Volume 210 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, Mario Souto, appealed from a judgment of conviction on three counts—assault of a police officer, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct—following a two-day jury trial during which the defendant represented himself. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial justice's finding that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel prior to trial. Specifically, the defendant argued that the trial justice was required to conduct a separate inquiry into his indigency status before finding a valid waiver, and that the trial justice had not considered the fact that, when the defendant agreed to allow his attorney to withdraw, he had not understood that he would be required to represent himself at trial if he did not hire another attorney. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in finding that the defendant had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel prior to trial. The Court determined that the defendant's actions—his failure to obtain counsel after being afforded multiple continuances over fourteen months—demonstrated a voluntary waiver. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in concluding that the defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel because the defendant had been warned about the consequences of his failure to hire an attorney at multiple times throughout the proceedings. The Court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the defendant had validly waived his right to counsel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The appellant, Karl Olsen, appealed from a February 6, 2018 Newport Superior Court judgment granting the motion for summary judgment of the appellee, Anna L. DeMayo, and denying Mr. Olsen's cross-motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Mr. Olsen contended that the Superior Court justice erred in granting Mrs. DeMayo's motion for summary judgment and denying his cross-motion for summary judgment in view of his arguments: (1) that G.L. 1956 § 34-18-22.3 provided him the right to recover all the rent which he had paid to Mrs. DeMayo over several years because she, as a landlord who was not a resident of this state, had failed to designate an agent for service of process as required by the statute (2) that he had a right to recover the rent under G.L. 1956 § 9-1-2, which provides "civil liability for crimes and offenses" and (3) that he had a right to recover the rent under the theory of unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice properly granted Mrs. DeMayo's motion for summary judgment as to all three issues. The Court concluded: (1) that Mr. Olsen's proffered interpretation of § 34-18-22.3 ran afoul of the canon of statutory construction that counsels against interpreting an ambiguous statute in a manner that yields an absurd result (2) that he had not met his burden of showing that he had suffered any damages as required by § 9-1-2 and (3) that he had not shown that it was inequitable for Mrs. DeMayo to have received and retained rent payments from him while, for nearly ten years, he and his family occupied a waterfront condominium owned by her. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The applicant, Adless Desamours, appealed from the Superior Court's denial of his application for postconviction relief. On appeal, the applicant argued that the trial justice violated Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to ensure that applicant entered his plea of nolo contendere knowingly and voluntarily, and by failing to establish a factual basis for his plea. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice's colloquy with the applicant established that the plea was voluntary, and that it was made with knowledge and understanding of the charge against him. In addition, the Court found that there was a factual basis for the applicant's plea because the state recited facts that supported the charge against the applicant, and the applicant unequivocally agreed with the state's recitation of facts it would prove if the matter proceeded to trial. Finally, the Court held that the applicant's petition for postconviction relief could also have been denied based on the doctrine of laches. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's denial of the applicant's application for postconviction relief.

The appellants, Michaela Arthurs and Mark Ryan, appealed from two November 9, 2016 final judgments entered after a trial in the Washington County Superior Court involving two consolidated cases. As the judgments indicate, the appellants had failed to prevail with respect to two controversies: one relative to the distribution of the assets of their mother's estate and the other involving an attempt to remove Lizbeth Larkin as the executrix of their mother's estate. (Michaela Arthurs, Mark Ryan, Lizbeth Larkin, and Lisa Ryan are the children of the decedent, Catherine Ignatia Ryan.) On appeal, the appellants contended that the Superior Court justice erred in: (1) interpreting their mother's will to read that two bank accounts not specified as joint accounts with right of survivorship be distributed only to Lisa Ryan and Lizbeth Larkin, instead of to all four siblings and (2) denying their motion seeking to remove Lizbeth Larkin as executrix of their mother's estate. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice properly determined that the two bank accounts should be distributed to Lisa Ryan and Lizbeth Larkin pursuant to the paragraph of Catherine Ryan's will relating to joint accounts with right of survivorship. The Court further concluded that the trial justice did not err in affirming the Probate Court's denial of the motion to remove Lizbeth Larkin as executrix. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed both judgments of the Superior Court.

The pro se plaintiff, Maurice J. Cusick, appealed from a Family Court postjudgment order in favor of his former wife, Judith P. Cusick, the defendant, requiring the plaintiff to submit to limited genetic testing for the benefit of the parties' minor children. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that by ordering him to submit to genetic testing, the hearing justice: (1) violated his right to privacy and to due process and (2) committed an abuse of discretion by relying on factual findings that overlooked and misconceived material evidence and were clearly wrong. The Supreme Court held that, because the plaintiff did not raise his right to privacy and due-process arguments before the hearing justice, he failed to preserve this argument for appeal and the exception to the "raise-or-waive" rule for basic constitutional rights did not apply in this case. Next, the Court held that, because the plaintiff failed to raise any objection to the introduction of an expert's affidavit, the plaintiff waived the right to contest it on appeal. Lastly, the Court held that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in ordering the plaintiff to submit to limited genetic testing because the hearing justice made sufficient findings of fact properly balanced the plaintiff's interests with that of the children and concluded that, based on the evidence presented by the medical experts, genetic testing was in the best interest of the children. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Family Court.

The plaintiff, La Gondola, Inc. (La Gondola), appealed from a September 14, 2016 judgment entered after a bench trial in Providence County Superior Court, which judgment was in favor of the defendants, the City of Providence, the Rhode Island Zoological Society, P.G.S., Inc., and various municipal officials. The case concerned the awarding of a concessions contract for concessions at Carousel Village in Roger Williams Park, located in the City of Providence. On appeal, La Gondola contended that the trial justice erred in: (1) "concluding that the [bidding] process was free of corruption, bad faith, and/or an abuse of discretion" (2) holding that a certain amendment to the contract at issue, which dealt with the operation of a trackless train, was not enforceable and (3) denying La Gondola's "contractual interference claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion or commit a clear error of law when he concluded that there was no corruption, bad faith, or a palpable abuse of discretion in this case. It further concluded that the trial justice did not err in finding that the amendment to the contract at issue, which dealt with the operation of a trackless train, was not binding. Finally, the Court found no error on the part of the trial justice in his conclusion that La Gondola was not entitled to relief on its claim of intentional interference with prospective contractual relations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.