Volume 210 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

Convicted, on pleas of guilty, of two counts of the crime of robbery in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the pleas. The defendant had been facing a maximum sentence of forty years of imprisonment on the robbery charges. After trial commenced on those charges, the defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for a sentence of six and one-half years of imprisonment followed by seven years of special parole. The trial court accepted the pleas after canvassing him and determining that the pleas were know- ingly and voluntarily made with the assistance of competent counsel. The court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas after conducting a hearing during which the defendant claimed that he was under duress during the plea proceeding because he had learned during the trial that an inspector from the state's attorney's office had coerced and given false information to a witness who had not yet testified. The defendant further asserted that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because, inter alia, they failed to pursue an alibi defense on his behalf. Held that this court could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by not affording the defendant an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, as the trial court afforded him ample opportunity to present his claims, clearly addressed each of his arguments appropriately as they were presented and, relying on the transcript of the plea proceeding, concluded that there was no basis for them: as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court noted that the defendant had indicated on various occasions during the plea canvass that he was satisfied with his counsel, the defendant failed to demonstrate an adequate factual basis to support an evidentiary hearing as to his counsel's alleged failure to pursue the alibi defense, as the defendant indicated during the plea canvass that he understood that, by pleading guilty, he was giving up the right to put on any defenses he might have had, he did not complain then or at any other time that his counsel failed to pursue the alibi defense, the defendant did not proffer facts in support of that defense or claim that he had ever dis- cussed it with his counsel prior to pleading guilty, and neither he nor his counsel proffered whether the defendant possessed such evidence or informed counsel that such evidence existed; moreover, the transcript of the plea proceeding conclusively refuted the defendant's claim of coercion by the state's inspector, as the defendant knew of that incident before pleading guilty, and at no time during the plea proceeding did he mention it to the court. Argued October 21, 2021—officially released January 18, 2022

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of cruelty to persons and disorderly conduct, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant, a former forensic nurse for a maximum security psychiatric facility operated by the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, and other facility staff, physically abused and demeaned the victim, who suffered from several mental health disorders and was committed to the facility. After the department learned of the defendant's conduct, it informed state law enforcement and launched an administrative investigation, which led to criminal charges and adverse employment actions against several employees, including the defendant. Prior to trial, the trial court held a hearing on the state's motion in limine seeking to preclude the admissibility of the victim's testimony on the ground that he was incom- petent to testify at trial pursuant to the relevant section (§ 6-3) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. At that hearing, the state offered expert testimony from the victim's treating psychiatrist, who had personally observed the victim multiple times per day, nearly every day, for a period of two years. The defendant argued that the psychiatrist's testimony alone was insufficient to establish that the victim was incapable of providing reliable and truthful testimony and moved for an independent psychiatric evaluation of the victim, which the court denied, or, in the alternative, the defendant requested that the court evaluate the victim under oath. The court granted the state's motion to preclude the victim's testimony and credited the testimony of the victim's psychiatrist, who testified that the victim had poor cognitive memory, had trouble retaining information, was unable to narrate events or recall past experiences in a rational way, and posed a safety risk to others. Before trial, the defendant moved for sanctions and argued that the prosecution had engaged in witness intimidation because the department attempted to intimidate the defense witnesses, H and L, facility employees, from testifying at trial on the defendant's behalf and such misconduct was attributable to the state through a theory of vicarious liability. H and L previously appeared at a sentencing proceeding for another facility employee who was accused of similar misconduct toward the victim as the defendant. At that proceeding, H and L allegedly exposed the victim's confidential and protected medical information while giving their statements to the court in violation of work rule policies and the Health Insurance Portabil- ity and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and, subsequently, were placed on administrative leave by the department, pending investigation. When called to testify at the pretrial hearing for the defendant, the prosecutor informed the court that there was a possibility that L could incriminate herself if she were to testify at the hearing. L invoked her fifth amend- ment right against self-incrimination and provided little substantive testi- mony, and H testified that she was afraid to lose her job but would appear at the defendant's trial if subpoenaed and would testify at trial if ordered to by the court with the understanding that her testimony would not violate work rules. At that same hearing, another defense witness, B, a human resources manager for the department, who was responsible for investigating and conducting fact-finding for alleged work rule and policy violations, testified that the victim's conservator had signed releases that permitted the defense witnesses to testify regarding the victim's health status and, therefore, the department would not take action against witnesses who testified regarding the victim. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court violated his sixth amendment right to present a defense by failing to take adequate procedural measures before ruling that the victim was incompetent to testify at the defendant's trial: a. The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it declined the defendant's request to contemporaneously observe the victim before ruling on his competency to testify at trial, contrary to the defendant's claim, State v. Weinberg (215 Conn. 231) did not stand for the proposition that the court must personally observe a potential witness prior to making a competency determination; moreover, in Weinberg, the trial court relied on the substance of the expert psychiatrist's testimony, and not its own contemporaneous examination, to make its legal determination regarding the witness' capacity for truthfulness, cognitive memory, and ability to receive correct sensory impressions; furthermore, under the circum- stances of the present case, the expert, who had personally observed the victim multiple times per day, nearly every day, for two years, had provided firsthand, expert testimony, which established that the victim had limited cognitive memory, was not oriented to time, and offered irrational responses to even the most basic questions and, therefore, provided an adequate evidentiary basis to determine that the victim was not competent to testify. b. The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it denied the defendant's motion to have the victim examined by an independent expert witness before ruling on his competency to testify, the decision to order a psychiatric examination is within the discretion of the trial court judge; moreover, the victim had undergone a psychiatric assess- ment by a board certified psychiatrist who, having personally observed him nearly every day for two years prior to the hearing, was uniquely positioned to assist the court in evaluating the victim's testimonial capac- ity; furthermore, the court reasonably could have determined that order- ing a second evaluation would have been redundant and a waste of judicial resources. 2. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court did not violate his due process right to present witnesses and properly exercised its discretion when it denied the defendant's motion to sanction the prosecution for intimidating potential defense witnesses from testifying at trial: there was no evidence that the department sought to intimidate defense wit- nesses through administrative discipline, any prior disciplinary action taken by the department against H and L was the sole result of their alleged HIPAA violations, and, at the time of the evidentiary hearing, H and L were not under threat of administrative discipline as the victim's conservator had signed releases that permitted them to testify regarding the victim's health status without violating HIPAA; moreover, the depart- ment was not acting as an arm of the state, although prosecutorial misconduct may extend to state agencies acting on the prosecution's behalf, there was no demonstrated relationship between the prosecution and the specific adverse employment actions taken by the department against H and L, and there was no evidence that B, who was primarily responsible for the internal investigation, had any contact with any law enforcement body during the pendency of the investigation. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecution engaged in impropriety when it alerted the trial court to a potential fifth amend- ment concern with a defense witness' expected testimony during a pretrial hearing, thereby violating his constitutional right to a fair trial: there was no evidence to indicate that the prosecutor undertook his warning with the intention to chill L from testifying; moreover, the prosecutor repeatedly stated that the state did not intend to pursue criminal charges against the witness; furthermore, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court denied his right to present a defense and compel testimony in his favor by improperly granting L a blanket fifth amendment privilege during the pretrial hearing on the defendant's motion for sanctions, the court having explicitly limited its ruling to the defendant's motion for sanctions, and the defendant, having made no effort to call L as a witness at trial, therefore failed to take steps to exercise his right to present a defense where the witness' absence at trial was due to his failure to call her. Argued September 13, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of murder and assault in the first degree in connection with his stabbing of three persons, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. Following a trial, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, conclud- ing, inter alia, that trial counsel's performance was not deficient and that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the peti- tioner having failed to demonstrate that the resolution of his claims involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner, or that the questions raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further: there was no merit to the petitioner's claim that his right to autonomy was violated when his trial counsel inappropriately conceded his guilt during closing arguments by arguing that the petitioner should not be found guilty because there was evidence that he was not the only poten- tial assailant at the crime scene and the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner, and not the other potential assail- ant, was responsible for the stabbings, as the record supported the habeas court's conclusion that, in making that argument, trial counsel did not concede the petitioner's guilt, and, therefore, contrary to the petitioner's contention, McCoy v. Louisiana (138 S. Ct. 1500) was not applicable and the petitioner's right to autonomy was not implicated; moreover, the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was premised on the petitioner's assertion that his trial counsel conceded his guilt during closing arguments, was unavailing, this court having concluded that the habeas court properly found that trial counsel did not concede the petitioner's guilt. Argued November 8, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

Convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree, cruelty to persons and tampering with physical evidence, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed that the trial court's jury instructions deprived him of his right to due process and a fair trial because they could have misled the jurors into thinking they could not consider inadequacies in the police investigation in evaluating whether the state had proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The complainant, L, and the defendant shared an apartment. After they returned to the apartment with M, the defendant's girlfriend, in the early morning hours after visiting a club, L told the defendant that he had twice slept with M. In the early evening of that same day, the defendant found L passed out in his room, covered in vomit and urine, with a red ring around his neck. The defendant told the 911 dispatcher that L had attempted suicide. The police found L on the floor of his bedroom. Although the police searched the apartment for anything that could have caused the red marks on L's neck, they did not enter or search the defendant's separate bedroom. One of the police officers who searched the apartment, relying in part on the defen- dant's statements, believed that L had attempted suicide and sought to have him seen by a psychologist after L was taken to a hospital. After L's mother reported to the police that, when L had awoken from a coma he was in at the hospital, he told her that the defendant had attempted to strangle him, the police interviewed the defendant, who changed his story and told them for the first time both that he had a form of autism and that L had told him about having had sex with M. The defendant's theory of defense was that the police conducted an inadequate investiga- tion in that, inter alia, they failed to sufficiently document the injuries to L's neck, they failed to interview L or his mother about the allegation that the defendant strangled him, they failed to analyze certain eviden- tiary inconsistencies, and they never considered that the defendant's autism could explain his behavior or inconsistent statements to paramed- ics and the police when they responded to his 911 call. The defendant filed a request to charge the jury in which he sought, in part, to have the jury instructed to consider the completeness or incompleteness of the police investigation and whether evidence concerning the adequacy of the investigation affected the reliability of the evidence and the credi- bility of witnesses. After conducting a charging conference with counsel, the court declined to instruct the jury in accordance with that portion of the defendant's request and instead instructed the jury in accordance with the model investigative inadequacy instruction on the Judicial Branch website at that time. Held: 1. The trial court's jury instruction on the adequacy of the police investigation was erroneous, as there was a reasonable possibility that it misled the jury and, thus, prejudiced the defendant: a. The trial court failed to inform the jury of the defendant's right to have it consider the inadequacy of the police investigation in evaluating whether the state had proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt: because the court noted during the charge conference that there was a factual dispute as to the adequacy of the investigation, the defendant was entitled to have the jury consider evidence of any relevant deficiencies or lapses in the investigation as bases for entertaining reasonable doubt as to his guilt; moreover, had language been added to the court's charge of the sort the defendant requested, the jury would have been apprised of his right to present an investigative inadequacy defense and the jury's right to consider it in evaluating the strength of the state's case. b. Because the trial court's instructional error prejudiced the defendant and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, he was entitled to a new trial, there having been a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict: the jury may have ignored key evidence as to the adequacy of the police investigation, as there was a significant risk that it was misled to believe that it could not consider the defendant's arguments as to the investigation, and it was apparent that the instructional error was harmful given the relative weakness of the state's case, which turned almost entirely on the believability of L's allegation that the defendant strangled him, even though L did not see the defendant attempt to do so; moreover, defense counsel adduced evidence that tended to under- mine L's credibility, elicited testimony that there were alternative expla- nations for L's neck injuries and argued that any inconsistencies in the defendant's statements or mannerisms could be explained by his autism; furthermore, the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would not have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt and, thus, find him not guilty on the basis of the alleged deficiencies in the police investigation. 2. The trial court improperly admitted into evidence a police disciplinary report in violation of the defendant's state and federal constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him: contrary to the court's determi- nation that the state offered the report to show that the police depart- ment had taken action with regard to the performance of an officer during the investigation, the report was introduced to prove the truth of its contents, which were that the officer's investigation and conclusion that L had attempted suicide were inadequate and unsatisfactory; more- over, the report was inadmissible under the business records exception (§ 52-180) to the rule against hearsay, as the state failed to establish that it was made in the regular course of business, and, because the report was made three months after the actions it described, it did not have the indicia of trustworthiness required to fall within the business records exception; furthermore, the report was testimonial in nature, the statements in it having been made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the report would be available for use at a later trial, and the state did not introduce evidence that the officer who prepared the report was unavailable to testify at trial or that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross- examine him. Argued October 13, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

The defendant G appealed from the judgment of the trial court sustaining in part the administrative appeal filed by the municipal plaintiffs from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission. The commission found that the plaintiffs violated the Freedom of Infor- mation Act (§ 1-200 et seq.) by requiring G to sign an acknowledgement form before releasing copies of public records he had requested, and ordered that the plaintiffs shall not require the signing of such a form as a condition precedent to the inspection or receipt of copies of public records. The trial court affirmed the commission's decision as to the provision of copies, but reversed the commission's order to the extent that it applied to the inspection of original public records. On G's appeal to this court, held that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, as G was not aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court as he failed to demonstrate a specific, personal, and legal interest in the subject matter of the challenged decision; G claimed that the court abused its discretion by holding that an agency may require requestors to sign an acknowledgement form as a condition precedent to the inspec- tion of original public records, but, based on the administrative record and the representations of the parties, it was clear the only issue decided by the commission involved the right to receive and inspect copies of public records, and the only public records sought by G in this matter were copies, such that the court's statements regarding original public records were merely dicta, and its judgment did not diminish any right that the commission's final decision afforded G. Argued September 15, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

The incarcerated plaintiff, who owed portions of filing fees for several cases he had initiated in federal court, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his complaint against the defendants, employees of the Department of Correction, in which he alleged that they had improperly removed funds from his inmate account to pay the federal filing fees. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendants were permitted to withdraw, in monthly installments, only 20 percent of the relevant balance of his inmate account for filing fees for a single federal case, not 20 percent of that balance for outstanding filing fees for each federal action he filed. The plaintiff claimed that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bruce v. Samuels (577 U.S. 82), which held that the governing federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b) (2)) requires the simultaneous recoupment of multiple filing fees from prison- ers with at least $10 in their accounts, did not apply to him, as he had filed his federal actions before that case was decided. The defendants claimed that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action because each defendant was entitled to statutory (§ 4-165 (a)) immunity and, with respect to any federal claims the plaintiff alleged, qualified immunity. Held that the trial court properly granted the defen- dants' motion to dismiss, that court having properly determined that the defendants were entitled to both statutory and qualified immunity: the plaintiff's allegations established that the defendants were acting within the scope of their employment and in accordance with federal law when they withdrew funds from his account, and, even if the plaintiff were correct that the holding in Bruce did not apply to him, he did not allege that the defendants' conduct was wanton, reckless or malicious; moreover, the plaintiff failed to allege facts establishing that the defen- dants violated his clearly established constitutional rights, as his com- plaint made no reference to any purported constitutional violation, nor did he argue to this court that the defendants violated any of his constitu- tional rights but, rather, he argued that the defendants misapplied the law in deducting the funds for fees that he acknowledged he owed and must pay. Argued October 18, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of possession of narcotics with intent to sell, criminal possession of a pistol, and carrying a pistol without a permit, the defendant appealed to this court. At 5 p.m. on the date of his arrest, Shot Spotter, a system of microphones around the city of New Haven that uses sound to triangulate the location of gunshots, detected a gunshot in the area of 17 Vernon Street. Approximately four minutes later, an individual called the police and reported seeing the defendant in the area with a handgun. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived at the scene, encountered the defendant in an area that was approximately three houses down from the location identified by Shot Spotter, and detained him. Although the defendant did not have any weapons on him, the police recovered a firearm from a snowbank on the property located directly behind where the defendant was discov- ered. The defendant was arrested and was found to have multiple packets of heroin in his possession. Additionally, the defendant's DNA and finger- prints were found on the recovered handgun. After a jury found the defendant guilty of all charges, he filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a pistol, and, accordingly, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to that charge: the state's arguments on appeal were consistent with the theory that it pursued at trial, namely, that the defendant had actual possession of the pistol on the date in question; moreover, the state was not compelled to prove constructive possession of the pistol because there was substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that, on the date of his arrest, the defendant actually possessed the handgun, fired it, and attempted to dispose of it, as Shot Spotter established that a gun was fired near 17 Vernon Street, less than five minutes later an officer arrived at the scene and found the defendant in an area only three houses down from the location registered by Shot Spotter, no other individuals were in the immediate area, the defendant exhibited evasive conduct by mis- leading the police regarding where he had been and where he was going, and, shortly after he was detained, the police found a handgun containing the defendant's DNA and fingerprints in a snowbank just over a fence from the location where he was apprehended. 2. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the defen- dant was guilty of carrying a pistol without a permit, and, accordingly, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal with respect to that charge: the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant carried a pistol on his person on the day in question by holding it in his hand and firing it at 5 p.m. in the area of Vernon Street and by carrying it and tossing it over a nearby fence in an effort to dispose of it on the basis of the same evidence that was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant criminally possessed a handgun on the date of his arrest. 3. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court did not commit plain error in charging the jury on criminal possession of a pistol by omitting from its charge that the state was required to prove that the defendant intended to exercise control over the handgun because the error, if any, was not so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice: the defendant's claim rested on an incorrect premise, as the state was not required to prove constructive possession, rather, it was sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant actually possessed the firearm; moreover, the trial court's charge dis- cussing constructive possession was substantially similar to those exam- ined in State v. Fasano (88 Conn. App. 17) and State v. Elijah (42 Conn. App. 687), which this court found had sufficiently explained the elements of the crimes charged to the jury. 4. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court erred by permitting two police officers to testify as to the ultimate issue of whether the defendant had intent to sell the narcotics found on his person because that claim was not properly preserved at trial: at trial, the defendant objected to the officers' testimony on the bases of rele- vance and lack of foundation, which the court overruled, but failed to object on the ground that the officers were testifying to an ultimate issue of fact, and, accordingly, the defendant could not challenge on appeal the proffered testimony as constituting improper opinion testi- mony on an ultimate issue; moreover, the defendant's alternative basis for consideration of his unpreserved claim, that this court consider it as a matter of plain error, was unavailing, as any error of the trial court in not ruling on an objection that was not made did not rise to the level required for plain error review, which is reserved for extraordinary situations in which the existence of the error was so obvious that it affected the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings. Argued October 7, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the decree of the Probate Court approving the final account filed by the defendant. The Probate Court had mailed notice of its decree on December 22, 2017. Prior to filing his appeal with the Superior Court on March 2, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for revocation with the Probate Court on December 26, 2017, which the Probate Court denied on February 8, 2018. Thereafter, the Superior Court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that it was untimely pursuant to the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 45a-186 (a)) that requires an appeal from a Probate Court decree to be filed in the Superior Court within forty-five days of when the decree was mailed to the parties. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed that his motion for revocation tolled the appeal period. Held that the Superior Court properly dismissed the probate appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that it was untimely: the plaintiff did not file his appeal with the Superior Court within forty-five days of when the Probate Court mailed its decree, and his motion for revocation, filed pursuant to statute (§ 45a-128), did not toll the appeal period for the Probate Court's underlying decision approving the final account, as the legislature clearly addressed tolling the appeal period in its statutory scheme governing appeals in probate cases and did not include the filing of a motion pursuant to § 45a-128 as an action that tolls the appeal period. Argued December 2, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to open the judgment of dissolution. At the time that the plaintiff commenced the dissolution action, she sought to enforce the terms of the parties' prenuptial agreement. The parties disagreed as to the defendant's obligations pursuant to the agreement and agreed to an arbitration of the dispute. The arbitrator concluded in favor of the defendant, and the court incorporated the arbitrator's decision into the judgment of dissolution. More than four months later, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion to open, asserting that the defendant made false representations during the arbitration and that the arbitrator had relied on the purportedly false testimony in reaching his conclusion. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff was seeking to obtain a new trial but had failed to demonstrate that the evidence on which she based her claims could not have been produced at the former trial through the exercise of due diligence. On the plaintiff's appeal, held that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying her motion to open: although the plaintiff's motion did not use the word fraud, the motion clearly addressed the elements of a fraud action, and her reply memorandum unambiguously asserted that her motion was based on fraud related to the defendant's testimony during the arbitration proceeding; moreover, the court adjudicated the plaintiff's motion pursu- ant to the standard for adjudicating a motion for a new proceeding on the basis of newly discovered evidence rather than pursuant to the standard for a motion to open on the basis of fraud, as the court's decision analyzed several of the factors required to adjudicate a motion for a new proceeding on the basis of newly discovered evidence, includ- ing an imposition on the plaintiff of an obligation of due diligence, which has been eliminated from the standard for adjudicating a motion to open on the basis of fraud; accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary hearing on a determination of whether there was probable cause to believe the judgment had been obtained by fraud. Argued September 20, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

The plaintiff, the executor of the estate of the decedent T, sought a right to title by adverse possession of a strip of the defendant's property located adjacent to certain real property that T owned at the time of his death. A was thereafter substituted as the plaintiff after he was appointed the successor administrator of T's estate. The trial court subsequently granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the action and rendered judgment thereon on the basis that A lacked standing to pursue an action on behalf of the estate, because the estate had no interest in T's property. On A's appeal to this court, held that the trial court correctly determined that A lacked standing because T devised the property to a trust for the benefit of his children, and, therefore, only the trustees of that trust, and not the executor or administrator of T's estate, had standing to prosecute the action: it was the owner of the property that stood to benefit from a resolution of the action, and, thus, that had the necessary personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, it was undisputed that T devised the property to a trust, and, accordingly, on T's death, title to that property immediately passed to that trust; more- over, A's attempt to assert standing on a theory of statutory aggrievement arising out of language in the applicable statute (§ 45a-321) was likewise unavailing, because there was no allegation that the property was needed to satisfy the debts of the estate, and, therefore, A failed to allege the necessary factual predicate to demonstrate that he was the proper party to invoke judicial resolution of any adverse possession claim. Argued October 20, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the final decision of the defendant Department of Agriculture upholding disposal orders to euthanize the plaintiff's dog, which had bitten several people. An animal control officer for the defendant town of Fairfield issued the orders pursuant to the statute (§ 22-358) pertaining to biting animals. A depart- ment hearing officer had upheld the disposal orders in a proposed final decision that the department then adopted as its final decision. The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal from the department's decision, concluding, inter alia, that he failed to prove that the depart- ment acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion in upholding the disposal orders. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the Superior Court erred in dismissing his appeal because § 22-358 (c) was unconstitutionally vague as applied in that the word ''necessary'' in the statute, concerning the issuance of a disposal order, authorizes arbitrary enforcement of the statute, and that his right to procedural due process was violated because the hearing officer adhered to no known rules, standards or procedures in determining that the disposal orders were necessary. Held: 1. The plaintiff's claim that § 22-358 (c) was unconstitutionally vague as applied was unavailing; the statute's lack of an explicit definition of ''necessary'' did not render it void for vagueness, as § 22-358 gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and provides sufficient notice that animal control officers are granted the discretion to decide what enforcement is necessary to protect the public in the case of a biting dog. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that his right to procedural due process was violated because the hearing officer used inadequate procedures in upholding the decision of the animal control officer; the Superior Court's procedural due process analysis pursuant to the factors enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge (424 U.S. 319) showed that the plaintiff's private interest in the possession of his dog was outweighed by the long-standing recognition that dogs that cause harm are subject to the police power of the state, the appeal procedures provided to the plaintiff pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (§ 4-166 et seq.) afforded him an adequate opportunity to challenge the disposal orders, and the imposition on the department of an obligation to provide a probable cause hearing in addition to the hearing before the hearing officer would be unduly burdensome, as it would require essentially duplicate proceedings. 3. The hearing officer did not abuse his discretion by admitting and consider- ing the animal control officer's expert testimony in light of the officer's knowledge, education and extensive experience and training in his posi- tion as an animal control officer. Argued September 22, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

The plaintiff sought to acquire title to a certain parcel of the defendant's real property through adverse possession, and the defendant filed a counterclaim seeking to quiet title. The trial court ordered the parties to respond to discovery and appear for depositions by a certain date, stating that the failure to comply with its order could result in sanctions, including, inter alia, fines. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for an exten- sion of time for his deposition, which the court denied. The defendant, represented by two law firms, filed two motions for order pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 1-21A), requesting that the plaintiff pay her attor- ney's fees and claiming that the plaintiff failed to respond to discovery in a timely manner, had failed to appear substantively at his deposition, and had executed documents under oath after previously indicating his inability to do so, and her counsel attached affidavits thereto. The plain- tiff did not object or respond to the defendant's motions for order. The plaintiff thereafter withdrew his complaint. The matter was tried to the court, which rendered judgment for the defendant as to her counter- claim, quieting title to the property. The court granted the motions for order and ordered monetary sanctions against the plaintiff comprised of attorney's fees in the amounts of $4859.55 and $5800, reasoning that the plaintiff failed to comply with the court's scheduling order and his discovery obligations and failed to respond to several of the defendant's motions. The plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding monetary sanctions to compensate the defendant for attorney's fees. Held that this court declined to review the plaintiff's claims that the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the defendant was improper and that those fees were excessive, unreasonable, and clearly erroneous: in accordance with Smith v. Snyder (267 Conn. 456), which indicates that the other party must oppose or otherwise take action in response to a request for attorney's fees, the plaintiff's failure to oppose or to present any chal- lenge regarding the attorney's fees to the trial court prior to its granting of the motions for order, precluded this court's review of his complaints regarding those fees at this juncture. Submitted on briefs December 6, 2021—officially released January 25, 2022

The plaintiff sought to confirm an arbitration award against the defendant arising out of a separate action in which she sought to recover damages from the insurer L for underinsured motorist benefits. The plaintiff previously had received a $20,000 settlement from a tortfeasor in connec- tion with injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle collision. In bringing the underinsured motorist action against L, the plaintiff alleged that the $20,000 settlement was insufficient to fully compensate her and that L was legally responsible for damages in excess of the underinsured motorist's coverage. The plaintiff, the defendant and L ultimately agreed to settle the case by means of binding arbitration and entered into a written arbitration agreement. Thereafter, an arbitrator issued an award in the amount of $33,807.50. The arbitrator made no findings regarding collateral sources, which were to be deducted from the total damages pursuant to the parties' arbitration agreement. The parties subsequently agreed with each other as to the amounts of collateral sources, but disagreed as to whether the $20,000 settlement should be deducted from the award. The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's application to confirm the award, in which it argued, inter alia, that it was legally responsible only for damages exceeding the $20,000 settlement that the plaintiff already had received from the tortfeasor. The defendant did not otherwise file a motion to modify or to correct the award. Thereafter, upon the parties' request, the arbitrator issued an articulation stating that the award of $33,807.50 was a full value award, which did not take into account any collateral sources or offsets, or the $20,000 settlement. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment confirming the award with deductions of $1020.02 in collateral sources and $20,000 to offset the prior settlement, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly deducted $20,000 from the arbitration award to offset the settlement that the plaintiff had received from the tortfeasor: although the plaintiff claimed that the court lacked statutory and com- mon-law authority to modify the award, this court concluded that the trial court did not modify the award but, instead, merely conformed the award to the parties' arbitration agreement; moreover, in light of the agreement's reference to the plaintiff's underinsured motorist lawsuit and the nature of her underlying claim, the only reasonable interpretation of the agreement was that the parties initially contemplated and agreed that the arbitrator's gross award would be the sum of the plaintiff's total economic and noneconomic damages, less the $20,000 she had received from the tortfeasor; furthermore, although the arbitration agreement provided that the arbitrator would calculate the gross award and then deduct damages determined to be collateral sources, the arbitrator made clear in his decision and in his articulation that his award was for the full value of the plaintiff's damages, without considering the issues of collateral sources or offsets, demonstrating that the parties subsequently modified their written agreement and submitted to the arbitrator only the question of the plaintiff's total economic and noneconomic damages and preserving the written agreement's provisions limiting the defen- dant's liability only to those damages in excess of the $20,000 settlement and any collateral sources. 2. This court concluded that, although the trial court properly deducted the $20,000 settlement from the arbitration award, it miscalculated the amount of the judgment: subtracting the collateral sources and the settlement from the arbitrator's full value award yielded the sum of $12,787.48, not the amount of $12,500 that the trial court had calculated. Argued May 11, 2021—officially released February 1, 2022

The plaintiffs appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeal from the decision of the Commis- sioner of Energy and Environmental Protection denying their applica- tions for two new source air permits. The plaintiffs sought the required permits from the defendant Department of Energy and Environmental Protection in order to install and operate two cremation machines at the site of their proposed crematorium. After a hearing, a department hearing officer issued a decision recommending that the plaintiffs' permit applications be denied on the basis that the plaintiffs' cremation system exceeded the maximum allowable stack concentration (MASC) for emis- sions of mercury pursuant to the applicable regulation (§ 22a-174-29). The commissioner adopted the hearing officer's decision and issued a final decision affirming the denial of the permit applications. Held: 1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that § 22a-174-29 (b) (2) should be interpreted to require mercury to be measured at the property line, at which point the mercury would be in its particulate form and calculating the MASC would be unnecessary, as it was clearly contrary to what a plain reading of the regulation provided; this court, like the commissioner and the trial court, interpreted § 22a-174-29 (b) (2) to require the calculation of the MASC for emissions of mercury in its vapor form at the discharge point from the crematorium stacks. 2. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court erred by interpreting improperly the term ambient air: the trial court properly interpreted § 22a-174-29 (b) (2), and, in light of this court's review of the record and the considerable discretion afforded to the commissioner on questions of facts, the trial court properly applied that regulation to the facts of the present case when it concluded that the commissioner's decision to deny the plaintiffs' applications was not unreasonable, arbi- trary, capricious, illegal or an abuse of discretion, as the data presented to the commissioner demonstrated that the concentration of mercury vapor at the discharge point would exceed the MASC for mercury. 3. The plaintiffs' contention that the trial court went beyond the pleadings and improperly adjudicated issues not raised on appeal was unfounded: because the plaintiffs claimed that the commissioner misinterpreted and misapplied § 22a-174-29, it was clearly necessary for the court to consider the interpretation of that regulation, along with how it should be applied to the facts of the present case, in order to resolve the plaintiffs' appeal. 4. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court erred by violating binding legal precedent and the applicable statute (§ 4-183 (j)): although the plaintiffs argued that the commissioner's decision was made upon unlawful procedure on the basis that he improperly admitted a certain letter from department staff into evidence without providing the plaintiffs the opportunity to respond or to cross-examine the staff, the commissioner made clear that the letter was not evidence and, therefore, there was no requirement to afford the plaintiffs the opportu- nity for cross-examination; moreover, the department's regulations did not prohibit such a letter, and the plaintiffs were able to respond to the letter by filing their objection; furthermore, the plaintiffs' claim that the court misunderstood the evidence and eschewed the expert opinions was simply unsupported by the record and, as this court already con- cluded, the court properly interpreted the regulations and properly applied the substantial evidence standard in its review of the commis- sioner's decision. Argued October 21, 2021—officially released February 1, 2022

The plaintiff landlord sought to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen- dants' alleged violations of a lease agreement entered into in connection with the rental of a furnished, single-family home. Within thirty days of the termination of their tenancy, the plaintiff sent to the defendants an accounting of their security deposit and the alleged damages to the leased property, which indicated that there had been more than $50,000 in damages and that the deposit had been fully expended to cover certain of the expenses incurred in connection therewith. The defendants filed a counterclaim in which they alleged that the plaintiff violated the security deposit statute (§ 47a-21) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his complaint and on the defendants' counterclaim, and the defendants appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court erred in rendering judgment against them for damages to the premises without determining the age and condition of the property at the time of the commencement of the tenancy and the relative wear and tear of the items at the time of the termination of the tenancy: the trial court had ample evidence before it that supported its calculation of damages, including a comprehensive list of the damaged items and fixtures, photo- graphs of the damage, and receipts for repairs and replacement pur- chases; moreover, any wear and tear of the individual items was insignifi- cant, given the scope of the documented damage; accordingly, the trial court's damages award was not improper. 2. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court erred in failing to render judgment in their favor on the counterclaim: a. The trial court's finding with respect to the amount of the security deposit paid to the plaintiff was not clearly erroneous: the lease agree- ment, which was admitted into evidence as an exhibit at trial, substanti- ated the court's factual finding as to the amount of the security deposit; moreover, the defendants did not offer any documentary evidence at trial, such as receipts or other banking records, of payments made to the plaintiff in excess of the security deposit amount set forth in the lease. b. The trial court's determination that the plaintiff properly provided the defendants with a written accounting of the deductions made from the security deposit, as required by § 47a-21 (d) (2), was not clearly errone- ous: a comprehensive written statement prepared by the plaintiff, which detailed the damages to the property, the costs incurred in association therewith, and the balance of the security deposit, was introduced into evidence at trial along with evidence that the plaintiff sent such statement to each defendant within thirty days of the termination of their tenancy; moreover, the remaining security deposit funds were properly applied to the damages caused by the defendants because the costs of repairing and replacing the damaged items, as documented in the written state- ment, exceeded the balance of the security deposit. c. This court declined to disturb the trial court's conclusion that the defendants failed to establish that the plaintiff had violated § 47a-21 (h) by failing to retain the security deposit in a separate escrow account: the defendants discussion of the plaintiff's alleged violation of § 47a-21 (h) was limited to the foundation that they laid for their counterclaim under CUTPA and, accordingly, this court's ability to grant relief was conditioned on whether the plaintiff's failure to hold the security deposit in an escrow account was a CUTPA violation; moreover, the plaintiff's alleged conduct, even if found by the court, was not sufficiently unfair or deceptive to constitute a CUTPA violation; furthermore, even if the plaintiff's alleged conduct did amount to a violation of CUTPA, the defendants were barred from recovery because they failed to satisfy the requirements of the applicable statute (§ 42-110g (a)), as they did not put forth any evidence of an ascertainable loss stemming from the plaintiff's handling of their security deposit and they failed to show that the plaintiff misappropriated or otherwise improperly took money out of the initial security deposit. Submitted on briefs September 20, 2021—officially released February 1, 2022

The plaintiffs, B and his wife, sought to recover damages from the defendant hospital for, inter alia, injuries B allegedly sustained while he was receiv- ing treatment from the defendant's employees. Over a three day period, two of the defendant's nurses, K and L, administered medication to B rectally via enema a total of three times. On the day following the final administration, a physician discovered that B's rectum had been perforated. As a result, B developed a necrotizing infection and sepsis, his health deteriorated, and he required multiple medical procedures. At trial, after the plaintiffs had rested, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, claiming that the plaintiffs had failed to present an evidentiary basis as to when the perforation occurred, which of the defendant's employees had breached the applicable standard of care, and whether the tip of the enema was capable of causing the perforation. The trial court reserved its decision on the motion and permitted the issues to be submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and the defendant filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and to set aside the verdict. The trial court denied both motions and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict: this court, determining that the issue was subject to plenary review because the question of whether the evidence was sufficient to withstand the motion was one of law, concluded that the plaintiffs had met their burden of producing sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the enema was physically capable of causing the perforation, as an expert testified regarding the average length of the anal canal and the length of the tip of the enema, stating that it could reach into the rectum and that it was possible for the tip to go through the rectum and cause the perforation suffered by B; moreover, the defendant did not provide any authority for its assertion that the plaintiffs needed to provide specific evidence regarding B's actual anatomical measurements, and the experts were not required to disprove all other possible explanations for the injury but only needed to show that their opinions were based on reasonable probabilities; furthermore, the use of a differential diagnosis was proper and sufficient to establish the plaintiffs' theory of causation, namely, that the defendant's employees caused the perforation suffered by B, as the jury heard evidence that there was no perforation of B's rectum prior to his hospitalization, that the most likely cause of the perforation was the insertion of a foreign object, and that, although there were four possible causation events, an expert witness used differential diagnosis to eliminate three of the potential causes and opined that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, an enema administered during B's hospitalization caused the perforation, and this court and our Supreme Court have indicated that a causal relationship between an injury and its later physical effects may be established by a physician's deduction through the process of eliminating other causes. 2. The trial court properly denied the motion to set aside the verdict, as the defendant could not prevail on its claim that the jury improperly was permitted to consider a theory of negligence unsupported by the evi- dence: the plaintiffs presented sufficient expert evidence for the jury to find that L caused the perforation of B's rectum, as L administered an enema during the time frame in which the perforation likely occurred, an expert physician testified that the perforation was caused by the administration of an enema with excessive force and indicated that one of the nurses had caused it, and a registered nurse, one of the plaintiffs' experts, testified that K or L had used improper technique in administer- ing the enemas and indicated that L had caused the perforation, although she later clarified her statement to indicate that she could not determine which individual nurse bore sole responsibility for causing the perfora- tion. Argued May 24, 2021—officially released February 8, 2022

The plaintiffs sought, inter alia, a partition of the assets and a dissolution of a family partnership, of which the plaintiffs and the named defendant were original members. The plaintiffs claimed that there was significant discord among the members, including that the defendant occupied certain real property in Manchester owned by the partnership without paying rent and refused to remit rent received from nonpartner tenants. In 2015, the court dissolved the partnership and appointed R as a receiver to wind up the partnership and to sell certain real property owned by the partnership. Later that year, during the trial, the plaintiffs and the partnership reached a settlement agreement and submitted a partial settlement notice, which stated that issues remained in dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendant. Soon thereafter, the plaintiffs and the defendant reached a settlement agreement. In accordance with the set- tlement agreement, the trial was adjourned and certain real property was sold with partial distributions made to the parties, with the exception of the defendant, who was to receive a certain parcel of real property, the value of which was to be deducted from his share of funds generated from the sale of real property. In 2017, the court approved the receiver's report, over the defendant's objection, which authorized the receiver to proceed with an application for a subdivision of real property. In 2018, the application for the subdivision of the property was approved and the court thereafter granted the receiver's motion for an order for the authority to list the lots for sale. Later that year, the defendant moved to inspect and copy financial records of the partnership, which the court denied. The defendant did not then appeal from that judgment. In 2019, the defendant filed a counterclaim, without a request for leave to amend or motion to amend. The defendant appealed from the court's judgment granting the plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendant's coun- terclaim, but failed to brief that claim. In 2020, the court appointed P as receiver. Thereafter, the defendant amended his appeal five times, challenging other actions of the court. Held: 1. The portion of the defendant's appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motions to inspect and copy corporate and partnership tax returns and his motion to compel further discovery was dismissed, the defendant having failed to properly appeal those rulings of the court. 2. The portions of the defendant's appeal challenging the trial court's failure to address the dispute in the presettlement notice among the parties before the settlement was reached and its failure to order the plaintiffs to release all claims during the 2015 settlement negotiations were dis- missed: these events occurred nearly four years before the defendant filed the present appeal; moreover, these portions of the defendant's appeal are not from judgments of the court and are not judgments encompassed in his notice of appeal. 3. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in authorizing an application for a subdivision of a property owned by the partnership as the claim was inadequately briefed, the defendant having failed to cite any statute, case law, rule of court, or other legal authority that could render the court's action improper. 4. The trial court did not err in appointing P as a receiver, as the appointment of a receiver is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Argued November 9, 2021—officially released February 8, 2022

The plaintiff, who had been arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of statute (§ 14- 227a), appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, suspending the plaintiff's motor vehicle operator's license and requiring the installation of ignition inter- lock devices on his motor vehicles pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b). Fol- lowing the plaintiff's arrest, a police officer administered a breath alcohol test on him four times. Although the second test yielded a higher blood alcohol content result than the first, it was invalidated. Only the first and fourth tests yielded valid results, the fourth producing a lower result than the first. At the administrative hearing before the defendant's hearing officer, the plaintiff presented the testimony of an expert, P, that the second test had been scientifically valid and that the plaintiff's blood alcohol content had been rising from the time he operated his motor vehicle to the time when the tests were performed. The hearing officer found that P's testimony was informative but not persuasive. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, claiming that the hearing officer improperly relied on the presumption in § 14-227b (g) that the results of blood alcohol tests commenced within two hours of operation of a motor vehicle were sufficient to indicate blood alcohol content at the time of operation and that the hearing officer had ignored the exception in the criminal statute, § 14-227a (b), that, if the results of a second blood alcohol test indicated that the ratio of alcohol in the blood was 0.1 percent or less and was higher than the results of the first test, the defendant was required to show that the test results and analysis accurately reflected the plaintiff's blood alcohol content at the time of the alleged offense. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that his right to procedural due process was violated by the administrative procedures contained in § 14-227b (g) regarding evidence of blood alcohol content in the context of a license suspension hearing: the hearing officer, having considered and found unpersuasive P's opinion that the results of the tests were unreliable, properly applied the permissive presumption that the breath alcohol test results were sufficient to indicate the plaintiff's blood alcohol content at the time of operation without the need for additional evidence; moreover, the state's interest in promoting traffic safety and performing license suspension hearings in an expeditious manner comported with the presumption in § 14-227b (g), and the plain- tiff, as the subject of a license suspension hearing, was not entitled to all of the procedural protections available in a criminal proceeding, thus, the rising blood alcohol content exception in § 14-227a (b) was not applicable to the plaintiff; furthermore; substantial evidence in the record consisting of the plaintiff's valid breath alcohol test results dem- onstrated that his blood alcohol content was falling, not rising. 2. The trial court properly determined that § 14-227b and not § 14-227a applied to the plaintiff's administrative license suspension hearing; §14- 227a (b) expressly provides that it applies to criminal prosecutions, and the plaintiff was the subject of a civil administrative license suspension hearing, which was governed by § 14-227b. Argued October 18, 2021—officially released February 8, 2022

The defendant B Co., which owned a portion of a residential housing develop- ment adjacent to Long Island Sound, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court summarily enforcing a settlement agreement among the parties to resolve a dispute over access to the shore. The plaintiffs, who owned interior lots in the development, had brought an action to quiet title to an avenue that ran through the development as well as to a lawn that abuts the sound at the end of the avenue. After most of the parties' claims were resolved during the course of the litigation, counsel for some of the parties informed the trial court that all of the parties had reached a settlement agreement and, thereafter, entered two interrelated agreements on the record during a pretrial hearing. The settlement agreement required, inter alia, that B Co. would quitclaim the avenue to the town of Branford and P Co., a municipal subdivision of the town, and grant the town an easement for the repair, maintenance and replacement of a certain drainpipe at the end of the avenue that ran toward the sound. After the court ordered that the case had been reported settled, B Co. claimed that the defendants J and E, who owned a waterfront lot in the development, had interfered with the execution of the settlement agreement. B Co. filed a motion seeking an order that J and E were bound by the agreement and had no right to interfere with its implementation but later withdrew its motions for order and to bind. J and E claimed that they were not bound by the agreement. At a later hearing on motions to enforce the agreement that were filed by the plaintiffs, the town and P Co., in which they asserted that J and E were not bound by the agreement, the plaintiffs' counsel did not represent that J and E had signed off on the agreement. The court then ordered the plaintiffs' counsel to file a proposed order regarding enforcement of the agreement. The court thereafter granted the plain- tiffs' motions to enforce the agreement, concluding that J and E were not parties to the agreement and entering certain orders to implement the agreement. Held: 1. B Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in finding that J and E were not parties to the settlement agreement, which was based on B Co.'s assertions that whether they were parties to the agree- ment was not before the court, that the record did not support the court's finding and that the court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matter: a. In determining that J and E were not parties to the settlement agree- ment, the trial court addressed a question that was relevant to its adjudi- cation of the motions to enforce the agreement, and, notwithstanding B Co.'s claim that the issue of whether J and E were parties to the agreement was not before the court as a result of its withdrawal of prior motions it filed to bind them to the agreement, the status of J and E was squarely before the court vis--vis the parties' motions to enforce the agreement. b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that J and E were not parties to the settlement agreement: during the pretrial hearing, counsel for J and E unequivocally conveyed to the court that J and E were not in agreement with the terms of the agreement, which no party disputed, and counsel for J and E was not present when the plaintiffs' counsel, without mentioning J and E, subsequently entered the agreement on the record; moreover, the agreement, which imposed no obligations on J and E, provided that it was without prejudice as to any claims by or against them, and B Co.'s counsel did not identify J and E as parties, and thereafter took the position that B Co. had not required J and E to approve the agreement; furthermore, statements made by the plaintiffs' counsel when he entered the agreement on the record and during the subsequent hearing on the motions to enforce the agreement reasonably could be construed to indicate that J and E, although not joining the settlement agreement, were not objecting to the other parties' presenting the agreement to the court. c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing as to whether J and E were parties to the settlement agreement: prior to and at the hearing on the motions to enforce the agreement, B Co. did not pursue opportunities it had to make a request to introduce evidence on that issue; moreover, at the hearing on the motions to enforce the agreement, B Co.'s counsel answered affirmatively when asked directly by the court to confirm that B Co. was no longer seeking an order binding J and E to the agreement, and B Co.'s counsel made no response to the court's statements that it did not believe it was necessary to hear evidence with respect to the motions to enforce. 2. Contrary to B Co.'s assertion, the trial court did not alter or omit material terms contained in the settlement agreement when it entered orders to implement the agreement, except for the court's failure to include notice and cooperation terms the agreement explicitly required: a. This court determined that, under its case law, the abuse of discretion standard of review applied to its consideration of B Co.'s claims. b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its orders implementing certain material terms of the settlement agreement in its enforcement decision, as the court reasonably determined that Long Island Sound was the southern boundary of a view easement contained in the settlement agreement, it did not fail to order that the settlement agreement was contingent on the execution of certain quitclaim deeds and releases, this court having perceived no appreciable difference between the parties' agreement that the settlement agreement was contingent on the execu- tion of the documents at issue and the court's ordering that all settlement documents, which included those at issue, shall be executed, the enforce- ment decision did not create confusion in describing the area in which sitting and recreating was prohibited, as this court perceived no apprecia- ble difference between the description of that area in the settlement agreement and the enforcement decision, the court's enforcement deci- sion, read in its entirety, provided, contrary to B Co.'s claim, that the town may maintain, repair and replace the drainpipe, the court did not improperly omit, as B Co. claimed, a cooperation clause from its enforcement decision, as the agreement contained no sweeping coopera- tion clause but required the parties to cooperate as to the town's acquisi- tion of the avenue and as to other necessary approvals, and the court did not improperly omit an order requiring the withdrawal and release of claims by the parties in a related action. c. The trial court improperly failed to include in its enforcement decision an order that the town was required to provide reasonable notice to and cooperate with B Co. in scheduling repair work on the drainpipe on B Co.'s property for which the town had an easement: the notice and cooperation terms were set forth explicitly in the settlement agreement, the court did not include or refer to them in its enforcement decision, and this court did not read them to be implicit in that decision; moreover, it was apparent that the court intended to have the enforcement decision encompass all material terms of the settlement agreement. Argued November 9, 2021—officially released February 22, 2022

The plaintiff, whose employment with the defendant had been terminated, appealed to this court from the trial court's judgment dismissing her application to vacate an arbitration award following the cancellation of an arbitration of a grievance relating to her termination. The Office of Labor Relations had denied a grievance by the plaintiff's union seeking her reinstatement. The plaintiff thereafter waived her right to union representation and sought independent counsel to represent her during the arbitration of that grievance. The plaintiff failed to deposit the required funds for her share of the arbitration costs in escrow, and the office cancelled the arbitration. The plaintiff filed an application to vacate an arbitration award pursuant to statute (§ 52-418 or § 52-420), and requested that the court issue a pendente lite order pursuant to statute (§ 52-422) to, inter alia, open the arbitration proceedings. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's application to vacate an arbitration award and, thus, properly dismissed it: no arbitration award was issued, thus, an essential condition of §§ 52- 418 and 52-420 was not met; moreover, because no arbitration was pending, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's petition for an order pendente lite. Submitted on briefs December 2, 2021—officially released February 22, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia, the alleged breach of a guaranty agreement. The plaintiff alleged that C Co. extended a loan to L Co., evidenced by a note executed on behalf of L Co. by the defendant L, acting as attorney-in-fact for the defendant S, the president of L Co. The note was secured by a mortgage on certain real property located in New York. Additionally, L, individually and as attorney-in-fact for S, executed a guaranty agreement, guaranteeing the debt under the note. L Co. defaulted on its payments, and C Co. com- menced an action in New York to foreclose on the property. Thereafter, L Co. filed for bankruptcy, and the Bankruptcy Court issued an order approving the sale of the property pursuant to an approved bankruptcy plan. C Co. assigned its claims against L Co. to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were liable under the guaranty for all amounts remaining due under the note. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in which they argued that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and that, pursuant to New York statute (N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1371), it was necessary for the plaintiff to move for a deficiency judgment in order to recover under the guaranty. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that § 1371 did not apply because the property was not sold in a foreclosure action, and the defendants appealed to this court. Held that the trial court did not err in denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment, as the plaintiff's claims were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata: by its terms, § 1371 applies only when a foreclosure sale occurs, and, because the property was sold pursuant to a bankruptcy plan, rather than a foreclosure sale, § 1371 did not require the plaintiff to seek a deficiency judgment, the defendants had not filed for bankruptcy and were not parties to L Co.'s bankruptcy proceedings, and, thus, there was no reason for the Bankruptcy Court to address whether there was any deficiency from the sale that would trigger the defendants' obliga- tions under the guaranty; moreover, although the Bankruptcy Court determined the amount that L Co. owed the plaintiff after the sale of the property, the parties agreed to litigate claims arising out of the guaranty agreement in Connecticut state court; furthermore, this court was not satisfied that the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to litigate its breach of guaranty claims against the defendants in L Co.'s bank- ruptcy proceeding, and this court was unaware of a case in which a plaintiff has pursued a breach of guaranty claim in a bankruptcy court against a guarantor who was not the subject of the underlying bankruptcy proceeding. Argued November 17, 2021—officially released March 1, 2022