2026 UT App 3
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
DANIEL STANISLAV MACBETH,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20230512-CA
Filed January 15, 2026
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Robert C. Lunnen
No. 211402124
Freyja Johnson and Rachel Phillips Ainscough,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Rebecca Barker,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER
concurred.
LUTHY, Judge:
¶1 Daniel Stanislav MacBeth ran a red light, striking another
vehicle in the intersection and killing its driver. MacBeth was
subsequently convicted of manslaughter. He now asks us to
reverse his conviction, asserting that the district court gave the
jury an erroneous instruction regarding what it means to act
“recklessly” for purposes of manslaughter. MacBeth also asserts
that his trial counsel (Counsel) provided ineffective assistance by
not opposing the State’s proposed jury instruction on the elements
of manslaughter.
State v. MacBeth
¶2 We agree with MacBeth that the district court provided the
jury with an erroneous definition of what it means to act
“recklessly” in the context of manslaughter. But we conclude that
neither the district court’s error nor Counsel’s assertedly deficient
performance prejudiced MacBeth’s defense, and we therefore
affirm his conviction.
BACKGROUND 1
The Accident and the Charges
¶3 On May 25, 2021, an off-duty law enforcement officer
(Officer) was driving west on State Route 194 toward Saratoga
Springs in an unmarked Dodge Ram truck. As he drove, he
noticed a “small white vehicle”—whose driver and sole occupant
turned out to be MacBeth—“following . . . closely behind” him.
MacBeth was so close that Officer “couldn’t see the hood of
[MacBeth’s] vehicle” in his rearview mirror. Officer and MacBeth
both came to the intersection at Redwood Road, turned left onto
Redwood Road, and then proceeded south in the left-most lane.
MacBeth was “still . . . traveling very closely” behind Officer, who
was going about fifty miles per hour, the posted speed limit.
¶4 At this point, Officer twice “stepped on [his] brakes to
brake check [MacBeth], to give a hint that [he was] too close.”
After Officer brake checked MacBeth the second time, MacBeth
“made an abrupt right lane change,” sped up until he was
“parallel with [Officer’s] vehicle,” “put out his left arm” and
“flipped [Officer] off, and then accelerated again.” MacBeth then
1. “On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most favorable
to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly. We present
conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand issues raised
on appeal.” State v. Hosman, 2021 UT App 103,
496 P.3d 1162
(cleaned up).
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State v. MacBeth
changed lanes to the left, in front of Officer, accelerated once
more, flipped Officer off again, and “kept going.” Officer, who
had training and years of experience pacing cars to monitor for
speeding, estimated that by this time MacBeth was traveling
seventy to ninety miles per hour toward the intersection at
Harvest Hills Boulevard. Officer then “saw the light at the
intersection turn red” and watched as MacBeth “disregarded” the
red light and entered the intersection.
¶5 During this same time, another southbound driver on
Redwood Road (Driver 1) was in the right lane with her toddler
son and was also approaching the intersection at Harvest Hills
Boulevard. Driver 1 began to slow down because the light at the
intersection had turned yellow. While she was slowing, she heard
the sound of a vehicle accelerating loudly behind her. She looked
in her rearview mirror and saw a “speeding” car—the one driven
by MacBeth—approaching her from behind. She then watched as
MacBeth “change[d] lanes quickly to the left” and “drove by [her]
very quickly.” She said to her son, “There goes another speeder
who’s going to run a red light.” As she said this, she saw MacBeth
“run the red light.”
¶6 An additional southbound driver in the right lane on
Redwood Road (Driver 2) also watched MacBeth run the red light
at the intersection at Harvest Hills Boulevard. Like Driver 1,
Driver 2 “noticed [when] the light started to change from green to
yellow,” so he “started slowing down.” As he did, he heard
MacBeth’s “loud” car approaching from behind, looked in his
rearview mirror, and saw MacBeth “coming up pretty hard [in]
. . . the left lane.” When MacBeth passed him, Driver 2 saw that
MacBeth “was just focused” and “trying to hit the light.”
According to Driver 2, MacBeth did not “hit [his] brakes” but,
instead, “just kept going faster” as he entered the intersection,
where the light had been red “[f]or a good two seconds.”
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State v. MacBeth
¶7 Meanwhile, a teenage driver (Victim) in a northbound
vehicle on Redwood Road had stopped at the same intersection,
waiting to turn left. After Victim’s light turned red—or a fraction
of a second before it did—Victim started to turn and was struck
by MacBeth, who was speeding the other direction through the
red light. The two cars “slam[med] into the retaining wall” on the
west side of the road. Driver 1 “immediately called 911,” thinking
the accident looked like one that “would kill someone.” Officer
radioed the highway patrol, telling it to dispatch “Saratoga
Springs units and the fire department.”
¶8 Although paramedics arrived and provided life-saving
efforts to Victim, he died at the scene. MacBeth was shaken up but
not seriously injured in the crash. He was subsequently charged
with being an alcohol restricted driver, driving with a measurable
controlled substance in his body, driving on a suspended license,
and manslaughter. He pled guilty to all of these charges except
manslaughter. A trial was held on the manslaughter charge.
The Trial
¶9 At trial, Officer, Driver 1, Driver 2, a paramedic who
responded to the scene, and a police officer assigned to the
accident investigation team testified for the State, relating the facts
outlined above.
¶10 The State also called a number of additional witnesses,
including the traffic signal operations engineer for the Utah
Department of Transportation (UDOT), who testified that after
reviewing data from sensors at the intersection where the crash
occurred, he determined that both MacBeth and Victim ran a red
light. A crash investigator who reviewed data and attempted to
reconstruct the accident testified that he believed Victim entered
the intersection “a fraction of a second prior to [the light] turning
red” and MacBeth entered the intersection “[m]ore than a fraction
of a second after the light turned red.” Two people who spoke
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State v. MacBeth
with MacBeth at the scene testified that he told them the light was
yellow when he entered the intersection.
¶11 Additionally, the State called a patrol officer assigned to
the accident investigation team, who testified that based on his
examination of the speedometer in Victim’s vehicle, Victim was
traveling about eighteen miles per hour when the collision
occurred. The State also called a crash reconstruction expert, who,
relying on evidence from the crash, estimated that MacBeth was
traveling ninety-four miles per hour just before he hit Victim.
While no additional witnesses for the State estimated the specific
speed at which MacBeth or Victim was traveling, one motorist
who was approaching the intersection from the south at the time
of the accident testified that she observed a “super loud blur” just
prior to the crash. Another such motorist testified that the first
thing she saw was Victim’s car and MacBeth’s car “flying through
the air” after the crash. And an additional northbound motorist
testified that he saw MacBeth “coming southbound . . . at a very
high rate of speed”—“much faster than any other vehicle” “[i]n
the vicinity”—right before the crash.
¶12 MacBeth called a single witness, an officer who “conducted
a major crash vehicle inspection” of MacBeth’s car. That officer
testified that MacBeth did not have “any obvious distractions
within the vehicle” at the time of the crash. MacBeth did not
testify.
The Jury Instructions
¶13 The State proposed and Counsel agreed to the jury
instruction on the elements of manslaughter, which stated in
relevant part as follows:
[MacBeth] is charged in Count 1 with committing
Manslaughter on or about May 25, 2021. You cannot
convict him of this offense unless, based on the
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State v. MacBeth
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each
of the following elements:
1. [MacBeth],
2. While acting recklessly,
3. Caused the death of [Victim].
¶14 The State and Counsel could not agree on an instruction
defining the mental state required for manslaughter. The State
proposed the following instruction, the first sentence of which
exactly tracks the definition given in section 76-2-103(3) of the
Utah Code:
A person engages in conduct “recklessly” with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the
result will occur. The nature and extent of the risk
must be of such a magnitude that disregarding it is
a gross deviation from what an ordinary person
would do in that situation.
MacBeth, on the other hand, proposed the following instruction:
A person acts “recklessly” when he is aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct
will cause a particular result, but he consciously
disregards the risk and acts anyway. The nature and
extent of the risk must be of such magnitude that
disregarding it is a gross deviation from what an
ordinary person would do in that situation.
The court determined that it would be “safer staying with the
statute” and gave the State’s proposed instruction.
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State v. MacBeth
¶15 The jury convicted MacBeth of manslaughter, and MacBeth
now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶16 MacBeth raises two issues on appeal. First, he asserts that
the district court “erroneously instruct[ed] the jury on a definition
of ‘recklessly’ that is not applicable to manslaughter.” Our
supreme court recently clarified “that the applicable standard of
review for jury instruction issues should be determined as it is for
any other issue on appeal,” meaning that, “in general, the
standard of review is based on the nature of the issue on appeal.”
State v. Hunt, 2025 UT 54, ¶ 43 (cleaned up). For example, “a
district court generally has discretion in deciding how it will
instruct a jury at trial, as jury instructions require no particular
form so long as they accurately convey the law.” Id. ¶ 45 (cleaned
up). Thus, “if the jury instructions are legally correct, the precise
wording and specificity of jury instructions is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Id. (cleaned up). On the other hand,
“if a criminal defendant asserts that the district court . . . gave a
legally incorrect instruction,” then the issue is a question of law,
the standard of review for which is correctness. Id. ¶ 46. Here,
because MacBeth asserts that the district court gave a legally
incorrect instruction, the issue he raises presents a question of law,
which we review for correctness. See id.
¶17 Second, MacBeth asserts that Counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by agreeing to the State’s proposed jury instruction on
the elements of manslaughter. “When a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, there is
no lower court ruling to review and we must decide whether the
defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a
matter of law.” State v. Miller,
2023 UT App 85, ¶ 22,
535 P.3d 390
(cleaned up).
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State v. MacBeth
ANALYSIS
I. Jury Instruction on the Mental State for Manslaughter
¶18 To be convicted of the version of manslaughter with which
MacBeth was charged, a person must have “recklessly cause[d]
the death of another individual.” Utah Code § 76-5-205(2)(a).
MacBeth contends that the district court “erroneously instruct[ed]
the jury on a definition of ‘recklessly’ that is not applicable to
manslaughter.” We agree but determine that this error was
harmless in this case.
¶19 Section 76-2-103(3) of the Utah Code defines what it means
for a person to have the mental state of recklessness for purposes
of criminal liability. It states,
A person engages in conduct . . . [r]ecklessly with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the
result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise under all the circumstances
as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.
Utah Code § 76-2-103(3).
¶20 The first sentence of section 76-2-103(3) contemplates that
for some crimes a mental state of recklessness exists if the actor “is
aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that [particular] circumstances [surrounding the
actor’s conduct] exist.” Id. An example of such a crime is the
offense of leaving a child unattended in a motor vehicle. See id.
§ 76-5-115. That crime is committed with a reckless mental state
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State v. MacBeth
when an actor recklessly “leaves a child in an enclosed
compartment of a motor vehicle,” the vehicle is on “public
property” or “private property that is open to the general public,”
“the child is not supervised by an individual who is at least nine
years old,” and “the conditions present a risk to the child of:
(i) hyperthermia; (ii) hypothermia; or (iii) dehydration.” Id. § 76-
5-115(2). The actor has the requisite mental state for the last
element of this crime, for example, if the actor is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances present a risk to the child of hyperthermia,
hypothermia, or dehydration. See id. §§ 76-2-103(3), -115(2). The
actor need not recklessly cause hyperthermia, hypothermia, or
dehydration; instead, it is sufficient that the actor engages in
conduct recklessly with respect to the circumstances surrounding
the actor’s conduct. See id.
¶21 Contrastingly, section 76-2-103(3) also contemplates that
for other crimes a mental state of recklessness exists if the actor “is
aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that . . . [a particular] result will occur” because
of the actor’s conduct. Id. § 76-2-103(3). One such crime is the
version of manslaughter with which MacBeth was charged. See id.
§ 76-5-205(2)(a). As already noted, an actor commits manslaughter
when the actor “recklessly causes the death of another
individual.” Id. Thus, for an actor to have the requisite mental
state for this crime, the actor must be aware of but consciously
disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the death of
another individual will result from the actor’s conduct. See id.
§§ 76-2-103(3), 76-5-205(2)(a).
¶22 In short, “[s]ome crimes or elements [of a crime] with a
mens rea of ‘recklessly’ require [only] that the defendant
recklessly engages in conduct, while others require that the
defendant recklessly causes a result.” Model Utah Jury
Instructions 2d CR304A committee’s note to the 2015 amendment,
https://legacy.utcourts.gov/MUJI/?cat=2 [https://perma.cc/6CQZ-
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State v. MacBeth
4CQ6]. Because our criminal code contemplates two different
ways in which a person may have the mental state of recklessness,
depending on the crime or element at issue, “[j]urors must be
specifically instructed as to the definition of ‘recklessly’ [that]
applies to the crime(s) or element(s) they are considering.” Id. And
“[i]f the jury is considering more than one count with a mens rea
of ‘recklessly,’ and if a single definition does not cover all counts,
then the jury must be instructed as to which definition applies to
each count.”
Id. 2
¶23 Here, rather than instruct the jury as to the specific
definition of “recklessly” that applied to the crime at issue, the
district court instructed the jury as to two possible definitions of
“recklessly” without specifying which one the jury was to apply.
This was error. Although the court’s instruction tracked the
language of the relevant statute, that approach was problematic
in this context where the statute contained multiple definitions,
only one of which applied to the crime at issue. Because under one
of those definitions the jurors might have believed they could
convict MacBeth if they found that he was aware of but
consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
some (unidentified) circumstance existed, without finding that he
was aware of but consciously disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that another person’s death would occur
because of his conduct, the instruction was erroneous.
¶24 Nevertheless, we conclude that this error was harmless in
this case. “An error is harmless and does not require reversal if it
is sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
2. While Utah’s model jury instructions “are merely advisory and
do not necessarily reflect correct statements of Utah law,” C.R.
Eng. v. Swift Transp. Co.,
2019 UT 8, ¶ 34 n.59,
437 P.3d 343 (cleaned
up), the committee’s notes that we have quoted aptly and
correctly state the relevant law.
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State v. MacBeth
proceedings.” State v. Zimpfer, 2024 UT App 136, ¶ 58,
558 P.3d
111 (cleaned up). In other words, “the likelihood of a different
outcome absent the error must be sufficiently high to undermine
confidence in the verdict.”
Id. (cleaned up). Our confidence in the
verdict here is not undermined by the erroneous definition of
“recklessly” that was given to the jury.
¶25 The jury heard Officer, Driver 1, and Driver 2 each testify
that they saw the traffic light turn red before MacBeth entered the
intersection. The jury also heard both UDOT’s traffic signal
operations engineer and a crash investigator opine that the light
was red before MacBeth entered the intersection. The only
contrary evidence on this point was MacBeth’s reported
statements to people at the scene that the light was yellow.
¶26 Moreover, the jury heard Officer testify—based on his law
enforcement training and years of experience—that MacBeth was
traveling seventy to ninety miles per hour when he entered the
intersection. The jury heard a crash reconstruction expert estimate
that MacBeth was traveling ninety-four miles per hour just before
he hit Victim. It heard from multiple eyewitnesses who generally
corroborated the experts’ estimates by testifying variously that
MacBeth was “coming up pretty hard”; that he was traveling at a
“very high rate of speed,” “much faster than any other vehicle”
“[i]n the vicinity”; that he “just kept going faster” as he entered
the intersection; and that he appeared as a “super loud blur.”
Finally, the jury heard another eyewitness testify that Victim’s car
and MacBeth’s car went “flying through the air” as a result of the
crash.
¶27 “Jurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing
instructions for subtle shades of meaning in the same way that
lawyers might.” State v. Gollaher,
2020 UT App 131, ¶ 38,
474 P.3d
1018 (cleaned up). “Rather, they apply a commonsense
understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken
place at trial.”
Id. (cleaned up). Considering these realities and the
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State v. MacBeth
compelling evidence that MacBeth ran a red light in traffic while
traveling roughly ninety miles per hour, there is no reasonable
probability that the jury—which plainly found that MacBeth was
aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk—did not also believe that the substantial and
unjustifiable risk that MacBeth disregarded was the risk of
causing another person’s death.
¶28 In sum, the error in the court’s definition of what it means
to act recklessly for purposes of manslaughter was harmless in
light of the evidence in this case. Thus, the error provides no basis
for us to overturn MacBeth’s conviction.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶29 MacBeth also asserts that Counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to insist on a proper instruction on the
elements of manslaughter. Because we see no prejudice to
MacBeth from Counsel’s performance, MacBeth’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim also fails.
¶30 To establish a successful ineffective assistance claim,
MacBeth must demonstrate that (1) “Counsel’s performance was
deficient” and (2) Counsel’s deficient performance “prejudiced
the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
(cleaned up). “Failure to establish either prong of the test is fatal
to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” State v. Nunes,
2020
UT App 145, ¶ 18,
476 P.3d 172 (cleaned up). “If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.”
Strickland,
466 U.S. at 697. Here, we limit our analysis to prejudice
and determine that MacBeth has failed to show he was prejudiced
by Counsel agreeing to the instruction on the elements of
manslaughter that was given to the jury.
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State v. MacBeth
¶31 The jury was instructed that to find MacBeth guilty of
manslaughter, it had to find that “[w]hile acting recklessly,” he
“[c]aused the death of [Victim].” This instruction misstated the
law because it allowed the jury to convict MacBeth if it found that
he acted recklessly in one way but caused Victim’s death in some
other, non-reckless way. See Utah Code § 76-5-205(2)(a) (“[A]n
actor commits manslaughter if the actor recklessly causes the death
of another individual . . . .” (emphasis added)).
¶32 The fact that Counsel did not object to an elements
instruction that misstated the law does not necessarily mean that
Counsel performed deficiently. See State v. Bonds, 2023 UT 1, ¶ 43,
524 P.3d 581 (“Just because a legal error existed . . . does not
necessarily mean that defense counsel’s failure to object to the
error amounted to deficient performance.” (cleaned up)). And in
this instance we need not decide whether Counsel’s failure to
object constituted deficient performance because, in any event,
MacBeth’s defense was not prejudiced by the faulty instruction.
¶33 Again, the jury heard compelling evidence that MacBeth
entered the intersection on a red light in traffic while traveling at
upwards of ninety miles per hour. It found that MacBeth’s
conduct was reckless. And it found that MacBeth caused Victim’s
death. Because there is no evidence that any conduct of MacBeth
caused Victim’s death other than MacBeth’s entering the
intersection on a red light at high speed, there is no reasonable
probability that the faulty elements instruction made any
difference in the jury’s verdict.
¶34 MacBeth resists this conclusion by arguing that he
“simultaneously committed multiple acts while driving and
engaging in the collision, and the evidentiary picture supports [a
determination] that jurors may have differed on which acts they
found to be reckless and which acts they found to be a cause of
[Victim’s] death.” For example, MacBeth asserts that “while some
jurors may have viewed [his] speeding as reckless, and some
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State v. MacBeth
jurors may have viewed his speeding as a cause of [Victim’s]
death, other jurors may have had reasonable doubt that [MacBeth]
was reckless in speeding through the intersection under the
circumstances or that speeding caused [Victim’s] death.”
However, we believe there is no reasonable likelihood that any
juror thought running a red light in traffic at seventy to ninety-four miles per hour in a fifty mile per hour speed zone was not
reckless. We also believe there is no reasonable likelihood that any
juror drew a line between MacBeth’s speeding and his running of
the red light and thought only one was reckless and only the other
caused Victim’s death.
¶35 In sum, MacBeth has not shown that he was prejudiced by
Counsel’s failure to object to the faulty elements instruction.
Accordingly, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
CONCLUSION
¶36 The district court gave an erroneous jury instruction on
what it means to act “recklessly” for purposes of manslaughter.
However, that error was harmless because it did not prejudice
MacBeth’s defense. The court also gave an erroneous instruction
on the elements of manslaughter to which Counsel did not object.
But even if that failure amounted to deficient performance (an
issue we need not decide), that deficient performance did not
prejudice MacBeth’s defense. Thus, MacBeth’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fails. For these reasons, we affirm
MacBeth’s conviction.
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