Volume 212 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

he defendants, the Town of Johnston, the Johnston School Department, the Johnston School Committee, and various municipal officials (the town), appealed from the Superior Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Rhode Island American Federation of Teachers/Retired Local 8307 and several retirees of the Johnston School Department (the association) in this declaratory-judgment action involving the annual cost of a life insurance policy made available to retired teachers in Johnston, Rhode Island. On appeal, the town argued that the Superior Court erred in granting the association's motion for summary judgment and denying its cross-motion for summary judgment because, according to the town, the trial justice incorrectly interpreted G.L. 1956 § 16-16-42. The town argued that the cost of life insurance for retired teachers must be that which is in effect at the time the teacher retires, not before the teacher retires. The Supreme Court held that the statute carries no ambiguity thus, in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning, Johnston's teachers are entitled to retain the insurance coverage in effect at the time of retirement by paying the same annual cost that the retiree paid before retirement, as an active employee. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court granting the association's motion for summary judgment.

The respondent, Jennifer L., appealed from a decree entered in the Family Court that terminated her parental rights with respect to her daughter, Violet G. On appeal, the respondent assigned error to the Family Court justice's finding of parental unfitness, her conclusion that DCYF made reasonable efforts to provide services to address the circumstances that led to Violet's placement in the first instance, and the determination that the termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of Violet. The Supreme Court held that there was adequate evidentiary support for the Family Court justice's findings of unfitness. The Court concluded that the record revealed that respondent failed to address her parenting and substance-abuse issues, as well as her need for mental-health treatment and medication management. Additionally, the Court was satisfied that DCYF complied with its obligation to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. Finally, the Court determined that termination was in the best interests of Violet. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the Family Court terminating the respondent's parental rights with respect to her daughter, Violet.

This case stemmed from a decade-long dispute over parking spaces in the Watch Hill section of Westerly. The defendants, Seaport Studios, Inc. and Randall Saunders, an officer of Seaport, appealed from an order of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, JHRW, LLC, as to count I of the plaintiff's amended complaint seeking a permanent injunction to bar the defendants from parking on JHRW's property. Before the Supreme Court, the defendants argued that the hearing justice erred in not referring the dispute to arbitration and in concluding that the defendants were precluded from asserting any claims or defenses with respect to the right to park on JHRW's property. The Supreme Court first held that the defendants had waived their right to arbitration. Next, the Supreme Court held that the defendants sought to litigate the same dispute over parking rights as was litigated in an earlier action which resulted in a final judgment and that, therefore, the defendants were precluded from relitigating the issue. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

<p> Id . (alterations and quotations omitted). </p>

The petitioner, Richard DiCarlo, appealed a Superior Court judgment in favor of the state, following a written decision denying the petitioner's appeal from a decision of a Drug Court magistrate upholding a determination by the Sex Offender Board of Review classifying him as a Level II, moderate-risk, sex offender. On appeal, the petitioner argues that, in determining his classification level, the board violated his rights to due process, to the presumption of innocence, and to be spared from double jeopardy, by relying on alleged impermissible hearsay allegations that were the basis for charges of which he was ultimately acquitted. The Supreme Court held that, because the petitioner did not raise his procedural due process argument before the magistrate and failed to provide any meaningful legal argument to the Superior Court, the petitioner failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. The Court further held that the exception to the "raise-or-waive" rule when an alleged error implicates an issue of constitutional dimension did not apply. Next, the Court held that, because sex-offender registration is a civil regulatory process, the board's actions were not in the context of a criminal trial and, thus, did not implicate the petitioner's right to a fair trial or violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

This case concerns an appeal from a denial of a request for reasonable litigation expenses under the Equal Access to Justice for Small Businesses and Individuals Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 92 of title 42 (EAJA). The plaintiffs, Rollingwood Acres, Inc., Smithfield Peat Co., Inc., and Smithfield Crushing Co., LLC, appealed from a Notice of Violation (NOV) issued on November 6, 2006, by the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM). The NOV alleged ten discrete violations of the Rhode Island Water Pollution Act, DEM's Water Quality Regulations, the Rhode Island Oil Pollution Control Act, DEM's Oil Pollution Control Regulations, and DEM's Regulations for the Rhode Island Pollution Discharge Elimination System. After a hearing before the Administrative Adjudication Division of DEM (AAD), the plaintiffs prevailed on all but two of the alleged violations, and the petitioners requested reasonable litigation expenses under the EAJA. The AAD hearing officer denied their request, finding that, first, DEM was substantially justified because a complaint had initiated DEM's investigation of plaintiffs, and, second, that complaint notwithstanding, DEM's actions were substantially justified. Adopting the hearing officer's reasoning, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of reasonable litigation expenses. The Supreme Court held that, in the first instance, the initiating complaint did not afford DEM substantial justification because there was not a sufficient nexus between the complaint and the NOV issued. The Supreme Court further held that DEM was not substantially justified based on its failure to cite the Rhode Island Department of Transportation (DOT) for the same violation, when, during the administrative proceedings, it was revealed that DEM knew that DOT made the changes that had caused the violations as well as that DOT had a general history of noncompliance with state environmental laws. The Supreme Court also noted DEM's lack of evidence as to the alleged water pollution and oil pollution violations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the judgment and remanded the record to the Superior Court with directions to enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $69,581.25 for attorneys' fees and $5,628.75 for the stenographic record.