Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

213 So. 2d 274

Docket No. 67-1085.

Edwards v. State

Charles EDWARDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided August 13, 1968.

Rehearing Denied August 28, 1968.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1968-08-13

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Intent, being a state of mind, is not subject to direct proof and can only be inferred from circumstances.” Edwards v. State, 213 So.2d 274 (Fla.App.1968).”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Hall v. State, 453 So. 2d 169 - State v. Stenza

Applies FL 924 § 924.34

Relies on 192 So. 2d 285 - Jones v. State · 107 So. 2d 284 - Channell v. State · 137 So. 2d 625 - Scott v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1968-08-13

How this case has been cited

Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently November 1993

13 state decisions

801968197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender and Jeffrey Michael Cohen, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

¶2Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Harold Mendelow, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

¶3Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and SWANN, JJ.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5Charles Edwards was charged by information with the crime of breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a felony therein, to-wit, grand larceny. He was tried by the court without a jury. At the close of the state's case, the court granted a directed verdict reducing the charge against Edwards to breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, to-wit, petit larceny. This appeal is from his judgment of conviction on the reduced charge.

¶6On appeal, appellant concedes that the state offered sufficient proof that he broke into and entered the building in question, and that he was properly and sufficiently identified as the individual who committed the breaking and entering.

¶7He contends, however, that there was insufficient proof that he broke and entered the building with the intent to commit a specific crime and, therefore, his conviction must be reversed, or reduced to the lesser included crime of trespassing and remanded for a proper sentence. He relies on Fla. Stat. § 924.34, F.S.A.

¶8In breaking and entering with the intent to commit petit larceny, there must be a proper showing by the state that the breaking and entering was with the intent to take personal property of some value. See Jones v. State, Fla.App. 1966, 192 So.2d 285; Scott v. State, Fla.App. 1962, 137 So.2d 625; and Channell v. State, Fla. App. 1958, 107 So.2d 284.

¶9Intent, being a state of mind, is not subject to direct proof and can only be inferred from circumstances. Scott v. State, supra. Under the rationale of the above cited cases there was sufficient for the trier of facts to find the requisite intent to commit petit larceny.

¶10Affirmed.

/213/so2d/274 · .json · Public domain