Volume 214 — United States Reports

<p>ERROR’ TO THE SUPREME COURT OP ALABAMA.</p> <p>The faóts are stated, in tile opinion.</p>

<p>APPLICATION AS ADMINISTRATRIX OÍ? THE GOODS, CHATTELS AND CREDITS OF CLARENCE B. RIGGS, DECEASED, IN BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY 'SITUATED, FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS AGAINST THE HONORABLES GEORGE C. HOLT AND CHARLES M.' HOUGH, JUDGES OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE' SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YtoRK, AND AGAINST THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE. UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF-NEW YORK.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

This was an action brought- by John E. White and Roberta B. White,- his wife, in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the county of Kootenai, to recover the possession of the “northwest quarter of the southwest quarter and lots five (5), six (6) and seven (7), of section two (2), township fifty-five (55) north of range two (2), east Boise meridian.” The defendants’ answer was in the nature of a cross bill in equity, admitting…

Held: not to question the validity of the constitutional provision and, even if erroneous, such decision did not repudiate the obligations of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal -Constitution and is not reviewable by this court under § 709, Rev. Stat. 1 Writ of error to review 191 N. Y. 254 , 192 N. Y. 382 , 583, dismissed.

<p>Where two sections of the Revised Statutes when taken together are not free from' ambiguity, and,- cannot be harmoniously applied, recourse may- be had to legislation. prior to the Revised Statutes from which the provisions of those sections were drawn in Order to arrive at the correct meaning. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 418, and Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, distinguished.</p> <p>Sections 5214 and 3411, Rev. Stat., cannot be so construed together, and effect given to both, as to leav.e a national bank liable to' the duty imposed by § 5214 and yet entitle it to the exemption provided by § 3411 under the contingency stated therein.</p> <p>The provisions in § 3411, Rev. Stat., exempting banks from taxation on. circulation, does not relate to .national banks but to state banks •only.</p> <p>One of the public policies of the National Bank Act was to secure the' public credit and encourage the issue of . notes to circulate as currency founded upon United' States bonds, .and § 3411 will not be construed as intending to exempt those national banks that allowed .their circulation to fall below five per cent of their, capital from the taxation provided by § 5214 to create a fund to bear the burden common to all national-banks for engraving and printing the notes.</p> <p>A uniform construction ever since its enactment for a long period, in this case.over thirty-five years, engenders doubt of a new and different construction.</p> <p>42 Ct. Cl. 6,- affirmed.-</p>

Thu facts, which, involve the construction of the contract between Ceballos & Co. and the United States for the repatriation of the prisoners of war and other persons from the Philippine Islands to Spain,, are stated in the opinion.

<p>The mere fact that a.constitutional question is alleged does not suffice, to give this court jurisdiction of- a-direct appeal from the Circuit Court if such question is unsubstantial and so clearly deVoid of merit as to be-clearly frivolous. Farrell v. O’Brien, 199 U. S. 100.</p> <p>A probate proceeding by which jurisdiction of the', probate court is asserted ovier a decedent’s estate for the purpose df administration is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, as to which all the world is charged with notice; the law of California conforms to this rule, -</p> <p>Even though the power of the State to prescribe length of notice ’be not absolute, a notice authorized by the legislature will only be set aside as ineffectual on account of shortness of time in a cleat case. Bellingham Bay Co. v. New Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314.</p> <p>Whether or- not a Sfate can arbitrarily determine by statute the length of notice to be given of steps in the administration of estates - in the custody of its courts, ten days ’ notice for the settlement of the. • final, accounts, of an executor and action on final distribution is not' so unreasonable as to be wanting in due process of law under the"' Fourteenth Amendment; and so held that the contention that §§■1633 and 1634 Of the Civil Code of California prescribing such length of notice are unconstitutional as.depriving a distributee of his property without due process of law is without merit.. Roller v.' Holly, 176 U. S. 398; distinguished.</p> <p>Writ of error to review 145 Fed. Rep.. 844,-dismissed.</p>

<p>APPEAL- FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the statutes of Massachusetts, chap. 333 of the Acts of 1904, and chap. 383 of the Acts of 1905, limiting the height of buildings in a certain quarter of a city, do not violate the Constitution of the United States. Francis C. Welch owned property in a residential section of Boston where building height was legislatively limited to 100 feet (30.5 m). In other, more commercial sections of the city, the legislation permitted building height up to 125 feet (38.1 m).

The appellant herein appeals from the decree of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii. The facts relating to the case are as follows: ' Hikaalani Hobron Noholoa was a resident of the island of Molokai, Territory .of Hawaii, which is called the leper settle-, ment, and was a leper, about seventy-five years of age, at the time of her death, on or about the twenty-ninth of June, 1906.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ’ CALIFORNIA. In No. 241, the plaintiff,in error, being imprisoned in the county' jail of San Francisco, in the State of California, by the sheriff, applied to the Supreme Court of that State in banc for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his discharge from imprisonment.

This is a, writ of error directed to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of'Columbia affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court dismissing a'petition for man-d'amus to require Leslie M. Shaw, then Secretary of the Treasury, to issue a draft ip favor of the petitioner, plaintiff in error here, for the sum of $181,358.95, in payment of a claim referred td'him by an act of Congress, approved February 17, 1903, Shaw, pending the appeal; resigned, and…

Held: in the case of United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 , that Congress may in the exercise of the powers to regulate commerce among the States, discriminate between commodities and between carriers engaged in such commerce.

This action was instituted by defendant in error against plaintiff in error, the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, hereinafter called the Texas and Pacific Company, and J. M. Tucker, its agent, for wrongfully billing and shipping 712 head of cows and calves via one road, though they were requested to be shipped via another, whereby they iyere required to go twice as far, and were seriously injured and damaged thereby.

<p>Where it is established law of a State, as it is of Texas, that when a debt is barred by limitations an action to foreclose a lien or mortgage given as security for it is barred also, the law must be enforced in the courts of the United States, whether sitting in law or in equity.</p> <p>Whether or not the statute of limitation bars a suit to foreclose is a question of substantive law, created by the State and not by the United States, and not one of procedure or jurisdiction; and the Federal court should be governed by the decisions of the State where the land lies. Slide & Spur Mines v. Seymour, 153 U. S. 509.</p> <p>The Federal courts cannot declare it wrong or inequitable for a debtor to rely upon a state statute of limitations, as that would be to declare wrong or discreditable what the legislature of the State declares to be right.</p>

<p>Judgment reversed on the facts, it being based on allegations of fraud and corruptioh. which this court holds were- not sustained by the evidence.</p> <p>The effect under the law of Porto. Rico of an heir waiving the benefit óf inventory is to make him personally liable for the debts of the succession without limit, as under the early law of Rome, of England and of France; but, after the inheritance is divided, the liability of the succession is at an' end and gives place to pérsonal liability of each heir for the whole debt to the extent of the assets received by ■ him, if accepted with benefit of inventory, or otherwise in full. ■</p> <p>Whether or not an heir in Porto Rico waives benefit of inventory is a pure question of fact; and, if the complaint is silent, the court will ■ not presume that there .was such a waiver. - '</p> <p>3 Porto Rico, 163, reversed.</p>

<p>In the courts of the United States attachment is but an incident to a • suit and falls unless the suit can be maintained, Ex parte Railway Co., 103 U. S. 794; and, unless the court has jurisdiction over the person-of the defendant, the suit cannot be maintained.</p> <p>Ubarri v. Laborde, ante, p. 168, followed to effect that after a succession in Porto Rico has been divided the liability of the heirs is personal; and, even if the suit can be maintained against the-succession, private property of the heirs cannot be attached to answer for the ’ judgment.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP LOÚISIANA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The publication of a portrait-with a statement thereunder imports ' .that the original of. the portrait makes the statement even if another name be attached to the statement. Wandt v. Hearst’s Chicago American, 129 Wisconsin, 419; Morrison v. Smith, 177 N. Y. 366, approved on this point.</p> <p>Publication of the portrait of one person with statements thereunder as of another, by mistake, and without knowledge of whom the portrait really is, is not an excuse.' A libel is harmful on its face, and one publishing manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual does so at his peril; and, if there is no justification other than that it was news or advertising, he is liable if the statements are false or are true only of some one else. See Morasse v. Brochu, 151 Massachusetts, 567.</p> <p>An unprivileged falsehood need not entail universal hatred to constitute a cause of action; to be libellous a statement need not be that the person libelled has done or said something that every one, or even a majority of persons in the community, may regard as discreditable ; it is sufficient if the statement hurts the party alluded to in the estimation of an important and respectable part of the community.</p> <p>A woman, whose portrait is published in connection with an endorsement of a brand of whiskey may be seriously hurt in her standing with a considerable portion of her neighbors and she is entitled to prove her case and go to the jury.</p> <p>Quaere and not decided whether the unauthorized publication of a person’s likeness is a tort per se.:</p> <p>154 Fed. Rep. 330; reversed.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS' OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: by this court to be palpably erroneous. Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300 , 307; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 ; Maguire *201 v. Tyler, 8 Wall. 650 , 664, 665; Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 , 53. A certificate of a court of last resort may serve to elucidate the determination whether a Federal question exists. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. McKendree 203 U. S. 514 , 525.

<p>ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.’</p> <p>The facts, which involve the boundary between the States of Washington and Oregon as the same was determined by this court in this action, 211 U. S. 127, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The State of Washington filed a- petition for -a rehearing herein, upon the following points:</p> <p>I. The court erred in finding and holding that the present ship channel at the entrance to the Columbia River was the old south channel.</p> <p>II. The court erred in finding and holding that the former north channel still subsisted to the northward of Sand Island, and that the boundary between the States of Washington and Oregon was to the northward of said Sand Island.</p> <p>III. The court erred in not finding and holding that the present single channel at the entrance to the mouth of the Columbia River was as much the former north channel of the entrance to said river as it was the former south channel, and in not giving effect as a matter of law to the said combined single channel as the boundary between the two States.</p> <p>IV. The court erred in finding and holding that the Columbia Rivet inside the entrance was not divided by islands and in finding and holding that the testimony failed to show anything calling for consideration in respect to the ownership of the said islands.</p>

Section 1307, Kentucky Statutes; 1903, provides: “ Any person who shall sell, lend, give, procure for or furnish spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, or any mixture of either, knowingly, to any person who is an inebriate or in the habit of becoming intoxicated or drunk by the use of any such liquors, or who shall suffer .or permit any such person to drink any such liquors in his barroom, saloon or upon the premises under his control or in his possession, shall be fined, for…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.</p> <p>This is a suit to foreclose a mortgage given by the appellant, Maria de las Nieves Cabrera y Pruna, to the appellee bank, executed by her on certain property in Porto Rico, to/secure a- promissory note for 8,000 pesos, provincial money,, made in favor of the bank by a mercantile firm in San Juan, known as Successores de J. M. Suarez y Compania, as principals, and the appellant above named as surety. The Banco Territorial y Agrícola was also made a party, but as it disclaimed any interest in the controversy, no further proceedings were taken against it. • Magdalena de la Cruz Cabrera y Pruna was made a party because, as it is alleged in the bill, the property mortgaged was conveyed to her by Maria de las Nieves Cabrera y Pruna, who was her 'sister, for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff (appellee here) of the benefit of its security, and that the conveyance was made' without consideration. . She answered, denying the allegations, and averred that the conveyance was made upon certain valuable considerations; which were set out.</p> <p>The answer of Maria de las Nieves Cabrera y Pruna set up that her signature to the mortgage had been obtained by fraud, an^ that Suarez & Co. had paid the debt secured thereby, that the original note signed by her had been renewed without her knowledge or consent, that the bank had accepted a bill of sale of the stock of merchandise belonging to Suarez & Co. in full payment of the indebtedness, and had executed a public document acknowledging the same. She also averred the good faith of the conveyance to her sister;</p> <p>The. principal contention of appellants in this court turns entirely on the truth of thé allegation that the bank had accepted the bill of sale of the stock of Suarez & Co. in full payment of the indebtedness. Of this bill of sale we may say at the outset that the District Court found, and we concur in that, finding, that it was. not executed with such intention. Appellants, therefore, are limited to the proposition that it had such effect by operation of law. They so contend, insisting that it was a conveyance of property on its face, and that it could not. be varied or changed by parol testimony. The District Court having admitted such testimony, it is further contended, committed error. The ruling that parol evidence will not be received to vary a written instrument is elementary, but the inquiry is, is that ruling so far imperative in Porto Rico that an instrument, though an absolute conveyance on its face, may not be shown as only intended for security?</p> <p>A statement of some of the facts will exhibit the situation of the parties and their relations to the indebtedness. Previous to the year 1900 Jose Maria Suarez carried on a mercantile business in San Juan, Porto Rico. Shortly before that date he died, and two of his brothers, including his widow, Maria de las Nieves Cabrera y Pruna, one of the appellants, continued the business under a partnership, organized in the early part of 1900, under, the firm name and style of Successores de J. M. Suarez y Compañía. Suarez had bought the store with his wife’s private funds, and owed her at the time of his death 8,000 pesos, ■ and she became a silent partner to that extent, but took no part in the management generally. The partnership being in need of money, borrowed from appellee, on the twenty-first of February, 1900, the sum of 8,000 pesos, equivalent to $4,800 in United States currency, and gave its promissory note.fo secure the sum, payable in six months, at 9 per cent interest. The note was in the following words:</p> <p>“ $8000.00 Pesos ■ \ -,.,, , ,' , “ $4800.00 Dollars \ Elther on demand-</p> <p>San Juan, Porto Rico, February 21, 1900.</p> <p>• “Six months after date, for value received, wé promise to pay to the American Colonial Bank of Porto Rico, at the office of the said company, in the city of San Juan, eight thousand pesos M. C. or forty-eight hundred dollars U. S. cy., having deposited with said company as collateral security for payment of this or any other liability or liabilities of ours to said company, now existing, or which hereafter may be contracted, the following property, vjz:</p> <p>“A cession-of all the interests of the signers of this in the estate of Nieves Prima y Vanrosi, and a mortgage on 'house on Sol street... This note can- be renewed with.the consent of the • cashier of the American Colonial Bank,.without prejudice to-the security or collateral, with full power and authority to said company to sell, assign and deliver the whole, or any part thereof, or any substitutes therefor, or any additions thereto, at any broker’s board, or at any public or private sale, at the option of said company, or its president, or treasurer, or its or their or either of their assigns, on the non-performance of this promise, or the non-payment at maturity of any of the other liabilities aforesaid, or at any time or times thereaftér, without demand of payment, advertisement or notice of sale, which are hereby, expressly waived; and after deducting all costs and expenses for collection, sale and delivery, to apply the residue of the proceeds of such sale, or sales, to pay any or all of said liabilities to said company, or its assigns, as its president ór treasurer, or assigns, shall deem proper, returning the overplus to the undersigned; and upon any sale at public auction or. at broker’s board the holder thereof may purchase the whole or any part of such securities, discharged from any right of redemption. And the undersigned agrees to be and remain liable to the holder hereof for any deficiency.</p> <p>“The company is hereby given.a lien upon all moneys held by it on deposit' or otherwise, to the credit of the undersigned, and is authorized at any time to appropriate all of said moneys to the payment of whatever may be due on this .note, or any other obligations of the undersigned now existing or hereafter contracted, whether the same be then due or not due.</p> <p>“In case of depreciation in the market value of the security hereby pledged, or which may hereafter be pledgéd for this loan, a payment is to be made on account, so that the said market value shall always be at least —per cent more than the amount- unpaid of this note. In- case of failure to do so this note shall be due and payable forthwith, anything hereinbefore expressed to the contrary notwithstanding, and the company may immediately reimburse itself by sale -of the security as hereinbefore provided.</p> <p>“ (Sgd.) Maria de las'Nieves de Suarez.</p> <p>“(Sgd.) Sue. de J. M. Suarez & Co.”</p> <p>The note was signed by her as a principal; but the bill alleges that the firm signed as principal, and that she signed as surety, and, to further secure the note, that she executed the mortgage in this suit. It is recited in the mortgage that the note was given by the firm- “as direct debtors,” and that she executed the mortgage as surety “for the debtors and principal guarantor of the debtors.” The mortgage was recorded.</p> <p>• On the thirteenth of March, 1901, a bill of sale upon which the controversy in the case turns was executed before a notary. The instrument recites that it was made by the Mercantile Society, Ltd., doing business under the firm name and style of Successores'de J. M. Suarez y Compañía, owner of the establishment, the bazaar “Europa,” Don Manuel and Ramon Suafez y Cordero, represented by its managing and active partners as parties of the first part, and Mr. Edwin L. Arnold, cashier of the American Colonial Bank of Porto Rico, party of the second part. The bill of sale further recites as follows:</p> <p>“ First. The Society Successores de J. M. Suarez y Cia now. is debtor to the American Colonial Bank of Porto Rico in the sum of four thousand eight hundred dollars, due on the 21st of 'August, last, according to the promissory note which they executed, and not • being able to deliver the amount thereof/ have offered to make payment thereof in mercantile stocks, according to the detailed inventory which they exhibit, subscribed by the society, and which they take with them bearing my signature and seal, and to which the creditor bank has manifested its conformity.</p> <p>“Second. That carrying into' effect the sale of the stocks set forth in the inventory exhibited, Messrs. Suarez y Cordero in the representation, by which they act, transfer all of the said effects set forth in the said inventory to the creditor bank for the sum of four thousand eight hundred dollars, leaving the same in the possession of the bank, in payment of the said amount of the promissory note above mentióned.</p> <p>.“Third. Mr Edwin L. Arnold accepts this deed; receives the inventory above mentioned and in consequence thereof says that he leaves in the said establishment of the sellers the 'Bazaar Europa’ all the stock and goods which such persons have sold to him in payment for the four thousand eight hundred dollars which they owe to the American Colonial Bank,, in order that, for the account and commission of the latter they proceed to realize from the said goods, prices not to be less than those fixed in the inventory, and they are obliged to present to the bank weekly account of sales they may make, together with the value in cash thereof, until the complete realization of the same takes place.”</p> <p>It was signed by Ramon Suarez y Cordero, Manuel Suarez y Cordero and Edwin L. Arnold, cashier.</p> <p>The District Court found, as we have already said, that the bill of sale was taken as additional security, and that there was no agreement or understanding that it should be considered as full payment of the main loan or debt; that Arnold never saw the stock of goods or any part of it, nor went to the store of the firm, and that the firm retained possession of the goods. . Neither of the appellants took part in the execution of the instrument, and, it - is found, that no' testimony was offered charging them or any of the members of the company with fraudulent conduct. It is also found by the District Court that subsequently the firm went into bankruptcy, tl^at the stock of goods was scheduled as part' of the assets of the firm, and that the bank received no part of the assets collected by the trustee in bankruptcy, and distributed among the general creditors of the firm. The District Court adjudged that the bank was entitled to foreclose its mortgage, and entered-a decree accordingly.</p>

Bong v. Campbell Art Co., 214 U.S. 236 (1909), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held, under the International Copyright Act of 1891, A copyright cannot be granted to a non-citizen whose country has not been acknowledged as in a reciprocal copyright arrangement with the United States by a formal presidential proclamation. Because the non-citizen is not granted a copyright, they cannot assign a copyright for a work to a citizen of a country with American copyright privileges. That citizen cannot register a copyright for the work. The case concerned the painting "Dolce Far Niente" by Daniel Hernández Morillo, a citizen of Peru.

<p>Where at the time of removal to the Federal court neither of the parties was a resident nor citizen of the district, that defect, although jurisdictional, being only as to the particular district, can be waived; and is waived, if, as in this case, the parties make.up the issues on the merits without objecting to the jurisdiction. Re Moore, 209 U. S. 490; Western Loan Co. v. Butte Co., 210 U. S. 368.</p> <p>It is the duty of the master to use reasonable diligence in providing a safe place for his employés to work in and to carry on his business; and the employé may, in the absence of notice to the contrary, assume that the master will use reasonable care in furnishing appliances for carrying on the business. Choctaw & Oklahoma R. R. v. McDade, 191 U. S. 64.</p> <p>The duty of the master to provide safe place and appliances for his employés is a continuing one and must be exercised whenever circumstances demand it, Santa Fe & Pacific R. R. v. Holmes, 202 U. S. 438; and this applies where the workmen are engaged in work more or less dangerous and it is' only a matter of using due skill and care to make the place and appliances safe. Choctaw & Oklahoma R. R. v. McDade, 191 U. S. 64.</p> <p>Where the negligence of the master in failing to provide and maintain a safe place contributes to the injury of the employé, the master is liable notwithstanding the concurring negligence of those performing the work. Deserant v. Cerillos Coal R. R. Co., 178 U. S. 409.</p> <p>Questions of negligence do not become questions of law except where all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from the evidence, nor should a case be withdrawn from the jury unless the conclusion follows as a matter of law that no recovery can be had upon any view which can be properly taken of the facts which the evidence tends to establish. Gardner v. Michigan Cent. R. R., 150 U. S. 349.</p> <p>In this case held that there was sufficient evidence as to the defective condition of a derrick and the method in which it was operated to require the submission, under proper instructions from the court, to the jury.</p> <p>152 Fed. Rep. 120, reversed.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Distinct judgments in favor of or against distinct parties, though in the same record, cannot be joined to give this court jurisdiction.</p> <p>While iii case of joint entry and ouster, where the answer of all defendants takes issue without setting up separate claims to distinct parcels, and the judgment for recovery of possession is against all defendants jointly, the-measure of appellate jurisdiction is the value of the whole land, Friend v. Wise, 111 U. S. 797, where there is no allegation of joint ownership or joint possession, and the controversy with each defendant relates to a separate and distinct parcel, and judgment is rendered separately, the measure as to each defendant is the value of his separate parcel. Tupper v. Wise, 110 U. S. 398. Nor does this court have jurisdiction in such a case if the judgment were jointly against the defendants for damages where the total amount awarded is less than the jurisdictional amount.</p> <p>Writ of error to review 2 Philippine, 142, dismissed.</p>

<p>Where plaintiff in error, defendant below, in a suit for penalty under a state law asks and the court refuses an instruction that if the jury find that the default occurred within a navy yard, over which the United States had exclusive jurisdiction, the recovery could not be had under the state law, this court has jurisdiction to review the judgment.</p> <p>The Norfolk Navy Yard is one of the places over which, under Art. T, § 8, par. 17 of the Constitution, Congress possesses exclusive power . of legislation, and that exclusive power necessarily includes exclusive jurisdiction; and it is of the highest importance that the jurisdiction of the State should be resisted at the border of such places. Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525.</p> <p>The State cannot inflict a penalty for the non-delivery of a telegram within the limits of a place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the . United States; and so1held that under the statute of Virginia in that regard the penalty cannot be collected for the non-delivery of a telegram to an addressee within the limits of the Norfolk Navy Yard. Congress alone can prescribe penalties in such a case.</p> <p>107 Virginia, 60, reversed.</p>

Held: that the sale of a stock of dry goods under a contract by which the articles sold remained the property of the vendor until paid for, with provision for substitution of other goods and that proceeds of goods sold also belonged to the vendor, was a conditional sale.

Held: where a creditor has a claim upon an open account for goods sold and delivered during the period of four months before the ■adjudication in 'bankruptcy, the account being made up of debits and credits, leaving a net amount due from the bankrupt estate, that payments made under such circumstances did not. constitute preferences which the creditor was bound to surrender before proving his claim in bankruptcy.

Held: and its order has - been affirmed by the Circuit Court and Circuit Court of Appeals, that *298 a carrier cannot chargé for a service rendered at the request and for the benefit of the shipperany amount in excess of the actual expense incurred, and fixed a rate less than this, court considers reasonable, this court cannot] where the. testimony has not been preserved in ' the record, fix a fair and reasonable charge,…

This action was brought by the United States to recover the sum of payments made át the sub-treasury in Boston upon 194 pension checks, the signatures or marks of the persons to whom the checks were payable having been forged. The National Exchange Bank of Boston was originally sole defendant, but in legal effect the National Exchange Bank of Providence was substituted as defendant, and the issues were made up between it and the United States.

<p>Money paid to the collector of a port under protest, and on the certainty that if not paid clearance to vessels necessarily sailing on definite schedule would be refused, to the great damage of the owner, is paid involuntarily,'and can, if unlawfully exacted, be recovered;</p> <p>Confress has power to deal with the admission of aliens and to confide the’ enforcement of law’s in regard thereto to administrative officers. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253.</p> <p>In construing a congressional statute this’ court may consider the re- ' port of the committee as a guide to its true interpretation in order to dispel ambiguity, if any exists. The Delaware, 161 U. S. 459; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470.</p> <p>It is within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obligations and ' sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.</p> <p>The authority, given by Congress in the Alien Immigration Act to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to impose an exaction on'a transportation company bringing-to the United States an alien immigrant afflicted with a loathsome contagious disease when the medical examination establishes that the disease existed, and could have been detected by medical examination at the time of embarkation, does not purport to define and punish any criminal offense, but merely entails the infliction of a penalty enforceable by civil suit; and it is within the power of Congress to provide for such imposition by an executive officer, and the enforcement is not necessarily governed by the rules controlling the prosecution of criminal offenses. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, distinguished; Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, followed.</p> <p>The constitutional right of Congress to enact legislation in regard to a matter wholly within its jurisdiction is the sole measure by which the validity of such legislation is to be determined by the courts; and the courts cannot proceed on the supposition that harm will follow if the legislature be permitted full sway and, in order to correct the legislature, exceed their own authority, and assume that wrong may. be done in order to prevent wrong being accomplished; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27.</p> <p>The imposition of a penalty by an executive officer when authorized by Congress in a matter wholly within its competency, such as alien immigration, is not unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment as taking property without due process of law.</p> <p>The courts cannot make mere form and not substance the test of the constitutional power of Congress to enact a statute in regard 'to a matter over which Congress has absolute control.</p> <p>The prohibition of § 9 of the Alien Immigration Act of March 3, 1903, c. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, against bringing into the United States alien immigrants afflicted with loathsome and contagious diseases is within the absolute power of Congress; and that provision of the act is not unconstitutional because it provides that the Secretary of Commerce and Labor may, without judicial trial, impose upon, and exact penalties from, the transportation company for violations of the provisions.</p> <p>The greater includes the less and where Congress has power to sanction a prohibition by penalties enforcible by executive officers without judicial trial on the ascertainment in a prescribed manner of certain facts, the person upon whom the penalty is imposed is not entitled to any hearing in the sense of raising an issue and tendering evidence as to the facts so ascertained, and is not, therefore, denied due' process because the time which the executive officer allows him after notice of the ascertainment and imposition to produce evidence as to certain’facts on which the fine might be remitted is too short.</p> <p>155 Fed. Rep. 428, affirmed.</p>

<p>IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR. THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The facts are stated.in the opinion.</p>

The complainant (the above-named petitioner) commenced this suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia against the defendant, the Peopie’s Steamboat Company and its officers and agents, for the purpose of obtaining an injunction restraining the corporation defendant from using certain .wharves on the Rappahannock River, in the State of Virginia, of some of which the complainant was the owner in fee, and of others the lessee of the…

<p>APPEAL PROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion..</p>

Held: that the Golding patent No. 547,242 for the process of expanding metal was a substantial improvement of the art involving mechanical operations and producing a new and useful result independently of particular mechanisms for performing such process, and is valid. 157 Fed. Rep. 564 , reversed; 164 Fed. Rep. 849 , affirmed.

Held: 203 U. S. 563 , that the information sufficiently set forth a contempt of the court tp punish which the court has jurisdiction, now finds on the testimony- taken under its direction that certain of the defendants named were guilty óf the . contempt as charged and directs -that attachments issue against . them, and that the defendants not found guilty be discharged.

prohibition DIRECTED TO THE JUDGES OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF. THE. ■ UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW. JERSEY. This case arose out of thé same facts as the preceding case and affected the proceeds of one of the vessels, and the same contention was made for petitioner.

This case was commenced in the. United States court for the Southern District of the Indian Territory and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff (defendant in error here) which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the United. States for the Indian Territory, and subsequently by the-Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; _

.An action for infringement of patent rights was .commenced in the' Circuit . Court of the United States for the Southern Dis-' trict of New York by one 'William A. Ferguson, whose citizenship is not disclosed, against the petitioner, a corporation of New Jersey, on patents alleged to have been assigned to the plaintiff by the Reilloc Tyre Company, a British corporation.

<p>Motions for leave to file petitions for leave to file bills of review in the lower court denied.</p>

Motions to dismiss or affirm and for damages. This was an action- for damages in which the defendant in error (plaintiff below) had recovered judgment for death of her husband, which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State and a petition for a rehearing denied by that court.

The certificate in this case is as follows: The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting at the City of St. Paul, Minnesota, on the tenth day of July, A. D. 1907, certifies that the record on file in .the action'above entitled, which is pending,in this, court upon writ of error duly issued to review a judgment rendered in this action in favor of the defendant in error, iii the United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Missouri,…

This was a writ of error to .review a judgment of the Supreme Court, of Illinois in a condemnation proceeding in which plaintiff in error contended that he had been denied due process of law.

Held: that an ordinance of a municipality of that State, valid under the law of that State as construed by its highest court, compelling a railroad to repair a viaduct constructed; after the opening of the railroad, by the city in pursuance of a contract relieving the railroad; for a substantial consideration, from making any repairs thereon for a term of years was not void under the contract, or the due process,- clause…

This was a writ of error to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals' by which plaintiff in error contended that he had been deprived, of his property without due process of law.

. Motion, to dismiss or affirm. This case came up on motion to dismiss or affirm a final decree or judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth' Circuit modifying a decree of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia in the bankruptcy proceedings of the Morgantown Tin Plate Company and rejecting all of a claim of 1100,000, except 822,500.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OP CIVIL APPEALS FOR THE THIRD SUPREME - JUDICIAL DISTRICT'OF THE STATE OF TEXAS.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss or affirm.</p> <p>The nature of this case appears above.</p>

Held: construing its own statutes and basing its decision upon one of a similar case in the Supreme Court of the United States, Denver Co. v. Ailing, 99 U. S. 480 , that the plaintiff in error has not the power of eminent domain; but, that in accepting its new charter from the legislature,- it accepted it in the status in which. *504 it was at the time of the renewal of its old charter with such changes only as were…

' APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP MINNESOTA. Appellant (complainant below) filed its bill against a large number of defendants to foreclose on special tax bills for assessment work done and for which defendant’s property was liable. The assessments aggregated more than two thousand dollars, but each assessment was less than that amount.

■ As stated by the Court of Claims, Henry C. Pearson filed a claim; for three months’ extra pay proper as an officer in the Volunteer Service during the civil war under the act of March 3, 1865; on May 22,1908, the United States Senate referred to the court Bill No. 7Ó1& of the 60th Congress, First Session, authorizing the Secretary.of the Treasury to reexamine and adjust claims of persons (including petitioner) under the act of March 3, 1865.

; As stated in the petition, petitioner is plaintiff in an action against the Republic Iron and Steel Company, a corporation, commenced in the state court which had jurisdiction. Defendant filed a bond and petition for removal, and caused said action to be removed to the United States Circuit Court of the District of Minnesota, Fifth Division, on the ground that the plaintiff was a citizen of Minnesota and the defendant a citizen. of New Jersey.

APPEALS EOR THE- EIGHTH ■ CIRCUIT. This was an action by the United States against the Guaranty Company to recover from it as surety on the official bond of one Bridgeman, an Indian agent.

<p>In error to the .Supreme Court of the-State of,Texas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of Porto Rico.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>