Volume 216 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The petitioner, who had been convicted of several crimes in connection with his involvement in an armed robbery and shooting, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate his troubled background and upbringing and to present that information as mitigation evidence at the sentencing proceeding. The petitioner, who was nineteen years old at the time of the robbery, was sentenced to seventy-five years of imprisonment. He thereafter filed an application for sentence review with the Sentence Review Division of the Superior Court. Before the start of the habeas trial, the sentence review division granted the petitioner's application for a sentence reduction and concluded that the seventy- five year sentence for nonhomicidal offenses was disproportionate and should be reduced to a term of forty-five years. The petitioner thereafter amended his habeas petition to allege that, had the mitigation evidence been presented to the sentence review division, a reasonable probability existed that he would have received a greater sentence reduction than the thirty years that was ordered. The petitioner testified at the habeas trial that he had been sexually abused as a child, had begun using illegal drugs at age eleven and was consuming drugs and alcohol regularly by age twelve. He testified that he had had little to no relationship with his father, who was a drug user, and had been constantly exposed to violence throughout his youth, during which he became a member of a street gang and witnessed a friend being shot in the head. The petitioner further stated that he had been diagnosed with behavioral and mental health problems during his childhood and had experienced periods of homelessness when he was not institutionalized in group homes and mental health facilities for lengthy periods of time. D, a social worker, who had reviewed the petitioner's records from those facilities, con- firmed substantial portions of his social history and testified about the probable adverse effects of his childhood and upbringing on his behavior as a young man. The habeas court analyzed the petitioner's claim under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668) for determin- ing whether a petitioner received ineffective assistance and rendered judgment denying the habeas petition. The court concluded that, although the performance of the petitioner's trial counsel at the sentenc- ing proceeding was so paltry as to be tantamount to having had no counsel at all, the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance before the sentence review division because he did not present evidence to show that the sentence review division would have rendered a decision more favorable to him than the thirty year reduction it ordered. The habeas court further concluded that it could not review or alter the sentence review division's determination because that body's decisions are final under the Sentence Review Act (§ 51-194 et seq.). The court thereafter granted the petitioner certification to appeal. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the state violated his due process right to a fair trial by presenting false or misleading testi- mony about its agreement with one of his alleged accomplices, H, to testify against him and by failing to disclose material evidence concern- ing the credibility of a police detective who led the investigation of the armed robbery and shooting: a. The record did not support the petitioner's claim that the state prom- ised H that his sentence would be reduced in exchange for his testimony, as the habeas court found that H never indicated that he had been promised any specific term of incarceration or number of years as a sentence reduction, which was disclosed through his testimony. b. Although the state failed to disclose the detective's personnel records, which indicated that he had a disciplinary record, there was no reason- able probability that the outcome of the petitioner's trial would have been different had those records been disclosed; in the present case, impeachment of the detective through the use of his disciplinary record would not have overcome the overwhelming evidence that supported the petitioner's conviction, which included H's testimony and a video recording that showed the petitioner committing the crime. 2. Although the habeas court correctly required the petitioner to prove under Strickland that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance, the judgment had to be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial in light of the court's erroneous determination that it was barred from reviewing or granting relief from the sentence review division's modification of the petitioner's sentence: a. This court rejected the assertion by the respondent Commissioner of Correction that the habeas court's judgment could be affirmed on the alternative ground that the petitioner failed to prove that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance at the sentencing proceeding: the respon- dent never presented to the habeas court his claim that, in the absence of expert testimony to establish that competent counsel would have presented the petitioner's mitigation evidence at the sentencing proceed- ing, the court improperly found that trial counsel's failure to present that evidence constituted deficient performance; moreover, the court's ruling was sufficiently supported by its findings that the petitioner's trial counsel presented almost no argument on his behalf at sentencing, relied almost exclusively on an incomplete presentence investigation report, and failed to investigate and present to the sentencing court any of the substantial mitigation information the petitioner had presented to the habeas court about his troubled background. b. The habeas court did not err in determining that the petitioner was required to prove under Strickland that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance, as the court correctly concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to a presumption of prejudice pursuant to United States v. Cronic (466 U.S. 648) and Davis v. Commissioner of Correction (319 Conn. 548): the performance of the petitioner's trial counsel did not constitute or result in a complete denial of representation necessary to invoke the Cronic presumption, as counsel alluded to por- tions of the presentence investigation report that mentioned mitigating facts about the petitioner's background, counsel argued that the peti- tioner had a conscience, which raised hope for his redemption, based on the petitioner's sometimes unsolicited cooperation with the police about criminal activity, and counsel attempted to help the petitioner preserve his claim of innocence by advising him not to offer his version of the events at issue during his interview for the presentence investiga- tion report. c. The habeas court erred in ruling that it was barred from reviewing or granting relief as to the deficient performance by the petitioner's trial counsel because of the statutorily mandated finality of the sentence review division's decision to modify the petitioner's sentence; in the present case, the habeas court had the authority under State v. Nardini (187 Conn. 109) to hear and decide the petitioner's constitutional chal- lenge to his modified sentence and to order a proper remedy for the violation of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, if such a violation were proved at the habeas trial, in the form of an order that his sentence be vacated and his case returned to the trial court for resentencing. d. This court was persuaded that the absence of the extensive information concerning the petitioner's troubled background and upbringing from the trial court record sufficiently undermined confidence in the sentence review division's determination that the thirty year reduction in the petitioner's sentence was sufficient to remedy the disproportionality of the original seventy-five year sentence: because trial counsel's deficient performance prevented the petitioner from presenting the mitigation evidence to the sentence review division, which is limited to reviewing challenged sentences for disproportionality solely on the basis of the record before the trial court, there was a reasonable probability that the sentence review division's order would have been more favorable to him if counsel's deficient performance had not deprived it of such mitigating information; accordingly, the habeas court's judgment denying the peti- tioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing had to be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. Argued March 2—officially released October 18, 2022

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-595), if a person fraudulently conceals the existence of a cause of action, that cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against such person when the person entitled to bring an action thereon first discovers its existence. The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a guilty plea, of various crimes in connection with his role in an armed robbery, filed a petition for a new trial, claiming that he was entitled to a new trial because several newly discovered letters written by an individual named ''Iris S.'' con- tained evidence establishing his innocence and that the respondents, a senior assistant state's attorney and the state of Connecticut, had possession of the letters and knowledge of their contents at the time of his guilty plea but purposefully failed to disclose them to him. The respondents asserted as a special defense that the petition was time barred because it was not filed within the applicable three year statute of limitations (§ 52-582). The petitioner filed an amended petition for a new trial claiming, inter alia, that the limitation period was tolled by § 52-595 as a result of the respondents' fraudulent concealment of the letters. Thereafter, the respondents filed a motion for summary judg- ment, arguing that there was no dispute between the parties that the petition was untimely under § 52-582 and that the petitioner's tolling claim failed as a matter of law because he had not adduced facts suffi- cient to permit a finding of fraudulent concealment. The trial court granted the motion and rendered summary judgment in favor of the respondents. In reaching its decision, the court, relying on Turner v. State (172 Conn. App. 352), and Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp. (207 Conn. 204), concluded that the limitation period set forth in § 52-582 is jurisdic- tional in nature and, therefore, not subject to the tolling provision of § 52-595. Thereafter, the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the tolling provision of § 52-595 applies to the three year limitation period of § 52-582, and, therefore, that limitation period may be tolled by proof of fraudulent concealment: this court concluded that the trial court's reliance on Turner and Fichera was misplaced, as the principal issue in this case, namely, whether the legislature intended that the limitation period of § 52-582 may be tolled by proof of fraudulent concealment pursuant to the tolling provision of § 52-595, was not addressed in Turner, and our Supreme Court's decision in Fichera had no bearing on that issue; moreover, given the plain and encompassing language of § 52-595, it must be deemed to apply to any limitation period that does not expressly disclaim its applicability, and, because § 52-582 contains no such disclaimer, its limitation period may be tolled upon a showing of fraudulent concealment pursuant to § 52- 595; furthermore, this court could discern no policy consideration that would prompt the legislature to deny the petitioner the benefit of that tolling provision and to conclude otherwise would be to impute to the legislature an intent to countenance such fraudulent concealment, a bizarre and wholly inequitable result that should not be attributed to that body. 2. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the alternative ground that the respondents were entitled to summary judgment because the petitioner failed to present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claim that the limitation period of § 52-582 was tolled by the respondents' fraudulent concealment of the letters: the petitioner inadequately briefed the issue of the sufficiency of his showing of fraudulent concealment, as he relied entirely on a patently meritless, if not frivolous, legal argument, the substance of which was set forth in two sentences, and, although he had a second opportunity to address the issue in a reply brief, he failed to do so; moreover, it was apparent that the evidence proffered by the petitioner in opposition to the respondents' motion for summary judgment, namely, the letters, was inadequate for that purpose, as the letters were not authenticated and, therefore, could not be relied on as probative evidence, the petitioner never identified the author of the letters with any particularity, there was nothing in the record to corrobo- rate the content of the letters, and there was no proof that the respon- dents received the letters or, if they did, that they concealed them from the petitioner for the purpose of preventing him from seeking a new trial. Argued February 9—officially released October 25, 2022

The plaintiff municipal water control authority sought to recover damages from the defendants, the state of Connecticut and M Co., a hotel franchi- sor, for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The plaintiff entered into a developer permit agreement with the state, which authorized the state to construct and install a new sanitary sewer main for a mixed-use development project in downtown Hartford. The state's subcontractors constructed the authorized sewer main along with a lateral sewer line that extended from the sewer main to a newly constructed hotel. Thir- teen years after the hotel opened, the plaintiff commenced this action, claiming that the hotel's connection to the sewer main was performed without a permit or an inspection by the plaintiff, that, as a result, the state remained liable for all maintenance and repairs of the sewer main, and that the state had failed to pay the plaintiff for such repairs. The trial court granted the state's motion to dismiss all counts against it on the ground of sovereign immunity. Prior to the filing of any responsive pleading by M Co., the plaintiff elected to exercise its administrative prerogative pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 7-249) to levy a special benefit assessment on the hotel property, which was in an amount equal to the amount of the damages that it sought in the pending civil action. Neither M Co. nor any entity associated with the ownership or manage- ment of the hotel property exercised or attempted to exercise its right to appeal the assessment. The assessment went unpaid, and the plaintiff filed a lien on the hotel's land records. Thereafter, M Co. filed a motion for summary judgment in the civil action, which the trial court granted, finding that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations (§ 52-576 (a)) and that the plaintiff had sued the wrong party, as M Co. did not own, manage or do business as the hotel, nor was it party to any written agreement involving the plaintiff. Following the trial court's judgment, the manager for the hotel sent a letter to the plaintiff asking it to release the sewer benefit assessment lien that it had filed against the hotel property in light of the court's decision. The plaintiff refused to release the lien, claiming that the lien did not have any relationship to the civil litigation. Thereafter, M Co. filed a postjudgment motion in the civil action, requesting that the trial court find the plaintiff in contempt and order the discharge of the lien. The trial court declined to hold the plaintiff in contempt but ordered the discharge of the lien, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court acted in excess of its authority and abused its discretion by ordering the discharge of the sewer benefit assessment lien: the plaintiff had the authority both to bring the action seeking compensatory damages on the theory of breach of contract and unjust enrichment and to levy the sewer benefit assessment against the hotel property pursuant to § 7- 249, those options were not mutually exclusive, and the relative merits of the civil action had no bearing on the validity of the plaintiff's decision to exercise its separate and distinct administrative authority to levy a sewer benefit assessment or on the validity of any resulting lien; more- over, the exclusive method to challenge the propriety of the sewer assessment lien was to file an appeal pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 7-250), and, because neither M Co. nor any other party associated with the hotel property ever filed such an appeal, the assessment became final and presumptively valid after the appeal period passed without a challenge to it and that assessment could not be collaterally challenged in the civil action; furthermore, the trial court's discharge of the sewer assessment lien could not be construed as a proper exercise of its inherent authority to issue orders necessary to protect or vindicate its prior judgment or of its authority pursuant to statute (§ 49-51) because allowing the plaintiff to file the lien and potentially foreclose on it would not undermine the trial court's final judgment, as the only final judgment it had rendered was summary judgment on the complaint, that judgment did not reach the merits of the causes of action alleged, and the lien existed prior to the summary judgment ruling, and the trial court abused its discretion by considering whether to discharge the lien pursuant to § 49-51 without making the required findings thereunder regarding the validity of the lien, as nothing in the court's decision suggested that the lien was jurisdictionally defective, not in proper form, or not duly recorded; additionally, there was no merit to M Co.'s arguments that either res judicata or judicial estoppel provided an alternative basis on which to affirm the judgment of the trial court. Argued March 9—officially released October 25, 2022

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his postjudgment motion to modify alimony and child support. At the time of dissolution, the dissolution court deviated from the child support guidelines and did not award child support to either party, concluding that it was in the best interests of the minor children and the parents that no child support be awarded. The defendant's motion for modification claimed that modification of the alimony and child support orders was warranted because the circumstances between the parties had changed substantially because the marital home had been sold, the parties were no longer cohabitating, and the parties' income and expenses had changed, and, additionally, that the parties' current circumstances warranted child support to be paid per the child support guidelines. Held: 1. The trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to modify the child support order solely on the basis that it did not find a substantial change in circumstances, that court having failed to address the defen- dant's additional and distinct claim as to whether the motion should be granted on the ground that the child support order substantially deviated from the child support guidelines in the absence of the requisite findings: in issuing its child support order, the dissolution court acknowledged that it was deviating from the child support guidelines but did not make an explicit finding that applying the presumptive amount as provided by the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate and, in the absence of a specific finding that a deviation was inequitable or inappro- priate, the child support order was continually subject to modification on the ground that it substantially deviated from the guidelines; in the present case, the court should have determined the presumptive amount, thereafter determined whether it would have been inequitable or inap- propriate to rely on that amount and, if so, explained which deviation criteria the court was relying on in order to justify its deviation; accord- ingly, the case was remanded for the purpose of holding a new hearing on the motion with respect to the modification of child support. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion to modify the alimony order, which was based on his claim that the court erred in concluding that he had not proven a substantial change in circumstances: the court, having found that, since the dissolution, the marital home had been sold, as had been anticipated by the court at the time of the dissolution, the parties' financial circum- stances had not significantly changed, and, although the parties' incomes had fluctuated since the dissolution, there had not been a substantial change in circumstances as contemplated by the applicable statute (§ 46b-86), properly concluded that the alleged change in circumstances did not warrant modification. Argued March 7—officially released October 25, 2022

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants, F and L, following their default on a promissory note secured by the mortgage. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability against the defendants and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. The trial court later vacated the summary judgment rendered against L only, as he was a nonap- pearing party. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for default against L for failure to plead. On L's appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure, this court affirmed the judgment and remanded the matter for the purpose of setting new law days. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to reset the law days. It later filed an updated affidavit of debt, a new appraisal of the property, and an affidavit of the appraiser, although it did not file an accompanying motion requesting that the trial court update the amount of the debt or the fair market value of the property. Following a short calendar proceeding on the motion, which the defendants did not attend as they were not provided with notice, the trial court issued an order reopening, modifying and reentering the judgment of strict foreclosure to increase both the amount of the debt and the fair market value of the property. It also set new law days. On F's appeal to this court, held that the trial court erred in rendering the subsequent judgment of strict foreclosure by making updated findings sua sponte and without providing the parties with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard: the plaintiff's motion sought only to reset the law days in accordance with this court's remand order, and the trial court exceeded the scope of that motion and the remand order by modifying the judgment to substitute updated fair market value and debt findings; moreover, F was not afforded due process in connection with the trial court's making of the updated findings because he was not notified that the court was considering modifying the judgment in such a manner; accordingly, this court remanded the case with direction to reinstate the original judgment and for the purpose of setting new law days. Argued October 4, 2021—officially released October 25, 2022

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to open and vacate a prior trial court's postjudgment modification of the plaintiff's alimony obligation. In 2017, the trial court modified the plaintiff's alimony obligation in accordance with a stipu- lated agreement the parties had filed with the court. The defendant did not file her motion to open until three years later, in 2020. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that she failed to prove that the plaintiff had fraudulently induced her to enter into the 2017 modification agreement and that the modification court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the agreement because, inter alia, the plaintiff mislabeled the motion to modify the alimony obligation and failed to pay the required filing fee. Held: 1. The defendant's contention that the modification court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider and modify the plaintiff's alimony obliga- tion was meritless; none of the purported defects in the motion to modify would have deprived the court of jurisdiction, and the defendant failed to provide any authority to support her jurisdictional claims. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to open and vacate the modification court's alimony order: the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiff fraudulently induced her to join his efforts to modify the alimony obligation, as the evidence showed that the parties negotiated the agreement with the advice of their counsel and that the defendant chose to sign the agreement despite her counsel's advice not to do so. 3. The defendant's claims that the modification court improperly failed to find the occurrence of a substantial change in the parties' circumstances and to conform its order to those changes was unavailing; because the plaintiff failed to file her motion to open or an appeal from the 2017 alimony modification within the twenty day appeal period, the claims she raised constituted an untimely and impermissible collateral attack on the actions of the modification court, as she could test only whether the court abused its discretion in denying her motion to open and vacate the alimony modification. Argued May 17—officially released October 25, 2022

The plaintiff grandmother appealed to this court from the order of the trial court denying her petition for visitation with her minor grandchildren brought pursuant to statute (§ 46b-59). The plaintiff, whose testimony was the only evidence presented at the hearing on the petition, claimed that she had had visitation with the children before the termination of the parental rights of the children's biological parents but that the defendants ended that visitation when they became the children's legal guardians. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the court improperly applied the factors set forth in § 46b-59 in determining that she did not have a parent-like relationship with the children and improperly emphasized the length of time since she had last seen them. Held that the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff's petition for visitation with the children, as it found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that she had a parent-like relationship with them: the court, which found the plaintiff's testimony not credible, determined that the plaintiff had seen the children once in four years and that her relationship with them had changed substantially from when it started in that she had had almost no contact with them since the defendants became their legal guardians; moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's assertions, the record supported the court's finding that the plaintiff had seen the children only once in four years, and it reasonably could be inferred from the court's decision that, pursuant to the factors in § 46b-59 (d), the court considered whether the plaintiff had had regular contact with and a close and substantial relationship with them; further- more, because the court found that no parent-like relationship with the children existed, it was not required to determine, as the plaintiff claimed, whether the denial of the visitation petition would result in real and significant harm to the children. Argued September 7—officially released October 25, 2022

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the respondent Commissioner of Correction had provided him with inadequate treat- ment for certain medical conditions that constituted deliberate indiffer- ence to his medical needs in violation of the eighth amendment to the United States constitution. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition and, thereafter, denied the petitioner certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion by denying his petition for certification to appeal, as the court expressly credited the testimony of the respondent's medical expert, who opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the petitioner had received adequate medical treatment, as well that of the petitioner's treating physician, in finding that the petitioner had received medically appropriate treatment, and this court, on appeal, would not second- guess those credibility determinations. Argued September 19—officially released October 25, 2022

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the defendant bank, rendered on remand from this court. On the plaintiff's previous appeal, this court had affirmed a judgment of strict foreclosure rendered in favor of the defendant and remanded the case solely for the purpose of setting new law days. On remand, the defendant filed a motion to reset the law days. The plaintiff objected, contending that the original judgment of strict foreclosure was based on a 2017 appraisal that did not consider a steep rise in Connecticut property values that had occurred since the trial court had rendered judgment. The plaintiff argued that the defendant should be required to file a motion to open the judgment and submit an updated appraisal and updated debt figures to allow the trial court to determine whether strict foreclosure or foreclosure by sale was appropriate. The trial court rejected the plaintiff's argument, reasoning that it was bound by the rescript of this court in in the previous appeal, Wahba v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (200 Conn. App. 852), to only set new law days. Held that the plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court, in rendering its subsequent judgment of strict foreclosure, erred in interpre- ting this court's remand order as prohibiting it from changing the nature of the judgment to a foreclosure by sale: the plaintiff's claim was fore- closed by Connecticut National Bank v. Zuckerman (31 Conn. App. 440), in which this court reasoned that, on remand from an appellate court, a trial court cannot deviate from the directions given by the appellate court; moreover, even if it is assumed that the trial court had the authority, following remand, to change the nature of the judgment to a foreclosure by sale, the plaintiff failed to file a motion to open the judgment for such purpose, nor did she preserve her claim by providing the trial court with an evidentiary foundation to support her argument, which amounted to little more than an unsupported statement of coun- sel. Argued September 21—officially released October 25, 2022

The plaintiff, T Co., sought to recover damages for, inter alia, environmental contamination to a parcel of land it owned, allegedly caused by hazard- ous materials from a drainpipe that extended onto the land from an adjacent parcel of property owned by the defendant M Co. The defen- dants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that T Co. could not meet its burden of production with respect to any of its causes of action and arguing that T Co.'s responses to certain discovery failed to provide them with clear and explicit details about the alleged contamina- tion of T Co.'s property. The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, a supporting memorandum of law, and several exhibits, including an affidavit from a licensed environmental professional who had conducted an environmental study of T Co.'s property. At the hearing on the motion, T Co. asserted that it had presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether hazardous material from M Co.'s property had contami- nated T Co.'s property. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, and T Co. appealed to this court. Held that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, this court having concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact, and the trial court's conclusions to the contrary were not legally and logically correct and were not supported by the record: to avoid summary judgment, T Co. was not required to prove its causes of action to the satisfaction of the trial court, and the defendants did not attempt to delineate or explain the substantive law governing any of T Co.'s com- mon-law or statutory claims, failing to set forth how the purported deficiencies in the evidentiary record necessarily established a lack of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to any particular element of any of the causes of action alleged in T Co.'s complaint; moreover, rather than demonstrating how they met the legal standard for granting a motion for summary judgment, the defendants' motion principally was founded on their argument that T Co. failed to answer certain interrogatories served on it, and, to the extent the court's granting of summary judgment focused too narrowly on this argument and thus could be construed as sanctioning T Co. for some perceived failure to comply with discovery, summary judgment was a wholly improper vehi- cle by which to do so; furthermore, even if the defendants met their initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, T Co. presented evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that demonstrated its entitlement to a trial, as a trier of fact might reasonably infer from the evidence presented that contaminants in T Co.'s soil came from the drainpipe attached to the defendants' building and that, given their exclusive control over the property, the defendants, either directly or through negligence, were responsible for allowing the contaminants to enter the drain. Argued April 11—officially released November 1, 2022

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for contempt. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated a provision of the parties' separation agreement, which had been incorporated into the judgment of dissolu- tion, requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff 50 percent of ''all awards'' that the defendant received from a workers' compensation proceeding that had been initiated when the defendant suffered a work- related injury during their marriage. Following the judgment of dissolu- tion, the defendant entered into a stipulation that resolved the workers' compensation proceeding. The defendant thereafter failed to pay the plaintiff 50 percent of the workers' compensation award, totaling approx- imately $250,000, which the defendant received pursuant to the stipula- tion. The defendant, however, used a portion of the workers' compensa- tion award to purchase a property in Kent. Having determined that the separation agreement clearly and unambiguously defined the term ''all awards'' to include the money the defendant received as part of the stipulation, the trial court granted the motion for contempt and ordered the defendant either to pay the plaintiff the money to which she was entitled or, as alternative relief, to transfer to the plaintiff the title to the Kent property. The defendant was ordered not to transfer, mortgage or in any way diminish the value of the Kent property prior to his full compliance with the court's contempt order. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for contempt, that court having correctly determined that the parties' separation agreement was unambiguous in that the phrase ''all awards'' properly included the defendant's compensation payment he received as a result of the stipulation: although the parties' settlement agreement did not define the phrase ''all awards,'' the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms clearly encompassed the defendant's $250,000 workers' compensation payment, the parties' use of the term ''all'' in the agreement indicated that their intention was that the plaintiff would be entitled to a portion of each and every workers' compensation payment, and the defendant's claim that the parties' did not contemplate dividing workers' compensa- tion awards intended for medical expenses was unavailing, as this inter- pretation had no basis in the plain language of the agreement insofar as the parties did not place any limitation as to which portions of a workers' compensation award the defendant must pay to the plaintiff, and there was no language in the agreement permitting the defendant to unilaterally withhold from his workers' compensation payment funds that were attributable to medical expenses; moreover, the distinction the defendant attempted to draw between an award issued by an adminis- trative law judge pursuant to statute (§ 31-300) and a voluntary agree- ment pursuant to statute (§ 31-296) was without any basis, as there was no reference to any statutory provisions in the separation agreement and, thus, no indication that the parties relied on the meaning of ''award,'' as that term is used in any statute. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the defen- dant wilfully violated the separation agreement, the record having suffi- ciently demonstrated that the defendant agreed to pay to the plaintiff 50 percent of all of his workers' compensation awards, but, upon receipt of his workers' compensation payment, he used the funds for his own purposes rather than complying with the separation agreement; in the present case, although the defendant claimed that his conduct was not wilful because he relied on the advice of his worker's compensation counsel, the trial court expressly found that it did not find the defendant's testimony credible, and this court would not reconsider on appeal the defendant's testimony at the contempt hearing, and, even if this court credited such testimony, his testimony failed to establish that he relied on counsel's advice or that counsel advised him not to pay any portion of the workers' compensation award to the plaintiff; furthermore, the defendant offered no explanation as to why he previously paid the plaintiff 50 percent of a workers' compensation award of $10,000, but failed to remit any of the $250,000 payment at issue. 3. The trial court did not improperly order alternative relief regarding the Kent property in granting the plaintiff's motion for contempt, as the ordered relief was a proper exercise of its remedial contempt authority to effectuate the terms of the judgment of dissolution: because the Kent property was purchased by the defendant postdissolution with the funds from the award and thus was not contemplated by the property provision of the separation agreement, the trial court had the authority to include the Kent property in its contempt orders as the plaintiff did not explicitly seek to modify the parties' property assignment but, instead, sought to enforce the practical effect of the original dissolution judgment; more- over, the evidence demonstrated that the defendant did not have the available liquid funds to pay the plaintiff, and, having transformed the funds from the workers' compensation award intended for the plaintiff into nonliquid assets, including the Kent property, the defendant forced the court to consider alternative remedies in order to protect the integrity and purpose of the settlement agreement, and the court left the defen- dant with the possibility that he can pay the plaintiff the money to which she is entitled instead of transferring the Kent property. Argued May 9—officially released November 1, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, a used car dealer, D Co., and one of its owners, E, for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The plaintiff claimed that E and G, D Co.'s other owner, agreed to retain her as an auctioneer for a classic car auction. She further claimed that, at a meeting with E and G, she agreed to provide substantial additional services to assist them in running their first such auction and, in return, they agreed to pay her 1 percent of the gross proceeds of the auction, with a minimum payment in the amount of $30,000. The plaintiff prepared a written agreement memorializing the agreed upon terms, told E that she had done so, and, at his instruction, left it on his desk. The agreement did not contain signature blocks, but it included a provision indicating that, unless rejected, it was to become effective ten days after receipt. Neither E nor G rejected the agreement or attempted to make any changes to it, and the plaintiff performed the services required of her thereunder. After D Co. failed to pay the plaintiff the contracted amount, she initiated the underlying action. At trial, E testified that the plaintiff was hired only to call the auction in exchange for a fee of $2500 plus expenses and claimed that he did not find the written agreement on his desk until several months after the auction was held. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on her breach of contract claim and for the defendants on the claim of unjust enrichment. On the defendants' appeal, this court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial solely on the plaintiff's breach of contract claim. On remand, following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and D Co. appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court's finding that the written agreement was an enforceable contract was not improper: a. The trial court properly found that D Co. assented to the written agreement by accepting the plaintiff's services thereunder and by failing to object to its terms: the trial court credited the plaintiff's testimony that she discussed with G and E the services that she would perform for the auction, that they agreed her fee would be 1 percent of the gross auction proceeds, with a minimum payment of $30,000, and that she delivered to E a copy of the agreement setting forth those terms; more- over, the trial court found that neither E nor G ever rejected the agree- ment or attempted to make any changes to it and that they instead accepted the plaintiff's services as outlined in the agreement; further- more, contrary to D Co.'s arguments, the trial court's findings did not depend on whether the parties discussed the specific terms of the agree- ment but, rather, on the parties' conduct after the plaintiff delivered the agreement, as evidenced by the plaintiff's testimony, numerous emails between the plaintiff and D Co.'s principals and employees, and the minutes from several weekly meetings held by D Co. in preparation for the auction; accordingly, there was evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that D Co. had assented to the written agreement. b. The doctrine of judicial estoppel was inapplicable to D Co.'s claim that the trial court should not have credited the plaintiff's allegedly perjurious testimony: although the plaintiff's responses to the trial court's questioning were equivocal on broad questions, this court disagreed with D Co.'s characterization of her testimony; moreover, D Co. alerted the trial court to the alleged inconsistencies, and, despite this, the trial court credited the plaintiff's testimony that the parties had agreed to the essential terms of the contract and that the plaintiff had memorialized those terms in the written agreement that she delivered to E, and this court declined to second-guess those credibility determinations. c. This court declined to review D Co.'s claim that the written agreement contained terms that were too ambiguous to meet the certainty require- ments of an enforceable contract because D Co. failed to raise such claim before the trial court: on appeal, D Co. claimed that the term ''gross auction proceeds'' as used in the agreement was ambiguous and that expert testimony was necessary for the court to resolve the ambigu- ity, however, although D Co.'s counsel had questioned the plaintiff at trial regarding her interpretation of the term, D Co. neither requested that the trial court make a determination as to whether the term was ambiguous nor advanced an alternative interpretation of the term and, instead, merely denied that it had agreed to that term in any sense. d. D Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court's finding that the plaintiff testified that she told E she had prepared the written agreement was a gross mischaracterization of the plaintiff's testimony and was clearly erroneous: the trial court's finding was supported by evidence in the record, namely, the plaintiff's testimony and the rational inferences drawn therefrom; moreover, that finding did not depend on whether the plaintiff used the word ''agreement'' to describe the docu- ment that she delivered to E but, rather, on her testimony that she delivered the document to E and told him that it reflected the parties' agreement. e. Contrary to D Co.'s claim, the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to D Co. to prove that it had not assented to the written agreement but, rather, properly applied the law: although D Co. purported to challenge the burden of proof applied by the trial court, its claim effectively challenged the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations, and the evidence presented was sufficient to support the court's finding that D Co. had assented to the agreement. f. D Co. could not prevail on its claim that, because the parties attached different meanings to the plaintiff's actions, there was a legal misunder- standing that precluded enforcement of the written agreement: the trial court found that D Co. had assented to the agreement on the basis of findings that this court held were supported by evidence in the record; moreover, the trial court determined that the plaintiff's version of the events was more credible than D Co.'s version, and this court would not second-guess such credibility determination. 2. D Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence on the issue of damages: to the extent that D Co. claimed that the trial court improperly admitted exhibit 57, a copy of the auction results as reported on the website that was used to hold the auction online, as inadmissible hearsay, this court declined to review the claim because it was not properly briefed and because D Co. failed to object to the admission of the exhibit on that ground at trial; moreover, the plaintiff's testimony with respect to exhibit 57 constituted a sufficient prima facie showing, pursuant to the applicable Connecticut rule of evidence (§ 9-1 (a)), to overcome D Co.'s challenge to its authenticity; furthermore, even if this court assumed, without deciding, that the admission of exhibit 5, a table prepared by the plaintiff that listed the cars sold at the auction and the prices for which they sold, was improper, that evidentiary ruling was harmless because D Co. failed to demonstrate that the exhibit's admission affected the result of the trial. Argued February 10—officially released November 1, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crime of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner had previously filed numerous habeas petitions that were either withdrawn or dismissed. The respon- dent Commissioner of Correction filed a motion pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (d)) for an order to show cause as to why the petitioner's habeas petition should not be dismissed as a result of undue delay. The petitioner did not dispute that the petition was untimely filed but claimed that he suffered from a mental illness that impaired his ability to file a habeas petition in a timely manner. The habeas court dismissed the petition for the petitioner's failure to demonstrate good cause to over- come the statutory presumption of unreasonable delay. On the petition- er's certified appeal to this court, held: 1. This court declined to reach the merits of the petitioner's claim that the habeas court erred in dismissing his petition because it included a claim of actual innocence, which, pursuant to § 52-470 (f), cannot be dismissed for failure to meet the statutory deadline of § 52-470 (d), that claim having been asserted for the first time on appeal: the habeas petition did not use the phrase ''actual innocence'' and, at the show cause hearing, because the petitioner did not assert a claim of actual innocence, the court did not address it, instead, addressing the reason for the delay on which the petitioner expressly relied, namely, claims of mental illness; accordingly, the petitioner's claim plainly reflected a strategic shift by him to raise a new argument on appeal, and it would amount to nothing more than an ambuscade of the habeas court for this court to consider a newly raised argument that was neither raised by the petitioner nor considered by that court at the time that the petitioner attempted to demonstrate that the petition should not be dismissed as untimely. 2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the habeas petition, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate good cause for an untimely filing pursuant to § 52-470 (e): the court found that the petitioner's testimony explaining his mental illness as the reason for the delay consisted of bare assertions that, without more, did not over- come the statutory presumption of unreasonable delay, and the record contained ample support for the court's conclusions, specifically, that, during the show cause hearing, the petitioner stated that his mental illness did not prevent from filing prior habeas petitions because he received assistance in filing the prior petitions; moreover, the court found that the petitioner's testimony, insofar as he testified that his mental illness or stress level was the reason for the delay in filing the petition, was not credible, and, as a reviewing court, this court must defer to the credibility findings of the habeas court based on its firsthand observation of a witness' conduct, demeanor, and attitude; furthermore, even if the habeas court had found that the petitioner credibly testified that he suffered from mental illness, it did not relieve the petitioner of his burden of demonstrating that his delay in filing the petition was attributable to his mental illness, which the petitioner failed to do. Argued May 9—officially released November 8, 2022

Convicted of several crimes in connection with his role in the robbery of a restaurant, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence of his identification by B, an employee of the restaurant, during a one-on- one showup procedure arranged by the police. The defendant and an accomplice, F, had forced the restaurant's employees at gunpoint to give them money from the restaurant's safe and cash registers before fleeing on foot across a heavily trafficked road. Within ten minutes after receiving the call regarding the armed robbery, the police apprehended F and detained him in the parking lot of a car dealership about 800 feet from the crime scene, where they had set up a staging area. While the police continued to search for the defendant, an officer drove B from the restaurant to the car dealership, which was well lighted, for a one- on-one showup identification during which she promptly identified F as one of the robbers. After the police apprehended the defendant a short time later, they drove B from the restaurant back to the staging area where, without hesitation, she identified the defendant less than ninety minutes after the robbery. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of B's identification of him, as the one-on-one showup identification procedure the police conducted was not unnecessarily suggestive in light of the exigencies of the situation: the police, who had found a gun in the restaurant, had no way of knowing whether other weapons were involved in the robbery, it was reasonable for the police to believe that the suspects remained armed and dangerous, which justified the need to act quickly, and the officers' belief that the safety of the public was at risk was confirmed when they apprehended F with an eight to nine inch knife on his person while the defendant was still at large; moreover, the showup identification was justified by the need to quickly confirm whether the defendant was the second perpetrator or whether the police needed to continue their search, and, even though there did not appear to be a risk that B would later become unavailable, the immediacy of her identification of the defendant ensured that she viewed him while her recollection was still fresh, and it was particularly important because the defendant wore a mask during the robbery and B had been able to see only his clothing, eyes, mouth and portions of his skin; furthermore, the police did not, as the defendant contended, conduct the showup in a suggestive place or stage it in a suggestive manner by returning B to the parking lot where she had identified F about thirty minutes earlier but, rather, took significant steps to minimize the inherent sugges- tiveness of a showup identification by transporting B to a neutral loca- tion, the car dealership, where the defendant was seated in an ambu- lance, rather than in a police car, during the identification procedure, the police did not indicate to B that the person she would be viewing was the person responsible for the crime, and the fact that the defendant was handcuffed during the showup did not render the identification procedure unnecessarily suggestive. Argued September 15—officially released November 8, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant city of New Britain and its animal control officer, D, for injuries she allegedly sus- tained as a result of the defendants' negligence. D had responded to reported dog attacks in January and June, 2016, involving two pit bulls that occurred at certain real property in New Britain. The plaintiff sus- tained injuries during a 2018 attack by the same pit bulls and, at the time, was a tenant at the property. The plaintiff alleged that D was negligent for, inter alia, failing to remove the pit bulls from the property, and alleged claims for indemnification and statutory negligence against the city. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that, based on the 2016 attacks, D knew or should have known that, as a tenant on the property, the plaintiff would have been attacked by the pit bulls. The court granted the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's amended complaint on the basis of governmental immunity, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. On appeal, the plaintiff did not dispute that governmental immunity applied to her claims against the defendants in light of the discretionary nature of D's alleged conduct but, instead, alleged that the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to govern- mental immunity applied. Held that the trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff's amended complaint was legally insufficient because she did not plead facts demonstrating that she was an identifiable victim for purposes of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity: that complaint did not contain allegations dem- onstrating that she was legally compelled to be at the property when the pit bulls attacked her or that her tenancy was required by law, rather, the only logical reading of the amended complaint was that her residence at the property was purely voluntary; moreover, the only identifiable class of foreseeable victims that our case law has recognized in connection with this exception to governmental immunity has been that of schoolchildren attending public schools during school hours, the plaintiff did not fall within that class, and this court declined to recognize any additional classes of individuals who may be identifiable victims beyond that demarcated limit. Argued October 3—officially released November 8, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant town, its mayor, H, its former tax assessor, F, and its counsel, B Co., for violations of the Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.) and for negligent inflic- tion of emotional distress and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) stemming from the defendants' alleged failure to comply with the Freedom of Information Act. The plaintiff sent a letter to F requesting the complete assessor's file for his property located in the town. Two days later, B Co. replied to the request on the town's behalf, indicating that it would review the request to determine whether any exemptions to production applied and noting that the town was committed to providing prompt access to all records subject to disclosure. The plaintiff replied, seeking clarification as to which part of his request might be subject to exemption. Prior to receiv- ing a response, he initiated this action. Approximately four months after receiving the initial request, B Co. provided the plaintiff with the requested records. Instead of withdrawing the action, the plaintiff then filed an amended complaint. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's claims of Freedom of Information Act violations because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint, setting forth the same claims as the first amended complaint. The trial court again granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the Freedom of Information Act claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Thereafter, the trial court granted the defendants' motions to strike the plaintiff's CUTPA and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, concluding that F's and H's activities were exempt from CUTPA pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 42-110c (a) (1)) and that the defendants were not engaged in trade or commerce under CUTPA. The plaintiff then filed a substituted complaint, alleging that F, H and B Co. were liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress and had violated CUTPA. The substituted com- plaint did not include any claims against the town. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to strike with prejudice as to all CUTPA claims. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a second substituted complaint asserting negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against all of the defen- dants, including the town. The trial court granted the defendants' motions to strike, determining that the plaintiff's claims failed because the defendants could not have reasonably foreseen that their behavior would cause emotional distress, and it rendered judgment for the defen- dants. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The plaintiff's allegations of CUTPA violations against the defendants in the first substituted complaint were insufficient: a. The trial court properly struck the CUTPA claims against F and H because the alleged conduct that served as the basis of those claims clearly fell within the scope of the exemption set forth in § 42-110c (a) (1): F's and H's conduct was authorized and regulated by state statute and regulations, as they were acting as representatives of the town at all times, F's role as tax assessor and H's role as mayor were governed by statute, and, in responding to the plaintiff's public records request, F and H were acting pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act; more- over, F's and H's decision to involve B Co. in their response to the plaintiff's request did not convert their authorized and regulated activity into activity outside the scope of the CUTPA exemption; furthermore, F and H were not engaged in trade or commerce within the meaning of § 42-110a (4) because the town's obligation to fulfill the records request served a purely governmental function and did not constitute trade or commerce. b. The trial court properly struck the CUTPA claims against B Co. because those claims did not involve the commercial or entrepreneurial aspect of the practice of law under Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital (243 Conn. 17) and, instead, were directed at the manner in which B Co. provided legal representation to the town. 2. The plaintiff failed to allege facts in his second substituted complaint that, if true, would have created a reasonably foreseeable risk of severe emotional distress and, therefore, the trial court properly struck the plaintiff's claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress: it was not reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would suffer severe emotional distress as a result of B Co. allegedly providing an insufficient response to the plaintiff's records request or as a result of F and H allegedly wrongfully incurring legal expenses at the expense of the town's taxpay- ers; moreover, this court has previously held that claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress based on allegations of misconduct dur- ing the course of litigation were insufficient because that misconduct did not create a reasonably foreseeable risk that a plaintiff would suffer severe emotional distress, and the trial court extended that reasoning to the defendants' allegedly unsatisfactory response to the plaintiff's public records request. 3. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court violated his right to due process by granting the motions to strike with prejudice instead of requiring the defendants to move for summary judgment was inadequately briefed and deemed to be abandoned, as the plaintiff failed to cite to any authority in support of his claim or to provide any meaningful analysis. Argued September 7—officially released November 15, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant bank for, inter alia, slander of title stemming from the bank's recording of a certificate of foreclosure on the land records relating to certain real property of which she was the record owner. The trial court granted the bank's motion to strike, concluding that count one, alleging slander of title, was insufficiently pleaded and that the other counts were time barred. The plaintiff subsequently filed a revised complaint, repleading her alle- gations of slander of title and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). The plaintiff appealed to this court from the order granting the motion to strike, which dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. The trial court thereafter granted the defendant's motion for judgment and rendered judgment thereon, concluding that the revised complaint did not include any new facts distinguishing the plaintiff's repleaded claims for slander of title and violations of CUTPA from the stricken ones. On the plaintiff's amended appeal, held that the plaintiff waived her right to appeal from the trial court's order striking the original complaint: the plaintiff's claim on appeal focused exclusively on alleged procedural infirmities in the motion to strike, alleging that it did not comply with Practice Book (2013) § 10-41 and was not directed to the operative complaint but did not claim that the revised complaint was materially different from the original complaint,, the repeated claims in the revised complaint were nearly identical to, and contained no materially different allegations in support of, those claims as set forth in the original complaint, and merely reiterating claims previously disposed of by the court did not constitute a material change; moreover, notwithstanding the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment because an automatic appellate stay was in effect, no enforceable appellate stay of execution resulted from the filing of a jurisdictionally infirm appeal. Argued October 5—officially released November 15, 2022

The defendants, coexecutors of the decedent's will and cotrustees of all trusts created under the will, appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered in their favor. The decedent left a will leaving the majority of his estate to a marital trust for his surviving spouse, with the residuary estate passing to a trust (residual trust) for the benefit of the plaintiffs, the decedent's two children. The residual trust was to be divided equally between two trusts, one for the benefit of each child. The terms of the separate trusts provided for mandatory distributions of trust principal when the primary beneficiary reached specific ages. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the defendants had improperly failed to fund the residual trust and to pay the required distributions pursuant to the trust terms and, in so doing, had breached their fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs as beneficiaries of the estate and of the residual trust, committed legal malpractice, and engaged in negligent misrepresenta- tion. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the com- plaint in its entirety, finding that, although the plaintiffs as beneficiaries of the residual trust had standing to sue the defendants in their capacities as both coexecutors and cotrustees, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the first and third claims because administration of the estate was not yet completed and, therefore, such claims were not ripe for adjudication, and the second claim, sounding in legal malprac- tice, failed because the plaintiffs were neither clients of the named defendant or his law firm nor intended third-party beneficiaries of such defendants' legal services. On appeal, the defendants argued that they were aggrieved by the trial court's determination that the plaintiffs had standing as beneficiaries of the residual trust to bring claims against the defendants for their actions as coexecutors of the estate and that the defendants could be collaterally estopped in a subsequent proceeding from challenging the plaintiffs' standing to sue the defendants as coexec- utors. Held that this court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the defendants were not aggrieved by the trial court's decision; in the present case, the defendants were granted the exact relief they sought—dismissal of the action in its entirety—and, because the trial court's determination regarding the plaintiffs' standing to bring counts one and three was dictum, it therefore could not have any preclu- sive effect in a later proceeding. Argued October 3—officially released November 15, 2022

The plaintiff, an entity that owned commercial real property, sought, inter alia, injunctive relief enjoining the defendants, various entities that owned or leased commercial property located to the south of the plain- tiff's property within the same city block, from interfering with the plaintiff's right to use a claimed easement area. The plaintiff acquired its real property in 1982, and the defendants, which were all owned or controlled by members of the same family, purchased their respective real properties between 1988 and 2014. Since the acquisition of its property, the plaintiff's members, employees, tenants, and invitees have used a twelve foot wide alleyway located between two of the properties owned by certain of the defendants and a portion of the paved area behind the defendants' properties to access its own gated parking lot. In 2015, the defendants erected a gate at the end of the alleyway that connected to the street and installed a chain barrier across the end of the alleyway that abutted the paved area. During the hours when the retail business that operated out of the defendants' properties was closed, the defendants locked the gate and put the chain barrier in place. After the defendants refused to provide the plaintiff with a key to the gate, the plaintiff commenced the present action, alleging, in its operative complaint, that it had a prescriptive easement over the alleyway and a portion of the paved area. The defendants asserted five special defenses to the plaintiff's complaint prior to its filing of the operative complaint. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, and the defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment. The trial court heard oral argument on the parties' cross motions. Thereafter, without seeking leave of the court, the defendants filed an answer to the plaintiff's operative complaint and filed amended special defenses, which reas- serted the five original special defenses and also asserted five new special defenses. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for sum- mary judgment and denied the defendants' cross motion for summary judgment. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judg- ment: a. To invoke the trial court's authority to grant the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff was obligated to address any special defenses to its operative complaint that the defendants had properly asserted in accordance with the rules of practice and, in moving for summary judgment, the plaintiff addressed only one of the defendants' five original special defenses: the trial court improperly adjudicated, sua sponte, the defendants' other four original special defenses that asserted waiver, estoppel, unclean hands, and laches; moreover, the plaintiff was not obligated to address the defendants' new special defenses and the trial court did not err in rejecting the same on procedural grounds because those defenses were not properly before the court, as the defen- dants did not file them until approximately three weeks after the date of oral argument on the parties' motions for summary judgment, which was beyond the filing period prescribed by the applicable rule of practice (§ 10-61), and they did so without obtaining the trial court's permission. b. The defendants' claim that the trial court improperly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the plaintiff's prescrip- tive easement claim was unavailing: the trial court properly rejected the relevant portion of the affidavit submitted in connection with the defendants' cross motion for summary judgment by M, one of the family members who controlled the defendants, because it did not constitute competent evidence pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 17- 46), as M's averments regarding the frequency with which the plaintiff used the alleyway were conclusory rather than factual, in that they lacked any indication of the regularity and frequency of M's observations of the vehicular traffic in the alleyway and over the paved area and evidenced his limited familiarity with the plaintiff and his inability to recognize vehicles driven by any of the plaintiff's owners, employees, clients or tenants, other than two individuals; moreover, the trial court did not err in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact that the plaintiff's use of the alleyway was under a claim of right because the plaintiff's failure to respond to occasional closures of the alleyway during the prescriptive period did not, on its own, imply that the plaintiff recog- nized a superior right of the defendants to the alleyway and the defen- dants' evidence that the parties were friendly with one another and shared parking spaces under certain circumstances was too speculative to infer implied permission on behalf of the defendants, as those facts were disconnected from the plaintiff's use of the alleyway; furthermore, the trial court did not err in concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's use of the claimed easement area was distinguishable from the public's use of that area, and, by comparing the use of both the alleyway and the paved area, the court conducted the correct analysis in making that determination because the plaintiff alleged in its operative complaint that it had acquired a prescriptive easement over both the alleyway and a portion of the paved area, and the defendants' special defense that asserted that the trial court should have considered only the use of the alleyway was procedurally improper because it was raised in the pleading that was filed in violation of Practice Book § 10-61. 2. The defendants' claim that the trial court improperly denied their cross motion for summary judgment was unavailing: the defendants' claim that the plaintiff could not seek to establish both deeded and prescriptive easements was not properly before the trial court because the defendants did not include such claim in their summary judgment submissions and, instead, asserted it for the first time at oral argument on the parties' motions for summary judgment and reasserted it in the pleading that the trial court deemed was procedurally improper pursuant to Practice Book § 10-61; moreover, because the defendants did not challenge on appeal the trial court's rejection of the claim on procedural grounds, this court did not reach the merits of the claim; furthermore, even if this court assumed that the defendants had properly raised the claim before the trial court, it would still fail because the plaintiff abandoned its deeded easement claims by withdrawing those counts from its com- plaint and by filing its operative complaint, which alleged only a prescrip- tive easement over the claimed easement area. Argued September 9, 2021—officially released November 22, 2022

The petitioner, a citizen of the United Kingdom who had been convicted of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his constitutional rights to procedural due process and equal protection were violated when the respondent Commissioner of Correction assigned a certain risk level to him, classified him as a public safety risk and limited his access to certain prison rehabilitative programs and other services. The habeas court dismissed the petition, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner's claims. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court properly dismissed the habeas petition with respect to the petitioner's procedural due process claim, the petitioner having failed to sufficiently allege, under the stigma plus test, a cognizable liberty interest over which the court had subject matter jurisdiction; contrary to the petitioner's contention that being assigned a certain risk level and classified as a public safety risk satisfied the stigma portion of the stigma plus test, he failed to sufficiently allege facts that, if taken as true, established stigma, as it appeared that the respondent was mindful that the petitioner was a British citizen subject to deportation upon completion of his sentence, and it was likely that his conviction of murder itself was the source of any stigma of being a public safety risk. 2. The habeas court improperly dismissed the petitioner's equal protection claim, in which he sufficiently alleged that he was treated differently from similarly situated prisoners because of his alienage and British citizenship; in the present case, because the habeas petition alleged that the respondent denied the petitioner access to rehabilitative programs and other services that were available to inmates who are United States citizens, the petitioner sufficiently alleged a cognizable violation of his right to equal protection, and, as alienage and national origin are suspect classifications, he sufficiently pleaded that the applicable statutes (§§ 18- 81w, 18-81x and 18-81z), as applied, burdened a suspect class of persons, notwithstanding the respondent's narrow interpretation of the habeas petition as asserting a class of one claim. 3. The habeas court improperly dismissed the petitioner's claim that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment as a result of the respondent's management of the COVID-19 virus at the correctional facility in which the petitioner was incarcerated; the petitioner sufficiently pleaded that the COVID-19 virus and the conditions of his confinement put his life at risk because of his preexisting medical conditions and that the respon- dent was deliberately indifferent to and disregarded that risk because social distancing and the use of personal protective equipment were not enforced among inmates or prison staff. Argued May 10—officially released November 22, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted of manslaughter in the second degree and evading responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that certain changes to a risk reduction earned credit program had been improperly applied to him by the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction. The habeas court, sua sponte and without providing the petitioner with prior notice or an opportunity to be heard, dismissed the petitioner's amended peti- tion pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 23-29), concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that petition and that the amended petition failed to state a claim on which habeas corpus relief could be granted. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed from the habeas court's judgment to this court. Held that, in light of our Supreme Court's recent decisions in Brown v. Commissioner of Correc- tion (345 Conn. 1), and Boria v. Commissioner of Correction (345 Conn. 39), this court concluded that, although the habeas court was not obligated to conduct a hearing before dismissing the amended petition, it was required to provide to the petitioner prior notice of its intention to dismiss, on its own motion, the amended petition and an opportunity to submit a brief or a written response addressing the proposed basis for dismissal, which it did not do; accordingly, on remand, should the habeas court again elect to exercise its discretion to dismiss the amended petition, or any subsequent amended petition properly filed by the peti- tioner, on its own motion pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29, the court must comply with Brown and Boria by providing the petitioner with prior notice and an opportunity to submit a brief or written response addressing the proposed basis for dismissal. Argued September 19—officially released November 22, 2022

Pursuant to statute (§ 46b-37 (b) (3)), it is the joint duty of each spouse to support his or her family, and both shall be liable for ''the rental of any dwelling unit actually occupied by the husband and wife as a resi- dence . . . .'' The plaintiff landlord, L, sought, inter alia, damages for back rent and use and occupancy in connection with a residential property he leased to the defendants, R and A, who were husband and wife. Although the lease listed both R and A as tenants and both R and A resided at the property, only R signed the lease. L's complaint sounded in breach of contract as to R and alleged that A was liable pursuant to § 46b-37 (b) (3) because she and R were married and used the premises as their primary residence. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of L as against R, in accordance with a stipulation entered into by L and R. The court did not find A liable for back rent or use and occupancy because A had not signed the lease agreement and, although it considered L's arguments regarding § 46b-37 (b) (3), it did not adopt L's interpretation of that statute. On L's appeal to this court, held that the trial court erred in failing to impose joint and several spousal liability as to A pursuant to § 46b-37 (b) (3); the language of that statute unambiguously provides that both spouses shall be liable for the rental of any dwelling unit actually occupied by a husband and wife as a residence, and here, in light of R's liability for back rent and use and occupancy, A was also liable for back rent and use and occupancy, as the defendants' argument that a spouse cannot be liable to a third party under the statute for rent owed when the spouse is not a signatory to the leasehold agreement was contrary to the plain language of § 46b-37 (b) (3) and analogous appellate precedent interpreting other subdivisions of § 46b-37 (b) vis- à-vis third-party claims for payment. Argued September 19—officially released November 22, 2022

The plaintiff employer, the city of Waterbury, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its appeal from the decision of the Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division (board), which affirmed the determination by an appeals referee that the defendant claimant was entitled to certain unemployment compensation benefits. The claimant, who had been a firefighter for the plaintiff, was discharged from his employment after testing positive for marijuana in a random drug test. The plaintiff alleged that the positive drug test was in violation of a ''last chance agreement'' that the claimant had previously made with the plaintiff and the claimant's union and other employer policies. The plaintiff contested the claimant's claim for unemployment benefits, asserting that the claimant had been discharged for wilful misconduct under the applicable statute (§ 31-236 (a) (2) (B)). The appeals referee determined that the claimant was a qualifying patient and had been using palliative marijuana prescribed by a physician for post-traumatic stress disorder in accordance with a provision (§ 21a- 408p) of the Palliative Use of Marijuana Act (§ 21a-408 et seq.), and that the plaintiff had failed to allege that the claimant was discharged because he was impaired on the job, in possession of marijuana at work, or selling or trading drugs. The referee further determined that the claimant was not discharged for wilful misconduct because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the claimant was discharged because he had been disqualified under state or federal law from performing the work for which he was hired as a result of a drug or alcohol testing program mandated by and conducted in accordance with such law. The board affirmed the appeals referee's findings, reasoning that, to the extent the last chance agreement contained a blanket prohibition against the use of palliative marijuana, without specific consideration of the claimant's fitness for duty, the agreement was unreasonable as of the date of the claimant's discharge based on the protections of § 21a-408p (b) (3), which provides that an employer cannot discharge a person solely on the basis of his status as a qualifying patient under the act. The board further concluded that the physician's prescribing palliative marijuana for the claimant's medical condition constituted good cause or a mitigat- ing circumstance for the claimant's violation of the last chance agreement, which prevented the board from finding that he committed wilful misconduct. The plaintiff appealed the board's decision to the trial court, which, having found that the claimant fell under the protections of § 21a-408p (b) (3), granted the motion for judgment of dismissal filed by the named defendant, the Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act. Held that contrary to the plaintiff's claim, because the legality of the claimant's discharge was not at issue and the issue before the board was whether the claimant's violation of the last chance agreement constituted wilful misconduct that disqualified him from receiving unemployment benefits, § 21a-408p (b) (3) was relevant to the reasonableness of the last chance agreement, on which the plaintiff based its claim that the claimant was discharged for wilful misconduct, and, therefore, the board properly considered it in the resolution of this case; moreover, because it was undisputed that the claimant was a qualifying patient entitled to protection under § 21a-408p (b) (3), the claimant was likewise entitled to protection against employment penal- ties resulting from his legal, off-duty use of medical marijuana; further- more, the board reasonably concluded that, insofar as the last chance agreement operated to allow the plaintiff to terminate the claimant's employment for his palliative use of marijuana, it was unreasonable, and the unreasonable application of the last chance agreement to the claimant's palliative marijuana use foreclosed the possibility that the claimant's employment was terminated for wilful misconduct. Argued September 7—officially released November 29, 2022

The plaintiff sought, inter alia, specific performance of an option to purchase certain real property that it had been leasing from the defendant and to recover damages for unjust enrichment. The option to purchase clause was contained in the parties' commercial lease agreement. After the plaintiff filed its complaint, the court granted multiple continuances while the parties engaged in settlement negotiations, during which time the parties entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the property. Thereafter, the defendant filed an answer and special defense, namely, that the purchase and sale agreement superseded the option to purchase in the lease agreement and rendered the action moot. Eight days prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the action, reiterating the mootness argument made in its special defense. Specifically, the defendant argued that the action was moot because it sought the interpretation and enforcement of a lease option that was no longer in effect, depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that the purchase and sale agreement was an execu- tory accord, which was executed as part of the parties' efforts to settle the underlying litigation and which was intended to have no legal effect unless and until the sale actually occurred. Following a hearing, which was limited to the arguments of counsel, the court granted the defend- ant's motion to dismiss, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdic- tion because, although the allegations in the complaint contemplated an action under the option to purchase clause of the lease agreement, the purchase and sale agreement was the controlling contract for the sale of the property. From the judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss as that court improperly determined that the defendant's motion to dismiss, which was premised on the argument that the purchase option had been superseded and rendered inoperative by the terms of the purchase and sale agreement, implicated mootness and, therefore, subject matter juris- diction: the defendant's argument was best construed as a legal defense to the plaintiff's allegations, as the defendant itself recognized when it filed its answer, the defendant, as the party raising the special defense, had the burden of proving the facts alleged therein, namely, the existence of the purchase and sale agreement and its implications relative to the merits of the underlying action when it filed its special defense, and the trial court, by adjudicating the special defense by way of a motion to dismiss, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff; moreover, in its motion to dismiss, the defendant was making a factual and legal argument regarding a change in circumstances that occurred after the plaintiff filed its complaint, premised on the parties' intent in executing the purchase and sale agreement, as to why the plaintiff could not succeed on the merits of its complaint, when the proper inquiry with regard to mootness was whether that change would prevent the court from granting any and all practical relief, regardless of the likelihood that the proponent is able to prevail on the merits; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. 2. Even if this court were to conclude that the defendant's motion to dismiss implicated mootness and the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before granting the motion: although it is within the trial court's discretion to choose when to address jurisdictional issues, be it at the time they arise, after discovery or after a full trial on the merits, it is often prudent to defer action on a motion to dismiss raising issues that are interrelated or inextricably intertwined with the merits of a dispute, particularly in cases involving the motives and purposes of contracting parties; in the present case, the trial court acknowledged that the issues raised in the complaint were intertwined with and dependent on the interpretation of the purchase agreement and the intent of the parties, as expressed in their agreements, the court had already scheduled the trial when the motion to dismiss was filed and had the discretion to postpone consideration of the mootness issue until after the trial was complete, and, having decided to resolve factual disputes at the motion stage, in particular with regard to the parties' intent and how the pur- chase and sale agreement should be construed in the context of the ongoing settlement negotiations of the parties, the court was obligated, at the very least, to hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to the disputed jurisdictional facts. 3. The trial court improperly determined that the parties' execution of the purchase and sale agreement rendered the underlying action moot in its entirety: even assuming that the defendant's motion to dismiss impli- cated mootness and that the lease option no longer had an operative legal effect with regard to the parties' sale of the property, such a determination would have no bearing on the allegations that the defend- ant was unjustly enriched by the plaintiff's continuing to honor its obliga- tions under the lease, including by continuing to pay rent, even though it did not include any provision requiring the plaintiff to do so; moreover, the court failed to discuss the unjust enrichment allegations and whether it could provide the plaintiff with practical relief even if the purchase and sale agreement superseded the lease agreement, and, at a minimum, it should have denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the unjust enrichment claim. Argued September 14—officially released November 29, 2022

The plaintiff public affairs firm sought to recover damages from the defend- ant quasi-public agency for violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). The defendant, an entity responsible for providing waste and recycling services to various munici- palities pursuant to statute (§ 22a-257), requested proposals for the provi- sion of municipal government liaison services. The plaintiff submitted a proposal that complied with the request, but the defendant awarded the liaison services contract to a law firm, whose proposal was non- compliant. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the award of the contract to the law firm without a legitimate public bidding process violated CUTPA. The defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint, arguing that it was exempt from CUTPA pursuant to the provision (§ 42-110c (a) (1)) that exempts from liability ''[t]ransactions or actions otherwise permitted under law as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the state or of the United States . . . .'' The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court did not err in granting the motion to strike; the bidding process the defendant engaged in before entering into the contract was expressly authorized and regulated by statute and its conduct throughout that process was subject to pervasive state regulation, which exempts the defendant from CUTPA liability pursuant to the governmental exemption, § 42-110c (a) (1). Argued September 15—officially released November 29, 2022

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff and making certain financial orders and denying her motion for contempt. Before trial, the parties had entered into a stipulation in which the plaintiff agreed to make mortgage payments on the marital home. The trial court denied the defendant's subsequent motion for contempt, in which she alleged that the plaintiff failed to pay past due mortgage payments, on the ground that his failure to pay the mortgage was not wilful. Each party was employed at the time of trial and had a pension associated with that employment. The parties were unable to agree on a professional evalua- tor to value the pensions and, at trial, neither party presented testimony from an actuary as to the value of the pensions. The court awarded the defendant the marital home, ordered that the plaintiff transfer 75 percent of his 457 (b) retirement plan to the defendant, and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant periodic alimony in the amount of $250 per week for two years, to support the defendant while she refinanced the mort- gage on the marital home. The court ordered that each party would retain sole ownership of his or her pension. Held: 1. The trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff was not in contempt for failing to comply with a pendente lite order: the court did not find that the plaintiff was in wilful noncompliance of its order that he make certain mortgage payments, which the defendant, as the party seeking the order of contempt, had the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence; in the present case, even though the court found that the plaintiff was late in making certain mortgage payments, it did not find that the plaintiff failed to make his best effort to make timely payments in violation of its order or that any such violation was wilful, and, because the court determined that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of contempt, the burden of production did not shift to the plaintiff to provide evidence in support of a defense of inability to comply with the court's order. 2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court's periodic alimony award was an abuse of its discretion: the court's award of time limited alimony was for a permitted purpose in that it provided interim support to the defendant until she was able to either refinance the mortgage or to list the marital home for sale, and the two year duration of the award was not arbitrary because it was connected to the court's order to refinance the mortgage in that time frame and was consistent with the defendant's proposed orders in which she specifically requested a two year time period to pursue refinancing; moreover, the court did not fail to consider the factors set forth in the applicable statute (§ 46b- 82), including the parties' needs, sources of income and employment, as the court explicitly stated that it had considered the statutory criteria for its award, and the record reflected that the court considered the plaintiff's ability to earn income from overtime and extra duty pay because such income was reflected on his financial affidavit, which the court specifically referenced in its memorandum of decision in its assessment of the plaintiff's income. 3. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court did not improperly fail to value the parties' pensions and equalize their distribution: the court did not remove the parties' pensions from the scales in determining an equitable division of the parties' property but, instead, stated that both parties were entitled to a pension on retirement and that it took that into consideration in fashioning its financial orders, and the defendant could not assert that the court improperly failed to value the parties' pensions given the scant evidence presented by the parties; moreover, the court was not required to ''equalize'' the pensions pursuant to the present division method and to distribute 50 percent of each pension to the parties, as the court is not required to distribute the pensions equally, or at all, for its order to be equitable, and this court could not conclude that the court's order declining to award the defendant a portion of the plaintiff's pension was inequitable in light of the totality of the court's financial awards. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award the defendant attorney's fees: the defendant did not demonstrate how the court's failure to award her attorney's fees undermined the court's other financial orders because, when the court's orders are viewed as a whole, the court reasonably could have concluded that the defendant had suffi- cient funds to pay her attorney's fees without any risk of undermining the efficacy of the court's other financial orders, because, in addition to being awarded periodic alimony and a portion of the plaintiff's 457 (b) plan, the defendant continued to receive income from her employ- ment and her financial affidavit indicated that she had money in checking and savings accounts. Argued March 2—officially released December 6, 2022

The plaintiff landlord sought, by way of summary process, to regain posses- sion of certain residential property that was occupied by the defendant tenant. The plaintiff and the defendant were parties to a written, one year lease that commenced on March 1, 2021. The defendant paid her rent in full until June, 2021, when she paid only a partial amount. She included with her partial payment an explanation that she had deducted the cost of recent air conditioning repairs from her rent payment. Both parties agreed that it was the plaintiff's obligation to repair the air conditioning if it was not working. The defendant acknowledged that she did not contact the plaintiff to request the repair but explained that she chose to proceed as she did because she was uncomfortable contacting the plaintiff in light of a civil protective order that she had obtained against the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently served the defendant with a notice to quit on July 21, 2021, with a quit date of August 21, 2021. The notice to quit included a use and occupancy disclaimer that stated that payments tendered after the quit date would be accepted for use and occupancy only and not for rent. The plaintiff subsequently commenced the summary process action on September 1, 2021, alleging that the plaintiff had failed to pay rent due on June 1, 2021. The defendant filed an answer that raised several special defenses, including, inter alia, that all rent had been paid to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision, in which it found that the defendant tendered monthly payments from July through September, 2021, on time and in full; that each check had ''rent'' written in the memo field; and that, although the plaintiff did not immediately deposit the checks for July, August, and September, the plaintiff eventually deposited them into his account. The court further found that, although the plaintiff did not accept the subsequent rent payments until after the quit date, the plaintiff's acceptance of rent payments tendered after service of the notice to quit but prior to the quit date reinstated the tenancy. The court subsequently dismissed the plaintiff's summary process action, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the defendant's tenancy was reinstated, not- withstanding the use and occupancy disclaimer, the plaintiff having failed to provide this court with an adequate record to resolve the factual dispute: the trial transcript was necessary to properly evaluate on appeal whether the evidence presented to the trial court supported that court's factual conclusions, it was the responsibility of the plaintiff as the appel- lant to provide this court with an adequate record for review, and the plaintiff failed to provide this court with a transcript of the summary process trial, leaving this court with an inadequate record upon which to determine whether the trial court's ruling on this claim was clearly erroneous. 2. This court declined to review the plaintiff's unpreserved claim that the governor's executive orders promulgated during the COVID-19 pandemic altered the required analysis of the case: this court was not bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial, and, in any event, the existence of the executive orders did not transform the factual question of the plaintiff's intentions when he accepted the additional payments from the defendant into a legal question; moreover, the plaintiff's failure to provide the court with a transcript of the summary process trial left the court with an inadequate record upon which to review the claim. 3. This court declined the plaintiff's request to adjudicate the merits of the defendant's special defenses: the trial court never reached the special defenses because it found that the plaintiff's acceptance of rent for the months of July, August, and September reinstated the defendant's tenancy and, therefore, having made that finding, the trial court did not need to address the special defenses, and, as a result, there was nothing for this court to review on appeal. Argued May 17—officially released December 6, 2022

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his constitutional rights had been violated by the failure of the respondent, the Commis- sioner of Correction, to provide him with proper medical care and with direct facility transport to medical appointments. Following a trial, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner was not entitled to appellate review of his claim that the habeas court improperly denied his amended petition, as he failed to brief the threshold issue of whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certifica- tion to appeal. Argued November 14—officially released December 6, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a request, pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (c) and (e)), for an order to show cause as to why the petitioner should be permitted to proceed despite her delay in filing her petition. The petitioner filed an objection to the request for an order to show cause in which she admitted that she filed an untimely petition. She alleged, however, that certain factors, including her age, mental illness, her inability to understand postconviction pro- ceedings and her reliance on the assistance of others, impacted the timely filing of her petition. Following a hearing at which the petitioner failed to present any witnesses or offer any exhibits, the habeas court dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that it was untimely. Thereafter, the court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal following its determination that she had failed to demonstrate good cause to overcome the statutory presumption of unreasonable delay in filing her petition; in the present case, in which she was required to provide some evidence of the reason for the delay, the petitioner failed to provide the habeas court with any information connecting her age, mental illness, lack of knowledge or reliance on others with her failure to timely file her habeas petition and, although she was provided with a meaningful opportunity to rebut the statutory presumption at the show cause hearing, habeas counsel chose not to present witnesses or offer exhibits. Argued September 20—officially released December 6, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, to burglary in the first degree and criminal violation of a protective order, sought a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court, on its own motion and without providing the petitioner with prior notice or an opportunity to be heard, dismissed the petitioner's amended petition pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 23-29), concluding that the petitioner's guilty plea waived any alleged constitutional defects not involving the court's jurisdiction and that the complaint attacked only issues that were outside the juris- diction of the habeas court. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal: in light of our Supreme Court's recent decisions in Brown v. Commissioner of Correction (345 Conn. 1), and Boria v. Commissioner of Correction (345 Conn. 39), the issue raised in the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal concerning the right to notice and a right to be heard prior to a dismissal under Practice Book § 23-29 was debatable among jurists of reason, a court could resolve the issue in a different manner, and the issue deserved encouragement to proceed further. 2. This court concluded that, although the habeas court was not required to hold a full hearing, the petitioner was entitled to notice of that court's intention to dismiss and an opportunity to file a brief or a written response concerning the proposed basis for dismissal, which it did not do; accordingly, on remand, should the habeas court consider dismissal of the amended petition, or any subsequent amended petition properly filed by the petitioner, on its own motion pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29, the court must comply with the procedure set forth in Brown and Boria by providing the petitioner with prior notice and an opportunity to submit a brief or written response addressing the proposed basis for dismissal. Argued January 13, 2021—officially released December 13, 2022

The self-represented plaintiff, a pediatric dentist, sought to recover damages for, inter alia, defamation and intentional misrepresentation in connec- tion with two articles published by the defendant. The articles concerned the plaintiff's disciplinary proceedings before the Connecticut State Den- tal Commission (commission) that stemmed from a complaint about his treatment of a three year old child. A reporter employed by the defendant contacted the plaintiff after he learned of a similar complaint against another dentist at the plaintiff's dental practice. The reporter left the plaintiff a voicemail, in which he asked for an interview. The parties disputed whether the reporter informed the plaintiff in that voicemail or in subsequent conversations that he would be the subject of the published articles. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts of the plaintiff's complaint, arguing, inter alia, that it was protected from liability for defamation under the fair report privilege and substantial truth doctrine and that the plaintiff's intentional misrepresentation claim was legally insufficient. In his objection to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff pointed to specific state- ments in the articles to which he objected, including the headline of the first article, and argued that the recorded voicemail from the reporter provided sufficient evidence to support his claim of misrepresentation. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, con- cluding that the alleged defamatory statements were protected under either the fair report privilege, which protects the publication of a report of an official action or proceeding that deals with a matter of public concern if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of the proceeding, or the substantial truth doctrine. Moreover, on the basis of an email exchange between the reporter and a senior editor employed by the defendant, which indicated that the original draft of at least one of the articles had referenced the second dentist, the court held that, because the reporter's affirmative representation was true, the reporter had no duty to tell the plaintiff he would be the subject of the defendant's article, and the plaintiff had no legal right to interfere with the defen- dant's publication of a story about him, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's intentional misrepresentation claim. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's defamation claims on the basis that the fair report privilege protected the defendant from liability: a. The trial court properly found that the statement in one of the defen- dant's articles that the Department of Public Health had been investigat- ing the plaintiff for two years was protected by the fair report privilege, as it was a fair and accurate abridgement of the underlying proceedings; moreover, if describing the proceedings before the commission as an ''investigation'' strayed from the truth of the matter, it did so only slightly and well within the leeway afforded to reporters of official matters of public concern. b. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the defendant abused the fair report privilege because the headline of one article used the word ''children'' rather than the word ''child'' and conveyed a message that the state's inquiry extended beyond the three year old child: the headline was accurate overall and any imprecision therein was amelio- rated by the accuracy of the article's abridgement of the proceedings, which clearly indicated that the case involved only one child. c. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's use of a specific statistic from another state agency in one of the articles was an abuse of the fair report privilege: the trial court determined that the fair report privilege did not apply to that statement, and, instead, that it was exempt from liability for defamation because that statistic was substantially true; moreover, the plaintiff failed to sufficiently brief his argument that the statistic was not substantially true. 2. The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the claim of intentional misrepresentation: contrary to the plaintiff's claim, the trial court did not choose between competing interpretations of fact, rather, the reporter's statement that he was working on an article about another dentist was apparently true, thus defeating any claim of intentional misrepresentation. Argued September 12—officially released December 13, 2022

The plaintiff brought an action alleging, inter alia, discrimination on the basis of race against the defendant. After the defendant was defaulted for failure to plead, it filed an answer to the plaintiff's complaint and a motion to set aside the default, which the trial court granted. The defen- dant then filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the basis that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to bring the action within the ninety day statutory (§ 46a-101 (e)) time limitation after receiving a release of jurisdiction from the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission). The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of the plaintiff's untimely filing. Following oral argument on the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, the court denied the request to reconsider its decision and reverse its ruling on the motion to dismiss. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to set aside the default: the court found that the defendant's claim that it had made a mistake in understanding the timing of its response was valid and further observed that the defendant had filed an answer by the time it was considering the motion; moreover, the plaintiff did not claim, either before the trial court or this court, that he suffered any prejudice; furthermore, the record reflected that this was the defendant's first request to open a default and that the duration between the time when the default entered and when the defendant filed its answer was only seventeen days. 2. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to commence the action within the ninety day time limitation set forth in § 46a-101 (e): it was improper for this court to review the plaintiff's claims when he had not properly raised them before the trial court and that court did not decide the issues; moreover, although the defendant argued in its brief to this court that these new claims by the plaintiff were not preserved, the plaintiff failed to address the defendant's argument, as he declined to file a reply brief and waived his right to oral argument. Argued September 20—officially released December 13, 2022

The self-represented plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her action seeking to enjoin the defendant city of Norwich from proceeding with a tax foreclosure sale of certain real property she owned until the state lifted its COVID-19 restrictions. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that an auction of the property while COVID-19 restrictions imposed by the state were in effect would bring a lower sale price than would an auction when the COVID-19 restrictions were not in place and, thus, result in an unconstitutional taking of her property. At the hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court was informed that the property had been sold and that the foreclo- sure court had approved the sale. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff's case was moot and that the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Subsequent to the plaintiff's filing of her appeal, and after the COVID-19 restrictions had been lifted, the trial court was informed that the successful bidder had failed to consummate the sale and the court ordered his deposit forfeited, thereby leaving the property unsold. Held that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the sale of the property had been approved by the court at the time of the hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff's appeal was moot, as there was no practical relief this court could grant her because the next foreclosure auction of the property would occur without any COVID-19 restrictions in place; moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, her case did not fall within the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine, as this court was not convinced that her action or its effect was of a limited duration such that it would become moot before appellate litigation could be concluded, nor was this court per- suaded that the questions posed were likely to arise in the future or that issues of public importance were involved in the plaintiff's appeal. Submitted on briefs October 12—officially released December 13, 2022