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2019 PA Super 136
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
RAYMOND DALE PAYNE, :
:
Appellant : No. 604 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order April 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Criminal Division at No.: 2562 of 1976
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., OLSON,
J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED APRIL 29, 2019
Appellant, Raymond Dale Payne, appeals from the April 13, 2016 Order
denying his Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we reverse the decision of the
PCRA court and grant Appellant a new degree-of-guilt hearing.
In 1977, Appellant pled guilty to murder generally, and three judges
were empaneled to decide Appellant’s degree of guilt (“Degree of Guilt
Panel”). The Commonwealth presented evidence to support its position that
Appellant committed a First-Degree Murder while Appellant presented
evidence to support his claim of Third-Degree murder. The Degree of Guilt
Panel convicted Appellant of First-Degree Murder. On August 5, 1977, the
lower court sentenced Appellant to a term of life in prison without parole.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, and our Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s
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Judgment of Sentence on January 24, 1979. Commonwealth v. Payne, 396
A.2d 630 (Pa. 1979).
After several unsuccessful attempts at post-conviction relief, on January
8, 1997, Appellant filed a PCRA Petition, which, inter alia, requested DNA
testing on the seminal fluid recovered from the victim’s body. The PCRA court
denied Appellant’s Petition, a panel of this Court affirmed that order, and our
Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.
Commonwealth v. Payne, 704 A.2d 1120 (Pa. Super. 1997) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied,
717 A.2d 533 (Pa. 1998).
On February 6, 2003, Appellant filed a Motion for DNA testing pursuant
to the then-newly passed provision of the PCRA permitting DNA testing under
certain circumstances. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1. The PCRA court denied the
Motion, and Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. On November 18,
2003, a panel of this Court affirmed the Order of the PCRA court, and on May
11, 2004, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s Petition for Allowance of
Appeal. Commonwealth v. Payne, 841 A.2d 577 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 626 WAL 2003 (Pa. filed May 11,
2004).
On May 16, 2011, Appellant filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Erie County
District Attorney’s Office alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for its refusal
to permit DNA testing.
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On September 9, 2011, during the pendency of the federal action,
Appellant filed a second motion for DNA testing pursuant to Section 9543.1.
On October 4, 2011, the PCRA court again denied relief. Appellant filed a
Notice of Appeal to this Court, and on July 31, 2012, this Court affirmed the
Order denying Appellant relief. On July 12, 2013, our Supreme Court denied
Appellant’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal. Commonwealth v. Payne, 55
A.3d 152 (Pa. Super. filed July 31, 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal
denied,
69 A.3d 601 (Pa. 2013).
On December 16, 2014, the United States District Court signed a
stipulated Order permitting post-conviction DNA testing. The DNA test results
established conclusively that Appellant was excluded as a contributor to the
seminal fluid found on the victim’s body.
On August 21, 2015, Appellant, through counsel, filed a PCRA Petition
asserting that he is entitled to a new trial or degree-of-guilt hearing based on
this after-discovered evidence. On April 13, 2016, the PCRA court entered a
final Order and Opinion denying Appellant relief.
Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal, and both Appellant and the
PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On November 15, 2017, this Court
certified this case for en banc review.
On appeal, Appellant presents three questions for our review.
[1.] Did the PCRA court err in finding that the [after-]discovered
DNA evidence was not likely to change the outcome of
[Appellant’s] criminal proceeding notwithstanding that the [after-discovered] evidence rebuts the Commonwealth’s overall theory
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of the case and disproves a key inference that the prosecution and
finder of fact relied on to establish the intent necessary for
conviction?
[2.] Did the PCRA court err to the extent that it held the [after-]
discovered evidence was immaterial or not exculpatory?
[3.] Did the PCRA court err by not considering [Appellant’s] claims
under the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
For the reasons discussed below, we find that the PCRA court erred when
it concluded that the DNA evidence was not likely to change the result of the
Degree of Guilt Panel. The PCRA court erroneously focused on other evidence
in the record to conclude that the DNA evidence would not likely change the
result of the Degree of Guilt Panel; this is not the proper analysis. The proper
focus is whether the after-discovered evidence significantly refutes an
assertion on which the Degree of Guilt Panel and the Commonwealth placed
significant weight. Because the Commonwealth argued and the Degree of Guilt
Panel accepted the theory that Appellant murdered the victim while he raped
her and the DNA evidence refutes the assertion that Appellant raped the
victim, we find that Appellant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the DNA evidence would likely result in a different verdict. We, thus, reverse
the decision of the PCRA court.
This Court reviews the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether
the record supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is
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otherwise free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803
(Pa. 2014).
The relevant provision of the PCRA requires a petitioner to plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction resulted from
“[t]he unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has
subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the
trial if it had been introduced.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). In order to
successfully prove an after-discovered evidence claim under Section
9543(a)(2)(vi), the petitioner must show that “(1) the evidence has been
discovered after trial and it could not have been obtained at or prior to trial
through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not
being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a
different verdict.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 228 (Pa. 2016)
(citation omitted).
In this case, there is no dispute that Appellant met the first three
requirements. The issue is whether Appellant has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the DNA evidence “would have changed
the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced.”1
1There is no dispute that a change in the outcome of a degree-of-guilt hearing
qualifies under these PCRA provisions as a change in the outcome of the trial.
See Commonwealth v. Bonaccurso, 625 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super.
1993).
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When evaluating whether a petitioner has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the after-discovered evidence would likely
produce a different verdict, a court must examine the persuasiveness of the
new evidence assuming the fact-finder believes it. Commonwealth v. Fiore,
780 A.2d 704, 713-14 (Pa. Super. 2001). This inquiry includes evaluations of
(1) the nature of the new evidence; (2) whether, and to what extent, the new
evidence is consistent or inconsistent with other trial testimony; and (3)
whether, and to what extent, the new evidence is consistent or inconsistent
with documentary evidence.
Id.
Our Supreme Court has examined several case-specific factors,
including: (1) the prosecution’s theory at the original trial, and the difficulty
of making this argument in light of the new evidence; and (2) the prosecutor’s
closing remarks, which may demonstrate the importance of the new evidence.
See Commonwealth v. Bulted, 279 A.2d 158, 161-62 (Pa. 1971);
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Mount, 257 A.2d 578 (Pa. 1969), ordered that the trial court resentence the
appellant as a result of after-discovered evidence. In Mount, a three-judge
panel had held a degree-of-guilt hearing and concluded that the appellant
committed First-Degree Murder because the appellant raped the victim and
then killed her. At the sentencing hearing, the appellant argued that he only
stabbed the victim and did not rape her. The Commonwealth, however,
presented evidence from a laboratory technician specializing in blood and
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other body fluid stains who testified that she analyzed a pair of underpants
located among the appellant’s belongings, found seminal fluids and
bloodstains, and concluded that the bloodstains matched the deceased’s blood
type. The panel imposed a sentence of “death in the electric chair.” Id. at
579. After the imposition of sentence, appellant discovered that the
laboratory technician had lied in other proceedings about her professional
qualifications and she had not fulfilled her educational requirements for a
laboratory technician.
In ordering a new sentencing hearing, the Supreme Court first analyzed
the impact that the after-discovered evidence had on the theory of the
Commonwealth and Degree of Guilt Panel. The Supreme Court found that the
after-discovered evidence was crucial because the technician’s testimony was
the only evidence that established that it was the appellant who raped the
victim and the Degree of Guilt Panel placed “considerable weight on [the
technician’s] testimony.” Id. at 582.
The Supreme Court concluded that the degree-of-guilt panel “should
have the opportunity to evaluate the qualifications of the [laboratory
technician] in the light of her lack of theoretical background sufficient to credit
her as a laboratory technician and to evaluate her long experience working in
a laboratory to determine whether she is qualified to testify as to laboratory
tests and laboratory findings. Such inquiry is mandated in order that the court
below might determine the weight, if any, to be given to her testimony upon
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which the Commonwealth relied, in large measure, for proof of the occurrence
of rape.” Id.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Cooney, 282 A.2d 29 (Pa. 1971), the
Supreme Court found that the after-discovered evidence of a bullet lodged in
the defendant’s head supported defendant’s claim of self-defense and “serves
to support and confirm the testimony given by appellant and makes his theory
of the crime much more believable.” Id. at 31. See also Bulted, 279 A.2d
at 162 (concluding that newly discovered evidence of a deposition transcript
of the decedent’s paramour refuted the Commonwealth’s theory that the
decedent did not have a paramour and corroborated the appellant’s testimony
that she did and “it would be monstrously unjust to deny [the] appellant a
second trial at which the jury will have an opportunity to weigh the [after
discovered evidence] before reaching their verdict.”).
Most important to our analysis in this case is that the Supreme Court
has determined that a reviewing court, when considering whether the after-
discovered evidence is likely to change the outcome at trial, should not
consider evidence in the record not relied upon explicitly by the trial court in
rendering its degree of guilt decision. In Mount, supra, the Commonwealth
argued that even if the Supreme Court ignored the evidence of rape, there
was still sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of First-Degree Murder
because the evidence demonstrated that the appellant also committed a
Robbery. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument because “an
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examination of the opinion of the three-judge panel indicates that the judges
emphasized the heinous character of this particular rape and predicated their
sentence on the rape feature of the crime.” 257 A.2d at 582.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Valderrama, 388 A.2d 1042 (Pa.
1978), the Supreme Court found that the after-discovered evidence was
significant enough to grant a new trial to the appellant even though other
evidence in the record was sufficient to sustain the convictions. Id. at 1045.
In Valderrama, the appellant was charged with murder and rape. At trial,
he presented an alibi defense that on the day of the crime, he was living and
working in Puerto Rico. The Commonwealth refuted the appellant’s evidence
that he was in Puerto Rico by presenting the testimony of an employee of the
Social Security Administration who stated that the appellant’s employment
records did not demonstrate that the appellant was working in Puerto Rico at
the time of the crime. The Commonwealth argued that this testimony
demonstrated that the appellant was not working in Puerto Rico at the time of
the crime. Id. at 1044.
After the conviction, the appellant obtained new evidence from his
employer in Puerto Rico showing that when appellant’s employer reported the
appellant’s wages to the Social Security Administration, it did so without a
social security number. As a result, the appellant argued that records of the
Social Security Administration that were presented to the jury were
incomplete because his employer failed to provide appellant’s social security
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number and not because appellant was not working in Puerto Rico at the time
of the murder.
The Supreme Court first found that the testimony of the appellant’s co-
conspirator was sufficient to sustain the convictions. However, the Supreme
Court concluded that the employment records are “of such a nature and
character that a different verdict will likely result if a new trial is granted.” Id.
at 1045. The Supreme Court reasoned that at trial, the Commonwealth had
argued that the appellant never worked in Puerto Rico and “the incomplete
employment records supported this assertion and cast doubt on [the]
appellant’s alibi defense.” Id. The completed records, however, provided
substantial support for appellant’s alibi defense and the Court concluded that
a different verdict would likely result. Id.
Finally, we note that the Supreme Court does not require that a
petitioner establish that the after-discovered evidence proves his innocence
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mount, supra, at 582 (after granting the
appellant a new sentencing hearing based on after-discovered evidence, the
Supreme Court noted that the Degree of Guilt Panel might find that the
laboratory technician’s “practical experience gained over a long period of years
in laboratory work did qualify her to make proper and sound laboratory
findings”); Cooney, supra at 31 (after granting the appellant a new trial
based on after-discovered evidence the Supreme Court noted that “it is
possible that a new trial would result in another conviction, but we believe
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that it is very likely that a different verdict would result”). Rather, a petitioner
must only establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the exculpatory
after-discovered evidence “would have changed the outcome of the trial if it
had been introduced.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi).
Applying these principles to this case, we analyze the basis for the trial
court’s denial of the PCRA Petition. The trial court denied the PCRA petition
because “the evidence, including [Appellant’s] statement to Crawford County
District Attorney Donald Lewis and his concealment of [the victim’s] body,
clearly established [Appellant’s] guilt of First-Degree Murder; accordingly, the
DNA evidence would not have changed the outcome.” PCRA Court Opinion,
4/13/16, at 9. The PCRA court, however, failed to apply the correct legal
standard. As noted in the above case law, the analysis is not based on
whether the record contains other evidence sufficient to convict the Appellant
of First-Degree Murder; rather, the focus is on whether Appellant has proven
by a preponderance of the evidence that the after-discovered evidence would
likely have changed the Commonwealth’s theory of the case and the decision
of the Degree of Guilt Panel. Mount, 257 A.2d at 582; Bulted, 279 A.2d at
161-62. As discussed below, both the Degree of Guilt Panel and the
Commonwealth placed significant weight on the theory that Appellant
murdered the victim while raping her. Because the DNA evidence refutes the
evidence of rape, the after-discovered would likely have changed the decision
of the Degree of Guilt Panel.
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A review of the Degree of Guilt Panel’s Opinion demonstrates the
significant weight that the panel placed on the conclusion that Appellant raped
the victim in determining that Appellant committed Murder of the first degree.
The Degree of Guilt Panel placed significant, if not exclusive, weight on the
testimony of Anthony Lee Evans, who was incarcerated with Appellant in Erie
County prison. The Degree of Guilt Panel characterized Mr. Evans’ testimony
as an “admission” that Appellant made to his cellmate and “the most
damaging” to the Appellant. Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/77, at 5, 6. The Degree
of Guilt Panel summarized Mr. Evans’ testimony about Appellant killing the
victim during the commission of a rape as follows:
Mr. Evans testified that [Appellant] confided in him and eventually
described in detail what had occurred. He said that [Appellant]
told him that while he and [the victim] were riding in his truck he
had put some “DOWNS” (pills) in the victim’s beer; that while she
was under the influence of the drug he took her to the woods
where he tied her up in the manner above described and
began having sexual intercourse with her; that she begged
him to stop, crying and screaming; that she “MADE HIM
MAD”” and he grasped the rope “ON EACH SIDE OF HER
AND PULLED IT TIGHT UNTIL SHE WAS DEAD.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
The Degree of Guilt Panel also relied heavily upon Mr. Evans’ testimony
that Appellant told him that the victim’s “death was a culmination of a sexual
fantasy that he had been living with for a long time; that HE LIKES TO TIE
WOMEN UP AND DO CRAZY THINGS TO ‘EM.” Id. (emphasis in original).
The Degree of Guilt Panel also relied heavily upon the testimony of Paul
Daube, a chemist employed by the Pennsylvania State Police, to corroborate
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Mr. Evans’ testimony that the victim died while “protesting a sexual attack
upon her” because Mr. Daube conducted tests and “found the presence of
seminal acid phosphatase in [the victim’s anal and vaginal area].” Id. at 6.
The Degree of Guilt Panel then compared Mr. Evans’ testimony to the
statement that Appellant made to the police and concluded that since Mr.
Evans’ testimony is similar to Appellant’s statement, except for the manner in
which the victim died, that Appellant’s theory of the cause of death “lacks
credibility.” Id.
Based on this analysis, the Degree of Guilt Panel then concludes that
the murder of the victim “was willful, deliberate and premeditated” and
Appellant’s “admission to his cellmate verifies that conclusion and removes all
doubt.” Id.2
We note that the Degree of Guilt Panel summarized other evidence
presented at the hearing, but did not place any weight on that other evidence
in reaching its conclusion of First-Degree Murder. Rather, the Degree of Guilt
Panel relied exclusively upon the testimony of Mr. Evans and Mr. Daube.
Similarly, the Commonwealth at the Degree of Guilt Hearing asserted
the theory that Appellant killed the victim while she resisted a sexual assault.
The prosecution repeatedly emphasized the evidence of seminal fluid during
2 The Degree of Guilt Panel also noted that the “testimony before the court is
also consistent with a slaying in the perpetration of a forceful rape which would
constitute murder in the second degree. However, having concluded that
[Appellant] is guilty of an intentional killing, we need not further pursue the
theory of felony murder.” Trial Court Opinion at 7.
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closing argument when urging the panel to convict Appellant of First-Degree
Murder. During closing argument at the Degree of Guilt hearing, the
prosecution argued: “[A]ll of the words from [Appellant] are consistent with
the fact that this was an intentional killing; that at least it was a rape, that
the facts of the case show that there was intercourse between the
two[.]” N.T., 6/28/77, at 17 (emphasis added) (asserting also “that there
was sexual activity between these two people”). Most significantly, the
prosecution also argued that the presence of seminal fluid, presumed to be
Appellant’s, was proof of the intent required for a First-Degree Murder
conviction. Id.
With the basis for the Degree of Guilt Panel’s decision and the
Commonwealth’s theory in mind, we turn to the implications of the DNA
evidence. The new DNA evidence is uncontroverted3 physical evidence that
excluded Appellant as a possible contributor of the DNA samples that Mr.
Daube had analyzed and testified about at the Degree of Guilt Hearing.
Because the Degree of Guilt Panel relied upon Mr. Daube’s testimony to
corroborate Mr. Evan’s testimony about Appellant murdering the victim while
raping her, this corroboration evidence is no longer valid and the Degree of
Guilt Panel erred in placing significant weight on it.
3 Although the parties dispute the inferences arising from this new DNA
evidence, there is no factual dispute about the expert’s conclusions in these
PCRA proceedings. See R.R. at 365a-368a (“Stipulations”).
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The DNA evidence also discredits Mr. Evans’ testimony that the victim’s
death was a culmination of a sexual fantasy and, thus, fundamentally alters
the Degree of Guilt Panel’s credibility decision in weighing Appellant’s version
of events against Evans’ testimony and the prosecution’s version of events.
Furthermore, the new DNA evidence makes it doubtful that the prosecution
would present this theory and the Degree of Guilt Panel would accept it.
In light of the foregoing, Appellant has satisfied the PCRA’s stringent
requirements under these unique circumstances and has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the DNA evidence would have likely
changed the decision of the Degree of Guilt Panel. We, thus, reverse the PCRA
court. In light of this ruling, we do not address Appellant’s other claims of
error.
Order reversed.
President Judge Emeritus Bender, and Judge Panella, Judge Lazarus,
Judge Kunselman, and Judge Murray join the Opinion
Judge Shogan files a dissenting opinion in which Judge Olson and Judge
Stabile join.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/29/2019
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