Volume 207 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the defendant. The trial court ordered that the parties' minor child would maintain a primary residence with the plaintiff in Connecticut until the child's second birthday. At that time, the child's residence would begin to alternate, so that he would spend one half of each year with the plaintiff and one half with the defendant, who lived in Saskatchewan, Canada. In the event that the parties were unable to agree on a custody schedule, the trial court ordered that the child would spend two months at a time with each party. The trial court further ordered that, following the child's fifth or sixth birthday, he would be enrolled in a full-time academic program in Connecticut and would again maintain a primary residence with the plaintiff. Held: 1. The trial court's physical custody orders did not modify the physical custody of the child prospectively and were not improper: the substance of the trial court's orders reflected that it intended the parties to maintain joint physical custody of the child at all times; moreover, the trial court's order requiring changes to the child's residence did not alter the nature of the joint physical custody award and, accordingly, did not require future modifications to the child's physical custody. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that, to the extent the trial court awarded the parties joint physical custody, it lacked the statutory authority to do so and deprived the plaintiff of her due process rights: the trial court had the authority to award the parties joint physical custody notwithstanding that both parties sought only sole physical custody, as the applicable statute (§ 46b-56a) restricted the court's authority to award joint legal custody, not joint physical custody; more- over, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she lacked fair notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard with respect to the trial court's award of joint physical custody, as she had requested broad relief and had the opportunity at trial to testify, to elicit testimony from a family relations counselor, to cross-examine the defendant, and to offer exhibits into evidence; accordingly, the trial court did not infringe on her due process rights. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the physical custody orders: the findings on which the orders were predicated, including the trial court's determination that the plaintiff was unlikely to foster a relationship between the defendant and the child without court orders, were based on substantial evidence; moreover, the physical custody orders did not hinder the plaintiff's ability to exercise the decision- making authority granted to her with respect to the legal custody orders; furthermore, the trial court determined that the physical custody orders it constructed were in the child's best interest in light of the child's young age and the large geographical distance between the parties' residences. Argued May 20—officially released August 31, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted of sexual assault in a spousal or cohabiting relationship, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation. The defendant requested that he appear as a self-represented party in his violation of probation proceed- ing. Following a canvass, the trial court determined that the defendant was competent to represent himself and granted his request. During the evidentiary hearing portion of the proceeding, the defendant had difficulty formulating nonargumentative, noncompound questions while cross-examining the state's witnesses. After the state rested its case, the defendant requested that a specific attorney be appointed as his defense counsel. The trial court was unable to grant the request because the attorney was not on the authorized list of special public defenders. The trial court instead appointed a special public defender to act as standby counsel, as the defendant continued to insist that he represent himself, and it ordered a competency evaluation of the defendant pursu- ant to the applicable statute (§ 54-56d). After the defendant refused to cooperate with the evaluators, the trial court determined that the defendant was no longer competent to represent himself and appointed his standby counsel to fully represent him. At the request of defense counsel, the trial court ordered a second competency evaluation to determine whether the defendant was competent to stand trial. The defendant again refused to cooperate with the evaluators, and the trial court, finding that the defendant understood the charges against him and was capable of assisting with his defense, proceeded with the evidentiary hearing. The defendant declined the opportunity to recall the state's witnesses for reexamination, and he did not testify or put forth any of his own witnesses. The trial court found the defendant in violation of his probation. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court's canvass regarding the waiver of his right to be represented by counsel was constitutionally inadequate under Faretta v. California (422 U.S. 806) because the claim failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as the defendant did not demonstrate that a constitutional violation existed: the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the defendant was competent to waive his right to coun- sel, as his request for self-representation was clear and unequivocal, he indicated during the trial court's canvass that he had represented himself in prior federal cases, that he was voluntarily waiving his right to counsel, and that he was aware of the disadvantages to proceeding as a self- represented party, and his technical legal knowledge was irrelevant to the competency determination; moreover, the trial court apprised the defendant of his maximum exposure for the violation of his probation and was not required to advise him of his maximum exposure with respect to certain misdemeanor charges that were not before the trial court at the time of the canvass. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that, even if the canvass regarding the waiver of his right to be represented by counsel was constitutional, he was entitled to a new trial under State v. Connor (292 Conn. 483): the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he suffered from such a significant mental impairment that the trial court should have, sua sponte, determined that he was incompetent to represent himself, as the defendant failed to cooperate during the two court-ordered competency evaluations and his inability to effectively cross-examine the state's witnesses was insufficient, alone, to overcome the statutory presumption of competency. 3. The trial court did not err when it failed, sua sponte, to canvass the defendant about the waiver of his constitutional right to testify and this court declined to exercise its supervisory authority to require trial courts to conduct such a canvass: our Supreme Court previously determined in State v. Paradise (213 Conn. 388), that trial courts were not constitu- tionally required to canvass a defendant about the waiver of his right to testify in instances such as the present case, where the defendant did not allege that he wanted to testify or that he did not know that he could testify; moreover, the exercise of supervisory powers relating to the issue was better left to our Supreme Court. 4. The defendant's claim that the trial court's judgment should be reversed because he was deprived of his constitutional right to conflict free representation because an actual conflict existed was unavailing: his public defender's one sentence reference to the defendant's threat of physical violence against him in a motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem, which was filed in an attempt to obtain releases of the defen- dant's relevant health information in order to determine his competency, did not provide an adequate factual basis for the defendant's contention that an actual conflict existed; moreover, the record did not reflect that his public defender sought to withdraw from further representation or that his public defender made any statements that were representative of divided loyalty. Argued March 3—officially released August 31, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted, in two cases, of the crime of felony murder on a plea of guilty in each case, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that the respondent Commissioner of Correction and the Board of Pardons and Paroles improperly determined that he was not parole eligible. On the first count of felony murder, which was alleged to have been committed on June 30 or July 1, 1981, the petitioner was sentenced to an indefinite term of incarceration of not less than twenty-five years nor more than life pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 1981) § 53a-35). On the second count of felony murder, which was alleged to have been committed on August 16, 1981, the petitioner was sentenced to a definite term of incarceration of fifty-five years pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 1981) § 53a-35a). The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. The petitioner had served the entire length of his definite sentence of fifty-five years, as reduced by credits he had earned while incarcerated, by May 28, 2014. He then sought a parole eligibility date for his indeterminate sentence but was told that he was not eligible for parole because his determinate sentence, which he had fully served, was not a parole eligible offense. At his habeas trial, however, S, the executive director of the board, testified that the petitioner was parole eligible. Thereafter, the habeas court dismissed the petition, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to state a claim involving the deprivation of a recognized liberty interest and that the issue of obtaining a parole eligibility determination was moot in light of S's testimony that the board had found the petitioner to be eligible for parole but declined to grant him a hearing. The court thereafter granted the petitioner certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. On appeal, the respondent conceded that the petitioner was eligible for parole. Held: 1. This court had jurisdiction to reach the merits of the petitioner's claims, as the respondent's concession that the petitioner was parole eligible did not render the appeal moot: in his habeas petition, the petitioner sought three forms of relief, a declaration by the habeas court that he was eligible for parole, an order that the respondent classify him as eligible for parole, and a classification by the board and the Department of Correction that he was eligible for parole and that they accord him consideration based on the criteria set forth in the applicable statute (§ 54-125), of which only the final request for relief was arguably satisfied by the respondent's concession, thus, this court could order practical relief by remanding the case with direction to render judgment that the petitioner is parole eligible; moreover, the petitioner's classification as a parole eligible inmate was a tangible benefit on which his release from prison, pursuant to a finding of parole suitability, was contingent; furthermore, the notion that there was no actual controversy between the parties on the issue of the petitioner's parole eligibility was belied by the existence of the appeal and the lack of a stipulation as to the petitioner's eligibility. 2. The habeas court improperly dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus as moot; at the habeas trial, although S testified that the petitioner was eligible for parole, a representative from the department testified that the petitioner would never be eligible, and this conflicting testimony, in conjunction with the respondent's closing remarks that it was ''not entirely clear that this is a parole eligible sentence,'' indicated that there was an ongoing controversy regarding the petitioner's eligibility for parole, despite S's testimony. 3. The habeas court erred in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the petitioner's ex post facto claim in his petition: the petitioner established a cognizable claim under the ex post facto clause of the United States constitution, as he made a colorable showing that the respondent's and the department's interpretation and application of certain statutes (§§ 53a-38 (b) and 54-125a (b) (1)) that rendered him categorically ineligible for parole on his indeterminate sentence on the first offense created a genuine risk that he would be incarcerated for longer than he would have been under the law that existed at the time he committed the first offense; accordingly, in light of the respondent's concession on appeal that the petitioner is parole eligible, this court granted the petitioner practical relief by directing the habeas court to render judgment declaring the petitioner to be parole eligible and did not reach a determination as to whether the respondent's interpretation and application of § 54-125a to the petitioner's sentence violated the ex post facto clause. Argued February 11—officially released August 31, 2021

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court committed plain error by permitting the victim's mother to testify as a constancy of accusation witness regarding statements the victim made to her disclosing the assault perpetrated by the defendant: the defendant's counsel raised the issue of the victim's delayed disclosure of the assault at trial during his cross-examination of the victim, thus, the court's admission of the mother's constancy of accusation testimony was consistent with the procedures established by our Supreme Court in State v. Daniel W. E. (322 Conn. 593) and contained in the applicable provision (§ 6-11) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence; moreover, the defendant's claim that the victim's disclosure of the assault within twenty-four hours should have precluded the use of constancy of accusa- tion testimony was an issue of first impression and, thus, the defendant failed to establish the existence of an error so obvious it affected the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceed- ings. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court committed plain error by admitting into evidence a videotape of the victim's forensic interview under the constancy of accusation doctrine or pursuant to the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the rule against hearsay evidence; nothing in the record indicates that the videotape was admitted pursuant to the constancy of accusation doc- trine, and, as the defendant did not object to the admissibility of the videotape on any grounds or question the victim regarding her under- standing of the purpose of the interview during trial, the record was inadequate to determine whether the victim understood that what she said during the interview was for the purpose of receiving medical diagnosis or treatment. Argued May 10—officially released August 31, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted in 2008, on a guilty plea, of the crime of kidnapping in the second degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. As relief, the petitioner requested that the habeas court allow him to with- draw his guilty plea. The respondent Commissioner of Correction filed a request for an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed. Following a hearing, the habeas court determined that the petition, which was filed in 2018, was timely filed within the limitation period set forth in the applicable statute (§ 52-470 (c)) because it was filed within five years of the disposition in 2016 of the petitioner's most recent violation of the probationary portion of his sentence on the 2008 conviction. The habeas court then, on its own motion, dismissed the petition pursuant to the relevant rule of practice (§ 23-29 (2)) on the ground that the petition failed to state a claim on which habeas corpus relief could be granted. Thereafter, on the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court improperly dismissed the habeas petition pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (2), the petition having stated a claim on which habeas relief could be granted; the petition raised allegations of ineffec- tive assistance of counsel that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner, implicitly challenged whether the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea, which states a cognizable claim for habeas relief. 2. The habeas court improperly determined that the habeas petition was timely filed within the limitation period set forth in § 52-470 (c); this court disagreed with the habeas court's construction of § 52-470 (c), as the timeliness of a petition under the statute is evaluated on the basis of when the judgment of conviction, not the sentence imposed for that conviction, is final, and any disposition following a violation of a probationary portion of a sentence cannot, as a matter of law, toll or restart the limitation period for filing a petition challenging the convic- tion; moreover, although the habeas petition was not timely, it having been filed six months beyond the limitation period, because the issue of whether the petitioner can establish good cause for the delay in filing his petition was not determined by the habeas court, the case was remanded to that court for further proceedings on that issue in accor- dance with § 52-470 (e). Argued January 14—officially released August 31, 2021

Convicted of the crimes of burglary in the third degree, attempt to commit tampering with physical evidence and attempt to commit arson in the second degree in connection with a break-in at a courthouse, the defen- dant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of all three offenses. At the time of the events at issue, the defendant had two felony charges pending against him and was scheduled to commence jury selection in a trial of those charges. Two days before the start of jury selection, a silent alarm was triggered at the courthouse at about 11 p.m. The police discovered, inter alia, a broken window that provided ingress to an office shared by assistant state's attorneys, a duffel bag containing six canisters of industrial strength kerosene on the floor of the hallway outside the office, and case files atop a desk that had two of its drawers open and other files scattered on the floor. Surveillance video also depicted a vehicle, similar to one the defendant drove, driving by the courthouse repeatedly in the hours before the break-in, and, while the defendant was in custody after having been convicted of other charges that had been pending against him, he asked his brother, in a recorded telephone call, to get rid of ''bottles of things'' for a heater, speculated about how the police located the vehicle and attempted to arrange an alibi. On the defendant's appeal to this court, this court concluded that the state had failed to produce sufficient evidence regarding the defendant's intent to commit tampering, which was a requirement com- mon to all of the charged offenses, reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to render judg- ment of acquittal as to all three charges. Our Supreme Court thereafter granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, reversed this court's judgment and remanded the case to this court for further proceed- ings. On remand, the defendant reiterated his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of all three charges and asserted that the court improperly excluded testimony from L, who had represented him on the felony charges, that, prior to the break-in, the defendant had told L that he intended to plead guilty to the felony charges, which the defendant alleged would have provided a defense to his motive to disrupt or delay the proceedings against him. Held: 1. The defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction was unavailing: a. The totality of the evidence regarding the defendant's actions before, during and after the break-in supported the jury's finding that he broke into the prosecutors' area of the courthouse with the intent to tamper with evidence: from the manner in which the defendant conducted recon- naissance of the closed courthouse late at night and his chosen point of entry, the jury reasonably could have inferred that he planned to engage in criminal conduct and wanted to gain access to the office of the prosecutor who was handling the pending felony charges and to his own specific file, and the reasonable inference that the staff of the prosecutor's office would not have left files strewn on the floor permitted the jury's successive reasonable inference that it was the defendant who had been searching for his own case file and that, if he could tamper with it, the state would be unable to secure a conviction against him; moreover, that the defendant brought industrial strength kerosene into an office filled with combustible materials provided a reasonable basis for the jury to infer that he intended to start a fire that would consume the file associated with his case and any physical evidence contained therein, and that he understood that he also needed to destroy other files to cover up his destruction of the evidence in his case; furthermore, those reasonable inferences were supported by the defendant's conduct after the break-in, which included his flight from the courthouse, a phone call he made to the public defender's office inquiring whether the courthouse would be open on the day after the break-in and incriminating statements he made to his family. b. Contrary to the defendant's assertion that the evidence was insufficient to support his arson conviction because the state failed to prove that he committed the completed crime of tampering with physical evidence, the state's burden was to prove that he intended to start a fire to conceal the crime of tampering with physical evidence and that he had taken a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime; moreover, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant, by bringing kerosene into an area packed with files and other combustibles, possessed the requisite intent to dam- age or destroy the building as a natural consequence of his actions, and, even if his primary intent was to damage or destroy the files in the prosecutors' office area, the jury reasonably could have inferred that he also intended to damage the building to achieve that objective. c. Notwithstanding the defendant's contention that his tampering convic- tion could not stand because the state failed to prove that any materials in the prosecutors' office constituted ''physical evidence'' as defined by statute (§ 53a-146 (8)), this court was not persuaded by his assertion that, even though the text of the tampering statute ((Rev. to 2013) § 53a- 155) does not contain the phrase ''physical evidence,'' the legislature intended to incorporate its definition in § 53a-146 (8) as an element of § 53a-155 because ''physical evidence'' is included in the title of § 53a- 155; despite the title of § 53a-155, the plain language of the text of § 53a- 155 required the state to prove that the defendant, believing that an official proceeding was pending, altered, destroyed, concealed or removed any record, document or thing with the purpose of impairing its verity or availability in an official proceeding. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court's improper exclusion of his statement to L constituted harmful error: a. Although the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the state- ment, which the defendant contended was admissible as evidence of his then existing mental state pursuant to § 8-3 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, he was not deprived of his constitutional rights to present a defense, as he was able to present his defense that he was not the perpetrator as well as alibi evidence via the testimony of his brother, and the defendant challenged the state's evidence regarding the issue of identity; moreover, the state presented considerable evidence regard- ing the defendant's activities prior to, during and after the break-in to establish his identity as the perpetrator and his intent, and his motivation to disrupt the court proceedings remained, as his stated interest in plead- ing guilty to the prior felony charges may have been diminished upon the realization that the offered plea agreement involved incarceration. b. The trial court's improper exclusion of L's testimony did not constitute harmful error, as the state introduced substantial evidence of the defen- dant's identity and actions with respect to the offenses with which he was charged, and the period of incarceration that would have resulted from his stated intention to plead guilty to the prior felony charges may have provided him with an incentive to commit the burglary, arson and tampering offenses such that a fair assurance existed that the improper exclusion of L's testimony did not substantially affect the jury's verdict. Argued March 11—officially released August 31, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of two counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child, appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the first of two motions he had filed to correct an illegal sentence and violated his right to a jury trial. The defendant asserted in his first motion to correct that his sentence on both risk of injury counts violated the fifth amendment's prohibition of double jeopardy. Concurrently with that motion, he filed a motion for the appointment of counsel to assist him in preparing and filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court appointed P, who found no merit to the issues raised in the first motion to correct. P then filed a second motion to correct an illegal sentence and to vacate the guilty plea on the ground that the defendant's plea to one of the two risk of injury counts was not made knowingly and voluntarily because the prosecutor's recitation of the factual basis for the plea with respect to that count had referenced a sexual assault that was not alleged in the arrest warrant or charged in the state's operative information. When the trial court then advised the defendant about the option of proceeding as a self-represented party if he wanted to pursue the claims in his first motion to correct, he stated that he did not intend to proceed as a self-represented party. The court then denied a motion the defendant had filed to discharge P and denied the second motion to correct an illegal sentence, concluding that the claims raised in the second motion were more properly brought in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Held: 1. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly dismissed his first motion to correct an illegal sentence; the trial court could not, and did not, render judgment on the merits of that motion, as it was superseded by the second motion to correct an illegal sentence, which became operative when the defendant requested the appointment of counsel and then declined the trial court's invitation to proceed as a self-represented party. 2. This court declined to consider the defendant's unpreserved constitutional claim that his right to a jury trial was violated; contrary to the defendant's assertion that his claim was ripe for review under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) or reversal under the plain error doctrine set forth in the applicable rule of practice (§ 60-5), extraordinary review under Golding and § 60-5 was not warranted because the defendant did not first present his claim to the ''judicial authority,'' which, in the rule of practice (§ 43- 22) governing motions to correct an illegal sentence, means solely the trial court, not the appellate courts of this state, and this court's decision to decline review of the defendant's claim would not result in hardship or injustice to him, as he may seek and obtain any appropriate redress for an illegal sentence before the trial court, which is in a superior position to fashion such a remedy. Argued April 6—officially released August 31, 2021

The plaintiff, an incarcerated individual, sought a declaratory judgment and punitive damages against the defendant B, an employee of the Department of Correction, claiming that B had retaliated against him for filing a grievance against her for allegedly denying him access to type legal documents on the facility's typewriter, which he claimed was a denial of access to the courts in violation of the federal constitution. In B's answer, she asserted the special defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, pursuant to federal statute (§ 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a)). At B's request, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing, prior to the start of trial, regarding B's defense of failure to exhaust. The trial court granted B's motion to dismiss, concluding that because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the department's grievance system, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a). On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. This court declined to review the plaintiff's unpreserved claim that the trial court erred in determining that he had failed to exhaust his adminis- trative remedies by not filing a second grievance regarding B's alleged retaliatory conduct pursuant to the department's grievance procedure, as this claim was not raised before the trial court: moreover, this court declined the plaintiff's request to review his unpreserved claim under the plain error doctrine, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there was an error so clear and obvious as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal, and beyond the plaintiff's unsupported assertions that the circumstances of his case were extraordinary because the trial court and B overlooked controlling case law, the plaintiff provided little to no analysis of this unpreserved claim under the plain error doctrine. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in considering B's special defense that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because B had waived that special defense by failing to raise it in her pretrial motions to dismiss and her motion for a summary judgment; contrary to the plaintiff's claim, B, under the relevant rule of practice (§ 10-60) was not required to raise her special defenses in her pretrial motions to dismiss, and, because exhaustion under § 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a) was an affirmative defense, the plaintiff was not required to factually plead in his complaint that he had exhausted his administrative remedies, and, thus, it was not until the plaintiff provided B with a list of the exhibits three days before trial was it confirmed that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative reme- dies for his retaliation claim. Argued April 14—officially released September 7, 2021

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's pending motions, which included a motion for modification of his alimony, child support and visitation orders, two motions for contempt, a motion for an order to prevent the plaintiff from filing additional motions without leave of the court pursuant to Strobel v. Strobel (92 Conn. App. 662), a motion to remove the guardian ad litem, and a motion to compel compli- ance with his discovery request, all for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (§ 46b-155 et seq.). Prior to the filing of the motion to dismiss, the defendant relocated to Florida and the plaintiff and the parties' children relocated to Tennessee. The defendant returned to Connecticut after approximately one year in Florida. While the plaintiff's motion to dismiss was pending, the defendant filed an application for an emergency ex parte order of custody, and the trial court entered an emergency order awarding temporary custody to the defendant and also ordered a hearing on the custody issue. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered that all existing orders regarding the custody of the parties' minor children be stayed until the plaintiff's motion to dismiss was resolved. Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss, for which the plaintiff submitted an affidavit in support of her arguments, as she was unable to attend in person, the trial court dismissed the defendant's motions for a Strobel order, to remove the guardian ad litem, and to compel, and one of his motions for contempt. The defendant appealed to this court and then filed a motion to reargue with the trial court. The trial court stayed consideration of the defendant's motion for modifica- tion of his alimony, child support and visitation orders, which remained pending, until the defendant's motion to reargue was resolved. The defendant then filed an amended appeal from the stay order. The trial court issued a memorandum of decision on the defendant's motion to reargue in which it, inter alia, vacated the stay and ordered dismissal of the custody proceedings, the defendant's motion for modification, and his second motion for contempt, and the defendant further amended his appeal to challenge that ruling. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court lacked a proper basis on which to grant the plaintiff's motion to dismiss: the substance of the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff, which recited details of her relocation, in addition to other documentation that she provided in connection with her motion to dismiss, including an individual education plan for her son that was prepared by his school in Tennessee and an electrical bill for a residence in Tennessee that listed the plaintiff as the account holder, undermined the defendant's claim that the plaintiff did not introduce any admissible evidence as to her residence, the length of time at her residence, the location of the children, or her financial circumstances. 2. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in staying enforcement of the emergency ex parte custody order: the claim was not properly before this court because the defendant failed to file a motion for review of the stay order, which, pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 66-6), was his sole remedy. 3. The trial court properly concluded that, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 46b-115l (a) (1)), it did not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the defendant's motions relating to custody of and visitation with the minor children and, therefore, it properly granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss those motions: jurisdiction under § 46b-115l (a) (1) terminated in April, 2018, when the plaintiff and the minor children relocated to Tennessee following the defendant's relocation to Florida, as neither the parties nor the minor children continued to reside in Connecticut after that time; moreover, Connecticut did not reacquire exclusive, continuing jurisdiction when the defendant returned to reside in the state, as § 46b-115l (a) (1) pertained only to continuing jurisdiction, not interrupted or intermittent jurisdiction. 4. The trial court improperly dismissed certain of the defendant's motions unrelated to the issues of child custody or visitation: the trial court's dismissal order was predicated on its conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the act, however, the act only concerned issues of custody or visitation and was not applicable to orders relating to child support or other monetary obligations; accordingly, although the defendant's two motions for contempt, which concerned custody and visitation with the minor children, and his motion for modification, which sought to modify the existing visitation order, were properly dismissed, the defendant's motion to modify his alimony and child sup- port orders, along with his motions for a Strobel order, to remove the guardian ad litem, and to compel compliance with his discovery request, were beyond the purview of the act, as they had no relation to the issues of child custody or visitation, and, consequently, they were improperly dismissed. 5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in deferring consideration of the defendant's motion to modify his alimony, child support, and visitation orders: the defendant's motion to reargue, which asked the trial court to reconsider and reverse its determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the act, required the deferral of consideration of the merits of his motion to modify until after the jurisdiction question was fully resolved. Argued January 7—officially released September 7, 2021

The defendants, the employer, S Co., and its insurance carrier, A Co., appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the decision of the Worker's Compensation Com- missioner finding that the plaintiff's repetitive workplace activities at S Co. substantially and permanently aggravated a preexisting condition in his knee and denying the defendants' motion for articulation. The plaintiff, who suffered from degenerative arthritis stemming from a work injury he suffered in 1972, and a subsequent surgery in 1973, prior to his employment with S Co., and who ultimately required a total replacement of his left knee, submitted into evidence medical records and correspondence from his treating physician, P. The defendants claimed that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's award because, inter alia, P's expert opinions were not expressed with reason- able medical probability. Held: 1. The board properly affirmed the commissioner's award. a. The board properly affirmed the commissioner's finding that P's opin- ion that there was a causal relationship between the plaintiff's employ- ment and his need for surgery was expressed with a reasonable degree of medical probability; P opined in unequivocal language that the plain- tiff's 1972 injury actually had been aggravated by the plaintiff's work at S Co., pulling and pushing pallets of parts weighing 800 to 1400 pounds for shifts of 12 hours, and, although P's notes indicated that the plaintiff's overwhelming medical issue was arthritis and that his need for surgery dated back to his 1973 knee operation, these references did not render P's entire opinion speculative and were not inconsistent with an opinion that the plaintiff's workplace activities at S Co. constituted a substantial contributing factor to the plaintiff's need for surgery because they aggra- vated the plaintiff's preexisting condition. b. The board properly affirmed the commissioner's finding that P's records constituted competent medical evidence from which the commis- sioner could find a causal relationship between the plaintiff's work activi- ties at S Co. and his need for surgery: P's records reported the plaintiff's condition, symptoms and course of treatment and contained P's expert opinion that the plaintiff's knee injury was causally related to his work, and the defendants did not object to the admission of P's records into evidence, nor did they depose P or call him to testify at the hearing; moreover, P's opinion was not incompetent for a lack of supporting facts, as, although the plaintiff testified that he retrieved the heaviest, 1400 pound fixtures only 20 to 30 times throughout the course of his career, P's opinion was that pushing heavy carts of up to 1400 pounds during back-to-back 12 hour shifts contributed to the plaintiff's injury; furthermore, P's medical evidence was supported by other evidence, including the plaintiff's extensive testimony as to his workplace activities pushing carts of heavy parts on a regular basis, which the commissioner found credible. c. The commissioner did not improperly refer to the plaintiff's work activities beyond those expressly identified in P's records; the commis- sioner had before him expert medical evidence that the plaintiff's work at S Co. caused his need for surgery, thus, he was not limited to consider only the activities expressly identified by P but was entitled also to consider the plaintiff's testimony, which in no way undermined the ade- quacy or competency of P's expert opinion. 2. The board properly affirmed the commissioner's decision to deny the defendant's request for articulation; the commissioner did not abuse his discretion in denying the request, as the finding for which the defendants sought an articulation, that the plaintiff's workplace activities had sub- stantially and permanently aggravated his underlying and preexisting knee condition, when considered together with P's records, reflected P's opinion that the work activities aggravated the plaintiff's underly- ing condition. Argued March 11—officially released September 7, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted of several crimes in connection with three armed robberies in Norwalk, Greenwich and Stamford, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel ren- dered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate adequately and to present evidence that he suffered from significant mental disease that rendered involuntary an inculpatory statement regarding his involve- ment in the Norwalk and Greenwich robberies that he had made to a cellmate while he was incarcerated on charges related to the Stamford robbery. The petitioner asserted that evidence of his mental health issues would have led the trial court to grant his motion to suppress that statement and was necessary, after the statement was admitted into evidence, to effectively cross-examine and to discredit the state's wit- nesses regarding that statement. The habeas court determined both that there was no evidence that the petitioner's statement to the cellmate was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, and that the petitioner failed to present evidence that showed how his mental health affected the voluntariness of that statement. The court further deter- mined that, during the pendency of the petitioner's criminal case, his mental health records had been reviewed by a physician who was board certified in forensic psychiatry and that another mental health profes- sional had prepared a report that concluded that the petitioner was malingering. The court thus concluded that the petitioner failed to prove that his trial counsel performed deficiently or that he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged failure to investigate or to present evidence about the petitioner's mental illnesses. The court therefore denied the habeas petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to demon- strate that he suffered constitutionally ineffective assistance from his trial counsel: there was no evidence regarding the scope of trial counsel's investigation into the petitioner's mental health or the strategic reasons, if any, why counsel believed such an investigation was not warranted, the petitioner did not call his trial counsel or any other witness to testify regarding the extent of the investigation into the petitioner's mental health problems, and the petitioner was not asked during his testimony whether he had had discussions with or had provided information to his trial counsel regarding the state of his mental health at the time he made his inculpatory statement to the cellmate; moreover, there was a dearth of evidence regarding whether the petitioner's mental health issues would have impacted the voluntariness of his statement to the cellmate to the extent that the trial court would have suppressed the statement, and this court declined to review the petitioner's inadequately briefed claim that evidence regarding his mental health was necessary to effectively cross-examine and to discredit the state's witnesses regard- ing the inculpatory statement, as his appellate brief was devoid of cita- tions to the record or to the trial transcript bearing on this issue, it did not state which witnesses he would have cross-examined, the substance of their testimony or how the medical evidence his counsel allegedly failed to find would have impeached that testimony, and there was no merit to the petitioner's assertion that the habeas court overlooked the evidence or should have drawn certain inferences in his favor. 2. This court declined to review the petitioner's inadequately briefed claim that the habeas court improperly concluded that he did not demonstrate that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise on direct appeal a claim that the trial court improperly granted the state's motion for joinder of the three robbery cases; the petitioner's brief contained no discussion, analysis or application of any of the evidentiary principles that would dictate whether certain evidence in one case would be cross admissible in the other cases, it did not analyze the cross admissibility of the inculpatory statements he made to various informants or the ballistics evidence that tended to show that the gun he used in and that was recovered from the Stamford robbery was also used in the Greenwich robbery, and he failed to recognize in his brief that the application of certain factors was unnecessary if the evidence was cross admissible or to discuss substantively why the evidence was not cross admissible. Argued February 3—officially released September 7, 2021

Convicted of attempt to commit assault of public safety personnel, the defendant appealed to this court. At a pretrial hearing, the defendant informed the trial court that he was dissatisfied with the representation provided by his public defender and requested that he be able to proceed as a self-represented party. The trial court determined that the defendant was mainly concerned with the speed at which the proceedings were progressing, denied the request without prejudice, asked the defendant to give defense counsel another chance to effectively represent him, and told the defendant that he could reassert his request at a later time. Approximately four months later, at another pretrial hearing, the defendant again indicated that he was frustrated with his defense counsel and the speed of the proceedings. He asked the trial court if he could have new counsel and then stated that he was reasserting his sixth amendment right to self-representation. The trial court told the defen- dant that he needed to file a motion if he wanted to represent himself. The defendant did not file such a motion and defense counsel continued to represent him without additional complaint until approximately nine months later, when the defendant personally filed several motions. Dur- ing a hearing on the defendant's motion for the removal of appointed counsel and appointment of new counsel, the defendant again asserted that his requests for self-representation and for new counsel were wrong- fully denied. He asked for the appointment of a special public defender to replace defense counsel, and he further indicated that he would not object to the appointment of new counsel. Thereafter, new counsel was appointed and the trial proceeded without the defendant making any additional requests for self-representation. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court deprived him of his right to self-representation because the defendant waived that right: the trial court did not conclusively deny the defendant's initial in-court request for self-representation, as it explicitly denied the defendant's request without prejudice, granted a short continuance to provide defense counsel with additional time to obtain the evidence that the defendant was seeking, and told the defendant that he could reassert his right at any point in the future; moreover, the defendant's second in-court request for self-representation did not constitute a clear and unequivocal request, as was required to invoke the right, because it was intertwined with a request for new counsel, and the trial court expressly advised the defendant that he could file a motion if he wished to proceed as a self-represented party; furthermore, the defendant's requests set forth in his motions did not reflect clear and unequivocal assertions of the right to self-representation, as he made simultaneous requests to represent himself and for the appointment of new counsel, and the defendant explicitly told the trial court at the hearing on his motion for the removal of appointed counsel and appointment for new counsel that he would not object to the appointment of new counsel. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior uncharged conduct was not reviewable, the defen- dant having waived that claim at trial: the defendant was precluded from claiming that the trial court erred by admitting such evidence because, during the hearing on the defendant's motion to preclude evi- dence, defense counsel conceded that the prior instances of uncharged conduct were relevant for showing intent, motive, and a common scheme and suggested that a limited number of the instances were admissible, and because defense counsel failed to object to any of the evidence of prior instances of misconduct at trial. Argued March 2—officially released September 7, 2021

The defendant, who had been convicted of several crimes, including capital felony, appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his request for the appointment of counsel to represent him on a motion to correct an illegal sentence that he had filed, as required by State v. Francis (322 Conn. 247). After the self-represented defendant filed his motion, it was reviewed by B, a public defender, who thereafter filed a report with the trial court, stating that no sound basis existed for the filing of the motion. B further stated in his report that he had notified the defendant by letter of the reasons for that conclusion and that the Office of the Public Defender would not represent him in the hearing on the motion. The trial court thereafter rejected the defendant's assertion that, as an indigent defendant, he was required to have counsel pursuant to Francis and denied the motion to correct. On appeal, the defendant claimed that his right to counsel was violated because, con- trary to the requirement of Francis, B did not consult with him regarding the motion to correct or inform him or the court of the reasons underlying his conclusion that no sound basis existed for the motion. Held that the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence was reversed and the case was remanded to that court with direction to appoint counsel to represent the defendant to determine, in accordance with Francis, whether a sound basis exists for that motion; because B failed to inform the trial court of his reasons for concluding that no sound basis existed for the motion, the court was not able to fulfill its obligation under Francis to consider B's reasoning, and, if persuaded by that reasoning, to permit B to withdraw as counsel for the defendant, as B's one paragraph report simply stated that he reviewed the motion, determined that no sound basis existed for it and informed the defendant by letter of the reasons for his conclusion; moreover, although the defendant claimed that B was required to inform him in a brief of the reasons for his conclusion, Francis does not require counsel to file a brief but requires only that counsel inform the defendant orally or in writing as to the reasons for his conclusion, and this court had no reason to doubt B's candor that he so informed the defendant in that letter. Argued May 11—officially released September 7, 2021

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant planning and zoning commission denying its application to build a facility to be used for the bulk storage of propane on certain of its real property located in an industrial district. The zoning regulations included as a permitted use the bulk storage of propane in this industrial district. The plaintiff's site development plan application met the required site plan requirements and all applicable zoning regulations. The commission held a public hearing at which town residents testified about their concerns regarding the application, specifically about potential safety hazards in the event of an emergency, the location of the facility at the end of a dead-end street which would potentially limit the ability of emergency services to access the area, and potential diminishing property values as a result of the facility being located near their homes. The commission thereafter denied the plaintiff's application. On appeal, the trial court affirmed the commission's decision, concluding that the commission properly had considered off-site traffic concerns, the preparedness of municipal services in an emergency, and the potential impact of property values when reviewing the plaintiff's site plan development application. The plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the trial court erroneously concluded that the commission properly considered off-site factors when it denied the plaintiff's site development plan application, and such error likely affected the judg- ment: the commission erred in its decision to deny the plaintiff's applica- tion on the basis that it did not adhere to regulations regarding the plan of conservation and development and concerns regarding property values, as the commission had amended its zoning regulations to permit the bulk storage of propane as of right in the industrial district in which the property was located and established a conclusive presumption that such use did not adversely affect the district, and the commission's decision reflected that it would have denied the site development plan application regardless of the plan's contents because it took issue with the use of the property as a place for bulk propane storage, even though the zoning regulations fully permitted that use; moreover, the commis- sion erred in its consideration of traffic concerns because, although the commission was permitted to consider traffic concerns for certain limited, site-specific purposes, the record revealed that the commission's concerns were not limited to the site itself, and improperly encompassed the entire area, the commission did not consider alternatives to the planned entrances and exits to the property to increase emergency access that were presented at the public hearing, and, in amending its regulations to permit the bulk storage of propane, the commission was aware of the street's location and accessibility and considered those factors when making its decision to amend its regulations; accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with direction to the commission to approve the plaintiff's site development plan appli- cation. Argued March 3—officially released September 14, 2021

The plaintiff, a substance abuse treatment facility in Kent, appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Department of Public Health approv- ing the application of the defendant B Co. for a certificate of need to establish a substance abuse treatment facility in Kent. B Co. submitted its application to the Office of Health Care Access pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 19a-638 (a) (1)). The OHCA sent a notice to B Co. stating that it would hold a hearing and that the notice was issued pursuant to a statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 19a-639a (f) (2)), which provides that the OHCA ''may'' hold a public hearing with respect to any certificate of need application. The plaintiff filed a notice of appearance with the OHCA and submitted a letter requesting to be designated as an intervenor with full rights to participate in the proceeding. The OHCA granted the plaintiff's request and held a hearing on the application. B Co. and the department entered into an agreement in which B Co.'s application was approved subject to specific conditions, which constituted the final order. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, claiming that the department abused its discretion when it approved B Co.'s application. The defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that there was a lack of a final decision in a contested case and that the plaintiff was not aggrieved by the department's decision. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground that there was no final decision in a contested case from which the plaintiff could appeal, and concluded, therefore, that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's appeal. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in granting the defendants' motions to dismiss: nothing in the other subsections of § 19a-639a indicates that the legisla- ture intended for the word ''may'' in § 19a-639a (f) (2) to be interpreted in any other way except as to confer discretion, and, thus, a hearing was not statutorily required on B Co.'s application; thus, the mere oppor- tunity for a hearing, coupled with the holding of a hearing, in the absence of a specific statute or regulation under which the hearing was required to be held, was insufficient to constitute a contested case; moreover, the plaintiff's argument that a mandatory hearing was held because a hearing officer stated at the beginning of the hearing that the proceeding was being conducted as a contested case failed because the hearing officer could not have converted the proceeding into a contested case by her words alone, especially when the notice plainly stated that it was being issued pursuant to § 19a-639a (f) (2), and, because that statute does not mandate a hearing, the requirements for a contested case were not met under the applicable provision (§ 4-166 (4)) of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, and, therefore, there was no final decision from which the plaintiff could have appealed. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in concluding that a letter written by the plaintiff to the OHCA requesting to intervene was insufficient to constitute a request for a public hearing pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 19a-639a (e)): although § 19a-639a (e) does not explicitly delineate what the content of the written request for a hearing must include, the plain language of that statute requires that a request be made, in writing, that a public hearing be held on the certificate of need application, and the plaintiff's letter did not make such a request; instead, the plaintiff requested only to intervene and to participate with full rights in the scheduled hearing; moreover, even if the plaintiff's letter could have been construed as a request for a hearing, the requirements of § 19a-639e (e) still would not have been met because, although the plaintiff argued that its letter should be liberally construed, there was nothing in the letter from which this court could infer that the plaintiff met the numerical requirements of § 19a-639a (e). Argued May 12—officially released September 14, 2021

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crimes of robbery in the second degree and tampering with physical evidence, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by, inter alia, failing to provide timely notice of his intention to use expert testimony in support of a duress defense. The habeas court rejected the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, with respect to his assertion that trial counsel failed to timely raise a defense of duress, the court found it to be without merit. Thereafter, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, and the petitioner, on the granting certification, appealed to this court. Held that the judgment of the habeas court denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed; the habeas court having thoroughly addressed the petitioner's argument that his counsel's representation was constitutionally ineffective, this court adopted the habeas court's well reasoned decision as a proper statement of the relevant facts and applicable law on that issue. Argued February 16—officially released September 14, 2021

The plaintiff subcontractor sought to recover damages for, inter alia, the breach of a contract it had entered into with the defendant N Co., the general contractor on a bridge construction project, which required the plaintiff to provide various concrete elements, including beams that would form the deck of the bridge. N Co. had contracted with the Department of Transportation to replace a bridge on Route 74 by August 31, 2016. To complete the work, N Co. was to detour traffic for no longer than eight weeks. The contract further specified that N Co. could earn incentive payments for each day Route 74 was reopened prior to the expiration of the eight week period. N Co. triggered the eight week period when it closed the bridge on June 13, 2016, which thereby required that Route 74 be reopened by August 8, 2016. To receive the maximum incentive payment, N Co. had to reopen Route 74 on or before July 19, 2016. Pursuant to statute (§ 49-41), N Co., as principal, also obtained from the defendant A Co., as surety, a bond that secured payment for labor and materials on the project, and made N Co. and A Co. jointly and severally liable for any unpaid balance on the subcontract. The plaintiff was required under the subcontract to deliver the concrete elements to N Co. at the jobsite on or before June 7, 2016, and N Co. was to pay the plaintiff the contract price. Relying on information the plaintiff provided about its production of the beams, N Co. scheduled delivery of the beams for June 29, 2016. On June 27, 2016, the plaintiff informed N Co. that the beams would not be ready for delivery as scheduled. The beams were thereafter delivered on July 26, 2016, and the project was completed on August 31, 2016. N Co. thereafter remitted partial payment to the plaintiff under the subcontract and refused to pay the remaining balance. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that N Co. breached the subcontract by failing to pay the remaining balance, and sought attorney's fees and interest pursuant to statute (§ 49-41a (c)). The plaintiff also sought payment from A Co. under the bond pursuant to statute (§ 49-42). N Co. filed a two count counterclaim, alleging that the plaintiff breached the subcontract as a result of the delayed delivery of the beams and engaged in unfair trade practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (§ 42-110a et seq.). The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on its breach of contract claim against N Co. The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the contract amount because N Co. had ultimately accepted the beams. The court denied the plaintiff's claim under § 49- 41a (c) for attorney's fees and interest from N Co., as well as its claim against A Co. for payment on the bond under § 49-42. The court reasoned that those claims were barred because the plaintiff materially breached the subcontract by virtue of its delayed delivery of the beams. The court also found that N Co. was entitled to damages and attorney's fees on its breach of contract counterclaim. It further determined that the plain- tiff had not proven that N Co. failed to mitigate its damages. The court also determined that the plaintiff's false and misleading statements with respect to the readiness of the beams and the timing of their delivery constituted a violation of CUTPA. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court's use of the June 7, 2016 delivery date to calculate N Co.'s damages on its breach of contract counterclaim was clearly erroneous; under the court's timeline, using June 7, 2016, as a start date, and combined with a thirty- six day period of completion pursuant to a nonaccelerated work pace, when construed as a worst case scenario, N Co. would have earned the maximum incentive payment by reopening Route 74 on or before July 19, 2016, as the court determined that N Co. was on track to earn the maximum incentive payment when it scheduled delivery on June 29, 2016, and was working at an accelerated pace at that time; moreover, the court determined, even if N Co. had worked at a nonaccelerated pace and had endured delays in rescheduling subcontractors and equipment rental, it would have reopened Route 74 by July 13, 2016, at the latest, had the beams been delivered on time; furthermore, as the beams necessarily were to be ready for delivery on or before June 7, 2016, to coincide with commencement of the road closure, the June 29, 2016 scheduled delivery date did not alter the plaintiff's contractual obligation to have the beams ready and available by June 7. 2. Contrary to the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly declined to find that N Co. failed to mitigate its damages by failing to work on the project at an accelerated pace once the beams were delivered, the record supported the court's finding that N Co. acted reasonably following delivery of the beams; N Co. already had lost the opportunity to earn any incentive payment and could not recover the expense of accelerating the work, it had lost its subcontractors in terms of when they would be able to come back to the project, and the acceleration costs would have caused N Co. to sustain significant losses that may have been passed on to the plaintiff. 3. The trial court erred in rendering judgment for A Co. on the plaintiff's payment bond claim, which was based on the court's determination that the plaintiff could not prevail on its claim for interest and attorney's fees under § 49-41a (c): no language in the payment bond or in §§ 49- 41a or 49-42 prevented A Co. from being held jointly and severally liable for the amount that N Co. was liable, even though the court did not award the plaintiff interest and attorney's fees pursuant to § 49-41a (c) against N Co., the court, in analyzing the plaintiff's claims against both defendants under § 49-41a while making no mention of § 49-42, effec- tively made A Co.'s liability under § 49-42 dependent on the plaintiff's succeeding against N Co. under § 49-41a; moreover, although the express terms of the payment bond made A Co. jointly and severally liable with N Co., the court concluded that N Co. was liable for the unpaid contract price, and, in the absence of N Co.'s having made payment for all materials and labor used or employed, A Co.'s obligation remained in full force and effect; accordingly, the judgment was reversed as to the plaintiff's payment bond claim, and the case was remanded for a new trial on that claim. 4. This court declined to address the plaintiff's claim, which was raised for the first time on appeal, that the trial court erred by failing to award it attorney's fees and interest pursuant to § 49-41a (c) on the ground that it did not substantially perform under the subcontract; the plaintiff failed to raise at trial its assertion that, because the court failed to recognize that N Co. had implicitly waived the subcontract's time is of the essence provision, the plaintiff was not contractually required to deliver the beams by June 7, 2016, and, thus, substantially performed by delivering the beams on July 26, 2016. 5. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that its actions constituted unfair trade practices was unavailing: contrary to the plaintiff's contention that it merely breached the subcontract, and that there was no evidence of aggravating circumstances or that its statements were made with ill intent, the record supported the court's factual findings that the plaintiff's unfounded assurances that beam fabrication was progressing on schedule, and, later, that the beams were fabricated and available so that a delivery date could be scheduled, constituted prevarications that were clearly immoral, unethical, and/or unscrupulous; moreover, the plaintiff's false information deterred N Co. from taking remedial action and caused it to incur additional expense by leading it into making unnecessary and/or premature plans and expen- ditures for labor allocation, equipment procurement and an inutile con- struction schedule. 6. The trial court's award of attorney's fees and expenses to N Co. was not erroneous in light of the court's finding that the plaintiff failed to supply the beams with promptness and diligence, the subcontract having expressly stated that N Co. had the right to recover attorney's fees and other expenses it incurred as a result of that failure. Argued January 15, 2020—officially released September 21, 2021

The plaintiff, a commercial property broker, sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia, breach of contract in connection with the defendants' failure to pay a real estate commission. The defen- dants listed certain property with the plaintiff through its affiliated licensed sales associates, F and P, and executed an exclusive right to sell agreement for a term of one year. Although the defendants entered into a purchase and sale agreement with a buyer, E Co., during the term of the listing agreement, that deal was cancelled. As such, the property was not sold when the listing agreement expired, and the defendants then entered into an exclusive listing agreement with L, one of the defendants who held a real estate broker's license. Eventually, the defen- dants and E Co. closed on the sale of the property, and the plaintiff brought an action alleging breach of contract and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (§ 42-110a et seq.), seeking to recover its commission pursuant to the listing agreement. Following a trial to the court, the trial court found for the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly refused to dismiss the plaintiff's action for lack of standing, the court having jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's claims: contrary to the defendants' contention, the plaintiff's failure to strictly comply with the licensing requirements of the statute (§ 20-325a) govern- ing actions to recover real estate commissions did not implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction, as certain amendments to § 20-325a, enacted after the Supreme Court's decision in McCutcheon & Burr, Inc. v. Berman (218 Conn. 512), permit recovery of a commission upon proof of substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute and that denial of a comission would be inequitable. 2. The trial court improperly concluded that the defendants had breached the listing agreement, the court having made a clearly erroneous finding on which it based its conclusion: the trial court found that L caused the plaintiff to lose the opportunity to negotiate with E Co. during the final full month of the listing agreement, but, contrary to the court's finding, the uncontradicted evidence showed that P, on behalf of the plaintiff, was an active participant and took the lead in negotiations through the end of the term of the listing agreement, and this court was left with the definite and firm conviction that the court's finding that the plaintiff was taken out of the negotiations during the last month of the listing agreement was a mistake; moreover, the court's memorandum of decision made clear that the court's clearly erroneous factual finding was the basis for its conclusion that the defendants breached the listing agreement and caused the plaintiff to suffer damages, such that the court's clearly erroneous finding was not harmless. 3. The trial court improperly concluded that the defendants violated CUTPA, as the court's conclusion that the actions of the defendants were per- formed in the conduct of trade or commerce for purposes of that statu- tory scheme was legally incorrect: the court found that L, using his real estate broker's license, inserted himself as the broker of record on the day after the listing agreement expired and, thus, engaged in trade or commerce, but all the acts alleged in the complaint and that the court determined to be CUTPA violations occurred before that date, and, consequently, at the time that L and the other defendants engaged in conduct that the court described as unscrupulous, immoral, unfair and deceptive, none of them did so while engaged in trade or commerce for purposes of CUTPA; moreover, the plaintiff's reliance on Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen (232 Conn. 480) was misplaced, because, unlike the situation in that case in which both the defendant and the plaintiff were acting as real estate brokers, in this case, at least during the term of the listing agreement, the defendants were acting as owners of the property and did not need a broker's license to discuss the sale of their property with any prospective buyers, and, although the terms of the listing agreement may have obligated them to refer any such inquiries to the plaintiff, their failure to do so would not have consituted their participation in trade or commerce for purposes of CUTPA. Argued January 11—officially released September 21, 2021

The plaintiffs, K and M, sought an injunction and to recover damages from the defendants for trespass, private nuisance, common-law negligence and statutory negligence in connection with a property dispute between the parties concerning surface water runoff onto certain real property located directly between the parties' properties. F Co., a limited liability company of which K is the principal and sole member, holds title to the subject property, which is maintained as a rental property. The plaintiffs never owned, occupied or resided at, or had a possessory interest in, the subject property. Following a trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain this action in their individual capacities against the defendants and, as self-represented individuals, could not maintain it on behalf of F Co., and, therefore, the action should have been dis- missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Argued May 17—officially released September 21, 2021

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendants M, T Co. and G Co. for, inter alia, violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (§ 42a-110 et seq.) and from T Co. and G Co. for violations of the New Home Warranties Act (warranties act) (§ 47-116 et seq.). The plaintiffs purchased certain real property from G Co., which included a house built by T Co. M, an owner of both T Co. and G Co., was aware before the purchase that the house had a problem with water in the basement, but he did not inform the plaintiffs. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs on their CUTPA and warranties act claims, and M and T Co. appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly determined that M was personally liable pursuant to CUTPA, but the court incorrectly determined that T Co. violated CUTPA. a. This court declined to review M and T Co.'s claim that the trial court's conclusion that they violated CUTPA was inconsistent with the judgment the court rendered in their favor on the plaintiffs' breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, negligence and fraudulent concealment claims; M and T Co. failed to meaningfully analyze in their brief how the court's rendering judgment in their favor on the other claims was necessarily inconsistent with its conclusion that the finding that G Co. violated CUTPA should be applied to them, and, thus, this court deemed the claim abandoned. b. M could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in extending CUTPA liability to him on the basis of its finding that G Co. had violated CUTPA; the court found that the evidence established that M effectively controlled the closely held corporations G Co. and T Co. and that he had complete knowledge of the water problems in the basement and the representations or nonrepresentations given to the plaintiffs, and he either directly participated in the wrongful conduct or had the ability to control it. c. The trial court improperly extended to T Co., on the basis of a joint coordination theory, its finding that G Co. violated CUTPA; the court's conclusion that Joseph General Contracting, Inc. v. Couto (317 Conn. 565) supported an extension of CUTPA liability to T Co. because it had jointly coordinated its activities with G Co. went beyond the issues considered by our Supreme Court in that case, which had considered only whether liability under CUTPA could be extended to an individual who engaged in unfair or unscrupulous conduct on behalf of a busi- ness entity. 2. T Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in concluding that it was a vendor pursuant to statute (§ 47-118 (a)) and, thus, that it violated the implied warranty that the improvement on the plaintiffs' house was constructed in a workmanlike manner; T Co. was a vendor pursuant to § 47-116, as it was engaged in the business of erecting or creating an improvement on real estate, and, pursuant to statute (§ 47- 119), a vendor who conveys an improvement to an intermediate pur- chaser to evade liability is liable to a subsequent purchaser, thus, T Co. was liable for a breach of the warranties act notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs directly purchased the house from G Co. Argued November 30, 2020—officially released September 21, 2021

The defendants H and T appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying their motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff, S Co. H served as trustee for T, a trust that owned certain real property where she resided. The defendants hired S Co. as a general contractor for renovations to the home located on the property, and, after a dispute, the defendants terminated S Co. S Co. and two subcontractors, R Co. and I Co., filed mechanic's liens claiming unpaid balances. H, as trustee for T, initiated a separate action against R Co. seeking to reduce or discharge R Co.'s lien. S Co. subsequently commenced this action to foreclose on its mechanic's lien. The trial court in the separate action found that the lienable fund for S Co.'s contract was exhausted and concluded that R Co.'s lien was invalid. Subsequently, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment in the present case, con- cluding that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether there was sufficient privity between R Co. and S Co. so as to preclude S Co. from pursuing its claims, and this appeal followed. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the court failed to apply the doctrine of res judicata, thereby improperly denying their motion for summary judgment: a. The trial court correctly analyzed the issue of privity: although our Supreme Court concluded in Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc. (332 Conn. 67) that the presumption of privity arises from the ''flow down'' obligation that a general contractor owes to a subcontractor, there is no corresponding ''flow up'' obligation extending from a subcon- tractor to a general contractor, and, thus, the court improperly applied the presumption of privity in this case; nevertheless, the trial court, on the basis of certain factual findings, thoroughly analyzed the issue of privity and correctly concluded, under the functional relationship test, that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether S Co.'s interests were sufficiently represented in the separate action so as to warrant the application of res judicata. b. The defendants' claim that the existence of the right of a general contractor to intervene in an action by a subcontractor involving a mechanic's lien established privity was unavailing: the defendants' argu- ment that, because S Co. had an interest in the separate action and would be bound by the court's holding in that action, S Co., therefore, had a right to intervene in that action was circular, the defendants having failed to identify any case holding that general contractors have an automatic right to intervene in an application to discharge the mechanic's lien of a subcontractor, and the defendants did not explain how or why a failure to intervene could establish privity for the purposes of res judicata. 2. The trial court properly declined to apply the doctrine of collateral estop- pel: the court thoroughly analyzed the issue of privity and the question of whether S Co.'s interests were sufficiently represented in the separate action, and, on the basis of this analysis, appropriately concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether S Co. and R Co. were in privity. Argued May 19—officially released September 21, 2021

The defendant H filed a complaint with the plaintiff Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities alleging discrimination in housing because of race against the defendant C, her neighbor in a condominium complex. C was defaulted in the underlying administrative proceeding. At the hearing in damages, the plaintiff commission requested $75,000 in com- pensatory damages. The human rights referee of the defendant Commis- sion on Human Rights and Opportunities awarded H, inter alia, $15,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress. The plaintiff commission filed a request for the referee to reconsider her decision, which request was deemed denied after the referee failed to take further action. The plaintiff commission then appealed the referee's decision, claiming, pri- marily, that the damages awarded were insufficient. The trial court remanded the matter for further consideration of damages in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co. (304 Conn. 679). On remand, the referee issued a final decision that did not change the amount of the damages awarded. The administrative appeal was then argued before the trial court, which rendered judgment dismissing the appeal and affirming the referee's decision. On the plaintiff commis- sion's appeal to this court, held that the referee did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in her decision and the trial court did not abuse its discre- tion in dismissing the plaintiff commission's appeal and affirming the referee's decision: neither the referee nor the trial court misinterpreted or misapplied Patino in the determination of emotional distress dam- ages, as Patino did not establish a presumptive or mandatory range of damages for emotional distress claims but merely addressed a general range that such claims typically merit, references to that range in other cases did not establish any binding principle pertaining to damage awards in emotional distress actions, the fact that the emotional distress damage award fell outside of that general range did not, by itself, create a presumption of error, and, although it might have been instructive or persuasive for the referee to consider damage awards and decisions outside of the state, there was no legal mandate requiring her to do so; moreover, neither the referee nor the trial court misapplied the factors set forth in Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Harrison v. Greco (CHRO No. 7930433) in the calculation of emotional distress damages, as the referee did not act unreasonably in considering the relationship between H and C because the nature of that relationship was highly relevant to the degree of offensiveness and to the impact the infliction of emotional distress had on H, H and C did not share a power dynamic similar to that of a landlord and tenant because, as her neighbor, C did not have any enforcement or supervisory power over H and he lacked the ability to oppress or penalize her, the referee's conclusion that the discrimination was not public was a reasonable factual finding in light of the evidence before her and this court declined to disturb it, and, in discussing the public nature of C's conduct and his intentions relating to the same, the referee did not impose an additional requirement without a legal basis but, rather, considered C's intentions as a means to analyze the circumstances surrounding the harassment and its effect on H. Argued March 2—officially released September 21, 2021

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of disorderly conduct stemming from a physical altercation with her husband, the defendant appealed to this court. She claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly determined that her request to instruct the jury on the infraction of creating a public disturbance as a lesser included offense failed to satisfy the test set forth in State v. Whistnant (179 Conn. 576). Held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of creating a public disturbance; the defendant's request failed under the fourth prong of the Whistnant test, as the evidence showing that the defendant intentionally hit her husband with her knee would have supported a conviction under either the greater or the lesser offense and, thus, the jury could not, as a matter of law, have found the defendant guilty only of creating a public distur- bance and not guilty of disorderly conduct. 2. The defendant could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that the statu- tory scheme that gave the prosecutor complete discretion in choosing whether to charge her with an infraction or with a misdemeanor that contained identical elements to the infraction violated her state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection under the law; our Supreme Court held in State v. Harden (175 Conn. 315) that a trial court should not give a lesser included offense instruction when both the greater and lesser offenses contain only identical ele- ments, and the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Batchelder (442 U.S. 114) that, if there is no discrimination against any particular class of defendants when deciding under what statute to charge a defendant, there is no violation under the federal constitution for two statutes with different penalties to punish the same conduct, thus, the defendant failed to establish her claimed constitutional viola- tions and her claim was not reviewable under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233). 3. The defendant could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that the statu- tory scheme that gave the prosecutor complete discretion in choosing whether to charge her with an infraction or with a misdemeanor that contained identical elements to the infraction violated the separation of powers provision of the Connecticut constitution by shifting power from the judiciary to the executive branch; our legal precedent has held that, in Connecticut, the power of sentencing is shared by all three branches of government, thus, the defendant failed to establish her claimed constitutional violation, and her claim was not reviewable under the third prong of Golding. 4. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury that it could consider her husband's affidavit, which had been admitted as a full exhibit, only for impeachment purposes; although the defendant failed to comply with the rules of practice by directing her requests to charge to particular evidence in the case, and she never requested that the court provide an instruction pursuant to State v. Whelan (200 Conn. 743) regarding the affidavit or asked the court specifically to instruct the jury that it could use the affidavit for substantive purposes, a review of the court's charge in its entirety revealed that the court never instructed the jury that it was limited in its use of the affidavit but instead instructed it to consider all of the testimony and exhibits admitted into evidence in reaching its verdict. Argued May 13—officially released September 21, 2021

The plaintiff, M Co., which designs and develops prototypes of medical devices, sought to recover damages for breach of contract and unfair trade practices from the defendants, A, a neurosurgeon and inventor, and I Co., which A and a partner had formed to develop medical devices for use in spinal surgery. In November, 2004, L, an owner of M Co., and A entered into a written agreement under which the parties were to share equally any compensation that resulted from the sale and/or licensing of a medical device conceived of by A, or any version thereof, for use in spinal surgery. The parties' one page contract provided that any required funding or financial commitments were to be part of a separate agreement they would negotiate later and that A was to promptly notify M Co. of any compensation he received for the device or any versions thereof. A further agreed that he was not under any contractual agree- ment with any other company concerning the device. At the time the parties entered into the written agreement, they also agreed orally that M Co. would create design drawings and a prototype of the device, and, at that time, A gave M Co. his initial drawings of the device. By early 2005, M Co. had prepared a prototype of the device and successfully installed it in a cadaver. M Co. thereafter utilized a different design and produced another prototype that it gave to A by October, 2005. By that time, A had become dissatisfied with M Co.'s work and continued to work on developing the device on his own without informing M Co. In December, 2005, A applied for a patent on an anterior intervertebral spinal fixation and fusion device that he had developed with the help of his son. A thereafter did not respond in writing to a letter from L in February, 2006, concerning the value of M Co.'s services and, in July, 2007, formed I Co. A also did not respond to e-mails from L in 2008 requesting an update on the project, and, in May, 2008, A and his son, without informing M Co., assigned to I Co. their ownership interest in their pending patent. In 2009, several months before A and his son were issued a patent on their device, I Co. entered into a cross license agreement with S Co., a medical device manufacturer, that allowed S Co. to sell spinal fusion devices that were based on the patented device. In exchange, I Co. was to receive shares of A Co.'s stock and, thereafter, certain royalty and other payments. Between June, 2010, and August, 2019, S Co. sent I Co. thirty-four royalty payments, shares of S Co. stock, and $50,000 for I Co.'s expenses in developing and patenting the spinal fusion device. A and I Co. never notified M Co. of their receipt of compensation for the sale and/or licensing of the spinal fusion device. After M Co. first became aware that A had developed and patented a profitable spinal fusion device, its counsel sent letters to A in November, 2017, and in February, 2018, requesting that A inform M Co. as to those matters. A did not respond to either letter. The defendants asserted various special defenses, including that M Co.'s claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations. M Co. asserted that the running of the statutes of limitations had been tolled pursuant to the statute (§ 52- 595) concerning fraudulent concealment and/or the continuing course of conduct doctrine. The trial court initially rendered partial judgment for M Co. on its breach of contract claim and its claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110 et seq.). The court deter- mined that the November 4, 2004 document, as supplemented by the parties' contemporaneous oral agreement, was sufficient to form a defi- nite contract. It further determined that the patented device was a version of the device for which M Co. had created design drawings and a prototype for A, and that I Co. was founded in bad faith to avoid liability to M Co. In awarding damages, the court found that, except for S Co.'s $50,000 payment for expenses, M Co. was entitled to recover 50 percent of the sum of all thirty-four royalty payments I Co. received from S Co., including the cash value of the payment of shares of S Co. stock, and awarded M Co. damages and prejudgment interest pursuant to statute (§ 37-3a) on its breach of contract claim. Additionally, the court determined that the running of any applicable statutes of limitations had been tolled by both § 52-595 and the continuing course of conduct doctrine but did not determine whether the three year statute of limita- tions (§ 52-581) or the six year statute of limitations (§ 52-576) applied to M Co.'s breach of contract claim. The court limited M Co.'s recovery under CUTPA to an award of attorney's fees and expenses. The court also awarded M Co. interest pursuant to statute (§ 52-192a) on an offer of compromise M Co. had made that the defendants did not accept. On the defendants' appeal and M Co.'s cross appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court's consideration of parol evidence in determining that the parties entered into an enforceable contract was permissible, as the November, 2004 agreement was not integrated: the written portion of the agreement was clearly not the final repository of the parties' dealings, as it included no obligation on the part of M Co. and, without mentioning M Co., merely stated that another agreement would be negotiated later; moreover, because the agreement was not integrated as to M Co.'s development commitments insofar as it provided that those commit- ments would be the subject of the separate agreement, the element of the parties' extrinsic negotiation the court relied on was that M Co. orally agreed to create drawings and a prototype, which did not violate the parol evidence rule; furthermore, the court's conclusion that the parties had an enforceable contract was premised on its amply supported factual finding that M Co.'s obligations were orally agreed to on the same date the document was signed, and because that finding was based on the court's credibility findings, the court's subsequent finding that the essential contract terms were agreed to on November 4, 2004, was not clearly erroneous. 2. The trial court properly determined that the patented device and M Co.'s prototype, on which it was based, were within the scope of the parties' agreement, and, thus, it was not improper for the court to conclude that the patented device was a version of the device depicted in A's initial sketches: the defendants could not prevail on their claim that the court failed to apply the language in the written agreement in analyzing whether the licensed patent was associated with the device in A's initial drawings or a version thereof, as the trial court's usage of ''relate'' reflected its interpretation of the agreement's operative language, and it stated elsewhere in its memorandum of decision that the patent drawings appeared to be a ''version'' of the same device on which A had promised to partner with M Co.; moreover, it was not improper, as the defendants claimed, for the court to compare A's 2004 sketches to the figures in the patent application and patent to determine if the idea in the patent was related to the idea referenced in the parties' agreement, as nothing in the agreement suggested an intention that a claims analysis under federal patent law be the method used to determine if a subsequent device was a version of the original device, as to which M Co. was entitled to receive compensation, and the court did not rely solely on the figures in the patent, as it mentioned several times in its decision what was described in the patent; furthermore, it was not improper for the court to consider M Co.'s prototype in analyzing the language of the agreement, as the agreement allowed for such consideration, the court considered the prototype to be a link in a chain from A's initial drawings to the design he patented, and the phrase in the agreement, ''intellectual property developed associated with this device and/or ver- sions of this device,'' covered intellectual property that was associated with versions of the device and permitted the court to consider later versions of the initial device. 3. The trial court improperly concluded that any statute of limitations applica- ble to M Co.'s claims was tolled under either § 52-595 or the continuing course of conduct doctrine: a. Because the statute of limitations could no longer be tolled as a result of fraudulent concealment once M Co. had sufficient knowledge of its cause of action for breach of contract, the six factual predicates on which the trial court relied in making its determination could not constitute fraudulent concealment, as A's letter to L in 2006, L's e-mails to A and A's transfer of his patent rights to I Co. in 2008, and I Co.'s receipt of S Co. stock in 2010 preceded any breach of the parties' contract, and, thus, it was impossible at those times for A to have intentionally concealed or to have had actual awareness of M Co.'s then nonexistent cause of action, and M Co. had already learned of the facts necessary to establish a cause of action for breach of contract at the time its counsel mailed the presuit letters to A; moreover, A's failure to notify M Co. whenever I Co. received compensation from the sale and/or licensing of the patented device merely constituted nondisclosure, which, standing alone, could not establish fraudulent concealment in the absence of a fiduciary duty. b. The continuing course of conduct doctrine did not apply to the defen- dants' actions, as A's series of breaches caused separate damages that were readily calculable at the time of each breach, which was incompati- ble with the doctrine's requirement of an initial wrong and a subsequent continuing duty that are distinct from one another; moreover, there was no evidence to support the court's finding that the parties had a special relationship, as A's continuing duty to report his gains from the device idea to M Co. alone was insufficient to establish a special relationship, the court made no findings that the parties had a confidential relationship or that there was a unique degree of trust and confidence between them, and a mere contractual relationship did not create a fiduciary or confidential relationship. c. The six year statute of limitations set forth in § 52-576 applied to M Co.'s breach of contract claim, as the contract between the parties was not executory; although there may have been some dispute at trial as to the extent of M Co.'s obligations, neither party challenged the trial court's factual finding that M Co. fully performed its contractual obliga- tions. d. Because of the viability of the defendants' special defense under the statute of limitations, the trial court's award of expectation damages on M Co.'s breach of contract claim had to be reduced to the total of all expectation damages the court awarded on the basis of the defendants' failure to pay M Co. its 50 percent share of the compensation the defen- dants received for the sale and/or licensing of the patented device within the applicable six year limitation period, and, although the court unac- countably included 50 percent of S Co.'s $50,000 reimbursement payment to I Co. for expenses in the calculation of M Co.'s expectation damages, this court did not need to modify the adjusted award of expectation damages because the $50,000 payment was received by the defendants before the six year limitation period began; moreover, because the trial court erroneously awarded prejudgment interest on several sums M Co. claimed as expectation damages that were outside the six year limitation period and then compounded that error by awarding additional prejudg- ment interest on those same sums until the date it rendered final judg- ment, the interest on both awards had to be reduced to exclude the improperly awarded interest. e. The trial court properly found that A breached the parties' agreement in bad faith and that those breaches constituted violations of CUTPA: although the court improperly awarded M Co. attorney's fees and expenses on the basis of conduct by the defendants that occurred outside of CUTPA's three year statute of limitations (§ 42-110g), the evidence supported the court's finding that a number of the defendants' breaches of the agreement occurred within the three year limitation period, and, because the court engaged in no discussion of the applicable statute of limitations, and several breaches on which it relied occurred outside the three year limitation period, the case had to be remanded for a determination, if possible, of what portion of the fees and costs awarded were reasonably incurred to litigate that portion of the CUTPA claim that was not barred by § 42-110g. 4. The trial court erred in determining the amount of offer of compromise interest to which M Co. was entitled: the court improperly calculated the interest on the basis of the difference between the amount of M Co.'s recovery and the amount of its offer of compromise, as § 52-192a (c) requires a calculation on that difference only when the offer of compromise is filed by a counterclaim plaintiff pursuant to statute (§ 8- 132), the court failed to include its award of prejudgment interest under § 37-3a in M Co.'s total recovery when calculating offer of compromise interest, and it improperly calculated the interest at a rate other than the statutory rate; accordingly, the judgment on the cross claim awarding offer of compromise interest was reversed, and the case was remanded for recalculation of the amount of that award. Argued March 10—officially released September 28, 2021

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs and operating a motor vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol content, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly declined to suppress evidence of his performance of a field sobriety test, a search warrant application and his blood alcohol content because that evidence was the tainted fruit of an illegal detention of him by the police. Following a report of a one vehicle accident on Interstate 84, O, a state trooper, was dispatched to the scene. While en route, O was informed by the dispatcher, who was watching the site through live feed cameras, that the two occupants of the vehicle were running from the scene. When O arrived at the scene, she observed the defendant and another person walking along the highway approximately 300 feet from the crashed vehicle. O approached them and briefly placed them in handcuffs for her safety and to prevent them from fleeing further. When another trooper arrived, O removed the handcuffs and began to administer field sobriety tests to the defendant, who was the driver of the vehicle. While O was speaking with him, she detected the odor of alcohol coming from his breath and noticed that his speech was slow and slurred and that his eyes were ''glossy.'' The defendant failed the first test and declined to perform another. Thereafter, the defendant was transported to a hospital. O remained at the scene where she obtained an account of the accident by the person who had reported it. He told O that he had observed the defendant's vehicle travelling at a high rate of speed, slide out of control and crash and that, when he spoke with the defendant, he could smell alcohol on his breath. O also inspected the defendant's vehicle and found an empty beer bottle and an empty bottle of liqueur. Subsequently, O prepared an application for a search and seizure warrant with a supporting affidavit to obtain the toxicology test results from blood and urine samples taken from the defendant while he was in the emergency department of the hospital. The trial court issued the warrant, and O obtained the toxicology test results, which showed that the defen- dant's blood alcohol content was two and one-half times the statutory limit. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence that had been unlawfully obtained by the police. The trial court granted the motion as to any evidence obtained by the police while the defendant was handcuffed and denied it as to any evidence obtained after the handcuffs were removed, including evidence of the failed field sobriety test and the defendant's blood alcohol content. Held that, contrary to the defendant's contention that evidence of the field sobriety test, the search warrant application and his blood alcohol content were the tainted fruit of an illegal detention, O's detention of the defendant was constitutionally permissible, as the totality of the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed, and, therefore, O was permitted to detain the defendant to maintain the status quo for a brief period to enable her to investigate; moreover, even if this court assumed that the field sobriety test was the fruit of an illegal detention and should have been suppressed, evidence of the defendant's blood alcohol content was not subject to suppression, as it was admissible under the independent source doctrine because the search warrant contained ample independent evidence supporting a finding of probable cause and, in light of that untainted evidence, it was inconceivable that O would not have sought a search warrant for the defendant's blood test results, irrespective of the additional information purportedly gained from the allegedly tainted field sobriety test. Argued May 17—officially released September 28, 2021

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff. At the time of the dissolution trial, the plaintiff worked as a per diem nurse with hours that varied considerably. The defendant worked as a biostatistician, and his income was dependent on the number of his employer's ongoing grant funded projects. At the time of the trial, his salary was approximately 50 percent of what his annual income had been during the five preceding years due to the expiration of at least three grants, which he and his colleagues were working to replace. The defendant remained in the parties' marital home in Ashford, which he had purchased prior to their marriage. The parties also jointly owned a home in Nicaragua. During the marriage, the defendant made two payments in excess of the scheduled monthly payments on the Ashford home mortgage without the plaintiff's consent. Additionally, after the filing of the dissolution action and the issuance of the automatic orders, the defendant transferred funds into education trust accounts for the parties' two minor children and the defendant's minor child from a previous marriage without consulting the plaintiff. The trial court, inter alia, dissolved the marriage, awarded the parties' joint legal and physical custody of their two children, entered a parenting time schedule, and permitted the plaintiff to relocate to Worcester, designating her residence as primary for purposes of school following the relocation. The trial court ordered the defendant to pay child support in the amount of $325 per week, which it stated was a downward deviation from the guideline amount. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff a lump sum property settlement, which it stated included settlement for the plaintiff's share of the Nicaragua property, along with partial reimbursement for the funds transferred into the children's education trust accounts and the overpayments on the Ashford home mortgage. The defendant appealed, and the plaintiff filed a motion for order of attorney's fees, requesting that the defendant pay the retainer for her appellate attorney. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the motion and the defendant amended his appeal to include a challenge to the attorney's fees award. Held: 1. The trial court did not err by failing to identify the presumptive child support obligation under the child support guidelines, as set forth in the applicable regulations (§ 46b-215a-1 et seq.), nor did it improperly calculate the presumptive amount for the defendant: the trial court explicitly stated that it had found the presumptive amount associated with each party's then current income to be $300 per week, determined that the presumptive amount was unfair and inequitable, deviated the amount upward on the basis of the defendant's earning capacity to $473 per week, and then deviated the amount downward to $325 per week in the interest of fairness to reflect the parties' shared custody, the defendant's variable income, and his increased commuting expenses resulting from the plaintiff's relocation; moreover, the trial court pro- vided sufficient justification for its application of the deviation criteria of earning capacity, as it found that the presumptive support amount calculated with the defendant's then current income would be unfair and inequitable, the defendant's earnings were at or near the top of his salary range during the five years preceding the trial before his annual income dropped nearly 50 percent to its then current level, and it was not credible that the defendant would be unable to earn more than he was then making. 2. The trial court did not err in its calculation of the parties' incomes: the trial court's finding regarding the defendant's earning capacity was supported by evidence in the record of the defendant's prior earnings, and its determination that the defendant could expect to earn more than he was earning at the time of trial was reasonable; moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in calculating child support on the basis of the plaintiff's actual income rather than attributing to her a greater earning capacity that was reflective of a work week of more than eighteen hours because its findings that, due to the intense nature of the nursing profession, it was not necessarily advisable for the plaintiff to work as many hours as were available and that her per diem employ- ment both maximized her hourly rate and allowed her flexibility to care for the parties' children, were supported by the record. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff a lump sum property settlement: contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court did not make an effective finding of dissipation by awarding the lump sum property settlement to the plaintiff, as, in doing so, the trial court used language that was consistent with the equitable determi- nations involved in the distribution of marital property, did not reference ''dissipation'' in its memorandum of decision or its articulations, and made its finding on the basis of its determination that the defendant had unilaterally allocated portions of the marital estate in accordance with his own financial priorities; moreover, the trial court's order divid- ing the parties' property was not an abuse of discretion because it determined that the defendant's overpayments on the Ashford home mortgage and his deposits into the children's education trust accounts were made without the input of the plaintiff and had the effect of reducing the liquid assets available for distribution. 4. The trial court did not err in awarding the plaintiff appellate counsel fees: many of the assets awarded to the plaintiff in the dissolution judgment were not easily liquidated and her attorney's appellate retainer amounted to almost 40 percent of her liquid assets; moreover, the trial court found that requiring the plaintiff to pay the retainer would undermine the financial awards made in the dissolution judgment, the defendant did not demonstrate that such finding was unreasonable, and the trial court explicitly stated that it had considered the criteria set forth in the applica- ble statute (§ 46b-82) in making its determination. 5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering its custodial orders: with respect to its orders designating the Worcester home as primary for school enrollment purposes, because the trial court had before it testimony from both parties relating to their positions on the Ashford and Worcester school systems and the recommendation of the family services counselor, the defendant essentially was requesting that this court reweigh the evidence in his favor, which it declined to do, as it was not this court's role to retry the facts or evaluate the credibility of witnesses; moreover, the trial court's order relating to the 6:15 a.m. transfer time for the physical custody of the parties' children was sup- ported by the record, which included evidence that the children wake up early and that such transfer time would permit the plaintiff to work day shifts; furthermore, in its memorandum of decision, the trial court stated that, in making its orders, it took the criteria set forth in the applicable statute (§ 46b-56 (c)) and applicable case law into consider- ation and had applied the same to the evidence before it. Argued May 18—officially released September 28, 2021