Volume 208 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, a salon and one of its owners, for injuries that she sustained when she walked into the glass doors at the entrance of the salon while attempting to enter the premises. Prior to trial, the defendants filed a motion in limine, seeking to prevent the plaintiff from entering into evidence a photograph of the entrance to the salon, which she had obtained from the salon's website. The photograph depicted the glass doors without any signage or handles. The defendants claimed that the photograph was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, as it had been taken long after the date of the accident and had been photoshopped to remove signage and the handles from the doors. The trial court granted the defendants' motion. At trial, one of the plaintiff's witnesses, S, testified that she had helped to deco- rate the salon prior to its opening, approximately three weeks before the plaintiff's accident. Following the objection of the defendants' coun- sel, the trial court precluded the plaintiff from asking S about the appear- ance of the salon's entrance when she had been working there, including whether the doors had signage or handles. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion to preclude the plaintiff from offering into evidence the photograph obtained from the salon's website: the defendants' counsel conceded that the trial court erred in determining that the plaintiff needed to establish the chain of custody of the photograph prior to introducing it into evidence; more- over, it was indisputable that the photograph was relevant, as it depicted the salon's doors, the appearance of which was central to the plaintiff's case; furthermore, the plaintiff had personal knowledge of the entrance to the salon and was prepared to testify that the photograph was a fair and accurate representation of the salon's doors on the day of her accident, and whether the photograph had been photoshopped and the extent to which it may have been altered went not to its admissibility but was a matter for the jury to consider in determining its eviden- tiary weight. 2. The trial court abused its discretion when it prevented the plaintiff from asking S about the appearance of the doors at the time she was decorat- ing the salon: S's testimony regarding whether there were handles on the glass doors was relevant to a central issue in the case, and may have aided the jury in assessing the credibility of other witnesses who had testified about the appearance of the doors prior to the date of the accident. 3. The preclusion of evidence central to the plaintiff's case may have affected the outcome of the trial; accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. Argued January 4—officially released September 28, 2021

Pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 23-18 (a)), in any action to foreclose a mortgage, ''where no defense as to the amount of the mortgage debt is interposed,'' the amount of the debt may be proved by the submission of an affidavit of debt. The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant. The plaintiff filed an affidavit of debt attesting to the amount of the mortgage debt. The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's affidavit, in which he claimed that, inter alia, the plaintiff had overstated his municipal taxes and that it had miscalculated his interest. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the defendant addi- tional time to obtain and submit verified documentation to support his contention as to those two amounts. The court thereafter held another hearing to consider, inter alia, the defendant's offer of proof as to his objection, which the defendant did not attend. The court, relying on the plaintiff's affidavit of debt and other submissions, rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it accepted the plaintiff's affidavit of debt and relied on it to establish the amount of the defendant's indebtedness: under our Supreme Court's decision in Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker (183 Conn. 369), once the defendant raised objections concerning the amount of the mortgage debt set forth in the plaintiff's affidavit, the hearsay exception provided in Practice Book § 23-18 (a) no longer applied, and the plaintiff was required to provide evidence of the amount of the debt. Argued April 15—officially released September 28, 2021

Convicted of the crimes of misconduct with a motor vehicle and assault in the third degree, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly precluded her from introducing into evidence certain medical records of T, who died after the motorcycle he was operating collided with the defendant's vehicle. The defendant had initiated a left turn into a parking lot, without signaling and while speaking on a cell phone, when she turned her vehicle into the path of the oncoming motorcycle before running over the motorcycle and both T and his passenger, who suffered serious injuries. The defendant gave a sworn statement to the police at the accident scene that she had not been on her cell phone at the time of the crash and later mailed to them a second sworn statement, written with the assistance of her counsel, in which she stated, inter alia, that no cars were in the other lane of travel when she turned into the parking lot and that she neither made nor received any phone calls within twenty minutes before the colli- sion. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to determine that she acted with criminal negli- gence, as required for a conviction of both misconduct with a motor vehicle and assault in the third degree; there was sufficient evidence pursuant to which the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant exhibited a failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the manner in which she drove her vehicle would cause T's death when, in a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe in her situation, she did not wait for the motorcycle to pass but, believing that it was not traveling that fast, turned left into its path and drove over the motorcycle and its passengers. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense when it precluded her from introducing into evidence a toxicology report that showed that T had five substances in his system twelve hours after the collision: a. The defendant's unpreserved evidentiary claim that the report was admissible as a business record was not reviewable: nothing in the record indicated that the defendant ever alerted the trial court that she was making such a claim, and, even if her claim had been preserved for appellate review, it failed, as the court precluded the report on the ground that the defendant did not establish its relevance, the defendant did not provide any testimony concerning the effects the substances may have had on T's ability to operate the motorcycle, which was not a matter of common knowledge of the jurors, the report merely listed the substances without an explanation as to the notation of abnormal for those with a positive value, and there was no way to know from the report the amount of any substance in T's body, when he ingested it or whether it was part of his medical treatment; moreover, admission of the report into evidence would have been prejudicial and likely confused the jury, which would have had to speculate regarding the substances and their effects, if any, on T's ability to operate the motorcycle, and the string of inferences the defendant sought to establish by admission of the report was too tenuous. b. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the toxicology report was not relevant and, thus, not admissible, the defendant's unpreserved constitutional claim that the court's evidentiary ruling deprived her of her right to present a defense was unavailing. 3. The defendant could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that the admis- sion into evidence of T's death certificate violated her sixth amendment right to confrontation because the death certificate contained testimo- nial hearsay; defense counsel waived any objection on confrontation clause grounds by stating that he had no objection when the document was marked for identification and objecting when it was offered as a full exhibit only on the ground that it was more prejudicial than probative. 4. The defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court violated her consti- tutional right to conflict free representation was unavailing: the record was inadequate to review the defendant's assertion that the court failed to inquire, sua sponte, into a conflict of interest that defense counsel created when he provided the prosecutor with the defendant's second statement to the police, which made counsel into a potential witness who was unable to object to the admission of the statement into evidence or to argue that he was responsible for it without admitting to his mistake; moreover, there was nothing in the record to indicate that the court reasonably should have known of a conflict, as the statement contained nothing signaling a conflict of interest but, rather, simply provided a description of the incident at issue, and there was never a mention of any purported conflict of interest by any party involved; furthermore, as it was not clear from the record that any conflict of interest existed, the court was correct to rely on defense counsel's lack of an objection and silence as to any conflict of interest in determining that there was no need to inquire. Argued April 6—officially released September 28, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover the security deposit he had paid to the defendant landlord in connection with a one year lease of a single-family home. A few months after the start of the lease term, the plaintiff purchased his own home and attempted to terminate the lease, offering to vacate the premises and pay the remaining rent due under the agree- ment. The defendant refused the offer, and the plaintiff agreed to con- tinue to pay rent and to fulfill his other obligations under the lease throughout the remainder of its term, despite vacating the premises. After the leasehold expired, the defendant sent the plaintiff an account- ing of the security deposit, indicating that no portion of it would be returned due to unpaid rent and fees due under the lease and expenses incurred to repair alleged damages to the premises, and that the plaintiff owed the defendant additional funds for damages that exceeded the amount of the security deposit. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff in part on his complaint and on the defendant's counterclaim, and the defendant appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not err when it awarded the plaintiff double damages as a result of the defendant's failure to return a portion of the security deposit: the trial court's determination that certain of the defendant's charges for damages to the premises were pretextual was not erroneous, as the court credited the plaintiff's testimony that he had hired a cleaning service after he vacated the premises and found the defendant's testi- mony relating to the claimed repair expenses unconvincing; moreover, although the trial court's finding that the charge for the replacement of the furnace filter was pretextual was erroneous, such finding did not undermine its conclusions regarding the disputed charges nor did it impact the judgment rendered; furthermore, the trial court's award of statutory damages equal to double the entire amount of the plaintiff's security deposit was required by the plain language of the applicable statute (§ 47a-21 (d) (2)), even though a portion of the security deposit was properly withheld. 2. The trial court did not err when it concluded that the defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.): the trial court's finding that the defendant engaged in unethical behavior that violated the public policy of the applicable statute (§ 47a-21 (d) (2)) by withdrawing portions of the security deposit for her personal use and by assessing certain itemized damages as a pretext to avoid having to return the security deposit following the termination of the lease was supported by the record; moreover, the defendant's claim that she was not required to place the security deposit into an escrow account because she had fewer than four rental units was unavailing because the applicable statute (§ 47a-21 (k) (2)) provided an affirmative defense only to criminal penalties for the failure to maintain an escrow account, not to similar civil actions; furthermore, the evidence in the record demonstrated that the plaintiff suffered an ascertainable loss as a result of the defendant's withholding of the portion of the security deposit that was legitimately owed to him. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff: the trial court's findings that the defendant did not act in good faith when she assessed pretextual damages to the plaintiff and failed to place the security deposit into an escrow account and that her actions caused substantial injury to the plaintiff were not clearly erroneous and were sufficient to support an award of punitive damages; moreover, the trial court based the award on the defendant's failure to comply with her statutory obligations as a landlord, not on her breach of contract; furthermore, the amount awarded was not excessive in light of the amount in dispute, the defendant's conduct, and the trial court's stated purpose in making the award, which was to provide the defendant with an incentive to comply with security deposit laws and to protect her future tenants. 4. The trial court did not err in holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to a return of the rental payments that he made after vacating the premises: the trial court correctly determined that, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 47a-11a), the plaintiff did not abandon the premises prior to the end of the lease term, as he explicitly stated that he intended to fulfill his obligations under the lease, he continued to pay rent and landscaping costs for the property throughout the lease term, and he did not return the keys to the premises or request the return of his security deposit until the lease term expired; accordingly, there was no early termination of the lease. 5. The trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff's common-law claim for money had and received: the trial court's determination that the plaintiff was obligated to make monthly rental payments in accordance with the terms of the lease was supported by the record, which demon- strated that the plaintiff signed the lease, indicated that he would con- tinue to abide by its terms, and failed to repudiate the lease during his tenancy; moreover, the record supported the trial court's conclusion that a duty to mitigate damages never arose under § 47a-11a and, accord- ingly, the plaintiff failed to prove that he had paid his monthly rent by mistake and that he was free from any moral or legal obligation to make the payments. Argued April 8—officially released October 5, 2021

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia, breach of contract. The parties entered into an escrow agreement in conjunction with the purchase of a lot in a residential subdivision owned by the defendant W Co. The escrow agreement provided that, in the event of a dispute, all costs of litigation, including attorney's fees, shall be paid to the prevailing party. During trial, the parties agreed that the issue of attorney's fees should be reserved until after a decision on the merits of the complaint had been rendered. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of W Co., from which the plaintiff appealed to this court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. While that appeal was pending, the trial court denied W Co.'s motion for attorney's fees. Follow- ing this court's release of its decision on the plaintiff's appeal, W Co. moved for judgment on its pending counterclaim seeking attorney's fees. The court denied W Co.'s motion for judgment and its motion for reargument and reconsideration, and W Co. appealed to this court. Held that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion with respect to W Co.'s claim for attorney's fees: the trial court summarily denied W Co.'s motion for attorney's fees and its motion for judgment on its counter- claim without explanation; in the court's subsequent articulation, it explained that it denied the motion for judgment because it had denied the motion for attorney's fees nearly two years earlier and W Co. had not filed an appeal, and the court's circular explanation for its denials of W Co.'s motions demonstrated that it failed to exercise its discretion; moreover, the parties' contract provided for attorney's fees for the pre- vailing party, and the court had a duty to exercise its discretion to determine whether W Co. had proven its claim for attorney's fees and whether those fees were reasonable, and, at no point, did the court indicate that it had considered the merits of the defendant's W Co.'s request; furthermore, W Co. properly moved for judgment on its pending counterclaim and timely appealed from the court's denial of that motion, and the lack of an appeal from the court's denial of W Co.'s motion for attorney's fees could not serve as the sole basis for not awarding attorney's fees. Argued January 6—officially released October 5, 2021

The plaintiff, O Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants, S and J. S and J originally signed a promissory note to G Co., secured by a mortgage on the property, and further agreed to participate in a ''bisaver program,'' through which they made a payment to G Co. every two weeks via a direct withdrawal by G Co. from S's checking account. G Co. ceased withdrawing payments in 2008, and reported S and J, who had neither requested nor authorized the cessation, as delinquent to several credit reporting agencies, which severely damaged S and J's credit. S and J thereafter reached an oral agreement with G Co., pursuant to which G Co. agreed to ''restore'' their credit. G Co. did not restore their credit, S and J ceased to make additional payments, and G Co. resumed reporting S and J as delinquent to the credit agencies. Subsequently, G Co. assigned the note to O Co. S and J asserted several special defenses to the foreclosure action, including unclean hands. Thereafter, P Co. was substituted as the plain- tiff. The trial court concluded that S and J had satisfied their burden of proof on their special defense of unclean hands and rendered judgment in their favor, finding that they had equitable title to the property. On P Co.'s appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court's finding that G Co. did not restore S and J's credit was not clearly erroneous: the court credited J's testimony that G Co. never sent letters to the credit reporting agencies in order to correct its error and restore S and J's credit, which supported the finding that G Co. did not restore their credit, and the court was not required to credit evidence submitted by P Co., including three letters that P Co. claimed demon- strated that G Co. had restored S and J's credit; moreover, this court declined to review P Co.'s unpreserved claim that the court relied on J's testimony in contravention of the best evidence rule, as P Co. did not object to J's testimony that G Co. and O Co. failed to restore S and J's credit, and J's testimony that G Co. did not send letters to the credit reporting agencies was based on his firsthand observations. 2. The trial court properly balanced the equities in concluding that P Co.'s legal title to the property was unenforceable after finding for S and J on their special defense of unclean hands. a. The trial court properly applied the doctrine of unclean hands: the court concluded that G Co.'s failure to take payments from S and J and to restore S and J's credit after erroneously reporting them to be in default caused their credit to be destroyed; moreover, the court's findings that G Co.'s conduct was wilful and that S and J came to the court with clean hands were not clearly erroneous, as G Co. voluntarily reported S and J's nonpayment, caused by G Co.'s failure to withdraw payments, to the credit reporting agencies, and the court credited J's testimony that G Co. failed to send letters to restore S and J's credit; furthermore, the court's finding that S and J's economic downfall was caused by G Co. was not clearly erroneous, as evidence presented linked S and J's economic difficulties to G Co.'s actions in failing to restore their credit, including J's testimony that G Co. had not attempted to restore S and J's credit but, instead, had continued to report nonpayment to the credit reporting agencies for more than ten years, and P Co.'s argument that the ruination of S and J's credit was unconnected to G Co.'s error in failing to withdraw the payments was based on the incorrect premise that G Co. had acted to restore S and J's credit. b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a reasonable balancing of the equities weighed in favor of S and J's equita- ble title to the property: the court considered all relevant factors and found that S and J's economic downfall was a greater inequity than their failure to make a payment on the note in more than ten years; moreover, the remedy ordered by the court did not eliminate S and J's obligations under the note or hold that P Co. may not pursue its legal remedy to enforce the note, but merely held that P Co. was not entitled to the equitable remedy of foreclosure. Argued February 10—officially released October 5, 2021

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, criminal possession of a revolver and risk of injury to a child, and, after a plea of guilty, of being a persistent serious felony offender, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court improperly declined to issue a capias he requested. The police had executed a search warrant on the defen- dant's apartment, where he lived with his wife and minor stepchildren. During their search of the apartment, the police found, inter alia, a loaded revolver and cash in a storage container, crack cocaine in a dresser drawer, used drug baggies that tested positive for cocaine resi- due and a digital scale. Two cell phones also were found during a search of the defendant's person. The defendant told the police that the revolver was his and that he had bought it to protect his family. Held: 1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of the weapon and drug charges, but his conviction of risk of injury to a child could not stand: a. The evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant had domin- ion and control over and constructively possessed the revolver, as his ownership of the revolver was the ultimate manifestation of dominion and control; the defendant's admission to the police that he purchased the revolver to protect his family supported the conclusion that he intended to exercise dominion and control over it by using it for that purpose, and, notwithstanding his contention that he was not in exclusive possession of the apartment and that the state never proved that he resided there at the time of the search, there was abundant evidence from which the jury could conclude that the defendant lived there, includ- ing the concession by his counsel that he spent time there with his wife and family, and, that the revolver was found in the bedroom he shared with his wife, reinforced the evidence of his ownership of and intention to maintain dominion and control over the revolver. b. The defendant's claim that the state failed to prove that he construc- tively possessed the narcotics found in his bedroom was unavailing, the confluence of incriminating statements and circumstances having supported the inference that he was in a position of control over the narcotics and, thus, constructively possessed them: the jury had evidence before it that guns frequently are used by drug dealers to protect them- selves and their cash and narcotics, the presence of the loaded revolver in the bedroom was relevant in determining whether the defendant intended to exercise dominion and control over the narcotics, the cash found in the same storage container as the revolver was in denominations that were significant to the purchase of narcotics, and digital scales are commonly used to ensure that narcotics are accurately measured for packaging and distribution; moreover, as the bedroom is an intimate area of the home, the jury reasonably could have concluded that access to it would ordinarily be limited to the defendant and his wife, and the cumulative effect of the most incriminating statements and circum- stances relating to the conduct of someone involved in the sale of narcot- ics implicated the defendant, rather than his wife. c. The mere presence of a firearm hidden in a storage container in the defendant's bedroom did not constitute a situation under the risk of injury statute (§ 53-21 (a) (1)) in which a child was likely to be injured, and the state conceded that it failed to present sufficient evidence with respect to that charge; accordingly the judgment was reversed with respect to that conviction. 2. The defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court violated his sixth amendment right to compulsory process when it declined to issue a capias for a police officer who failed to appear at trial in response to a subpoena and denied the defendant's request for a continuance: a. Although the trial court mistakenly believed it could not issue the capias in the absence of in-hand service of the subpoena on the officer, who was in Florida at the time of trial, it properly considered the inter- woven nature of the defendant's requests for the capias and a continuance before it denied the request for a continuance, which the defendant did not challenge on appeal, as the court had before it uncontroverted evidence that the officer had been out of state at all relevant times and would remain so for another two weeks, the defendant already had been granted continuances to procure witnesses, his request was untimely, the length of the requested continuance was too long, the proffered testimony would be cumulative of evidence already before the jury, and the denial of the continuance would not impair his ability to defend him- self. b. Any violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process stemming from the trial court's refusal to issue a capias to procure the police officer's presence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as defense counsel conceded that the officer's testimony might have been cumulative of evidence that was already before the jury, the impact of the testimony would have been inconsequential, as the defendant never proffered that it would undermine the evidence against him, and, given that the officer had discovered the narcotics in the bedroom and heard the defendant confess that the gun was his, the testimony likely would have been adverse to the defense, for which the defendant never articulated to the court a reason to believe otherwise. Argued December 2, 2020—officially released October 5, 2021

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of criminal damage to a landlord's property in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court claiming that the state presented insufficient evidence to establish the element of specific intent. The defendant entered into a residential lease with the victim for a property in Windsor. Subsequently, the victim went to the property during the lease term and discovered that it was damaged. The victim informed the defendant that he wanted to return with a home improvement contractor to estimate the damage to the property. The defendant refused to allow the victim subsequent access to the property, and, when the victim and the contractor eventually returned, a police officer had to accompany them. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the state presented insufficient evidence to establish that he specifically intended to damage the victim's property: the state produced testimonial and photographic evidence of the substantial dam- age to the entirety of the victim's property, and this severe damage provided the jury with a basis to reasonably find the necessary specific intent to find the defendant guilty, and the jury reasonably could have inferred, from the extent of the damage, that the damage was not caused by accident or neglect; moreover, the defendant's conduct after damag- ing the victim's property indicated his consciousness of guilt, which the jury could have relied on to infer his specific intent. Argued September 9—officially released October 5, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted on a guilty plea, of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in connection with his involvement in an altercation in 2008, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, a violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution. In 2011, the legislature enacted a statute (§ 18-98e) that permitted certain inmates, including the petitioner, to earn risk reduction earned credit toward the reduction of their sentences, at the discretion of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, and amended the statute (§ 54-125a) governing parole eligibility to permit risk reduction credit to be applied to advance the parole eligibility date of inmates convicted of certain violent offenses. In 2013, No. 13-3 of the 2013 Public Acts (P.A. 13-3) amended § 54-125a and removed the language that permitted the risk reduction credit earned under § 18-98e to advance the parole eligibility date of violent offenders. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the 2013 amendment, as applied retroactively to him, violated the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution. The habeas court rendered judgment declining to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-24 (a) (1)) on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioner then filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that the Department of Correction (department) had unconstitutionally forfeited his risk reduction earned credit that had already been earned and applied. The court again declined to issue the writ, concluding that the second petition was identical to the first petition. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certifica- tion to appeal and in declining to issue a writ of habeas corpus on the petitioner's second petition because it was identical to the first petition, as no such ground is contained in Practice Book § 23-24: under § 23-24, the judicial authority shall issue a writ of habeas corpus unless it appears that it lacks jurisdiction, the petition is wholly frivolous on its face or the relief sought is not available; moreover, as the respondent conceded, the first and second petitions were not identical, as the first petition was construed by the habeas court as a constitutional challenge regarding the department's failure to allow the petitioner to continue to earn and apply new credits to his sentence, and the second petition specifically concerned risk reduction earned credits that allegedly had already been earned and applied pursuant to § 18-98e. 2. This court affirmed the decision of the habeas court to decline to issue a writ of habeas corpus on the alternative ground that the habeas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the second petition, as the peti- tioner's criminal offense predated the enactment of the risk reduction earned credit program; this court previously applied precedent from our Supreme Court in the context of a habeas court's decision to decline to issue a writ for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Practice Book § 23- 24 (a) (1) in Whistnant v. Commissioner of Correction, (199 Conn. App. 406), and the present case was indistinguishable from that case in all material respects, as both cases involved petitioners who committed criminal offenses in 2008, years before the enactment of the risk reduc- tion earned credit program in 2011, and who claimed that the retroactive application of the 2013 amendment to § 54-125a (b) (2) to him violated the ex post facto clause, and, as in Whistnant, the enactment of P.A. 13-3 simply returned the petitioner to the same position in terms of parole eligibility that he was in at the time that he committed the offense. Argued March 4—officially released October 12, 2021

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying her postjudgment motion for clarification. Pursuant to the par- ties' separation agreement, which was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, the parties were to list their jointly owned home for sale prior to June 30, 2012, and equally divide the sale proceeds. Alternatively, either party could buy out the other's interest for 50 percent of the home's net value, which was to be calculated by subtracting any outstanding mortgages from the fair market value. The plaintiff was permitted to remain in the home until the date of sale, provided, inter alia, that she make the mortgage payments. Postjudgment, the parties agreed not to sell the home, and the plaintiff continued to reside in it and make the required mortgage payments, which increased in July, 2012, from interest only to principal and interest. In 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for clarification, requesting that the trial court issue an order requiring the buyout price to be calculated using the mortgage balance as of the date of the separation agreement or as of June, 2012, in order to prevent the defendant from obtaining a windfall on the sale or buyout of the home, as the distribution of the sale proceeds or buyout price would not otherwise take into account the payments she had made on the mortgage between June, 2012 and 2019. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the sale of the home, set the list price, required that the sale proceeds be equally divided in accordance with the separation agreement, and declined to change the calculation of the buyout price, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that, in denying the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for clarification, the trial court did not improperly modify the parties' separation agreement but, rather, effectuated the terms of that agreement: the trial court correctly construed the plaintiff's motion for clarification as an impermissible motion for modification and properly determined that it did not have the authority to modify the terms of the agreement, as the agreement clearly stated the intent of the parties to equally divide the net proceeds of the sale of the home and to calculate the buyout price based on the mortgage amounts outstanding at the time of the buyout, the parties did not alter the manner in which the sale proceeds were to be distributed or the buyout price was to be calculated when they agreed to deviate from the judgment by not selling the home prior to the date required by the agreement, and, through her motion, the plaintiff sought to amend the agreement, rather than to clarify its terms, by altering the manner in which the buyout price was to be calculated, and such an amendment would cause a substantial change to the existing judgment; moreover, the separation agreement did not provide for a set off or credit for any mortgage payments made by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff acquiesced to the possibility that the defendant would receive more money from the sale or buyout of the home than initially contemplated when she decided, without further altering the terms of the agreement, not to sell the home or buy out the defendant prior to the date required by the agreement. Argued April 8—officially released October 12, 2021

The plaintiff filed an affidavit of illegal discriminatory practice with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the defendant A Co. wrongfully terminated her employment. Follow- ing an assignment of the matter to the commission's Office of Public Hearings, a human rights referee granted A Co.'s motion for summary judgment, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact. The plaintiff and the commission separately appealed the referee's decision granting the motion for summary judgment to the Superior Court. The plaintiff claimed that genuine issues of material fact existed. The trial court consolidated the appeals, sustained the consolidated appeal and remanded the matter for a trial before the Office of Public Hearings, concluding that the referee improperly rendered summary judgment because A Co. did not meet its burden of establishing that there were no genuine issues of material fact. On A Co.'s appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly sustained the consolidated appeal and remanded the matter for a hearing: the court properly considered the plaintiff's affidavit as competent evidence in opposition to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment as the plaintiff's affidavit of discriminatory prac- tice was sworn and was properly considered pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 17-49); moreover, the court properly conducted a plenary review of the record in considering whether genuine issues of material fact existed, as the deferential standard used to review administrative fact-finding did not extend to the determination of whether genuine issues of material fact existed in the summary judgment context; furthermore, the court did not err in considering whether genu- ine issues of material fact existed, as the record contained contradictory information, including a sworn statement by an employee of A Co. that the plaintiff's job duties required her to be physically present at the workplace and the plaintiff's sworn statement that she had received a workplace accommodation to work from home, and the referee, rather than identifying factual disputes raised by the competing affidavits, improperly decided the factual question by crediting the statements made in the affidavit of the A Co. employee and improperly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Argued March 2—officially released October 12, 2021

The plaintiffs, who owned residential property adjacent to that of the defen- dants, T and E, sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages for trespass resulting from T's construction of a fence that encroached on the plaintiffs' property. The parties previously had constructed privacy fences on their properties on opposite sides and within inches of a chain-link fence that was located on a portion of the boundary line between their backyards. T thereafter constructed an extension to the defendants' privacy fence and, without the plaintiffs' permission, removed portions of the chain-link fence. T also constructed a split rail fence that extended the privacy fence along or near the boundary line. A surveyor thereafter found that a portion of the split rail fence encroached on the plaintiffs' property. The defendants filed special defenses alleging that they were entitled to establish a divisional fence, pursuant to statute (§ 47-43), on the boundary of their property. The defendants further claimed that § 47-43 permitted placement of the fence on the plaintiffs' property. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to liability, finding against the defendants on the plaintiffs' claim of trespass, and against T for conversion as to the chain-link fence. The court concluded that a majority of the length of the fences T constructed was not located on the dividing line of the parties' properties and, thus, could not be considered a divisional fence pursuant to § 47-43. After a hearing in damages, the court granted the plaintiffs injunctive relief and awarded them nominal damages for con- version as to the chain-link fence and for trespass as to the split rail fence. On appeal, the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in finding them liable for trespass because the fence at issue was compliant with § 47-43. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improp- erly found them liable for trespass, which was based on their assertion that their privacy fence was a divisional fence pursuant to § 47-43 and was within the permitted limit of intrusion on the plaintiffs' property: contrary to the defendants' assertion, the clear and unambiguous lan- guage of § 47-43 requires a divisional fence to be centered on the property line at issue, the parties did not dispute that the defendants' fence was not centered on the property line, and the defendants failed to demonstrate how any of the other statutes they cited pertaining to fences undermined the plain language of § 47-43; moreover, this court found unavailing the defendants' assertion that the placement of their fence did not constitute a trespass because the fence did not exceed the width permitted by § 47-43 for materials used to construct a divisional fence, as an interpretation of § 47-43 that allows a property owner to construct a divisional fence on a neighbor's property would render the centering language in § 47-43 superfluous; furthermore, it was undisputed that the split rail fence encroached on the plaintiffs' property, and the middle of the fence did not sit on the mutual boundary line of the parties' properties. 2. This court declined to review the defendants' unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly found E liable for trespass because the split rail fence was a fixture appurtenant to the property she owned, the defendants having failed to argue to the trial court that the plaintiffs did not properly raise or brief the issue of ''trespass of ownership by fixture''; moreover, the two paragraphs of argument in the defendants' opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was devoid of analysis or legal authority that was relevant to the bases on which they challenged on appeal the trial court's judgment as to E. 3. The trial court's judgment finding T liable for conversion could not stand, as the plaintiffs never pleaded conversion in their complaint or briefed it in their motion for summary judgment; because the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that T's conduct in dismantling portions of the chain-link fence constituted trespass, the defendants were never given notice or afforded an opportunity to defend a claim of conversion; accordingly, the judg- ment was reversed as to the court's finding that T was liable to the plaintiffs for conversion. Argued April 15—officially released October 12, 2021

The defendant employer, G Co., and its insurer appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board affirming the Workers' Compensation Commissioner's award of survivorship benefits to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's deceased spouse, S, who had been an employee of G Co., slipped and fell while delivering oil to one of its customers. The fall aggravated S's existing knee injury to such an extent that he could no longer work or carry out his daily activities. S's physician recommended knee replacement surgery, however, S's health insurance had been canceled thirty days after the incident and he could not afford the procedure. S filed a workers' compensation claim relating to the compensability of the knee replacement surgery. Prior to the conclusion of the formal hearings before the commissioner, S died. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a claim for survivorship benefits. Following the testimony of both expert and lay witnesses, the commissioner determined that S had died by suicide as a result of depression that stemmed from compensable work injuries and that the plaintiff was entitled to survivor- ship benefits. The defendants filed a petition for review of the commis- sioner's finding and award with the board, claiming that, inter alia, in accordance with Sapko v. State (305 Conn. 360), S's consumption of an excessive amount of alcohol and medication prior to his death consti- tuted a superseding cause that broke the chain of causation between the work incident and S's death. The board disagreed and affirmed the commissioner's finding and award, and the defendants appealed to this court. Held that the board properly affirmed the commissioner's award of survivorship benefits to the plaintiff: the commissioner's subordinate findings that the decedent developed depression following the work incident, that his compensable injuries were a substantial contributing factor to his development of depression, that the manner of his death was a suicide, and that his suicide stemmed from his depression, were reasonable and grounded in the evidence produced during the proceed- ings before the commissioner; moreover, the commissioner's finding that a chain of causation existed linking the decedent's compensable injuries to his death was supported by the record and was not the misapplication of law, as, unlike in Sapko, which involved a death resulting from an accidental overdose, in the present case, the decedent's manner of death, a suicide from acute intoxication, was an act not untethered to his compensable injuries or the depression that he there- after developed. Argued April 13—officially released October 19, 2021

The plaintiffs, M and C, Connecticut State Police troopers who suffered injuries when a motor vehicle driven by a nonparty tortfeasor, B, struck a police cruiser, sending it into physical contact with them, sought to recover underinsured motorist benefits allegedly due under insurance coverage provided by the defendant state of Connecticut, a self-insurer, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Following a bench trial, the trial court found, inter alia, that, to the extent B was underinsured, the state was contractually obligated to provide coverage to the plain- tiffs, the plaintiffs' claims for damages caused by the alleged post-trau- matic stress disorder (PTSD) they developed were not compensable under the underinsured motorist claims statute (§ 38a-336), and it calcu- lated the plaintiffs' damages. The plaintiffs filed a joint appeal to this court. The parties then filed a stipulation before the trial court regarding sums that the plaintiffs had already received, and the court held a hearing to consider any reductions to the plaintiffs' damages. It concluded that certain workers' compensation benefits the plaintiffs had received were deductible from the plaintiffs' damages, but that certain recoveries the plaintiffs received under the Dram Shop Act (§ 30-102) were not, adjusted the plaintiffs' damages accordingly, and rendered judgments for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then filed an amended joint appeal, and the state filed a cross appeal to this court. Held: 1. This court concluded that the plaintiffs' original joint appeal was not taken from final judgments and it must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the plaintiffs' amended joint appeal was jurisdic- tionally proper; final judgments were not rendered in the trial court until the court had reduced the plaintiffs' damages to account for certain sums received by the plaintiffs, which occurred after the original appeal had been filed; the plaintiffs' amended joint appeal encompassed all of the claims raised by the plaintiffs in their original joint appeal, and this court could review all of the plaintiffs' claims in the context of their amended joint appeal. 2. The trial court properly declined to award the plaintiffs damages related to their claims of PTSD, as those claims were not compensable under § 38a-336: guided by our Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. Continen- tal Casualty Co. (252 Conn. 405), in which the term bodily was deter- mined to relate to something physical and corporeal, as opposed to purely emotional, this court concluded that bodily injury in § 38a-336 (a) (1) (A) must necessarily be physical in nature, and, under that interpretation, PTSD, in and of itself as a purely emotional injury, could not be construed as a ''bodily injury'' within the purview of § 38a-336; moreover, guided by the rationale in Moore, in which the question was the legal meaning of ''bodily injury'' as defined in an insurance policy and not the medical or scientific question of the degree to which the mind and the body affect each other, this court was not convinced that the PTSD purportedly developed by the plaintiffs was transformed into a ''bodily injury'' under the statute by virtue of the physical manifestations accompanying it. 3. The trial court properly reduced the plaintiffs' damages by the sums of certain workers' compensation benefits they had received, as the statu- tory and regulatory scheme governing underinsured motorist coverage in Connecticut did not impose a requirement on a self-insurer to notify claimants of an election of permissive offsets under the applicable state regulation (§ 38a-334-6): although, as a self-insurer, the state must main- tain a preaccident writing reflecting its election of permissive regulatory offsets as mandated by Piersa v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (273 Conn. 519) and clarified in Garcia v. Bridgeport (306 Conn. 340), it had no legal obliga- tion to provide its employees with notice of its election to offset its liability for underinsured motorist benefits by the amount of any work- ers' compensation benefits paid, as our Supreme Court expressly con- strued § 38a-334-6 of the regulations not to be a notice provision, determining that it served the substantive function of specifying the basic requirement of how an insurer may limit its liability, and the court made no mention of self-insurers providing claimants with copies of such written documents or otherwise notifying claimants of the election of permissive regulatory offsets; accordingly, it was sufficient for the state to maintain a written memorandum containing its election in its files as a public record. 4. The trial court committed error in declining to reduce C's damages by the sums he had recovered pursuant to the Dram Shop Act, as C was being compensated twice for the same injury; the parties stipulated that, among other sums received by C, he recovered certain sums from an establishment under the act as compensatory damages, and, without a reduction of C's damages to account for his dram shop recovery, C was compensated twice for the same injury in violation of the common-law rule precluding double recovery, a legal principle ingrained in this state's underinsured motorist laws. 5. This court concluded that, because neither plaintiff was entitled to recover damages against the state, the trial court, on remand, must render judg- ments in favor of the state in the plaintiffs' respective cases. Argued March 9—officially released October 19, 2021

Convicted of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree as a result of the stabbing death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that he was deprived of his right to present a defense when the trial court precluded certain evidence he claimed was vital to his defense of self-defense. The defendant had stabbed the victim during an altercation on a highway exit ramp after the automobiles they were driving had collided. The defendant called 911 on his cell phone during the altercation but did not explain his situation to the dispatcher until he made a second 911 call after he was able to leave the victim and drive to another location. The trial court precluded the defendant from introducing evidence that, at the time of the altercation, a rearrest warrant had been issued for the victim in connection with pending motor vehicle violations against him. The defendant claimed that the victim was the initial aggressor and was motivated to attack him because he thought the defendant was talking on the cell phone to the police during the altercation and wanted to avoid an encounter with the police. The trial court also precluded the defendant from introducing into evi- dence as spontaneous utterances under § 8-3 (2) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence statements he made in his second 911 call and in a videotaped interview with the police when they told him that the victim had died. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claims that the trial court incor- rectly determined that evidence of the victim's rearrest warrant was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, and that his second 911 call and por- tions of his interview with the police did not constitute spontaneous utterances under § 8-3 (2): a. The rearrest warrant and evidence of the victim's prior motor vehicle violations did not have a logical tendency to support a finding by the jury, as the defendant claimed, that the victim had a motive to be the initial aggressor, as it was not logical to infer that a person seeking to avoid the police following his involvement in a minor automobile accident would initiate a physical altercation in a public place with a person he believed to be summoning the police on a cell phone; moreover, evidence that the victim was an unlicensed driver who had an outstanding warrant for operating a motor vehicle while his driving privileges were suspended was unduly prejudicial in that it clearly portrayed him in a negative light and was likely to arouse the emotions of the jurors, and the exclusion of the proffered evidence did not deprive the defendant of his right to present a defense, as he was adequately able to present his claim of self- defense by way of his own testimony, by cross-examination of the state's witnesses, and through the opportunity to present other relevant and admissible evidence; furthermore, the court's ruling did not substantially affect the jury's verdict so as to constitute harmful evidentiary error, the state having presented a strong case and disproved the defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and there was no dispute that the defendant and the victim engaged in a physical altercation in which the defendant used a knife and that the victim died of a stab wound. b. The defendant's claim that the recording of his second 911 call was admissible under § 8-3 (2) was unavailing, the trial court having reason- ably found that the call was not made in such close connection to the altercation with the victim as to negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication: despite the defendant's belief that the second 911 call was a spontaneous utterance because it was made minutes after his first 911 call ended, it was eminently reasonable to infer that, by the time the defendant made the second call, he was aware of the seriousness of his predicament and that his statements to the 911 dispatcher could have serious consequences for him; moreover, the facts suggested that, after the defendant drove away from the scene of the altercation, he made the second call from a location of relative calm, where he no longer expected to encounter the victim and made factual statements concerning the altercation that were consistent with statements he made during the first 911 call; furthermore, because the court's evidentiary ruling did not reflect an abuse of discretion, the defendant could not prevail on the unpreserved constitutional aspect of his claim in which he asserted that the court's ruling infringed on his right to present a defense. c. The undisputed circumstances surrounding the defendant's interview with the police amply supported the trial court's finding that his reaction to news of the victim's death did not constitute a spontaneous utterance: contrary to the defendant's contention that the startling event at issue was his learning from the police that the victim had died, the court properly considered the startling event at issue to be the altercation on the exit ramp many hours before the defendant's interview with the police, as the defendant had a lengthy opportunity to contemplate his predicament and craft a response to avoid prosecution, and was well aware that he was at police headquarters, was a suspect in a criminal case and that any statements he made concerning the altercation would likely affect his penal interest; moreover, the defendant's response to news of the victim's death was a self-serving expression of disbelief, which was analogous to a denial of culpability and consistent with his assertions to the police that he did not stab the victim in the chest, and, even if the defendant had been startled by news of the victim's death, his reaction was relevant to an assessment of his conduct during the altercation, including whether he caused the victim's death; furthermore, because the court properly precluded the admission of the interview on evidentiary grounds, the defendant could not prevail on the unpreserved constitutional aspect of his claim, in which he asserted that the court's ruling infringed on his right to present a defense. 2. The defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the order of its deliberations and misled it as to the consequences of a finding that he acted in self-defense was unavailing: despite the defendant's contention that the jury could not have considered the lesser included offenses at issue if it found him not guilty of a greater offense on the basis of his defense of self-defense, it was not reasonably possible that the jury was misled, as the court's instructions led the jury to a correct understanding that self-defense was a complete defense to murder, the crime with which the defendant had been charged, and the lesser included offenses at issue, the court instructed the jury that it had to evaluate the defense of self-defense before returning a verdict with respect to any of the offenses, and it instructed the jury that it was required to return a verdict of not guilty if it found that the state failed to disprove the defense of self-defense; moreover, although the jury was not instructed that the state's failure to disprove the defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt required it to find the defendant not guilty of murder and all of the lesser included offenses at issue, the defendant's interpretation of the jury charge was belied by the court's repetitive and unambiguous instruc- tions that conveyed the applicability of the defense of self-defense to every offense at issue, as well as the legal significance of a finding that the state failed to disprove the defense of self-defense; accordingly, the defendant failed to demonstrate that a constitutional violation existed that deprived him of a fair trial. 3. This court declined to exercise its supervisory authority over the adminis- tration of justice to require trial courts to instruct juries to consider the defense of self-defense prior to considering whether the defendant is guilty of the charged offense and any lesser included offenses, the defendant having failed to persuade this court that the procedure fol- lowed by the trial court in instructing the jury infringed on the integrity of the trial or the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole. Argued January 5—officially released November 2, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and carrying a pistol without a permit, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, H, provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present a third-party culpability defense. Specifically, the petitioner alleged that H failed, inter alia, to question D, a detective involved in the case, regarding his investigation of certain other suspects, to present out-of-court state- ments of certain witnesses that D had interviewed, and to offer into evidence a statement made by a witness, M, to the police in which he identified individuals other than the petitioner as suspects. Following an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition. The habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal because the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the issues raised were debatable among jurists of reason, that the court could have resolved the issues in a different manner, or that the questions raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further: although, contrary to the claim of the respondent Commissioner of Correction, the petitioner's stated grounds for appeal in his application for waiver of fees, costs and expenses and appointment of counsel sufficiently put the habeas court on notice that the petitioner sought to appeal his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present a third-party culpability defense, the petitioner did not provide any affirmative evidence that would support such a defense, as he failed to produce D as a witness at the habeas trial, to identify the particular witnesses whose out-of-court statements he claimed would support his defense, or to introduce into evidence a statement or photographic array signed by M that identified individuals other than the petitioner as suspects, and the witnesses that the petitioner did produce were unable to identify the individuals they had seen following the incident; more- over, the petitioner failed to establish that he was prejudiced by H's decision to forgo a third-party culpability defense because he did not demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his criminal trial would have been different if H had presented such a defense; accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. Argued April 7—officially released November 2, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of multiple crimes, including murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the two criminal matters underlying his petition and that his conviction of kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm violated his right to due process. The first incident occurred in Hartford, and the second incident occurred four days later, and was tried in New Britain. Specifically, he claimed that the jury in the New Britain case was not instructed to determine whether the victim was restrained to an extent exceeding that which was necessary to complete the other crimes, as required by State v. Salamon (287 Conn. 509). Thereafter, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on his claims that counsel in his underlying criminal matters rendered ineffective assistance. a. The habeas court correctly determined that the petitioner's trial coun- sel, O, in the Hartford case did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to advise him adequately regarding his decision to testify: the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that O's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and failed to overcome the presumption that his counsel acted competently; the court's finding that O met with the petitioner to discuss his case eighteen times was supported by the petitioner's own testimony, and, although O could not recall how he advised the petitioner regarding whether he should testify, O testified regarding what he would normally do with respect to advising a criminal defendant about whether to testify, and the court found O's testimony to be credible; moreover, O could not have foreseen that the petitioner would not testify truthfully, which resulted in the petitioner opening the door to the introduction of evidence concerning the New Britain case. b. The habeas court correctly determined that the petitioner's trial coun- sel in the New Britain case, C, did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to adequately advise him about a plea offer to resolve that case: the record supported the habeas court's conclusion that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court would have accepted the plea agreement, as the petitioner presented no evidence to that effect, and, even if this court assumed the existence of such an agreement, the petitioner's equivocal testimony that he ''possibly'' would have accepted the plea offer was insufficient to meet his burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that, if not for C's defective performance, he would have accepted the plea offer. 2. The petitioner's claim that his kidnapping conviction in the New Britain case violated his right to due process because the jury was not instructed to determine whether the victim was restrained to an extent exceeding that which was necessary to complete the other crimes was unavailing: the court correctly determined that the absence of a Salamon instruction at the petitioner's criminal trial constituted harmless error; the court thoroughly addressed each of the Salamon factors as applied to the facts of the present case and made factual findings in connection there- with, which were not clearly erroneous, as the restraint and movement of the victim were done to facilitate the petitioner's escape from the robbery scene, not to accomplish the robbery itself, and, as such, they had independent criminal significance, the court's determination that those factors did not favor the petitioner was supported by the record, and, thus, the absence of a Salamon instruction could not have substan- tially affected or influenced the jury's verdict. Argued September 9—officially released November 2, 2021

The defendant commission granted various permits and approvals to the applicant, C Co., to construct and operate a gasoline station on property it leased. The plaintiff, S Co., the owner of a gasoline station near the property C Co. leased, appealed the commission's decision to the trial court. The trial court affirmed the decision of the commission after rejecting the merits of S Co.'s claim and dismissed the appeal, from which S Co. appealed to this court. Thereafter, during the pendency of the appeal, C Co. notified this court that it had terminated its lease and was no longer interested in pursuing the project. Held that S Co.'s appeal from the trial court was moot because this court could no longer grant S Co. any practical relief; accordingly, because the appeal became moot through no fault of S Co., this court granted S Co.'s motion for vacatur and vacated the judgment of the trial court and the commission. Argued September 7—officially released November 2, 2021

Convicted on a plea of guilty of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs as a second offender, the defendant appealed to this court following the trial court's denial of her motion to modify a condition of her probation. As part of the plea agreement, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to each of two unrelated charges against the defendant, for breach of the peace in the second degree and criminal trespass in the first degree. The breach of the peace charge arose from an incident between the defendant and her boyfriend, L, and the criminal trespass charge arose from an incident in which the defendant trespassed on the property of her former hus- band, R, and their two children. As part of the defendant's sentence, the court imposed a special condition of probation, in which it ordered that the defendant have no contact with the ''domestic violence com- plainants.'' After the commencement of her probationary period, the defendant filed a motion, requesting that the no contact condition be modified to delete the phrase ''domestic violence complainants'' and to replace it with language that specifically referenced only L and R. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court's determination that the special condition prohibited the defendant from having any contact with her children was not improper: although the trial court's oral pronouncement that the defendant have no contact with the ''domestic violence complainants'' was ambiguous, its clarification that the phrase was meant to include the defendant's children was not manifestly unreasonable, because, even though crimi- nal trespass is not a domestic violence crime, it was clear that the court intended the phrase ''domestic violence complainants'' to include those affected by the defendant's criminal trespass in addition to the victim of the breach of the peace, L, and, although the children were not direct complainants in the criminal trespass charge, the terms ''complainant'' and ''victim'' may be used interchangeably in criminal proceedings, the defendant did not challenge the fact that R, who was also the victim of criminal trespass, was included in the no contact order, and, if the trial court had intended the order to apply only to L, it would have used the singular term ''complainant'' instead of the plural term ''complainants''; moreover, the issue of no contact with the children was before the court at the defendant's sentencing hearing, as, during that hearing, R specifically requested that the defendant be prohibited from contacting him and the children and defense counsel argued that, if a no contact order were to be imposed, it should not apply to the children. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for modification: a. The defendant could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that her right to procedural due process was violated because she was not pro- vided with notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to the no contact condition, the defendant having failed to establish a violation of a constitutional right under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233): the trial court was not required to canvass the defendant regarding the special condition of probation under the applicable rule of practice (§ 39-19) because the condition was not a direct consequence of the plea; more- over, at the sentencing hearing, R specifically and repeatedly requested that the defendant have no contact with him and the children and the defendant was provided with a meaningful opportunity to address the issue; furthermore, the defendant did not move to withdraw her plea even though she was aware, prior to the imposition of the sentence, that a special condition of probation prohibiting contact with the children was before the trial court. b. The defendant's constitutional right to substantive due process was not violated because the special condition of probation did not violate her fundamental right to parent her children, as the condition did not reach further than was necessary to protect the children's safety: the no contact condition furthered a valid objective of probation because it sought to protect the safety of the children as members of the public; moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's taking into consideration the emotional and mental health safety of the defen- dant's children when fashioning its special conditions of probation was an appropriate extension of State v. Ortiz (83 Conn. App. 142), in which a no contact order was imposed to protect the physical safety of the defendant's children, as there was ample indication in the record of emotional harm, and the no contact order focused on the emotional well-being of the children. Argued May 19—officially released November 9, 2021

The defendant employer and its insurer appealed from the decision of the Compensation Review Board affirming the Workers' Compensation Commissioner's decision to grant the plaintiff's request to commute into a lump sum certain disability payments. The defendant had employed the plaintiff as a member of its municipal police department. While employed by the defendant, the plaintiff was diagnosed with hyperten- sion. Subsequently, the commissioner found that the plaintiff's hyperten- sion was a significant, contributing factor in the development of his coronary artery disease and, accordingly, that such disease was compen- sable under the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.). The plaintiff was later diagnosed with chronic kidney disease caused by his hypertension and, in a supplemental finding and award, was awarded 245 weeks of permanent partial impairment disability benefits. The plaintiff thereafter requested that the final 123 weeks of the award period be commuted into a lump sum. After a hearing, the commissioner concluded that the plaintiff had shown good cause for a commutation of his award pursuant to statute (§ 31-302), and, accordingly, granted the plaintiff's request for a commutation of the benefits due to him for weeks 123 through 245 of his award. The defendant appealed to the board, claiming, inter alia, that the commissioner improperly applied § 31-302 by ordering a commutation of the back end of the award without also awarding the defendant a moratorium of payment of benefits for the front end of the award. The board affirmed the order of the commissioner, and this appeal followed. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's order granting the plaintiff's request for a commutation of the partial disability payments due to him for weeks 123 through 245 of his award, without instituting a moratorium against payment of the benefits due for the first 122 weeks of his award: although the defendant argued that a lump-sum payment pursuant to a commuta- tion order should be included in determining whether a payment exceeds the maximum weekly compensation under the applicable statute (§ 31- 309) for workers' compensation benefits, this interpretation was incon- sistent with the purpose of the commutation statute and, without refer- ence to the lump-sum payment pursuant to the commutation, the plain- tiff's award did not exceed the maximum weekly compensation under § 31-309. 2. The defendant's claim that the board erred in not concluding that the commissioner's commutation order violated the cap on heart and hyper- tension benefits pursuant to statute (§ 7-433b) was unavailing: although the statutory cap applied in the present case because the plaintiff was receiving both a disability benefit pursuant to statute (§ 7-433c) and a retirement pension, the plaintiff's award complied with the statutory cap imposed by § 7-433b because the plaintiff's lump-sum payments pursuant to the commutation award are excluded and the amount of the plaintiff's weekly disability benefit coupled with his pension payment did not exceed the statutory guidelines. 3. The board correctly concluded that the commissioner's commutation order did not violate the principles of equity: contrary to the defendant's claim, there was no double recovery because, although one-half of the award was paid in weekly installments and the other half was paid as a onetime lump sum, the plaintiff did not receive anything in excess of the original award to which he was entitled and, thus, the fact that the plaintiff received the lump sum while simultaneously receiving weekly payments of the award did not constitute a double recovery; moreover, although the commutation order may have presented a budgetary chal- lenge for the defendant, this court was not persuaded that the commis- sioner's decision to commute the award in the fashion requested by the plaintiff was improper. Argued April 14—officially released November 9, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on pleas of guilty, of the crimes of murder and assault in the first degree, appealed to this court from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed that O, the attorney who represented him during the plea proceeding, rendered ineffective assistance, as did P, the attorney who represented him during the sentencing proceeding. The petitioner alleged that O failed to properly advise him regarding potential defenses and made misrepresentations to him about the willing- ness of a codefendant, B, to testify at the petitioner's criminal trial. The petitioner further alleged that P failed to present adequate mitigation evidence at the sentencing proceeding and failed to file a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 39-27 (4)), on the basis of O's ineffective assistance. The petitioner testified at the habeas trial that O had met with and told him and his parents on the day of the plea proceeding that he had been informed by B's counsel that B was not willing to testify at the petitioner's criminal trial. The petitioner further testified that, until that meeting, he was under the impression that B was going to testify. The petitioner then appeared before the trial court for the plea proceeding and initially rejected a plea offer. The petitioner then changed his mind during the court's canvass of him and entered his guilty pleas, as it was his under- standing that this was his final opportunity to accept the plea offer. Prior to the sentencing proceeding, however, the petitioner learned from his family that B was willing to testify. The habeas court, in determining that O did not render deficient performance, rejected the petitioner's claim that O incorrectly advised him about whether B was willing to testify. The court made an implicit factual finding that O had told the petitioner it was not likely that B would testify and an express finding that O's assessment was reasonable. The habeas court further deter- mined that its conclusion as to the petitioner's claims against O fore- closed the petitioner's claim that P improperly failed to file a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. The court reasoned that the petitioner failed to present credible evidence that his pleas were made unwillingly or involuntarily and determined that P made a reasonable decision not to file a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas because the state had insisted that the petitioner plead guilty to the murder charge. The habeas court thereafter granted the petitioner certification to appeal. Held: 1. The habeas court's implicit finding that O told the petitioner during their meeting on the day of the plea proceeding that it was not likely B would testify at the criminal trial was clearly erroneous, and, thus, the judgment had to be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial as to the claim that O rendered ineffective assistance in connection with his purported misrepresentation about B: a. There was no evidence to support the habeas court's finding, the petitioner and his father having testified that O, in absolute terms, told them B would not testify, and O having testified that he did not recall any discussion during the meeting about B's willingness to testify and that he did not recall ever having told the petitioner that B would not testify created a dispute as to that factual issue, and this court could not discern whether the habeas court would have credited the testimony of the petitioner and his father in the absence of the habeas court's clearly erroneous finding; moreover, contrary to the request by the respondent Commissioner of Correction, because this court made no conclusion as to whether O rendered deficient performance, a remand for further proceedings to address the issue of prejudice was not proper. b. Because the habeas court committed error with respect to the petition- er's principal claim that O made misrepresentations to him as to B's willingness to testify, the judgment also had to be reversed as to the petitioner's intertwined claim that O rendered ineffective assistance in failing to properly advise him as to potential defenses. 2. The habeas court's judgment as to the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as to P had to be reversed in part and the case remanded for a new trial on the claim that P was ineffective in failing to file a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas pursuant to § 37-27 (4): a. Because this court reversed the habeas court's judgment as to certain of the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims against O, the habeas court's denial of the petitioner's claim that P rendered ineffective assistance in failing to file a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas could not stand; certain of the habeas court's determinations in rejecting the claim as to P were untenable, and its reasoning that P made a strategic decision not to seek withdrawal of the pleas was irrelevant, as the purpose of seeking withdrawal of the guilty pleas was not to negotiate a better plea deal but to insist on going to trial. b. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner did not demon- strate that P rendered ineffective assistance as a result of his failure to present adequate mitigation evidence at sentencing; the record reflected that P submitted ample mitigation evidence, which the sentencing court took into consideration, and the petitioner did not identify any informa- tion P failed to present that would have made it reasonably probable that the sentencing court would have imposed a lesser sentence. Argued October 19, 2020—officially released November 9, 2021

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant R Co. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the trial court, in an oral decision, rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure against R Co. Prior to the expiration of the law day, R Co. appealed, claiming that the court erred in denying its motion to dismiss the action, that the judgment of strict foreclosure was defective, and that the court's appoint- ment of a receiver was improper. After the appeal was filed, the court filed an order, dated as of the date of the trial, in which it stated that a judgment of strict foreclosure shall enter and in which it made a finding as to the amount of the debt. The defendant did not amend its appeal to challenge this order. Held that the appeal was dismissed because it was not taken from a final judgment: the trial court, by means of its order, dated as of the date of the trial, but not filed until after the appeal was filed, effectively issued a nunc pro tunc order, making its finding concerning the amount of the debt effective as of the date of its judgment of strict foreclosure, but the court's nunc pro tunc order could not rectify the jurisdictional defect that existed at the time the appeal was taken; there could be no dispute that a condition precedent to the taking of an appeal, namely, a finding with respect to the amount of the debt, was made only after the appeal was filed and after the law day was set to expire, and, thus, at the time that R Co. filed the appeal, a final judgment did not exist, and, accordingly, in the absence of a final judgment, this court dismissed the appeal. Argued November 19, 2020—officially released November 16, 2021

The plaintiff, a single member limited liability company, sought to recover monetary damages from the defendant, a general partner in four limited partnerships, for default on promissory notes that had been executed by H, the managing general partner of the limited partnerships, and the plaintiff's predecessor in interest. Before the trial court, the defendant raised several special defenses, including that the plaintiff was barred from recovery because H breached his fiduciary duties to the defendant, who was H's general partner in the limited partnerships. The defendant alleged that H, without providing him any notice, executed certain notes on behalf of the limited partnerships for H's own benefit, entered into another note using the original notes as collateral, and sold real property assets of the limited partnerships to entities controlled by H's son or an affiliate of the plaintiff for inadequate consideration. Following a trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant on his special defense of breach of fiduciary duty, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court concluded that the trial court's finding that H failed to disclose to the defendant all relevant information related to the note transactions was not clearly erroneous, and this failure constituted a breach of fidu- ciary duty that precluded enforcement of the notes against the defendant. a. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court could not have reasonably found that the defendant lacked notice of the notes, there being no evidence that the defendant was aware of their execution: the record did not reflect that, prior to executing certain of the notes, H ever communicated to the defendant that he intended, as the managing general partner of the limited partnerships, to issue promissory notes to himself and another company, R Co., memorializing the amounts he claimed were owed by the limited partnerships; moreover, the evidence the plaintiff pointed to that allegedly showed a free and frank disclosure of relevant information, certain letters of correspondence and audited financial statements, fell short of clear and convincing evidence of fair dealing, and, by issuing the notes, H circumvented the contractual limits of liability for obligations arising under the management agreement and converted a nonrecourse debt obligation into a recourse debt obligation; furthermore, the mere fact that certain partnership agreements author- ized H to execute the notes, coupled with the defendant's knowledge of debts owed to H and R Co. and of H's contemplation of a potential loan transaction, did not relieve H of his fiduciary duty to disclose to the defendant all relevant information specific to the notes; accordingly, H's fiduciary duty was not simply to inform the defendant that the limited partnerships were in debt, but, rather, to keep the defendant apprised of the details of the limited partnerships' repayment plans, especially when those plans implicated the defendant to the extent they did here. b. The trial court did not err in failing to address the relevant factors under Konover Development Corp. v. Zeller (228 Conn. 206), which outlines, in certain circumstances involving sophisticated business ventures, how a fiduciary demonstrates that a particular transaction is fair: in light of this court's conclusion that H failed to disclose all relevant information regarding the notes, the other Zeller factors could not outweigh, as a matter of law, the failure to make a free and frank disclosure, as a party cannot have competent and independent advice about a transaction as to which there has not been a free and frank disclosure of all relevant information, and a party's level of sophistication to understand a transac- tion is of little value if the party does not know about the transaction; moreover, adequate consideration is a necessary, not sufficient, condition to establish fair dealing, as although the lack of adequate consideration may lead to a conclusion that a fully disclosed transaction nevertheless constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, adequate consideration alone will not establish fair dealing as to a transaction that was not fully disclosed to the principal and to which the principal did not agree. c. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court, in reaching the conclusion that H breached his fiduciary duty to the defen- dant, committed a number of legal errors that required reversal: the plaintiff misconstrued the import of the court's conclusion and minimized the central finding of the court that H failed to disclose to the defendant that he was converting his accounts receivable claims against the limited partnerships into promissory notes that he then would use to secure loans for himself and R Co., as the court's reference to the sale of the limited partnerships' real property assets was not the basis for its conclusion that H breached his fiduciary duty to the defendant, but that H's breach of fiduciary duty occurred much earlier when he endorsed the notes over to himself and/or R Co.; moreover, it was not just that H benefitted from the transaction, but that he did so without making the necessary free and frank disclosure of all relevant information to the defendant; accordingly, the plaintiff could not exclude from the court's analysis its key finding, which was not clearly erroneous, that H failed to disclose all relevant information relating to the notes, and the failure to make a free and frank disclosure of all the information regarding the transactions, which unquestionably personally benefited H to the detriment of the defendant, was fatal to the plaintiff's claims of legal error. 2. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendant on the notes issued to R Co., even though it concluded that R Co. had not breached any fiduciary duty it owed to the defendant, was without merit; the court rejected the special defense that R Co. breached its fiduciary duty to the defendant because R Co. owed no fiduciary duty to the defendant, and, nonetheless, the transaction by which it received promissory notes from the limited partnerships was orchestrated by H, for his own benefit and without making a free and frank disclosure to the defendant, and the plaintiff, standing in H's shoes, could not avoid the effects of H's breach of fiduciary duty simply because H created an obligation to a third party he controlled instead of a direct obligation to himself. Argued December 11, 2019—officially released November 23, 2021

The plaintiff employer appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities sustaining a claim of ancestry discrimination brought by the plaintiff's employee, the defendant P, who is Vietnamese. P filed an affidavit of illegal discrimi- natory practice with the commission following the termination of his employment as a probationary police officer. P claimed that, after two negative interactions with a sergeant, K, during which K questioned P's ancestry and language skills and P stated that he would file a grievance against K, other sergeants began complaining about his performance, motivating the plaintiff to terminate his employment. The trial court rendered judgment affirming the decision of the commission, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court improperly held that there was substantial evidence in the record that P's termina- tion from employment arose under circumstances that gave rise to an inference of discrimination: although K's remarks to P were despicable and K filed a memorandum criticizing P following their negative interac- tions, there was not substantial evidence in the record to support a finding of a causal connection between K's remarks and the plaintiff's decision to terminate P from employment or that K played any role in the decision to terminate P's employment, as there was no evidence that the chief of police, who did terminate P's employment, ever saw K's memorandum, K's memorandum did not recommend that P be termi- nated, P had received both negative reports before his interactions with K and positive reports after those interactions, and, contrary to the findings of the commission's human rights referee that the sergeants who gave P negative reports following his interactions with K were influenced by K's animus because they were promoted at the same time and socialized with K, the other sergeants testified that there was no particular comradery among that group and that K had no influence on how they viewed P or that they had no contact at all with K regarding P; moreover, although the referee was not required to credit the testi- mony of the police officers, she was not permitted to infer the opposite of their testimony solely from her disbelief of the testimony; furthermore, the evidence in the record did not support the referee's conclusion that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for P's discharge set forth by the plaintiff were pretextual and that the decision was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias, as issues regarding P's truthfulness and unprofessional demeanor were documented in contemporaneous reports from both before and after P's interactions with K, P testified that none of the plaintiff's employees other than K ever treated him differently due to his ancestry, and K had no role in the decision to terminate P. Argued April 19—officially released November 23, 2021

In this joint appeal, the appellants were the plaintiffs in a breach of contract action and the defendants in a separate action brought by various limited liability companies to discharge lis pendens filed against their properties in connection with the breach of contract action. The appellees were various limited liability companies with rental properties. Sixteen of the appellees filed an application pursuant to statute (§ 52-325a) to discharge the lis pendens. The trial court granted the application, concluding that the appellants had not shown probable cause that their breach of contract case was an action intended to affect the real property on which the lis pendens had been filed. Pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-325c), the appellants appealed to this court from the order discharg- ing the lis pendens and indicated on the appeal form that the appeal was also being filed in connection with their breach of contract action. Thereafter, the appellants filed a motion to stay the order discharging the lis pendens pending the appeal pursuant to § 52-325c, which the trial court denied. The appellants then filed a motion for review pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 66-6), challenging the denial of their motion to stay, but failed to request a stay of execution of the trial court's judgment until this court had ruled on their motion for review. The appellees recorded the order discharging the lis pendens on the land records. Thereafter, this court dismissed the appellants' motion for review and ordered the parties to file memoranda to address whether the appeal should be dismissed as moot as to the lis pendens case and for lack of a final judgment as to the breach of contract case. The appellants filed a memorandum of law opposing dismissal. The appellees did not file a response to the order. Held: 1. The portion of the appeal challenging the trial court's judgment in the lis pendens case was moot: pursuant to § 52-325c, a stay is automatic for only seven days from the date of the court's order discharging the lis pendens unless, during that period, the aggrieved party appeals the order and applies for a further stay pending appeal; moreover, because the trial court denied the appellants' motion for stay and the appellants never sought a stay from this court, there was no stay in effect when the clerk delivered the order discharging the lis pendens or when the appellees recorded the order on the land records; furthermore, that the appellants timely filed their appeal within the seven day period mandated by § 52-325c did not overcome the fact that this court could not grant the appellants any practical relief in the appeal because the appellees effected the discharge of the lis pendens on filing the trial court's order on the land records, when there was no appellate stay in effect, and the lis pendens could not be resurrected after they were discharged; additionally, the question presented in this appeal did not qualify for review under the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to mootness because the appeal was rendered moot not due to the inher- ently limited duration of the proceeding but due to the appellants' failure to seek the appropriate remedy from this court and, therefore, the appellants failed to demonstrate that the substantial majority of appeals from orders discharging lis pendens would become moot before those appeals could be decided. 2. The portion of the appeal with respect to the breach of contract case was not taken from a final judgment and, accordingly, this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it: at the time the appeal was filed, the appellees had not filed any pleadings in response to the complaint and the trial court had not issued any order from which an appeal could be filed. Considered August 31—officially released November 23, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the murder of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by permitting certain prejudicial prior misconduct evidence to be admitted at trial. The state had indicated that it would seek to introduce testimony from E, who had been the victim of a prior drive- by shooting allegedly perpetrated by the petitioner, on the ground that E's testimony was relevant to prove that the petitioner had the means to commit the murder of the victim. The trial court ruled that E's testi- mony was relevant but limited the state's inquiry to whether E had seen the petitioner holding a revolver. Prior to E's testimony, the petitioner's counsel cross-examined two other state's witnesses, C, the petitioner's parole officer, and J, a police detective. C testified that he had been asked by J to violate the petitioner's parole on the basis of allegations that J never substantiated, one of which involved the drive-by shooting. J testified that he was never able to substantiate many of those allega- tions. The state then called E, who testified that, on the day of the drive- by shooting, he saw the petitioner carrying a revolver. The habeas court rejected the petitioner's claim that his counsel's cross-examination of C and J opened the door to the admission of evidence that the petitioner had been in possession of a weapon. The habeas court reasoned that evidence that the petitioner was in possession of the weapon was not admitted because of his counsel's cross-examination of C and J but because it was probative of the petitioner's means to commit the murder. The habeas court further reasoned that it was not objectively unreason- able for the petitioner's counsel to attempt to discredit J's testimony with evidence of the unsubstantiated allegations because counsel knew that E was going to testify about the weapon and that E's testimony would be in the back of the jurors' minds. The habeas court thus con- cluded that the petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel ren- dered deficient performance or that he was prejudiced thereby. The court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied the petitioner certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the habeas court's denial of his petition for certification to appeal constituted an abuse of discretion, as he failed to demonstrate that the issues raised in his petition for certification to appeal were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve them in a different manner or that they were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further; it could not reasonably be disputed that the inquiry of C and J by the petitioner's counsel, viewed with an eye toward emphasizing J's history of lodging unsubstantiated allegations of wrongdoing against the peti- tioner, could have inured to the favor of the petitioner, and, thus, that a trial strategy aimed at undermining the veracity or accuracy of the state's witnesses, although ultimately unsuccessful, was not sound or constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Argued October 13—officially released November 23, 2021

Convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the third degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from his sexual abuse of the minor victim, his niece. Before trial, the court granted the state's motion to allow the introduction of uncharged misconduct evidence, specifically, evidence regarding the defendant's sexual abuse of the victim's cousin, D. At trial, the victim testified, inter alia, that she maintained certain journals, which related to her abuse, and the court declined to allow the defendant access to the journals. The prosecutors assigned the task of reviewing the journals for exculpatory material, which were handwritten in Spanish, to a bilin- gual investigator in their office. The court indicated that it would conduct an in camera review of any materials that might be exculpatory, and defense counsel did not challenge this procedure. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly admitted uncharged misconduct evidence. a. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in permitting the state to present uncharged misconduct evidence regarding the sexual abuse of D to show his propensity for such acts, because the court ultimately admitted this evidence for a limited purpose, namely, as an explanation for the victim's delayed disclosure of the abuse, and not to establish the defendant's propensity to commit such acts. b. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to strike the testimony regarding the uncharged misconduct evidence after the prose- cutors declined to call D as a witness: the evidence was admitted only for the purpose of explaining the victim's delay in disclosing her own sexual abuse by the defendant, the evidence did not have only minimal probative value as the victim testified that she delayed disclosing her abuse after she learned of the defendant's abuse of D and observed the subsequent shunning of D and D's mother by her family, and her testi- mony was not cumulative of expert testimony presented on delayed disclosure; moreover, contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial judge, as the finder of fact, was not prejudiced after hearing of the defendant's sexual abuse of D and was not unable to limit consideration of this evidence to the sole purpose for which it had been admitted, the defen- dant having failed to point to anything in the record to overcome the presumption that the court, as the trier of fact, considered only properly admitted evidence when it rendered its decision. 2. The defendant's claim that his right to a fair trial was violated by prosecu- torial impropriety was unavailing: although the prosecutor erred in her consideration of what was necessary for uncharged misconduct to be admitted into evidence, the defendant neither demonstrated the lack of a good faith basis by the prosecutor nor showed that his right to a fair trial was violated, the defendant failed to establish a lack of a good faith basis with respect to the prosecutor's attempt to admit the defen- dant's guilty plea relating to the case involving D.C. pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (400 U.S. 25), and the prosecutor's efforts to admit constancy testimony did not raise to the level of impropriety. 3. The trial court properly denied the defendant access to the victim's jour- nals. a. The defendant's claim that he was entitled to review the victim's journals because she had reviewed them prior to her testimony was unavailing: the court considered the private nature of the journals, that the victim reviewed only a few pages of the journals before testifying, and that the state had been reviewing the journals for exculpatory mate- rial, and, thus, its decision was neither so arbitrary as to vitiate logic nor based on improper or irrelevant factors. b. The defendant waived the claim that he was entitled to the contents of the victim's journals because they constituted a statement pursuant to the rules of practice (§§ 40-13A and 40-15 (1)): defense counsel agreed to the procedure to be used in the review of, and the potential disclosure of, the contents of the journals, specifically, the prosecutors' review of the journals for exculpatory material and to the court's in camera review of any exculpatory material, and, having agreed to this procedure before the trial court, the defense cannot now challenge that procedure. 4. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his rights under Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83) were violated, which was based on his claim that the prosecutors were required to personally review the victim's journals for exculpatory information and that this task could not have been delegated to a nonlawyer member of their office: although, ultimately, the obligation for complying with Brady rests with the prose- cutor, it does not follow that the personal review of items such as the victim's journals by a prosecutor is constitutionally required. Argued March 1—officially released November 30, 2021

The plaintiff, a secured party, sought to recover monetary damages from the defendant debtor, for breach of a retail installment sales contract, secured by an interest in the defendant's vehicle. After the defendant defaulted, the plaintiff took possession of the vehicle and sent the defen- dant a presale notice regarding her right to redeem and the notice of sale. The defendant took no steps to redeem the vehicle, and the plaintiff sold it in an arm's-length transaction. Following the sale, the plaintiff sent the defendant a postsale notice advising her of the sale and informing her that the sale price was less than the amount that she owed and that the plaintiff may seek a deficiency judgment. The defendant did not pay the amount allegedly due. Following a bench trial, the trial court ren- dered judgment for the plaintiff and awarded certain damages, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in determining that the plaintiff properly provided notice of the right to an accounting as required by article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), as the provision of an actual accounting in lieu of a statement of a right to an accounting was enough to satisfy the requirements set out by the applicable statute (§ 42a-9- 613 (1) (D)): although the statute only requires a statement that the debtor is entitled to an accounting, additional information is permitted and exact language is not required, and providing an actual accounting in the notice is the type of additional information that the statute allows; moreover, providing the actual accounting, especially when provided free of charge, served as a consumer focused means of meeting the statutory purpose of notification to the debtor; accordingly, the plaintiff's presale notice, which provided detailed information, including details of the defendant's debt and the amount she owed to the plaintiff, and actively invited questions, adhered to the requirements of the UCC and thus satisfied the accounting provision of the statute. 2. This court declined to reach the merits of the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in determining that the plaintiff properly provided a telephone number from which the defendant could learn the full amount she would need to pay in order to redeem her vehicle as required by article 9 of the UCC, the claim not having been properly preserved for appellate review; the defendant did not raise this issue until her posttrial brief, and this court's careful review of the record revealed the issue was not raised at trial and was not addressed in the court's memorandum of decision, of which no further articulation was sought, and, because the court did not consider the issue, the factual record was wholly inadequate for review. 3. The trial court did not err in determining that the plaintiff satisfied the requirements of the Retail Installment Sales Financing Act (RISFA) (§ 36a-770 et seq.) regarding the repossession and sale of a motor vehicle. a. The defendant's claim that the postsale notice failed to provide a proper itemization as required by statute (§ 36a-785 (e)) was not properly preserved for appellate review, the defendant having failed to raise this issue until her posttrial brief, and the record was unclear how, if at all, the issue was raised at trial since the issue was not addressed in the court's memorandum of decision. b. The plaintiff did not violate § 36a-785 (g) when it credited the defendant with the actual sale price of the vehicle, an amount lower than the statutory fair market value as determined by the formula in § 36a-785 (g); the purpose of § 36a-785 (g) is not to calculate an amount that a creditor must credit to a debtor's account but, rather, to provide the debtor with the tools to defend herself in a deficiency proceeding brought by a secured party, and, where a secured party seeks a deficiency judg- ment following a calculation pursuant to subsection (g) of the statute, the secured party may rebut the presumed value of the vehicle with direct in-court testimony, which the plaintiff did here, presenting testimony regarding how the sale price represented the actual fair market value of the vehicle due to damage sustained in an accident that prompted the defendant's surrender of the vehicle, and, additionally, the defendant did not offer any evidence as to the vehicle's value. Argued September 16—officially released November 30, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of several crimes after two trials, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he received ineffective assistance from counsel, F and R, who represented him in posttrial proceedings to reduce his sentences. The petitioner had been sentenced to eighteen years of incarceration after the first trial, in which a mistrial was declared as to certain charges on which the jury was unable to reach agreement. The Sentence Review Division of the Superior Court thereafter denied the petitioner's application for a sentence reduction. The petitioner was then retried and convicted of the charges on which the jury previously had failed to reach a verdict and was sentenced to fifty-five years of incarceration to run concurrently with the sentence in his first trial. At about the time of the second trial and after the petitioner had cooperated with the state in conjunction with two murder trials, F represented him in discussions that led to an agreement with the state under which it would not oppose a sentence modification hearing as to the fifty-five year term of imprisonment. The modification hearing did not result in a sentence reduction. Thereafter, F discussed with the petitioner the possibility of applying for a review of the fifty- five year sentence, even though the deadline for such an application had expired. The petitioner then filed petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, which were consolidated before several counts were dismissed by the habeas court. R, the petitioner's habeas counsel, then negotiated an agreement with the respondent Commissioner of Correction to file a joint motion for a stipulated judgment under which the petitioner's right to apply with the Sentence Review Division for a reduction of the fifty-five year term of imprisonment was reinstated, and the petitioner would be foreclosed from filing any future civil actions challenging the judgments of conviction from his two trials and the remaining counts of his habeas petition would be stricken with prejudice. F represented the petitioner at the review proceeding after the petitioner's rights to sentence review were restored. The Sentence Review Division affirmed the petitioner's sentence, noting that it could not consider the petitioner's cooperation with the state because the sentencing court had not consid- ered it when it sentenced the petitioner. In the present habeas petition, the petitioner alleged, inter alia, that F rendered ineffective assistance in advising him to pursue sentence review and failing to consult with R about the stipulation. The petitioner further claimed that R rendered ineffective assistance because he had not investigated and consulted with F to determine the basis for the stipulation before advising the petitioner to forgo his habeas corpus rights in exchange for sentence review. The habeas court denied the petition, concluding that neither F nor R rendered ineffective assistance, and that the petitioner's with- drawal with prejudice of the prior habeas petition was knowing and voluntary. Thereafter, the court granted the petitioner certification to appeal. Held that the habeas court properly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus: R informed the petitioner that the remaining claims in his consolidated habeas petition were weak and that sentence review might afford him relief from the fifty-five year sentence, F and R individually counseled the petitioner in separate and distinct capacities in the respective proceedings, and R believed that the petitioner compre- hended the consequences of entering into the stipulated judgment, including his waiver of habeas corpus rights arising out of his convic- tions; moreover, the petitioner's claim that his withdrawal of his habeas corpus petition was not knowing or voluntary was unavailing, R having spent approximately one hour with him discussing the six page motion for the stipulated judgment and answering his questions before the petitioner signed the document; furthermore, the habeas court found R's testimony to be more credible than the petitioner's, and this court was bound by those credibility determinations, as it is the habeas court that sits as the trier of fact. Argued October 18—officially released November 30, 2021