Volume 208 — United States Reports

<p>An office commonly requires something more than a single transitoiy act to call it into being.</p> <p>A money contribution by the Philippine Government to the performance of certain military functions, and entrusting the funds to an officer of the United States Army, who is held to military responsibility therefor ' by court-martial, does not make that officer a civil officer of the Philippine Government and amenable to trial in the civil courts for. falsification of his accounts as a public official.</p> <p>The fact that an officer of the United States Army, entrusted with money by the Philippine Government to be expended in connection with his military command, signs his account “Disbursing Officer” instead of by his military title, does not make him a civil officer of the Philippine Government; and qumre whether he could become such-'a civil officer in view of the act of March 3,' 1883, 22 Stat. 567, prohibiting the appointment of officers of the United States Army to civil offices.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN • DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

- This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York to review the judgment rendered upon a remittitur from the Court of Appeals of the same State, wherein an assessment of taxes against the plaintiff in error, imposed by the Board of Taxes and Assessments of the City of New York, who are the defendants in error, was affirmed.

<p>The object of requiring the posting of the preliminary notice of mining claims is to make known the purpose of the discoverer and to warn others of the prior appropriation; and one having actual knowledge of.a prior location and the extent of its boundaries, the outlines of which have been marked, cannot relocate it for himself and claim a forfeiture of the original location for want of strict compliance with all the statutory requirements of preliminary notice.</p> <p>The determination by the trial court that the locators of a mining claim had sumed work on the claim after a failure to do the annual assessment work, required by § 2324, Rev. Stat., and before a new location had been made, and the finding by the highest court of the State that such determination is conclusive, do not amount to the denial of a Federal right set up by the party claiming the right to relocate the claim, and this court cannot review the judgment under § 709, Rev. Stat.</p> <p>¿¿ucere and not decided, whether a forfeiture arises simply from' a violation of a mining rule established by miners of a district which does not ex- ■ pressly make non-compliance therewith work a forfeiture.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of §§ 1098 and 1261 of the Revised Statutes, and the opening clause of the Navy Personnel Act. of March 13, 1899, are stated in the opinion.

This is a writ of error directed to the Supreme Court of the -Sta'-e of Ohio. In that court the defendants in error obtained a decree declaring that certain negotiable notes held by them, which had been made by. the Toledo and Wabash Railroad Company, were entitled to a lien on property once owned by that company and now. owned by the plaintiff in' error, and ordering a sale in satisfaction of that lien.

<p>IN ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. -• '</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: and its judgment must be Affirmed.

Finn, the defendant in error, holds a patent from the United States for certain lands in Yakima County, State of Washington, for which' Prosser, the plaintiff in error, had previously made an entry under what is known, as the timber-culture statutes.

Held: that the lien of the Government for unpaid revenue taxes on land of the delinquent was prior to that of the mortgagee bringing this action, and that the sale of the land by distraint proceedings, and ■ not by foreclosure suit in equity , was in conformity with the act of July 13, 1866, then in force, and vested the title in the purchasers at the sale and their grantees, subject to the right of redemption given by…

<p>IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO AND APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), was a US labor law case of the United States Supreme Court which declared that bans on "yellow-dog" contracts (that forbade workers from joining labor unions) were unconstitutional. The decision reaffirmed the doctrine of freedom of contract which was first recognized by the Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897). For this reason, Adair is often seen as defining what has come to be known as the Lochner era, a period in American legal history in which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legislation aimed at regulating business. In earlier cases, the Court had struck down state legislation limiting the freedom of contract by using the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which only applied to the states.

This case comes here on a certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, for the Eighth Circuit.

Held: in this case, to be equivalent to a holding that the charge for the barrel, is not in itself excessive, and therefore, also held, that barrel-oil shippers who had not demanded tank cars had not been discriminated against, and were not entitled to reparation for the amounts paid by them on the barrels.

Held: as appears from the decision in this case, that,the purpose of the statute of limitations was to cure -just such defects as are asserted by-the plaintiff herein; and that after five years they cannot be availed of. This court is bound by the construction placed upon a local statute by a local court.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME. COURT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA.</p> <p>The fácts are stated in'the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.'</p>

<p>Under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 152, 18 Stat. 482, granting to railroads the right of way through public lands of the United States, such grant takes effect either on the actual construction of the road, or on the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, after the definite location and the filing of a profile of the road in the local land office, as provided in § 4 of the act; and a'valid homestead entry made after final survey but before either the construction of the road or the approval by the Secretary of the profile, is superior to the rights of the company. Jamestown & Northern Railway Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 125, explained and followed.</p>

United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260 (1907), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held the copyright statute does not require notice of the American copyright on books published abroad and sold only for use there.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts'are stated in the opinion. .</p>

Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), also referred to as the Danbury Hatters' Case, is a United States Supreme Court case in United States labor law concerning the application of antitrust laws to labor unions. The Court's decision effectively outlawed the secondary boycott as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, despite union arguments that their actions affected only intrastate commerce. It was also decided that individual unionists could be held personally liable for damages incurred by the activities of their union.

<p>APPEAL FROM. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Cleveland Terminal and Valley Railway Co. v. Cleveland Steamship Co., 208 U.S. 316 (1908), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court which held that damages caused to a bridge pier, bridge protective pilings, and docks by a vessel on navigable waters was not a cause for action under United States maritime law. The ruling was legislatively overturned in 1948.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Appellees, residing in Juana Diaz, Porto Rico, filed on the twenty-ninth day of March, a. d. 1906, their petition in duplicate,- praying that Pascasio Alvarado, also of Juana Diaz, be adjudged a bankrupt.

This was an informtion filed on behalf of the United States, June 8, 1905, in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, for- the forfeiture of certain jewels which, it was set forth, had been fraudulently imported into the United States without the payment of duty, and that, upon May 19, 1905, the 'jewels so smuggled had been seized by Charles F. Leach, collector of the District of Ohio,'within the said district. .

By indictment returned in the District Court of the United States for the District of Idaho, the plaintiff in error, Dick, was charged with the offense cf having unlawfully and feloniously; introduced intoxicating liquor, whiskey, into the Indian country, to wit, into and upon -the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, in the county of Nez Perce, State-of Idaho. ' The indictment was based upon § 2139 of the Revised Statutes as amended and reenacted by the act of July 23, 1892, 27…

<p>■A receiver, as soon as he is appointed and qualifies, comes under the sole direction of the court and his engagements are those of the court, and the liabilities he',incurs are chargeable upon'the property and not against the parties at whose instance he was appointed and who have no authority over him and cannot control his actions.</p> <p>While cases may arise in which it may be equitable to charge the parties at whose instance a receiver is appointed with the expenses of the receivership, in the absence of . special circumstances the general rule, which is applicable in this case, is that such expenses are a charge upon the property or fund without any personal liability therefor on the part of those parties; and the mere inadequacy of the fund to meet such expenses does not render a plaintiff who, has not been, guilty of any irregularity liable therefor.</p>

Held: in this case, not to amount to such a contract *379 that the club could disregard the valid laws subsequently enacted by the State, regulating the sale of liquor.

Held: together with a copy of the indictment for the offense on which he is now held, it being impossible to procure a copy of said warrant on the presentation of this petition on account oi.the shortness of the time since said warrant has been issued, and because said Sheriff of Bristol County threatens to immediately remove said Bassing out of the jurisdiction of this court.

Held: in. effect, that it was not, the bringing of an alien woman into the United States that she may'live with the person importing her as his concubine not being in its opinion an act ejusdem generis with the bringing of such a woman to this country for the purposes of “prostitution.” Was that a sound construction of the statute?.

• R. M. FIenningsen and Edward W. Clive, as copartners, in May, 1903, contracted with the United States for the construction of certain buildings at Fort Lawton, in the State of Washington, and entered into a bond with the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company of Baltimore (hereinafter called the Guaranty Company) as surety in the penal sum of $11,625 for the faithful performance of the contract, and to “promptly make full, payments to all persons supplying labor or…

Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), was a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court. Women were permitted by state mandate fewer working hours than those allotted to men. The posed question was whether women's liberty to negotiate a contract with an employer should be equal to a man's. The law did not recognize sex-based discrimination in 1908; it was unrecognized until the case of Reed v.

<p>Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is questioned merely in respect to its general authority as a judicial tribunal to entertain a summary proceeding to coinpel repayment of assets wrongfully withheld from a receiver appointed by it, its power as a court of the United States as such is not questioned and the case cannot be certified directly to this court under- , the jurisdiction clause of § .5 of the Judiciary Act of 1891.-</p> <p>Where no sufficient reason' is stated warranting this court in deciding that the Circuit Court acted without jurisdiction, this court will assume that the Circuit Court-acted rightfully, in appointing receivers and issuing an injunction against disposition of assets.</p> <p>The delivery of a check'is not-tne-equivalent-of payment of the money ordered by the check to be paid, and in this case, the check not having been cashed until after receivers had been appointed, the payee, who had knowledge of their appointment and the issuing of an injunction order, was required to repay the amount.</p> <p>A court of equity has power by summary process, after due notice and opportunity to be heard, to compel, one who, in violation of an injunction order of which he had knowledge, has taken' assets of a corporation in payment of indebtedness,!» repay the same to the receiver.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE» TERRITORY OP HAWAII.</p> <p>The facts áre stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the agreement concerned a settlement of the rights of the, parties to the property left by decedent and did not contemplate transferring any interest in the property from the other owners to thfe widow, and that the word “remainder” referred only to the remainder of the half interest of her testator and not to the balance remaining of the proceeds of the share of the other owners. 6 Philippine Reports, 88,…

<p>The provisions of § 13, Rev. Stat., that the repeal of any statute shall hot have the effect- to release or extinguish any penalty, incurred under the statute repealed, are to be treated as if incorporated in, and as a part of, subsequent enactments of Congress, and, under- the general principle of construction' requiring effect to be given to all parts of a law, that section must be enforced -as forming part of such subsequent enactments except in those instances where, either by express declaration or necessary implication such enforcement would nullify the legislative intent.</p> <p>The act of Congress of June 29,1906, c. 359, 34 Stat. 584,-known as the Hep-bum law, as construed in the light of § 13, Rev. Stat., as it must be construed, did not repeal 'the act of February 19, 1903, c. 708, 32 Stat. 847. •• known as the Elkins law, .so as to deprive the Government of the right to prosecute for violations of the Elkins law committed prior to the enactment of the Hepburn law; nor when so construed does the Hepburn law under the doctrine of inclusio unius exclusio alterius exclude the right of the Government ¡to prosecute for past offenses not then pending in the courts because pending causes are enumerated in, and saved by, § 10,of the Hepburn law.</p> <p>In citing approvingly, as to the particular point involved in-this case, cases recently decided in the lower Federal courts, this court expresses no .opinion upon any other subjects involved in such cases, and does not even indirectly leave room for any implication that any opinion has .been expressed as to such other issues which máy heréafter come before it for decision. ...</p> <p>Although a ground for demurrer to indictment may be sufficiently broad to embrace a contention raised before this court, if'it appears-, that such contention was disclaimed, and was not urged, in the-trial court, and in the ■ Circuit Court of Appeals,- and was not referred to in any of the opinions below- or in -the petition for certiorari or the brief in support thereof, this court, will, without intimating any opinion in regard to its merits, de-cline to consider it. ... .</p>

The plaintiff in error herein seeks to reverse a judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama which reversed a judgment in his favor given by the City Court of Mobile.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The indeterminate sentence law of Michigan of 1903, as. construed and sustained according to its own constitution, by the highest court of that State, does not violate any provision of the Federal Constitution. It is of a character similar to the Illinois act, sustained by this court in Dreyér ' v. Illinois, 187 Ü. S. 71.</p> <p>When a subsequently enacted criminal law1' is more drastic than the exist-, ing law which in terms is repealed thereby, the claim that it is éx post facto as to one-imprisoned under the former law and therefore void, and that the earlier law being repealed he cannot be held thereunder, has no force in this court where the state court has held that the later law does not repeal the earlier law as to those sentenced thereunder. In. such a case this court follows the construction of the state court.</p> <p>The Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the' Federal Constitution do not limit the power of the State. ' . ’</p> <p>The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not-limit the power of the State in dealing with crime committed within its own borders or with the punishment thereof. But a State must not deprive particular persons or classes'of persons of equal and impartial justice.</p> <p>This court follows the construction of an indeterminate sentence law by the. highest oourt of the State, to the effect that where the. maximum term of imprisonment for a crime has been fixed by statute a maximum term fixed by the coúrt of'a shorter period is simply void.</p> <p>.The granting of favors by a State-to criminals in'its prisons, is entirely a matter of policy- to be determined by thfe legislature, which may attach thereto such conditions as it sees fit, and where -it places the granting of súch favors in the discretion, of an executive officer it is not bound to give the convict applying therefor a hearing.</p> <p>The provision in the "'¿determinate law of Michigan of 1903, excepting prisoners twice sentenced before from the privilege of parole, extended in the discretion of- the Executive to prisoners after the expiration of tneir minimum sentence, does not deprive convicts of the excepted class of their liberty without due process of law, or deny to them the equal protection of the laws.</p>

This -is a suit in equity, brought in the United States Circuit ' Court for the Middle District- of Tennessee, by the University of the South, a corporation, and' -by ‘the several individual complainants named in the bill, who are residents of the county of Fránklin, in that State, and lessees of certain lands from the university, to obtain an injunction against the individual defendants, who are a state revenue agent, and a trustee of Franklin County, and also against the…

<p>The views of the territorial courts are very persuasive on this court as to the construction of local statutes.</p> <p>This court holds, following the construction by the Supreme Court of New Mexico of the statutes of that Territory, that there is no authority in New Mexico for the issuing of an. alias writ of attachment, and that levy- . ing upon property under such a writ gives the court no jurisdiction there-over, and the purchaser, acquires no title through sale under such a levy.</p> <p>One claiming to .have been influenced by the declarations or conduct of another in regard to expending money on real estate must, in order to' assert estoppel against that person, not only be destitute, of knowledge of the true state of the title,-but also of any cqnvenient and available means of acquiring knowledge in regard thereto; where the condition of the title to real property is known to both parties, or both have the same means of ascertaining'the truth, there'can be no estoppel.</p> <p>One whose mining property was sold under a void attachment held in this case not to have been estopped from asserting his title to the property as against‘the vendee from the purchaser at the sheriff’s sale by reason of statements made by him to such vendee prior to the final payment.</p> <p>Held also in this case that the actions and declarations of the owner of a mining claim sold under a void attachment did not amount to an abandonment of his claim so that he could not reassert his title to the property as against the purchaser at the sale or his vendee.</p>

<p>The restrictions on the right of alienation óf lands to be allotted in severalty under the Chippewa Treaty of 1854 extend to the disposition of timber on the land as well as to the land itself; and the consent of the President to a contract for cutting timber does not end his control over the matter; he may put conditions upon the disposition of the proceeds. United States v. Paine Lumber Co., 206 U. S. 467, distinguished.</p>

<p>In this casé this court finds that the evidence was so , far conflicting as to remove the verdict of the jury from reversal by an appellate tribunal.</p> <p>Under par. 4277, § 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Oklahoma of 1893, the original books of entry must be produced on the trial; their production before the notary taking the deposition of the witness who kept the books is not sufficient, and copies made by the notary cannot be used where the objecting party gives notice that the production of the books themselves will be insisted upon.</p> <p>While there may be a general rule that in actions for tort an allowance for interest is not an absolute right, under par. 2640, § 23 of the Oklahoma Codé. o^ 1893, the detriment .caused by, and recoverable for, the wrongful conversion of personal property is the value of the property at the time ■ of the conversion with interest from that time.</p> <p>Where the local statute provides, as does par. 4176, § 298 of the Oklahoma Code of 1893, that on request the court may direct the jury to find upon particular questions of fact, the verdict will not be set aside because the jury fails to answer an interrogatory improvidently submitted in regard to a fact which was only incidental to the issue.</p> <p>Objections to remarks of the trial court which counsel consider prejudicial must be taken at the time so that if the court does not then correct what is misleading its action is subject to review.</p>

Held: that: Under the circumstances of this case; the discounting bank was entitled to hold the proceeds of the note, as represented by the credit given on its books therefor, as collateral security for the payment of the note and to charge the note against such credit, and relieve itself from further responsibility therefor.

<p>• APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY 05 NEW MEXICO.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., ante, pi 267, followed as to construction of the contract involved hi that case and this, and as to the rights of stockholders to carry on business under their own name.</p> <p>Although the trade-name may not be mentioned in the sale of a business taken over as a going concern, a deed conveying trade-marks, patent-rights, trade-rights, good will, property and assets of every name and nature is broad enough to include the trade-name under which the vendor corporation and its predecessors had achieved a reputation.</p> <p>The name of a person or town may become so associated with a particular product that the mere attaching of that name to a similar product' without more would have all the effect of a falsehood, and while the use of that name cannot be absolutely prohibited, it can be restrained except when accompanied with a sufficient explanation to prevent confusion with the product of the original manufacturer or original place of production.</p>

<p>While there are no general rules of law determining what payments are chargeable against Indian annuities, when annuities which have been confiscated on account of an outbreak of the annuitant Indians are restored, sums paid by the Government for the support of the annuitants on account of their déstitution must be taken into account, and in this case the restored annuities are also chargeable with the amount of depredations during the outbreak for which the Indians were liable under a treaty made subsequently to- that granting the annuity and before the outbreak.</p> <p>This court affirms the judgment of the Court of Claims adjusting the claim of the Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of Sioux Indians for their confiscated annuities restored under acts of Congress.and in regard to which jurisdiction was conferred by the act of June 21, 1906, c. 3504, 34 Stat. 372.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT. COURT OF MILWAUKEE COUNTY (BRANCH NO. 1), STATE OF WISCONSIN.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>In cases arising under the contract clause of the Federal Constitution this court determines for itself, irrespective of the decision of the state court, whether a contract exists and whether its obligation has been impaired, and if plaintiff in error substantially sets up a claim of contract with allegations of its impairment by state or municipal legislation, the judgment of the state court is reviewable by this court under § 709, Rev. Stat.</p> <p>Municipal legislation passed under supposed legislative authority from the State is within the prohibition of the Federal Constitution and void if it impairs the obligation of a contract.</p> <p>While an ordinance merely denying liability under an existing contract does not necessarily amount to an impairment of the obligation of that contract within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, where the ordinance requires expenditure of money by one relieved therefrom by a contract, a valid contract claim is impaired and this court has jurisdiction.</p> <p>The right' to exercise the police power is a continuing one that cannot be limited or .contracted away by the State or its municipality, nor can it be destroyed by compromise as it is immaterial upon what consideration the attempted contract is based.</p> <p>The exercise of the police power in the interest of public health and safety is to be maintained unhampered by contracts in private interests, and uncompensated obedience to an ordinance passed in its exercise is not violative of property rights protected by the Federal Constitution; held, that an ordinance of a municipality of that State, valid under the law. of • that State as construed by its highest court, compelling a railroad to repair a viaduct constructed, after the opening of the railroad, by the city in pursuance of a contract relieving the railroad, for a substantial consideration, from- making any repairs thereon for a term of years was not void under the contract, or the due process, clause of the Constitution.</p>

This is a writ of error to the highest court of the State of Virginia. The defendant in error is a corporation created by the State of Virginia and operating a railroad entirely within that State. Its main line runs near the town of Martinsville, and from it a branch line runs into Martinsville and there ends.

After the decision in this case, reported 208 U. S. 38, the defendants in error petitioned for a rehearing and moved, if that were denied, that the judgment be modified: The substance of the motion was stated by counsel to be that the judgment should be modified “by specifically directing that the Supreme Court of Ohio affirm so much of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Lucas County, Ohio, as finds and adjudicates the rights of these defendants in error,' and each of…

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>