Patrick v. Patrick

[Cite as Patrick v. Patrick, 

.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

ROBERT M. PATRICK,                                   :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant/                :
                 Cross-Appellee,                              No. 115037
                                                     :
                 v.
                                                     :
MICHELLE L. PATRICK,
                                                     :
                 Defendant-Appellee/
                 Cross-Appellant.                    :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;
                           AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 12, 2026


             Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Domestic Relations Division
                                 Case No. DR-19-379098


                                               Appearances:

                 Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis LPA and Anne C.
                 Fantelli, for appellant/cross-appellee.

                 Stafford Cruz Law Company and Kelley R. Tauring, for
                 appellee/cross-appellant.


DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.:

                Plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee Robert M. Patrick (“Robert”) and

defendant-appellee/cross-appellant Michelle L. Patrick (“Michelle”) appeal the
decree of divorce issued by the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Division of

Domestic Relations. After reviewing the facts of the case and pertinent law, we

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with

this decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

  A. The Marriage

             Robert and Michelle met in 2006, on Halloween, when they “were

introduced by a mutual friend.” (Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 88-89.) Robert is a physician and

was then practicing at the Cleveland Clinic. Michelle had been living in Los Angeles,

California, and was home visiting her parents. Within about six months, the couple

were cohabiting. They purchased a century home in Cleveland Heights in early

2009. Robert provided the funds for the down payment of approximately $55,000.

Robert and Michelle married on September 6, 2009, and continued to live in the

same home. The mortgage was retired prior to these divorce proceedings. No

children were born as issue of the marriage.

             The record reflects that Michelle struggled with mental-health issues

“[a]t least since 2010.” (Aug. 4, 2020 tr. 179.) By 2011, Robert and Michelle were in

marital counseling, and the counselor referred Michelle to psychiatrist Claudia

Metz, M.D. Michelle began seeing Dr. Metz the same year. Consistent with that

timeline, Robert conceded in his testimony that Michelle’s mental-health struggles,

particularly with depression, began well before the divorce. (June 10, 2021 tr. 44

and 54.) “It was bad,” he testified, agreeing that it affected Michelle’s ability to work,
that she was barely able to function during depressive episodes, and that she was

put on antidepressant medications that “were changed several times.” (June 10,

2021 tr. 54-58.) At one point, Michelle was taking five different medications at the

same time while continuing to struggle with both depression and anxiety. (June 10,

2021 tr. 58; Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 126.)

              Robert testified that he ultimately left Michelle because he could no

longer “take [her] excessive spending.” (June 10, 2021 tr. 61.) He characterized his

own spending habits as “pretty minimalist,” mainly limited to “books and tools and

a few other things,” while Michelle “buys a lot of clothes and make up.” (June 10,

2021 tr. 83.)1 Robert testified that the main issue in their marriage was Michelle’s

“spending on her own credit cards which were not visible to [him], and

accountability around that spending, and accountability around spending from

[their] joint checking account.” (June 10, 2021 tr. 83-84.)2 While Robert conceded

that some excessive spending was attributable to her mental-health issues, he




       1 In his opening brief, Robert describes Michelle as a “spender” and himself as a

“saver.” Putting aside whether his characterization of Michelle is accurate, the evidence
does suggest that Robert qualifies for the “saver” moniker. On the first day of trial,
August 4, 2020, Robert testified that despite practicing medicine for many years, he was
still driving a 2001 Toyota Camry that he had purchased — used — prior to the marriage.
(Aug. 4, 2020 tr. 35.)

       2 The marriage was strained in other respects as well.    At trial, Michelle’s counsel
repeatedly suggested that Robert may have been unfaithful prior to their separation.
Whether true or not, Michelle testified without contradiction that she and Robert had not
been intimate for about five years and that he considered her “morbidly obese” and
“unattractive.” (Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 102 and 116.) In addition, Michelle wanted children, while
Robert did not. Michelle testified that Robert told her she “would not be a good mother.”
(Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 109.)
testified that it was unclear how much of it flowed from Michelle’s depression and

how much was “willful.” (June 10, 2021 tr. 61.) He eventually began redirecting his

earnings from their joint account to his own account “[b]ecause we weren’t saving

any money.” (June 10, 2021 tr. 88.) Robert testified:

      Michelle was spending all of the money from my paycheck every month
      and it was a constant source of friction between the two of us, and I
      asked her to reduce her spending and she wasn’t able to do that, and so
      I redirected my direct deposit into my checking account and then
      deposited half of my paycheck into our joint checking account.

(June 10, 2021 tr. 88.)

  B. The Separation

            Robert surprised Michelle by moving out of the Cleveland Heights

home in March 2019. (June 10, 2021 tr. 63.) By that point, Michelle had been

unemployed for approximately nine months. (Aug. 4, 2020 tr. 179.) Before Robert

broke the news to Michelle that he was leaving her, they celebrated his birthday,

which fell on a Friday. Michelle “baked a cake as [she] always did,” and they had “a

birthday party with his family.” (Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 111.) On Saturday, Michelle spent

most of the day with a friend at a Cleveland Botanical Gardens art workshop. On

Sunday morning, Robert briefly visited a hardware store, returned home, and sat

down with Michelle:

      [H]e said I need to talk to you, please sit down.

      And I sat down and he said, I do not love you anymore. I would like a
      divorce. I have an apartment, I moved my stuff yesterday while you
      were at the Botanical Gardens, and I’ve hired an attorney.
(Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 112; see also Aug. 4, 2020 tr. 177 and 186.) Robert confirmed at

trial that he had told Michelle he did not love her anymore and “told her [he] was

moving out.” (Aug. 4, 2020 tr. 177.) He further conceded that Michelle neither

asked nor wanted him to leave, that she offered to go back to counseling, and that

he even feared she might become suicidal, having told him “maybe I should kill

myself.” (Aug. 4, 2020 tr. 178, 183, and 185.) In deciding what to take and what to

leave, he “removed the guns from the house.” (Aug. 4, 2020 tr. 186.)

  C. The Divorce Proceedings

              Robert filed his complaint for divorce on November 5, 2019. Michelle

filed her answer and counterclaim on December 5, 2019. Robert replied to the

counterclaim on December 19, 2019, and the parties engaged in discovery. Robert

filed his financial disclosure affidavit on February 3, 2020. Michelle filed hers on

July 31, 2020. Following motion practice, the trial court ordered Robert to pay

Michelle temporary support in the sum of $4,000 per month.

             By order dated February 3, 2020, the court scheduled trial for August 4,

2020.3 Trial commenced that morning before a court magistrate. Robert testified

on direct and was cross-examined extensively, but cross-examination was not

completed that day. For reasons not evident in the record, trial was not rescheduled




       3 Motion practice continued with respect to temporary support, and on July 31,

2020, Robert filed a motion in limine arguing that Michelle should be precluded from
entering any exhibits at trial because of her alleged failure to comply with the court’s trial
order. For purposes of brevity, however, we will omit further discussion of procedural facts
(such as these) that are not relevant to the parties’ assignments of error.
until December 18, 2020. While there is no formal journal entry, an appearance

docket notation on that date indicates trial was rescheduled for June 10, 2021.

            Trial did resume on June 10, 2021. Michelle’s counsel continued the

cross-examination of Robert but did not complete it. Two more days of trial were

then scheduled. Once again, there is no formal journal entry but merely appearance

docket notations, both dated June 10, 2021. Trial was set to continue on two dates,

August 23, 2021, and November 15, 2021.

            Trial did not proceed on August 23, 2021, though neither a journal

entry nor an appearance docket entry indicates the reason. On October 5, 2021,

however, the trial court issued an amended trial order stating that trial would be

completed on November 15, 2021, and instituting strict time limits on testimony.

The amended trial order also required both parties to submit updated financial

disclosure statements in accordance with R.C. 3105.171(E)(3) and (5) no later than

November 5, 2021.

              On November 4, 2021, Michelle filed a notice of appeal challenging the

amended trial order.     By journal entry dated November 10, 2021, this court

dismissed the appeal sua sponte for lack of a final appealable order.

             The case did not proceed to trial on November 15, 2021. Instead, on

that same day, Michelle appealed this court’s sua sponte dismissal of her appeal to

the Ohio Supreme Court. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction

on February 24, 2022.
              According to appearance docket notations entered on April 6, 2022,

the trial court rescheduled the remainder of the trial for ten months later, on

February 6, 7, and 8, 2023. Michelle filed an updated financial disclosure statement

on January 30, 2023. On January 31, 2023, Michelle filed a motion requesting to

continue the February 6 trial date because of scheduling conflicts. Michelle followed

up with a notice of trial conflict on February 1, 2023. By journal entry dated

February 3, 2023, the trial court granted the motion to continue as to the February 6

trial date, but ordered that trial resume as previously scheduled on February 7 and

8, 2023.

              Trial resumed on February 7, 2023, with the continued cross-

examination of Robert, followed by brief redirect and recross. Robert then called

Michelle as if on cross-examination, after which Michelle’s counsel conducted her

direct examination. On February 8, 2023, Michelle’s direct examination continued,

followed by brief recross. Trial concluded with Michelle’s final witness, Dr. Kiran

Rai, who at the time was Robert’s romantic partner.

              Over the course of the four days of trial, which focused on the core

issues of division of marital property and spousal support, the trial court heard

testimony and admitted exhibits into evidence with respect to real estate holdings,

financial accounts, retirement accounts, and personal vehicles, as well as credit card

debts. Robert was subjected to cross-examination with respect to Michelle’s mental-

health issues, as well as his purported nondisclosure of certain assets and failure to
provide up-to-date asset valuations for retirement and financial accounts.4 Michelle

testified principally to her mental-health issues and matters pertinent to property

division and spousal support, such as lingering debt and her plan to pursue

employment and further education.

              On the penultimate day of trial, while Robert was offering exhibits for

admission, the magistrate suggested possible supplementation to obtain up-to-date

account balances:

      There is an issue with regard to some of these records being outdated,
      so that’s something that the Court’s going to consider. Perhaps order
      the Plaintiff to submit updated documentation so we have the accurate
      balances on these accounts.

      So nonetheless, I’ll allow these exhibits in, but subject to a possible
      order to update. Okay?

(Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 79.)

              At the conclusion of testimony, the trial court directed the parties to

submit written closing arguments. The trial court also followed through on its

remarks concerning updated financial documentation. By journal entry dated

February 8, 2023, it ordered Robert to submit updated financial documents and an

updated financial disclosure statement no later than February 16, 2023. After

securing an extension of time, Robert filed a notice of compliance on March 10,

2023, as well as an updated (but not notarized) financial disclosure statement.




      4 Alleged financial misconduct issues are addressed in more detail in connection

with our summary of the trial court’s rulings on objection and in our discussion of
Michelle’s second cross-assignment of error.
             The parties submitted written closing arguments. Robert filed his on

April 28, 2023, and Michelle filed hers on June 2, 2023.

  D. The Magistrate’s Decision

              The trial court magistrate filed a decision on July 24, 2023. We again

focus only on findings pertinent to this appeal. The magistrate expressly found that

the duration of the marriage was from September 6, 2009, until August 4, 2020, the

first day of trial. The magistrate further found that based upon personal observation

of witness testimony, including gestures and voice inflections, both Robert and

Michelle were “generally credible and reliable.”

              Following the unchallenged division of real property, personal

property, and automobiles, the magistrate turned to financial accounts, finding the

following accounts marital in nature:

      Key Bank Checking Account x1913 with an approximate balance of
      $442.00; Key Bank Checking Account x8632 with an approximate
      balance of $79,669.00; Key Bank Savings Account x8640 with an
      approximate balance of $26,050.00; Key Bank Checking Account
      x7930 with an approximate balance of $6,596.00; and Key Bank
      Savings Account x7396 with an approximate balance of $29.00.

(Magistrate’s decision at p. 5.) Some of the account balances appear to have been

derived from Michelle’s exhibit No. III and corresponding testimony — specifically,

the January 2023 balances in accounts x1913, x8632, and x8640. Key Bank

Checking Account x7930 and Key Bank Savings Account x7396 were supported by

Michelle’s exhibit BBB, and the assigned balances are both as of January 2023.

              The magistrate ordered that account x1913 be closed, with the balance

split 50/50. The magistrate further ordered that Robert retain accounts x8632 in
the amount of $79,669.92 and x8640 in the amount of $26,050.55, that Michelle

retain accounts x7930 in the amount of $6,596.75 and x7396 in the amount of

$29.00, and that Robert pay Michelle the sum of $49,547.36 (representing a 50/50

split of the referenced marital accounts).

              The magistrate found that Robert had opened a separate Key Bank

Account (x9324) during the pendency of the divorce and further found that this

should be treated as Robert’s separate property. Robert had testified without

contradiction that Key Bank Account x9324 had been funded solely by “checks that

[his] parents have given [him]” and that no marital funds had ever been deposited

into that account. (Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 44-45.) Notably, the magistrate provided no

rationale for using January 2023 financial account balances rather than balances as

of the explicit marriage termination date of August 4, 2020, i.e., the first date of trial.

               The magistrate found certain retirement accounts of both Robert and

Michelle to be marital property and ordered that the accounts be divided evenly as

of August 4, 2020, the first day of trial. The provenance of the specific dollar

amounts assigned as the value of each account is unstated, but they appear to be

drawn principally from Michelle’s admitted exhibits, the sole exception being

Robert’s Thrift Savings Account. The balance for that account appears to be drawn

from Robert’s updated financial disclosure statement, which was never admitted

into evidence. The division of Robert’s accounts was to be offset by his $82,500

equity interest in the Cleveland Heights marital home.
               The magistrate found that Robert’s two remaining retirement

accounts, both from the University of Utah, were Robert’s separate property.

               The magistrate found that the parties had no joint debts and that any

existing debt was each party’s respective responsibility.

               Next, the magistrate rejected Michelle’s claim that Robert engaged in

financial misconduct. After discussing the relevant statutory provision and myriad

cases, the magistrate wrote:

       Upon review of the evidence and testimony the Court finds that
       Plaintiff’s conduct does not either rise to the level of financial
       misconduct, nor warrant a distributive award to Defendant in this
       matter. Plaintiff asserted his separate property interests in several
       assets in good faith. Further, although Plaintiff failed to file his updated
       Financial Disclosure Statements the Court finds that this was a mistake
       on Plaintiffs part, not made in bad faith, and that Plaintiff submitted
       his updated Financial Disclosure Statement once notified by the Court
       of his requirement to do so. Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff did
       not initially disclose a retirement asset that was earned prior to the
       marriage, however, defendant was not harmed by Plaintiff’s initial
       failure to disclose as this retirement account is not a marital asset.
       Therefore, the Court declines to provide Defendant with a distributive
       award in this case.

(Magistrate’s decision at p. 8.)5

               Turning to spousal support, the magistrate noted the statutory factors

and found it appropriate for Robert to pay spousal support to Michelle in the amount

of $4,000 per month, along with 2 percent processing, for a term of 44 months. The


       5 The magistrate’s factual recitation is partially incorrect. The transcript reflects that

Robert neglected to disclose his Cleveland Clinic Cash Balance Plan, a marital asset. (See
also Michelle’s closing argument brief at p. 8 and Magistrate’s decision at p. 6.) Robert had
disclosed the existence of his nonmarital retirement accounts (both from the University of
Utah) at the outset of this litigation. As discussed below, however, we view the magistrate’s
minor error as inconsequential.
magistrate expressly based that finding on the factors set forth in R.C.

3105.08(C)(1), including income derived from the property division and other

sources, “the relative earning abilities of the parties; the ages and physical, mental

and emotional condition of the parties; the duration of the marriage; and the relative

assets and liabilities of the parties[.]” (Magistrate’s decision at p. 12.)

               Finally, after an extensive discussion of the governing statute and case

law, but without reference to any specific facts in this case (e.g., the behavior of

either party or their respective attorneys), the magistrate found that “it is equitable

and appropriate that each party pay their own individual attorney fees.”

(Magistrate’s decision at p. 11.)6

  E. The Objections Phase

               Each party filed preliminary and supplemental objections to the

magistrate’s decision. In his two objections, Robert argued that the magistrate erred

by using different valuation dates for the parties’ assets without explanation and by

failing to give Robert credit for temporary support paid during the pendency of the

divorce proceedings. In her five objections, Michelle argued that the magistrate

erred by ordering Robert to submit financial records and documentation after the

completion of trial without giving her an opportunity for cross-examination, that the


       6 The closest the magistrate came to a rationale was quoting, with emphasis, this

passage from Oatey v. Oatey, 

 (8th Dist. Apr. 25, 1996): “The
court must also examine the conduct of the parties to determine at what point the quest for
justice ceases, and the legal system becomes a tool used to punish, harass, coerce and
intimidate the opposing party.” Id. at *47, citing Farley v. Farley, 

(8th Dist. 1994).
magistrate erred by failing to find that Robert had engaged in economic misconduct

and by not ordering a distributive award or treble damages, that the magistrate erred

in dividing marital property (and more specifically, purported marital debt), that the

magistrate’s award of spousal support was insufficient and inequitable, and that the

magistrate erred by not awarding Michelle her attorney’s fees.

               On June 28, 2024, the trial court filed its judgment entry on the

parties’ objections. With respect to Robert’s objection to using different valuation

dates for the assets — specifically, dividing the financial accounts based on balances

in early 2023 rather than August 4, 2020, the first date of trial — the trial court held:

      The Court has done a de novo review of this case and finds the
      following: The trial in this case began on August 4, 2020, and, due to
      the COVID-19 pandemic and an interlocutory appeal filed by
      Defendant, was completed on February 8, 2023. During the pendency
      of the trial the assets in the marital accounts fluctuated considerably.
      For example, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, from February 2020, listed the Key
      Bank Checking Account ending in 8632 with a balance of $20,510.00.
      However, Plaintiff’s updated financial disclosure statement filed on
      March 10, 2023, in response to the Magistrate’s February 2023 Order
      indicates that the Key Bank Checking Account had a balance of
      $79,669.00. The parties also have a Key Bank Savings Account ending
      in 8640. The Savings Account balance increased from $45.00 in 2020
      to $26,050.00 in 2023.

      For the purposes of the date of divorce, the first date of trial is
      presumed to be the date used to divide the assets. However, due to the
      COVID-19 pandemic and the fluctuations in the values of the marital
      accounts during this extended period of time, it is equitable to divide
      the marital accounts as of February 2023. Plaintiff’s objection is
      overruled.
(Judgment entry on objections at p. 4.)7

                The trial court likewise rejected Robert’s second objection, which

concerned temporary support. The trial court noted that the purpose of temporary

spousal support was to preserve the status quo during divorce proceedings and

found that in considering the factors listed in R.C. 3105.18, the final award of $4,000

per month for 44 months was “reasonable and appropriate.” (Judgment entry on

objections at p. 5.) The court did, however, make what appears to be a typographical

error with respect to the duration of the marriage. It wrote that “Plaintiff and

Defendant were married on September 6, 2009, until August 4, 2020;

approximately twenty-one (21) years or 131 months.”                   (Judgment entry on

objections at p. 5.) The beginning and end dates are correct. The duration in months

is accurate. The calculation of years, however — both as spelled out and in

parentheses — is inaccurate.

               Turning to Michelle’s objections, the trial court first considered

whether the magistrate erred by ordering the submission of financial

documentation after the completion of trial. While Michelle’s objections had not

explicitly distinguished between financial accounts and retirement accounts, the

trial court did. It first held that the magistrate did not rely on posttrial evidence with

respect to financial accounts because those “were either testified to or admitted into

evidence as exhibits during the trial.” (Judgment entry on objections at p. 5.) With


       7 Despite referencing Robert’s updated financial disclosure statement in its analysis,

the trial court noted later in its opinion that the financial account balances were actually
the subject of testimony at trial, as well as exhibits. (Judgment entry on objections at p. 6.)
respect to retirement accounts, however, the trial court noted the magistrate’s

reliance on updated records but found that Michelle could only have benefited from

that decision:

      [T]he Magistrate did rely on Plaintiff’s updated financial documents for
      two (2) of Plaintiff’s four (4) retirement accounts that were earned
      during the marriage, the Thrift Savings Account and Fidelity Rollover
      IRA. The assets in Plaintiff’s Thrift Savings Account and Fidelity
      Rollover IRA that were testified to and or/ [sic] admitted into evidence
      as exhibits during the trial were significantly outdated, and in the case
      of the Thrift Savings Account, significantly lower than what Plaintiff
      disclosed in his updated financial documents. Therefore, although
      Defendant was not provided an opportunity to cross-examine Plaintiff
      on the updated retirement accounts, it would be inequitable for the
      Court to not consider them in making its decision. Further, if the Court
      were to use the 2020 Thrift Savings Account and Fidelity Rollover IRA
      documents in its decision it would only be to Defendant’s ultimate
      detriment.

(Judgment entry on objections at p. 6.)8           The trial court therefore overruled

Michelle’s first objection.

                 The trial court also rejected Michelle’s second objection, which alleged

that the magistrate erred in failing to find that Robert had committed financial

misconduct by concealing marital assets. After discussing pertinent law, the trial

court wrote:

      Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff did fail to disclose the
      updated balances and subsequent value of his assets in 2023. Plaintiff
      provided his financial information to Defendant in preparation for the
      August 2020 trial but failed to provide updated financial records
      between August 2020 and February 2023. Several financial accounts



      8 Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the Fidelity Rollover IRA balance specified

by the magistrate appears to be drawn from an admitted exhibit, specifically, Michelle’s
exhibit VV.
      accumulated significant assets during this time and Plaintiff did not
      provide that information to Defendant.

      However, the record does not support Defendant’s allegation that
      Plaintiff deliberately and willfully failed to disclose his updated
      financial information to deprive Plaintiff of her share of the marital
      estate. Plaintiff testified that he would have produced the information
      if he had been instructed by counsel. Further, Defendant did not file a
      motion to compel or other related motions to obtain updated
      documents from Plaintiff between August 2020 and February 2023.
      Plaintiff’s failure to disclose updated financial records was certainly not
      in compliance with this Court’s orders, but this failure does not rise to
      the level of financial misconduct and the requisite wrongful intent.
      Further, Defendant was not harmed by Plaintiff’s failure to disclose and
      is receiving her share of the marital estate. Defendant’s objection is
      overruled.

(Judgment entry on objections at p. 7.)

              The trial court likewise rejected Michelle’s third objection, which

concerned the amount and duration of spousal support. The trial court listed the

statutory factors, considered Michelle’s arguments regarding income disparity and

her mental-health issues, and ultimately concluded:

      There is evidence in the record that Defendant has mental health issues
      that make it difficult for her to maintain employment. However,
      Defendant has a Bachelor’s Degree and some credits towards a Master’s
      Degree and Defendant testified that no doctor has told her she cannot
      work. At the start of Trial Defendant was only 46 years old and she is
      receiving a significant award from the division of property in this
      matter. There are no minor children of the marriage. An indefinite
      period of spousal support is not appropriate.

      Upon review of the record and the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18 the
      Court finds that an award of $4,000.00 per month for a term of 44
      months is reasonable and appropriate in this matter. Defendant’s
      objection is overruled.

(Judgment entry on objections at p. 9.)
              The trial court found some merit to Michelle’s fourth objection to the

magistrate’s decision, which concerned an award of attorney’s fees.          Michelle

claimed she incurred attorney’s fees in the amount of $71,360.32 and pointed to

disparities in the parties’ income and expenses and Robert’s purported financial

misconduct as justifying the award.

              The trial court had already rejected Michelle’s objection related to

Robert’s alleged financial misconduct. It nevertheless awarded Michelle just under

one-half of her claimed attorney’s fees based on Michelle’s lack of employment and

the disparity in the parties’ income:

      The Court has reviewed the record and finds that an award of a portion
      of Defendant’s attorney fees and litigation expenses is reasonable and
      appropriate. Plaintiff’s annual income is over $240,000.00 and
      Defendant does not currently have employment. There is a significant
      disparity in the parties’ incomes. Therefore, the Court finds that an
      award of $35,000.00 in attorney fees and litigation expenses is
      equitable in this matter. Defendant’s objection is sustained.

(Judgment entry on objections at p. 10.)

              The trial court further found merit to Michelle’s fifth objection related

to the division of the parties’ debts. The trial court found:

      A review of the record shows that although the [$57,259.88] debt is
      titled solely in Defendant’s name, $52,259.88 of the debt is marital debt
      accrued during the marriage. It is inequitable to allocate that debt only
      to Defendant. Defendant has an additional $5,000.00 personal loan
      that she took during the divorce that is her responsibility. Therefore,
      the Court shall modify the Magistrate’s Decision to indicate that
      Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be responsible for 50% of the marital
      debt accrued during the marriage. Defendant shall be solely
      responsible for the $5,000.00 personal loan. Defendant’s objection is
      sustained.

(Judgment entry on objections at p. 10.)
  F. The Final Decree

              The trial court did not immediately enter a final decree of divorce. On

July 26, 2024, 28 days after the trial court entered its judgment entry on the parties’

objections, Robert filed a notice of appeal. See Patrick v. Patrick, No. 114197 (8th

Dist.). Four days later, this court dismissed the appeal sua sponte for lack of a final

appealable order. After reciting relevant legal authority, this court wrote:

      Here, the trial court thoroughly analyzed and overruled the objections
      to the magistrate’s decision and then adopted the magistrate’s decision
      without setting forth its own independent judgment on the issues
      submitted to the court for determination. The trial court’s decision on
      the issues submitted to the court is not apparent in the decision and
      requires the parties to refer to another document, the magistrate’s
      decision, to determine the court’s judgment. Therefore, that order does
      not constitute a final, appealable order. If appellant is able to obtain a
      final order within 30 days of the date of this order, appellant may
      motion this court for delayed reconsideration of this order to reinstate
      the appeal.

              The trial court, however, did not issue its final decree until seven

months and three weeks later, on March 21, 2025. A careful review of the final

decree confirms that it is substantively identical to the magistrate’s decision apart

from modifications consistent with the trial court’s ruling sustaining certain

objections.   Neither the magistrate’s decision nor the trial court’s ruling on

objections, however, had established a definite start date for the 44 months of

spousal support. The final decree expressly fixed a beginning date of August 1, 2023.

In other words, by the time of the March 21, 2025 final decree, Robert was already

approximately 19 months into his 44-month support-obligation period.
              Robert filed a timely notice of appeal on April 18, 2025. Michelle filed

a timely cross-appeal on April 25, 2025.

II. Assignments of Error

  A. Robert’s Assignments of Error

              Robert’s appeal raises three assignments of error:

      ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1: The Trial Court abused its discretion
      by using different valuation dates for the parties’ assets and by failing
      to divide the marital assets as of the first date of trial.

      ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2: The Trial Court abused its discretion
      when ordering the commencement date and duration of spousal
      support.

      ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3: The Trial Court abused its discretion
      by ordering Robert to pay attorney’s fees to Michelle.

  B. Michelle’s Cross-Assignments of Error

             Michelle’s cross-appeal likewise raises three assignments of error:

      CROSS-APPELLANT’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1: The trial court
      erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by ordering the
      Appellant/Cross-Appellee to submit additional records and
      documentation after the close of evidence and the conclusion of trial.

      CROSS-APPELLANT’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2: The trial court
      abused its discretion by failing to find the Appellant/Cross-Appellee
      guilty of economic misconduct and awarding the Appellee/Cross-Appellant a distributive award.

      CROSS-APPELLANT’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 3: The trial court
      abused its discretion in calculating the Appellant/Cross-Appell[ee]’s
      spousal support obligations, limiting the term of his support
      obligations to forty-four (44) months, and failing to retain jurisdiction
      over the issue of spousal support.
III. Analysis

  A. Introduction

              We “generally review a trial court’s determination in domestic

relations cases for an abuse of discretion.” Hunter v. Troutman, 

 (8th Dist.), citing Holcomb v. Holcomb, 

 (1989). In

Hunter, we noted that “[d]omestic relations courts must have discretion to do what

is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each divorce case.” 

,

citing Booth v. Booth, 

 (1989).

              A trial court “abuses its discretion when it exercises its judgment in an

unwarranted way with respect to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.”

, citing Johnson v. Abdullah, 

. “The term abuse

of discretion implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable.” Hunter at ¶ 64, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 

(1983). Where the trial court record “contains competent, credible evidence to

support the trial court’s decision,” there is no abuse of discretion. 

,

citing Trolli v. Trolli, 

 (8th Dist.). We are not permitted to

substitute our judgment for the judgment of the trial court. 

, citing

Vannucci v. Schneider, 

 (8th Dist.).

              For ease of analysis, we address some of the parties’ assigned errors

out of order or in conjunction with assigned errors raised by the other party.
  B. Robert’s First Assignment of Error and Michelle’s First Cross-Assignment of Error

                We address Robert’s first assignment of error and Michelle’s first

cross-assignment of error together because both relate to the valuation of certain

marital assets as of specific points in time. In his first assignment of error, Robert

argues that the trial court erred by using different valuation dates for the parties’

assets and by failing to divide the marital assets, specifically financial accounts, as

of the first date of trial. In her first cross-assignment of error, Michelle argues that

the trial court erred by ordering Robert to submit additional financial records and

documentation after the close of evidence and the conclusion of trial. We find merit

to both arguments and remand for further proceedings as specified below.

                While Robert’s opening brief refers to both financial accounts (i.e.,

personal checking, joint checking, and savings accounts) and retirement accounts,

he consistently argues that the trial court erred only by ordering that the financial

accounts be split as of February 2023 rather than the first day of trial, August 4,

2020. This aligns with Robert’s supplemental objections filed with the trial court on

September 1, 2023. Indeed, Robert noted in his supplemental objections that

“throughout the remainder of the [magistrate’s decision], the parties are ordered to

value and divide all accounts as of August 4, 2020.” (Robert’s supplemental

objections at p. 8.) That included the retirement accounts. In dividing the parties’

marital retirement accounts, the magistrate and trial court referenced the balances

as of 2023 but ordered that the accounts be divided as of August 4, 2020, the first

day of trial.
               Robert argues that dividing the marital financial accounts using their

value in February 2023, rather than their value as presented to the trial court on the

first day of trial via testimony and exhibits was reversible error. We agree, finding

that the trial court failed to adequately justify using different dates for division of the

financial accounts versus the retirement accounts.

               “The date of termination of marriage is presumed to be the date of the

final hearing in the divorce case.” W.G. v. D.G., 

 (8th Dist.),

citing O’Brien v. O’Brien, 

 (8th Dist.). See also Machen v.

Miller, 

 (8th Dist.). “More specifically, the presumptive date for the

termination of a marriage is the first day of trial pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(A)(2).”

Karabogias v. Zoltanski, 

 (8th Dist.). “In order to achieve an

equitable distribution of property,” however, “the trial court must be allowed to use

alternative valuation dates where reasonable under the particular facts and

circumstances of the case.” Glick v. Glick, 

 (8th Dist.

1999). See also 

; Abernethy v. Abernethy, 

, ¶ 19

(8th Dist.); Keating v. Keating, 

 (8th Dist.).

               This court has recognized that while domestic relations trial courts

should generally consistently apply the same set of dates when valuing marital

property, the circumstances may require different dates for valuation. 

, citing Weller v. Weller, 

 (11th Dist.). Indeed, “‘[t]he

choice of a date as of which assets available for equitable distribution should be

identified and valued must be dictated largely by pragmatic considerations.’”


, quoting Berish v. Berish, 

 (1982). The

trial court therefore “‘has discretion to determine the date of valuation, and this date

may vary from asset to asset.’” 

, quoting Wei v. Shen, 2003-Ohio-

6253, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). “The trial court, however, ‘must adequately explain its

reasons for choosing a different valuation date for certain marital assets.’”

, quoting Coble v. Gilanyi, 

, *9 (11th

Dist. Dec. 23, 1999). See also Saks v. Riga, 

 (8th Dist.) (“If the

court uses different dates to value certain marital assets, it must adequately explain

its reasons for doing so.”); 

 (collecting cases).

              In the present case, the trial court magistrate found that the marriage

terminated on August 4, 2020, the first day of trial.         That finding as to the

termination date of the marriage went unchallenged and therefore found its way into

the trial court’s final decree. The magistrate had ordered that the parties’ retirement

accounts be divided essentially 50/50 as of the first day of trial, August 4, 2020. The

magistrate likewise ordered a 50/50 division of the parties’ marital financial

accounts, but failed to specify a valuation date. Instead, the magistrate merely listed

the updated financial account balances established at trial on February 7, 2023 —

two years, six months, and three days after the marriage termination date. The

magistrate ignored the balances as of the unrebutted marriage termination date of

August 4, 2020, balances established through Robert’s case-in-chief. (Aug. 4, 2020

tr. 28; Robert’s exhibit Nos. 1, 14, and 15.) The magistrate offered no explanation
for dividing the financial accounts based on their value as of February 7, 2023, rather

than as of August 4, 2020.

              In his objections, as here, Robert argued that the growth in certain

financial accounts had stemmed from Robert’s tendency to be a saver rather than a

spender, i.e., that once he began depositing temporary support into Michelle’s

personal checking account (see, e.g., magistrate’s temporary support order filed

Mar. 26, 2020, at p. 2), he deposited his remaining income into other financial

accounts. Robert had testified, for example, that his earnings were deposited into

Key Bank Checking Account x8632 and that he paid support out of that account.

The balance in 2020 was $20,510, and the balance in 2023, the number used by the

magistrate and ultimately the trial court, was $79,669. (Robert’s exhibit No. 1 and

Michelle’s exhibit No. III.) Robert’s Key Bank savings account x8640 was valued at

a mere $45 at the time of the first day of trial, but had grown to $26,050 by the time

trial concluded in February 2023. (Robert’s exhibit No. 1; Michelle’s exhibit No. III.)

              We reference these two accounts because they are exactly the two

highlighted in the trial court’s entry overruling Robert’s objections. The trial court

justified overruling Robert’s objection based on the fact that “the assets in the

marital accounts fluctuated considerably” between the beginning of trial on

August 4, 2020, and its conclusion over two and one-half years later on February 8,

2023. The trial court noted that these delays were driven at least in part by the

COVID-19 pandemic and an interlocutory appeal by Michelle.
              The trial court’s statement that “the assets in the marital accounts

fluctuated considerably,” however, is an observation, not a rationale. As noted

above, a domestic relations court has the discretion to determine the valuation

dates, which may vary from asset to asset, but those determinations “‘must be

dictated largely by pragmatic considerations.’” Karabogias, 

 (8th Dist.), quoting Berish, 

 (1982). In Karabogias, for

example, we noted with approval the principle that “[w]hile the trial court should

consistently apply the same set of dates when evaluating all marital property, the

trial court has the discretion to use different valuation dates where the valuation at

a certain date was the only evidence before the trial court.” (Emphasis added.)

, citing Homme v. Homme, 

, ¶ 62 (12th Dist.).

In Karabogias, as here, the trial court found that the marriage terminated as of the

first day of trial, January 8, 2018. The trial court nevertheless divided certain

marital assets as of July 23, 2019. This court affirmed, but only after concluding

that the trial court had “adequately explained its reasons for utilizing an alternative

valuation date to achieve equity.”      

.      The trial court had

“specifically stated that ‘each item of marital property will not be valued as of

January 8, 2018,’ because wife had not provided valuation of her retirement assets

as of the trial date, even though the court had requested it.” (Emphasis added.)

. In a nunc pro tunc entry,

      the trial court clarified and confirmed that the divorce decree used an
      alternative date — July 23, 2019 — for the division of wife’s pension
      because wife failed to submit evidence of value as of the date of the
       trial, and the trial court also affirmed that the utilization of the
       alternative date would achieve an equitable division.

(Emphasis added.) Karabogias at ¶ 17.

               In Wei, 

 (12th Dist.), another commonly cited case in

this context, the parties had actually agreed to divide their assets as of a specific date,

February 6, 2002. The Twelfth District approved the trial court’s use of alternative

dates, however, based on “pragmatic considerations.” Id. at ¶ 21. Specifically, the

trial court had chosen varying dates for valuing the marital assets because “the

evidence adduced at trial did not always correspond to this date.” Id. The values

and dates assigned to each asset, the Twelfth District explained, was instead

“established through documentary exhibits and the parties’ testimony.” Id.

               These cases dovetail with those involving claims of de facto marriage

termination dates. In such cases, when determining a date for termination of a

marriage for purposes of dividing marital assets, “the presence or absence of reliable

data concerning the value of the parties’ assets is probably the most significant factor

the court must consider.” Saks, 

 (8th Dist.). See also

Machen, 

 (8th Dist.). In Saks, this court found that “it

would have been unreasonable for the court to select an earlier date if the necessary

information to make an equitable distribution was not available at that time.” 

. In Machen, by contrast, this court upheld the division of assets using a de

facto marriage termination date of November 30, 2018, rather than the first day of

trial, which commenced on November 4, 2021. There was evidence to support a de

facto marriage termination date that preceded the trial date, and from a pragmatic
standpoint, the court wrote “that an abundance of exhibits entered into evidence by

both parties at trial contain[ed] financial documents concerning the parties’ marital

property dating back to at least 2017.” Id. at ¶ 52. As a result, “the trial court had

reliable data regarding the parties’ finances dating back to at least 2017.” (Emphasis

added.) Id.

               In the present case, the fluctuations (or more accurately, growth) of

the financial accounts occurred after the marriage ended because both the

magistrate and the trial court found that the marriage terminated on the first day of

trial. Both the magistrate’s decision and the trial court’s final decree divided the

parties’ marital retirement accounts as of the first day of trial, August 4, 2020. The

magistrate’s decision divided the marital financial accounts as of February 2023, but

does not explain the inconsistency, i.e., why it would be logical and equitable to

divide one set of assets as of August 2020 and another as of February 2023, when

reliable data was available as of the first day of trial, and where both sets of accounts

had grown in the interim.

              The magistrate did not even reference a date for valuation of the

financial accounts; the decision merely lists financial account balances from 2023

rather than August 2020. The magistrate never explained why it would be logical or

equitable to divide the financial accounts as of February 2023 rather than as of the

first day of trial, August 4, 2020.

               The trial court, in overruling Robert’s objection, also failed to address

the unexplained inconsistency between the magistrate’s selection of February 2023
as the date for division of the financial accounts but August 4, 2020, for division of

the retirement accounts. In its de novo review, the trial court cited the pandemic,

delays, and “fluctuations” in the value of the financial accounts. But nothing in the

record suggests Robert was responsible for the trial delays, especially the delays

caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and Michelle’s unsuccessful interlocutory

appeal, and we have already noted that the reference to fluctuations in the financial

accounts is more an observation than a rationale.

               In short, at no point did the trial court adequately explain the

inconsistency — carried through to the final decree of divorce — in dividing the

retirement accounts and the financial accounts as of different dates years apart.

Nothing in the magistrate’s decision, the trial court’s ruling on objections, or the trial

court’s final decree suggest that a decision to value assets as of different dates was

“logically related to the facts of this case.” Kramer v. Kramer, 

, *7 (8th Dist. July 29, 1999). In Kramer, this court upheld a decision

in which the magistrate valued certain retirement accounts as of 1990 but the

marital home as of 1995. The magistrate wrote that “‘[t]he retirement funds are

being valued as of separation [in 1990] for the reason that, in essence, the marriage

ended as of separation[.]’” By contrast, the magistrate used a “March 1995 date to

value the houses because that date would encompass appellee’s improvement

dollars and acknowledge that both had continued to pay the mortgages on the

property.” Id. at *6.
               In the present case, the magistrate offered no explanation for using

different dates in valuing marital assets, and the trial court’s ruling on objections

and the final decree did not cure that deficiency. In contrast to the situations

presented in Saks and Kramer, the trial court’s decision here reads as a post-hoc

rationalization with no logical tie to the underlying facts to justify or otherwise

explain the inconsistency. The trial court failed to adequately explain its reasons for

utilizing an alternative valuation date to achieve equity and thereby abused its

discretion.

               Robert’s first assignment of error is sustained, and the case is

remanded with instructions for the trial court to divide the parties’ financial

accounts, like the retirement accounts, as of the first day of trial, August 4, 2020, as

established via testimony and admitted exhibits. This is not a remand for a new

trial, and it is not an invitation for the trial court to revisit other aspects of the case

to rebalance the equities by, for example, increasing the amount or duration of

spousal support, modifying the percentage split of the financial or retirement

accounts, or otherwise robbing Peter to pay Paul. See Hissa v. Hissa, 2010-Ohio-

3087, ¶ 30-36 (8th Dist.).

               We next turn to Michelle’s first cross-assignment of error, in which

she argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by

ordering Robert to submit additional financial records and documentation after the

close of evidence and the conclusion of trial. We find merit to Michelle’s argument

based on this court’s recent decision in Hunter, 

 (8th Dist.).
“Generally, in rendering a decision, a trial court may only consider evidence

admitted at trial.” Id. at ¶ 115. In Hunter, the trial court magistrate had relied on

an exhibit not admitted into evidence in awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of

$192,960.22. Because the exhibit supporting that specific sum had not actually been

admitted into evidence, the court held that “it was an abuse of the trial court’s

discretion to award attorney’s fees in the amount of $192,960.22.” Id. at ¶ 116. This

court ordered a very limited remand:

       We sustain Michelle’s third assignment of error as it relates to exhibit
       PPP(1) and remand this matter for the trial court to issue a journal
       entry to correctly reflect what occurred at trial, specifically that exhibit
       PPP(1) was not admitted at trial. We find the attorney’s fees award in
       the amount of $192,960.22 was an abuse of discretion. We vacate the
       trial court’s award of $192,960.22 in attorney’s fees to Holden and
       remand the case for the trial court to determine, pursuant to R.C.
       3105.73(A) and the evidence in the record at trial, an award of
       reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses that the court finds equitable.

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 117.

               Accordingly, it would have been erroneous for the trial court to rely

on any posttrial documentation — in this case, an updated financial disclosure

statement and any financial and retirement account statements submitted after trial

— because such documents, by definition, had not been admitted into evidence at

trial.9 Fortunately, with one exception, the magistrate and trial court used financial

figures supported by testimony and admitted exhibits in reaching their decisions.



       9 It makes no difference that Robert’s updated financial disclosure statement was

filed with the trial court. “In making its decision following trial, the trial court may only
consider the evidence the court admitted at trial. Other evidence in the record but not
admitted at trial may not be considered.” Hoaglin Holdings v. Goliath Mtge., Inc., 2004-
               First, we address the parties’ marital financial accounts. As the trial

court noted in overruling Michelle’s objection, the magistrate’s findings were

supported by testimony and exhibits admitted during trial. Our review confirms

that the magistrate’s findings with respect to the financial account balances, even

while specifying balances as of February 2023, were supported by testimony and

exhibits. The balances as of August 4, 2020, were likewise supported by testimony

and exhibits. As a result, the trial court has the evidentiary materials required to

comply with our remand instructions above, i.e., to divide the financial accounts as

of August 4, 2020, based on testimony and exhibits admitted at trial.

               Second, we address the parties’ marital retirement accounts. As with

the financial accounts, the magistrate and trial court listed 2023 account balances,

even while specifying that the retirement accounts were to be divided as of August 4,

2020. The listed balances therefore reflect gains and losses up to January 2023.

               The trial court stated that the magistrate relied on posttrial

documents for two of Robert’s retirement accounts, the Thrift Savings Account and

the Fidelity Rollover IRA. This is only partially correct. The magistrate and trial

court assigned a value of $2,502 to Robert’s Fidelity Rollover IRA. This figure was

supported by Michelle’s exhibit VV, a Fidelity Rollover IRA statement ending

December 31, 2022. The trial court was correct, however, that the magistrate relied

on updated information not admitted into evidence in valuing Robert’s Thrift



Ohio-3473, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). In Hoaglin, this court explicitly warned against “confus[ing]
the concepts of ‘evidence in the record’ and ‘evidence at trial.’” Id.
Savings Account x1947 at $148,025. The only admitted exhibits pertaining to the

Thrift Savings Account were Robert’s exhibit No. 12 (a statement listing a balance of

$77,219), Robert’s exhibit No. 1 (his 2020 financial disclosure statement containing

the same figure), and Michelle’s exhibit L (another copy of Robert’s 2020 financial

disclosure statement with the same dollar figure).

              It was error for the magistrate to specify a value of $148,025 for

Robert’s Thrift Savings Account where neither testimony nor any exhibit established

that precise figure. On remand, the trial court’s final decree must be corrected to

reflect the only balance supported by the evidence, $77,219 rather than $148,025.

              Unlike the split of marital financial accounts, however, our remand

does not require the trial court to completely recalculate the division of defined-

contribution marital retirement accounts. The final decree divided the accounts as

of August 4, 2020, plus earnings, gains or losses on the awarded shares. The

operative feature of this division of property is the as-of date plus the earnings,

gains, and losses mechanism. Accordingly, the listing of balances subsequent to

August 4, 2020, is not prejudicial to either Michelle or to Robert. See Saks, 2014-

Ohio-4930, at ¶ 24 (8th Dist.).

              Furthermore, while Robert contested the values to be assigned to the

financial accounts in his first assignment of error, neither party has expressly

challenged the division of the defined-contribution retirement accounts, including

the values specified, the date assigned to the division of that property, or the

percentage split. See Snyder v. Old World Classics, L.L.C., 

(“Under the principle of party presentation, ‘we rely on the parties to frame the

issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the

parties present.’”), quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 

 (2008);

App.R. 16(A)(7).10

               Michelle’s remaining arguments under this assignment of error merit

little discussion. In fact, they confirm the lack of prejudice. Michelle complains that

the trial court required Robert to submit updated records but that she had no

opportunity to cross-examine Robert regarding such records.                Every account,

however, was the subject of testimony and was supported by one or more exhibits.

Michelle had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Robert with respect to each

and every account, including, but not limited to, the Thrift Savings Account.

               In that regard, the existence of the Thrift Savings Account was

indisputably disclosed to Michelle before the first day of trial. Not only could

Michelle cross-examine Robert with respect to that account, but she also could have

sought updated records through discovery and sought court intervention in the

event Robert refused to cooperate. The record reflects that no motions to compel




       10 In Karabogias, 

 (8th Dist.), where there was a dispute regarding

valuation of a pension, the wife erroneously argued “that documentation regarding the
valuation of the pension was not necessary because the pension is a ‘defined benefits plan.’”

. This court held: “‘[A]n assigned value for pension funds is
necessary for adequate appellate review’ and ‘[a] court’s decision to simply divide the
marital portion of a pension equally between the two parties, without designating a specific
dollar value to the marital portion of the pension, represents an abuse of discretion.’” 

quoting Derrit v. Derrit, 

 (11th Dist.). Based on the parties’
failure to point to a similar dispute in this case, we view Karabogias as distinguishable.
were filed either prior to trial or during the long period between the beginning of

trial in August 2020 and the conclusion of trial in February 2023.

              Michelle’s real argument appears to be that she was precluded from

additional cross-examination as to all retirement accounts “after [Robert] was

discovered to have concealed his [Cleveland Clinic Cash Balance Plan] retirement

account,” which she characterizes as demonstrating “a penchant for falsifying

financial affidavits, concealing marital property, and acting to intentionally defeat

Michelle’s property rights.” (Michelle’s brief at p. 18.) Michelle explicitly states:

      The trial court’s mandate that Robert disclose updated valuations and
      disclosures was not error; it was the trial court’s preclusion of
      Michelle’s proper and necessary cross-examination of Robert that
      necessitates an Order reversing the June 28, 2024 and March 21, 2025
      Entries under Hunter.

(Michelle’s brief at p. 18.) This statement appears to contradict Michelle’s own first

cross-assignment of error and does little more than muddy the waters. For example,

Michelle’s exhibit V (a Cleveland Clinic subpoena response dated August 3, 2020)

confirms she was on notice of the existence of the Cleveland Clinic Cash Balance

Plan and its then-current balance before the first day of trial. On the third day of

trial, February 7, 2023, Michelle finally explored Robert’s purported concealment of

assets during Robert’s continued cross-examination, which included cross-

examination regarding the Cleveland Clinic Cash Balance Plan.11 (See, e.g., Feb. 7,


      11 In discussing Michelle’s second cross-assignment of error below, we conclude that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Robert’s nondisclosure of his
Cleveland Clinic Cash Balance Plan was unintentional and that he did not otherwise engage
in financial misconduct.
2023 tr. 33; Michelle’s exhibit V and Y.) In light of this, Michelle’s reframing of the

issue suggests that her actual complaint concerns the trial court’s time limit on

cross-examination.12

                 Michelle, however, has not separately assigned error to the trial court’s

limitations on cross-examination. She also did not move for a new trial below, and

she has not developed an argument that we should order a new trial to provide her

with additional cross-examination time.

                 In that regard, even if we were to view Michelle’s argument for

additional cross-examination as a distinct assignment of error, she has not cited any

legal authority in support of her position. “An appellate court may disregard an

assignment of error pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2) if an appellant fails to cite to any

legal authority in support of an argument as required by App.R. 16(A)(7).” Strauss

v. Strauss, 

 (8th Dist.). We are not obligated to construct or

develop arguments for either party or to guess at undeveloped claims. Story v.

Story, 

 (8th Dist.). See also Strauss at ¶ 72 (‘“If an argument

exists that can support this assigned error, it is not this court’s duty to root it out.’”),

quoting Cardone v. Cardone, 

, *22 (9th Dist. May 6,

1998).

                 Instead, Michelle limited her legal argument to Hunter and similar

cases.     As discussed above, Hunter, like this case, involved the trial court’s




         12 See Parsai v. Parsai, 

 (8th Dist.).
consideration of a document not admitted into evidence. In Hunter, this court did

not order a new trial or otherwise suggest the trial court could reopen the case; it

merely remanded with instructions that the trial court calculate a fee award based

on “the evidence in the record at trial.” Hunter, 

 (8th Dist.).

Michelle has not expressly argued that the remand in this case should be any

different.

              Michelle’s first cross-assignment of error regarding the trial court’s

reliance upon financial documents submitted after the conclusion of trial and never

admitted into evidence is likewise sustained.

              The case is remanded with the following instructions: With respect to

the parties’ marital financial accounts, the trial court shall divide the accounts as of

the first day of trial, August 4, 2020, using the balances established via testimony

and admitted exhibits. With respect to the parties’ marital retirement accounts, the

trial court’s final decree must be corrected as to the balance of Robert’s Thrift

Savings Account, i.e., to reflect the only balance supported by the evidence ($77,219)

rather than $148,025. However, because the final decree divided the marital

retirement accounts as of August 4, 2020, plus earnings, gains, or losses on the

awarded shares, no further adjustments to the divorce decree are required with

respect to the marital retirement accounts. The decree’s specification of balances

subsequent to August 4, 2020, has not been challenged by Robert and is not

prejudicial to Michelle. “‘[A]ny error or defect in the proceeding which does not

affect the substantial rights of the complaining party may be disregarded,’” and “‘the
existence of error does not require reversal of a judgment unless the error is

materially prejudicial to the complaining party.’” Hissa, 

, at ¶ 19

(8th Dist.), quoting Fada v. Information Sys. & Networks Corp., 

 (2d Dist. 1994).

  C. Robert’s Second Assignment of Error and Michelle’s Third Cross-Assignment of Error

              Robert’s second assignment of error and Michelle’s third cross-

assignment of error both center on the amount and duration of spousal support.

Accordingly, we address those assignments of error together.

              In her written closing argument with proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law, Michelle asked the trial court to award her $12,000 per month

in spousal support, three times what the trial court ultimately ordered. She also

asked for an indefinite period of support subject to the trial court’s continuing

jurisdiction. Michelle’s arguments below, as here, focused principally on the income

disparity between Robert and Michelle, the couple’s standard of living while

married, and Michelle’s mental-health issues and limited employment prospects.

              Robert’s posttrial proposal represented the other end of the support

spectrum: He had asked for credit for his temporary support payments and urged

the trial court magistrate to find he should pay only five months of permanent

support as a lump sum of $20,000 (i.e., his then-current $4,000 per month support

obligation multiplied by five).   As discussed above, the trial court ultimately

approved the magistrate’s recommendation of $4,000 per month of spousal support

for a period of 44 months, with permanent support commencing August 1, 2023.
             This court has held:

      When awarding spousal support, the “trial court is provided with broad
      discretion in deciding what is equitable upon the facts and
      circumstances of each case.” Kunkle v. Kunkle, 

,
      

 (1990). Thus, a spousal support decision is generally left
      to a trial court’s discretion, subject to the statutory factors set forth in
      R.C. 3105.18(C).

Saks, 

 (8th Dist.). R.C. 3105.18(C) provides:

      (1) In determining whether spousal support is appropriate and
      reasonable, and in determining the nature, amount, and terms of
      payment, and duration of spousal support, which is payable either in
      gross or in installments, the court shall consider all of the following
      factors:

        (a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not
        limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or
        distributed under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code;

        (b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;

        (c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of
        the parties;

        (d) The retirement benefits of the parties;

        (e) The duration of the marriage;

        (f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because
        that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek
        employment outside the home;

        (g) The standard of living of the parties established during the
        marriage;

        (h) The relative extent of education of the parties;

        (i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not
        limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties;

        (j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or
        earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to, any
         party’s contribution to the acquisition of a professional degree of the
         other party;

         (k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking
         spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so
         that the spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment,
         provided the education, training, or job experience, and employment
         is, in fact, sought;

         (l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal
         support;

         (m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted
         from that party’s marital responsibilities;

         (n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and
         equitable.

      (2) In determining whether spousal support is reasonable and in
      determining the amount and terms of payment of spousal support,
      each party shall be considered to have contributed equally to the
      production of marital income.

              “A trial court is not required to enumerate each factor in R.C.

3105.18(C)(1), but must provide a sufficient basis to support its award.” 

.

Furthermore, “[n]othing in those factors prohibits a trial court from attempting to

equalize the parties’ income.” Id. at ¶ 64. Finally, “[w]e will not reverse the trial

court’s spousal support decision absent an abuse of discretion.” Id.

              In its final decree of divorce, the trial court wrote:

      The Court finds upon considering the factors set forth in Ohio Revised
      Code Section 3105.08(C)(1), that it is reasonable and appropriate that
      Plaintiff pay spousal support to Defendant. The Court finds that the
      following factors support this award: the income of the parties, from all
      sources, including but not limited to, income derived from property
      divided, disbursed, or distributed under Section 3105.171 of the
      Revised Code; the relative earning abilities of the parties; the ages and
      physical, mental and emotional condition of the parties; the duration
      of the marriage; and the relative assets and liabilities of the parties,
        including, but not limited to, any Court Ordered payments by the
        parties.

(Final decree at p. 1-2.) This reflects the trial court’s consideration of the required

statutory factors. “The purpose of spousal support is to achieve equity,” and “‘equity

requires that a disadvantaged spouse receive sufficient spousal support to bring him

or her up to a reasonable standard of living in light of the standard maintained

during the marriage.’” Id. at ¶ 77, quoting Howell v. Howell, 

, ¶ 25

(2d Dist.).

               Robert’s principal objection is that the trial court did not give him

credit, when establishing his final spousal support obligation, for the many months

of temporary spousal support paid during the pendency of the divorce proceedings.

This included not only initial temporary support but support paid between the

commencement of trial on August 4, 2020, and the magistrate’s decision on July 23,

2023.

              We reject Robert’s arguments. “Temporary spousal support is the

support awarded during the pendency of any divorce proceeding[.]” Saks, 2014-

Ohio-4930, at ¶ 85 (8th Dist.).       Its purpose is to maintain the status quo.

Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 

 (8th Dist.); La Spisa v. La Spisa,

 (8th Dist.) (“[T]he purpose of a temporary support order is

to ‘maintain the present financial status quo of the parties’ marriage’ and ‘support

the economically disadvantaged party’ while the case is pending.”), quoting

Dilacqua v. Dilacqua, 

 (9th Dist. 1993).
              “Permanent spousal support,” by contrast, “is the support awarded

after the court determines the division or disbursement of property under R.C.

3105.171.” 

. “The purpose of permanent spousal support differs from

that of temporary spousal support” in that permanent support is designed to reach

an equitable result. S.M. v. A.P., 

 (8th Dist.). Domestic

relations courts, therefore, “are not required to order the commencement of spousal

support as of the termination of the marriage date.” Saks at ¶ 85, citing Patterson

v. Patterson, 

 (4th Dist. Dec. 14, 1998).

              In Saks, for example, the couple separated in March 2011. Id. at ¶ 7.

As in the instant case, the husband began voluntarily paying support. Id. at ¶ 4. The

husband filed for divorce in February 2012, and the trial court ordered temporary

spousal support beginning March 1, 2012. Id. at ¶ 5. The trial court issued its final

decree of divorce in February 2014, ordering 60 months of spousal support

commencing March 1, 2014. Id. at ¶ 75 and ¶ 84. In one assignment of error, the

husband argued that the trial court “discounted the three years of spousal support

[the wife] received from the date they separated” to the date of the final divorce

decree. Id. at ¶ 84. After explaining the distinction between temporary support and

a final order of spousal support, this court wrote:

      There is no indication that the court disregarded any support payments
      Saks was obligated to pay during the pendency of the proceedings when
      it made its award of permanent spousal support. As previously stated,
      the aim of any spousal support award is equity. Kaechele, 

, 

. The trial court considered all the factors
      required by R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) and made an equitable spousal support
      award in both duration and amount based on those factors. Therefore,
      since the spousal support award was equitable under the circumstances
      of this case, the actual date upon which the spousal support order
      commenced was of no consequence.

Id. at ¶ 86.   Compare Rossi v. Rossi, 

 (8th Dist.)

(upholding trial court decision that explicitly gave husband credit for 22 months of

previous support payments where trial court explained that its purpose was to

fashion an equitable award of permanent support).

               Here, as in Saks and Rossi, there is nothing to indicate that the trial

court overlooked or otherwise disregarded Robert’s temporary support payments,

voluntary or otherwise, when it determined the amount and duration of permanent

spousal support. In overruling Robert’s objections to the magistrate’s decision, the

trial court, like this court in Saks, explicitly referenced the distinction between

temporary support and an order of permanent support. It further conveyed its

understanding of the duration of Robert’s temporary support obligation, noting that

between the time a support magistrate entered the temporary support order in

March 2020 and the trial magistrate issued a decision in July 2023, Robert had been

paying temporary support for “approximately 40 months.” It nevertheless ruled

that based on a marriage of approximately 131 months and “[c]onsidering the factors

listed in R.C. 3105.18, an award of $4,000.00 per month in spousal support for 44

months is reasonable and appropriate.” In its March 21, 2025 final divorce decree,

the trial court ordered that Robert’s permanent support obligation commenced

effective August 1, 2023, the first day of the month following release of the

magistrate’s decision. (In other words, the trial court did not order the 44 months
to commence at the time it journalized the final decree of divorce.) All of this reflects

the trial court’s careful consideration of the statutory factors based on competent,

credible evidence, as well as further consideration of Robert’s history of paying

temporary support.

               In Saks, 

 (8th Dist.), the trial court ordered the

husband, who had a lucrative private-practice legal career, to pay $3,500 per month

in spousal support to the wife, a government attorney. 

. Support was to

continue for 60 months or until the wife remarried. 

 This court found the award

equitable based in part on “the large discrepancy in the parties’ income[.]” Id. at

¶ 78. The present case presents an even wider income disparity and is further

complicated by Michelle’s mental-health struggles and her resulting difficulties

maintaining stable employment. We find and conclude that the trial court’s award

of 44 months of spousal support commencing August 1, 2023, in the amount of

$4,000 per month, was not an abuse of discretion.

               As a result, we likewise reject Michelle’s argument that the trial court

erred by ordering too little support, i.e., that it should have ordered Robert to pay

her $12,000 per month indefinitely.         The record reflects that the trial court

considered Michelle’s arguments with respect to income disparity, mental health,

and standard of living in determining the amount and duration of permanent

support, rejecting Robert’s argument for comparatively little permanent support

($20,000, paid as a lump sum) and instead ordering continued support for an

extended period of 44 months, which will ultimately total $176,000. The record
suggests this was an equitable award. While the evidence confirmed Michelle’s

struggle with mental health, at the time of trial, she was not yet 50 years old and

there was no evidence Michelle was permanently unable to work. She even testified

that no doctor had ever told her she was unable to work. (Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 65-66.)

Indeed, Michelle testified that she was looking for employment and that she had

been accepted into a master’s program. (Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 54-55 and Feb. 8, 2023 tr.

27.) She testified she wanted to “get [her] career back on path[.]” (Feb. 8, 2023 tr.

28.) In light of the parties’ competing proposals with respect to the amount and

duration of support, and the multitude of factors considered by the trial court, we

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s final spousal support award. Robert’s

second assignment of error and Michelle’s third cross-assignment of error are

overruled.

  D. Michelle’s Second Cross-Assignment of Error

              In her second cross-assignment of error, Michelle argues that the trial

court erred by failing to find that Robert committed economic misconduct. Michelle

contends that R0bert committed financial misconduct and that the trial court

should have ordered a distributive award. We find no merit to Michelle’s arguments.

              This court has recently reiterated that R.C. 3105.171(E)(4) “provides

that if a spouse has engaged in financial misconduct, including but not limited to the

dissipation, destruction, concealment, or fraudulent disposition of assets, the court

may compensate the offended spouse with a distributive award or with a greater

award of marital property.” Anderson-Fye v. Mullinax-Fye, 

, ¶ 94-
95 (8th Dist.), citing A.E. v. J.E., 

 (8th Dist.).             “‘The

distributive award concept is consistent with the well-established principle that trial

courts have broad discretion when creating an equitable division of property in a

divorce proceeding.’” Strauss, 

 (8th Dist.), quoting Adams

v. Chambers, 

 (12th Dist. 1992); La Spisa, 2023-Ohio-

3467, at ¶ 72 (8th Dist.) (same).

              “The complaining spouse bears the burden of proving the financial

misconduct.” 

, citing A.E. at ¶ 28, citing Victor v. Kaplan,

 (8th Dist.). “‘A spouse commits “financial misconduct”

where he or she engages in intentional conduct by which he or she either profits

from the misconduct or intentionally defeats the other spouse’s interest in marital

assets.’” A.E. at ¶ 29, quoting 

, citing Rodgers v. Rodgers, 2017-Ohio-

7886, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.).

               Upon our independent review of the record, we find that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in finding that Robert did not intentionally conceal

assets or otherwise engage in financial misconduct. We turn first to disclosures

concerning the parties’ financial accounts. Without excusing Robert’s failure to file

updated financial disclosure statements, we have separately concluded, in resolving

Robert’s first assignment of error in his favor, that the trial court erroneously divided

the financial accounts based on the balances in January 2023 rather than the first

date of trial, August 4, 2020. Moreover, the record supports the conclusion that

Robert never concealed the existence of any marital financial accounts. The only
new account that might have been listed on an updated financial disclosure

statement was Key Bank Checking x9324, which the magistrate and trial court

concluded was opened during the pendency of the divorce and was therefore not

marital property.

              The subject of retirement accounts is somewhat more complicated.

Following our extensive review of the record, we find that the magistrate erred in

concluding that Robert “did not initially disclose a retirement asset that was earned

prior to the marriage, however, defendant was not harmed by Plaintiff’s initial

failure to disclose as this retirement account is not a marital asset.” (Magistrate’s

decision at p. 8.) The magistrate appears to have confused Robert’s nonmarital

University of Utah Defined Contribution Plan and Discontinued 403(b) Plan with

his Cleveland Clinic Cash Balance Plan. Robert in fact disclosed the existence and

then-current balances of the two University of Utah retirement accounts (the only

retirement accounts deemed nonmarital) in his February 20, 2020 financial

disclosure form. As Michelle correctly argued in her written closing argument to the

magistrate, Robert actually failed to disclose the existence of the Cleveland Clinic

Cash Balance Plan, which was indisputably a marital asset.

              The magistrate’s minor error in identifying the omitted disclosure,

however, does not alter the outcome. Robert still explained this omission during his

cross-examination.    Robert’s attorney filed his initial disclosure statement in

February 2020. By that time, Robert was not only almost six years removed from

his employment with the Cleveland Clinic, but he had been living in an apartment
rather than the marital home for nearly a year.          Robert testified on cross-

examination that account statements were being sent to the marital home and he

had overlooked the Cleveland Clinic Cash Balance Plan when cataloging marital

retirement assets. (Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 33.) The statements themselves confirm they

were addressed to the marital home. (Michelle’s exhibits V and Y.) The trial

transcript does not reflect a scheme to conceal assets, and there was no suggestion

that Robert dissipated or disposed of marital property. Cf. Bertalan v. Bertalan,

 (8th Dist.) (husband attempted to sell condominium without

wife’s consent or a court order).

              Furthermore, on redirect, Robert’s attorney established that Michelle

was made aware of the existence of the account, albeit via the Cleveland Clinic’s

response to Michelle’s subpoena, no later than August 3, 2020, before the start of

trial. (Feb 7, 2023 tr. 42; Michelle’s exhibit V.) Michelle was therefore aware of the

account not only on the first day of trial on August 4, 2020, but also while the case

limped into 2021, 2022, and finally 2023. Even during that extensive time frame,

Michelle did not file a motion to compel or any other motion seeking financial

documents. See Saks, 

 (8th Dist.) (husband had “not

identified anywhere in the record where he sought court intervention to obtain

evidence of” allegedly concealed accounts).

              The magistrate, who observed Robert’s testimony, was convinced that

Robert had made an honest mistake and did not intend to conceal assets. This court

has consistently held:
       “The credibility of a witness is primarily for the trier of fact to assess.”
       Khatib v. Peters, 

, 

, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.). “The
       underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court
       rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the
       witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections,
       and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered
       testimony.” Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 

, 

 (1984).

Machen, 

 (8th Dist.). This deference likewise extends to

trial court magistrates when they function as the sole triers of fact. “[W]hen a

magistrate comments on credibility and the trial court does not take additional

evidence . . . the judgment of the magistrate on issues of credibility is, absent other

evidence, the last word on the issue for all practical purposes.” (Cleaned up.)

Pitrone v. Pitrone, 

 (8th Dist.). See also S.S. v. T.M., 2025-

Ohio-1827, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.) (agreeing with trial court that where case turns on

credibility, “the magistrate was in the best position to assess [the parties’]

credibility”).

                 The trial court, upon its own review, expressly found that the record

did not support Michelle’s argument that Robert intentionally concealed assets, that

any oversight “does not rise to the level of financial misconduct and the requisite

wrongful intent[,]” and that Michelle was “receiving her share of the marital estate”

and was therefore not harmed in any fashion. On this record, and in light of the

relevant case law surrounding issues of intentional financial misconduct, we find

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we overrule Michelle’s

second cross-assignment of error.
  E. Robert’s Third Assignment of Error

                  In his third assignment of error, Robert argues that the trial court

abused its discretion by ordering him to pay attorney’s fees to Michelle. This court

has stated that

      “[t]here are no ‘automatic attorney fees’ in domestic relations cases,
      and when determining whether to award attorney fees in divorce cases,
      ‘the court must start with a presumption that attorney fees are the
      responsibility of the party who retains the attorney.’” (Cleaned up.)
      A.A.O. v. A.M.O., 

 (8th Dist.), quoting Victor v.
      Kaplan, 

, 

 (8th Dist.). “It is well-established that an award of attorney fees is within the sound discretion
      of the trial court.” Rand v. Rand, 

, 

 (1985); see also A.A.O. at ¶ 58, citing Saks v. Riga, 2014-Ohio-
      4930, ¶ 89 (8th Dist.). An “award [of attorney’s fees] will not be
      overruled absent an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
      unconscionable.” Cyr v. Cyr, 

 (8th Dist.).
      Therefore, this Court will not reverse a trial court’s award of attorney’s
      fees absent an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Wilson, 

 (8th Dist.). “Under this highly deferential standard of review, we
      ‘may not freely substitute [our] judgment for that of the trial court.’”
      Allan [v. Allan], 2019-Ohio-[2111,] at ¶ 95 [(8th Dist.)], quoting
      Dannaher v. Newbold, 

 (10th Dist.). “A court
      may award reasonable attorney fees if it determines that the award is
      equitable.[”] Allan at ¶ 100.

E.A. v. A.A., 

 (8th Dist.). “In determining whether an award

of attorney fees is equitable, ‘the court may consider the parties’ marital assets and

income, any award of temporary spousal support, the conduct of the parties, and

any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate.”’ Rossi v. Rossi, 2014-Ohio-

1832, ¶ 100 (8th Dist.), quoting R.C. 3105.73(A).

                  As discussed above, the trial court magistrate had declined to award

attorney’s fees to Michelle. Michelle timely objected, arguing that she incurred

attorney’s fees in the amount of $71,360.32. She pointed to disparities in the parties’
income and expenses, as well as to Robert’s purported financial misconduct, as

justifying the award. The trial court sustained the objection. Because the trial court,

like the magistrate, found no evidence of financial misconduct, it focused on income

disparity, noting that there was a “significant disparity” in that Robert’s “annual

income is over $240,000.00 and Defendant does not currently have employment.”

(Judgment entry on objections at p. 10.)13 It ultimately awarded Michelle $35,000,

which is just under one-half her claimed fees.

                 Robert argues that the trial court “magistrate was in the best position

to evaluate the trial cadence and behavior and as such determined that attorney fees

were not warranted.”          (Robert’s brief at p. 20.)          Unlike the magistrate’s

determinations of credibility, however, the “trial cadence,” as well as the behavior of

counsel, can be determined from a review of the transcript. Every objection and

other interruption is apparent from the transcript, and credibility is not at issue

because the alleged disruptions were by counsel.14 The trial court, therefore, did not

inappropriately discount any credibility determinations made by the magistrate.


       13 Without separately assigning error, Robert implies that the trial court should not

have considered “Michelle’s untimely filed Supplemental Objections to the Magistrate’s
Decision.” Michelle’s supplemental objections, though untimely, were accompanied by a
motion for leave to file the supplemental objections instanter. While the trial court did not
explicitly rule on the motion for leave, its consideration of the supplemental objections
reflects the granting of that motion. See Samman v. Nukta, 

(8th Dist.) (While the “court did not explicitly rule on the motion for leave to amend . . . its
order granting summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds implicitly granted it.”);
see also Carpet Barn v. CSH, Inc., 

, *3 (8th Dist. June 5, 1997);
Debaggis v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 

, *3 (8th Dist. Aug. 4, 1983).

       14 Neither side contends that the parties themselves were disorderly or contributed

to any trial delays. The transcript instead suggests, and the magistrate confirmed, that both
                Furthermore, in addition to income disparity, the record reflects that

Michelle borrowed money from a friend in order to pay her attorney’s retainer.

(Feb. 7, 2023 tr. 134.) The same amount is listed as an unsecured debt on her

financial disclosure statements. (Michelle’s exhibit P and BBB.) Michelle testified

that the last payment she had made to her attorney was only $180. (Feb. 7, 2023 tr.

68-69; Feb. 8, 2023 tr. 38.)

                Robert’s argument that Michelle failed to provide sufficient evidence

of the actual value of services is likewise not well taken. At the conclusion of trial,

the following exchange occurred with respect to stipulating to the reasonableness of

Michelle’s attorney’s fees:

      [Exhibits] Triple M and MMM-1 are the rates. The outstanding
      amounts which we want a stipulation on is fair, reasonable, and
      necessary is the amounts set forth on page 14.

      Total amount of fees and expenses as of the date of last charge was
      $71,360.32. Of that, $4,243.32 were expenses.

(Emphasis added.) (Feb. 8, 2023 tr. at 93-94.) The magistrate stated: “Is that

acceptable, counsel, on behalf of Plaintiff?” (Feb. 8, 2023 tr. at 94.) Robert’s counsel

responded, “[y]es,” and the magistrate stated that the court would accept the

stipulation. (Feb. 8, 2023 tr. at 94.)

                “A stipulation is ‘a voluntary agreement entered into between

opposing parties concerning the disposition of some relevant point in order to avoid

the necessity for proof on an issue’ or to ‘narrow the range of issues to be litigated.’”


Michelle and Robert testified in a forthright manner, even when latter had to endure a
prolonged cross-examination.
Stratton v. Stratton, 

 (8th Dist.), quoting Bodrock v. Bodrock,

, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.).        Accordingly, a stipulation “‘renders proof

unnecessary.’” Stratton at ¶ 17, quoting Rice v. Rice, 

,

*11 (8th Dist. Nov. 8, 2001). Robert cannot complain with respect to the value of

Michelle’s attorney’s fees.

                  Given the highly deferential standard of review, we decline to disturb

the trial court’s ruling awarding Michelle just under half of her claimed attorney’s

fees. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and Robert’s third assignment of

error is overruled.

                  Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Specifically, on remand, the trial

court shall divide the parties’ financial accounts as of the first day of trial, August 4,

2020, using the balances established via testimony and admitted exhibits.

Furthermore, with respect to the parties’ marital retirement accounts, the trial

court’s final decree must be corrected with respect to the balance of Robert’s Thrift

Savings Account, i.e., to reflect the only balance supported by the evidence, $77,219.

      It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.




DEENA R. CALABRESE, JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, P.J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR