[Cite as State v. Terrell,
2026-Ohio-652.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Nos. 114674, 114903
and 115693
v. :
CHARLES TERRELL, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: VACATED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 26, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-22-676159-A and CR-23-687332-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and, John T. Dowling, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Goldberg Dowell and Associates LLC and Adam Parker,
for appellant.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
Defendant-appellant Charles Terrell (“Terrell”) appeals the
imposition of $40,000 in fines after being convicted of aggravated robbery and
other charges.1 For the reasons that follow, we vacate the fines.
Factual and Procedural History
In December 2023, a grand jury was convened and indicted Terrell
on 32 counts, including 11 counts of aggravated robbery (Counts 1, 3-6, 8, 10, 12, 15,
18, and 21); 14 counts of kidnapping (Counts 2, 7, 9, 11, 13-14, 16-17, 19-20, and 22-
25); five counts of having weapons while under disability (Counts 26-30); one count
of tampering with evidence (Count 31); and one count of obstructing official
business (Count 32). Each of the first 25 counts included one- and three-year
firearm specifications. The State alleged that Terrell committed ten aggravated
robberies at convenience stores between September and November 2023 and, in the
course of that conduct, kidnapped 14 separate victims while displaying a firearm.2
In addition, Terrell was on community-control sanctions for attempted domestic
violence, a felony of the fifth degree, that he pleaded guilty to in June 2023.
In October 2024, the parties entered into a plea agreement. In
exchange for a guilty plea to 10 counts of aggravated robbery (Counts 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10,
12, 15, 18, and 21); the 3-year firearm specifications attached to Counts 1 and 3; one
1 Terrell also appealed a separate case involving the revocation of community-
control sanctions; however, he did not raise any assignments of error for that case.
2 A codefendant was identified in the last two robberies and is not part of this
appeal.
count of having weapons while under disability (Count 26); and one count of
tampering with evidence (Count 31), the State moved to dismiss the remaining
charges and associated firearm specifications. Additionally, the parties agreed to a
recommended sentence of 18 years in prison.
After accepting the guilty plea, the trial court imposed an aggregate
prison sentence of 18 to 19½ years. In addition, the trial court imposed a fine of
$20,000 each on Counts 1 and 3.3 The trial court also determined that Terrell was
in violation of his community-control sanctions in the attempted-domestic-violence
case and imposed a one-year sentence to run consecutively to the aggravated-
robbery case. Terrell received 364 days of jail-time credit.
Terrell appeals raising the following assignment of error for our
review:
Assignment of Error
The Court abused its discretion in imposing a $40,000 fine.
Law and Analysis
Terrell argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing
the $40,000 fine because he was indigent and, given his lengthy sentence, unlikely
to be able to pay the fine any time in the future. We agree.
Trial courts have broad discretion in imposing a financial sanction,
and courts have consistently held that appellate courts review the imposition of
3 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed additional fines on other counts
and suspended them. However, that decision is not reflected in the sentencing entry and
neither appellant nor the State has raised the issue as a challenge on appeal.
financial sanctions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Kyle, 2021-Ohio-3346, ¶ 7
(8th Dist.), citing State v. Sekic,
2011-Ohio-3978, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.); State v. Percy,
2021-Ohio-1876, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.) An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s
decision is “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State v. Hill, 2022-Ohio-
4544, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Beasley,
2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12, citing Blakemore v.
Blakemore,
5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
In the instant case, the trial court imposed two fines of $20,000 as
permitted by R.C. 2929.18(A)(3)(a). However, prior to imposing a fine, the trial
court must consider “the offender’s present and future ability to pay the amount of
the sanction or fine.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(5). There are no specific factors that a trial
court must address nor specific findings that the court must place on the record to
establish that it considered the offender’s present and future ability to pay. State v.
Mosby, 2024-Ohio-5210, ¶ 64 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Cotto,
2019-Ohio-985, ¶ 12
(8th Dist.), and State v. Petticrew,
2023-Ohio-159, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.), citing State v.
Parker,
2004-Ohio-1313, ¶ 42 (2d Dist.). Still, “‘there must be some evidence in the
record that the trial court considered the defendant’s ability to pay.’” State v.
Schneider,
2012-Ohio-1740, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Jacobs, 2010-Ohio-
4010, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Cosme,
2008-Ohio-2811, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.).
“Generally, a trial court complies with [the requirements of R.C. 2929.19(B)(5)]
when it considers a presentence-investigation report that contains information
about the offender’s financial situation and his ability to pay the financial sanction.”
State v. Simpson,
2014-Ohio-4580, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).
In the instant case, the trial court considered a post-sentence-
investigation report from Terrell’s attempted-domestic-violence conviction that was
created in 2023, a year prior to the sentencing in this case. The trial court noted that
Terrell was employed as the manager of a fast-food restaurant, working six days a
week, and also worked three days a week at a convenience store. The trial court
further noted that Terrell reported that his financial situation was “good.” However,
this information was gathered prior to Terrell’s arrest for this case. Terrell was
arrested in December 2023 and remained in jail on a $100,000 cash/surety bond,
while these charges were pending. As of sentencing in October 2024, Terrell had
not worked for a year and his “good” financial situation had undoubtedly changed
over the course of that year. “‘A court must . . . determine a defendant’s ability to
pay considering his financial condition at the time of sentencing.’” State v. Smith,
2018-Ohio-4421, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Emrich,
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS
897, *7 (Mar. 10, 1995). Accordingly, we find that the trial court could not have
considered Terrell’s ability to pay at the time of sentencing.
Moreover, with respect to Terrell’s future ability to pay, the court
noted that Terrell was 23 years old, had a high school diploma, would be relatively
young when released, and that while in prison, he would have the ability to earn
money to pay his fines. Although these factors indicate a potential to pay the fine in
the future, this court has repeatedly held that when looking at mandatory fines that
the possibility an offender could pay a fine in the future is not a proper basis to
determine whether the defendant is indigent. State v. Zsigray, 2021-Ohio-1401,
¶ 19 (8th Dist.); State v. Clemons,
2015-Ohio-520, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.); State v. Smith,
2018-Ohio-4421, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). Certainly, this analysis is also relevant to
discretionary fines, especially in a case such as this, where the offender is sentenced
up to 19½ years in prison. The income he will earn will be pennies on the dollar.4
Finally, upon his release, his earning capacity will be challenged by his criminal
record.
Importantly, in State v. Williams, 2009-Ohio-5964 (8th Dist.), we
found that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a fine where the
record established the defendant had “no income, no cash on hand, no real estate,
and no automobile.” Id. at ¶ 9. Further, the defendant was responsible for
supporting his four children, their four mothers, and his parents, plus he had unpaid
medical bills. Additionally, Williams had to serve five years in prison. In that
situation, the defendant filed the required affidavit of indigency to have the
mandatory fine waived. Consequently, we found the trial court abused its discretion
when it imposed a $10,000 fine.
Similarly, in State v. Davis, 2014-Ohio-2052 (8th Dist.), the
defendant filed an affidavit of indigency, which alleged that he was unemployed, did
not have an alternative source of income, owned no real property, and had no
automobile licensed in his name. The record also reflected that he lived with his
mother, had a daughter, had a ninth-grade education, a prior felony conviction as a
4 See Admin.Code 5120-3-08, establishing inmate income of $0/month for
category 1 inmates, to $12-26 per month for category 6 inmates. Income may differ
depending on the type of institution.
juvenile, a suspended license, and abused marijuana and cocaine, all factors that
would impede his ability to obtain gainful employment once released from prison
after his 18-month sentence. Id. at ¶ 10. The appellate court found that it was an
abuse of discretion to impose a $5,000 fine in those circumstances.
Given the foregoing and based on the unique circumstances of this
case, we find that the trial court’s imposition of a $40,000 fine was unreasonable
where the trial court only reviewed a year-old post-sentence report and did not
consider his current ability to pay. Furthermore, the probability that Terrell could
pay the fine in the future was an insufficient basis to establish a future ability to pay,
especially given the length of the prison term and Terrell’s specific convictions.
Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the $40,000
fine.
Accordingly, the assignment of error is sustained and we vacate the
fines.
Judgment vacated as to the imposition of fines.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
