Congressional District—R.C. 3513.05 conveys that board of elections with whom a protest against candidacy is filed may consider whether candidate "has not fully complied with" R.C. Ch. 3513—Board of elections did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard applicable law in denying protest against candidacy, because board correctly determined signature-validity issues involving candidate's petition at protest hearing—Writ denied.

Civil Stalking Protection Order

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's pretrial motion to amend the negligence and wrongful-death allegations in a complaint where the proposed amendments, nearly five years after the decedent's death, would have shifted the theory of liability and alleged a different cause of death.

CRIMINAL - felony sentencing; standard of review; contrary to law; due process; meaningful review; consecutive sentences; R.C. 2929.11 and .12; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings; criminal history

CRIMINAL - property violations; sufficiency of the evidence; registration statement on vacant land; notice or knowledge to register; property maintenance; affirmed in part, reversed in part and vacated.

Criminal complaint lacked both a numerical ordinance designation and a proper oath, rendering it invalid under Crim.R. 3 and depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. A separately stapled record of arrest could not cure the deficiencies absent express incorporation language in the complaint. WITH DISSENTING OPINION

Plaintiff, business invitee, appeals decision granting summary judgment in favor of public bar on negligence claim. Plaintiff injured by umbrella after burst of wind on bar patio. Trial court found accident result of an unforeseeable "act of God." Genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the bar breached a duty of care to the plaintiff by failing to secure umbrella. Genuine issues of fact remained as to proximate cause, and whether wind conditions were sole cause of injury ("act of God" defense), or whether the wind, in conjunction with a breach of duty, contributed to Plaintiff's injury. WITH DISSENTING OPINION.

In a situation where a child has previously been adjudicated dependent and legal custody has been granted to a non-parent, the juvenile court did not commit plain error or otherwise abuse its discretion in denying the parents' motions for visitation. The record demonstrated the court considered the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.051(D) and the totality of the circumstances demonstrated the mother's and father's progress with sobriety and stability was somewhat recent and occurred only while subject to court supervision and sanctions. The juvenile court also did not commit plain error or otherwise abuse its discretion by waiting more than a year to rule on the parents' motions for visitation where the delay did not prejudice the parents and was caused by service issues, attempts at mediation, and continuance requests that were acquiesced to by the parents.

Court of Claims did not err in finding that a public-records requester was abusing the public-record laws based upon the number, frequency, and duplicative nature of his public-records requests to a city and the enforcement actions he had filed, and in dismissing the requester's public-records-access complaints under R.C. 2743.75(D)(2). Court of Claims properly struck requester's objections to the special master's recommendation for dismissal.

Defendant appeals convictions for aggravated murder. Autopsy reports admissible under Evid.R. 803(8), public records hearsay exception. Coroners are not "law enforcement personnel" under Evid.R. 803(8). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to provide jurors with accomplice instruction under R.C. 2923.03(D). Trial court did not abuse discretion in providing a consciousness-of-guilt instruction. Defendant failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct and a violation of Evid.R. 410(A) (inadmissibility of plea evidence). Defendant's convictions supported by overwhelming evidence.

Trial court failed to orally advise defendant of consequences of violating postrelease control. Trial court properly notified defendant of possibility of postrelease control during combined plea and sentencing hearing. Trial court not required to make statutory findings when consecutive sentences are jointly recommended by defendant and State. Appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review jointly recommended consecutive sentences that are authorized by law. WITH DISSENTING OPINION

R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(a), de facto termination of marriage, expert witness, case management order, Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(c), separate property, passive appreciation

Prohibition, R.C. 2969.25, inmate account statement, affidavit of prior filings

FDA, FDCA, consumer sales practices act, R.C. 1345.01, R.C. 1345.12, CSPA, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), implied preemption, express preemption, police powers, tobacco, vapes, safe harbor, 21 U.S.C. 387t(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. 387, 21 U.S.C. 387b(6), Ohio Administrative Code 109:4-3-02(A)(1), statutory interpretation, supremacy clause, moot

summary judgment, Civ.R. 56(C), insurance, declaratory judgment, contract, 4511.215, motor vehicle, golf cart, R.C. 4501.01(XX), R.C. 4511.214(B)(a)

Mandamus, compel ruling, procedendo, moot

Summary Judgment; Weight of the Evidence, Breach of Contract; Fraud; Control of Docket. Trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claim when there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the terms of the oral contract and as to whether plaintiff completed the contract. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the fraud claim when defendant could not show justifiable reliance. Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for a third extension of the discovery deadline.

Sufficient Evidence; Manifest Weight; Self-Defense Instruction. To secure a jury instruction on self-defense, the Defense must produce evidence that tends to support the conclusion that he or she used force in self-defense. This involves producing evidence from which each of the elements of self-defense could be found. The elements of self-defense are cumulative; thus, the failure to establish one element means that this affirmative defense is not successfully raised. To establish a conviction for assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), the State must prove that the defendant knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to another. The slightest injury is sufficient to establish physical harm in this analysis.

Manifest Weight; Sentencing. Conviction for Gross Sexual Imposition was not against the weight of the evidence. Further, sentence was not based on improper considerations.

Community Control Violation; Substantial Evidence; Confrontation of Witnesses; Due Process. The trial court did not err by finding that substantial evidence supported a finding that defendant-appellant violated the terms of his community control. The trial court did not violate defendant-appellant's due-process rights at his community-control revocation hearing.

Sentencing - Consecutive Sentences

Fraudulent Inducement, Resulting Trust, Partition

Elections—Mandamus—Writ sought to compel board of elections to hold hearing under R.C. 3513.05—Relator failed to establish a clear legal right to a mandatory hearing or board's corresponding clear legal duty to hold such a hearing because his request did not constitute a valid protest under R.C. 3513.05—A hearing on relator's request would be in vain as it would not result in candidate's removal from primary-election ballot—Writ denied.

Standing; preliminary injunction; permanent injunction; beyond a reasonable doubt; clear and convincing evidence; Civ.R. 65; conversion; void for vagueness; unconstitutional taking; rational basis test

R.C. 2967.191; jail-time credit; plain error; concurrent terms

manifest weight of the evidence; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; conversion; trees; stumpage value; R.C. 901.51; sufficiency of the evidence; punitive damages; malice; attorney fees

motion to suppress; R.C. 4503.21(A)(2); license plate; covered; visibility

On appeal from a criminal sentence, imposed pursuant to a guilty plea, that included a non-mandatory two-year prison term for felonious assault and a mandatory one-year prison term for a firearm specification attached to the felonious-assault offense. Because the felonious assault offense had an attendant firearm specification, a prison term was required by R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) as interpreted in State v. Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772. Because the prison term was required by R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), it was a "mandatory prison term" as defined in R.C. 2929.01(X). The trial court erred in designating the two-year prison term for felonious assault as non-mandatory. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Appellants pled facts sufficient to establish standing to sue under Count III of their complaint, and the trial court erred in finding otherwise. Judgment reversed in part; cause remanded.

The trial court did not apply the incorrect legal standard to appellant's motion to vacate for lack of personal jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion in concluding appellant failed to rebut the presumption of proper service. Service by ordinary mail was accomplished in accordance with Civ.R. 4.6(D), and appellant did not provide any evidence to substantiate his claim he was incarcerated at that time. Judgment affirmed.

PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST—R.C. 149.43—REMEDIES—R.C. 2743.75: Because respondent failed to certify that a copy of its objections to the special master's report and recommendation was sent to requester via "certified mail, return receipt requested," as required by R.C. 2743.75(F)(2), neither party timely lodged objections in the manner prescribed by the statute. Thus, pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(F)(2), the court of claims should have "issue[d] a final order adopting the report and recommendation, unless it determines that there is an error of law or other defect evident on the face of the report and recommendation." In recognizing the statutory defect in respondent's certificate of service, and in the absence of any evidence showing requester was served with a copy of respondent's objections "by certified mail, return receipted requested," the court of claims erred in considering respondent's objections and conducting an independent review of the evidence. Judgment reversed in part; cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision and the applicable law.

GUILTY PLEA—CRIM.R. 32.1—POSTCONVICTION MOTION: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty plea without a hearing. Defendant failed to show that a hearing was warranted or that withdrawal of his pleas was necessary to correct a manifest injustice where defendant failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating his actual innocence of the charged offense, legal impossibility, or any error on the part of trial counsel. Judgment affirmed.

Any error in the court's exclusion of the decedent's statements under Evid.R. 804(B)(5) was harmless. The trial court properly instructed the jury on prevention of performance.

Per Osowik, J., Appeal is dismissed. The merits of appellant's assignments cannot be addressed because the completion of her jail-time sanction renders her appeal moot.

Crim.R. 33; Motion for new trial

No abuse of discretion occurred when the trial court denied a criminal defendant's pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.

Civil stalking protection order

At the time community control is imposed, the trial court must advise the defendant that it reserves the authority to impose consecutive sentences upon any violation of the terms of community control.

Procedendo, moot, motions withdrawn, actual controversy

ineffective assistance of counsel, manifest weight of the evidence, sufficiency of the evidence, joinder, constructive possession

felony murder – self-defense – manifest weight – initial aggressor – shooting – witness credibility – surveillance footage – bar fight – bathroom

Mandamus, improper party, fatally defective, deceased respondent, dismissed

Procedendo, issue ruling, moot, vain act

CIVIL - R.C. 2711.02(B); R.C. 2711.03; arbitration; stay; compel; satisfied; trier of fact; Civil Rule 56(E); affidavits.

Marketable Title Act; multiple possible roots of title may exist within a chain of title; a trial court must review every possible root of title deed up to the severance deed before determining whether an interest has been preserved; Senterra Ltd. v. Winland, 2019-Ohio-4387 (7th Dist.).

CIVIL – civil stalking protection order; electronic mails; disclosure of medical diagnosis, ownership of weapons; credibility; failure to sua sponte permit supplemental briefing.

Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms trial court's judgment convicting appellant of possession and conveyance as supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Possession and conveyance do not merge for sentencing purposes, and appellant failed to explain why trial counsel's failure to seek admission of certain exhibits was ineffective assistance of counsel.

Duhart. Divorce. Settlement agreement. Meeting of the minds.

Osowik. The trial court properly determined that landlord/appellee JOGA made a reasonable effort to re-rent the premises following tenant/appellant TT419's breach of the parties' lease agreement. Appellants have failed to show that JOGA failed to make reasonable efforts to mitigate the damages resulting from appellant's breach of the lease agreement.

Anders Brief - No Nonfrivolous Issues

Contract - Bona Fide Purchasers for Value - Erroneous Factual Finding by Trial Court - Tortious Interference with Contract - Manifest Weight of the Evidence

failure to establish good cause for filing application for reopening a year after appellate decision affirming his conviction; application to reopen denied.

Crim.R. 11(E); court required to inform a defendant of the effect of a guilty plea prior to accepting the plea; state confesses error; reversed and remanded.

summary judgment; final, appealable order; political subdivision immunity; R.C. Chapter 2744; federal qualified immunity

guilty plea; vehicular assault; failure to stop after an accident; R.C. 2929.19; court permitted to consider reports from Community Corrections Association of Appellant's violation of electronically monitored house arrest

CIVIL – docket; trial continuances; abuse of discretion; damages; speculative; ascertainable; repair estimates; hearsay; lay witness testimony; no objection; Civ.R. 53(E)(3)(b); plain error.

Marketable Title Act; Blackstone v. Moore, 2018-Ohio-4959; Erickson v. Morrison, 2021-Ohio-746; minor deviations found between the original reservation and the reference within the root of title deed do not make a reference general where the language is nearly verbatim and the essential terms are the same; remand to enter judgment where party admits the process of reasonable due diligence not met in Dormant Mineral Act analysis; remand to determine the amount of royalties owed and who must pay those.

Motion to suppress; illegible license plate, R.C. 4503.21; improperly illuminated license plate, R.C. 4513.05; initiating vehicle stop; reasonable articulable suspicion; no contest plea; failure to inform defendant of effects of no contest plea; failure of defendant to express no contest plea on the record; Crim.R. 11; de novo review; ineffective assistance of counsel; trial strategy

Motion to suppress; substantial compliance; National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") standards; R.C. 4511.19(A); R.C. 4511.19(D); R.C. 3701.143; Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-03; Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05. Affirmed. The trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress alcohol-test results is affirmed because the appellee met its burden of demonstrating substantial compliance with Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 when it introduced the dry gas supplier's certificate of analysis showing traceability to NIST standards.

Motion for new trial; Crim.R. 33(A)(6); Brady violation; de novo review; prejudice; allied offenses; merger; R.C. 2941.25; plain error; concurrent sentence; indefinite sentence; Reagan Tokes Act; R.C. 2929.144(B)(2) and (C); felony sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); "qualifying felony"; R.C. 2929.14(A); 2929.19(B)(2); minimum and maximum terms. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded for resentencing. Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the late disclosure of information. In other words, appellant did not establish that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the trial would have been different. Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to deny appellant's motion for new trial because his due-process rights were not violated. Nevertheless, we reverse appellant's sentence because the trial court improperly sentenced appellant on allied offenses of similar import. In addition, the trial court incorrectly imposed the minimum and maximum prison terms as set forth in R.C. 2929.144(B)(2) and (C) and failed to properly advise Ayers of the notification requirements as set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2). Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

Motion to suppress; traffic stop; window tint; Mimms order; Terry frisk; pat-down search; waiver; Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14; R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); R.C. 2923.12(A)(2); R.C. 2923.16(B); R.C. 2941.1417(A). Judgment affirmed. Following lawful stop for suspected illegal window tint, state trooper lawfully ordered defendant-appellant out of the vehicle under Mimms. Defendant-appellant's argument that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution should be interpreted to provide broader protection than the Fourth Amendment in the Mimms context was waived because he did not raise it in the trial court. In addition, defendant-appellant did not argue plain error and nothing in the record suggested plain error. The subsequent pat-down was justified under Terry because defendant-appellant exited the vehicle in an unusual, hunched posture with his right arm pressed toward his waistband, he had provided only an identification card rather than a driver's license, and there was broken glass inside the car.

Sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; rape; fellatio; attempted vaginal rape; kidnapping; felonious assault; strangulation; R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); operating a vehicle under the influence; absence of scientific evidence; sexually violent predator; ineffective assistance of counsel; jail-issued clothing; involuntary intoxication; R.C. 2971.01(H); jury instructions; lesser-included offense; unlawful restraint; inferior-offense; allied offenses of similar import; R.C. 2941.25; consecutive sentences; one or more course of conduct. The trial testimony of the victim was sufficient to support the State's charges of rape (fellatio), attempted vaginal rape, kidnapping, felonious assault, and strangulation and overcome defendant-appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. The evidence was sufficient to overcome the Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal on the operating a vehicle under the influence charge where (1) the defendant-appellant testified that he drove his vehicle and while he was driving he became sleepy and confused about his directions and (2) the responding patrolman testified that he believed the defendant-appellant — who he found asleep in the driver's seat of his truck with the truck running and stopped in the middle of an intersection — was intoxicated because he smelled strongly of alcohol, had glossy eyes, had wet his pants, and was unable to stand up on his own. There was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find the defendant-appellant was likely to engage in a sexually violent offense in the future and, thus, classify him as a sexually violent predator. There was sufficient, competent, credible evidence to support the defendant-appellant's convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and, accordingly, his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant-appellant did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err when it allowed the State to introduce testimony during the sexually violent predator specifications portion of the trial. The Ohio Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply to sexual violent predator classification hearings, and the evidence supported a sexually violent predator classification under R.C. 2971.01(H). The trial court did not err when it chose not to instruct the jury on unlawful restraint, the lesser-included offense of kidnapping, or aggravated assault, the inferior-offense of felonious assault. The evidence did not support merger of the rape (fellatio) conviction with the attempted vaginal rape, kidnapping, felonious assault, and strangulation convictions. The trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was not contrary to law.

Petition for postconviction relief; R.C. 2953.21; findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court erred in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its denial of the petition for postconviction relief.

Motion for mistrial; Sixth Amendment right to public trial; no closure by court; officer's testimony; personal knowledge; not hearsay; no violation of Sixth Amendment right; Confrontation Clause; conceded error; theft is a lesser included offense of robbery. Appellant appeals ruling during trial and his sentencing. Appellant's first assignment of error alleges the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial when his family was allegedly accidentally informed by a court employee trial that day had been canceled when it was not. Because there was no action by the court and the trial was not actually closed and still open to the public there is nothing for us to review and thereby no violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Appellant's second assignment of error alleges the trial court erred permitting testimony from the investigating officer regarding appellant's out-of-state arrest and extradition to Cuyahoga County arguing the officer did not have personal knowledge of this information, the information was hearsay, and it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront an out-of-court witness. We find the officer did testify to his personal knowledge and that there were not out-of-court statements made during his testimony such that there was no hearsay and thereby no confrontation clause concerns. Appellant's third assignment of error alleges the trial court erred by sentencing him to both counts of theft and aggravated robbery, since the theft is lesser included offenses and they should have merged for sentencing. The State concedes assignment of error three. As such we overrule appellant's first two assignments of error and sustain his third assignment and vacate the trial court's sentence and remand the matter for resentencing.

Suppression; marijuana; citation. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in granting the defendant's motion to suppress. The search of the defendant's vehicle was unlawful. Although marijuana is now legal in Ohio, it is not legal to smoke it in a vehicle. The defendant admitted he smoked marijuana in his car and the officer issued a citation for that. There was no indication that the defendant had committed any other offense, and therefore the search of the defendant's vehicle was unlawful.

Inaccurate transcript; App.R. 9; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; bench trial; alibi defense; credibility; admission of evidence; proffer; hearsay; victim's statements to officer; plain error; Crim.R. 52; impeachment evidence; extrinsic evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel; prejudice; futile objection; Evid.R. 608; cumulative error. Despite asserting that the transcript was inadequate because it contained a number of instances where testimony was "inaudible," appellant did not utilize any of the provisions of App.R. 9. Appellant was able to file his brief and did not identify any error that he could have raised but for the transcript issues. The trial court did not preclude appellant from proffering evidence. The officer's testimony regarding statements made by the victim did not constitute hearsay in violation of the Confrontation Clause because the victim also testified and was subject to cross-examination, and the officer's testimony was duplicative. Appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and was supported by sufficient evidence. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and the cumulative-error doctrine did not apply.

Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings; disassociated partner; no attorney-client relationship formed. Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly granted the defendants' Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The disassociated partner was without authority to retain legal representation for the partnership from which he disassociated.

Medical records; privilege; waiver; R.C. 2317.02; protective order. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The domestic relations court erred by not granting a protective order to limit the dissemination of the medical records to anyone other than the parties and their counsel of record, or any experts or professionals retained by counsel in preparation for trial. Notwithstanding, the trial court did not err by denying plaintiff's request to preclude the defendant from reviewing the materially relevant evidence to assist in preparation of the case.

Trafficking; cocaine; R.C. 2925.03(A)(2); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12; sentencing factors; considered; negotiated plea agreement; jointly recommended sentencing range; ineffective assistance of counsel; guilty plea; prejudice; confidential informant; speculative; exculpatory information; advocate; minimum sentence. Affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence for tracking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) with forfeiture specifications. Appellant failed to affirmatively show that the trial court failed to consider the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 or that his sentence is contrary to law. Appellant also failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered a guilty plea under a negotiated plea agreement, offered a speculative argument and did not establish the need for disclosure of a confidential informant, his trial counsel advocated for the minimum sentence under a jointly recommended sentencing range, and no deficient performance or prejudice was shown.

Magistrate's decision; objections; transcript; Civ.R. 53. - Decision affirmed where this court lacked any ability to review appellant's assignments of error because she did not provide a transcript or affidavit of the evidence, requiring this court to accept the trial court's factual findings. Moreover, newly raised arguments not raised below are disregarded under Civ.R. 53.

Permanent custody; juvenile court; custody; best interests of the child; temporary custody; parental rights; best interest; manifest weight of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence; guardian ad litem recommendation; best interest; termination; permanent placement; trial. Mother did not demonstrate any error with regard to claimed procedural irregularities or altered documentation. Mother failed to show how the trial court restricted her cross-examination of witnesses or refused to hear her motions. Further, the trial court's determination that awarding permanent custody to the agency was in the child's best interest was supported by clear and convincing evidence. The decision to terminate Mother's parental rights and award permanent custody to the agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Crim.R. 29; sufficiency of the evidence; strangulation; domestic violence; R.C. 2903.18(B)(3); R.C. 2919.25(A); hearsay; plain error; Crim.R. 52(B). Judgment affirmed. After viewing the evidence against the defendant-appellant in a light most favorable to the State — and absent authority cited to the contrary — we find that the trial court could reasonably conclude from substantial evidence that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) knowingly caused or created a substantial risk of physical harm to the victim, his then wife, by means of strangulation or suffocation in violation of R.C. 2903.18(B)(3) and (2) knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to the victim in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). Thus, we find that the defendant-appellant's strangulation and domestic-violence convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and his Crim.R. 29 motions for acquittal were properly denied. Moreover, we decline to address the defendant-appellant's second assignment of error — claiming that portions of two officers' testimony amounted to inadmissible hearsay — since no objections were raised at the trial-court level and defendant-appellant failed to make a plain-error argument on appeal.

Summary judgment; compulsory counterclaim; res judicata; landlord-tenant dispute; jurisdiction; housing court; forcible entry and detainer; money damages; Civ.R. 13(A); Civ.R. 12(B)(1); R.C. 1901.17; R.C. 1901.131; R.C. 1901.181. Judgment affirmed. Appellant tenant's common pleas action was barred based on principles of subject-matter jurisdiction and the doctrine of res judicata. Appellant's common pleas claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, negligence/breach of fiduciary duties, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief all arose from the same landlord-tenant relationship, lease, rent issues, and eviction proceedings as landlord's housing court action for forcible entry and detainer and money damages. Appellant's common pleas claims were logically related to the housing court action and were therefore compulsory counterclaims under Civ.R. 13(A). While appellant had attempted to file a counterclaim in the housing court, the counterclaim had been stricken as untimely, the housing court later entered final judgment in favor of landlord on its claims, and no attempt was made to appeal the housing court's decision.

Res judicata; allied offenses; voidable sentence. The trial court's judgment denying the petitioner's motion for allied-offense determination was affirmed. The petitioner's arguments were either not properly before this court or barred by res judicata.

Knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea; sex offender registration; Tier II sex offender registration; consecutive sentences; allied offenses; merger; double jeopardy; collateral consequences; Crim.R. 11; R.C. 2941.25; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); R.C. 2967.28(B)(4); ineffective assistance of counsel; postrelease control. Judgment affirmed. Defendant-appellant's guilty plea to amended counts of abduction with sexual motivation and attempted felonious assault was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 and adequately explained the direct consequences of Tier II sex-offender classification. Any confusion about defendant-appellant's contact with his nieces concerned collateral rather than direct consequences of the plea. Defendant-appellant expressly waived any merger argument by stipulating pursuant to the plea agreement that the offenses were not allied, which defeated his attack on consecutive sentences and his related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel secured a substantial benefit by reducing two first-degree felonies and eliminating sexually violent predator specifications. The imposition of postrelease control consisting of a statutory range did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.

App.R. 26; application to reopen an appeal; Murnahan; ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Appellant's application to reopen his appeal is denied because the appellant was not subject to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and his offenses were not allied offenses.

Judgment reversed. The trial court applied the doctrine of waiver by estoppel, rather than the doctrine of equitable estoppel, to find the defendant/landlord was estopped from claiming the leases terminated on December 31, 2021. However, competent, credible evidence did not support the court's estoppel determination, because the defendant/landlord accepted the rent from the plaintiff/tenant prior to the expiration of the parties' final standstill agreement, and the defendant/landlord did not engage in any conduct inconsistent with its right to claim either that the final standstill agreement expired on April 15, 2022 or that the leases expired on December 31, 2021.

The trial court did not err in granting appellee's motions for summary judgment. Because appellants cannot show that they were treated differently than a party similarly situated in all relevant respects, their equal protection claims fail. Judgments affirmed.

DIVORCE – CUSTODY – SHARED PARENTING – SCHOOL-PLACEMENT PARENT – BEST INTEREST – R.C. 3109.04: Where the trial court appropriately balanced the competing testimony of Mother and Father with the best interest of their child, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in naming Mother as the residential parent for school-placement purposes, notwithstanding the guardian ad litem's recommendation that Father be designated the school-placement parent. Judgment affirmed.

The Franklin County Municipal Court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff credit union on its claims against the defendant for nonpayment of an automobile loan and a credit card. The credit union met its initial burden of pointing to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) showing there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant did not satisfy her reciprocal burden under Civ.R. 56(E) of setting forth by evidence permitted under Civ.R. 56(C) specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial.

Knowing, Voluntary, Intelligent plea

Merger; Allied offenses; Agreed upon sentencing; Weapon under disability; Carrying a concealed weapon; Improper handling of a firearm

Merger; Allied offenses; Agreed upon sentencing; Weapon under disability; Carrying a concealed weapon; Improper handling of a firearm

Transfer on death designation affidavit and undue influence

On certified entry of felony conviction.

Defendant's conviction on a felony drug-possession charge was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Appellant's claim that his guilty pleas are invalid because the trial court failed to personally address him during the plea hearing and failed to ensure that he understood the effect of his pleas as required by Crim.R. 11(C) lacks merit because the record established that the trial court satisfied those requirements. Appellant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing certain arguments from his motion to suppress lacks merit because it is purely speculative as to whether the withdrawn arguments would have been successful, and because withdrawing the arguments was a strategic and tactical decision by counsel that cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance claim. Appellant's claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him to plead guilty as opposed to no contest also fails because the claim relies on evidence outside of the record and therefore cannot be raised on direct appeal. Appellant's claim that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences lacks merit because the trial court made all the required consecutive-sentence findings at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry, and those findings are not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Appellant's claim that the trial court erred by failing to consider his present and future ability to pay financial sanctions lacks merit because no such consideration was required given that the trial court imposed only court costs, which are not financial sanctions. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant argued that his 14-month sentence for strangulation, a felony of the fourth degree, is contrary to law. However, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow an appellate court to reweigh the statutory factors contained in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. In addition, appellant's sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law because the trial court properly considered the purposes and principals of sentencing, considered the seriousness and recidivism factors, and concluded that granting appellant community control would demean the seriousness of his conduct. In addition, the trial court did not rely on incomplete or inaccurate information when imposing appellant's prison sentence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction of involuntary manslaughter for the death of her diabetic, teenage son is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was sentenced to a prison term of 11 to 16.5 years in connection with her guilty plea to permitting child abuse, a first-degree felony. Her prison sentence was within the permissible statutory range, and the record established that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in sentencing her. Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial record indicated that appellant created the violent situation and that he was not acting out of a legitimate fear of imminent bodily harm when he attacked appellee. Judgment affirmed.

Any error as to the form of appellant's indictment, to which there was no objection, did not constitute plain error. The verdict forms were neither erroneous nor incomplete. Appellant was correctly designated a violent offender. The trial court did not err in the admission of video tape evidence. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by not merging appellant's convictions of attempted murder and discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises. Judgment affirmed.

GRAND JURY — TESTIMONY — CRIM.R. 6(E) — DISCLOSURE: Where defendant had a particularized need to establish whether exculpatory evidence was presented to the grand jury, and where the State stipulated it had not presented any exculpatory evidence to that body, defendant's particularized need was met and the trial court abused its discretion in ordering disclosure of additional testimony from the grand jury transcript.

JUVENILE — DELINQUENCY — VENUE — CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE — SUFFICIENCY — MANIFEST WEIGHT: The State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish venue where the testimony of the officer includes mention of two responding police departments, several road names that are all in the same area and connect in some manner, several landmarks, and descriptions of the area that all identify the area in which this incident occurred as Indian Hill, a State's exhibit identifies the area of the accident on Given Road, which was at Livingston Lodge, as being located in "Cincinnati, Ohio," the police report attached to the complaint is from the Indian Hill Rangers, the complaint was file stamped in Hamilton County, and the police report was assigned a Hamilton County case number.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT — CIVIL PLAIN ERROR: Where defendant-debtor failed to file objections to the magistrate's decision granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-creditor, defendant-debtor waived all but plain error on appeal, and the trial court's judgment adopting the magistrate's decision and granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-creditor will be affirmed where defendant-debtor failed to raise a plain-error argument on appeal and plain error is not apparent in the record or the trial court's decision.

There was no plain error in standby counsel's participation in sidebar conferences, the court did not err in excluding exhibits and evidence, and the conviction for failure to register was supported by sufficient evidence.

Where no objection was raised, appellant failed to establish plain error where, in contravention of the plea agreement, the State's comments at sentencing were an attempt to influence his sentence.

Per Mayle, J., defendant waived error respecting admission of excited utterances by stating that he had "no objection" when State sought to admit the evidence. State presented evidence of "knowingly" where defendant fired eight shots in residential neighborhood in middle of afternoon while children played outside. Convictions not against manifest weight of evidence. On State's cross-appeal, sentence contrary to law where wrong subsection cited and court failed to impose maximum indefinite prison term.

Per Sulek, J., court cannot say that record clearly and convincingly does not support trial court's finding that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to seriousness of appellant's conduct and danger he poses to public. Appellant did not demonstrate reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have entered guilty plea. Record is devoid of evidence from which court can conclude that appellant's conduct did not support elevated degrees of offenses.

Duhart. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. The convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court, in sentencing separately for counts 1 and 2 did not err simply because the parties agreed that they should merge.

Elections—Mandamus—Writ sought to compel board of elections to hold hearing in accordance with R.C. 3501.39 and 3503.24—Rule of necessity requires board members to hear elector's protest and challenge against candidate despite board members' concerns that their participation in matter could convey a perception of bias—Writ granted.

CRIMINAL – motion to withdraw plea; North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); no contest; State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236, (1st Dist.1995); prejudice to the state; waiver of appellate rights; testimony at the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea.

Imposition of jail sentence for failure to pay restitution

Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where multiple witnesses established that he shot the victim and then ordered his accomplice to shoot the victim a second time. There was no reasonable likelihood that the false testimony of the State's witness could have affected the judgment of the jury where the defense demonstrated the factual error through another witness. The State had provided sufficient evidence of appellant's prior conviction to support finding he is a repeat violent offender ("RVO"). The trial court engaged in unconstitutional fact-finding in imposing an RVO sentence when it made explicit findings under R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(a)(iv) and (v) which the Ohio Supreme Court has excised from the statute as unconstitutional. Therefore, appellant must be resentenced without these findings.

Defendant's voluntary guilty plea waived his claim that the State violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers' speedy-trial provisions. Such a violation is non-jurisdictional, and Ohio does not permit conditional guilty pleas reserving pretrial issues for appeal.

The trial court did not err in refusing to merge several convictions for voyeurism and illegal use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented material or performance because, among other reasons, the former punishes an individual's trespass on a minor victim's reasonable expectation of privacy and is narrow in scope whereas the latter seeks to more generally combat conduct that supports or encourages the exploitation of children. As a result, each crime was of dissimilar import and could not be merged.

Complaint for a writ of prohibition dismissed. Relator, the Ohio Attorney General, did not demonstrate the Probate Court patently and unambiguously acted outside of its inherent authority when appointing the Attorney General to act as a special prosecutor in proceedings seeking the removal of elected municipal officials accused of misfeasance or malfeasance because the city's director of law and the county prosecutor (the statutorily proscribed prosecutors of such cases) asserted conflicts of interest.

motion to suppress, arrest warrant, search warrant, Fourth Amendment, Section 14, Article I, Ohio Constitution

political subdivision immunity, governmental v. proprietary functions, summary judgment

Eighth Amendment, excessive fines, forfeiture, grossly disproportional, Operating a Vehicle Impaired ("OVI"), R.C. 4511.19, R.C. 4503.234(E), findings of fact, competent, credible evidence

writ of habeas corpus – petition – R.C. 2969.25 – filing requirements – balance statement of inmate account – dismissal

R.C. 733.72, R.C. 733.73, municipal home rule, municipal charter, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution, Home Rule Amendment

Sufficiency of the Evidence; Manifest Weight of the Evidence; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. The defendant-appellant's obstructing-official-business and resisting-arrest convictions are based on sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The decision of the defendant-appellant's trial counsel to cross-examine a witness without the use of the transcript of the hearing is trial strategy and does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

Sufficiency; Manifest Weight; Collateral Attack. Prior judgment entries sufficiently established that defendant had pleaded guilty to, or been convicted of, 5 prior Operating a Vehicle Impaired ("OVI")s within 20 years. Collateral attack on prior plea for being uncounseled not supported by the evidence.

Evidence of Prior Convictions for Impeachment Purposes; Evid.R. 609(B); Abuse of Discretion; Limiting Instruction; Merger; R.C. 2941.25; Plain Error. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of the defendant-appellant's prior convictions. The prior convictions are within the ten-year time limit and involve crimes of dishonesty and moral turpitude. Defense counsel's decision not to request a limiting instruction regarding the jury's use of the defendant-appellant's prior convictions can be a tactical one. Trial courts should not interfere with the tactical decisions of defense counsel by stepping in and sua sponte giving a limiting instruction. Therefore, the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to sua sponte give a limiting instruction. The defendant-appellant cannot establish the first element of the plain-error test—that an error occurred—because the trial court did not err by sentencing the defendant-appellant on the felonious-assault and domestic-violence convictions.

Post-Sentence Motion to Withdraw a Plea; Manifest Injustice; Crim.R. 32; Hearing.1. When a defendant is represented by an attorney and is not proceeding pro se, defense counsel is to make motions. If a motion to withdraw a plea is made after a sentence has been pronounced, the legal standard governing post-sentence motions to withdraw a plea is applicable even if the sentencing entry has not yet been issued. Under Crim.R. 32.1, a trial court may grant a post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea to correct a manifest injustice.

Mootness of Appeal. The appeal is moot because the defendant-appellant voluntarily completed her jail term and her community control was terminated.

CRIMINAL - evidence; non-hearsay statements; sufficiency of the evidence; domestic violence; kidnapping; restraint of liberty; strangulation; weight of the evidence; witness credibility

CRIMINAL LAW - speedy trial; statutory and constitutional rights; mixed question of law and fact; speedy trial waiver; failed to raise in trial court; waived on appeal; tolling events; no prejudice; authentication of video evidence; abuse of discretion; Evid.R. 901(A); admissibility; "silent witness" theory; misdemeanor sentencing; within statutory limits; contrary to law; community control condition; firearms restriction; inherent to being supervised; reasonably related; interests of justice; affirmed.

CIVIL – employee sovereign immunity; R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a); R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a); with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; intentional tort; intentional infliction of emotional distress.

intentional inflictions of emotional distress; negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; alleged political subdivision immunity; summary judgment; R.C. 2744.09(B); genuine issues of material fact

CIVIL - Forcible Entry and Detainer; R.C. Ch. 4781; R.C. Ch. 1923; Manufactured home park operator; R.C. 4781.37; R.C. 4781.45; R.C. 4781.39; owner of manufactured home park was without statutory authority to prevail in forcible entry and detainer where the owner failed to allege tenant had committed any violation of the tenancy.

Forfeiture of cellphone proper

Review of 60(B) motion

R.C. 2913.42(A)(1) and (B)(4), Tampering with records; R.C. 2950.05(F)(2); Failure to register; Manifest weight; Sufficiency of evidence; Definition of "defraud"; Explanation of obtaining benefit and/or causing detriment pursuant to defraud definition; Purpose to defraud; Community control violation standard of review; Review of felony sentencing