Volume 211 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder, filed a fifth petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, appellate counsel, and his prior habeas counsel to his first, second, and third petitions had provided ineffective assistance, that his due process rights had been violated at his criminal trial, and that there had been significant developments in the science of eyewitness identification that warranted the court to vacate or modify his conviction or sentence, which the habeas court interpreted as an actual innocence claim. The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, appellate counsel, and first habeas coun- sel, his claim of due process violations, and his claim of actual innocence. The habeas court held a hearing on the two remaining claims and subse- quently dismissed the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of his second habeas counsel and denied the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of his third habeas counsel, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner's claims concern- ing ineffective assistance by his trial counsel, appellate counsel, and first habeas counsel were barred by the doctrine of res judicata; the petitioner did not allege that he was seeking different relief than the relief he sought in prior petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel or that there were new facts or evidence not reasonably available at the time of his original petition. 2. The habeas court properly determined that the Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Guilbert (306 Conn. 218) and State v. Dickson (322 Conn. 410) could not be applied retroactively on collateral review to the petitioner's claims concerning due process violations and actual innocence, and, therefore, the petitioner's claims were properly dismissed on the basis of res judicata: a. Although Dickson held that first-time, in-court identifications impli- cated due process protections and must be prescreened by the trial court, this constitutional rule did not apply retroactively on collateral review because it was neither a substantive rule nor a watershed proce- dural rule. b. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that Guilbert, in which a nonconstitutional state evidentiary claim involving the reliability of eyewitness identifications was at issue, applied retroactively on collateral review: because Guilbert did not announce a new constitutional rule or a new judicial interpretation of a criminal statute, complete retroactive application was inappropriate; moreover, the Guilbert framework for evaluating the reliability of an identification that was the result of an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure did not fall within the narrow watershed exception pursuant to Teague v. Lane (489 U.S. 288) because the rule was prophylactic, a violation of the rule did not necessar- ily rise to the level of a due process violation, and the rule amounted to an incremental change in identification procedures. c. Because the petitioner previously raised and litigated the claims per- taining to the admission of the in-court identification of the petitioner in his direct appeal, the habeas court's dismissal of the petitioner's claims of violations of due process and actual innocence was appropriate. 3. The habeas court's denial of the petitioner's claim alleging ineffective assistance by his third habeas counsel was affirmed on the alternative ground that it was barred by collateral estoppel: the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the petitioner from raising the issue of whether his third habeas counsel was ineffective for failing to argue claims against his appellate counsel based on their failure to challenge the witnesses' identifications because it previously had been determined that the admis- sion at trial of the identifications of the petitioner was proper; moreover, the habeas court correctly determined that the petitioner's third habeas counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to allege and prove a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present a third-party culpability defense, the petitioner having failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the evidence was adequate to support a viable third-party culpability defense. Argued October 19, 2021—officially released March 8, 2022

The self-represented petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of kidnapping in the first degree, assault in the third degree, interfering with an officer, and possession of narcotics, sought a writ of habeas corpus. His amended petition set forth seven grounds of alleged error. Grounds I through VI alleged that, at his criminal trial, his constitutional rights to a fair trial, to present a defense, to represent himself, and to counsel were violated and that the prosecutor violated the disclosure requirements of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83). Ground VII alleged that the petitioner's appellate counsel, D, provided ineffective assistance during his direct appeal by raising only one claim, namely, that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the petitioner's conviction of kidnapping in the first degree under State v. Salamon (287 Conn. 509). The habeas court dismissed grounds I through VI of the amended petition, concluding that the petitioner's claims were procedur- ally defaulted because he failed to present any evidence, other than his own self-serving testimony, to show cause for failing to raise the claims on direct appeal and to establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The habeas court denied ground VII of the amended petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that D's performance was deficient or that the petitioner suf- fered any prejudice as a result of D's representation. The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court with respect only to the issue of whether his constitutional right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel was violated. The habeas court denied the petition, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court declined to review the petitioner's claims that the habeas court improperly denied his motion to sequester D, struck his motion to reconstruct and correct the record, and denied his application to issue a subpoena: an appellate court can review only the merits of the claims specifically set forth in the petition for certification to appeal, and, because the petitioner failed to include such claims in his petition, the habeas court did not have the opportunity to consider such issues in the context of a petition for certification to appeal; accordingly, such claims were not properly before this court and were not reviewable. 2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition for certification to appeal its dismissal of grounds I through VI of the amended petition and its denial of ground VII of the amended petition because the petitioner failed to raise a claim that met any part of the test for certification to appeal from the denial of his petition: a. The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's claims alleged in grounds I through VI of the amended petition on the ground of procedural default: the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that he had satisfied the cause and prejudice standard required to raise such claims in a collateral proceeding because, contrary to his assertions, he provided no specific evidence, other than his own self-serving testimony, to support his claim that he introduced sufficient evidence at the habeas trial to rebut the presumption that his counsel rendered adequate assis- tance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, as he did not call D as a witness to explain why he raised only a claim of insufficient evidence in the petitioner's criminal appeal nor did he present any expert testimony or other competent evidence to demonstrate that D's representation was deficient as a result of his failure to raise the claims alleged in grounds I through VI of the petitioner's amended petition. b. The habeas court did not err by denying ground VII of the petitioner's amended petition: the petitioner failed to adequately brief his claim because, although his principal appellate brief contained a litany of errors that D allegedly committed with respect to the petitioner's criminal appeal, he did not provide any legal analysis regarding how the habeas court erred with respect to those claims, and his self-represented status did not excuse such failure; moreover, the petitioner's attempt to remedy his failure by providing supplemental information in his reply brief was inadequate because such arguments could not be raised for the first time in a reply brief; furthermore, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the habeas court's finding that he failed to provide evidence, beyond his own self-serving, conclusory testimony, that D provided ineffective assistance was clearly erroneous, as the petitioner failed to call D as a witness or to present expert testimony to demonstrate that D's represen- tation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Argued October 20, 2021—officially released March 8, 2022

The petitioner, a citizen of Jamaica, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, R, had provided ineffective assistance by failing to unequivocally advise him that a guilty plea to the charge of risk of injury to a child would subject him to mandatory deportation. The petitioner initially was charged with offenses that exposed him to 160 years of incarceration before he pleaded guilty and received a lesser sentence, with the potential of no jail time, under a plea agreement offered by the state. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, concluding that, although R had rendered deficient performance by failing to clearly and unambiguously convey to the petitioner the certainty of his deportation, the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by that performance. Following the granting of the petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improperly concluded that he had failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668); the court's conclusion that the petitioner had not satisfied the prejudice prong was supported by evidence in the record that the court found to be credible, namely, R's testimony that the petitioner was concerned with both the risk of deportation and the risk of incarceration, the state's case against the petitioner was strong, and it was likely that, if the petitioner had gone to trial and been convicted, the petitioner would have received a sentence of thirty years of incarceration; moreover, the court, having assessed the petitioner's testimony and having considered whether the petitioner rationally would have rejected the plea offer had he known that accepting it would result in mandatory deportation, did not find the petitioner's testimony to be credible. Argued December 1, 2021—officially released March 8, 2022

The plaintiff sought damages for the alleged deprivation of his due process rights by the defendant, the statewide bar counsel for the Statewide Grievance Committee. The plaintiff had filed two grievance complaints with the committee against R, an attorney. In response to each complaint, the defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff stating that, after review, it was decided to dismiss the plaintiff's complaints without referring them to a grievance panel because the complaints did not allege facts that, if true, would violate the rules governing attorney conduct. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated his rights under the federal and state constitutions by dismissing his grievance complaints against R. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground of absolute immunity and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as the defen- dant was entitled to absolute immunity because his actions in reviewing complaints of attorney misconduct were taken in a quasi-judicial capac- ity as part of a statewide grievance proceeding: the defendant acted at all times pursuant to the statutory (§ 51-90c) authority vested in his office and in accordance with the applicable rule of practice (§ 2-32), as the statewide bar counsel has the responsibility to exercise judgment and discretion, is vested with investigative authority, ascertains and determines facts, makes decisions affecting the personal or property rights of private persons, and makes binding orders and judgments to either dismiss a complaint or refer it to a grievance panel or an arbitration panel; moreover, because the Office of the Statewide Bar Counsel is a creature of statute entrusted with the responsibility for reviewing complaints of attorney misconduct, a sound public policy existed to recognize the statewide bar counsel's complete freedom of expression that a grant of absolute immunity provided; furthermore, the Office of the Statewide Bar Counsel also acts as an arm of the court to effectuate its inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline members of the bar. Argued November 30, 2021—officially released March 8, 2022

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the decree of the Probate Court appointing the defendant H as the conservator of the estate of the plaintiff's mother. The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as it was filed pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute (§ 52-592 (a)), which does not apply to probate appeals. The plaintiff filed a motion to open and vacate the judgment of dismissal, which the trial court denied. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that there was no basis on which to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to open. Argued February 10—officially released March 8, 2022

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a foreclo- sure action because any mortgage interest the plaintiff had held in the subject property had been foreclosed in an earlier action brought by the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. After the defendant's attorney, in his brief to this court, refuted certain factual representations made by the plaintiff's attorney in the plaintiff's principal brief, the plaintiff's attorney failed to clarify the matter in the plaintiff's reply brief. During oral argument before this court, when the plaintiff's attorney was questioned about the disputed factual representations, he was unable or unwilling to vouch for the veracity of those statements, did not direct the court's attention to any relevant portion of the record, and did not provide any citation to the record to support those factual assertions. Approximately one month later, the plaintiff's attorney filed a motion with this court for leave to correct the plaintiff's brief. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on its challenge to the trial court's dismissal of its action; because the plaintiff, who was defaulted for failure to appear in the prior foreclosure action brought by the defendant, made no effort to redeem on or before its designated law day, its mortgage interest was extinguished and, after all law days had passed, title to the property vested in the defendant, leaving the property no longer subject to the plaintiff's mortgage. 2. This court denied the motion for leave to correct the plaintiff's brief filed by the plaintiff's attorney as untimely: the plaintiff's attorney waited too long to correct the misrepresentations, and his effort to remedy them in their entirety was lacking; moreover, the plaintiff's attorney was placed on notice that future, similar conduct would result in the imposi- tion of sanctions and/or professional discipline. Argued January 6—officially released March 8, 2022

The plaintiff, which had entered into a written contract in 2014 with the defendant to supply deicing liquid, brought an action alleging, inter alia, that the defendant had breached the contract by failing to pay the plaintiff for services rendered on four occasions in 2018. The defendant filed an answer and special defenses alleging, inter alia, that the contract was satisfied in full prior to the four occasions in question. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that, although the parties' written contract had expired, the parties had an implied contract on the basis of their course of dealings over the years since 2014, and the defendant breached that implied contract. Thereafter, the court granted the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint alleging breach of implied contract, and the defendant appealed. Held that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to amend its complaint after trial to conform to the evidence; although both com- plaints sought payment for services rendered on specific occasions, the amended complaint alleged an entirely new and different factual situation, as the original complaint was based on the parties' express written contract and sought the outstanding balance allegedly due and the amended complaint alleged an implied contract and sought only the plaintiff's commission, and the defendant was not given the opportunity to defend against the amended complaint by filing amended special defenses, conducting discovery, or calling witnesses at trial to rebut the plaintiff's claim for a commission; accordingly, the defendant was entitled to judgment in its favor. Argued December 6, 2021—officially released March 8, 2022

The defendant, who had been on probation in connection with his convic- tions, in two cases, of risk of injury to a child and sexual assault in the fourth degree, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation in each case. The parties appeared at a violation of probation hearing before the trial court, which noted that the parties had agreed to an open recommendation for sentencing, explained an open recommendation to the defendant, and canvassed the defendant on his admission to a violation of probation in each case. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to advise him of his right to maintain a denial of his violation of probation: the defendant's admissions were made knowingly and voluntarily, as the court's compre- hensive canvass of the defendant informed him of the maximum sen- tence, of his right to a violation of probation hearing and the opportunity to present defenses at that hearing, and explained the state's burden of proof; moreover, the defendant indicated to the court that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, that he had discussed the implications of his admissions with his attorney, and that he entered his admissions of his own free will; furthermore, the defendant's experi- ence at his underlying criminal prosecution and a prior probation revoca- tion proceeding supported the inference that his admissions were made knowingly and voluntarily. Argued November 8, 2021—officially released March 8, 2022

The plaintiff, who was incarcerated following his conviction on the basis of his guilty plea to multiple counts of assault in the first degree, sought damages for alleged legal malpractice by the defendants, two attorneys and their law firm, who had previously represented the plaintiff in a habeas action concerning his criminal conviction. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and rendered a judgment of dismissal. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's legal malpractice action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it was not ripe for adjudication; this court, applying the exoneration rule set forth in Taylor v. Wallace (184 Conn. App. 43), and subsequent cases, which holds that a legal malpractice action is not ripe for adjudication when success in that action would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction and the underlying convic- tion has not been invalidated, concluded that, because the plaintiff had been convicted and that conviction had not been invalidated on direct appeal or through a habeas action, his claim was a collateral attack on his underlying conviction, his claim for legal malpractice was not ripe, and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Argued February 14—officially released March 8, 2022

The plaintiff city sought to vacate an arbitration award issued in connection with its alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement that it had entered into with the defendant police union. Between March, 2017, and June, 2018, all five of the city's police captains retired and their positions remained vacant until September, 2018, when they were filled simultane- ously. The union filed a grievance, alleging that the city had violated the terms of certain appendices to the agreement, which it claimed required the city to maintain five police captain positions at all times. The parties submitted the issue for arbitration. An arbitration panel found that the city had violated the agreement by leaving open the vacancies and awarded each of the employees who were appointed to the position of police captain in September, 2018, an amount equal to the difference between their rate of pay on the date when the first police captain retired and their rate of pay on the date when they were appointed police captain, for the period between March, 2017, and September, 2018, not including any overtime worked during that period. The city filed an application to vacate the arbitration award, which the trial court denied, and the city appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly rejected the city's claim that the panel exceeded its authority in violation of the applicable statute (§ 52-418 (a) (4)) in finding that the city violated the agreement: although the agreement did not explicitly state that the city must employ five police captains at all times, the panel interpreted the language of the agreement in such a manner, such an interpretation was not unreasonable, and the city's disagreement with the interpretation was not sufficient to establish that the panel had exceeded its authority; moreover, the city could not prevail on its claim that the award failed to draw its essence from the agreement or that the panel was dispensing its own brand of industrial justice, because the award referenced only the appendices of the agreement that were referenced in the submission to arbitration and the panel's reference to the contractual requirement that the city fill vacancies within a specified period of time underscored its good faith effort to construe and apply the relevant terms of the agreement in the context of the questions submitted to it. 2. The city could not prevail on its claim that, because the award was inconsistent with the agreement, which explicitly stated that police captains were not entitled to overtime pay, the panel exceeded its author- ity in fashioning the remedy: the agreement did not provide a remedy for the violation at issue nor did it prohibit back pay and, therefore, back pay was not inconsistent with the agreement; moreover, the agree- ment did not require a prevailing party who established that he or she should have been promoted at an earlier date to return the salary, including overtime pay, that he or she was previously paid for work performed. Argued December 1, 2021—officially released March 8, 2022

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff. During the dissolution proceedings, the defendant claimed that the parties had entered into a prenuptial agree- ment but that the agreement was missing. The court held an evidentiary hearing to permit the defendant to attempt to prove the existence and terms of that agreement by offering collateral evidence as to its contents. The defendant attempted to introduce as a proposed exhibit a boilerplate prenuptial agreement that had been downloaded from an online pub- lisher of legal documents in order to prove the content of the parties' alleged agreement. The document had several areas that were not popu- lated and there were no financial disclosures attached. The plaintiff testified that she had signed a prenuptial agreement but that the defen- dant had not signed it, and she had no clear recollection as to what the terms might have been or what the defendant's financial disclosures may have included. The court found that, although there was a premarital agreement that was signed prior to the date of the marriage, there was a lack of evidence as to the terms of the agreement, and concluded that the proposed exhibit would not be allowed into evidence. Following a trial, the court ordered the defendant to contribute to the plaintiff's legal fees and costs. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court did not err in failing to enforce the alleged prenuptial agreement, the evidence having amply supported the court's finding that the defendant did not sufficiently establish the contents of the agreement: although the defendant presented some evidence to prove the contents of the alleged missing agreement, including the proposed exhibit, the court found that no specific date of the agreement had been proven and there was a conflict with the nature and depth of the financial disclosures; moreover, contrary to the defendant's claim, the court did not impermissibly favor the plaintiff's lack of memory of the terms of the alleged agreement or completely overlook the evidence the defendant proffered, the defendant having failed to appreciate that it was within the province of the court, when sitting as the fact finder, to weigh the evidence presented and determine its credibility and effect, and the court found the plaintiff's testimony generally credible throughout the trial and significant portions of the defendant's testimony to be not credible; accordingly, this court, deferring to the trial court's assess- ments concerning credibility, determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the defendant's proposed exhibit. 2. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff: the court methodically analyzed the plaintiff's purported justifications for entitlement to attorney's fees and determined that an award of attorney's fees was warranted pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 46b-62 (a)) for payment of attorney's fees in dissolution proceedings; moreover, there was no support in the record for the defendant's claim that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees in the amount of $280,000. Argued January 5—officially released March 15, 2022

The defendants appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiffs' motion for contempt. The defendants owned property that was located in the plaintiff town. In 2009, the plaintiffs commenced the underlying action seeking injunctive relief to compel the defendants to comply with certain zoning regulations. The parties entered into a joint stipulation, which, inter alia, prohibited the defen- dants from selling or having taken from the property by truck, or in any way removing from the property any soil, sand, gravel, clay, rock, or other earth material, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the stipulation. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed several postjudgment motions for contempt alleging that the defendants had violated the terms of the stipulated judgment. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' first motion, filed in 2011, and entered certain orders. Following the plaintiffs' second motion for contempt, filed in 2013, the trial court ordered the parties to conduct periodic meetings at the property to monitor the defendants' compliance with the judgment. When the town was satisfied that the defendants were in compliance with the judgment, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion. In 2018, the plaintiffs received several complaints about noise and excess truck traffic on the property. In response, the plaintiffs took aerial photographs of the property in January, 2019, which depicted construction equipment and stockpiles of construction materi- als on the property. The plaintiffs filed their third motion for contempt, the resolution of which served as the basis for the present appeal. The court found that the defendants had wilfully violated the judgment by using the property for commercial rock mining and construction related operations and they had concealed their noncompliance with the judg- ment. The court granted the motion and imposed sanctions against the defendants, including a $13,800 fine, a conditional fine of $100 per day until the defendants purged their contempt by restoring the property to its prior condition, and injunctive relief ordering, inter alia, that the defendants remove any improperly buried materials from the site. Held: 1. Contrary to the defendants' claim, the trial court's finding that the defen- dants had violated the terms of the stipulated judgment by engaging in commercial mining and construction related operations on the property was not clearly erroneous: the court's finding was supported by the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for contempt, specifi- cally, the photographs of the property that showed the use of certain construction equipment and stockpiles of construction materials, and testimony from the town's land use enforcement officer about the condi- tion of the property; moreover, it was apparent from the court's decision that it doubted the defendants' credibility and, instead, chose to credit the evidence presented by the plaintiffs, which it was entitled to do as the trier of fact. 2. This court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions related to its finding of contempt, this court having considered the defendants' wilful and continued violation of the judg- ment, the defendants' efforts to conceal their noncompliance with the judgment, and the purpose of the sanctions, which was to ensure the defendants' future compliance with the judgment. Argued October 18, 2021—officially released March 15, 2022

In two separate actions, the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant attorney, K, in the first action for, inter alia, legal malpractice and breach of contract, and from the defendant law firms K Co. and M Co. in the second action for, inter alia, legal malpractice and transferee liability, in connection with an underlying marital dissolution proceed- ing. In the first action, the trial court granted K's motion to strike the count of the complaint sounding in breach of contract and granted K's motion for summary judgment on, inter alia, the count sounding in legal malpractice. In the second action, the court granted K Co. and M Co.'s motions for summary judgment on, inter alia, the counts of the complaint sounding in legal malpractice and transferee liability. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of K, K Co. and M Co. as to the plaintiff's legal malpractice claims against them: the plaintiff, who did not dispute that an expert witness was required in order for her to prove her legal malpractice claims, failed to meet the deadline set place in the scheduling order in each action for the disclosure of an expert in support of her claims; moreover, even after the deadline had passed, the court never indicated that it would not consider the opinion of an expert submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment; furthermore, although the plaintiff filed motions for permission for late disclosure of an expert witness, the motions did not identify any expert or the substance of opinions to be provided and the plaintiff never disclosed an expert before the court rendered judgment. 2. The trial court properly granted K's motion to strike the count of the plaintiff's complaint sounding in breach of contract; the count alleged a claim for legal malpractice rather than for breach of contract, as it was not a claim that K breached the retainer agreement with the plaintiff but rather a claim that K negligently performed professional services. 3. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of K Co. and M Co. as to the plaintiff's transferee liability claim against them; because the court found no liability on the part of K Co., the predecessor law firm to M Co., there was no successor liability that could attach to M Co. Argued November 8, 2021—officially released March 15, 2022

The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder, filed an amended petition for habeas corpus, claim- ing, inter alia, that the state failed to disclose exculpatory evidence or to correct certain false and misleading testimony, in violation of his due process rights. At the petitioner's criminal trial, D, a coconspirator, testified as to how she and the petitioner were involved in the death of the victim, and her testimony was corroborated by forensic evidence. The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing in part and denying in part the petitioner's claims, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court erred in failing to find the existence of a cooperation agreement or understanding between D and the state with respect to D's testimony: the petitioner's reliance on Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction (336 Conn. 168) was misplaced because, even assuming the veracity of the petitioner's allegations that D was provided benefits in exchange for her cooperation, Gomez applies only when a petitioner establishes the existence of an agreement between the state and a witness and that the witness received some benefit as a result of the agreement, and this court's review of the record confirmed the habeas court's finding that the petitioner failed to prove that the state had entered into an agreement or understanding with D; moreover, with respect to the petitioner's due process claim, the habeas court's finding that the petitioner had not proved that an agreement or understanding existed between the state and D was supported by substantial evidence. Submitted on briefs January 26—officially released March 15, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for breach of contract, alleging that the defendant had failed to make the final payment for services rendered. The parties had entered into a research agreement for the plaintiff to study the potential benefits of the defendant's nutrition supplement on a certain group of individuals. The agreement was amended and was accompanied by a revised protocol concerning the characteristics of individuals suitable for the study. The defendant filed a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff breached the parties' contract by, inter alia, failing to comply with the requirements of the agreement and the protocol regarding the population of individuals to be included in the study. Following a trial to the court, the court awarded the plaintiff damages for the defendant's breach of contract and prejudgment interest based on its finding that the defendant had wrongfully withheld funds from the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly concluded that the defendant had breached the research agreement by failing to pay a final invoice, the plaintiff having conducted the study in accordance with the agreement: contrary to the defendant's claim, the plaintiff was not obligated, under the definitive terms of the revised protocol and amended agreement, to perform any analysis to determine whether certain medications had the potential to interact with the ingredients in the supplement, as the language of the parties' revised protocol unambiguously provided that the plaintiff was required to exclude only potential study participants with diabetes or hypertension who were taking medication with a known potential to interact with the supplement; moreover, the language of the revised protocol, including the term ''overweight but otherwise healthy,'' was clear and unambiguous with respect to the selection of study partici- pants, as it set forth the criteria that, if met, would allow prospective participants to enroll in the study and detailed the criteria that would exclude a prospective participant from the study; furthermore, there was ample evidence in the record to support the court's finding that the plaintiff performed its obligations under the contract, including the selection of study participants, and the fact that the defendant did not obtain the results it wanted from the study did not constitute a breach of contract nor did it negate its obligation to pay the amount due on the final invoice. 2. This court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding prejudgment interest to the plaintiff pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 37-3a), as the record supported the court's finding that the defendant had no good faith basis to withhold final payment and, there- fore, doing so was a wrongful detention of money due under the contract. Argued September 22, 2021—officially released March 15, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages resulting from the defendant's alleged breach of a credit card agreement. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant applied for and received a credit card by virtue of a credit card agreement, and the defendant defaulted under the terms of that agreement by failing to make the payments agreed to therein. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to insufficient service of process, which the court denied without issuing a memoran- dum of decision. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability and damages. The plaintiff appended to the motion an affidavit from H, the director of collections for the plaintiff. H's affidavit stated that as a result of the defendant's credit card application submitted to the plaintiff, the defendant received two credit cards. Attached as exhibits to the affidavit were the defendant's credit card application, credit card disclosure statements, transaction listings for the two accounts, and the credit card agreement that allegedly estab- lished the defendant's liability to the plaintiff and the amount of the debt that the defendant owed, $46,812.08. The defendant opposed the motion for summary judgment, arguing that it differed from the com- plaint because the complaint referenced only one credit card and under- lying agreement, while the motion for summary judgment referenced multiple credit cards with separate debts, along with documents that indicated the existence of separate agreements. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judg- ment, that court having properly concluded that the plaintiff met its burden to establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact as to the factual basis for the defendant's liability to the plaintiff and the amount of damages owed: although the defendant argued that the complaint referenced only one credit card agreement and one credit card, the defendant admitted at oral argument before this court that he held two separate accounts with the plaintiff and that the two accounts arose from the same application and, therefore, he failed to establish that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his liability on the two accounts; moreover, because H's affidavit asserted that the plaintiff was owed $46,812.08, which was also reflected in the attached transaction ledger for each account, and the defendant admitted at oral argument before this court that the total amount of the debt was $46,812.08, there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to the amount of damages. 2. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss that alleged that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to insufficient service of process: pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 10-30 (b)), a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction as a result of an insufficiency of service of process is waived unless raised by a motion to dismiss filed within thirty days of the filing of an appearance; accord- ingly, because the defendant filed an appearance and failed to file a motion to dismiss within thirty days of filing his appearance, he waived any right to challenge the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Argued January 6—officially released March 15, 2022

The petitioner, a citizen of Nigeria, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, E, rendered ineffective assistance for having failed to advise him properly about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea to the reduced charge of larceny in the second degree. During the trial court's canvass of the petitioner in the plea proceeding, the petitioner stated that he understood the possible immigration conse- quences of his guilty plea and that E had discussed those consequences with him. E also stated that he had discussed those consequences with the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner was deported to Nigeria on the ground that the larceny conviction constituted an aggravated felony under federal law, which mandated deportation for such offenses in virtually all cases. At the habeas trial, E testified, inter alia, that he discussed with the petitioner the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, and the petitioner was not concerned about deportation but, rather, his sole concern was the term of incarceration he would receive upon conviction and he sought to minimize his sentence. The petitioner testi- fied, inter alia, that when he entered the guilty plea, he was unaware of its immigration consequences and that E had told him that a conviction for larceny in the second degree would not make him eligible for deporta- tion. The court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition and denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court correctly denied the petition for certification to appeal from the denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as the petitioner failed to establish that the issues were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner, or that they were adequate to proceed further: there was ample evidence in the record to support the habeas court's implicit finding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial if he had been properly informed about his deportability; moreover, the habeas court deemed E's testimony highly credible, including his testimony that the petitioner was concerned only with the length of the sentence he would receive upon pleading guilty and not the deportation conse- quences of any such plea and found the petitioner's testimony contradict- ing E in virtually all material respects to be entirely unworthy of belief; furthermore, this court rejected the petitioner's claim that, because the habeas court's evaluation of his credibility was predicated on the transcript of his deposition testimony and not on a firsthand observation of his conduct and demeanor, its credibility assessment warranted less deference, that argument having been unsupported by any authority and incompatible with the bedrock principle that the habeas court sits as the trier of fact, the habeas court found the testimony of E more credible than the petitioner's, and this court was bound by those credibility determinations. Argued November 10, 2021—officially released March 22, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant insurance com- pany for breach of contract, a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) arising from a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) (§ 38a-815 et seq.), and promissory estoppel, in connection with a restorationist insur- ance policy issued by the defendant. The plaintiff, the owner of a historic property, had filed a claim pursuant to that policy for loss to her property resulting from a tree falling on her home during a storm. In a prior action, the plaintiff sought to vacate an arbitration award setting the amount of the insured loss to her property. The trial court in that action, Tierney, J., granted the plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award on the basis that it violated the applicable statute (§ 52-418). In the defendant's appeal from that judgment, Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. (326 Conn. 638), our Supreme Court reversed Judge Tierney's decision and remanded the case with direction to render judg- ment denying the plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award, concluding, inter alia, that Judge Tierney had improperly substituted his judgment for that of the appraisal panel that had decided the amount of the loss. In the present action, commenced during the pendency of the appeal from Judge Tierney's decision, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint, claiming that, in light of the pending appeal, this action was not ripe or, alternatively, was barred pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine. The trial court, Heller, J., denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's second revised and amended complaint, in which it argued that the breach of contract claim was barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata and the suit limitation provision of the restorationist policy, the CUTPA/CUIPA claim was time barred and failed as a matter of law, and the promissory estoppel claim was barred pursuant to the suit limitation provision of the policy and failed as a matter of law. The trial court, Hernandez, J., denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, relying entirely on Judge Tierney's findings in his decision granting the plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award in the prior proceeding, even though that decision already had been reversed by our Supreme Court, and on Judge Heller's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss, pursuant to the law of the case doctrine. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. Contrary to the plaintiff's claim, this court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the denial of the defendant's motion for summary judgment in its entirety as an appealable final judgment: the trial court relied on the same rationale in rejecting all of the defendant's claims raised in its motion for summary judgment, and, consequently, all of the defendant's claims were inextricably intertwined. 2. The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, as that court improperly relied on Judge Tierney's findings and Judge Heller's ruling: the law of the case doctrine did not apply to Judge Tierney's findings, as they were made in a decision issued in a separate matter concerning the plaintiff's application to vacate the arbitration award, and, even if the law of the case doctrine were applica- ble, Judge Tierney's findings became a nullity in light of our Supreme Court's reversal of Judge Tierney's decision in Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co.; moreover, the court's reliance on Judge Heller's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss was improper because the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment concerned wholly separate claims and involved different legal standards; further- more, under the circumstances of this case, the appropriate remedy was for this court to remand the case for further proceedings and to provide the defendant with another opportunity to pursue its motion for summary judgment, rather than for this court to delve into the merits of the defendant's claims. Argued September 20, 2021—officially released March 22, 2022

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court issuing a postsecondary educational support order pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 46b-56c). On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court misconstrued § 46b-56c (d) when it entered the support order, because the defendant had excluded him from the college selection process of their daughter, H, and, therefore, failed to satisfy the require- ment of § 46b-56c (d) that both parents participate in and agree upon the institution of higher education that H would attend. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court, in ordering him to pay a portion of H's college education expenses, misconstrued § 46b-56c (d): although the language of the statute creates a mandatory duty on both parents to participate in and reach an agreement upon which college a child will attend, the court found that the plaintiff had excluded himself from H's college selection process, as the evidence showed that the defendant informed the plaintiff of the colleges to which H had applied but that the plaintiff never discussed this information with either the defendant or H, did not object to any of the colleges or suggest alternative institutions, and did not timely open messages from the defendant asking him to complete financial aid forms for H; more- over, the defendant was not required to seek an order resolving the issue of which institution of higher education H would attend before seeking a support order, as the plaintiff's refusal to participate in H's college selection process did not provide the defendant with notice that the plaintiff would disagree with H's choice of college, and, in granting the defendant's motion, the court exercised its authority pursuant to § 46b-56c (d) to resolve any disagreement between the parties. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly predicated its decision on factual findings from the parties' dissolution of marriage or a consideration of his relationship with H in issuing its support order; the court's memorandum of decision clearly stated that its order was based on the facts surrounding H's college selection pro- cess and the plaintiff's failure to participate in that process, not the historical facts regarding the breakdown of the parties' marriage; more- over, the court's finding that the plaintiff did not reach out to H about her high school graduation or ask her about her college preferences merely pointed out one way the plaintiff could have been involved in the college selection process but did not form the basis of the court's decision to enter the educational support order. 3. The trial court's finding that the defendant attempted to include the plaintiff in H's college selection process was not clearly erroneous; evidence in the record showed that the defendant sent the plaintiff e-mails about H's interest in colleges beginning in H's junior year of high school and through the fall of H's senior year of high school. Argued December 6, 2021—officially released March 22, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crime of murder, appealed to this court from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas petition had been filed more than six years after the petitioner's guilty plea was determined to be a final judgment due to the expiration of the time period allowed for appeal and after October 1, 2017. The respondent Commissioner of Correction filed a request, pursuant to statute (§ 52- 470), for an order to show cause for the petitioner's delay in filing the habeas petition. Following a hearing, the habeas court found that the petitioner, who claimed that mental health and cognitive disabilities had prevented him from timely filing his habeas petition, had failed to show good cause as required by § 52-470 for the late filing. Thereafter, the court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the peti- tioner having failed to demonstrate that the issues involved in his appeal were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner, or that the questions raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further: the only evidence that the petitioner relied on to support his claim that his mental health conditions constituted good cause for filing an untimely habeas petition were health and educational records dated between eight and fourteen years prior to the hearing before the court, and the petitioner did not provide the court with any insight into how or whether the mental health deficiencies described in the records affected the filing of the petition, thus, the court properly concluded that the petitioner did not demon- strate whether a present condition affected his ability to file a habeas petition in a timely manner; moreover, as the petitioner filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a self-represented litigant, there was no authority upon which the court was bound to infer that any deficiency documented in the health and education records caused or contributed to the untimely filing. Argued October 5, 2021—officially released March 22, 2022

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's motions for modification and appellate attorney's fees. The parties had one minor child together. At the time of the dissolu- tion, the plaintiff lived in West Hartford and the defendant lived in Andover, Massachusetts. Incorporated into the judgment of dissolution was a separation agreement which provided that, following the comple- tion of the child's 2018-2019 academic year, the plaintiff would relocate to an area within one hour from her place of employment in Hartford, and that the defendant would make efforts to explore relocation to an area in Massachusetts such that the parties were to be within thirty minutes of each other. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for modification alleging a change in circumstances in her employment, namely, that she received a promotion and that she would no longer be able to relocate and maintain her employment. She requested that she and the minor child be permitted to remain residing in West Hartford. Following a hearing, the court granted the plaintiff's motion, and the defendant appealed to this court. The trial court then granted the plain- tiff's motion for attorney's fees to defend the appeal and the defendant amended his appeal. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion for modification, as the plaintiff's promotion represented a substantial change in circumstances that warranted modification of the parties' dissolution agreement with respect to parenting access and location: the court credited the testimony of the plaintiff regarding her promotion, which provided her an increase in salary and provided potential career growth, but no longer allowed her to work remotely on a routine basis and relocate to Massachusetts as the parties originally intended, and that she had looked into employment elsewhere, but that she would be starting from the bottom; moreover, the court also made factual findings that directly addressed factors related to the best interests of the child, including that the plaintiff's financial stability was in the best interests of the child, the plaintiff's financial independence was critical given that the defendant's failure to ensure that she had timely access to funds following the divorce put her in a vulnerable financial position, and that it was in the best interests of the child to continue residing primarily in the Hartford area, supported by the plaintiff's testimony as to the child's academic progress, friendships with children in the neighborhood and at school, relationships with teachers at school and after-school childcare, and involvement in sports. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees to defend the appeal; the court expressly and reasonably found that its failure to award attorney's fees would undermine its prior financial orders, and such finding was supported by the record, namely, the plaintiff's testimony that, in order to pay her counsel fees, she had obtained funds from her investments and retirement account, the assets that had been awarded to her in the dissolution. Argued February 3—officially released March 29, 2022

The plaintiffs, two former employees of the defendant, sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, breach of their employment contracts and failure to pay wages pursuant to statute (§ 31-72). The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their respective claims for breach of written contract and failure to pay wages pursuant to § 31-72, and in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs' respective claims for breach of oral contract. The court declined to award the plaintiffs double damages or attorney's fees as provided by § 31-72, reasoning that such an award is appropriate only when the trial court has found that the defendant acted with bad faith, arbitrariness, or unreasonableness, which the trial court concluded was not demon- strated in the present case, and the trial court declined to award prejudg- ment interest on the amounts awarded to the plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that the trial court erred in finding that there was no bad faith, arbitrariness, or unreasonableness on the part of the defendant to support an award of double damages and attorney's fees with respect to the plaintiffs' claims for failure to pay wages pursuant to § 31-72, and that the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding prejudgment interest pursuant to statute (§ 37-3a (a)). Held that this court declined to address the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, the plaintiffs having failed to provide this court with an adequate record: pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 61-10 (a)), the plaintiffs, as the appellants in the present case, bore the burden of providing this court with an adequate record for review; moreover, although the trial occurred over three days, the plaintiffs failed to provide this court with any transcripts and, in the absence of such transcripts, this court could not evaluate the plaintiffs' arguments under the applicable standards of review without resorting to speculation; accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. Argued November 29, 2021—officially released March 29, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, his siblings, M, H and C, and his brother-in-law A, for, inter alia, unjust enrichment and breach of contract. The plaintiff alleged that the parties entered into a family cooperative agreement following the death of his mother in 1973. Under that agreement, the plaintiff would use his discretion over the assets that he and C had inherited from their mother to cooper- ate with M and H, who had been disinherited, in order to bring the family closer together. The assets included properties located at Haverhill Road and Partridge Lane in Trumbull. After their mother's death, M and A moved into Haverhill Road with C, who could not live alone, while the plaintiff went away to college. Over the course of several decades, the parties continued to assist each other financially and otherwise. In 2005, the plaintiff sold Haverhill Road to M and A for $183,100, which was $250,000 less than the fair market value of the property, to help finance a project at Partridge Lane. The parties allegedly had decided to build a house on the Partridge Lane property as the first step in their overall family plan to develop their various properties. In his second amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that M and A owed him the $250,000 difference between the sale price and the fair market value of Haverhill Road, on the basis of the family cooperative agreement, under the theories of breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court rejected the plaintiff's breach of contract claim, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of the family cooperative agreement. The court found for the plaintiff and C on the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim against M and A, concluding that the sale of Haverhill Road for less than fair market value was part of a separate family agreement to develop property in Newtown that the parties had inherited from an uncle. The court concluded that the $250,000 that the plaintiff and C had lost on the sale of Haverhill Road had unjustly enriched M and A. The trial court rejected the plaintiff's remaining claims. Thereafter, M and A appealed to this court and the plaintiff cross appealed from the trial court's judgment. Held: 1. The trial court erred in rendering judgment for the plaintiff and C on the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, the court's conclusion having been based on a wholly unalleged agreement between the parties: although the trial court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on his unjust enrichment claim because the transfer of the Haverhill Road property was part of a separate family agreement to develop and sell the Newtown property, the plaintiff's complaint never mentioned any agreement linking the sale of Haverhill Road to the development of the Newtown property, and, in fact, it did not contain a single reference to the Newtown property; moreover, the manner in which the plaintiff pursued his unjust enrichment claim at trial and the evidence he pre- sented in support of that claim did not overcome the deficiency in his pleading to provide M and A with sufficient notice of the basis of the court's award, as the plaintiff presented no evidence that he, M, and A had a separate understanding or expectation regarding Haverhill Road and the Newtown property that was not a part of the overall family cooperative agreement that the court found had not been proved; further- more, this court's review of the plaintiff's posttrial briefs filed with the trial court reflect that the plaintiff never relied on a separate Haverhill Road/Newtown property agreement or understanding in support of his unjust enrichment claim and, instead, argued that any agreement regard- ing the Newtown property was part and parcel of the family cooperative agreement; accordingly, there was no basis to conclude that the 2005 contract regarding the sale of Haverhill Road did not fully address the transfer of that property to M and A. 2. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in not finding that a confiden- tial relationship existed between the parties, and that the defendants breached their obligations created by that relationship, was not review- able, the plaintiff having failed to brief the claim adequately: the plaintiff's brief before this court was confusing, repetitive, and disorganized, and provided minimal relevant citation to the record, almost no citation to applicable legal authorities, and no meaningful analysis for his claim. Argued October 20, 2021—officially released March 29, 2022

The plaintiff property owner sought reimbursement from the defendants, the city and its tax assessor, for certain real property taxes paid to the city. In 2017, the plaintiff discovered that the city's tax assessment records listed its property as being comprised of 1.15 acres, rather than the 0.89 acres that the plaintiff's appraiser had determined in 1995 or the 0.88 acres that it had been surveyed at in 2008. The plaintiff contacted the tax assessor, who confirmed that the discrepancy was the result of an error and indicated that it likely had occurred when the city converted its records to an electronic system in 1993. The tax assessor corrected the error, credited the plaintiff for the excess amount it had paid in 2016, the then current tax year, informed the plaintiff that, pursuant to the applicable statutes (§§ 12-60 and 12-129), the city could only refund the plaintiff for excess payments made during the prior three years, and sent the plaintiff an application for reimbursement for the excess amounts paid for the 2014 and 2015 tax years. Instead of completing the application, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendants demanding a refund of all excess taxes paid since 1993. The defendants' response reiterated that any claim for a refund going back more than three years was time barred by the applicable statutes. The plaintiff filed its com- plaint, and, in response, the defendants asserted six special defenses, including that the statute of limitations set forth in §§ 12-60 and 12-129 precluded the plaintiff from bringing a claim arising from a clerical mistake in the assessment of taxes on the property more than three years after the applicable due date and that the plaintiff's failure to take advantage of the statutory remedies available to it precluded it from recovering pursuant to a claim for unjust enrichment. The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff opposed the motion, claiming that its complaint set forth common-law restitution and unjust enrichment claims, rather than claims pursuant to §§ 12-60 and 12-129, that the defendants had the burden of proof on the issue of the applicability of §§ 12-60 and 12-129 because they raised such claim in their special defenses, and that the defendants failed to sustain that burden because they failed to prove that the assessment error was clerical. The trial court granted the defendants' motion and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the defendants were entitled to judg- ment as a matter of law and the trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment in their favor: the plaintiff was precluded from asserting a common-law claim for unjust enrichment because, contrary to its assertions, the applicable statutes were sufficient to redress the plaintiff's grievances regardless of how the property assessment error occurred, as §§ 12-60 and 12-129 apply to errors that are clerical in nature and certain other applicable statutes (§§ 12-117a and 12-119), raised at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, apply to errors that are nonclerical; moreover, the fact that the plaintiff failed to take advantage of the statutory remedies available to it within the applicable statutes of limitations did not render the statutory scheme inadequate or allow the plaintiff to circumvent the state taxation scheme by way of the common law; furthermore, because the statutory scheme was adequate regardless of the cause of error, the cause of error was not a genuine issue of material fact. Argued January 13—officially released March 29, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries that she alleg- edly sustained as a result of the defendant's negligence. The court referred the case to arbitration pursuant to statute (§ 52-549u). Following a hearing, the arbitrator issued a decision in favor of the defendant. Electronic notice of the decision was provided to the parties' counsel on that same day. Neither party filed a demand for a trial de novo within twenty days of when electronic notice was sent. Because a demand for a trial de novo was not filed within twenty days, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the arbitrator's decision. Thereafter, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to open and vacate the judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the court improp- erly denied her motion because the language of the applicable statute (§ 52-549z) and rule of practice (§ 23-66) require that notice of an arbitra- tor's decision be sent both electronically and by mail before it can become a judgment of the court, and notice was not sent by mail in the present case. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to open and vacate the judgment: § 52- 549z does not provide that notice of an arbitrator's decision must be sent both electronically and by mail in order for the statutory twenty day period to commence, § 52-549z was amended after the judicial branch gave notice of its practice of sending only electronic notice of an arbitrator's decision unless counsel obtain an exclusion from the electronic services requirement, and Practice Book § 23-66 does not preclude electronic service of an arbitrator's decision; moreover, it was undisputed that both the plaintiff's and the defendant's counsel received electronic notice of the decision, neither counsel obtained an exclusion from the electronic services requirement, the plaintiff's counsel never argued that he was unaware of the court's practice of sending only electronic notice of the decision, and the case did not involve self- represented parties; accordingly, notice did not need to be provided by mail. Argued January 6—officially released March 29, 2022

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of assault of public safety personnel, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant was incarcerated at the time of trial, serving a sentence for a previous conviction of murder. While incarcerated, the defendant was also convicted of various assault charges on three separate occasions. On the day jury selection commenced in his trial, the defendant, who was represented by B, a special public defender who had been assigned as counsel, requested to the trial court that he be appointed new counsel. The court denied that request. The court also denied the defendant's request to have his restraints removed during trial, noting the defendant's extensive criminal history and disciplinary record. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request for new counsel: although B had represented the defendant for more than one year and the defendant did not make his request until the first day of jury selection, the court thoroughly considered the defendant's complaints against B and explained that B had notified the defendant of his trial date as soon as he had received notice from the court, that B, as an attorney with twenty to thirty years of experience, was well suited to pursue the most effective defense strategy, and B's lack of communication of that strategy with the defendant was due to the defendant's refusal to see or speak to B, and that the defendant would have ample opportunity to discuss his case with B throughout the proceedings; moreover, the defendant indicated that he was willing to commence jury selection with B's counsel, and he did not renew his request for new counsel. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request to have his restraints removed and in requiring him to be restrained during trial: the court afforded great consideration to the defendant's right to remain free from restraints during the trial proceed- ings and implemented the least onerous means of restraining the defen- dant possible in light of his extensive violent criminal record and disci- plinary history, which included 231 disciplinary tickets while incarcerated, and the defendant's threats of assault against his counsel in a prior matter, the court properly having weighed safety concerns against the defendant's rights in employing an intermediate system of restraints; moreover, the court, noting that jurors would already know that the defendant was incarcerated due to the nature of the charge against him and likely would expect him to be restrained, expressly instructed the jury that the use of restraints was routine for inmates while in court; furthermore, neither party objected to the court's proposal of a curative instruction making the jury aware of the restraints, and the jury never heard of the defendant's history that created the security risk. 3. The defendant's claim that the trial court should have inquired further into a potential conflict of interest with B when B indicated to the court that he would not feel comfortable trying the case if the defendant were not shackled was without merit; immediately prior to addressing the shackles issue, the court asked B if he would zealously represent the defendant and B replied that he would, and, although B's safety concerns on the basis of the defendant's violent history were understandable, B did not express that those concerns prevented him from representing the defendant or posed a conflict of interest requiring his removal from the case. Argued January 26—officially released March 29, 2022

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's motion for modification of custody, seeking to relocate with the parties' minor child to Poughkeepsie, New York. Held that the trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for modifica- tion of custody: contrary to the defendant's contention that the trial court ignored the parties' informal agreement for alternating weekly parenting time with the child for the seven to eight months leading up to the hearing on the plaintiff's motion, that court heard extensive testimony from both parties as to that schedule, which the parties had in place during the unique circumstances of the child's remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic, and, now that in-person schooling had resumed, neither party sought a continuation of that schedule, the court's previous ex parte order recognized that alternating weekly parenting schedule, and the court's statement that it was in the child's best interests to maintain the continuity of living with his mother and his brother found support in the record as it reasonably could be construed as a reference to the parties' former parenting time schedule; moreover, the court's finding that the plaintiff had a more active role in the child's life was not clearly erroneous, as there was evidence in the record to support that finding, including the plaintiff's testimony that she primarily cared for the child from his birth and throughout his childhood, and the defendant's testimony that he had, at times, missed the child's doctor's appointments and parent-teacher conferences due to his work schedule; furthermore, the defendant did not point to any evidence to support his argument that the court prejudged the motion on the basis that the plaintiff already had moved to Poughkeepsie, and, to the contrary, the court applied the criteria set forth in the applicable statute (§ 46b-56d) to the evidence presented at the hearing in reaching its determination, and there was sufficient evidence presented for the court's consideration of the educational component listed in § 46b-56d (b), as the plaintiff provided testimony as to the educational plan for the child following relocation. Argued February 2—officially released March 29, 2022

The plaintiff housing authority sought, by way of summary process, to regain possession of certain premises leased to the defendant tenant. The plaintiff sent the defendant a pretermination notice for nonpayment of rent, to which the defendant did not respond. The plaintiff then served the defendant with a notice to quit possession and, thereafter, served the defendant with a summons and complaint seeking immediate posses- sion of the premises. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the pretermination notice was defective. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and rendered a judgment of dismissal. Nineteen days after the court rendered the judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue, which the court denied. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to this court, and the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the appeal was untimely, which this court granted. Held that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's appeal, the plaintiff having failed to comply with the five day appeal period set forth in the applicable statute (§ 47a-35): the plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the five day appeal period set forth in § 47a-35 applies only to a tenant and not to a landlord, as the clear and unambiguous language of the statute includes appeals by any party, and the legislative policy in favor of the swift resolution of summary process actions, as reflected in the plain language of the statute, applies whether the appeal is brought by the landlord or the tenant; moreover, because the plaintiff's motion to rear- gue was filed outside of the statutory five day appeal period, its denial did not give rise to a new appeal period from the underlying judgment, as allowing an appeal from the judgment of dismissal pursuant to the denial of the motion to reargue would circumvent the jurisdictional appeal period created by the legislature; furthermore, this court lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of the plaintiff's motion to reargue because the plaintiff's claims on appeal related only to the merits of the court's legal analysis in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, and, therefore, permitting review of the denial of the motion to reargue would have required this court to review the merits of the underlying judgment and effectively would have extended the time to appeal from the underlying judgment of dismissal when the time to do so had expired by statute. Considered January 5—officially released April 5, 2022

The defendant town of Trumbull and its Board of Assessment Appeals appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiff's appeals from the decisions of the board, which upheld the town's tax assessments levied against the plaintiff's real property. In 2010, the plaintiff purchased the real property with the intent of leasing it out as a data center, a location to house and secure electronic data. It organized the building into colocation suites, each of which were occupied by multiple users. The plaintiff provided the space, the raised floors, power, cooling, Internet connectivity, security, and the redundancy required to store the electronic data, and the colocation customers either provided their own computers or leased them from the plaintiff. In 2011, the plaintiff decided to remediate and expand the property to, inter alia, build two additional data suites, Suite 210 and Suite 220. The plaintiff intended each suite to be occupied by a single wholesale customer, who would supply its own computers and racks. The plaintiff, however, was unable to find wholesale customers for the new suites and, by mid-2013, it was leasing space within Suite 210 to colocation customers. The construction on Suite 220 was never com- pleted. By the time of trial, it remained raw space with only an unfinished concrete floor, walls, and a ceiling in place. As a result, the plaintiff claimed that the suite was unfit to be leased even as powered base building (PBB) space, which would require the plaintiff to supply a space with completed exterior construction, power, and connectivity, while the customer would build out the interior to its own specifications. The town assessed the property as part of its revaluation for its 2011 grand list. It then conducted interim reassessments of the property in 2013 and 2014, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 12-53a), to take into account the new construction. Following these reassessments, the town assessor determined that the fair market value of the property, based on its physical condition as of October 1, 2013, and October 1, 2014, respectively, and market conditions as of October 1, 2011, was approxi- mately $145,446,000. The plaintiff appealed the assessor's 2013 and 2014 valuations to the board, which denied its appeals. The plaintiff then appealed to the trial court, which found that the fair market value of the property, based on its physical condition as of October 1, 2013, and October 1, 2014, and market conditions as of October 1, 2011, was $109,000,000, and, accordingly, it sustained the plaintiff's appeals with respect to its claims of excessive valuation. On the defendants' joint appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court's determination that Suite 220 had no income and no income potential in 2011 was not clearly erroneous: a. Contrary to the defendants' claim, there was evidence in the record to support the trial court's factual finding that there was no market for Suite 220 in Trumbull in 2011, namely, the testimony of L, the appraiser serving as the plaintiff's trial expert, and D, one of the plaintiff's execu- tives, which the court found to be credible. b. The defendant's argument that Suite 220 clearly added value to the property, as allegedly confirmed by L's cost approach analysis, rested on a faulty premise: the trial court found that the income capitalization approach, rather than the cost approach, was the most reliable and appropriate valuation method for the property, and the defendants con- ceded that, under such an approach, the income producing potential of the suite was determinative of its value; accordingly, because there was evidence in the record that there was no actual or market rent for Suite 220, this court could not conclude that the trial court's finding that no income potential existed was erroneous. c. Despite the defendants' request, this court declined to usurp the role of the trial court and reweigh the evidence relating to the market for Suite 220 in Trumbull in 2011 in their favor, as such evidence was before the trial court and carefully considered by it, and it was the role of the trial court to determine the credibility of such evidence. d. Contrary to the defendants' claim, it was not improper for the trial court to consider evidence of the Trumbull data center market in 2013 or 2014 in determining that there was no market for Suite 220 in Trumbull in 2011: that evidence was relevant because S, the appraiser serving as the defendants' trial expert, considered information regarding market rent and market conditions through October 1, 2014, in his analysis; moreover, although the trial court referenced the plaintiff's argument concerning the lack of success in renting the suite within the years immediately prior to trial, it made clear that such argument was not material to its decision and that it instead relied on evidence of the data market in Trumbull in 2011, 2013 and 2014 in determining that there was no market for Suite 220 as of the revaluation date; furthermore, the defendants failed to provide this court with any legal support for their argument that the trial court's consideration of the market through S's 2014 cutoff date was improper; accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that none of the evidence credibly supported the defendants' claim that Suite 220 was marketable as PBB space in 2011, 2013 and 2014. e. Contrary to the defendants' assertion, the trial court's finding that there was no market for Suite 220 was not inconsistent with its market rent analysis: evidence in the record, namely, the plaintiff's investment committee memoranda and D's testimony, supported the trial court's conclusion that any market for the property would lie exclusively with Connecticut based customers; moreover, although the court found that the Trumbull market was comparable to the Boston market with respect to the size of potential tenants, it determined that demand in Trumbull was limited by the inherent characteristics of the Connecticut market, which finding was not unfounded or contrary to the trial court's market rent analysis. f. Despite the defendants' claim, there was evidence in the record indicat- ing that Suite 220's square footage made it unmarketable as PBB space, including D's and L's testimony, which the trial court found to be credible, and the plaintiff's form 10-K annual reports, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2011 and 2013, which included information regarding the average number of total square footage of the plaintiff's new and renewal PBB leases. 2. There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's determination that the highest and best use of Suite 210 was as wholesale space: although the trial court credited S's testimony that colocation was becoming more popular, it determined that such testimony did not preclude it from agreeing with L's conclusion that the highest and best use of the suite was as wholesale space, especially in light of D's testi- mony regarding the various factors that made colocation rentals less desirable than wholesale rentals; moreover, contrary to the defendants' assertion, the trial court properly considered Suite 210's actual rent in determining its fair market value, however, because the existing leases were for colocation customers, the court applied market rental rates to determine the suite's fair market value as wholesale space; furthermore, the court's conclusion that the highest and best use of Suite 210 was as wholesale space did not contradict its conclusion that there was no market for PBB space in Trumbull in 2011, as such conclusion did not preclude the court from also finding that there was demand for a wholesale lease of a fully built out suite, like Suite 210. 3. The trial court's application of a capitalization rate of 8 percent to the property's net income in determining its market value was supported by evidence in the record: the trial court determined that the capitaliza- tion rate proposed by L was essentially correct; moreover, in making its determination, the trial court properly gave credence to one appraiser's method of calculating the capitalization rate over the other's and deter- mined an appropriate capitalization rate based on the evidence in the record, which included information regarding capitalization rates for various other transactions throughout the country that were detailed in industry newsletters and reports; accordingly, to arrive at its capitaliza- tion rate, the trial court adjusted the rate proposed by L to ensure that sufficient consideration was given to the effect of the electrical infrastructure installed on the property during its remediation and expan- sion. 4. Contrary to the defendants' assertions, the trial court's alleged failure to consider the plaintiff's internal property valuations did not make its determination of the fair market value of the property clearly erroneous: the trial court determined that the plaintiff's 10-K annual reports for 2013 and 2014 reflected the book value of the property, rather than the fair market value, and, as a result, such statements were not relevant to its calculations; moreover, the trial court determined that the valuation set forth in the plaintiff's 2014 impairment analysis of the property, which was based on optimistic assumptions and a best case scenario and included the value of various items of personal property located on the property, was consistent with its own valuation; accordingly, the trial court considered, but did not place weight on, the plaintiff's internal valuations. Argued December 1, 2021—officially released April 5, 2022

The plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of the decedent, sought to recover damages for medical malpractice from the defendant B, an emergency medicine physician who treated the decedent for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident that ultimately led to his death. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the plaintiff moved to admit into evidence certain excerpts from a medical text known as the Advanced Trauma Life Support guidelines, which the plaintiff contended constituted excep- tions to the rule against hearsay as statements in learned treatises, pursuant to the applicable provision (§ 8-3 (8)) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. The basis for the plaintiff's motion was that two of his medical experts had recognized those guidelines as an authoritative treatise in the field of trauma medicine and had relied on specific por- tions of the guidelines in providing their expert testimony. The court denied the plaintiff's motion on the ground that the relevant excerpts could confuse the jurors as to the relevant standard of care. Following the jury's verdict for B, the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that § 8-3 (8) creates a presumption of admissibility, that the guidelines met the requirements for admission, and, accordingly, that the trial court lacked a legal basis upon which to exclude them. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding admission of the guidelines excerpts; although Connecticut permits the admission of learned trea- tises into evidence, the court had the discretion to exclude evidence that carried the danger of misunderstanding or misapplication by the jury, and the court correctly determined that, had the excerpts been admitted, the jury could mistakenly have assessed B's conduct only in light of the guidelines rather than determining whether B deviated from the standard of care in treating the decedent, as, throughout the trial, the plaintiff repeatedly and erroneously contended that the guidelines set forth the relevant standard of care. Argued November 16, 2021—officially released April 5, 2022

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, claiming that the court abused its discretion by finding his net weekly income, declining to accept his proposed parenting schedule, and refusing to deviate from the relevant child support guidelines in fashioning its support orders. Held that this court declined to review the defendant's claims as the claims were inadequately briefed, the defendant having provided no statement of the facts, minimal relevant citation to the record, almost no citation to applicable legal authorities and no meaningful analysis for his claims, and his briefing was conclusory, confusing and disorganized. Argued March 3—officially released April 5, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various criminal offenses, sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. During the pendency of his habeas action, the petitioner filed a motion seeking his immediate release from the custody of the respondent Commissioner of Correction. The petitioner claimed that his continued confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic consti- tuted an unnecessary risk to his life and that he had a 9 percent chance of survival if he contracted the COVID-19 virus while incarcerated. The habeas court conducted a remote hearing during which it heard testi- mony from the petitioner and F, the acting regional medical director for the Department of Correction. The court denied the petitioner's motion, concluding that he failed to show that, during the early months of the pandemic, the respondent acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution. The court reasoned that the respondent had provided the petitioner with adequate medical care and taken appropriate mea- sures to minimize his exposure to and risk of contracting COVID-19. The habeas court granted the petitioner certification to appeal. On appeal, he claimed that the habeas court improperly concluded that he had not established the deliberate indifference necessary to constitute an eighth amendment violation or that the respondent violated his rights under article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. During the pendency of his appeal, the petitioner declined the department's offer to provide him with doses of a COVID-19 vaccine that had been approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration. Held: 1. The respondent's claim that the petitioner's appeal was moot because he declined the department's offer to vaccinate him was unavailing; the petitioner's appeal concerned the adequacy of the measures taken by the respondent to prevent transmission of the COVID-19 virus, and, as it was undisputed that the petitioner could contract the virus even if he had accepted the vaccination offer, an actual controversy existed regarding the adequacy of the measures taken by the respondent; accord- ingly, the appeal was not moot, as this court could provide the petitioner with practical relief if it were to conclude that the respondent's conduct during the early months of the pandemic constituted deliberate indiffer- ence to the petitioner's health and safety. 2. The habeas court properly concluded as a matter of law that the petitioner had not met his burden of demonstrating the deliberate indifference necessary to establish an eighth amendment violation: the record sub- stantiated the court's determination that the respondent's response to the COVID-19 outbreak in the state's correctional facilities was reason- able, and that the respondent had provided adequate medical care and took appropriate measures to minimize the petitioner's exposure to and risk of contracting the virus, as the court, being the sole arbiter of witness credibility, credited F's testimony regarding the petitioner's medical issues and the department's measures to safeguard his health; moreover, the court had before it declarations made under penalty of perjury by department officials who outlined the screening, testing and isolation protocols that were implemented, as well as measures that were implemented regarding social distancing, personal protective equipment and cleaning, and, in light of those measures, this court could not con- clude that the respondent's conduct was an unreasonable reaction to the risk posed to the petitioner that amounted to the recklessness required under law. 3. The petitioner's state constitutional claim that his continued confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment under article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the state constitution was unavailing under the circumstances of his case: a. The petitioner's claim was unpreserved, as he did not indicate in his motion for immediate release that he was pursuing such a claim, he presented no evidence or argument that contemporary standards of decency compelled the conclusion that the respondent violated his state constitutional rights and he did not seek an articulation of the habeas court's decision with respect to any state constitutional claim. b. Although review under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) is available in habeas appeals for unpreserved constitutional claims that could have been raised in the habeas petition or which challenge the actions of the habeas court, such review was unavailable in the petitioner's circum- stances, as he did not distinctly raise a state constitutional claim in his habeas petition or invoke the protections of the state constitution during the hearing on his motion for immediate release; moreover, despite the petitioner's assertion that the habeas court should have construed his motion to include a state constitutional claim, under the applicable rule of practice (§ 5-2), that court was under no obligation to decide a question of law that was not distinctly stated to it. Argued January 6—officially released April 5, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, R, had provided ineffective assistance as a result of R's failure to meaningfully explain the state's plea offer and to review and explain certain surveillance video evidence prior to plea negotiations and trial. Following a hearing, the habeas court denied the petition. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that his claims involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the questions raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further: after a thorough review of the record and briefs, and based on the underlying facts as found by the habeas court, this court concluded that the habeas court properly found that R did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel, as the habeas court credited R's testi- mony that he explained the state's plea offer of six years of incarceration and that the petitioner understood the terms of the offer, the court did not credit the petitioner's testimony that he misunderstood the state's offer, the court found that R was generally aware of what the surveillance video depicted prior to viewing the video, R's failure to view the video before trial did not negate his pretrial discussions with the petitioner regarding the content of the video, and it was the petitioner who initially made R aware of the existence of the video; accordingly, R provided the petitioner with adequate information on which he could make an informed decision as to whether to accept or reject the state's plea offer. Argued February 8—officially released April 12, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment by the defendant, which she claimed was the result of pregnancy discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employ- ment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.). The defendant hired the plaintiff to work in its brand and creative strategy department. S, the only other employee in the department, was her supervisor. According to the plain- tiff, the two had a good working relationship through the end of her first month of employment, when the plaintiff informed S that she was pregnant. Thereafter, the relationship deteriorated. According to the plaintiff, S no longer invited her to collaborate on projects, became curt and unfriendly, and began to micromanage and criticize her work. S also started to document the plaintiff's alleged performance deficiencies. Less than five weeks after the plaintiff disclosed her pregnancy, S informed the plaintiff that her employment was being terminated for her poor performance. Following a trial to the jury, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability. Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and awarded the plaintiff economic damages in addition to prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, and attorney's fees. On appeal to this court, the defendant challenged only one element of the plaintiff's prima facie case, namely, whether she established that the termination of her employment occurred under circumstances that gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict: a. The plaintiff satisfied her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination: there was sufficient evidence in the record from which a rational fact finder could have inferred that the termination of the plaintiff's employment was motivated by discriminatory bias based on her pregnancy, including evidence of the change in the working environment and in the relationship between the plaintiff and S following the plaintiff's disclosure of her pregnancy. b. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant's stated reason for the termination of the plaintiff's employment was pretextual and that the defendant intention- ally discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of her pregnancy: evidence in the record supported the plaintiff's claims of a drastic change in the work environment and the working relationship between the plaintiff and S following the plaintiff's disclosure of her pregnancy and there was a lack of documentary evidence of the plaintiff's allegedly defective performance prior to her disclosure, with the exception of a single e-mail, which the jury reasonably could have determined was of little to no consequence when juxtaposed against the considerable evidence supporting the plaintiff's contention that her disclosure marked a dramatic shift in work environment; moreover, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod- ucts, Inc. (530 U.S. 133), the jury was permitted to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination on the basis of the inferences reason- ably drawn from the evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case and rebutting the defendant's nondiscriminatory explanation for the termination of the plaintiff's employment; furthermore, contrary to the defendant's assertion, the plaintiff did not rely solely on evidence of the temporal proximity of the disclosure of her pregnancy to her dismissal to establish her claim, as other evidence, even though not overwhelming, was sufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict for the jury to have inferred that the defendant's nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual and that the termination of the plaintiff's employment was actually motivated by intentional discrimina- tion. 2. The trial court's assessment of the plaintiff's damages was not clearly erroneous: the trial court determined that the defendant proved that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages for only seventeen of the fifty-two months that she was unemployed on the basis of all of the evidence before it and, contrary to the defendant's claim, did not rely solely on documentary evidence or the lack thereof; moreover, the burden was on the defendant to prove that suitable work existed and that the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence to obtain employ- ment, and the trial court found that the testimony of the defendant's expert regarding such matters was entitled to little weight. Argued November 10, 2021—officially released April 12, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant insurance com- pany for, inter alia, breach of contract, claiming that the defendant had a duty to defend C, doing business as E Co., under a business liability insurance policy it had issued to C, and that its failure to do so left the defendant liable to the plaintiff for damages the plaintiff suffered due to C's and E Co.'s negligence. The plaintiff sustained injuries when a trailer that was attached to a pickup truck driven by C, transporting large kettle corn equipment owned by E Co., dislodged from the pickup truck and struck the plaintiff. After the incident occurred, the plaintiff brought a personal injury action against C and E Co., seeking to recover damages for his injuries. At the time of the incident, C was insured under the business liability insurance policy issued by the defendant. The defendant, however, declined to defend C, citing a provision that excluded coverage for bodily injuries that arose out of the use of an ''auto.'' C did not appear or otherwise defend the personal injury action, and the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against C and E Co. There- after, the plaintiff brought the present action against the defendant pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 38a-321). The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that, on the basis of a provision in the policy that excluded coverage for injuries arising out of the operation of an ''auto,'' it was entitled to a declaration that the policy did not provide liability coverage for the injuries sustained by the plain- tiff. While that motion was pending, the case proceeded to a bench trial on the breach of contract count based on a stipulated record. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant on that count, finding that the defendant did not have a duty to defend C or E Co. because the policy's auto exclusion applied and, thus, precluded coverage for the plaintiff's injuries. The trial court also dismissed the remaining two counts of the plaintiff's complaint, concluding that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring either count in light of the court's conclusion that the plaintiff did not have privity of contract with the defendant and there was no statutory or common-law basis to support the plaintiff's allegations under either count. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court did not err in determining that the defendant did not have a duty to defend C and E Co., that court having correctly concluded that all of the injuries that the plaintiff sustained were excluded from coverage under the provision in the business liability insurance policy applicable to injuries arising out of the use of an auto: the auto exclusion in C's insurance policy plainly and unambiguously precluded coverage for the plaintiff's injuries as the injuries that he sustained arose out of C's act of driving his truck and trailer on public roads and, therefore, arose out of the use of an auto; moreover, although negligence unrelated to the use of an auto, namely, the claim that the trailer and kettle corn equipment were disconnected from C's truck due to his failure to properly secure the trailer to the truck and/or his failure to properly maintain the hitch on the truck to which the trailer was attached, may have contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, those injuries nonetheless arose out of the use of an auto because the plaintiff would not have been injured without C's use of the truck and trailer. Argued November 17, 2021—officially released April 12, 2022

The plaintiff subcontractor sought to recover damages from, among others, the defendant general contractor, G Co., for, inter alia, breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The plaintiff entered into a contract with G Co. in connection with a construction project for the renovation of a property owned by the named defendant, M Co. In its operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that G Co. had failed to pay for materials and services that the plaintiff had provided. In its special defenses, G Co. asserted that language in the parties' contract made clear that the G Co.'s obligation to pay the plaintiff was dependent upon G Co. first receiving payment from M Co. Specifically, the contract stated that the plaintiff expressly agreed that payment by M Co. to G Co. was a ''condition precedent'' to G Co.'s obligation to make partial or final payments to the plaintiff. G Co. filed a motion for summary judgment on the counts against it based on that contractual language, arguing that it had no duty to pay the plaintiff because it had not yet received payment from M Co. The trial court granted G Co.'s motion and rendered summary judgment in favor of G Co., and the plaintiff appealed to this court. 1. The trial court properly granted G Co.'s motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's breach of contract claim: the clear and unambiguous language of the parties' contract provided that G Co. was not obligated to pay the plaintiff until it received payment from M Co.; moreover, this court declined the plaintiff's invitation to find ambiguity in the payment provision and to interpret it to mean that G Co.'s obligation to pay the plaintiff merely was postponed for a reasonable period of time; furthermore, the plaintiff did not cite any binding appellate authority to support its assertion that clauses such as the one at issue in the present case are disfavored in Connecticut and, more particularly, in the construction industry. 2. The trial court properly granted G Co.'s motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing: the plaintiff failed to allege or to provide any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that G Co. acted in bad faith in attempting to collect payment from M Co. or in failing to pay the plaintiff; moreover, this court's independent review of the record that was before the trial court when it rendered its summary judgment did not reveal a potential sinister motive or dishonest purpose on the part of G Co. Argued January 3—officially released April 12, 2022

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's denial of its motion to open the judgment dismissing its 2019 action against the defendant town regarding a municipal tax dispute, claiming that the court failed to exercise its discretion in ruling on that motion or, in the alternative, that it abused its discretion. The court had dismissed the 2019 action pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine, on the basis that the plaintiff had filed a previous action in 2016 against the defendant which had not been resolved and the two actions were virtually alike, both actions having been brought to adjudicate the same underlying rights and factual claims. Thereafter, the trial court in the 2016 action denied the plaintiff's request for leave to amend its complaint to add a count alleging the constitutional violations that it had asserted in the 2019 action, and the court in the 2019 action denied the plaintiff's motion to open the judgment. Held that the trial court exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to open, as it considered and rejected the change in circum- stances identified by the plaintiff in its motion, and the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the court's denial of the plaintiff's request to amend its complaint in the 2016 action did not require that the judgment of dismissal in the 2019 action be opened; moreover, the plaintiff could still fully and fairly litigate its constitutional claims in the 2016 action, as the plaintiff raised an identical constitutional argument as a special defense to the defendant's counterclaim in the 2016 action and the fact that the plaintiff was forced to make its constitutional claim defensively instead of affirmatively did not affect the plaintiff's ability to litigate those arguments; furthermore, the court properly considered the interests of judicial economy and efficiency and the need to avoid duplicative litigation and conflicting results in denying the plaintiff's motion to open. Argued November 18, 2021—officially released April 19, 2022

The plaintiff housing authority sought, by way of a summary process action, to regain possession of certain premises leased to the defendant tenant. The plaintiff served a notice to quit possession for nonpayment of rent on the defendant and, thereafter, filed a summary process action. Subse- quently, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a stipulated agree- ment pursuant to which the trial court rendered a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff and a stay of execution. In accordance with the stipulated judgment, the plaintiff agreed to allow the defendant to remain in the premises provided that the defendant made reasonable use and occupancy payments to the plaintiff and satisfied other conditions. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of noncompliance requesting an order for execution for possession on the ground that the plaintiff had not received payment from the defendant in accordance with the terms of the stipulated agreement and for the alleged serious nuisance that he committed because he had been arrested for various drug offenses at the premises. The trial court denied the plaintiff's request following a hearing and sustained the defendant's objection thereto, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court's finding that the defendant was not a tenant at sufferance was clearly erroneous because it was unsupported by the facts in the record; the defendant, who continued to reside at the premises after the lease agreement was terminated as a result of the plaintiff having served on the defendant a notice to quit possession of the premises, recognized his change of status when he entered into the stipulated agreement and agreed to make use and occupancy payments instead of rent payments to the plaintiff so long as he continued to occupy the premises. 2. The trial court erred in holding that the requirements of the applicable statute (§ 47a-11) concerning the obligations of a tenant did not apply to the defendant because the stipulated agreement did not include an express condition to that effect; even in the absence of express language in the stipulation, a tenant at sufferance must fulfill all of the statutory obligations otherwise applicable to the tenant. 3. The trial court erred in concluding that an affidavit of noncompliance filed pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 17-53) was not the proper method for the plaintiff to seek the issuance of an execution based on the alleged serious nuisance committed by the defendant because such proceeding would not allow for the defendant to be fully heard on that issue: a. The plaintiff was not required to institute a second summary process action to obtain an execution against the defendant for his alleged com- mission of a serious nuisance as such an action against the defendant would not have survived a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had satisfied the statutory (§ 47a-15) requirement when it served on the defendant a valid notice to quit, which effectively terminated the lease between the parties, making the defendant a tenant at sufferance, and the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff thereafter. b. The plaintiff's allegation that the defendant allegedly committed a serious nuisance was properly before the trial court and should have been considered at the hearing on the plaintiff's affidavit of noncompli- ance filed pursuant to Practice Book § 17-53: although the trial court expressed concerns about the defendant's due process rights, the hearing on the plaintiff's affidavit of noncompliance could have included evidence pertaining to the defendant's violations of § 47a-11 and/or the stipulation because of the separate obligations imposed on him pursuant to the stipulation and § 47a-11; moreover, although Practice Book § 17-53 does specifically reference a scenario in which the landlord seeks an execution based on a serious nuisance included in a statute but not included in a stipulation, Practice Book § 17-53 should be interpreted liberally where the court's narrow interpretation and misapplication of § 47a-11 and Practice Book § 17-53 denied the plaintiff recourse to address the serious nuisance allegedly committed by the defendant on the premises in viola- tion of § 47a-11 and the ability to obtain relief by way of execution of possession; furthermore, the defendant had notice of the plaintiff's claim that he violated § 47a-11 because of his arrest for the sale and possession of drugs; accordingly, the case was remanded for a new hearing at which the trial court should consider the plaintiff's affidavit of noncompliance in light of this court's conclusions that the defendant was a tenant at sufferance, the requirements of § 47a-11 applied to the defendant, and the serious nuisance issue was properly before the court. Argued February 1—officially released April 19, 2022