Volume 213 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendants, Kenneth Lantini and 1200 Hartford LLC, appealed an order entered in the Superior Court that denied their motion for a new trial after a jury found in favor of the plaintiff, Daryl Heneault. The parties had entered into a lease agreement whereby the plaintiff was to operate his medical marijuana business out of a commercial building owned by 1200 Hartford LLC. The plaintiff paid the defendants a security deposit and rent for the first month of occupancy in advance. Before the parties entered into the lease, the parties also agreed, in a "receipt agreement," that, if for any reason Mr. Lantini could not provide occupancy by the start date in the lease, then all deposits would be fully refundable. Before the lease start date, however, the commercial building was condemned, and the town instructed the plaintiff to vacate the premises. The plaintiff was reimbursed for the payment of the first month's rent but, when the plaintiff requested that Mr. Lantini return the security deposit, Mr. Lantini refused. The plaintiff filed this action in Superior Court, claiming in his complaint that the defendants had converted the security deposit for their own use and that the defendants' actions constituted a breach of contract. On the eve of trial, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and argued before the trial justice that the economic loss doctrine barred the plaintiff from recovering purely economic damages under a tort claim. The trial justice held that the motion was not timely and denied the motion. After a two day jury trial, the trial justice instructed the jury on the plaintiff's claim for conversion, but he did not instruct the jury on the plaintiff's breach of contract claim. No objection was made by either party, and the jury thereafter rendered a verdict, finding in favor of plaintiff on his conversion claim. The plaintiff was later awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-45. Thereafter, posttrial hearings commenced, and the defendants reasserted the economic loss doctrine argument. The defendants also argued that the plaintiff should not have been awarded attorneys' fees because the case did not arise out of a breach of contract, as required under § 9-1-45. The trial justice found that the economic loss doctrine did not apply because the case sounded in contract, and that there was a proper basis to award attorneys' fees under § 9 1 45. On appeal, the defendants argued that the economic loss doctrine barred the plaintiff from recovering damages for the tort of conversion and that the trial justice erred in awarding attorneys' fees to the plaintiff. Relying on precedent that parties may not allege entirely new issues of law during a motion for a new trial, the Supreme Court held that the defendants had waived the economic loss doctrine argument because the argument was not timely brought before the trial began and was not raised again until the posttrial hearings. The Court did, however, hold that there was no proper basis to award attorneys' fees under § 9-1-45, because the case did not arise out of a breach of contract. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Superior Court.

After the death of their mother, Augusta Hathaway, the plaintiff, Wenda Branson, brought this action against her sister, Marion Louttit, challenging the validity of amendments to Ms. Hathaway's inter vivos trust and gifts of interest in a family limited partnership. After a trial, the jury found that Ms. Hathaway lacked the testamentary capacity to amend her trust and that the defendant had unduly influenced Ms. Hathaway, thereby causing Ms. Hathaway to execute the challenged amendments and gifts. The jury also found that the defendant had breached her fiduciary duty as trustee of the inter vivos trust. Following the verdict, the defendant renewed her motion for judgment as a matter of law and moved for a new trial. The trial justice denied those motions as to the claims of undue influence and testamentary capacity, but granted both with respect to the claim that defendant had breached her fiduciary duty. The parties filed cross appeals. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of laches did not bar the plaintiff's claims because the defendant could not show that she was prejudiced by any delay in bringing the case. The Court further held that sufficient evidence existed in the record to support the plaintiff's claim of undue influence, that the instructions imparted by the trial justice fairly covered the jury's charge to weigh the expert opinions provided and to assess their credibility, and that the expert's testimony regarding his understanding of the meaning of undue influence did not depart in any meaningful way from the definition of undue influence adopted by the Court. The Court held, therefore, that the trial justice was correct to deny the defendant's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for new trial on that issue. Because the Court determined that the challenged gifts and trust amendments were properly nullified on the grounds of undue influence, the Court determined that the issue of Ms. Hathaway's testamentary capacity had become moot. Additionally, the Court held that the excessive award of damages on the fiduciary duty claim did not, standing alone, support an inference that the jury's entire verdict was the product of improper passion, sympathy, or prejudice. The Court further held that the defendant had failed to preserve or adequately present her argument that she was entitled to a new nonjury trial on the equitable issues of undue influence and testamentary capacity. The Court also held that, even if the defendant had breached a fiduciary duty as trustee of Ms. Hathaway's trust, the plaintiff could not prove that she had been damaged because the trust required that any money the defendant received, whether by means of a legitimate gift or as a result of a breach of a fiduciary duty, be accounted for when allocating distributions to the beneficiaries of the trust. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all respects, and vacated the trial justice's superfluous grant of a new trial on the issue of fiduciary duty.