Volume 209 — United States Reports

White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company, 209 U.S. 1 (1908), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States which ruled that manufacturers of music rolls for player pianos did not have to pay royalties to the composers. The ruling was based on a holding that the piano rolls were not copies of the plaintiffs' copyrighted sheet music, but were instead parts of the machine that reproduced the music. This case was subsequently eclipsed by Congress's intervention in the form of an amendment to the Copyright Act of 1909, introducing a compulsory license for the manufacture and distribution of such "mechanical" embodiments of musical works.

Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 209 U.S. 20 (1908), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held the existence of some copyright-infringing information in a rote reference work does not entitle the original author to seek an injunction against the printing the later article when the later article's contents demonstrate significant original work.

Held: in an action against a corporation and others by one of the stockholders, that where the complaint alleges joint fraudulent conduct on the part of the corporation and the other defendants with whom it jointly resists that charge, the corporation cannot be realigned as a party plaintiff even if it might be to its financial interest to have the plaintiff prevail.

<p>Under Article I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Federal Constitution, Congress has power to purchase land within a State for post offices and courts by consent of the legislature of the State and to exercise exclusive legislation over the same.</p> <p>Under §§711 and 5339, Rev. Stat., the United States courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all offenses enumerated in § 5339, committed in a post office owned by the United States over which the State has ceded jurisdiction.'</p> <p>The language of the Constitution, being- wide enough to authorize the purchase of land for post offices and the acceptance of a grant of jurisdiction, the language of the statute based thereon will not be taken in any narrower sense as excluding post offices.</p> <p>Even if the burden of proof be on the Government to prove the fact of a prisoner’s sanity, until evidence is given on the other side, the burden is satisfied by the presumption arising from the fact that most men are sane, and the trial judge is not bound to go further than to instruct the jury that the Government is bound to prove the fact beyond reasonable doubt, and that the jury consider all the evidence including the bearing of - the prisoner, and the manner of his own testimony.</p> <p>An interruption of the court asking defendant’s counsel to make a proper argument held in this case to be justified and not a ground for exception.</p>

<p>A man may sometimes be punished in person where he has brought consequences to pass, although he was not there in person. In re Palliser, 136 U. S. 257.</p> <p>A solicitation of funds for campaign purposes made by letter in violation of § 12 of the Civil Service Act of January 16, 1883, c. 27, 22 Stat. 403, is not complete until the letter is delivered to the person from whom the contribution is solicited, and if the letter is received by one within a building or room described in § 12 of the act the solicitation is in that place and the sender of the letter commits the .prohibited offense in the prohibited place.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. Neither the order of the Secretary of War, nor the “Platt Amendment” was a ratification by the United States of the tortious act of General Brooke. Neither does the Secretary of War possess any such inherent and plenary powers as to make his order equivalent to a ratification by the United States of a tortious conversion of private property, committed by an army officer in time of peace.

Held: that the articles of copartnership, construed as a whole, provided that the partner in a land venture advancing the amount needed for the venture should have a lien on the land regarded as assets. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Leíais M. Ogden, with whom Mr. James O. Flanders was on the brief, for appellant. *54 Mr. Walter Bennett, for appellees.

Held: that the law itself might be changed, because the power to regulate and legislate respecting such commerce is reserved in Congress. Fitzgerald v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 63 Vermont-, 173; McGowan v. Wilmington, 95 N. Car. 417; Clarendon v. Rutland &c.. Ry. Co., 75 Vermont, 6; St. Anthony vi St. Paul Water Co., 168 U. S.. 37 '2. The indictments in these cases are sufficient.

<p>Decided on the authority of Armour Packing Company y. United States, ante, p. 56.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.</p> <p>Plaintiff in error applied to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in February, 1901, to be admitted to practice law in the Philippine courts. His petition was supported by various certificates as to professional qualifications and good character, and set forth that petitioner was a graduate of the University of Manila; and practiced law in the Philippine Islands from 1892 until the cessation of the Spanish courts; “that he is of good character, and has not been inscribed in the record of Spanish nationality, in consequence whereof I have lost this, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, and therefore I am neither a subject nor citizen of any foreign government, and consequently, in my opinion, have the condition required by General Order No. 29, July 19. 1899, of the United States Military Government in these islands for continuing the practice of my profession.”</p> <p>July 27,1901, the petition was denied by the Supreme Court, without opinion, on the ground that the applicant “does not possess the political qualifications required by law for the practice of his profession in the Philippine Archipelago.”</p> <p>Plaintiff subsequently filed a, petition for rehearing, accompanied by additional certificates and affidavits as to his professional and personal reputation. In this petition he claimed to be entitled to practice his profession under Article IX of the Treaty of Paris and under § 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which had been enacted since the date of his first petition.</p> <p>The petition for rehearing was denied- by the court in an opinion rendered by the Chief Justice, 1 Philippine Rep. 88, which held that petitioner had not lost his Spanish nationality, but was a Spanish subject upon an equal footing with other foreign residents who were not entitled to practice the legal profession under the law, either prior or subsequent -to the Treaty of Paris.</p> <p>In January, 1906, plaintiff in error presented to the court the following motion:</p> <p>“Appears Juan Garcia Bosque and asks that the Honorable Supreme Court be pleased to declare that the petitioner has a right to practice as an attorney at law in the Philippines before all courts. This motion is founded upon the accompanying affidavit.”</p> <p>The affidavit referred to stated that the affiant, on April 10, 1899, and for eight years immediately prior thereto, had practiced law continuously before the courts of the islands. The Supreme Court overruled the motion, and thereupon plaintiff sued out this writ of error.</p> <p>The qualifying clause, in the Treaty of Paris, “being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners,” is not conclusive against the right to continue the practice of his profession as .claimed by plaintiff in error, because, first, there is nothing in the context of the article quoted nor elsewhere in the treaty to warrant such a construction; secondly,'because no such intention is to be imputed to the framers of the treaty, for it were wholly unnecessary to specify rights which any and all foreigners enjoy, and wholly unjust to reduce to naught- by the mere stroke of a pen all the rights incident to citizenship created under the flag of the former sovereign; and, lastly, even though such a construction be admissible there existed at the time of the ratification of the treaty no law ; disqualifying foreigners from becoming members of the bar in the Philippine Islands. Plan of Studies (Plan de Estudios) of 1836; Royal Decree of July 26, 1853; Yol. 5, Diccionario de Alcubilla, p. 423; Same, Vol. 6, p. 798; Yol. 1, Diccionario de Berriz (1888), p. 1341; Diccionario de Alcubilla, p. 873, (Vol. 6); Vol. 3, p. 348; Vol. 5, p. 428; Vol. 3, p. 357; Vol. 2, 'p. 566.</p> <p>■ The' Supreme Court of the Philippines has neither power, jurisdiction nor authority to render in any proceeding had in this matter, a decision the effect of which would be to deprive plaintiff in error of the right to practice his profession. Sections 21 to 25 of the Code specify the only grounds upon and the only manner in which a lawyer may be deprived of the right to practice his profession. - As well might the Philippine Supreme Court have declared that plaintiff in error was disqualified to practice because he professed a certain religious belief as to have assigned the reasons it did for such alleged disqualification. There can, therefore, be no question of res adjudicata herein.</p> <p>The right of plaintiff in error to- practice his profession is a vested right of which he may be deprived only by due process of law. For the proper exercise and enjoyment of -this right the recognition by the Insular Supreme-Court, in the manner and form herein prayed, is essential. Cummings v. State of Missouri-, 4 Wall. 356; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 366; Ely’s Administrator v. United States, 171 U. S. 220-223; Smith v. United States, 10 Peters, 330; Soulard v. United States, 4 Peters, 511; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Peters, 411; Bryan v. Mennett. 113 U. S. 179.</p> <p>And in Article VIII (2nd par.) of the Treaty of Paris is found an express declaration that the relinquishment or cession of sovereignty “cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by laws belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds ... of private individuals of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.”</p> <p>Plaintiff in error did not become a citizen of the Philippine Islands under the new sovereignty, but continued to remain a Spaniard. His Spanish nationality could only be lost by continuous ■ residence in the islands and failure to declare his intention of retaining it within the time specified (Art. IX, Treaty of Paris, 30 Stat. 1754). He was absent from. the islands during the whole of the period allowed for making such declarations, and remained away for more than a year and a half. It makes no difference that he intended to return; it was not necessary in order to retain his Spanish nationality that he should remain away permanently.</p> <p>■ As a Spaniard, he is not entitled to practice law in the Philippines. Under the Spanish law foreigners were not allowed to practice the legal profession in Spain and her colonies. Royal Order of July 26, 1853; Diccionario de Alcubilla, Yol. 5, p. 423; Law of Public Instruction, Art. 96, id., Vol. 6, p. 798; decree of February 6, 1869, Alcubilla, Yol. 6, p. 873; Art. 25, Constitution of 1869; Art. 27, Civil Code of Spain; Royal Orders of October 10, 11, 1879, Alcubilla, Vol. 6, pp. 1135-1136.. That point is immaterial, however, because the provision in Article IX of the Treaty of Paris that Spanish subjects in the Philippines shall have the right to carry on their professions, etc., subject to “such laws as are applicable to other foreigners” refers to the laws enacted by the new sovereignty. Spaniards were not “foreigners” at the time of the treaty, but only became so after the cession of the islands, and it is evident that the words meant such laws as shall be applicable to other foreigners.</p> <p>Under the laws and regulations on the subject, put in force in the Philippines first by the military and then by the civil authorities, plaintiff is not entitled to the privilege which he seeks. General Orders, No. 29, series of 1899, §§2-6; Philippine Code of Civ. Pro., §§ 13, 15,' 19; 1 Pub. Laws, p. 378. The explicit reservation as to aliens runs through all the laws and regulations, making it clear that the intention was and had been from the first to require all members of the bar to be either citizens of the United States'or those enjoying the status of natives of the Philippines, and to exclude all foreigners from the legal profession in the islands.</p> <p>The effect of the decision of the Philippine court was not to deprive plaintiff of the right to practice his profession. The privilege ceased by virtue of the stipulations of the treaty of Paris and the subsequent laws and regulations of the new sovereignty. Those sections of the Code which prescribe the grounds upon which a lawyer may be deprived of the right to practice relate to the removal or suspension from the bar of attorneys already practicing, and have no application to the case of one who has been denied admission to practice at all .The fight claimed by plaintiff is not a vested or property right. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Bradwell v. United States, 16 Wall. 130; Languille v. State, 4 Tex. App. 312; State v. Gazley, 5 Ohio, 14; Cohen v. Wright, 22 California, 293; Sprayberry v. Atlanta, 13 S. E. Rep. 197. The property rights intended to be protected by the stipulation in the eighth article of the Treaty of Paris do not relate to the rights connected with trades and professions. As to definition of propiedad, used in the Spanish text of the treaty; see 4 Escriche, 736.</p>

This case is here upon certified questions by the judges of the Circuit. Court of Appeals.

Certain proceedings were had before the Interstate Com-, merce Commission. They were commenced by the filing of a petition by the Chicago Live Stock Exchange in April, 1902, • charging the defendants, who are now the appellees, with the violation of §§ 1 and 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887.

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), is a United States Supreme Court case that allows suits in federal courts for injunctions against officials acting on behalf of states of the union to proceed despite the State's sovereign immunity, when the State acted contrary to any federal law or contrary to the Constitution. That ruling allows plaintiffs to sue in federal courts to prevent state officials from enforcing unconstitutional state laws.

James H. Wood, the appellee, beiftg one. of the ticket agents of the Southern Railway Company, was, on July 17, 1907, charged in the police justice’s court of the city of Asheville, in the county of Buncombe, in the State of North Carolina, with unlawfully and' willfully overcharging one T. J. Harmon for a railroad ticket from. Asheville, North Carolina, to Canton, North Carolina, in violation of the state law..

Held: it is said, that, under the laws of the State, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for any purpose.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: in this ease, to have lost the entire use of the house and to be entitled to recover on the undertaking the reasonable rental value of the house for the season. 28 App. D. C. 271 , affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Edwin C. Brandenburg, with whom Mr. Clarence A. Brandenburg and Mr. F. Walter Brandenburg were on the brief, for appellants.

The facts are stated in the opinion. A statute which prohibits the bringing of cattle into the State without having them first inspected, regardless of whether such cattle are .infected or are perfectly healthy, is not a proper exercise of the police power. This statute not only interferes with interstate commerce, but also conflicts with the United States statute and the rules and regulations of the Department of Agriculture.

' The facts are stated in the opinion. Federal questions arise upon the decision of the trial court, • which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Iowa, whereby the plaintiff in error was denied the right of trial by jury, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment tó the United States' Constitution.

Loraine Lipphard, of the District of Columbia, died December 9, 1903, leaving a paper writing purporting to be her last will and testament, bearing date April 27, 1898, duly attested by three witnesses, and naming Rev. Mr. Meador as executor.

Held: under the circumstances of this case, not to be the fellow-servant of the foreman of the gang constructing the bridge which fell and caused the accident.

<p>The power of this court to review judgments of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico given by § 35 of the act of April 12, 1900, 31 Stat. 85, is the same as that to review judgments of the Supreme Courts of the Territories and is controlled by § 2 of the act of April 7, 1874, 18 Stat. 27; on writ of error, therefore, this court is confined to such legal questions as necessarily arise on the face of the record, such as exceptions to rulings on the rejection and admission of testimony and the sufficiency of the findings to sustain the decree based thereon.</p> <p>In this case the facts sustained the plaintiff’s contention that she was a citizen of Spain and as to"that point there was no ground for dismissal for want of jurisdiction.</p> <p>A bill in equity to set aside an agreement adjusting a community between the widow and children, brought after the death of the widow who had ■ also left children by a second marriage, held in this case, to be a liquidation of the community, and, although the property was derived solely from the first husband; the children of the second marriage were, as heirs of the mother, interested in her share and necessary parties to the bill.</p> <p>In establishing a civil government for Porto Rico Congress by § 33 of the act of May 1, 1900, in scrupulous regard for local institutions and laws, preserved thé local courts and recognized their jurisdiction over local affairs, including matters of probate jurisdiction.</p> <p>By art. 62, par. 5, of the Porto Rican Code, power to administer estates is exclusively vested in the judge of the last place of residence of the deceased, and this includes all actions incidental to the liquidation of a community existing between husband and wife, and the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico has not jurisdiction of an action to set aside an agreement of liquidation of a community where the estates are still open in, and subject to the power and authority of, the local court.</p>

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which brings up for review the judgment of that court affirming that of the Circuit Court of the Eastern District of New York in favor of the defendant in error (plaintiff below) against the plaintiff in error for the sum of $2,054.23.

' The appellant commenced this suit in equity against the defendants on the eighteenth day of July, 1905, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, for the purpose of obtaining an injunction against the corporation defendant, restraining it and its manager, the defendant D. G. Drake, at Chicago, Illinois, from receiving, and the Chicago postmaster and the letter carriers named as defendants from delivering, mail-matter…

This action was brought by plaintiff, who is the defendant in error, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for •the purpose of recovering an amount alleged to be due the plaintiff from the defendant- (plaintiff in error) on a policy of reinsurance.

<p>When the meaning of a statute is doubtful the construction given by the department charged with its execution should be given great weight. Robertson v. Downing, 127 TJ. S. 607; United States v. Healy, 160 U. S. - 136.</p> <p>The reenactment by Congress, without change, of a statute which had previously received long continued executive construction, is an adoption by Congress of such construction. United States v. Falk, 204 U. S. 143.</p> <p>Par. 296 of the Tariff Act of July 11, 1897, construed in accordance with Treasury decisions.</p>

This is an action to collect interest on deferred taxes assessed for the years 1898 to 1902, both inclusive, on distilled spirits, which were stored in the warehouse of plaintiff in error.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The act of 1905 is an attempt to control interstate commerce, and cannot be sustained under the police power. As is established by principle and authority, the court must examine the reasonableness of a claim to support a state statute regulating commerce, under the guise of an exercise of the police power. The act of 1905, as applied to the Passaic, is without any justification in the needs of the inhabitants of the State.

Held: not to inure to the benefit of a consolidated corporation, of which the exempted corporation was one of the constituent companies, organized after the adoption of the state constitution of 1890. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Held: under the circumstances of this case, not to be a preferential payment within the meaning of § 60a of the bankrupt law. 147 Fed. Rep. 659 , affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Held: as the receipt shows, as security for losses in purchase or sale of stocks, bonds or securities on account of the customer, and the separate paragraph of the receipt, giving the right to repledge, etc., and substitute similar stocks, bonds and securities, had reference to the stock, securities, etc., obtained in executing the orders for purchase made by the- customer.

Held: as the authorities indicate (2 Dillon on Municip.

Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U.S. 405 (1908), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that contracts for the sales of cotton for future delivery that do not oblige interstate shipments are not subjects of interstate commerce. The Court also held that a state tax on persons engaged in buying and selling cotton for future delivery was not a regulation of interstate commerce, and that the imposition of the tax was not beyond the power of the state.

The facts are stated in the opinion. When notice by statute is relied on to supply the place of process it must contain the‘elements of notice and must be as definite and certain in all the. essentials of notice as any other legal process.

Held: *422 “ (a) that Chapter 240 of the Laws of .1906 should be construed to have a retroactive effect, and “(b) that such construction would not be in violation of the Fourteenth Article of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United .States and, “ (c) would not impose and exact a tax without due notice ■ and without due process of law, and “(d) that the State would not by such act and such construction thereof…

This suit was brought in the District Court of the county of Lincoln, Territory of Oklahoma, by appellees as stockholders of the Shawnee Compress Company against appellants, to cancel a lease made by the Shawnee Comprdss Company to the Gulf Compress Company..

<p>Statutes of limitations with regard to land affect the right even if in terms only directed against the remedy. The act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, § 8, 26 Stat. 1099, providing that suits to vacate and annul patents theretofore issued shall only be brought within five years after the passage of the act, applies to a void patent, and where suit has not been brought within the prescribed period a patent of public lands, whether reserved or not, must be held good and to have the same effect as though valid in the first place.</p> <p>On the admission of Michigan to the Union the bed of the Sault Ste. Marie, whether strait or river, passed to the State, and small unsurveyed islands therein became subject to the law of the State.</p> <p>By the law of Michigan a grant of land bounded by a stream whether navigable in fact or not, carries with it the bed of the stream to the center of the thread thereof, and under this rule the patentee of government land bordering on the Sault Ste. Marie, takes to the center line, including small unsurveyed islands between the main land and the center line; nor are the rights of riparian owners to the center affected by the fact that the stream is a boundary.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. The complaint is insufficient in substance to sustain the conviction or order of deportation, in that it does not allege facts showing fraud in defendant’s coming to the United States. In fact the issuance to plaintiff in error of his student’s certificate and his subsequent admission thereunder into this country, by the officers of the government, operated as an adjudication of the bona fides and lawfulness of his coming.

<p>APPEAL. FROM THE SUPREME COURT -OF’THE TERRITORY' OF OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. To challenge a grand juror for any ground of disqualification is the right at common law of any one who is under prosecution for any crime whatever. 2 Hawkins P. C., c. 25, § 16; 1 Bishop Crim. Pro. (3d ed.), § 676; 4 Crim.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Prior to the execution of the compact New Jersey did not have jurisdiction for any purpose over the land under the waters of Hudson River and New York Bay and has no jurisdiction now below low-water mark of the river and bay or over the property of the plaintiff in error except that conferred by the compact.. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash.

Held: in this case, not to be an action against the State within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. The facts are stated in the opinion.

This is an application by petitioner for a writ of mandamus to compel the Circuit Court of the United States'for the Eastern Division of the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri to .remand the case of this petitioner.?;. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Company to the state court, from whence it came.

IN EQUITY. The serious objections to the defendant’s draft' of decree are particularly to par. II. but also to pars.