Volume 214 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff, an inmate in a state correctional institution, sought to recover damages from the defendant M, an employee of the Department of Correction, in his individual capacity, pursuant to federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1983), for the alleged violation of his federal constitutional rights in connection with a motor vehicle accident during which he sustained injuries. The plaintiff, who was being transported to and from a medical appointment in a vehicle operated by M, was placed in full restraints in the rear seat of the vehicle, in which there was not enough room for the plaintiff to sit upright. The plaintiff informed M that the vehicle was too small, but M said that he could not obtain a larger vehicle. The plaintiff did not ask M to secure his seat belt, and M did not check to see if the seat belt was fastened. On the return trip, M drove erratically and in excess of the speed limit, ultimately colliding with another vehicle. The plaintiff alleged that M had violated his civil rights under the eighth amendment to the United States constitution, claiming that M's failure to abide by reasonable safety standards while transporting him gave rise to a claim of deliberate indifference. The trial court denied M's motion for summary judgment, finding that there was a disputed question of fact as to whether M knew and was indifferent to an excessive risk to the plaintiff's health and safety. On M's appeal to this court from the denial of his motion for summary judgment, held that the trial court erred in holding that M was not entitled to qualified immunity, as the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint and the record before the court did not give rise to a claim for deliberate indifference because no federal precedent clearly established that M's conduct violated the eighth amendment constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment: the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Jabbar v. Fischer (683 F.3d 54), held that the failure of prison officials to provide inmates with seat belts does not, without more, violate the eighth amendment, and other federal courts have held the same and largely have held that dangerous road conditions, distracted driving and speeding while trans- porting inmates do not give rise to a claim for deliberate indifference; moreover, in the few instances in which a federal court has found that a constitutional violation occurred during the transportation of an inmate, the plaintiff typically has alleged that he was not seat belted, the defendant purposefully drove in a reckless manner and the plaintiff asked the defendant to fasten his seat belt or to drive more safely but the defendant ignored the requests, and, in the present case, the plaintiff neither alleged nor presented evidence that he requested to be seat belted, requested that M drive more safely or requested that M obtain a larger vehicle for safety rather than for comfort; furthermore, M's conduct was not severe enough to constitute an obvious constitutional violation in the absence of clearly established law, as the present case involved a motor vehicle accident with circumstances under which no federal court has found an eighth amendment violation. Argued March 9—officially released July 26, 2022

The plaintiff sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment from the trial court determining the manner in which the plaintiff's buy out of the defendant's interest in certain parcels of real property pursuant to their settlement agreement was to be calculated. The settlement agreement provided that the buyout amount would be based on the fair market value of each property multiplied by the defendant's interest in each property. The parties disagreed as to whether ''interest,'' as used in the settlement agreement, meant equitable interest or a percentage of the fair market value of the property, without taking into account any existing mort- gages. This court, in a prior action between the parties, had determined that the settlement agreement was ambiguous with respect to the calcu- lation of the buyout amount. In the present case, the trial court, noting that it was bound by this court's prior decision, determined that the term ''interest'' meant ''equitable interest'' and, accordingly, that the calculation of the buyout amount required consideration of the existing mortgages on the properties. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly determined that the buyout amount for the defendant's interests in the properties was to be calculated by multiplying his percentage interest in each property by the difference of its fair market value minus any outstanding mortgage debt: contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court's reliance on § 201 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in resolving the underlying action, rather than § 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, was not improper because § 220 was not applicable, as the word ''interest'' as used in the settlement agreement had no habitual or customary meaning, § 201 was applicable because the parties attached different meanings to the term ''interest,'' and there was ample evidence to support the trial court's determination that the defendant had reason to know that the plaintiff believed that the term, as used in the settlement agreement, meant ''equitable interest'' because the defendant was aware of the mortgages on the properties and, as an attorney specializing in transac- tional real estate, he should have known that he did not have legal title to the mortgaged properties and was unable to convey a full legal interest in his share of the fair market value of the properties; moreover, the trial court's decision not to ascribe any weight to certain e-mails between the defendant, his attorney and the plaintiff's attorney, in which the plaintiff's attorney indicated that the buyout amount was to be deter- mined by value, not equity, and which the defendant claimed showed that the plaintiff knew of the defendant's interpretation of the term ''interest,'' was not clearly erroneous because the e-mails were sent after the agreement was negotiated, there was evidence that the plaintiff's attorney was not involved in the negotiations and was unaware of the mortgages encumbering the properties, and there was no evidence that the plaintiff had read the e-mails, discussed them with his attorney, or agreed with his attorney's interpretation of how the buyout amount should be calculated; furthermore, contrary to the defendant's claims, the trial court's conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the term ''interest'' did not conflict with the plain language of the agreement, which was ambiguous, and the trial court properly considered both the entire language of the agreement and evidence beyond the language of the agreement when making its factual findings regarding the intent of the parties; additionally, the defendant inadequately briefed his claim that equity required that the mortgage encumbering one of the properties not be included in the calculation of the buyout amount for that property because the mortgage was taken out solely to fund security deposits on the property that had not previously been funded due to the alleged mismanagement of the plaintiff, and, even if the claim had been ade- quately briefed, the issue did not involve a determination of equity but, rather, the interpretation of the contract, and there was no evidence that the parties intended to treat the mortgage on that property differ- ently than the mortgages on the other properties. Argued April 12—officially released July 26, 2022

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendants, A and G Co., for, inter alia, vexatious litigation, in connection with a prior quiet title action regarding a disputed area of real property. A acquired a parcel of real property in 1996, and, in 2014, the plaintiffs acquired the adjoining property. Subsequently, the defendants notified the plaintiffs of their claim to a strip of land along the northern boundary of the plaintiffs' property. In October, 2015, the plaintiffs filed on the land records a notice of intent to dispute and prevent the defendants from acquiring the right to possess the disputed area. The plaintiffs then commenced the action to quiet title to their property and to obtain a declaration that the defendants did not have an interest in the area. In response, the defendants asserted a two count counterclaim sounding in adverse possession and trespass, alleging that they had been in possession of the disputed portion of the plaintiffs' property for more than fifteen years prior to the filing of notice on the land records. Following a trial, the trial court found for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then filed the underlying action in relation to the defendants' counterclaim, and, following trial, the court found that the plaintiffs successfully had demon- strated that the defendants lacked probable cause to bring the counter- claim and that the defendants had failed to prove their defense of advice of counsel. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. This court determined that the defendants properly appealed from a final judgment in light of the fact that the trial court, although it did not explicitly address the plaintiffs' trespass count in its decision, implicitly disposed of that count; according to the testimony at trial, the plaintiffs incurred expenses to remove structures that had been placed on the property following judgment in the action to quiet title and the court awarded the plaintiffs costs to remove those structures, such that the court implicitly found in favor of the plaintiffs on their count alleging a trespass. 2. The trial court did not err when it determined that the defendants lacked probable cause to bring the adverse possession and trespass counts of their counterclaim, there having been a dearth of evidence to support their claims: the court properly determined, on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, that the defendants did not have a reasonable good faith belief in the existence of facts essential to bring the adverse posses- sion claim with respect to certain encroachments, their use of hedges, a retaining wall and pillar, a mailbox, and a driveway, because, although A testified that the alleged encroachments on which their adverse posses- sion claims were based existed when he purchased the property in 1996, certain surveys and photographs admitted into evidence showed either that no such encroachments existed on various dates following the purchase or that the encroachments were on the defendants' property and not the plaintiffs' property, and the trial court found A's testimony not credible and inconsistent; moreover, because the court did not err in finding that the defendants lacked probable cause to believe that they had acquired the property by adverse possession, the defendants also lacked probable cause to assert their trespass claim with respect to the disputed property over which they had no possessory right. 3. The trial court properly concluded that the defendants did not establish their advice of counsel defense, as evidence in the record supported the court's findings that the defendants withheld and misrepresented material facts to counsel, limited counsel's preparation, acted to prevent counsel from learning adverse material facts by preventing counsel from independently investigating to corroborate their version of events, and, thus, their reliance on counsel's advice necessarily could not have been made in good faith. 4. The trial court properly inferred that the defendants acted with malice, that court having properly determined that the defendants lacked proba- ble cause to bring their claims. Argued January 4—officially released July 26, 2022

The defendant acquittee, who previously had been found not guilty of certain crimes by reason of mental disease or defect, appealed to this court from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the state's petition, filed pursuant to statute (§ 17a-593), to extend his commitment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. On appeal, the acquittee claimed that this court had subject matter jurisdiction over his appeal because the trial court's order denying his motion satisfied at least one prong of the finality test set forth in State v. Curcio (191 Conn. 27). Held that the trial court's order denying the acquittee's motion to dismiss the state's petition did not satisfy either prong of Curcio and was not a final judgment for purposes of appeal: the order did not terminate a separate and distinct proceeding for purposes of the first prong of Curcio as the order involved a constitutional challenge that was inextricably intertwined with the adjudication of the petition and, as a result, the proceedings concerning that order were not wholly severable from the merits of the state's petition; moreover, the order did not result in the irreparable loss of a claimed right if immediate appellate review was not afforded, required to satisfy the second prong of Curcio, as the petition remained pending before the trial court, the acquittee's claimed right to discharge from the board's jurisdiction on the basis of his right to equal protection pursuant to the United States constitution was still intact and further proceedings could still affect the acquittee's claimed right; accordingly, this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Argued December 7, 2021—officially released July 26, 2022

Convicted of the crimes of burglary in the first degree and robbery in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court. An intruder entered the house of the victim, F, one night while she was at home and, inter alia, struggled with her before stealing money and other various items. F never saw the intruder's face, but he left behind what appeared to be the fingertip of a latex glove. The police responded to the home shortly after the crime was committed. With the assistance of a canine officer, they recovered the stolen items, which had been discarded in the neigh- borhood, and tracked the intruder's scent past the defendant's house to a garage that was a couple of houses north of the defendant's, where the trail disappeared. Various officers spoke with the defendant that night, after encountering him outside of his home during their investiga- tion. Although the defendant matched F's general description of the intruder, his clothing did not match her description, and one of the officers determined that the defendant's breathing and heart rate appeared to be normal shortly after the crime was completed. Touch DNA evidence was recovered from the glove fragment and certain of the recovered stolen items, and the defendant was determined to be a major contributor to a mixture of DNA found on what was believed to be the interior side of the glove fragment. The state was unable to identify the defendant as a contributor to the DNA found on the other items tested. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held that the cumulative force of the state's evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, was insufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's identity as the intruder: the DNA evidence alone was insufficient for the jury to determine that the defendant had worn the glove during the robbery because there was no testimony or other evidence as to whether the DNA on the interior piece of glove was deposited via primary or secondary transfer, as to the significance of the defendant being a major contributor to the DNA mixture found on the glove fragment, or as to whether the defendant, in contrast with the two other unknown DNA contributors, was more likely to be the individual who wore the glove during the commission of the crime; moreover, because the state could not identify the defen- dant as a contributor to the touch DNA found on the other items tested, there was no other physical evidence connecting the defendant to the crime; furthermore, the nonphysical evidence, even when considered with the DNA evidence, was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the perpetrator, as such evidence did not provide any compelling reason for the jury to conclude that the defen- dant, rather than any other black male of average build in the neighbor- hood, was the perpetrator of the offenses; accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to render a judgment of acquittal. Argued November 10, 2021—officially released August 2, 2022

The plaintiff homeowners sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the defendant, a property owners association, violated the defendant's gov- erning documents and restrictive covenants by improperly preventing the plaintiffs from accessing their driveway. The plaintiffs, whose real property abutted a portion of the association's property, claimed that the only means of access from their property to a certain public road was via a driveway that was located over a portion of the defendant's property and that the defendants had improperly barricaded the drive- way by erecting a fence along the common boundary between the two properties. The plaintiffs had previously brought an action in the trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs had an easement by implication over the defendant's property. The trial court determined that the plain- tiffs had failed to establish an interest in the defendant's property so as to grant an easement and rendered judgment for the defendant, which this court affirmed on appeal. Thereafter, the plaintiffs brought the present action, and the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held that the trial court did not err in concluding that the plaintiffs' claims in the present action were barred by the doctrine of res judicata: the claims asserted in both actions arose out of the same series of connected transactions, as both actions concerned the same parties, the same property, the ability of the plaintiffs to access the road from their residence, and the defendant's legal capacity to construct a barrier between the two properties, and both actions sought similar remedies; moreover, although the plaintiffs argued that their present claims were separate and distinct from the claims raised in the first action, they failed to demonstrate why their present claims could not have been brought in the first action and, therefore, the plaintiffs had an adequate opportunity to litigate the claims of alleged breach of governing documents and deeded rights at the time of the first action and their present claims were merely additional legal theories arising from the same transaction or nucleus of operative facts; furthermore, the combined facts of both actions constituted a single transaction that could have formed a convenient unit for the trial court in the first action, and their treatment as a unit would not have been unexpected by the parties. Argued April 11 2022—officially released August 2, 2022

The plaintiff escrow agent sought, by way of an action for interpleader, a determination of the rights to certain funds that the defendant purchaser had placed in escrow with the plaintiff as a deposit pursuant to a the purchase and sale agreement made in 2018 for certain real property owned by the defendant seller. Prior to closing, the purchaser learned that the seller had entered into an agreement (neighbor agreement) several years prior with the owners of neighboring properties, which included a provision for an easement on the seller's property in order to connect the neighbors' properties to the town's sanitary sewer system via a sewer line to be installed across the seller's property. The purchase and sale agreement did not reference the neighbor agreement or the potential sewer easement and further represented in § 16 (m) that the seller was not aware of any claims for rights of passage, easement, or other property rights to the property. Because of the neighbor agreement, the purchaser's title insurance company refused to issue a title policy. As a result thereof, the purchaser invoked § 9 (b) of the purchase and sale agreement relating to encumbrances of title and the seller's obligation to cure such claimed encumbrance or other defect in marketable title, specifically the sewer easement, and thereafter terminated the contract when the seller failed to cure such claimed encumbrance prior to closing. Subsequently, the plaintiff initiated an interpleader action to determine the defendants' rights to the deposit held in escrow by the plaintiff. Thereafter, each of the defendants filed cross claims against the other, claiming, inter alia, breach of contract and return of deposit. At trial, the seller sought to introduce a letter of intent, signed by the defendants in 2016 during the early negotiations for the sale of the property, which provided that there was an existing sewer easement that ran with the land. The purchaser objected to the introduction of the letter of intent on the basis of the parol evidence rule, arguing that the purchase and sale agreement contained an integration clause, and, therefore, any extrinsic evidence related to the contract should be excluded. The trial court overruled the purchaser's objection and admitted the letter of intent as an exhibit, recognizing that it would not be considered in connection with interpretation or application of the contract and, there- fore, could not be used to impute or presume knowledge on the pur- chaser or alter the contract, but could be used in connection with other claims such as fraudulent inducement. Following a trial, the trial court concluded that the seller breached the purchase and sale agreement and that the purchaser was entitled to a return of its deposit and rendered judgment in favor of the purchaser, from which the seller appealed to this court. On appeal, held: 1. Contrary to the seller's claims that the purchaser could not invoke § 9 (b) of the purchase and sale agreement and could not argue that the failure to include the existence of the neighbor agreement in the pur- chase and sale agreement resulted in a material breach of that agreement because the letter of intent established the purchaser's knowledge of the neighbor agreement and potential sewer easement at the time the purchaser signed the purchase and sale agreement, § 16 (m) of the purchase and sale agreement established the purchaser's knowledge at the time that the agreement was signed and any evidence offered to alter the purchaser's knowledge was impermissible under the parol evidence rule: the trial court correctly determined that the seller relied on the letter of intent to alter the extent and manner of the parties' understanding as established in the purchase and sale agreement, as the agreement was explicit that the property was not subject to any easements or potential easements and contained no reference to the neighbor agreement or any potential easement on the property, and, therefore, the letter of intent was offered to vary or contradict the terms of the written purchase and sale agreement and was not proper evidence regarding what the parties agreed to in 2018; moreover, the seller's claim that the court erred in determining that the purchaser had no actual knowledge of the potential sewer easement failed, as the seller relied exclusively on the letter of intent and, therefore, constituted an addi- tional, impermissible attempt to alter the understanding between the parties established when they signed the purchase and sale agreement in 2018. 2. This court declined to review the seller's claim that the neighbor agreement was not an additional encumbrance pursuant to § 9 (b) of the purchase and sale agreement because the purchase and sale agreement required both the refusal of the purchaser's title insurer to issue title insurance and a qualified encumbrance pursuant to title standards, that claim having been inadequately briefed as the seller failed to cite any law or analysis in support of this argument that could render the court's action improper. 3. This court declined to address the seller's claim that that the trial court erred when it determined that the failure to disclose the existence of the neighbor agreement was a material breach of the purchase and sale agreement: because the trial court found that the seller had breached the purchase and sale agreement both by failing to return the deposit after the purchaser terminated the purchase and sale agreement and in his misrepresentations in the contract itself, there was no practical relief that this court could grant the seller with respect to his claim regarding a material breach, even if the court agreed with such claim, because the seller failed to challenge the other basis the trial court found a breach of the contract, and the seller's liability for breach of the purchase and sale agreement would remain intact. Argued February 1—officially released August 2, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder and several other crimes in connection with a shooting incident, appealed to this court from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing in part and denying in part his fourth petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner had reasserted claims he made in his prior unsuccessful habeas petitions, alleging that the trial court violated his right to due process by failing to instruct the jury that its verdict must be unanimous and that his trial counsel, F, and two of his prior habeas counsel, V and G, rendered ineffective assistance. The court in the present case denied the petitioner's claims against F and V and rejected the petitioner's claim that G rendered ineffective assistance in failing to file a petition for certification to appeal from the second habeas court's judgment because, as a special public defender, she had no legal obligation to file an appeal on his behalf. The court dismissed the petitioner's remaining ineffectiveness claims against G on the ground that they were not ripe for adjudication and, thus, not justiciable. The court reasoned that the petitioner could not demonstrate that he was prejudiced until he had been denied permission to untimely file certain posttrial pleadings, including a late petition for certification to appeal. After the close of evidence in the present habeas action, the petitioner filed with the second habeas court a motion for permission to file a late petition for certification to appeal from its judgment, which had not been adjudicated at the time the habeas court in the present case rendered judgment. The petitioner thereafter filed a motion to open the judgment in the present habeas case to consider the second habeas court's denial of his motion for permission to file a late petition for certification to appeal. The court denied the motion to open, reasoning that no legal authority existed requiring a court to take judicial notice of pleadings and decisions after the close of evidence. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal as to his claim that his right to due process was violated when the trial court failed to instruct the jury that its verdict must be unanimous: the habeas court correctly concluded that the trial court properly denied the petitioner's request for a specific unanimity charge and his motion for a new trial, which was based on similar grounds, as the jury was instructed that its verdict on each count of the state's information must be unanimous, and the petitioner expressly conceded that the court's instructions did not sanction a nonunanimous verdict; moreover, contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the lack of a specific unanimity charge did not permit each juror to reach separate and distinct conclusions under different theories of liability premised on different evidence; furthermore, this court could not ignore the Supreme Court's determination in State v. Famiglietti (219 Conn. 605) that the petitioner was obligated to demonstrate that the jury instructions expressly sanctioned a nonunanimous verdict and that the absence of that threshold requirement ended review of his claim that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. 2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal as to his ineffective assistance claims against F and V and correctly dismissed certain of his ineffective assistance claims against G for lack of justiciability: a. This court could not conclude that the habeas court erred in finding that F made a valid strategic decision not to obtain copies of the tran- scripts from the separate criminal trial of R and S, who were present at the time of the shooting, or that F's cross-examination of the state's witnesses was hindered by that decision; moreover, there was no merit to the petitioner's claim that F's failure to obtain the transcripts rendered him unable to make informed decisions as to which witnesses to call and how to cross-examine the state's witnesses, as F had attended the trial of R and S and observed the witnesses testify, the petitioner con- ceded to this court that F had pointed out inconsistencies in the wit- nesses' testimony, and F's concern that the transcripts could be used against the petitioner was not unfounded; furthermore, this court con- cluded that the habeas court did not err in finding that F did not render ineffective assistance by failing to obtain the transcripts from the trial of R and S, the petitioner could not prevail on his claim that V rendered ineffective assistance by failing to submit those transcripts to the court in the petitioner's first habeas trial and to assert that F's failure to do so at the criminal trial greatly inhibited F's ability to impeach the credibil- ity of the state's witnesses. b. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court erred in dismissing as nonjusticiable his ineffective assistance of counsel claim against G, which was based on the court's determination that the claim was not ripe for adjudication because he failed to file a petition for certification to appeal from the second habeas court's judgment: because the petitioner did not file a motion for permission to file a late petition for certification to appeal from the second habeas court's judgment until after the close of evidence in the present case, his right to seek appellate review of that judgment had not been foreclosed and, thus, he could not demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice; moreover, the petitioner could not demonstrate that the court's denial of his motion to open the judgment in the present case reflected an abuse of discretion, as he could have sought permission from the second habeas court to file a late petition for certification to appeal at any time since that court's 2006 judgment and, thus, could have presented to the court in the present case evidence that he sought to present had his motion to open the judgment been granted. Argued February 3—officially released August 2, 2022

The plaintiff, an inmate in a state correctional institution, sought, inter alia, to recover damages, pursuant to federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1983), from the defendants, three current or former employees of the Department of Correction, in their individual capacities, for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights in connection with injuries he allegedly sus- tained during a fire in his housing unit. An electrical fire occurred in a different cell in the plaintiff's housing unit, and the plaintiff, who was not evacuated from his cell during the three minutes between when the fire was reported and was declared extinguished, claimed that he suf- fered from smoke inhalation as well as labored breathing and mental trauma following the incident. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the facts alleged by the plaintiff were insufficient to demonstrate malevolent intent by the defen- dants as required for purposes of proving an eighth amendment violation pursuant to Whitley v. Albers (475 U.S. 312). The plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court should have applied the deliberate indifference test adopted in Estelle v. Gamble (429 U.S. 97). Held that the trial court correctly concluded that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment, as the facts alleged by plaintiff did not give rise to a triable issue for determination by the fact finder under even the lesser deliberate indifference standard: the defendants did not consciously disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff, as they responded immediately to the fire, which was confined to a single cell that the plaintiff was not occupying, the fire was extinguished within three minutes of being reported, and the plaintiff was afforded medical attention within minutes after the fire was extinguished and demon- strated no serious ill effects; moreover, the defendants were justified in not evacuating the plaintiff or other potentially affected inmates for safety and security reasons, as there were ninety-two inmates in the unit and the staff was beginning a shift change when the fire was discovered. Argued February 15—officially released August 2, 2022

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and, under a part B information, on a plea of guilty, of being a second time offender pursuant to statute (§ 14-227a (g) (2)), the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant had attempted to make a U-turn when the car he was driving twice struck a car being driven by A. The defendant drove away from the accident scene and went home, where he claimed to have consumed a significant amount of alcohol and smoked a ''spliff.'' When the defendant reappeared at the scene on foot about twenty minutes later, A identified him as the driver of the other car. Police officers noticed that he was acting aggressively, slurring his speech and moving unsteadily. The defendant thereafter failed three sobriety tests the police administered to him and was taken to the police station where he was questioned after being advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436). The defendant was charged under subdivision (1) of § 14- 227a (a), the behavioral subdivision, pursuant to which blood alcohol levels generally are excluded from evidence without a defendant's con- sent, in accordance with § 14-227a (c). The defendant testified on his own behalf, including testifying that he had not begun to consume alcohol until after he returned home after the incident with A. The state offered as rebuttal evidence the testimony of its expert witness, L, a forensic toxicologist. L testified in response to a set of hypothetical facts about the amount of time it typically takes for alcohol to have observable effects on an individual's motor functions and typical behav- ior associated with certain blood alcohol levels. The court overruled the defendant's objection to L's testimony. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that L's testimony was tantamount to testimony about the defendant's blood alcohol content and, thus, violated the prohibition of such testimony under § 14-227a (c) in a prosecution under the behav- ioral subdivision. Held: 1. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor: the defendant's reckless driving, the fact that he drove away from the accident scene, and his slurred speech and belligerent behavior toward the police when he returned to the scene permitted the jury reasonably to infer that he was intoxicated when his car struck A's car; moreover, the defendant admitted that he had been driving, he was substantially unable to follow the police officers' instructions when he failed the sobriety tests, and his refusal to take a breath analysis or urine test at the police station permitted an inference that a test would have revealed that he had an elevated blood alcohol content; further- more, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant's intoxi- cation when he reappeared at the accident scene was not reasonably attributable to his drinking when he arrived home after leaving the scene, which was supported by L's testimony, and, although the defen- dant claimed that A's testimony was suspect and that the jury was obligated to credit his testimony that he consumed a significant amount of alcohol when he returned home, it was within the jury's province to determine whose testimony to credit. 2. The defendant could not prevail under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) or the plain error doctrine on his unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly permitted L to testify, in violation of § 14-227a (c), about the likely blood alcohol content of a person who was slurring his speech: a. Because the defendant objected to L's testimony on the ground that it was irrelevant and that L could not provide any definite conclusions about the defendant's blood alcohol content, the defendant's claim on appeal was unpreserved, as he did not cite to § 14-227a (c) or otherwise inform the trial court that the admission of L's testimony without the defendant's consent would violate § 14-227a (c). b. The defendant's claim that he was denied his right to due process as a result of L's testimony was unavailing; the defendant failed to demon- strate that the testimony was so crucial, critical and highly significant that he was denied a fair trial, as his claim did not implicate anything more than an evidentiary or statutory claim and, thus, could not be reviewed because it was not constitutional in nature, as required by Gold- ing. c. Although the state violated the spirit if not the letter of § 14-227a (c) by seeking to admit opinion testimony in a behavioral case under § 14- 227a (a) (1) that implicitly related to the defendant's blood alcohol content, the defendant nevertheless failed to demonstrate the existence of plain error. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the defen- dant failed to establish a proper foundation to cross-examine L about whether other substances could have affected the rate at which an individual can become visibly intoxicated from alcohol: although the defendant had the opportunity to lay a factual foundation as to what substances he ingested, he did not define what a spliff was or what substances it contained, and, without that evidentiary foundation, any opinion by L regarding the effect of other substances in combination with alcohol on the rate of intoxication lacked relevance; accordingly, the court's decision to preclude L's testimony on that basis did not violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. 4. The record was inadequate to review the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress statements he made at the accident scene and at the police station, as he failed to seek a proper memorandum of decision from the court addressing all of the arguments he raised in his motion or to seek an articulation of the court's decision, which was made without having conducted an evidentiary hearing prior to ruling on the motion. Argued April 11—officially released August 2, 2022

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (d) (1)), when a habeas petitioner files a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus more than two years after the date on which judgment on a prior habeas petition challenging the same conviction is deemed final, there is a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause. The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child, filed a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because the third petition was filed beyond the two year time limit for subsequent petitions set forth in § 52-470 (d) (1), the habeas court, upon the request of the respondent Commissioner of Correction, issued an order to show cause why the petition should be permitted to proceed and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Prior to the show cause hearing, the petitioner moved to disqualify the habeas judge on the ground that he had presided over the petitioner's first habeas trial and that his comments related to the credibility of the petitioner's testimony in that case would create the appearance of impropriety if he were to preside over the present case. The habeas court denied the petitioner's motion for disqualification. At the show cause hearing, the petitioner testified that he had filed a timely second habeas petition, but it was withdrawn prior to trial on the advice of his counsel and that his counsel had advised him to wait at least sixty days before filing another petition to avoid the suspicion of the court. The habeas court dismissed the third habeas petition as untimely, concluding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate good cause for the nearly ten month delay in filing the petition and that the withdrawal of the second petition was strategically filed to manipulate or delay proceeding to trial. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that his claims involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner, or that the questions raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the petitioner failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay in filing his third habeas petition: contrary to the petitioner's claim that he estab- lished good cause because the delay was due to his second habeas counsel's incorrect advice, the petitioner failed to establish that some- thing outside of his or his counsel's control caused or contributed to the delay in filing the third petition, and, even assuming that it was reasonable for him to withdraw the second petition prior to his pending trial and to wait at least sixty days before filing another petition, the petitioner did not file his third petition until nearly ten months after the statutory deadline had elapsed, and he provided no explanation as to why he waited an additional eight months beyond his counsel's suggested sixty day period before filing it; moreover, in making its determination, the habeas court reasonably considered the fact that the petitioner made no claim that the delay was due to missing witnesses or newly discovered evidence and reasonably concluded that the petitioner's actions were an attempt to manipulate or delay proceeding to trial. 3. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for disqualification of the habeas judge: contrary to the petition- er's contention that certain comments made by the judge during the petitioner's first habeas trial created the appearance of impropriety, the judge indicated that he had no recollection of the prior proceeding, which had occurred seven years earlier, and the subject comments were made in the purview of his judicial role and reflected credibility determinations made with respect to the specific testimony given and the demeanor exhibited at the first habeas trial, and, therefore, it was clear that the judge's previous credibility determinations would not cause a reasonable person to question his impartiality in presiding over the present case nor were his comments so extreme as to display a clear inability to render fair judgment. Argued March 10, 2021—officially released August 9, 2022

The plaintiff shopping mall sought indemnification from the defendant A Co., a security company it contracted with to provide security services to the mall property, including crime prevention. The plaintiff had incurred economic losses as a result of a separate wrongful death action brought against it by the administrator of the estate of a pedestrian who had been struck and killed while crossing the roadway surrounding the mall while on her way to work in the mall. The wrongful death action alleged that the plaintiff's negligence caused the collision by, inter alia, its design of the mall's parking lots and roads and its failure to implement various traffic calming measures. The plaintiff demanded defense and indemnifi- cation from A Co. in connection with the wrongful death action; A Co. denied the plaintiff's demand, explaining that A Co. was not responsible for the design of the roadway or the absence of traffic calming measures. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in the indemnification action, asserting that, inter alia, A Co. had a contractual duty to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in connection with the wrongful death action, and A Co. filed a cross motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied A Co.'s motion, granted the plaintiff's motion as to liability and awarded damages to the plaintiff. On A Co.'s appeal to this court, held that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denying A Co.'s motion for summary judgment, as A Co. was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law: A Co.'s obligation to defend the plaintiff was not triggered by the wrongful death action, as the wrongful death action did not contain allegations of negligence or other conduct that even arguably fell within the scope of A Co.'s contractual responsibilities to provide security services, and the court erroneously conflated the allegations in the wrongful death action regarding traffic control with A Co.'s contractual obligations for crime prevention as the security contractor for the property; moreover, as A Co. did not have a duty to defend the plaintiff pursuant to the indemnification provision of the security contract, A Co. did not have a duty to indemnify the plaintiff. Argued March 2—officially released August 9, 2022

The plaintiff physician sought to recover damages from the defendant attor- ney for his alleged legal malpractice in connection with his representa- tion of the plaintiff in a prior breach of contract action against a hospital. During the pendency of the breach of contract action, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a count asserting a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). After the court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him damages on his breach of contract claims, the defendant commenced a separate action against the hospital, alleging a violation of CUTPA. The trial court in that action rendered judgment for the hospital, concluding that the CUTPA claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (§ 42-110g (f)). The plaintiff thereafter brought this legal malpractice action, claiming that the defendant had committed professional negligence by failing to timely bring the CUTPA claim and a claim of tortious interference with business expectancies against the hospital. Pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 13- 4), the plaintiff disclosed an attorney, S, as an expert witness who would testify at trial. The plaintiff did not disclose S's opinions at that time. After the trial court extended the trial date and discovery deadlines several times, the defendant filed motions to preclude S from testifying at trial and for summary judgment. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's expert witness disclosure was not in conformance with the requirements of Practice Book § 13-4 and that summary judgment was required because, in the absence of expert testimony, the plaintiff could not prevail on his legal malpractice claims. The court again continued the trial date and extended the plaintiff's deadline for the disclosure of expert witnesses. Two weeks after the court-ordered deadline for the disclosure of expert witnesses, the plaintiff again disclosed that S would be the expert he planned to call to testify at trial. The plaintiff disclosed that S would testify that the defendant had breached the standard of care he owed to the plaintiff in the prior action and that the breach caused the plaintiff to sustain damages. The defendant thereafter deposed S, who testified in his deposition, inter alia, that, although he had received sixteen boxes of materials from the defendant's representation of the plaintiff in the prior action, he was not authorized to read that material, he would not read it until he received authorization to do so and that the plaintiff's counsel had instructed him not to review the documents or spend much time preparing for the deposition. S further testified that the plaintiff's counsel had told him that he could opine as to the elements of legal malpractice in light of certain facts that S could assume the plaintiff hoped to prove at trial. S also testified that he had not read the fact finder's decision in the prior action or spoken to the expert witnesses who testified in that action. The defendant again filed motions to preclude S from testifying at trial as an expert witness and for sum- mary judgment. The trial court granted both motions and rendered judgment for the defendant, concluding, inter alia, that the plaintiff's disclosure did not comply with the requirements of § 13-4 in that it failed to set forth an expert opinion concerning causation and damages as well as the factual bases for S's opinions. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. This court could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding S from testifying at trial and determining that the sanction of preclusion was proportional to the plaintiff's noncompliance with the disclosure requirements of Practice Book § 13-4: the plaintiff failed to set forth any expert opinion as to the legal malpractice elements of causation and damages, he did not supplement his disclosure of S to add such opinions, he failed to provide the substance of the grounds for each of the disclosed opinions, and he abused the discovery process by engaging in gamesmanship that prevented S from learning the perti- nent facts of the prior action, thereby thwarting the defendant's ability to ascertain what S likely would opine at trial; moreover, S admitted that he had done limited legal research and lacked knowledge about the prior action, and the affidavit he submitted in opposition to the defendant's summary judgment motion showed that S reviewed only limited and selective materials from the prior action and that his opinions were untethered to facts in the record, as he admitted that they were based on hypothetical facts and facts that he expected to be brought out at trial; furthermore, the court reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiff's noncompliance and discovery abuse could not be addressed by a less severe sanction or combination of sanctions, as the trial date had been continued eight times, the plaintiff had ample opportunity to disclose a prepared, informed expert or to ensure that S was apprised of the pertinent facts, and a less severe sanction or combination of sanctions would have the practical effect of rewarding the plaintiff's pattern of game-playing, as S did not review the file during the two months between the two days of his deposition and another continuance to allow him more time to review the file would require the defendant to conduct additional discovery. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment; summary judg- ment was required because, in the absence of expert testimony, the plaintiff could not prevail on his legal malpractice claims, as he could not establish the applicable standard of care that the defendant owed to the plaintiff and whether the defendant breached that standard of care by not initiating CUTPA and tortious interference with business expectancies claims against the hospital in the prior action, and, thus, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to causation and damages. Argued March 3—officially released August 9, 2022

The plaintiff tenant sought to recover possession of certain premises and personal property following the allegedly unlawful entry and detainer by the defendant landlords, a boxing club and its executive director, C, in violation of the applicable statute (§ 47a-43). The plaintiff provided boxing classes at the boxing club and used its premises for his own training services as well. While a summary process action was pending against him, the plaintiff commenced the present action, alleging, inter alia, that C had prevented him from occupying or accessing the premises since August, 2020, and that he had personal property that either had not been returned to him or had sustained water damage. Following a show cause hearing, the trial court determined that the plaintiff had satisfied his burden of proving that C had violated § 47a-43 and ordered, inter alia, that the plaintiff was to be restored to the premises and that any items of personal property detained by C were to be returned to the plaintiff. In addition, the court continued the matter for a hearing regarding the return of the plaintiff's personal property and any damages claimed by him. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a declaration of damages. At the first damages hearing, the plaintiff testified that he had incurred costs from two truck rentals and the rental of a storage space where he transported and stored his boxing equipment after he had retrieved it from the premises. Statements for the rentals, which were admitted as full exhibits, indicated that the plaintiff paid a total of $290.97 for the two truck rentals, not including the cost for damage sustained to one of the trucks while it was in the plaintiff's possession and accrued a total of $975.55 in storage fees from December, 2020, to April, 2021. The statements also indicated that, although the plaintiff incurred a $170.11 monthly rental fees and taxes charge in November, 2020, that charge was waived. At a second damages hearing, a witness for the defendant testified that, in October and November, 2020, the plaintiff provided youth boxing services at the witness' youth center and that the plaintiff paid her $550 during that time. Following the hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $10,286.63, plus costs. On C's appeal to this court, held: 1. This court declined to review C's claim that the trial court improperly found that the plaintiff and C had a landlord-tenant relationship, C having failed to provide this court with an adequate record; C provided this court with only a partial transcript of the show cause hearing, consisting of only the plaintiff's testimony, and, in the absence of the complete transcript, this court could not resolve C's claim without resorting to speculation, which it declined to do. 2. The trial court erred in part in its calculation of the plaintiff's damages award: although that court's awards of $5700 for the plaintiff's water damaged boxing equipment and $2600 for additional property loss, which corresponded to the cost of a new boxing ring, were supported by sufficient evidence and, therefore, were not clearly erroneous, its award of $1986.63 for the plaintiff's moving expenses was clearly erroneous, as there was no evidence in the record to support the court's inclusion of an extra monthly rental fees and taxes charge because, although the plaintiff incurred a $170.11 monthly rental fees and taxes charge in November, 2020, that charge was waived, and, therefore, he had no obligation to pay it; accordingly, the judgment was reversed as to the award of damages, and the case was remanded with direction to reduce the damages award by $170.11. Argued May 17—officially released August 16, 2022

The plaintiff bank sought to recover damages for alleged tortious interfer- ence with business expectancy and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.), for the defendants' actions in connection with the plaintiff's attempt to collect amounts owed to it by S Co., which the plaintiff alleged was a shell company controlled by the defendant A. The plaintiff sought to enforce a judgment it previously obtained against S Co. in a different jurisdiction and alleged that the defendants deliberately interfered with a court-ordered sale of certain assets to satisfy that judgment by fabricating a document purporting to grant the defendant C the right of first refusal to acquire the asset, shares in a software company. The trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, in which they claimed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's allegations arose out of communications made and actions taken in past judicial proceedings and were thus barred by the litigation privilege. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court erred in denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for tortious interference with business expectancy, as the claim was predicated on communications made during and relevant to prior judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings: multiple paragraphs of the plaintiff's complaint included allegations concerning the defendants' participation in or commencement of legal actions or appeals, and the fact that the plaintiff characterized the defendants' alleged legal actions as conduct that was meritless, frivolous or an abuse of the legal system did not bring the conduct within the limited exception to the litigation privilege, as the cause of action of tortious interference does not chal- lenge the purpose of the underlying litigation procedure; moreover, the plaintiff could have pursued other remedies to address the defendants' claimed abuses, including an abuse of process or vexatious litigation claim, but chose not to do so. 2. The trial court erred in denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim asserting a violation of CUTPA; the plaintiff's claim, premised largely on the defendants' alleged communications and con- duct in prior judicial proceedings, including the alleged introduction of false and/or fabricated evidence and the alleged filing of false and/or frivolous actions and appeals, closely resembled CUTPA claims that courts in Connecticut consistently have held are barred by the litiga- tion privilege. 3. Although the plaintiff's complaint included allegations unrelated to com- munications in the course of judicial proceedings, the litigation privilege barred those claims, as the complaint was permeated with allegations pertaining to the defendants' communications and participation in prior judicial proceedings, which were both central to the plaintiff's claims and inextricably intertwined with the allegations of extrajudicial conduct. Argued February 14—officially released August 23, 2022

The defendant, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crimes of assault in the first degree and carrying a pistol without a permit, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant was sentenced in 2017 to a term of incarceration followed by a period of special parole. Subsequently, the legislature enacted No. 18-63, § 2, of the 2018 Public Acts (P.A. 18-63), which repealed and replaced subsection (b) of the special parole statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 54-125e), to require a trial court, when sentencing a person, to determine, based on various factors, whether a period of special parole was necessary to ensure public safety. The defendant alleged in his motion to correct an illegal sentence that P.A. 18-63 applied retroactively to his sentence of special parole and that the court should vacate that part of his sentence and hold a new sentencing hearing. The court denied the defendant's motion, concluding that P.A. 18-63 did not apply retroactively. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that § 2 of P.A. 18-63 was intended to apply retroactively to his sentence of special parole on the basis that § 54-125e is procedural in nature rather than substantive: this court concluded that the defendant's claim was governed by its decision in State v. Omar (209 Conn. App. 283), in which it determined that, because P.A. 18-63 repealed and replaced the imposition of a form of punishment for a criminal conviction, the plain meaning analysis set forth in State v. Bischoff (337 Conn. 739) controlled and the criminal savings statutes (§§ 54-194 and 1-1 (t)) applied to P.A. 18-63, and, having considered the plain language of § 2 of P.A. 18-63, determined that the act clearly and unambiguously prohibited retroactive application; moreover, this court determined in Omar that, in the absence of a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent that an amendment to a criminal penalty applied retroactively, an act repealing and replacing the imposition of a form of punishment is governed by the presumption in the criminal savings statutes against retroactivity. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that P.A. 18-63 was intended to apply retroactively to his sentence of special parole because the legislative history and amendatory language of P.A. 18-63 demonstrated that it was meant to clarify § 54-125e, rather than effect a change in the law: this court concluded that its decision in State v. Smith (209 Conn. App. 296) controlled this claim, this court having held in Smith that the legislature, in passing P.A. 18-63, did not intend to clarify § 54-125e, that the language in the prior version of § 54-125e (b) was already clear prior to the amendment, and the language that was added changed § 54-125e (b) by narrowing its application; moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention that Smith was concerned primarily with § 1 and not § 2 of P.A. 18-63, it was clear that this court in Smith considered both sections of P.A. 18-63 and determined that neither was intended to clarify the statutes at issue, including § 54-125e. Argued May 11—officially released August 23, 2022

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court opening the judgment of dissolution and modifying his alimony obliga- tion. The defendant, who resided in Pennsylvania at the time the plaintiff filed her motion to modify alimony, claimed that the court improperly determined that the plaintiff's service of the notice of the motion to modify, which consisted of a certified mailing by a state marshal to his residence in Pennsylvania, was legally sufficient. He further claimed that the trial court erred in opening the judgment of dissolution following the automatic stay imposed by the defendant's petition for chapter 13 bankruptcy pursuant to federal law (11 U.S.C. § 362) and in ordering retroactive alimony resulting in a substantial arrearage. Held: 1. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff's service on the defendant of the notice of her motion to modify was legally sufficient: the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for order of notice permitting her to serve the defendant with notice of her motion to modify by certified mail, the plaintiff served the defendant with a copy of the motion to modify through a state marshal pursuant to statutory require- ments (§§ 52-50 and 52-52), as the state marshal made service on the defendant by certified mail, the receipt for which was signed by the defendant's stepdaughter, who resided with the defendant, and this court declined to hold that certified mail service by a state marshal was legally insufficient to comply with §§ 52-50 and 52-52; moreover, the signature by the defendant's stepdaughter at his residence was sufficient to confer actual notice on the defendant, the defendant's counsel conceded at oral argument that the defendant did not dispute that he received actual notice of the plaintiff's service, and none of the defendant's filings in the trial court contested the manner of the plaintiff's notice of service. 2. The trial court did not violate the automatic bankruptcy stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 in modifying the defendant's alimony obligation and opening the judgment of dissolution; the Bankruptcy Court's written order clearly expressed its intention to terminate the automatic stay with respect to the plaintiff's request that the trial court modify the defendant's alimony payments, and that order, which expressly permit- ted the plaintiff to take ''all actions necessary'' to modify the defendant's alimony obligation, did not prohibit the opening of the judgment of dissolution or prohibit the plaintiff from seeking, and the trial court from ordering, the payment of retroactive alimony. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by increasing the defendant's alimony obligation and ordering retroactive alimony to the date on which the plaintiff filed her motion for modification: the court, having opened the judgment of dissolution, was no longer restricted by the limitations in the parties' separation agreement incorporated therein, and, on the basis of the plaintiff's testimony at the hearing on her motion to modify, the court found that the defendant intentionally had concealed substan- tial assets at the time of the judgment of dissolution and that the plain- tiff's income and assets had decreased significantly from the date of that judgment; moreover, although the defendant failed to provide updated financial records, his bankruptcy filing established a substantial increase in his earnings and earning capacity; furthermore, the defendant, despite every opportunity to present any defense to the plaintiff's motion to modify, failed to do so. Argued March 8—officially released August 23, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, the city of New Haven, the city's board of education and J, a high school principal, for injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of sexual abuse by F, a theater teacher at the high school. F supervised and directed an extracurricular school play in which the plaintiff had a part. F occasion- ally met with the plaintiff and other students involved in the play for one-on-one singing and acting lessons. Although J did not know that F met with students privately for lessons, other employees at the high school were aware of those meetings. F sent text messages from her personal cell phone to the plaintiff and other students about matters related to the play. The conversations between F and the plaintiff eventu- ally became more intimate, and the plaintiff began going to F's classroom in the mornings before classes started and they would kiss. The plaintiff, along with other students at the high school, was enrolled in afternoon classes at an arts center and therefore was dismissed from the high school at 12:30 p.m. Monday through Thursday. One Friday, when the plaintiff did not have classes at the arts center, he went to F's classroom after his last class ended at 12:30 p.m. and she performed oral sex on him. On another day, the plaintiff and F went to an adjacent dressing room adjoining the auditorium stage. A security guard entered the dress- ing room and discovered them; the police and high school administration were immediately notified and an investigation ensued. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants failed to supervise employees and classrooms and teachers' use of cell phones. The plaintiff further alleged that J violated a ministerial duty to report suspected child abuse under the mandatory reporting statutes (§ 17a-101 et seq.) because she had reasonable cause to suspect that, prior to the incident between the plaintiff and F in the dressing room, the plaintiff or other students were imminently at risk of being sexually abused by F. The defendants thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that they were entitled to governmental immunity. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, concluding, inter alia, that nothing in the record supported the plaintiff's assertion that the defendants had knowledge of or reasonable cause to suspect that, prior to the date of the incident in the dressing room, F had been sexually abusing the plaintiff. The court also concluded that governmental immunity barred the plaintiff's claims of negligence that arose from discretionary acts by the defendants because he failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was an identifiable person subject to imminent harm. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether J breached the ministerial duty under § 17a-101a to report a reasonable suspicion of child abuse or that the defendants violated ministerial duties to prohibit free class periods and to take attendance in every class: a. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether J or any other staff member had reasonable cause to suspect that F was sexually abusing or exposing the plaintiff to an imminent risk of sexual abuse: F's personnel file was devoid of complaints or disciplinary actions prior to the events at issue, her applica- tion for her teaching position was accompanied by positive recommenda- tions from her references, there was nothing inherently suspicious about a teacher occasionally meeting with a student privately in connection with a supervised extracurricular activity, and, although the school administration knew F had collected contact information from the stu- dents involved in the play, neither that nor the nontraditional, relaxed setting of F's classroom that included a couch would cause a reasonable person to suspect that any of those students were at imminent risk for sexual abuse; moreover, none of the evidence suggested that J or any other staff member was aware that F had exchanged sexually suggestive messages with the plaintiff, as neither F nor the plaintiff disclosed to anyone that they were communicating by text message; furthermore, the plaintiff ensured that he and F were alone before any inappropriate contact occurred between them, both took measures to be discreet and no staff member had witnessed them engaging in sexual conduct. b. Contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, J's deposition testimony was insufficient to give rise to genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants violated ministerial duties requiring that attendance be taken in every class and prohibiting students from having free periods in their class schedules: J did not testify unequivocally that she had communicated to her employees a mandatory method for creating class schedules without free periods but, rather, highlighted a general practice that lacked the specificity necessary to establish a ministerial duty, and her testimony did not constitute the specific and clearly stated directives to school employees required to establish a ministerial duty to take attendance in every class and notify parents about student absences, as J merely observed that no student should have had a free period in his or her class schedule and that students were dismissed early when their schedules ended before the school day concluded; moreover, even if J's testimony were sufficient to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had a ministerial duty to take attendance in every class, the defendants still would be entitled to summary judgment because there was no evidence that they breached that duty; furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff's related contention that he was allowed to visit F's classroom unnoticed because the defendants failed to account for students who were dismissed early but did not leave the high school building, J's testimony plainly established that there was no general practice or requirement for staff members to account for students permit- ted to leave the building, much less a clear directive compelling them to account for the whereabouts of those students in a prescribed manner. 2. The plaintiff's claim that he fell within the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity was unavailing, as nothing in the record gave rise to a genuine issue of material fact that it would have been apparent to J or other staff members that F was so likely to harm the plaintiff that the defendants had an unequivocal duty to act to prevent such harm: the record made clear that the plaintiff and F took steps to avoid raising suspicion about the nature of their relationship, and there was no evidence to suggest that the plaintiff's repeated visits to F's classroom should have made it apparent that a sexual assault was imminent, particularly when the plaintiff had an ostensibly legiti- mate reason for visiting F's classroom due to his involvement in the school play; moreover, the defendants received no complaints concern- ing F prior to the discovery of the abuse, her recommendations for the theater teaching position were all positive, and nothing in the record suggested that any staff member reasonably would have anticipated that a sexual assault of the plaintiff or any student would be the immediate result of F's relaxed classroom setting, particularly in light of the fact that it was a space intended for dramatic arts instruction; furthermore, there was no basis in the record to conclude that J or any staff member wilfully ignored circumstances that otherwise would have alerted them to the possibility of imminent and immediate harm, as they were under no duty to ask questions beyond that which was immediately apparent. Argued March 8—officially released August 23, 2022

The defendant, who had been convicted of the crimes of murder and assault in the first degree, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his motion to correct an illegal sentence. At the time the defendant committed the crimes, he was twenty-one years old. Following trial, the defendant was sentenced to sixty years of incarceration. In his motion to correct, the defendant argued that his right to due process was violated when the court made assumptions at his sentencing pro- ceeding regarding his future rehabilitative potential that were materially false when contrasted with the brain science underlying the continuous growth and development of young adults during late adolescence. He also contended that he was entitled to a resentencing hearing because the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution permitted him to present evidence demonstrating that juve- nile criminal records are not indicative of rehabilitation potential. The court dismissed the motion to correct, concluding that the defendant failed to state a colorable claim for relief under Miller v. Alabama (567 U.S. 460), and its progeny. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. Although the trial court erred in holding that the defendant failed to state a colorable claim for relief, the defendant could not prevail on his motion to correct an illegal sentence: because the defendant's claim relied on the theory of youth related brain science set forth in Miller and its progeny for purposes of sentence mitigation, the defendant properly invoked the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction as his claim chal- lenged his sentence or sentence proceedings and not the underlying conviction, his claim having been predicated on the theory that the court impermissibly failed to properly consider his potential for rehabilitation when imposing the sentence of incarceration; moreover, it is well settled that a defendant who was an adult at the time he committed the offense for which he was sentenced could not succeed on a federal constitutional claim that he was entitled to be resentenced based on the youth related brain science underlying Miller and its progeny, and, here, the defendant was twenty-one years of age when he committed the underlying offenses; accordingly, because the defendant stated a colorable claim properly invoking the court's subject matter jurisdiction, but could not prevail on his motion to correct an illegal sentence, the court should have denied rather than dismissed his motion. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to present expert testimony on juvenile brain science in support of his motion to correct; although the defendant relied on a state case, State v. Miller (186 Conn. App. 654), in which it was contended that the state constitution could be interpreted as permitting youth related sentencing mitigation for defendants above the age of eighteen, the defendant's state constitutional due process claim was not advanced in either his appellate brief or at oral argument on appeal, and, therefore, the claim was abandoned. Argued May 17—officially released August 23, 2022

The plaintiff, inter alia, sought to recover damages from the defendant property owner for breach of contract. The parties had entered into an oral management agreement for an unspecified term, pursuant to which the plaintiff agreed to act as the defendant's exclusive agent for the licensing of rooftop telecommunications equipment to be located at the defendant's property in exchange for a percentage of the monthly receipts generated by any licenses. The plaintiff procured two contracts for the placement of wireless telecommunications equipment on top of the building on the property and collected the commissions due in connection therewith for approximately eleven years. Thereafter, the defendant only intermittently remitted the commissions to the plaintiff. Additionally, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the defendant had entered into similar contracts for the placement of wireless telecommunications equipment on the building with three other parties and had not remitted any commissions to the plaintiff in connection with those contracts. After commencing this action, the plaintiff filed an application for a prejudgment remedy, inter alia, to secure an amount equal to the amounts allegedly due to it with respect to the two original contracts and with respect to the commissions that it should have received in connection with the three additional contracts. In response, the defen- dant asserted special defenses, including that the plaintiff had violated the applicable statute (§ 20-325a), which barred the recovery of certain real estate commissions, and that enforcement of the oral management agreement was barred by the statute of frauds and the rule against perpetuities. The trial court granted the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy with respect to its breach of contract count, determining that the plaintiff had established probable cause that the parties had entered into a valid and enforceable oral management agree- ment and that the defendant had breached that agreement by failing to remit to the plaintiff the commissions relating to the three additional contracts, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly rejected the defendant's special defense that the plaintiff's claims were barred by § 20-325a because the plaintiff was exempt from its prerequisites pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 20- 329 (9)), which provided an exception for leases or licenses of space on buildings for unattended personal wireless services facilities, related devices, and ancillary equipment used to operate such devices in an area not to exceed 360 square feet for any one service: it was not improper for the trial court to rely on the testimony of the plaintiff's expert, A, in determining the meaning of the language of the § 20-329 (9) exception because, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 1-1 (a)), the undefined, technical statutory terms relating to the calculation of the square footage requirement of the exception were to be accorded the meaning that they would convey to an informed person in the applicable field, and, having worked in the wireless industry for nineteen years, A was an informed person in the applicable field; moreover, the defendant's argument that the definitions contained in the applicable federal statute (47 U.S.C. § 332) and regulation (47 C.F.R. § 1.6002) required the conclu- sion that the space occupied by antennas must be included within the square footage calculation for purposes of determining the applicability of the exception was unavailing because those definitions did not relate to measurement; furthermore, the defendant's proposed construction of the exception, which would limit its applicability to a single wireless facility, was unreasonable because it ignored the context of the phrase at issue, which suggested that the square footage limitation applied to each such facility; additionally, the defendant's argument that A improp- erly added together the square footage of certain components of the installation, rather than measuring the entire area in which the compo- nents were contained, was unavailing. 2. The trial court properly determined that the defendant's defense with respect to the rule against perpetuities did not defeat the finding of probable cause because such rule concerned only the rights to property, the oral management agreement did not create or transfer any right in property, and the plaintiff did not claim any interest in the defen- dant's property. 3. The trial court properly determined that the defendant's defense with respect to the statute of frauds did not defeat the finding of probable cause: the defendant's argument that the oral management agreement was unenforceable pursuant to statute (§ 52-550 (a) (4)) because the plaintiff's claims concerned real property was unavailing because the trial court correctly determined that the agreement was for services and did not confer any rights to an interest in real property; moreover, the defendant's argument that the oral management agreement was unenforceable pursuant to § 52-550 (a) (5) because it was not to be performed within one year from the making thereof was also unavailing because the trial court determined that the agreement was one of indefi- nite duration, and, accordingly, it was outside of the proscriptive force of § 52-550 (a) (5) regardless of how long it would actually take to complete performance. Argued March 1—officially released August 30, 2022

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of larceny in the third degree and identify theft in the third degree, and, under a part B information, on a plea of guilty, of being a persistent serious felony offender, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant stole a wallet, belonging to his father, M, and used the credit cards, a debit card and his father's driver's license contained within to make several purchases from various stores, totaling in excess of $2000. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had appropriated in excess of $2000 from M to himself and that certain documentary evidence was improperly admitted in violation of the defen- dant's constitutional right to confrontation and the rule against hear- say. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that, because the state presented evidence that M suffered only a loss of credit through the defendant's use of the stolen credit cards and that the state failed to prove that credit is money, the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant appropriated in excess of $2000 from M to himself: contrary to the defendant's assumption that the state's theory of the case at trial with respect to the use of the credit cards was that the defendant stole money, the state's theory of the case was that the defendant stole credit from M, and it was sufficient to present evidence of the transactions, the credit card statements posting the transactions and M's efforts to remove those transactions from his credit card statements, and the record clearly demonstrated that the defendant used M's credit cards to purchase items without authorization to do so, those items were charged to M, and M's credit card issuers billed him for those charges, and the defendant failed to provide other facts that the state could have produced to prove that unauthorized use of a credit card results in a taking of credit; moreover, although the credit card issuers eventually did not hold M responsible for the debt that the defendant incurred, the defendant's actions resulted in a reduction of M's available credit at the time of the unauthorized purchases; furthermore, although M's loss of credit was not permanent, it did not mean that his credit was not stolen. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that both a property report, created by the investigating police officer that detailed the fraudulent transactions made by the defendant, and M's statement to the police, constituted testimonial hearsay that was improperly admitted into evidence in violation of his sixth amendment right to confrontation, as the record clearly demonstrated that defense counsel waived any objection to the admission of the property report and M's statement. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that letters from two card issuers regarding the fraudulent charges, which were admitted into evidence as past recollections recorded under a provision (§ 8-3 (6)) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, constituted testimonial hearsay that was admitted in violation of his sixth amendment right to confrontation, as any error in admitting these letters was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; these letters were admitted to show that the fraudulent charges occurred and that M reported that he was not involved in those transactions, and, contrary to the defendant's claim that the other exhibits were all evidence of the same facts and, therefore, the letters were corroborative, the record demonstrated that the letters were cumulative. 4. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that two state- ments from M's credit card issuers were improperly admitted as past recollections recorded under § 8-3 (6) of the Connecticut Code of Evi- dence, on the ground that the information contained therein was never personally known to M, through whom the statements were presented, as any such error did not substantially affect the verdict; the record demonstrated that M's statement to the police established the dates and values of the fraudulent transactions and, therefore, the statements, admitted only to prove those values, were merely cumulative, the testi- mony of M and the investigating police officer regarding the charges established the amounts listed on the property report and in M's state- ment to the police, and, accordingly, the two statements were not needed to corroborate the information presented. Argued April 12—officially released August 30, 2022

The defendant T Co. appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider T Co.'s motion to reargue or to reconsider the trial court's prior denial of T Co.'s motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure. The defendant R Co. had defaulted on a promissory note and mortgage it executed in favor of the plaintiff concerning a parcel of real property. The trial court rendered judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff and set the law day to run on May 20, 2019. R Co. did not file a timely appeal from the judgment but, on May 15, 2019, filed a motion to open and vacate the judgment. The court denied R Co.'s motion to open and set a new law day for June 24, 2019. On June 10, 2019, pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 11-11) and within the twenty day appellate stay period, R Co. filed a motion to reargue or to reconsider the court's denial of its motion to open. The court denied the motion to reargue on July 3, 2019, and notice of the court's ruling was sent to the parties on July 5, 2019. The plaintiff thereafter filed a certificate of foreclosure on the land records and quitclaimed the property to another entity. On December 7, 2020, pursuant to statute (§ 49-15), T Co. filed a motion to open and vacate the foreclosure judgment. T Co. claimed that title to the property had never passed to the plaintiff because the June 24, 2019 law day fell within the twenty day appellate stay period and the parties did not receive notice of the trial court's denial of R Co.'s motion to reargue until July 5, 2019. The trial court concluded that T Co.'s motion to open was moot because the filing of R Co.'s motion to reargue did not stay the June 24, 2019 law day and, thus, absolute title had vested in the plaintiff on the passing of the June 24, 2019 law day. Held that the trial court erred in determining that it was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear T Co.'s motion to open and vacate the foreclosure judgment: under the applicable rule of practice (§ 63-1 (b)), R Co.'s timely filing of its motion to reargue the court's denial of R Co.'s motion to open and vacate the foreclosure judgment triggered the automatic stay provision in the applicable rule of practice (§ 61-11 (a)) until the parties received notice of the court's ruling on R Co.'s motion to reargue on July 5, 2019, and, because the June 24, 2019 law day fell within the extended appellate stay period, the June 24, 2019 law day had no legal effect and could not vest absolute title in the plaintiff; accordingly, the trial court retained jurisdiction to decide T Co.'s motion to open and vacate the foreclosure judgment. Submitted on briefs December 8, 2021—officially released August 30, 2022

The plaintiff tenant sought, inter alia, an order to compel the defendant to exterminate an infestation of insects and rodents in her leased premises, one of six rental units in a building for which the defendant is the landlord. The plaintiff, who was the recipient of a rent subsidy, first reported the infestation to the defendant and then contacted the munici- pal agency responsible for housing code enforcement in the city in which the premises was located. An inspector from the agency ordered the defendant to rid the premises of the infestation and issued a notice of compliance after the defendant treated the infestation. The plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint for housing code enforcement pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 47a-14h), alleging that the defendant violated the statute (§ 47a-7 (a) (1)) when it failed to exterminate the infestation in the premises, and she began paying her portion of the monthly rent to the clerk of the court pursuant to § 47a-14h. The defendant filed a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff had prevented and/or failed to prepare for its access to the premises in an attempt to debilitate and/ or thwart its ability to comply with the housing code enforcement orders. The trial court determined that the premises had been infested with insects and rodents for more than one year, the defendant's efforts to remediate the infestation had not been reasonable as, inter alia, other units within the building also remained infested, and the defendant had violated its duties as a landlord pursuant to § 47a-7 and the housing code. The court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on her complaint and on the defendant's counterclaim and awarded the plain- tiff, inter alia, an abatement of any rent in arrearage and six months of prospective abatement of rent based on her share of the subsidized rent. Thereafter, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded as a matter of law that the defendant had violated the housing code and the housing code was unconstitution- ally vague, and the plaintiff filed a cross appeal, arguing that the court erred in calculating rent abatement based on her share of the subsidized rent. Held: 1. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider evidence of housing code violations that predated the filing of the plaintiff's complaint with the municipal agency; the defendant did not dispute that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's complaint, as the plaintiff complied with the requirement pursuant to § 47a-14h that a complaint be made to the municipal agency responsible for enforcement of the housing code at least twenty-one days prior to the filing of a complaint with the court, and the defendant's claim that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over any evidence of housing code violations prior to the filing of the complaint was an evidentiary claim raised for the first time on appeal. 2. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly concluded as a matter of law that the defendant violated the housing code; the city's housing code plainly and unambiguously required that, when an infestation exists in two or more dwelling units, the owner of the property was responsible for extermination, defined as the control and elimination of insects or other pests, and the court's factual findings that the defendant did not act reasonably to resolve the infestation problem because its actions were too slow and not effective were not clearly erroneous, as, on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the court found that the premises and several other units in the building had been infested, that more than one year had elapsed between the initial report of infestation and the notice of compliance from the munici- pal agency, and that multiple other units remained infested in violation of the housing code. 3. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the housing code, as applied to it in this case, was unconstitutionally vague: although the plaintiff claimed that the defendant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not applicable, as the municipal agency responsible for enforcing the housing code was not a state agency as defined by statute (§ 4-166 (1)); moreover, the defendant's unpreserved claim that the housing code was void for vagueness failed to meet the requirement of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) that a constitutional violation occurred that deprived the defendant of a fair trial, as the defendant had proper notice of what constituted an infestation under the housing code and the required steps to remedy such an infestation, and the housing code did not lack minimal guidelines or sufficient standards to guide the municipal agency or the court with respect to its proper application in this case. 4. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim in her cross appeal that the trial court erred in calculating rent abatement based on her share of the subsidized rent rather than the full market rent: § 47a-14h clearly and unambiguously authorized the court to order abatement of rent and return such rent paid to the court in proportion to the amount paid by each party; moreover, although the court was not required to make the subsidizing entity a party to the action, and the subsidizing entity was not made a party, the statute explicitly provided that, when a subsidizing entity is joined as a party and pays its share of rent to the court, any rent to be returned shall be returned to the tenant and such entity in proportion to the amount of rent each deposited with the court. Argued March 1—officially released August 30, 2022

The plaintiff property owner sought to recover damages from the defendant title insurance company for an alleged violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.), based on a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) (§ 38a-815 et seq.), in connection with a title insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought the present action after protracted negotiations between the parties regarding the value of the plaintiff's claim as to a disputed property title. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices in its administration of the policy and in its handling of the plaintiff's claim. Following a trial, the trial court found that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate any unfair claim settlement practices under CUIPA by the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the evidence he presented at trial established that the defendant's unfair practices in failing to acknowledge and act with reasonable promptness upon communications with respect to his claim, in violation of the applicable provision (§ 38a-816 (6) (B)) of CUIPA, were part of a general business practice by the defendant, as required under § 38a-816 (6). Held that the trial court correctly rendered judgment in favor of the defendant with respect to the CUTPA claim, as the plaintiff, having failed to establish a general business practice of delaying communications by the defendant, failed to set forth a valid CUIPA claim, which was fatal to the plaintiff's CUTPA claim: the evidence presented by the plaintiff did not establish the existence of a general business practice by the defendant for pur- poses of § 38a-816 (6), as the cases relied on by the plaintiff to show a general business practice were factually distinguishable and had ques- tionable evidentiary value in light of their differences, and the plaintiff failed to present any testimony or other documentary evidence relating to the alleged business practice of the defendant; moreover, the delays in the plaintiff's case were caused by both the plaintiff and the defendant, and, although some delays resulted from corporate inefficiencies and mismanagement by the defendant, a fair portion of the delays in the present case were due, in part, to other causes, including the plaintiff's own delayed responses to communications and his insistence on receiv- ing compensation for the potential relocation of a replacement septic system, an issue that prolonged the negotiations and that the court ultimately found to be of tenuous relevance to the diminution in value of the property. Argued February 3—officially released September 6, 2022

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's application for a civil restraining order pursuant to statute (§ 46b-15). At an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff testified that there was a pending action for a dissolution of marriage between the parties and that she had been increasingly afraid of the defendant. The plaintiff testified that one evening, when she went to a restaurant with a group of people, she saw the defendant approach the hostess stand, he stared at her with a furrowed brow, locked eye contact with her, and that he seemed very agitated in his physical movements. After the defendant left the restaurant, he sent various text messages and emails to the plaintiff regarding the encounter. The trial court granted the application for a civil restraining order against the defendant, finding that the defendant's conduct created a pattern of threatening. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held that the trial court erred in failing to apply an objective standard to its determination when it issued the civil restraining order based on the pattern of threatening provision of § 46b-15 (a): the court viewed the evidence through the lens of the plaintiff's subjective reaction to the defendant's conduct, namely, her resulting fear, and stated that the plaintiff's testimony indicated a tone of hostility that she felt frightened her, and, although the reaction of an applicant can help provide context, subjective fear of an applicant is not a statutory requirement under § 46b-15, and, instead, what is required is the occurrence of conduct that constitutes a pattern of threatening; moreover, § 46b-15 does not contain any statutory language requiring a subjective-objective analysis, and there is nothing in the statutory language indicating that the legislature intended for courts to issue civil restraining orders under the pattern of threatening portion of § 46b-15 in situations other than where it is objectively reasonable to conclude, based on context, that the defendant had subjected the alleged victim to a pattern of threatening. Argued April 6—officially released September 6, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his prior trial, habeas, and appellate counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The respondent Commis- sioner of Correction filed a motion to dismiss the habeas petition, arguing that the petitioner had released the state from all the claims set forth therein pursuant to a settlement agreement that the petitioner had entered into with the state after he filed the habeas petition. The settle- ment agreement related to an action filed by the petitioner in federal court against employees of the Department of Correction, in which he alleged that the conditions of confinement during his incarceration violated his constitutional rights. The settlement agreement contained a general release provision that released the state from all actions arising out of any matter that had occurred as of the date of the settlement agreement. The habeas court determined that the release encompassed the habeas petition and granted the respondent's motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the habeas court granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court, claiming that the settlement agreement was unenforceable because the terms of the release provision in the agreement were unconscionable. Held that the habeas court did not err when it dismissed the habeas petition: our Supreme Court in Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction (326 Conn. 772) rejected the argument that habeas rights should never be subject to waiver, stating that constitutional and appellate rights could be waived as long as the waiver was intentional; moreover, the settlement agree- ment between the state and the petitioner was not procedurally uncon- scionable, as the petitioner's counsel conceded that the petitioner entered into it knowingly and voluntarily, the petitioner was represented by attorneys who negotiated the settlement agreement on his behalf, and the petitioner failed to introduce any evidence to support his claims of procedural unconscionability; furthermore, although its release provi- sion was broad, the settlement agreement was not substantively uncon- scionable with respect to the habeas petition because it was not limitless, barring only the petitioner's claims against the state that arose before the date of the settlement agreement, which included those raised in the habeas petition, by the time the parties executed the settlement agreement, the petitioner already had numerous opportunities to chal- lenge his convictions, through appeals and collateral attacks spanning decades, and it was not so unreasonable or oppressive as to render it unenforceable, as, in exchange for the release, the petitioner received funds in his inmate trust account and the state agreed to forgo the collection of any amounts owed by the petitioner to the state for the cost of his incarceration from the proceeds of the settlement and to vacate a finding of guilty against the petitioner on a disciplinary report. Argued April 4—officially released September 6, 2022

The plaintiffs, legal guardians of the minor child C, appealed from the orders of the trial court requiring C to suspend contact with his long-term personal counselor, L, and engage with a new therapist with the goal of working toward the resumption of visitation with the defendants, C's maternal grandparents. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion with the trial court, seeking an order that, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' appeal, there was no automatic appellate stay in effect. Subsequently, the trial court issued an order that there was no automatic stay of the custody and visitation orders and that the plaintiffs were to comply with the trial court's orders. Thereafter, the trial court denied the plain- tiffs' motion for a discretionary stay. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed motions for review of the trial court's orders determining that there was no automatic appellate stay and denying their motion for a discre- tionary stay. Held: 1. This court granted the plaintiffs' motion for review of the trial court's order determining that there was no automatic appellate stay in effect but concluded that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that there was no automatic appel- late stay; the trial court's orders pertained to the manner and extent of visitation, as well as contact with the defendants, and visitation orders expressly were exempt from the automatic appellate stay under the relevant rule of practice (§ 61-11 (c)). 2. This court granted the plaintiffs' motion for review of the trial court's order denying their motion for a discretionary stay and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion only insofar as the court ordered the parties to engage with a new therapist for the purpose of facilitating visitation, but it concluded that the trial court did abuse its discretion in suspending contact between C and L, as that court did not have before it any evidence regarding the impact of the suspension of therapy on C's best interest, L was not engaged at the behest of the trial court, the suspension of therapy was only a suggestion made by the defendants' counsel at closing arguments, the guardian ad litem indicated that suspension of therapy with L would not be in C's best interest and, therefore, the court did not adequately account for the potential harm to C that could follow from the disruption of his relation- ship with L; accordingly, relief was granted in part, in that the court's order that the therapy sessions between C and L were suspended until further order of the court was stayed pending the final resolution of this appeal, and the remainder of the relief requested was denied. Considered May 11—officially released September 6, 2022