Volume 213 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff bank sought to recover damages for the defendant's breach of a credit card agreement, claiming that the defendant had defaulted on a credit card account. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for default for failure to disclose a defense, pursuant to the relevant rule of practice (§ 13-19), and rendered judgment thereon following a hearing in damages. During the proceedings, the defendant filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge, F, from further participation in the proceedings on the ground of impropriety, which the trial court denied. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improp- erly denied the motion to disqualify. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to disqualify F, the defendant having failed to establish that a reasonable person presented with the facts would doubt F's impartiality; the record demonstrated that the defendant's counsel failed to provide any evidence of bias or impropriety sufficient to meet the required threshold, as counsel's history of past litigation involving F's former law firm and a single conversation with F, both occurring nearly twenty years ago, simply did not put F's impartiality in question. 2. The trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for default for failure to disclose a defense; contrary to the defendant's claim that she had no obligation to disclose a defense because the action did not fit into any of the categories specified under Practice Book § 13-19, this court determined that, for the purposes of § 13-19, the complaint, which sounded in default on a credit account, constituted an action ''upon [a] written contract'' within the meaning of § 13-19, as each credit card transaction was a unilateral promise to repay the debt being incurred, in accordance with the terms set forth in the credit card agreement, in exchange for the issuing bank's performance. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the plaintiff's business records of the defendant's monthly account billing statements into evidence; although the defendant claimed that such admission was improper under the business records exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to statute (§ 52-180) and the applicable provision (§ 8-4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence because the producing witness was not a bookkeeper who kept or maintained the records of the defendant's account, the witness' testimony provided an adequate foundation for admission, as he testified as to his current role as a recovery support lead for the plaintiff, which involved the management of collection agencies and maintaining records for collection efforts to ensure they are accurate and complete, and that he had reviewed the defendant's account history and monthly billing statements and that they were accu- rate in all respects and had been mailed to the defendant. Argued December 7, 2021—officially released June 7, 2022

The plaintiff R, who sustained injuries after he was injured in a motor vehicle collision involving an uninsured motorist, sought to recover uninsured motorist benefits allegedly due under an automobile insurance policy issued by the defendant W Co. At the time of the accident, R was operating a vehicle owned by a car dealership and covered by a commer- cial garage insurance policy issued by W Co. The trial court granted W Co.'s motion to bifurcate the issues of the insurance coverage limits and damages. A bifurcated trial before the court followed, limited to the issue of uninsured motorist coverage provided by the policy. During the trial, the sole witness, B, the owner of the dealership, testified credibly that he did not have education or formal training on risk loss and insurance purchasing but wanted to have the minimum amounts of uninsured motorist coverage required by state law as the dealership was not in the business of loaning or renting cars. B consulted with an insurance professional, C, to provide him advice, which he considered in determining the scope of coverage for the dealership. B attested that he received a waiver form from C, which listed $100,000 in uninsured motorist coverage, reviewed it, knowingly approved his selection, and signed his name on the last page of the form and sent it back to C. In its memorandum of decision, the court determined, inter alia, that the dealership, the only named insured on the policy, knowingly made an informed decision to reduce the uninsured motorist coverage from $1 million, the amount of liability coverage under the policy, to $100,000 on the waiver form, and, although the waiver form did not contain a statement of premium costs for each of the uninsured motorist coverage options available as required pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 38a- 336 (a) (2)), which permits the named insured to request a lesser amount of uninsured motorist coverage in writing, such noncompliance was excused because the policy was for a commercial garage. Thereafter, R moved for an articulation, which the court granted. The court expressly indicated that it had determined, based on B's testimony at trial that the dealership had knowingly selected $100,000 in standard, rather than conversion, uninsured motorist coverage. Subsequently, W Co. filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining issue of damages, claim- ing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because R had received workers' compensation benefits in excess of $100,000, which offset the $100,000 in uninsured motorist coverage under the policy. The court granted W Co.'s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in its favor. Thereafter, following R's death, the court granted the motion to substitute the coadministrators of R's estate as plaintiffs. Subsequently, the substitute plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the court improperly concluded that W Co.'s failure to comply with the statutory requirements of § 38a-336 (a) (2) was excused under the particular facts of this case and improperly concluded that the policy in question provided for standard, rather than conversion, insurance coverage. On the substitute plaintiffs' appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court improperly concluded that W Co.'s failure to comply with the statutory requirements of § 38a-336 (a) (2) was excused: contrary to W Co.'s contention that Frantz v. United States Fleet Leasing, Inc. (245 Conn. 727), Kinsey v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. (277 Conn. 398), and McDonald v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA (79 Conn. App. 800), created an exception for every case involving a commer- cial fleet or garage insurance policy, those cases recognized a limited exception to the statutory requirements of § 38a-336 (a) (2) that were fact-specific and predicated on several factors that distinguished com- mercial entities from typical purchasers of insurance, including that the policies involved a large commercial entity with departments specializ- ing in legal and insurance matters, were procured by insurance special- ists who were fully aware of the relative cost of uninsured motorist coverage, and covered a mass fleet of automobiles used to conduct large-scale commercial activities, the unreasonable and impracticable result of requiring strict adherence to the statutory requirements when there were numerous named insureds on the policy, whether the com- mercial entity was self-insured, and the premium amounts paid, and the present case differed from Frantz, Kinsey, and McDonald, as the dealership was not a large commercial entity, it was a local business involved in repair and used car sales with only ten to twenty vehicles for sale at that time that remained primarily on the dealership property, it was not self-insured, its annual insurance premium was far less than the premiums paid by large commercial entities, and the dealership was the only named insured on the policy; moreover, B, who was responsible for procuring insurance for the dealership, had no education or formal training on risk loss and insurance purchasing and was not aware of the availability, relative costs, and benefits of uninsured motorist cover- age and, therefore, relied largely on C to advise him, which was further demonstrated by his testimony that he requested the minimum amount of uninsured motorist coverage required by state law from C but procured $100,000 in uninsured motorist coverage—more than double the $40,000 required by state law; accordingly, because the dealership's uninsured motorist coverage was not effectively reduced pursuant to § 38a-336 (a) (2), summary judgment should not have been granted as a triable issue remained as to the amount of damages, as the $1 million liability coverage under the policy exceeded the workers' compensation benefits that R received. 2. The trial court properly determined that the policy provided for standard, rather than conversion, uninsured motorist insurance coverage: the pol- icy was ambiguous as to whether it provided standard or conversion uninsured motorist insurance coverage, and, because the issue of whether the dealership purchased standard or conversion coverage pre- sented a question of historical fact, rather than one of contract construc- tion, an examination of extrinsic evidence determined the parties' inten- tions, B's testimony at trial having undermined R's claim that the dealership intended to purchase enhanced coverage for an additional premium, as B testified that he wanted to have the minimum amount of insurance coverage required by state law and that he did not know what conversion coverage was and never asked C about it; moreover, this court declined to incorporate by reference language from the preprinted waiver form, which provided that the policy would be issued with the highest level of coverage selected if more than one coverage option was selected, because, as this court determined, the waiver form was an ineffective attempt to reduce the uninsured motorist coverage under the policy and the uncontroverted evidence in the record demonstrated that B did not select any of the boxes for a specific coverage option and did not intend to purchase conversion coverage for the dealership. Argued January 18—officially released June 7, 2022

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting his motion to modify his unallocated alimony and child support obligation. In his motion, the plaintiff requested to modify certain provi- sions of the parties' separation agreement, which had been incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, on the basis of, inter alia, his loss of employment and decrease in income. The parties' separation agreement provided in relevant part that the plaintiff was required to pay unallo- cated alimony and child support to the defendant, which was calculated on the basis of the plaintiff's ''pre-tax compensation from employment'' and included a minimum payment per month. The separation agreement defined ''pre-tax compensation from employment'' to include any and all earnings of any nature whatsoever actually received by the plaintiff in the form of cash or cash equivalents, or which the plaintiff is entitled to receive, from any and all sources relating to the services rendered by the plaintiff by way of his current or future employment. At a hearing on the plaintiff's motion, the plaintiff claimed that he had no income, but, when asked, testified that he receives interest and dividend income that he had failed to list on his financial affidavit. The court subsequently granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that there was a substantial change in the parties' circumstances. The court ordered, inter alia, that the plaintiff was not required to pay the defendant a minimum amount of unallocated alimony and child support per month. The court also ordered, as proposed by the defendant, that the definition of ''pre-tax compensation from employment'' set forth in the parties' separation agreement be modified to include income from all sources, including passive income from capital gains, interest and dividends, and income from business interests and other investments. Held that the plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the definition of ''pre-tax compensation from employment'' in the parties' separation agreement: although the plaintiff argued that the court's inclusion of capital gains, interest and dividends, and income from business interests and other investments conflicted with our Supreme Court's decision in Gay v. Gay (266 Conn. 641), that case was materially different from the present case in that it involved a modification pursuant to statute (§ 46b-86 (a)), which required the court to consider certain statutory (§ 46b-82) criteria and did not involve a separation agreement like the one in the present case, which expressly defined the term ''pre-tax compensation from employment'' and set forth specific, contractual parameters for modifying that definition; moreover, it was clear that the parties here, in their separation agreement, intended to give the court broad discretion to modify the definition of ''pre-tax compensation from employment'' to ensure that they were treated fairly in accordance with the spirit of the agreement, not in accordance with the criteria set forth in § 46b-82. Argued December 7, 2021—officially released June 7, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for alleged discriminatory conduct. The plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities alleging that the defendant town of East Lyme discriminated against him on the basis of national origin by denying him equal services and by treating him differently than his neighbors. The commission issued a release of juris- diction, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to warrant further investigation. The Superior Court granted the plaintiff's application for a waiver of fees, and the plaintiff subsequently served the defendants with a summons and complaint. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdic- tion pursuant to statute (§ 46a-101), because the plaintiff commenced the action more than ninety days after he received the release of jurisdic- tion. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the time limitation in § 46a-101 was subject matter jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. The court determined that, although the plaintiff had filed an application for a waiver of fees, the plaintiff's complaint was commenced, by service of the summons and complaint, beyond the ninety day limitation period. The court also concluded that the plaintiff improperly failed to plead the continuing course of conduct doctrine in his complaint in order for it to consider its affect on the limitation period. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court erred in concluding that the ninety day limitation period for commencing an action pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 46a-100) was subject matter jurisdictional: neither the language of § 46a-101 nor its legislative history revealed any indication that the legislature intended the time limitation of that statute to be jurisdictional, the geneaology of our antidiscrimination laws suggested an ongoing legislative intent to expand a complainant's right to seek a remedy for acts of discrimination, these factors underscored the remedial nature of the statutory scheme and weighed against a conclusion that the legislature intended to make the time limitation in § 46a-101 jurisdictional, and this court located support for its conclusion that the time limitation in § 46a-101 was mandatory and, thus, subject to waiver and equitable tolling, from state and federal case law. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly dismissed his action, which was based on his claim that the court erred by not considering the action commenced on the date that he filed his application for a waiver of fees: pursuant to §§ 46a-100 and 46a-101, the plaintiff had ninety days from the date that he received the release of jurisdiction to commence an action in the Superior Court, and, although the plaintiff filed an application for a waiver of fees, he did not serve the summons and complaint on the defendants until after the statutory limitation period had expired; moreover, the plaintiff did not provide any support for the proposition that the filing of an application for a waiver of fees tolled the limitation period while the application remained pending, and, even if his application did toll the deadline until the date that the court granted the application, the plaintiff's action would still have been untimely filed. 3. The trial court erred in concluding that the plaintiff was required to plead the continuing course of conduct doctrine in his complaint; this court found nothing in the applicable rule of practice (§ 10-57) that suggested, much less required, that the continuing course of conduct doctrine must be pleaded in the complaint, no special defense raising a limitations defense was filed by the defendants to which the plaintiff could have replied, the defendants raised the ninety day limitation period for the first time in their motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff raised the continu- ing course of conduct doctrine in his opposition to that motion. Argued October 13, 2021—officially released June 7, 2022

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the decree of the Probate Court denying his application to hear and decide a rejected claim. The plaintiff alleged that certain of his personal property was lost in a fire that destroyed a house owned by an estate that was administered by the defendant. The defendant received insurance proceeds, which included an amount for the personal property loss incurred by the plaintiff. The Probate Court issued a decree permitting the defendant to pay certain of the insurance proceeds to the plaintiff on the condition that he provide an affidavit of ownership for the destroyed items. The plaintiff, however, asserted that he was not notified of the decree and, despite his repeated efforts to obtain payment, the proceeds were never distributed. Following the appointment of a successor administrator to the estate, the plaintiff requested that the defendant act on his claim, which the defendant then rejected in its entirety. Thereafter, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 45a-364 (a)), the plaintiff presented to the Probate Court an application to hear and decide the rejected claim. The Probate Court denied the application, stating that its prior ruling permitting the payment of certain insurance proceeds to the plaintiff was dispositive of the matter. The plaintiff then filed a complaint for appeal from probate in the Superior Court pursuant to statute (§ 45a- 186). The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the plaintiff was not permitted to file a probate appeal following the denial of his application and, instead, should have commenced suit in accordance with § 45a-364. The Superior Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Superior Court properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because the Probate Court's decree was a denial of the plaintiff's applica- tion to hear and decide the rejected claim, and the court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's purported appeal: the plaintiff brought the probate appeal pursuant to § 45a-186, which limits the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to that of a Probate Court, and, as such, the Superior Court was not statutorily conferred with jurisdiction over the appeal because the proper procedure was to commerce suit in the Superior Court pursuant to § 45a-364 (b); moreover, the plaintiff's assumption that the Probate Court did not deny his applica- tion but, rather, effectively granted his application and considered his underlying rejected claim on its merits was mistaken, as the Probate Court expressly stated that it denied the application, and the fact that it provided reasoning for its denial by mentioning an earlier decree that it found to be dispositive of the claim did not eliminate that fact. 2. This court declined to engage in a discussion of the plaintiff's alternative argument that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because an alleged failure to satisfy the time requirement of § 45a-364 (b) for commencing suit must be raised by way of special defense rather than by a motion to dismiss: the issue of whether the plaintiff's failure to follow the procedures set forth in § 45a-364 (b) deprived the Superior Court of subject matter jurisdiction over his pro- bate appeal was properly presented in the defendant's motion to dismiss because it related to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, and the plaintiff's hypothetical claim was immaterial because the plaintiff did not file an action pursuant to § 45a-364 (b). Argued February 2—officially released June 7, 2022

The plaintiff city sought to confirm an arbitration award issued in connection with the termination of the defendant's employment as a police officer for the city. The city's chief of police, C, requested an internal affairs investigation of the defendant on the basis of his alleged insubordination and misappropriation of public funds after he enrolled in a training course at the city's expense even though his request to attend that training had been denied. Upon learning of this investigation, the defen- dant filed a complaint against C in which he alleged a pattern of retalia- tory conduct. An independent consultant, R, was hired to conduct the internal affairs investigation of the defendant, and he concluded, in relevant part, that the insubordination allegation was substantiated. The city hired an attorney, A, to investigate the defendant's allegations against C. A concluded that the totality of the evidence did not support, and in many instances was contradictory to, a finding of retaliation by C. As a result of A's findings, the city manager placed the defendant on administrative leave and requested that an internal affairs investigation be conducted regarding the defendant's allegations against C. R was retained to act as an independent hearing officer. R reviewed the results of A's investigation and determined that many of the defendant's allega- tions against C were not made in good faith and that some were know- ingly false, and that the defendant violated certain police department rules and an order pertaining to topics such as accountability, dishonesty and retaliatory conduct. Upon R's recommendation, the city terminated the defendant's employment. The defendant's union filed a grievance on behalf of the defendant, which was submitted to arbitration. After a hearing, the arbitration panel made numerous factual findings and issued its award, which stated that the defendant's termination had been for just cause. The city filed an application with the trial court to confirm the award, and the defendant subsequently filed an application to vacate the award. Following a hearing, the trial court rendered judgment grant- ing the city's application to confirm the award and denying the defen- dant's application to vacate the award, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard when it reviewed his application to vacate the arbitration award because he alleged that the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-418 (a) (1)): the trial court properly determined that § 52-418 (a) (1)) did not apply to warrant vacatur of the arbitration award because, although the defendant repeatedly asserted, without any factual support, that an e-mail he discovered after the arbitration hearing was concealed from him and that the e-mail contained facts material to the panel's determination, the trial court did not have reason to consider that e-mail when rendering its decision, as the defendant did not provide the court with an affidavit to authenticate the e-mail or to show that he was the individual referenced in the e-mail; moreover, the defendant offered no explanation as to how he obtained the e-mail or why he was unable to discover it prior to the arbitration hearing; furthermore, the defendant's arguments concerning the e-mail and the effect it would have had on the award had he introduced it as evidence at the arbitration hearing were purely speculative. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in determining that the arbitration procedure was fair and impartial on the basis of his claim that the panel improperly allowed C to be present at the arbitration hearing while his subordinates were testifying: although the defendant argued that C's presence at the hearing had a chilling effect on the subordinates' testimony, he acknowledged that he could not point to any specific instances in which that testimony was affected by C's presence and did not cite case law to support his argu- ments; moreover, the defendant did not argue that C should have been sequestered in order to prevent him from shaping his testimony to falsely corroborate the testimony of another witness, which is the purpose of sequestration; furthermore, it was for the arbitration panel to determine whether and when sequestration was to occur. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred by overlooking the arbitration panel's reliance on an investigation that was not fair and impartial: although the defendant attempted to raise public policy concerns about the panel's alleged reliance on A's investiga- tion by arguing that A's representation of the city and C in other matters prevented her from conducting a fair and impartial investigation of C in the present case, the defendant was essentially raising an evidentiary claim, and, because the submission to arbitration was unrestricted, the trial court was not permitted to review the evidence considered by the panel, and this court would not review the award for errors of fact; moreover, because the defendant had the opportunity to raise his con- cerns about A at the arbitration hearing and it was within the province of the panel to consider A's relationship with the city and C and what effect, if any, those relationships had on her investigation, the defendant failed to identify a clear public policy that allegedly was violated by the panel's award. Argued February 14—officially released June 14, 2022

Convicted under two informations of the crimes of risk of injury to a child, assault in the third degree, breach of the peace in the second degree and interfering with an officer, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's convictions stemmed from his involvement in a domestic violence incident with his girlfriend, which her minor child witnessed, and from his aggressive behavior with a police officer and hospital staff after he was brought to a hospital following the domestic violence incident. He claimed that the trial court improperly failed to conduct an adequate independent inquiry into his competency to stand trial and to order a competency hearing at the start of trial following a prior evaluation in which he had been found competent to stand trial. He also claimed that the court improperly granted the state's motion for joinder of the cases for trial because the conduct alleged in the domestic violence assault case was significantly more brutal and shocking than the conduct at the hospital alleged in the interfering with an officer case. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a competency evaluation or in failing to conduct an indepen- dent inquiry into his competency, the defendant having failed to meet his burden that, at the time he moved for the competency evaluation, the court had before it specific factual allegations that, if true, would have constituted substantial evidence of mental impairment: the court, before ruling on the motion, engaged in extensive dialogue with the defendant, observed his demeanor, took notice of his general pattern of disruptive conduct, reviewed the competency report in the case file, and determined that the defendant was competent to stand trial and that his repeated disruptions and assertions that he did not understand were a delay tactic and specifically referenced the defendant's behavior when denying the motion; moreover, the court concluded that, on the basis of the defendant's comments and ability to remain calm and cooper- ative during the initial stages of jury selection, the defendant clearly understood what was happening; furthermore, the court did not err in relying, in part, on the defendant's previous competency evaluation, as the defendant failed to produce any evidence that demonstrated that his condition had changed since that evaluation, and the previous report was not the only source of information on which the court relied in making its determination. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the two informations for trial, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that joinder resulted in substantial prejudice to him: although the trial court erred by joining the defendant's two cases for trial because the defendant's conduct with respect to the domestic violence assault charge was signifi- cantly more brutal and shocking than his conduct at the hospital relating to the interfering with an officer charge, the court's explicit instructions to the jury to consider each charge separately in reaching its verdict sufficiently cured the risk of substantial prejudice to the defendant and, therefore, preserved the jury's ability to fairly and impartially consider the offenses charged in the jointly tried cases; moreover, it was highly unlikely that the violent nature of the facts adduced in the domestic violence case prejudiced the jury's verdict as to the defendant's state of mind in the interfering with an officer case because the facts of what happened at the hospital were undisputed; furthermore, the fact that the jury acquitted the defendant of charges in both cases highlighted the limited prejudicial impact that joinder had. Argued January 3—officially released June 14, 2022

The plaintiff, an energy company, sought to recover damages for, inter alia, an alleged violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.), in connection with an alleged false bid certification submitted by the defendants, competing energy companies, in an attempt to secure a long-term clean energy contract with a utility company. As part of the bidding process, the defendants were required to demonstrate that they had full control over the property for the proposed energy facility. The plaintiff alleged that the city of Danbury, in executing an option agreement to lease certain land to the defendants, failed to comply with the city charter and with statutory notice require- ments, which effectively invalidated the defendants' option agreement. The plaintiff claimed it suffered damages in lost revenue that it would have received in securing the contract but for the defendants' false bid certification that was ultimately chosen. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue its CUTPA claim, which the trial court granted. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: the trial court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain its CUTPA action against the defendants, as the plaintiff's claims were remote and indirect because, if the defendants' knowingly submitted a false bid and the option agreement was unlawful and without legal effect as the plaintiff alleged, the utility company that was a party to the energy facility contract would have been a directly injured party and would have been best suited to seek a remedy for the harm; moreover, although the plaintiff claimed that it was certain to have received the contract in question if the defendants lacked the necessary site control, because that contention was not alleged in the operative complaint and was undermined by the plain language of the request for bids, which stated that the utility company retained discretion in awarding shared clean energy facility contracts and reserved the right to reject any or all offers, the plaintiff's purported injuries were purely speculative. Argued March 1—officially released June 14, 2022

The incarcerated plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, employees of the Department of Correction, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants improperly confiscated materials in his outgoing mail in violation of his constitutional right of access to the courts. The defen- dants filed a motion to strike the complaint, arguing that the conduct alleged did not constitute a violation of his constitutional rights and because the plaintiff failed to allege the specific personal involvement of four of the defendants in the conduct claimed to constitute a violation. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion to strike: the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege the specific personal involvement of the defendants C, M, S and T in the actual confiscation of his mail, and, therefore, the plaintiff could not prevail on his claim as to those defendants because he failed to assert that they personally were involved in the alleged violation; moreover, the court properly granted the defendants' motion to strike as to the defendant W because, although the plaintiff alleged that W confiscated his mail, he failed to allege that he suffered any actual injury as a result of such confiscation; furthermore, because the plaintiff did not allege that the materials were being mailed to his attor- ney or to the court, he failed to plead that the confiscation hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim or that his access to the courts was frustrated or impeded by their confiscation. Argued February 15—officially released June 14, 2022

The plaintiff city sought to foreclose a municipal tax lien on certain real property on which the defendant trustee, S, held a first mortgage. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure and set law days. S filed a motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure and to convert it to a judgment of foreclosure by sale, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, S filed a motion to open and to extend the sale date, claiming that there was an interested buyer in the property and that contract negotiations were ongoing. The plaintiff opposed the motion because S failed to identify the alleged buyer or to provide any documentation evidencing the potential sale. The trial court denied the motion, and S appealed to this court. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discre- tion by denying S's motion to open the judgment and to extend the sale date because its determination that the balancing of the equities favored the plaintiff was made after considering all of the relevant circumstances and needs of justice specific to the case and was reasonable under the facts and circumstances in the record. Argued March 3—officially released June 21, 2022

Convicted of the crime of conspiracy to commit murder as a result of a drive-by shooting during which an unintended person rather than the intended victim was fatally shot, the defendant appealed. He claimed, inter alia, that his conviction was legally insufficient because the state relied on the doctrine of transferred intent to prove the conspiracy charge and because it is legally impossible to conspire to kill an unin- tended victim. The state, which also charged the defendant with murder, alleged that the defendant had intended to kill a member of a rival gang but, instead, fatally shot the unintended victim, and the trial court, in its instructions to the jury, stated that the doctrine of transferred intent applied to both the murder charge and the charge of conspiracy to commit murder. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his convic- tion of conspiracy to commit murder is legally insufficient, which was based on his assertion that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to the crime of conspiracy, and, thus, he was deprived of his right to due process because it is legally impossible to conspire to kill an unintended victim: the state did not rely on the doctrine of transferred intent, as that theory bore no relevance to the conspiracy charge because it made no difference whether the rival gang member or the unintended third party was killed, and the state alleged and proved the elements of the conspiracy charge, which were the agreement to kill the rival gang member and the overt act of firing the gunshot intended for the gang member in furtherance of that agreement; moreover, the trial court's jury instruction on transferred intent did not transform the state's theory of the conspiracy charge into one predicated on that doctrine, that instruction having been, at most, surplusage that had no bearing on the nature of the state's case or the jury's consideration of whether the state proved its case. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain incriminating statements he had made to the police during their custodial interrogation of him was unavailing, as the record supported the court's findings that the police ceased questioning him after he invoked his right to counsel but that he thereafter initiated further communication with them of his own accord without counsel present: a. Contrary to the defendant's assertion that the police induced him to speak to them after he invoked his right to counsel, the trial court correctly concluded that he knowingly and voluntarily initiated further communication, as it credited testimony by R, the lead detective during the questioning, that another officer had informed R that the defendant, notwithstanding the previous invocation of his right to counsel, wanted to speak with the police: the defendant was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) before questioning resumed, he pro- vided no authority to support his claim that the police were required to provide him with an attorney or means to contact one, he did not ask them for permission to contact anyone, and his father was at the police station during the custodial interview and had visited with him; moreover, the record did not bear out the defendant's contention of persistent statements by the police that they wanted to talk to him, and the brief outline of the incriminating evidence they gave him was in response to his question about why he was being held on a charge of murder. b. This court concluded, in light of all of the relevant facts adduced at the suppression hearing, that the state had met its burden of demonstrating a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver by the defendant of his Miranda rights, as there was no showing that the police threatened the defendant or employed other coercive or improper tactics to obtain the waiver: although the defendant became eighteen years of age the day before the police questioned him, that did not require the court to reach a different conclusion, as the defendant had an eleventh grade education, could read and write, was not impaired in any way, and had signed two waiver forms after twice being informed of his Miranda rights, and his assertion of his right to counsel after being advised of those rights the first time was a clear indication that he understood those rights; moreover, the defendant's will was not overborne, as he contended, because the police did not contact a lawyer for him and, for a period of time, left him alone in the interview room separated from his father, and the surroundings and circumstances of his police interview, although hardly comfortable, did not mean that he was necessarily unable to decide whether to resume speaking to the police without a lawyer. c. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that he was harmed by the admission of R's testimony as to certain statements the defendant made during his police interview: because there was compelling indepen- dent evidence that the defendant was a passenger in the vehicle from which the gunshot was fired at the time it was fired, his statement to R acknowledging that he was in the vehicle was merely cumulative, and his statement to R identifying the intended victim of the shooting did not establish that the defendant was present when the shooting took place, as that statement contained no indication as to how the defendant became aware of the identity of the intended victim, it was hardly persua- sive evidence of his participation in the shooting, and it could have been based on information he learned after the shooting; moreover, the state was not required to establish the shooter's identity for purposes of the charge of conspiracy to commit murder, the evidence having been clear that, even if the defendant did not fire the gunshot, it was fired from the vehicle in which he was a passenger, and the testimony of another passenger who claimed that the defendant was not in the vehicle at the time of the shooting was flatly contradicted by that passenger's sworn statement to the police; furthermore, all of the witnesses who testified were subjected to extensive cross-examination about whatever interest or motive they may have had to falsely implicate the defendant, and the jury was well aware of any such interest or motive. Argued September 20, 2021—officially released June 21, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted of, inter alia, felony murder, and sentenced to fifty years' incarceration, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for failure to preserve his direct appeal. Following the imposition of his sentence, the trial court clerk handed the petitioner notices of the right to appeal and the right to sentence review and informed the petitioner that by signing the documents, he acknowledged receipt of them. The petitioner's trial counsel, a special public defender, explained to the petitioner what the documents were and also what had to be done to initiate the appeal, in particular that in order for the appellate process to start in motion, an application for waiver of costs and fees and appointment of appellate counsel had to be filed. After receiving this information, the petitioner signed the notice forms. Trial counsel then asked the petitioner if he wanted him to initiate the appeal process or forward the matter to the Office of the Chief Public Defender so that the appellate unit might begin an appeal. Angered by the verdict and lengthy sentence imposed, the petitioner abruptly told his trial counsel that he wanted him to have no contact with his case any longer. Despite the advice of the trial clerk, his trial counsel, and the contents of the notice itself, the petitioner mistakenly believed that signing the notice of right to appeal form was all that was necessary to begin his appeal. The habeas court, after a hearing at which the petitioner and his trial counsel testified, dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied the petition for certification to appeal. The petitioner did not immediately appeal from the judgment of the habeas court. Approximately twenty-five years later, the petitioner filed an application for waiver of fees and for appointment of counsel to appeal the judgment of the habeas court. Subsequently, the court granted the petitioner's application for waiver of fees and referred his petition for appointment of appellate counsel to the Office of the Chief Public Defender, which appointed counsel. On the petitioner's appeal to this court, held: 1. The petitioner failed to establish that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to establish that the issues raised were debatable among jurists of reason, that they reasonably could be resolved by a court differently, or that they raised questions deserving further appellate scrutiny. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court's conclusion that he was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel rested on clearly erroneous factual findings concerning his trial counsel's representations to him during his sentencing proceeding, a careful review of the record, including the transcript of the habeas trial, having revealed that the court's findings were supported by the evidence in the record; the court's factual findings set forth in its memorandum of decision were derived directly from the testimony of the petitioner's trial counsel at the habeas trial, the court had discretion to credit or discredit the witnesses who testified and was the sole arbiter of the weight to be given to witness testimony, and, in light of the testimony, there was ample evidence in the record to support the court's findings that the petitioner's trial counsel advised the petitioner regarding the initiation of the appeals process and offered to initiate the appeals process on the petitioner's behalf or forward the matter to the Office of the Chief Public Defender. 3. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court erred in concluding that his trial counsel's representation was not deficient and therefore that the petitioner failed to satisfy the performance prong of Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668): it was undisputed that the petitioner expressly discharged his trial counsel following the imposition of his sentence, and it was reasonable for trial counsel to believe that initiating an appeal on the petitioner's behalf would contradict the peti- tioner's explicit instructions and violate his ethical duty to the petitioner, and it was clear that trial counsel was prepared to assist the petitioner in initiating the appeals process but ultimately deferred to the petitioner's instructions to not handle his file any longer. Argued March 1—officially released June 21, 2022

The plaintiff tenants, J and S, sought, inter alia, an order to compel the defendants to use the money collected from them for rent to make certain repairs to their leased premises. The plaintiffs, who had entered into a residential lease agreement with the defendants, filed a complaint for housing code enforcement, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 47a- 14h), with the town in which the premises was located, alleging that the defendants had violated the statute (§ 47a-7) when they failed to repair and maintain certain conditions at the premises, including, inter alia, the swimming pool, furnace, and chimneys. The trial court deter- mined that only the plaintiffs' alleged violations concerning the furnace and chimneys arguably fell within the statutory criteria. During the bench trial, W, a town building official, testified that he notified D, a sanitarian for the local health district that enforces the health code, of the complaint because the alleged issues were property maintenance matters to be addressed by the local health district. D attested that after reviewing the complaint and speaking to J on the phone, she concluded that the alleged violations did not rise to the level of a health, fitness, or habitability concern and further determined that the defendants could not be cited for any code violations as the furnace reached a level of sixty-five degrees, which was legally sufficient, especially in July, and the housing code did not require chimneys or fireplaces to be provided or maintained. In its memorandum of decision, the court determined, inter alia, that based on the record and the evidence presented, the plaintiffs failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the violations alleged in the complaint rose to the level of violations materially affecting the health, safety, and habitability of the premises and, therefore, rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed to this court, arguing that their claims regarding the swimming pool, furnace, and chimneys did not need to constitute violations of the housing code or rise to a level affecting the health, safety, and habitability of the premises to prevail on their complaint pursuant to § 47a-14h alleging violations of § 47a-7. Held that the trial court's finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that their allegations constituted violations of the housing code or materially affected the health, safety, and habitability of the premises as required under § 47a- 7 was not clearly erroneous: to trigger the sanctions available for a violation of § 47a-7, the plaintiffs were required to show more than dissatisfaction with the condition and operation of the pool, furnace, and chimneys and, instead, were required to adduce evidence that estab- lished a substantial violation or series of violations of housing and health codes that created a material risk or hazard to the plaintiffs as occupants; moreover, the evidence in the record demonstrated that the plaintiffs failed to establish that any of their allegations constituted a violation of § 47a-7, as the furnace reached a legally sufficient level of temperature, the lack of repairs to the pool was not a health, safety, or habitability issue, especially considering that the parties' signed agreement provided that the pool was strictly an amenity, of which use was not guaranteed, and J testified that the plaintiffs did not suffer any injury or illness as a result of the defendants' alleged failure to clean the chimneys. Argued December 2, 2021—officially released June 21, 2022

The defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities appealed from the judgment of the trial court vacating the damages award granted by its human rights referee to the defendant employee, P, for garden- variety emotional distress in a sexual harassment complaint against the plaintiff employer. During a public hearing before the referee, P testified that the harassing and discriminatory conduct of M, who was her direct supervisor while she was employed by the plaintiff, made her feel uncom- fortable, stressed, and nervous and caused her to become depressed. On direct examination, she was not asked about, and did not testify regarding, any medical treatment that she received relating to her depres- sion. On cross-examination, however, the plaintiff's counsel questioned P regarding the professional treatment that she sought as a result of the emotional distress M had caused and asked why she had not pro- duced any medical records relating to such treatment. The plaintiff's counsel continued this line of questioning even after the referee ruled that P was not required to produce any medical records because she was claiming only garden-variety emotional distress. With the exception of her testimony in response to the questions of the plaintiff's counsel, P did not offer any evidence regarding her medical treatment. The referee found in favor of P and awarded her back pay and damages for garden- variety emotional distress. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, which vacated the referee's damages award, and the commission appealed to this court. Held that the trial court erred when it vacated the referee's damages award because it incorrectly concluded that the plaintiff was prejudiced by P's failure to disclose her medical records: the referee did not abuse her discretion when she awarded P damages for garden- variety emotional distress because our Supreme Court in Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert (343 Conn. 90) made clear that, where a claimant limits her claim to one for garden-variety emotional distress damages, her medical records have no relevance, and P's allegations in her complaint and her testimony on direct examination, redirect examination, and in response to the referee's questions during the hear- ing were consistent with a claim for garden-variety emotional distress and the referee's final decision clearly indicated that her award was limited to damages for garden-variety emotional distress; moreover, a new hearing in damages was not required because, unlike in Gilbert, any prejudice that may have resulted from P's testimony regarding her psychiatric treatment and medication was caused solely by the plaintiff's counsel, who insisted on questioning P about her treatment even though the subject was not raised in her direct testimony and he was informed multiple times that such evidence was not relevant; furthermore, con- trary to the plaintiff's claim, our Supreme Court in Gilbert did not state that a hearing on medical records was a prerequisite to allowing a complainant to present evidence of garden-variety emotional distress; accordingly, the plaintiff did not have a right to P's medical records and could not have been prejudiced by P's failure to produce them. Argued January 6—officially released June 21, 2022

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting in part the defendant's motion to modify the existing child support, custody, visitation and parental access orders with regard to the parties' four minor children. Pursuant to those orders, the plaintiff had sole legal custody and primary physical residence of the children, with a specific visiting and access schedule for the defendant and pay- ment of child support from the defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant's motion requested, inter alia, sole custody of the children and a suspen- sion of the support order. After a hearing, the court granted the defen- dant's motion to modify as to access and visitation, issued a revised parenting schedule and reduced her weekly support obligation. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly modified the orders as to visitation, the parental access plan and child support because the defendant's motion sought to modify only custody: the plain language of the defendant's motion placed before the court the issues of custody, visitation and the parental access schedule, the defendant testified at the hearing that she had difficulties complying with the orders as to child support and the parental access schedule and proposed a new visitation and access schedule, and the plaintiff declined to present rebuttal witnesses to the defendant's testimony; moreover, none of the requests by the plaintiff's counsel for clarifications of the court's oral ruling concerned the scope of the ruling compared to the motion to mod- ify. Argued February 1—officially released June 21, 2022

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgments of the trial court finding him in contempt on two separate occasions and sanctioning him for bad faith litigation. The court granted the plaintiff's motions for contempt, which alleged that the defendant had failed to make certain lump sum payments that the court had ordered him to pay toward a child support arrearage. The court also granted the plaintiff's motion for sanctions, concluding that the defendant had engaged in bad faith litigation because of his repetitive motions that did not raise any color- able claims. The court also awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees with respect to these motions. Held that, after a careful review of the record, briefs, oral argument and relevant law, this court concluded that the defendant failed to demonstrate any instance of reversible error by the trial court, as that court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and the proper legal standards and analyses were applied to the defen- dant's claims. Argued January 26—officially released June 21, 2022

The plaintiffs, two entities that, respectively, owned a parcel of real property and a billboard located on that property, sought a declaratory ruling from the trial court pursuant to statute (§ 4-175) following the failure of the defendant Department of Transportation to act on their petition for a declaratory ruling that they could replace the billboard's existing support structure. The billboard, which was located in a residential zone within 660 feet of a federal highway and had been erected prior to 1968, was a nonconforming grandfathered sign pursuant to the federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965 (23 U.S.C. § 131 et seq.) and related state statute (§ 13a-123). In order to replace the billboard's support structure, the plaintiffs acknowledged that they would need to remove the existing billboard for a short period of time. The department denied the plaintiff's application for a permit to replace the support structure, as a new sign was not permitted pursuant to 23 U.S.C. §131 et seq. and § 13a-123. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the proposed replacement of the billboard's existing support system constituted permissible maintenance and repair. The court further held that, pursuant to a zoning statute (§ 8-2), the sign's preexisting noncon- forming use was a vested right with which the department and the defendant Commissioner of Transportation could not interfere. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held that the trial court erred in holding that replacing the billboard's existing support structure constituted maintenance and repair pursuant to federal and state law: although, as a grandfathered nonconforming sign, the billboard could continue to exist, even though it did not comply with state regulations, and it could be maintained and repaired without losing its grandfathered status, replacing the billboard's existing support system was not customary maintenance and repair because such construction would substantially change the billboard and constitute the erection of a new billboard, and all other jurisdictions confronted with similar facts have held that such structural replacement constitutes the erection of a new sign and, thus, the termination of the preexisting sign's nonconforming usage; more- over, this court's determination that reconstructing a billboard with a new support structure did not constitute customary repair and mainte- nance was consistent with the purpose of 23 U.S.C. § 131 et seq., as the policy behind the act was for billboards located in certain zones along federal highways to cease to exist after they had reached the natural end of their lives; furthermore, the court's reliance on § 8-2, which restricts municipal zoning authorities from interfering with nonconform- ing uses, was misplaced, as that statute applies only in a zoning context and this case was governed by federal and state law and regulations, and, contrary to the plaintiffs' claim, there was no taking of a vested property right, as the defendants did not direct the plaintiffs to remove the billboard. Argued January 11—officially released June 21, 2022

The plaintiff general contractor sought to recover damages for, inter alia, an alleged violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.), in connection with a breach of contract claim between the plaintiff and the defendants, a subcontractor, T Co., and its manager, P. Under the contract, T Co. was to perform certain work on a construc- tion project to build a condominium complex at a fixed sum. Although the contract called for payment upon delivery for furnished materials and equipment, the defendants convinced the plaintiff to pay a 30 percent deposit for all of the estimated costs of materials and equipment up front, claiming that the deposit would be used to buy materials ahead of time to avoid an anticipated price increase and to avoid delivery delays. Unknown to the plaintiff, the defendants did not intend to use these funds as promised but, instead, intended to use the funds to finance its payroll and work on other projects. When the invoices for supplies remained unpaid by the defendants, a mechanic's lien was placed on the property and, thereafter, the plaintiff terminated the contract. The trial court concluded that the defendants breached the contract, inter alia, in failing to perform the work and to pay for materials, equipment and labor used, and that the defendants were unjustly enriched. It also found the defendants' conduct was deceptive, unethical and unscrupu- lous and constituted an unfair and deceptive business practice in viola- tion of CUTPA. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. Contrary to the defendants' claims, there was sufficient evidence of inten- tional, reckless, unethical and unscrupulous conduct by both defendants to establish a violation of CUTPA: the record supported a finding that P, as the manager and controlling member of T Co., knowingly or recklessly engaged in the unscrupulous acts, because he personally represented to the plaintiff that the deposit would be used for materials, labor, and overhead for the plaintiff's project, and P controlled how the deposit was ultimately spent; moreover, the court's finding of ascertainable loss was not clearly erroneous, as the court expressly found that, although the plaintiff deposited a certain sum of money, the plaintiff only received value in completed work in an amount less than the deposit and, accord- ingly, there was little question that the difference between the money paid and the value received constituted an ascertainable loss for the purposes of CUTPA. 2. The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff punitive damages, as the evidence sufficiently supported the court's findings that the defendants' false representations to the plaintiff that the deposit would be used to purchase materials and rent equipment was intentional, deceptive, unethical, and unscrupulous and that the defendants fully intended to use the deposit to fulfill obligations under other projects unrelated to the plaintiff's project; moreover, the record also supported the court's finding that it was known to P that T Co. was in a shaky financial condition when it convinced the plaintiff to pay the deposit and, thus, these findings supported the court's conclusion that the defendants acted with reckless indifference to the plaintiff's rights; furthermore, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff, as the court properly found that the defendants violated CUTPA. Argued November 17, 2021—officially released June 28, 2022

The plaintiff employee sought to recover damages from the defendant employer for personal injuries he sustained while working for the defen- dant. In his complaint, the plaintiff, whose employment duties included painting, alleged, inter alia, that, although he was initially provided a respirator by another employee to prevent excessive inhalation of toxic chemicals from the paint he used, after about one month, D, the defen- dant's safety manager, informed the plaintiff that he was not authorized to use the respirator in the workplace. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had deliberately instructed him to continue to paint in known dangerous conditions, the defendant was aware that his injuries were substantially certain to result from its action, and it had engaged in wilful and serious misconduct. The defendant filed a motion to strike with prejudice on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the exclusivity provision (§ 31-284) of the Workers' Compensation Act (act) (§ 31-275 et seq.), which provides that the act is the exclusive remedy for employees injured in most instances, because the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts that D was the defendant's alter ego such that the defendant could be held liable for D's tortious conduct, and, alternatively, D's actions did not constitute intentional misconduct. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike, concluding that the plaintiff's complaint did not state a legally sufficient cause of action that fell within the intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision of the act. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not allege the level of control required by the instrumentality rule or the unity of ownership interest required by the identity rule to disregard the defendant's corporate structure, but merely attempted to impose liability on the defendant for the alleged intentional acts of D, as a supervisor, on the basis of her apparent authority to act on the defendant's behalf. The court granted the motion to strike with prejudice, reasoning that the claim had been stricken multiple times and it was clear that the plaintiff was unable to cure the legal insufficiencies in the allegations. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to strike with prejudice, the plaintiff having failed to plead that D was the defendant's alter ego such that D's alleged intentional torts could be attributed to the defen- dant to pierce the corporate veil and fall within the exception to the exclusivity provision of the act: the plaintiff's allegations simply estab- lished D's control was typical of any corporate safety manager and did not rise to the level of alter ego status to disregard the defendant's corporate structure, the plaintiff's allegations having failed to meet the stringent alter ego test, which requires that the corporation have no separate existence from the alter ego who controls and dominates the corporation's business affairs, as the plaintiff's allegation that D created a policy regarding the use of respirators did not establish the requisite level of control over the defendant; moreover, this court declined to review the plaintiff's argument that it should reconsider its jurisprudence regarding the alter ego exception to the act's exclusivity provision with respect to larger corporations, as the plaintiff failed to raise this argu- ment before the trial court and raised it for the first time to this court in his reply brief; furthermore, although our Supreme Court in Patel v. Flexo Converters, U.S.A., Inc. (309 Conn. 52), reasoned that a plaintiff alleging an intentional tort directly committed or authorized by the employer was not required to prove that the actor was the employer's alter ego, this court declined to consider the applicability of that excep- tion to the exclusivity provision of the act, as the plaintiff did not allege or argue that an intentional tort had been directly committed or authorized by the defendant. Argued January 10–officially released June 28, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted of several crimes, including murder, as a result of a shooting in a nightclub, sought a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance as to the petitioner's third-party culpability defense and the admission into evidence of eyewitness identifications of the petitioner. The petitioner further claimed that his right to due process under the state constitution (article first, §§ 8 and 9) was violated because the eyewitness identifica- tions of him were obtained through unnecessarily suggestive identifica- tion procedures. The petitioner had claimed that he could not properly be identified as the shooter because the witnesses could not distinguish between him and his brother, W, who was present at the time of the shooting. The trial court declined the petitioner's request to instruct the jury on third-party culpability, reasoning that the evidence failed to establish a direct connection between W and the crimes at issue. The petitioner claimed that his trial counsel were ineffective for having filed a request to charge that did not adequately refer to the evidence in support of the charge, which, in turn, resulted in the court's declining to give the jury a third-party culpability instruction. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition and, thereafter, denied the peti- tioner certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal with respect to his claims that his trial counsel were ineffective in litigating his third-party culpability defense and issues relating to the admission at trial of the eyewitness identifications of him: a. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to cite certain evidence in their request for a jury instruction on third-party culpability, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had counsel included references to that evidence in the request to charge, as this court pre- viously determined in the petitioner's direct appeal from his conviction that the trial court did not improperly decline to instruct the jury on the proposed charge because the evidence raised merely a bare suspicion as to a third party, which was insufficient to establish the required direct connection to that third party so as to warrant a charge on third-party culpability; moreover, contrary to the petitioner's claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to present the testimony of certain eyewitnesses in support of the petitioner's identification defense, the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that counsel declined to call those witnesses on the basis of reasonable professional judgment, the habeas court having credited counsel's testimony that they had engaged in a risk analysis concerning whether to call the witnesses, one of whom may have given contradictory statements to the police, and the other of whom, in a written statement to the police, had identified the petitioner as the shooter, and it was not for this court to second- guess the decision of trial counsel when counsel were aware of the substance of the witnesses' anticipated testimony and made the reason- able decision not to present it due to its potentially harmful nature. b. The petitioner failed to show a reasonable probability that counsel would have been successful in seeking to offer the testimony of an eyewitness identification expert, as any such effort would likely have been fruitless in light of our Supreme Court's case law at the time of the petitioner's criminal trial, which made clear that such testimony generally was disfavored and that it would not have been an abuse of a trial court's discretion to refuse to allow it; accordingly, the petitioner could not demonstrate that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assis- tance by declining to pursue a motion for expenses to retain and, ulti- mately, not to call, an eyewitness identification expert; moreover, the procedures the police employed concerning the photographic array of suspects that they showed to the witnesses were within the acceptable parameters of effective and fair police work and satisfied the require- ments of due process, as the petitioner failed to present credible evidence that those procedures were so flawed as to present a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification; furthermore, the petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel performed deficiently by not presenting evidence that an eyewitness to the shooting had chosen a photograph other than that of the petitioner from the array of photo- graphs prepared by the police, as counsel's choice not to call that witness was not outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, the witness was only 50 percent sure of his choice from the array, he was not emphatic in his knowledge of the shooter's identity and, thus, could have testified that the petitioner was the shooter, thereby hurting the petitioner's defense, the witness' statement to the police tended to undermine the petitioner's third-party culpability defense and, even if counsel had performed deficiently by failing to question the witness, the jury's guilty verdict was supported by substantial other evidence concerning the petitioner's identity as the shooter. 2. The petitioner failed to establish cause and prejudice to overcome his procedural default in having failed to claim at his criminal trial and on direct appeal that the admission into evidence of the eyewitness identifications of him as the shooter violated his right to due process under article first, §§ 8 and 9; contrary to the petitioner's contention that good cause existed for that failure because established law at that time would have made his argument futile, the habeas court properly determined that he had a reasonable basis at that time to claim that the identification procedures at issue were unnecessarily suggestive and, thus, that he did not establish good cause and prejudice because our Supreme Court's case law at that time explicitly invited continued chal- lenges to identification procedures. Argued January 31—officially released June 28, 2022

The plaintiff, a certified nursing assistant, sought to recover damages from the defendant for an alleged violation of the Connecticut Fair Employ- ment Practices Act (CFEPA) (§ 46a-60), for failing to hire the plaintiff, who is hard of hearing, on the basis of her disability. During the hiring interview with S, the owner and administrator of the defendant, the plaintiff asked S to speak up, as she had trouble hearing her. S subse- quently asked how the plaintiff would be able to hear her clients and the plaintiff responded that she had no problem communicating with her nonverbal autistic son. The interview continued with no further questions regarding the plaintiff's disability but, instead, focused on the plaintiff's sporadic work history. After the interview, S received a fax containing employment discrimination information from the plaintiff's mother, which S interpreted as a potential threat of litigation. Thereafter, the defendant did not hire the plaintiff. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed her discrimination action with the trial court, which determined that the plaintiff had not proven that the reason she was not hired by the defendant was because of her hearing disability, and that the reasons given by the defendant for not hiring the plaintiff, the gaps in her employ- ment history, her reliability, and the fax sent by her mother, were not due to intentional discrimination. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard for determining the defendant's liability under CFEPA. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred in applying the but-for causation standard in reviewing her disability claim pursuant to CFEPA, as the trial court properly applied the motivating factor test as the causation standard, which required the plaintiff to prove only that the illegal discrimination was a cause of the adverse employment action: although the trial court's decision did not state which causation test it applied, the court's use in its memorandum of decision of the phrase ''because of,'' when it stated that the plaintiff had failed to prove that she was not hired because of her hearing disability, was not inconsistent with the court's application of the motiva- ting factor test, as both our Supreme Court and this court have interpre- ted the phrase ''because of'' in CFEPA as incorporating the motivating factor test; moreover, the language of the court's memorandum of deci- sion was completely consistent with its application of the motivating factor test, as the court's findings made clear that it concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove that her hearing disability played any role in the defendant's decision not to hire her and, therefore, was not a motivating factor, the record having supported the court's conclusion in crediting S's testimony that she decided not to hire the plaintiff because she had concerns about the plaintiff's work history and felt threatened by the fax from the plaintiff's mother. 2. Contrary to the plaintiff's claim, statements in the defendant's pretrial brief alleging that the plaintiff was not hired because of concerns that her hearing impairment could endanger her clients were not judicial admissions: although it is possible that, in certain circumstances, an attorney's unequivocal representations of facts on behalf of his client could constitute a judicial admission, the defendant made no clear, deliberate and unequivocal or voluntary and knowing concessions of fact, and, instead, set forth the arguments it intended to make based on the evidence it expected to be admitted at trial and explicitly referred to those statements as arguments, and those statements constituted, at most, evidentiary admissions that the trial court was free to accept or disregard; moreover, the plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the court's findings were clearly erroneous in that the court failed to give sufficient weight to the different explanations offered by the defen- dant for not hiring the plaintiff, as the record sufficiently supported the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove that she was not hired because of her disability and the trial court was free to weigh the evidence, consider the parties' credibility, and decide the facts based on all the information, and not just the particular statements on which the plaintiff focused and, accordingly, regardless of the different state- ments that the defendant made in its pretrial brief, the trial court's finding that the plaintiff failed to prove her discrimination claim was not clearly erroneous. Argued February 2—officially released July 5, 2022

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants M and V. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment along with three affidavits averring, respectively, to the out- standing debt, the fair market value of the property, and additional facts relevant to the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff then filed an application for a prejudgment remedy to attach potential proceeds that V could obtain as a result of the adjudication or settlement of an unrelated pending civil action in which he was the plaintiff. The parties reached an agreement, which was approved by the trial court, pursuant to which the plaintiff agreed to defer a hearing on its prejudgment remedy application until the unrelated action was resolved and the defendants agreed to notify the plaintiff of any judgment or settlement of the unrelated action and further agreed not to dispose of any assets identified in the plaintiff's application. That following year, asserting that the defendants violated their agreement by failing to inform the plaintiff of the settlement of the unrelated action, the plaintiff filed what it deemed to be an ex parte application for a prejudgment remedy, which referenced the affidavits filed in connection with its motion for summary judgment and also attached an affidavit from an officer of its loan servicing company, averring facts in support of its allegation that exi- gency necessitated the granting of a prejudgment remedy. Without con- ducting a hearing, but after reviewing the objections filed by the defen- dants, the trial court granted the ex parte application, and the defendants appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the application for a prejudgment remedy because the application was not defective with respect to the affidavits provided: the affidavit attached to the plaintiff's application and those that it incorporated by reference contained facts intending to establish probable cause that the plaintiff would prevail in obtaining a foreclosure judgment against the defendants, including a right to recover an amount greater than or equal to the amount of the prejudgment remedy that it sought; moreover, the applicable statute (§ 52-578e) does not require that affidavits in support of a prejudgment remedy be directly attached to the application itself nor does it bar a party from incorporating by reference affidavits that were already a part of the record and were available to the trial court and all parties. 2. The defendants' claim that, even if the trial court had jurisdiction, it improperly acted on the application without providing the defendants with a prompt postattachment hearing as due process required was moot: subsequent to the filing of this appeal, the trial court granted summary judgment as to the defendants' liability on the mortgage note and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff, establishing that there was probable cause for a prejudgment remedy, that insufficient equity in the property existed to cover the total debt owed by the defendants to the plaintiff, and that the deficiency exceeded the prejudgment remedy in place; accordingly, any remand for a hearing regarding probable cause and any opportunity to be heard regarding the amount of the prejudgment remedy would be meaningless and could provide no practical relief to the defendants. Argued November 17, 2021—officially released July 12, 2022

The plaintiff law firm sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, breach of contract in connection with its representation of the defendant. The matter was referred to an attorney fact finder, who filed a report recommending judgment for the plaintiff on the complaint. The trial court overruled the defendant's objection to the report of the attorney fact finder and rendered judgment in accordance with it. Two exhibits, a retainer agreement and a bill for services, were considered by the attorney fact finder, but were not reviewed by the court, as they were reported missing from the clerk's office. The defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the court improperly overruled her objection to the attorney fact finder's report and improperly rendered judgment in accordance with the attorney fact finder's report because the report contained insufficient factual findings. Held: 1. The trial court improperly overruled the defendant's objection to the attorney fact finder's report because the court failed to review all of the evidence considered by the attorney fact finder: a court, on reviewing a report of an attorney fact finder, must assess all of the evidence that was presented to the attorney fact finder in order to properly consider objections challenging the report, and, here, the court could not ade- quately assess the defendant's claims that the billing was excessive and that the quantum of work claimed by the plaintiff did not correlate to the claimed time expended without reviewing the retainer agreement and billing record entered as exhibits before the attorney fact finder; moreover, faced with the fact that these exhibits were missing from the record, it would have been appropriate for the court to remand the case to the attorney fact finder or to have taken any other action it deemed appropriate pursuant to the relevant rule of practice (§ 23-58 (a)). 2. The trial court improperly rendered judgment in accordance with the report of the attorney fact finder because it was not supported by sufficient factual findings: the minimal report's conclusion that the defendant owed the plaintiff a certain amount of money was not sup- ported by the sole factual finding that the plaintiff's representation of the defendant was partially successful, its statement that exhibits were entered into evidence by the plaintiff did not constitute a finding as to the content of those documents, and it did not provide an adequate factual underlayment for the court's ultimate determination to accept it, falling below the bare minimum necessary for the court appropriately to render judgment; moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, this claim was properly preserved for appellate review, as in her objection to the report, the defendant, a self-represented party, specifically claimed that the report's conclusions were not properly reached on the basis of various separate grounds and, at the hearing on her objection, the defendant repeatedly advanced the same arguments that the report's conclusions were unsupported. Argued March 7—officially released July 19, 2022

The plaintiff taxpayers, J and B, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant Commissioner of Revenue Services disallowing in part their claims for certain income tax refunds. The plaintiffs resided in Connecticut, but J performed services for his employer, U Co., in both Connecticut and New York. As part of his compensation for those ser- vices, J received stock options and restricted stock from U Co. For the 2005, 2007 and 2008 taxable years, the plaintiffs filed Connecticut resi- dent income tax returns on which they reported compensation that J had received from his exercise of stock options and the vesting of restricted stock that U Co. previously had granted to him. They also sought a credit for taxes paid to New York during those years for services J performed for U Co. that occurred both in Connecticut and New York. The commissioner allowed the credit pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 12-704 (a)). Following an audit conducted in New York, the plaintiffs paid additional taxes to New York for compensation that J had received from U Co. for the 2005, 2007 and 2008 taxable years. The plaintiffs filed amended Connecticut resident income tax returns for those years and sought a credit for the additional taxes they paid to New York. The commissioner disallowed in part the requested credit and the plaintiffs' claims for refunds of the taxes paid to New York for the subject taxable years on the ground that the plaintiffs were required to allocate income from the exercise of stock options and the vesting of restricted stock between Connecticut and New York in accordance with the relevant state regulations (§§ 12-711(b)-17 (c) and 12-711(b)-18 (c)). In determin- ing the apportionment and the credit to which the plaintiffs were entitled, the commissioner applied the methodology set forth in those regulations, which he construed as requiring a computation of the total compensation received by J during the relevant periods, including deferred compensa- tion that J received in those periods for services rendered prior thereto. The plaintiffs had proposed an alternate methodology pursuant to the relevant state regulation (§ 12-711(b)-15 (a)) that did not include deferred compensation. The plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from the commissioner's decision, claiming that the commissioner had misin- terpreted §§ 12-711(b)-17 (c) and 12-711(b)-18 (c), and abused his discre- tion in failing to utilize their alternate apportionment methodology because the methodology that he applied resulted in an unfair and inequitable allocation. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the commissioner, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court and the commissioner correctly interpreted §§ 12-711(b)- 17 (c) and 12-711(b)-18 (c) of the regulations, as their construction was mandated by the plain language of those regulations and did not yield absurd or unworkable results: it was undisputed that the deferred com- pensation at issue was received during the relevant periods, and, there- fore, it fell squarely within the straightforward regulatory language directing that the computation of credit shall include all of the compensa- tion received during the relevant periods for the particular services identified therein; moreover, although the plaintiffs claimed that the regulations must be understood in the context of the broader regulatory scheme and its overriding purpose and that their construction of the regulations best achieved that goal, they failed to identify any language in the regulations to substantiate their construction of those provisions, and their belief as to how the regulatory purpose is best served did not trump the plain and unambiguous language of the regulations, which was determinative of their meaning. 2. The plaintiffs' alternative claim that the trial court incorrectly refused to require the commissioner to exercise his discretionary authority under § 12-711(b)-15 (a) of the regulations to approve their proposed alternate apportionment methodology was without merit; because the commis- sioner correctly construed and applied §§ 12-711(b)-17 (c) and 12-711(b)- 18 (c) of the regulations, the resulting apportionment was presumptively fair and equitable under § 12-711(b)-15 (b), and the plaintiffs failed to overcome that presumption by establishing that the methodology set forth in §§ 12-711(b)-17 (c) and 12-711(b)-18 (c) was so unfair and inequi- table as applied to J that the commissioner was required to use their alternate apportionment methodology in determining the amount of their tax credit. Argued October 5, 2021—officially released July 19, 2022

Convicted of four counts of risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant, a rabbi, was a teacher at and served as the dean of a private, Orthodox Jewish high school. The victim, E, attended the school for four years, commencing in 2001. E alleged that, during his sophomore year, when he was fourteen and fifteen years old, he and the defendant met at least once a week to engage in various sexual acts. The defendant continued to engage in sexual acts with E after he turned sixteen years old. In 2016, E reported the sexual abuse to the police. The defendant was arrested and charged with four counts each of sexual assault in the second degree and risk of injury to a child. At trial, the state introduced uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant to a provision (§ 4-5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence regarding a sexual relationship between the defendant and R, a former student at the school, and the defendant's relationship with E after his sixteenth birthday. Following R's testimony, the court provided a limiting instruc- tion to the jury. After the close of evidence at trial, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal as to the charges of sexual assault in the second degree on the ground that the prosecution was barred by the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2001) § 54-193a, as amended by Public Acts 2002, No. 02-138, § 1) of limitations because E had not notified a police officer or state's attorney within five years of the commission of the offense. The state conceded that the charges were barred, and the trial court granted the motion for a judgment of acquittal. Thereafter, the state filed a new information limited to the four counts of risk of injury to a child. In its final instructions to the jury, the court instructed in relevant part regarding misconduct evidence: ''It is for you to determine whether the defendant committed any uncharged sexual misconduct . . . .'' The jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant filed postver- dict motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, claiming, inter alia, that the limitation period applicable to the charges of sexual assault in the second degree should also apply to the risk of injury charges because the charges were based on the same conduct. The trial court denied the motions, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the risk of injury charges: our courts previously have concluded that risk of injury to a child and sexual assault are separate and distinct offenses; moreover, contrary to the defendant's assertion, the requirement that a victim notify a police officer or state's attorney of an offense within five years of its commission was limited by the plain and unambiguous language of § 54-193a to charges of sexual assault in the second degree pursuant to statute (§ 53a-71 (a) (1)); furthermore, if the legislature had intended the additional reporting requirement to also apply to charges of risk of injury under the applicable statute (§ 53- 21 (a) (2)), it would have stated so expressly, and, accordingly, for the court to expand the requirement to violations of § 53-21 (a) (2) would be contrary to the presumed intent of the legislature; additionally, applying different statutes of limitations to the two sets of charges would not lead to an absurd or unworkable result, as two criminal statutes can be construed to proscribe the same conduct and a defendant may be prosecuted under either. 2. The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the evidence of uncharged misconduct: the defendant adequately preserved his challenge to the trial court's instructions regarding the uncharged misconduct evidence involving the defendant's continued sexual acts with E after E turned sixteen by stating in his request to charge that, ''[a]s to any evidence of uncharged misconduct,'' the state had the burden to prove such conduct by clear and convincing evidence; moreover, the trial court instructed that it was for the jury ''to determine'' whether the defendant engaged in the acts of uncharged misconduct and, contrary to the defen- dant's assertions, there was no meaningful distinction between an instruction that a jury may consider prior misconduct evidence if it ''believes'' such evidence, which our Supreme Court endorsed in State v. Cutler (293 Conn. 303) and which is used in the Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions, and the trial court's use of the word ''determine''; accordingly, the trial court's instructions regarding the uncharged mis- conduct were not deficient. Argued February 28—officially released July 19, 2022

The defendant, who had been convicted, after a trial to the court, of the crime of assault in the first degree, appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court had improperly denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made to police officers while he was in a hospital examin- ing room where he was attached to an intravenous line. The defendant claimed that the statements were inadmissible because they were the product of custodial interrogation, and the police had not advised him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436). The state disagreed and claimed that, even if the police were required to advise the defendant of his rights pursuant to Miranda, the admission of his statements at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The defen- dant had visited P and another man at their apartment, where the men consumed beer and whiskey and socialized. The men became highly intoxicated. An argument ensued, and P punched the defendant in the face. The defendant thereafter attacked P from behind and stabbed him six times with a knife. The defendant then walked to a nearby hospital. He was brought to the examining room, where he remained that evening and into the early morning for about four and one-half hours. The attending physician did not permit him to be discharged until he regained sobriety. At various times, five different police officers conducted multi- ple rounds of questioning of the defendant in his hospital room, during which he made inculpatory statements. One of the officers also tran- scribed the defendant's version of the events at issue, placed him under oath, instructed him to sign the written statement and then left the hospital room. The officer returned later and informed the defendant that he was free to leave the hospital but only if the medical staff allowed him to do so. None of the officers ever advised the defendant of his rights pursuant to Miranda or told him that he was under arrest or that he could terminate the interviews at any time. The questioning by the officers lasted, collectively, about one hour. Some of the officers wore plain clothes; others were in uniform and visibly armed with their service weapons. Several officers were in the defendant's room at the same time during three of the interviews. Hospital security guards and medical staff also were in the room during some of the questioning. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, reasoning that he had failed to prove that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda and that a person in his position would have understood that his freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. Held: 1. Contrary to the trial court's determination, the defendant was in police custody for purposes of Miranda: the police did not explain to the defendant that they were not holding or detaining him until more than two hours after their first encounter with him, at no point did they inform him that he was free to stop answering their questions, and the police dominated atmosphere in his hospital room, with multiple officers entering and exiting for numerous rounds of questioning at various points throughout the evening, created a large and intimidating police presence that could undermine an individual's decision to remain silent; moreover, this court was unpersuaded that the factors that militated against a finding that the defendant was in custody outweighed the coercive features of his detention, as five different police officers repeat- edly questioned him for one hour, collectively, during the late evening into the early morning hours, the surroundings in which the questioning took place were not familiar to the defendant, who had a tenth grade education and was intoxicated during the questioning, and, although the defendant was alert enough to be able to converse with the police and the medical staff, in light of the police dominated atmosphere, his ability to request assistance from the medical staff to terminate the police interrogation did not mean that a reasonable person in his position would believe he was at liberty to do so; furthermore, a person in the defendant's position reasonably would have believed he was in police custody to the degree associated with a formal arrest, as the defendant was presented with inherently coercive pressures that included the officers' conduct, which conveyed a clear message of complete, unfet- tered and temporally indefinite police control, the restraint the medical attendants imposed on him for purposes of his treatment, and of which the police took advantage, and the extensive duration of the questioning by multiple police officers and their failure to advise him that he was free to terminate the interviews. 2. The police officers' questioning of the defendant constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation for purposes of Miranda, and the police were required to advise him of his rights pursuant to Miranda before eliciting statements from him and should have known that their questions reasonably were likely to elicit incriminating statements; the officers repeatedly asked the defendant to provide his version of the altercation with P, their questions were not objectively neutral and unrelated to the altercation but implied that the defendant was involved in it and explicitly called for responses regarding the altercation, for which he was later prosecuted, and, despite the testimony of one of the officers that he did not advise the defendant of his Miranda rights prior to taking his statement because, in the officer's mind, the defendant was not a suspect, the officer's subjective understanding of whether the defendant was a suspect did not overcome the strong, highly relevant relationship between the questions asked by all of the officers and the crime committed. 3. Contrary to the state's contention, the admission of the defendant's incul- patory statements at trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and, therefore, the defendant was entitled to a new trial: this court could not say that the defendant's statements were relatively benign or facially innocuous, as the trial court explicitly relied on at least one of them in determining that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the element of intent, a requisite element of the charge of assault in the first degree; moreover, the state extensively cross-examined the defendant at trial as to several of the statements he made to the police and recited them to the jury at the conclusion of the trial; furthermore, the court's analysis of the defendant's claim of self-defense may have been influ- enced by many of the defendant's statements, which incriminated him with regard to various elements of that claim and may have had a tendency to demonstrate that he ignored any duty to retreat he may have had. Argued January 10—officially released July 19, 2022

The plaintiff sought damages for vexatious litigation from the defendant P, his former wife. P previously sought the dissolution of her marriage to the plaintiff and, in that action, a disputed asset was a trust. While the dissolution action was pending, the trustees of the trust brought a declaratory judgment action against P and the plaintiff, seeking approval of their actions in forming another trust, into which they had decanted all of the assets of the initial trust. As part of the declaratory judgment action, the defendants T and N Co., who represented P in both actions, filed a cross complaint on her behalf, alleging that the plaintiff violated his duty to preserve the marital assets by allowing the trustees to remove assets from the marital estate. The trial court rendered summary judg- ment in favor of the plaintiff on the cross complaint. In this vexatious litigation action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants lacked probable cause to institute and pursue the cross complaint. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by T and N Co. Following a bench trial on the plaintiff's claims against P, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of P, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court correctly concluded that P had probable cause to pursue her cross complaint in the declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff having failed to satisfy his burden to prove that P did not have a reasonable, good faith basis for her cross complaint against him; as aptly noted by the trial court, not only did P have a good faith belief in the facts alleged in her cross complaint, but the relevant facts related to the existence of probable cause were undisputed, as P alleged that the plaintiff failed to seek the return of the assets of the initial trust, which were transferred to another trust, and, in light of the automatic orders that issue in dissolution cases, including an order that neither party transfer or dissipate marital assets, it could not reasonably be argued that P did not maintain a good faith belief that the plaintiff violated the automatic orders when the trustees decanted funds that arguably were marital assets to a different trust. Argued April 5—officially released July 19, 2022

The defendant, who had been previously convicted, following a jury trial, of various crimes, including felony murder and manslaughter in the first degree, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court had merged the defendant's convictions of felony murder and manslaughter and sentenced him on the felony murder conviction. The defendant claimed that his acquittal on charges of capital felony and murder barred, on double jeopardy grounds, his prosecution during the same trial pro- ceeding for felony murder and manslaughter and that the court had improperly sentenced him on his felony murder conviction rather than his manslaughter conviction. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that, because he had been acquitted of both capital felony and murder, his prosecution for felony murder and manslaughter was barred on double jeopardy grounds, as the motion to correct an illegal sentence failed to advance a colorable claim that invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court: rather than challeng- ing the sentence or the sentence proceeding, the claim challenged the proceeding leading up to the defendant's underlying convictions, over which the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction; accordingly, this court concluded that the claim was properly rejected by the trial court but that the form of the judgment was improper with respect to this portion of the defendant's motion, and the case was remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing that portion of the defen- dant's motion. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant on his felony murder conviction rather than his manslaughter conviction; pursuant to our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Polanco (308 Conn. 242), and this court's decision in State v. Holmes (209 Conn. App. 197), the trial court had authority to impose a sentence on the greater felony murder charge rather than the less serious manslaughter charge. Argued March 10—officially released July 19, 2022