¶1Opinion by
¶2The granting or refusing of a new trial except for causes like errors of law by the judge or misconduct of the jury, where it may be matter of right, is an exercise of judicial discretion by the court in furtherance of right and justice according to the circumstances of the case. Hence it is well settled that the court may impose terms upon either or both of the parties as conditions of the grant or refusal, and the latitude allowed to the discretion of the court to this end is very great. As each case must be determined on its own circumstances the causes cannot all be specified or enumerated beforehand, but in general as is said by the most prominent writer on the subject, “ it may be safely asserted that no case can occur presenting circumstances timely addressed to the discretion of the court, in which the rights of the parties may not be fully protected by the imposition of conditions meeting the exigency: ” Graham on New Trials, 610.
¶3Large as the discretion is however it is a judicial discretion and must be used with reference to the rights involved in the controversy. The conditions imposed therefore must have some direct relation to the issue between the parties in the case.
¶4The condition complained of in the present proceeding transgresses this limit. The conveyance of the three acres was not asked for by the city nor offered by the appellant. Whatever its merits as a just or wise settlement between the parties, it was not apparently desired by either, and was certainly no part of the issue which they brought into court to have decided. In imposing it as a condition of the refusal of a new trial therefore, the court exceeded its discretionary authority.
¶5*481Tbe condition was erroneous also from another point of view as tending to deprive appellant of his property in violation of his right to have a jury pass upon its value. In this respect the case goes further than Lehr v. Brodbeck, 192 Pa. 535, where the jury having found a verdict for defendant contrary to the instructions of the judge, as to part of the goods sued for, the court directed the acceptance of an offer by the defendant to pay a sum less than plaintiff claimed, and on refusal of plaintiff to accept, refused a new trial. It was held that this was error. In the opinion our Brother Dean said: “ The plaintiff claimed that the value of her goods wrongfully seized and sold was $335. And whether this was the value or not, she had offered evidence tending to establish it as the value. As a suitor under the law she had a right to the opinion of the jury on the evidence; and the court at the trial thought so too. It however now directs her arbitrarily to strike from her claim $85.00 and as a penalty for refusal in effect says she shall have nothing.” See also Bradwell v. Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co., 139 Pa. 404.
¶6Judgment reversed, and record remitted with directions to reinstate the rule for new trial and proceed to dispose of it according to law.