Volume 215 — United States Reports

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. This court has jurisdiction both as the basis of the amount involved, and because the construction of a statute of the United States (Act of. July 1, 1902, § 45; 32 U. S. Stat. 703) is in question. The facts as well as the law are before the court for review. De la Rama v. De la Rama, 201 U. S. 309. The judgment of the Court of First Instance was plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence..

Section 9,. chapter 407, Laws of June 10, 1890, 26 Stat. 130-135, known as the Customs Administrative Act, under which defendant was indicted, reads as follows: “That if any owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person shall make or attempt to make any entry of imported merchandise by means’ of any fraudulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means’ of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance…

Held: that in proceedings purely of a probate character there was no jurisdiction .in the Federal courts.

Held: in substance, that. oleomargarine acts are complete in themselves and contain provisions' for all the punishment that Congress intended for violations thereof. United States v. Lamson, 165 Fed. Rep, 80 ; Grier v. Tucker, 150 Fed. Rep. 658 ; Schafer v. Craft, 144 Fed. Rep. 907 ; Craft v. Shafer, 153 Fed. Rep. 175 ; S. C., 154 Fed. Rep. 1002 .

<p>The giant in letters patent, issued in pursuance of the treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek of September 27,1830, 7 Stat. 333, conveying the tract described to the Choctaw Indians in fee simple to them and their descendants to inure to them while they should exist as a nation and live thereon, was a grant to the Choctaw Nation, to be administered by it as such; it did not create a trust for the individuals then comprising the nation and their respective descendants in whom as tenants in common the legal title would merge with the equitable title on dissolution of the nation.</p>

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI: The facts are stated in the opinion'. The provisions of § 5278, Rev. Stat., will be strictly construed and all the requirements 'of the statute must be respected. Ex parte Hart, 63 Fed. Rep. 259; Ex parte Morgan, 20 Fed. Rep. 298; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.

These cases were consolidated in the Circuit Court, The appellants were complainants in the suits respectively, and asserted title by virtue of patents from the United States to lands bordering on and touching Lakes Washington and Union in the State of Washington to the lands below the high-water mark of said lakes respectively, against a title claimed by the State.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The instrument under which defendant claims title was void because the purported grantors had nothing but a “ squatter’s right.” Under the Oregon Donation Law neither legal nor equitable title vests in the settler before his full compliance with all the requirements of said act. Hall v. Russell, 101 U. S. 509; Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 514; Ore. & Cal. R. R. Co. v. United States, 190 U. S. 195; United States v. Ore. & Cal.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the Employers’ Liability Law of June 11, 1906, c. 3073, 34 Stat. 232, as applied to the Territories of the United States, are stated in the opinion. .This court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the state court of Texas; the plaintiff in error as defendant below asserted the unconstitutionality of the Employers’ Liability Act and that this case was controlled by the statute of New Mexico.

On December 10, 1907, the Interstate Commerce Commission entered an order requiring certain railroads running into Chicago to cease and desist from making a terminal charge of two dollars per car for the transportation of live stock beyond the tracks of said railroads in Chicago, and for delivery thereof at the Union Stock Yards, and requiring them to establish and put in force for said services a charge of one dollar per car.

Held: collected and retained by said bank until all liabilities, present or future, of the undersigned, or any or either of them, due or not due of every kind to said bank, now or hereafter contracted, shall be paid and fully satisfied.” For the Hanover. .Bank, it is contended that although the notes were not in its possession as collateral security for any debt due it, nevertheless, as it had the physical possession of…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND .CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The Hanover Bank was entitled in equity to set off the-advance made against the notes which it held. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499; Carr v. Hamilton, 129 TJ. S..252; Scam-mon v. Kimball, 92 U. S. 362; Bispham’s Equity, 7th ed., 1905, § 327; 2 Bolles’ Modem Law of Banking, 742; Bolling Mill v. Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S. 596, 615; Schuler v. Israel, 120 U. S. 506; Armstrong v. Chemical Bank, 41fFed. Rep. 234; Bank v. Massey, 192. U. S. 138. In. New York the-set-off would have been allowed under the Code. Pera v. Wickham, 135 N. Y. 223; DeCamp V. Thompson, 159 N. Y. 444; Empire Feed Co. v. Chatham Bank, 30'App. Div. 476; Thompson v. Kessel, 30N. Y. 383; G. & H. Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226/236; Brown v. Buckingham, 21 How. Pr. 190.</p> <p>. There is no question of set-off, legal or equitable, in the case, nor is there any equity in the bill. The receiver’s case was really one in replevin. N. Y. Code of Civ. Pro., §§ 1718,1726, 1730, and see also § 501; 2 Abbot’s Form of Pleading, 869; Moffatt v. Van Doren, 4 Bosw. 609; 1 Nichols N. Y. Prac. 972, and cases cited; Dinan v. Coneys, 143 N.' Y. 544.</p>

The facts; which involved' the jurisdiction of the admiralty court of a case for salvage services rendered to a vessel in dry dock and in peril from a fire originating on land, are stated in the opinion. The jurisdictional question is properly certified.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.</p> <p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>A prima facie case against both Hygienic companies is made out by the admissions without the aid of other proof regardless of the Clotworthy deposition. Hutter v. Stopper Co., 128 Fed. Rep. 283; United Shirt & Collar Co. v. Beattie, 149 Fed. Rep. 736, 742.</p> <p>There was no denial or explanation by either infringing • company: cases supra and Signal Co. v. Electric Co., 97 Fed. Rep. 810; aff’d 107 Fed. Rep. 284; Hemolin v. Dyewood Co., 131 Fed. Rep. 483; aff’d 138 Fed. Rep. 54; certiorari denied, 199 U. S.608.</p> <p>The Clotworthy deposition should have been received. A court, may take judicial cognizance of its own records in a ' former litigation, especially one in which present parties were privies. Butler v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 240; Aspen Mining Co. v. Billings, 150 U. S. 31, 38; Cramer v. Washington, 168 U. S.‘ 124, 129; Re Boardman, 169 U. S. 39, 44; Bresnahan v. Tripp Co., 72 Fed. Rep. 920; Cushman Box Co. v. Goddard, 97 Fed. Rep. 664; Des Moines Nav. Co. v. Homestead Co., 123 U. S.552; United States v.Des Moines Nav. Co., 142 U. S. 510¡ National Co. v. Dayton Co., 95 Fed. Rep. 991, 996. Both the Hygienic companies were “parties” to the test suit. 3 Robinson on Patents, § 1176; Robbins v. Chicago,-A.Wall. 657; Penfield-v. Potts, 126 Fed. Rep. 475, 480; Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S.351.</p> <p>Privity was not shown between either of the Hygienic companies and the defendant on the test suit. Privity must be affirmatively shown. Johnson v. Powers, 139 U. S. 156; Litchfield v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 549; Theller v. Hershey, 89. Fed. Rep. 575; Felting Co. v. Asbestos Co., 4 Fed. Rep. 816; Telephone Co. v. Telephone Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 663; Miller v. Tobacco Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 91; Eagle Có. v. Bradley Co., 50 Fed. Rep. 193; S. C., 57 Fed. Rep. 980; Box Co. v. Paper Co.,95 Fed. Rep. 991; Lane v. Wells, 99 Fed. Rep. 286.. v</p> <p>The Circuit Court of Appeals of the. Second Court eijred in taking judicial notice of matters outside the record. Stanley v. McElrath, 86 California, 449; Downing v. Hewlett, Q Colo. App. 291; Adler v. Lang, 26 Mo. App. 226; Grace v. Ballou, 4 S. D. 333; Re Manderson, 51 Fed. Rep. 501; Streeter v. Streeter.. 43 Illinois, 155; Taylor v. Adams, 115 Illinois, 570; Loomis v. Griffin, 78 Iowa, 482; Granger v. Griffin, 78 Iowa, 759; Banks v. Burnam, 61 Missouri, 76; Spurlock v. Mo- Pac. Ry., 76 Missouri, 67; Daniel v. Bellamy, 91 N. C. 78; People v. De La Guerra, 24 California, 73; State v. Edwards, 19 Missouri, 674; Baker v. Mygatt, 14 Iowa, 131; Allison v. Insurance Co., 104 N. W. Rep. 753; Be Osborne, 115 Fed. Rep. 1; Bank v. Taylor, 86 Ill. App. 388; Ralphs v. Hensler, 97 California, 296; McCormick v. Herndon{ 67 Wisconsin, 648; Enix v. Miller, 54 Iowa, 551; Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U. S. 521; State;v. Wilson, 39 Mo. App. 114; Water Co. v. Cowles, 31 California, 215; 1 Wharton on Evidence, §326.</p> <p>The chemical company failed to make out a prima facie case. Bates v. Coe, 98 U. S. 31, 49; Royer v.- Chicago Mfg. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 853.</p> <p>The extract from the Clotworthy deposition ■fras inadmissible as against the Hygienic companies. Street Railway Co. v.' Gurnby, 99 Fed. Rep. 192; Chase’s Stephen’s Evidence, 2ded., Art. 32; Greenleáf on Evidence, § 163; Insurance Co. v. Commissioners, 117 Fed, Rep. 82.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEARS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated, in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182 (1909), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held a person cannot file a second copyright claim to amend the first, even if the first was determined to be invalid.

<p>On writ of error taken by the United States under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2,-1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246, where the indictment was dismissed as not sustained by the statute and also as bad on principles of general law, this court can only review the decision . so far as it is based on the invalidity or construction of the statute; it cannot consider questions of general law. United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370.</p> <p>In determining whether a special remedy created by a statute for enforcing a prescribed penalty excludes all other remedies, the intention of Congress may be fopnd in the history of the legislation, and, ' in the absence of clear and specific language, Congress will not be • presumed to have excluded the Government from a well-recognized method of enforcing' its statutes.</p> <p>The fact that a penal statute provides for enforcing the prescribed penalty of fine and forfeiture by civil suit does not necessarily exclude enforcing by indictment; and so held in regard to penalty for assisting the immigration of contract laborers prescribed by §§ 4 and 5 of the Immigration Act of February 20,1907, c. 1134, 34 Stat: 898.</p> <p>Although the term misdemeanor has at times been used in the statutes of'the United States without strict regard to its common-law meaning a misdemeanor at all times, has been a crime, and a change in a statute by which that which before was merely unlawful is made a misdemeanor will not be presumed to be meaningless.</p> <p>When the Government prosecutes by indictment for a penalty that it might sue for in a civil action the person proceeded against is entitled to all constitutional protection as to production of witnesses against him and a verdict cannot be directed against him as might be the case in a civil action.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. Even if indictment will not lie for a violation of § 4 of the Immigration Act of 1907, Congress has made that offense' an express misdemeanor; and such statutory classification of the crime brings a conspiracy to commit it unmistakably within § 5440, Rev. Stat. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 99; United States v. Van Schaick, 134 Fed. Rep. 592; Cohen v. United States, 157 Fed. Rep. 651; United States v. Tsokus', 163 Fed. Rep. 129.

This was a bill in equity filed by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company in the Circuit Court of- the United States for the District of Maryland against the Interstate Commerce Commission, July 20, 1908, which prayed for a‘preliminary injunction and a final decree enjoining, annulling and suspending a certain order of the commission served June 24, 1908, in a proceeding before the commission entitled “Rail and River Coal Company vs. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.” On…

<p>On authority of preceding case held that under § 1 of the expediting act of February. 11, 1903, c. 544, 32 Stat. 823, the case, although turning only on a point of lawj cannot be certified to this court, in absence of any judgment, opinion, decision, or order- determinative of the case below.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.</p> <p>. Pablo Yordi,. being detained in custody by the United States marshal of the Western District of Texas, obtained from the District Court for that' district a writ of habeas Corpus to secure his release. He was charged in the republic of Mexico with the crime of “fraud and forgery of documents,” and a warrant for his arrest was duly issued by the criminal judge of the city of Guadalajara. He avoided arrest in Mexico and fled to El Paso, Texas, where he was detained in prison, under an order of the United States commissioner, awaiting the' issue by the proper authorities of an order for his extradition.</p> <p>At the hearing on the habeas corpus it was stipulated that the crimes in the complaint made before the United States commissioner were extraditable offenses under the existing treaty between the United States and Mexico; that at the time of the hearing before the commissioner the complaint in the case made by A. Y. Lomeli, consul of Mexico, was solely upon information and belief; that he had no actual or personal knowledge of the commission of any offense, but at the time of making the complaint the said Mexican consul had before him the record and depositions of the witnesses of the republic of Mexico in the proceedings before the criminal judge of Guadalajara.</p> <p>There were three complaints made against Yordi. The first, made by the assistant United States attorney, was dismissed. The se’cond and third were made by the Mexican consul.</p> <p>Upon the hearing under the first complaint the record and evidence contained in the proceedings in Mexico were introduced in evidence before the commissioner, as they were also on the hearing on the second complaint. The commissioner found that there was probable' cause to believe Yordi guilty of the offense of uttering a forged instrument in the State of Jalisco, United States of Mexico, on or-about the twenty-sixth day of May, 1908, and that' there was also probable cause to believe Yordi had • committed the offense of obtaining money by means of false device in the Mexican state mentioned. The commissioner therefore ordered Yordi to be held for extradition to the republic of Mexico on the charges alleged in the third and fourth counts of the complaint, and that he be committed to the county jail of El Paso County, Texas, to await the action of the proper authorities in the city of Washington, upon demand for his extradition to the republic' of Mexico.</p> <p>The case was heard before Maxey, District Judge, who discharged the writ of habeas corpus, and required the marshal to hold the petitioner in custody until a warrant of extradition was duly issued. From this final order this appeal was taken. Judge Maxey’s opinion is reported in 166 Fed. Rep, •921, Ex parte Yordi.</p>

Held: although such transactions were concealed in a report made to the Comptroller by false statements exhibiting a more favorable condition of the bank than would have appeared if the truth had been stated, that no intent to injure the bank could possibly be imputed, even although the necessary effect of the false statement was to prevent the Comptroller from exerting the powers conferred upon him by law for the…

.ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK The facts, which involve the' validity of the removal of a cause to the Federal court, are stated in the opinion.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The question litigated in the present suit was rendered res judicata by the judgment in the Federal court as it was matter that should have been set. up as counterclaim. Such is the rule in South Carolina, §§ 170, 171, Code of Procedure, and under § 914, Rev. Stat., the practice of the Federal courts must conform thereto. See Simonton, Fed.

<p>In this , case the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory- of Oklahoma, involving contract rights, is affirmed.</p> <p>The opinion of the Supreme Court of the Territory followed to the effect that the facts stated constituted duress within the meaning of the'territorial statute.</p> <p>Stating -only part of a statutory definition of duress in the charge to the jury held not .reversible error, it not appearing that the defendant was hurt thereby.</p>

The general object of this suit — which was brought by the United States in one of the courts of New Mexico on the twenty-fourth day of May, 1897 — was to obtain an injunction to prevent the Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company from .constructing and maintaining a dam across, and a reservoir over and near, the Rio Grande River at a certain point in that Territory.

At the May term, 1908, of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington an indictment was found against the defendant, the first count of, which reads: “That one Bob Celestine, an Indian, on the thirtieth day of August, in-the year of our Lord 1906, within the limits of the Tulalip Indian Reservation, within the boundaries of the State of Washington, and within said Western District of Washington, Northern Division, did, with force and arms,…

The defendants were indicted in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Washington for introducing liquor into the Indian country, as thus stated in the indictment: “To wit, into and upon a certain Indian allotment No. 670, within the limits of the boundary of the Yakima Indian Reservation, in the Eastern District of Washington, which said allotment had theretofore been allotted to a certain Indian, a member of the Yakima tribe of Indians, named…

TERRITORY OP NEW MEXICÓ. The facts are stated in the opinion. The peremptory writ of. mandamus should not have been issued without a hearing or opportunity for respondents' to be heard. The writ is confined to the requirement of official duties of a ministerial character. 2 Spelling, Ex. Rem.,- §§ 1432-1434, 1437.

Held: the lessor owes to the public; and in the former, because of the obligations of the employer to his employé arising from the relation of master and servant.

<p>Where the remedy at law is of doubtful adequacy and the policy of the State is clearly indicated for the protection of an important industry, equity may interfere, although under different. circum - ' stances an injunction-might be denied; and so held as to an injunc.tion against cutting or boxing timber on pine lands in Georgia.</p> <p>Possession of unenclosed woodland in natural condition is a fiction. of law rather than a possible fact, and can reasonably be assumed to follow the title; and, in this case, held that á suit in equity could be maintained to remove cloud on title and cancel a fraudulent deed of timber lands in Georgia notwithstanding there was no allegation of possession.</p> <p>A suit in equity may be maintained to cancel a deed improperly given where the invalidity does not appear on its face, and under which by the state law, as in Georgia, possession might give a title.</p> <p>The fact that the defendant has, during the pendency of an equity' action to set aside a deed, continued to waste the property does not destroy the jurisdiction of the court; the bill may be retained and - damages assessed.</p> <p>The objection of multifariousness is one of inconvenience, and, after trial, where the objection was not sustained by the lower court and defendants did not stand upon their demurrer setting it up, it will not prevail in this court in a case where the bill charged a conspiracy between several trespassers whose trespasses extended over contiguous lots treated as one.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. The statutes of Iowa, §§1305-1322 of the Code, provide a scheme of taxation of banks by which the franchises, good will, good business management, dividend earning’ power, and United States bonds held as required by law are all included by force of the very statutes themselves, while all of these elements are’ excluded by force of the same statutes, as to moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens- and invested in the very…

(p. 480) which in West Virginia is the law of- the, case, whatever may' be the reasoning employed in the opinion- of the court — is as follows: “1. Deeds conveying coal with rights of removal should be construed in the same way as. other written instruments, and the intention of the parties as manifest by the language used in the deed itself should govern. 2.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The liability of stockholders for an additional amount equal to the stock'owned by them, although 'statutory, is contractual in its nature, and therefore within the protection of Art. I, §' 10, of the Federal Constitution. Whitman- v. Oxford .National Bank, 176 U. S. 559; Woodworth v. Bowles, 61 Kansas, 569.

Held: “It was the evident intention of Congress by the apt of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 491 , giving a right of- way to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, to grant such right of way through those lands which by surveys should be found to be sections 16 and 36, the school sections which it intended to give to the future State of Nebraska, pursuant to the provisions of the *390 organic act of 1854, 10 Stat, 283, creating the…

This case is before us on a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: supposing his title good, possession for ten years might create an indisputable right. But if the public facts known by the grantee showed ■ that the conveyance to him was void, we understand that it would not constitute a starting point for the running of time, and that the grantee’s actual belief . *417 would not help his case. .

Held: when dealing with defendant, to know its character, its purposes, and powers, as disclosed by its articles of incorporation.” We come now to the terms of the ratifying act of March 4, 1879. Laws of Minn., 1879, p. 410, c. 299.

Held: by virtue of a general appearance or otherwise, to have waived the defect in the service, and to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.” In view of the principles thus determined, we think the return of the sheriff in the state court, was not conclusive upon the question of service.

The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, from whose judgment affirming the decree of the District Court of Kingfisher County this, appeal was prosecuted, stated the case as follows (17 Oklahoma, 438): “This action was brought on the thirteenth day of May, 1902, by the plaintiff in error, John F. Haffner, against the defendants in error, for the specific enforcement of an oral contract for the sale of real estate.

The facts, which involve the question of whether a duty rested upon the railroad company to obey an order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission in regard to the distribution of coal cars, are stated in the opinion. Under §§ 12, 13, 14 of the Hepburn Act, June 29, 1906, 34.

<p>Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, ante, p. 452, followed as to power, under the act to regulate commerce, of the Commission to make reasonable arrangements for the distribution of coal cars to shippers, including cars, for transportation of fuel purchased by the railroad company for its own use.</p> <p>Where the case is submitted oh bill and answer, a fact, alleged in the complaint and denied in the answer and for which proof is demanded, cannot be considered, especially where, as in this case, there is a contrary finding of a body such as the Interstate Commerce Commission.</p>

<p>Regulations which are primarily within the competency of the Interstate Commerce Commission are not subject to judicial super-vision or enforcement until that body has been properly afforded an opportunity to exert its administrative functions. Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, applied, and Southern Railway Co. v. Tift, 206 U. S. 428, distinguished.</p> <p>The distribution to shippers of coal cars including those owned by the shippers and those used by the carrier for its own fuel is a matter involving preference and discrimination and within the -compe-. tency of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the eourts cannot interfere with regulations in regard to such distribution until ■ after action thereon by the commission.</p> <p>Even if not assigned as error, this court will consider the jurjsdic-tional question of whether there is power in the court, in view of the provisions of the act to regulate commerce, to grant the relief prayed for in regard to matters within the competency of the Interstate Commerce Commission.</p> <p>Under the court review provisions of § 15 of the act to regulate commerce as amended in 1906, the courts are limited to the question of power of the commission to make the order and cannot consider the wisdom or expediency of the order itself. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad, ante, p. 452.</p> <p>Section 23 of the act to regulate commerce, although added thereto in 1889, will now be construed in the light of § 15, as amended in 1906; and the remedy of mandamus is limited to compelling the performance of - duties which are either so plain as not to require a prerequisite exertion of power by the Interstate Commerce Commission, or which plainly arise from the obligatory force given by the statute to existing orders rendered by the commission within the lawful scope of its authority</p> <p>Petition in mandamus by a shipper averring discrimination in distribution of coal cars by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad dismissed' because the matter had not been first submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission.</p>

Held: in substance, that shippers, who complain of rates adopted by interstate carriers, cannot obtain relief by an original suit brought in any court, Federal or state, but must make application, at the outset, to the Interstate Commerce Commission.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of North Dakota, are stated in the opinion. The act complained of, chap. 189, Gen’l Laws, 1907, of •North .Dakota is not a regulation for sale of liquor and is not a proper exercise of the police power of the State. It relates only to .the holders of .Federal licenses. , Even if such was the intent of the legislature, effect cannot be so given to it unless the language is plain and unambiguous.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT • OF COLUMBIA.,</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

This was an indictment in the District Court of the Umted States for the Western District of North Carolina against the Old Nick Williams Company, a corporation which was authorized to carry on the business of a rectifier, and which was convicted of violating the second paragraph of § 3317 of the Revised Statutes by the verdict of a jury finding it guilty of carrying on thé business of a rectifier with intent to defraud the United States of the tax on the spirits rectified…

This- was a suit commenced on June 13,1903, in the District Court of Pawnee County, Oklahoma, by William H. Herbert and Mary B. Herbert, his wife, against a number of defendants, the principal one being Solomon R. Wagg, the appellant. The suit was one to have a certain conveyance, in form conveying the legal title to a tract of land from Mrs. Herbert to Wagg, adjudged void, as having been fraudulently obtained, and. to redeem the property from a prior mortgage lien.

OF HAWAII. The facts are stated in the opinion. It is law of this case that the terms of the agreement require the inculcation of general learning and knowledge accompanied with religious instruction in accordance with the confession of faith submitted to the Hawaiiañ government, Lowrey v. Hawaii, 206 U. S. 206, and it is as much a breach to fail to teach doctrine as to teach religion. The condition for religious teaching is unchanging, definite and absolute to-day.

original, of October Term, 1908]. On June 1, 1909, after the opinion and judgment of the court (214 U. S. 403) were delivered, The Solicitor General moved in open court for sentence, and thereupon the defendants Shipp, Gibson, Williams, Nolan, Padgett and Mayes, moved for leave to present petition for rehearing and the court ordered that they be allowed thirty days to present a motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing and that they be Temanded to custody to be…

<p>A writ of error to review the judgment of the highest court of a State dismissed for want of jurisdiction without opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP MONTANA.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p>

<p>A writ of error to the highest court of a State dismissed for want of jurisdiction on the authority of previous decisions.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR .THE ' SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE- CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p>

<p>A writ of error to the Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed without opinion on the authority of Macfadden v. United States, 213 U. S. 288.1</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP MISSOURI.</p>

<p>Writ of error to review a judgment of the state court dismissed for want of jurisdiction without opinion on authority of previous decisions.</p>

<p>A writ of error to review a judgment of the highest court of .a State, dismissed for want of jurisdiction without opinion.</p>

<p>Writ of error to review judgment of highest court of a State, dismissed ' for want of jurisdiction without opinion on authority of previous decisions.</p>

<p>APPEAL from the district court op the united states POR THE DISTRICT OP NEW JERSEY.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p>

<p>A judgment of the state court sustaining a tax on property of an officer of the United States Navy affirmed on the authority of previous cases.1</p>

<p>A writ of error to review judgment of the highest court of a State dismissed for want of jurisdiction, on authority of Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674; no Federal question was suggested prior to petition for writ of error.</p>

<p>A certificate in which there was no opinion, judgment or order of the court below dismissed on authority of Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission, ante, p. 216.</p>