Volume 215 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the parking violation assessment issued against him by the hearing officer for the defendant town of Mansfield. After the town had issued the plaintiff a $30 parking ticket, the plaintiff filed an appeal with the town. Following a hearing, the town's hearing officer issued the subject assessment against the plaintiff. The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 7-152b (g)), by filing a petition to reopen the assessment. The court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the appeal was moot as a result of the town's having elected to void the underlying parking ticket. There- after, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for an order of mandamus to compel the clerk of the court to tax costs he had incurred by filing and litigating the appeal, concluding that the plaintiff was not the prevail- ing party, and, therefore, he was not entitled to the taxation of costs under the applicable statute (§ 52-257). On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff's appeal as moot because it could have granted the plaintiff practical relief by sustaining his appeal and ordering the town's hearing officer to vacate the assessment: although the town voided the parking ticket, the assessment against the plaintiff remained in effect, as the parking ticket, which is an allegation that the plaintiff committed a parking violation, was separate and distinct from the assessment, which is an adjudication of the plaintiff's liability for the alleged violation, and, therefore, the assessment had independent legal significance from the parking ticket; accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with direction to sustain the appeal and to order the town's hearing officer to vacate the assessment. 2. The trial court improperly denied the plaintiff's motion for an order of mandamus to compel the taxation of costs: that court, having been notified that the town had voided the parking ticket underlying the appeal, should have sustained the appeal and ordered the town's hearing officer to vacate the assessment, and, given that outcome, there was no question that the plaintiff would have been the prevailing party in the appeal; accordingly, the court was directed to consider on remand whether the plaintiff was entitled to costs pursuant to § 52-257. Argued May 23—officially released September 6, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to an automobile insurance policy issued by the defendant insurer in connection with injuries she had sustained in a motor vehicle accident in 2012. The plaintiff first brought an action against the defendant in 2016 related to the accident, which the trial court disposed of by granting the defendant's motion for nonsuit due to the plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery orders. The plaintiff initiated the present action against the defendant in 2019 pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute (§ 52-592 (a)). The defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiff could not bring the present action pursuant to § 52- 592 (a) because the nonsuit in the prior action was for disciplinary reasons and further alleging that her claim for benefits was untimely pursuant to the terms of the policy, which precluded claims for underin- sured motorist benefits from being brought more than three years after the date of an accident without invoking a tolling provision of the policy by providing the defendant with written notice of a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. The plaintiff claimed that a letter her counsel sent to the defendant in 2012 satisfied the tolling provision of the insurance policy. The trial court granted the motion and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the defendant: although the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on the basis that, as a matter of law, § 52-592 (a) was not applicable, this court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment on the alternative ground that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff failed to bring suit within three years and failed to toll that limitation period in accordance with the insurance policy, as it was undisputed that the plaintiff commenced the action for underinsured motorist benefits outside of the three year limitation period, as neither the 2016 action nor the 2019 action was commenced within three years of the 2012 accident, and, the written notice the plaintiff provided to the defendant of the accident contained no reference to a potential claim for underinsured motorist benefits and, thus, as a matter of law, was insufficient to satisfy the policy's unambiguous tolling provision; moreover, the defendant was not required to make a showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to all elements of the tolling provision, as the plaintiff's failure to meet either requirement of the tolling provision rendered it inapplicable. Argued May 9—officially released September 6, 2022

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion for contempt. The defendant had alleged that the plaintiff wilfully refused to comply with several financial orders in the parties' separation agreement, which was incorporated into the dissolu- tion judgment, by failing to reimburse her for certain expenses she unilaterally incurred on behalf of the couple's minor children, including, inter alia, $5775 for dental surgery, $51,500 for the cost of a private college coach and $9000 for an automobile, as well as the significant cost of a twenty-two day enrichment program in Jackson, Wyoming. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff's actions did not rise to the level of contempt. It determined that the separation agreement was ambiguous as to the date on which certain of the parties' financial obligations were to commence and that the defendant sought reimburse- ment for items that either were not covered by the agreement or for which she had not obtained the plaintiff's consent, as required under the agreement. The court further concluded that certain of the defendant's expenditures were extravagant and unnecessary and that she had not acted in good faith under the agreement. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly rewrote the separation agreement, thereby denying her reimbursement from the plaintiff, and improperly awarded him attorney's fees pursuant to the statute (§ 46b- 87) applicable to contempt proceedings. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for contempt, as the separation agreement was ambiguous regarding the date on which the plaintiff was to commence paying the children's tuition as well as certain other financial obligations; although the agreement contained a definitive commencement date for the plaintiff's payment to the defen- dant of unallocated alimony and child support, it did not provide a start date for the payment of the children's expenses, and, as there were two reasonable interpretations of the commencement dates, those portions of the agreement did not constitute clear and unambiguous orders of the court. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court modified the separation agree- ment's child support order such that the plaintiff was not required to pay for certain of the children's expenses was unavailing, as the court's findings that the plaintiff was not required to reimburse the defendant for the cost of the automobile she bought for the children, as well the costs for the private college coach and the enrichment program, were not clearly erroneous: although the provision of the agreement pertaining to the car was ambiguous, the court determined, after considering all of the evidence, that the parties did not intend the agreement to cover the cost of an automobile but, rather, the expenses for a child to obtain a license to drive an automobile as well as related expenses such as fuel, maintenance, insurance or driving lessons; moreover, the court's finding that the defendant's conduct did not comport with an implicit duty of good faith was supported by the record, as the enrichment program was more akin to a vacation for the defendant and the children than an extracurricular activity for the children, and the expenditure for the private college coach was extravagant and unnecessary in light of the fact that college counseling was part of the tuition package at the children's boarding school; furthermore, the plain and unambiguous meaning of the separation agreement did not obligate the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant for the hundreds of lower monetary value expenses she itemized that could not be considered extracurricular or related to organized activities within the meaning of the agreement. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not enter orders requiring the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant for children's expenses that she unilaterally incurred, the court having properly concluded that those expenses were either not covered under the agreement or were not made in good faith. 4. The trial court did not err in determining that the defendant was not entitled to full reimbursement from the plaintiff for the cost of the children's dental procedures: contrary to the defendant's assertion, the court's factual findings with respect to those procedures were not clearly erroneous but were supported by evidence that the plaintiff arranged for the procedure to be done by an in-network dentist and agreed to share the cost with the defendant, as was his prerogative under the separation agreement, but that the defendant insisted that the proce- dures be done by an out-of-network oral surgeon because it was an emergency; moreover, because the plaintiff did not agree to have the procedure performed by the out-of-network dentist and the defendant did not offer any credible evidence as to the nature of the procedure or the necessity that it be performed quickly and by a particular oral surgeon, she was required under the agreement to obtain the plaintiff's consent for the procedure; accordingly, the court properly concluded that the defendant was entitled under the separation agreement to reim- bursement for 60 percent of the cost of the procedures performed by an in-network dentist or oral surgeon. 5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees, as § 46b-87 permits the award of such fees to the prevail- ing party in a contempt proceeding: the plaintiff's actions did not rise to the level of wilful contempt, whereas the defendant did not exercise good faith and good judgment in making arbitrary and unilateral expendi- tures that were based on a strict reading of the separation agreement; moreover, the court properly considered the defendant's behavior, as an award of attorney's fees under § 46b-87 is punitive, rather than com- pensatory, and, contrary to the defendant's contention, the court's ability to award the plaintiff attorney's fees was not impacted by its order that the plaintiff reimburse her for certain tuition costs, as a trial court has broad discretion to make a party whole, even in the absence of a finding of contempt, as well as the authority under its equitable powers to fashion an order designed to protect the integrity of the dissolution judg- ment. Argued January 13—officially released September 6, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, filed a fourth petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court, upon the request of the respondent Commissioner of Correction, issued an order to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely given that it had been filed beyond the time limit for successive petitions set forth in the applicable statute (§ 52-470 (d)). The court held an evidentiary hearing, during which the petitioner testified that he had filed a timely third habeas petition but withdrew it prior to trial because his prior habeas counsel had advised him that withdrawing the petition and refiling it would be in the petitioner's best interest because counsel had lost contact with a key witness. The petitioner further testified that counsel did not discuss § 52-470 (d) or its effect on the petitioner's ability to file another petition challenging his conviction nor did he take any other action to address the witness' unavailability and that, if the petitioner had known that withdrawing the petition and refiling would result in an untimely petition, he would not have done so. The habeas court dismissed the fourth habeas petition as untimely, concluding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay in filing the petition. Thereafter, the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the petitioner failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay in filing his fourth habeas petition: contrary to the petitioner's claim that his prior habeas counsel's deficient advice to withdraw his third habeas petition constituted good cause, there were no external factors outside of the petitioner's control that caused or contributed to the withdrawal of that petition and the delay in filing the fourth habeas petition, and the petitioner and his counsel together exclusively bore responsibility for the delay in filing the fourth petition; moreover, insofar as the petitioner contended that the witness' unavailability for trial on the third habeas petition constituted an external factor that warranted the withdrawal of that petition and the subsequent untimely filing of the fourth habeas petition, it was clear that the petitioner and his counsel both bore personal responsibility for this proffered excuse, as neither took steps to address the witness issue by filing a motion for a continuance or requesting a status conference, but, rather, the petitioner addressed the issue by taking the drastic step of withdrawing the petition; furthermore, this court rejected the petitioner's assertion that the habeas court's decision was inconsistent with our Supreme Court's holding in Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction (343 Conn. 424) that a petitioner's lack of knowledge of a change in the law is potentially sufficient to establish good cause, as the court in Kelsey did not hold that ignorance of the law is typically sufficient, and the habeas court in this case specifically considered both the petitioner's and his counsel's lack of knowledge of the time limit in § 52-470 (d) but, nevertheless, determined that there was no good cause for the delay in filing the petition. Argued February 3, 2021—officially released September 13, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of criminal possession of a pistol and risk of injury to a child, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, C, had provided ineffective assistance. The police obtained a search warrant for the home of P, the petitioner's cousin, on the basis of a tip from a confidential informant indicating that P was in possession of a semiautomatic handgun. The petitioner was in the home when the police executed the warrant. The police discovered a semiautomatic pistol, which they later determined had been stolen, inside of a backpack that was in the closet of one of the bedrooms. After the petitioner became aware that the police had located the pistol, one of the police officers overheard him ask P in Spanish, ''quién va a tomar,'' meaning, ''who's going to take it.'' There- after, both the petitioner and P denied possession and knowledge of the pistol. The petitioner, however, admitted that he was staying in the bedroom in which the pistol was located, that his clothes were hanging in the closet, and that he had been in and out of the closet multiple times. Prior to trial, the petitioner rejected two offers to enter into a plea agreement, the first of which would have required him to serve three years of incarceration and the second of which would have required him to serve two years. Following trial, he was sentenced to a term of twelve years of incarceration. The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging, inter alia, that C had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to meaningfully convey the plea offers and by failing to investigate and call the confidential informant as a witness. The habeas court denied the writ of habeas corpus, and, on the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court's conclusion that the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by C's allegedly deficient pretrial advice was not improper: although C rendered professional assistance that may have been deficient in certain respects, the petitioner could not prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance with respect to the pretrial proceedings because he failed to establish, pursuant to Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668), that he was prejudiced by C's actions, as the habeas court, crediting C's testimony that the petitioner insisted that he was innocent of the crimes charged and thought that the second offer was unfair when compared to the offer received by P and discrediting the petitioner's testimony that, but for C's advice, he would have accepted a plea offer, found that there was no credible evidence that the petitioner was ever willing to accept a pretrial offer, regardless of C's advice; moreover, the petitioner's alternative argument that the habeas court, in analyzing the claim under Strickland, applied an improper legal standard failed because, contrary to the petitioner's claim, C's conduct was not presumptively prejudicial under United States v. Cronic (466 U.S. 648), as the record demonstrated that the petitioner was provided legal coun- sel throughout his criminal trial, the petitioner did not claim that his criminal trial presented a situation in which no competent attorney could render effective assistance, and C did not entirely fail to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to C's failure to investigate and call the confidential informant as a witness because he failed, under Strickland, to establish that he was prejudiced by such failure: the habeas court's conclusion that the informant's testimony would have been cumulative to other evidence elicited at the criminal trial was supported by the evidence, including the warrant to search the apartment, which was obtained on the basis of the informant's tip that P was in possession of a gun; moreover, the state's theory at trial was that the petitioner constructively possessed the gun, and the fact that P had been, at one time, in actual possession of the gun did not by itself negate that theory; furthermore, the informant did not and could not offer any testimony regarding the petitioner's knowledge, dominion or control of the backpack or the gun that was sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict, which was supported by the petitioner's admissions and by his incriminating state- ment in Spanish to P, which supported an inference that he knew of the gun's presence and its incriminating nature; accordingly, this court was not convinced that there was a reasonable probability that, but for C's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Argued February 8, 2021—officially released September 13, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant landlord for injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of the defendant's negligence in failing to maintain a porch railing on the premises leased by the plaintiff. One winter morning, the plaintiff fell and broke his leg when he exited his apartment building while sleet and/or freezing rain were falling. The plaintiff claimed that his fall was due to a defective railing that ran along the stairs leading up to the building. He alleged that the railing gave way when he grabbed onto it, which caused him to lose his balance and fall down the stairs. The defendant asserted the ongoing storm doctrine as a special defense, claiming that it did not have a duty to remove any ice from the property during a storm. The plaintiff argued that the doctrine was not applicable because the theory of his case, as presented to the jury, was that his fall was due to the defective railing, not to the presence of ice on the porch. Over the plaintiff's objection, the trial court instructed the jury that if it determined that the ice on the porch and stairs was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's fall and subsequent injuries, it had to apply the ongoing storm doctrine. The trial court also provided the jury with a set of interrogatories. The first two questions asked the jury whether it found that there was an ongoing storm at the time of the incident and, if so, whether the defendant had proved that the icy condition from such storm was the proximate cause of the fall and damages sustained by the plaintiff. In the event that its responses to those questions were in the affirmative, the interrogatories instructed the jury to skip the remaining questions and to return a verdict in favor of the defendant. The jury answered the first two questions in the affirmative and, in accordance with the instructions, returned a defendant's verdict. Thereafter, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court's inclusion of the ongoing storm doctrine in the jury instructions and interrogatories was in error because the doctrine was inapplicable and irrelevant to the plaintiff's claims: the plaintiff alleged that his fall was due to the defective railing, not to the presence of snow and ice on the porch; moreover, the plaintiff never claimed that the defendant breached its duty of care by failing to remove ice and snow from the porch and stairs, and, therefore, the liability issue that the jury had to resolve was whether the plaintiff's fall was caused by the defective railing, the accumulated snow and ice, or the plaintiff's own carelessness; furthermore, even though the defendant had asserted the ongoing storm doctrine as a special defense, an instruction on it could not reasonably have been supported by the evidence. 2. The trial court's erroneous instruction and interrogatories regarding the ongoing storm doctrine were harmful: the trial court likely misled and confused the jury by instructing it on a doctrine that was irrelevant to the case, and such confusion was compounded by the court's decision to have the jury answer questions about the ongoing storm doctrine first and by its instruction to the jury that it was not to answer any additional interrogatories and was to return a defendant's verdict if it determined that the ongoing storm was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; moreover, the trial court's actual instruction on the ongoing storm doctrine likely further confused and misled the jury because it was an incorrect statement of the law, as it told the jury that the existence of an ongoing storm impacted its causation analysis instead of properly stating that the doctrine relates solely to duty, which was not at issue in this case; furthermore, the trial court's repeated reference in the charge to ''the'' proximate cause and its suggestion that the jury had to find either the railing or the ongoing storm to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury was incorrect, as it ignored the fact that the injury could have had more than one proximate cause; additionally, the instruction also was likely misleading, as it suggested to the jury that it had to return a verdict for the defendant if it concluded that the plaintiff's fall was caused by the ongoing storm even if it also concluded that the defective railing contributed to the fall. 3. The defendant could not prevail on its alternative grounds for affirmance as they did not undermine this court's conclusion that the instructional error was harmful or that reversal was required: contrary to the defen- dant's claim, the plaintiff clearly introduced evidence that the railing was defective; moreover, the plaintiff was not required to introduce expert testimony as to the standard of care for the railing because that issue was a matter of common knowledge; furthermore, the plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant had constructive notice of the defective railing. (One judge concurring in part and dissenting in part) Argued January 31—officially released September 13, 2022

The petitioner, who had been found guilty of several crimes, following a jury trial, and who had entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of being a persistent serious felony offender in connection with his role in an armed bank robbery, sought a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner and another perpetrator, each openly carrying a gun, had entered the bank and taken money from the tellers' drawers and the safes. The petitioner claimed that his trial counsel, B, had rendered ineffective assistance and that his plea of nolo contendere had not been knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The habeas court denied the habeas petition, concluding, inter alia, that B's performance was not deficient and, there- after, granted the petition for certification to appeal. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that B provided ineffective assistance by failing to request an instruction requiring the jury to find that the firearm he used during the robbery was operable pursuant to the applicable sentence enhancement statute (§ 53-202k) with respect to the charges of robbery in the first degree and by failing to advise the petitioner of the public interest element of the persistent serious felony offender charge: the petitioner's conduct in brandishing a gun as a show of force during the robbery indicated to the victims that the gun could have been fired and, thus, satisfied the statutory (§ 53a-3 (19)) definition of a firearm and subjected him to sentence enhancement pursuant to § 53-202k; moreover, even if the jury instruction had been requested, the trial court would have properly denied the request, thus, the peti- tioner could not prove prejudice; furthermore, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that, but for B's alleged deficient performance in failing to advise him with respect to the public interest element of the charge of being a persistent serious felony offender pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2007) § 53a-40 (c)), he would not have entered a nolo contendere plea with respect to that charge, as the plea canvass by the trial court reflected that the petitioner affirmatively answered the court's question as to whether he and B had discussed the evidence the state had to support the charge, it was reasonable for the habeas court to conclude that the petitioner's evidence at the habeas trial did not rebut the presumption that B had explained the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the petitioner notice of what he was being asked to admit, and the habeas court found that the petitioner's habeas testimony that he would not have entered a plea of nolo contendere had B properly advised him was not credible, as the petitioner had an extensive criminal history and the state had a strong case favoring sentence enhancement. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that his plea of nolo conten- dere to the charge of being a persistent serious felony offender was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, as he failed to rebut the presumption that B had informed him of the elements of the charge. Argued April 4—officially released September 13, 2022

The plaintiff, P Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant T. P Co., as holder of the note and mortgage at the time of the commencement of the action, sent a letter to T by certified mail return receipt requested, notifying him that the loan was in default and, pursuant to statute (§ 8-265ee (a)), provided him with the specific notice required to be given prior to its commencement of a foreclosure of a qualifying mortgage under the Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (EMAP). Thereafter, P Co. assigned the note and mortgage to W Co., and W Co. was substituted as the plaintiff. Subse- quently, the trial court rendered judgment of strict foreclosure, and set law days. T filed a motion to open on the last extended law day, claiming that the judgment needed to be opened so that he may pursue a motion to dismiss the action for P Co.'s failure to comply with the notice provision of § 8-265ee (a). Specifically, T claimed that P Co. never sent the EMAP notice and, in support of that contention, provided the affidavit of a consultant who previously worked in the United States Postal Service (USPS). The consultant claimed in a report that, although P Co. created a certified mail label, the EMAP notice was never actually placed in the mail system, as revealed by a tracking query he produced from the USPS website. Subsequently, the trial court denied T's motion. On appeal, T claimed, inter alia, that the trial court incorrectly determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the foreclosure action on the ground that P Co. provided T with the required EMAP notice. Held that the trial court correctly determined that it had subject matter juris- diction over the present foreclosure action and that the court's factual findings that P Co. complied with the EMAP notice requirement under § 8-265ee (a) were not clearly erroneous, as W Co.'s evidence amply supported the trial court's factual finding that P Co. provided the required EMAP notice to T: W Co. provided the court with an affidavit by its counsel certifying that P Co. had mailed T the EMAP notice and, in support thereof, attached a photocopy of an envelope addressed by its counsel to T, which included the certified mail barcode and correspond- ing certified mail numbers, as well as the physical receipt provided by the USPS to P Co.'s counsel, and the lack of evidence of a return receipt postcard corresponding to the EMAP notice was inconsequential, as lack of receipt did not affect proof of EMAP compliance; moreover, T's contention that the trial court failed to give proper weight to his evidentiary submissions was unavailing because, despite an isolated statement by the trial court regarding the late and protracted state of the proceedings, the court explicitly stated that it had carefully reviewed and considered the motion, the related filings and exhibits attached thereto, and that it had weighed both parties' evidence before ultimately finding that T's submissions failed to refute W Co.'s evidence; further- more, the trial court was free to discredit or find unpersuasive T's evidence, and this court declined to reweigh the evidence in T's favor on appeal. Argued December 9, 2021—officially released September 13, 2022

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the murder, assault and kidnap- ping of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that his trial counsel, M, rendered deficient performance by failing to present a specific theory of defense to establish that the petitioner lacked the intent to cause the victim's death. The petitioner had driven to a nail salon parking lot where he met the victim, whom he had recently begun dating. The petitioner punched the victim in the face as she entered his car and punched her in the face a second time as they drove away. F, who was in his car in the parking lot at the time, witnessed both punches. The petitioner later gave the police a statement in which he admitted that he would choke the victim when he became angry. A state medical examiner, C, concluded that the victim had been strangled and had suffered blunt force trauma to her head and neck but was unable to say whether the head injury or strangulation caused her death. C stated that a person with the victim's strangulation injury could have survived and that it was possible that the victim did not lose consciousness immediately after the infliction of the head injury but could have survived for up to ten hours. At the habeas trial, the state's chief medical examiner, G, agreed with C as to the cause and manner of the victim's death but could not rule out the possibility that her head injuries were caused by later trauma to the same area of the head. Although M testified that his strategy was to present a cohesive defense that accounted for all of the evidence and showed that the petitioner lacked the intent to kill regardless of which injury caused the victim's death, the petitioner claimed that M rendered deficient representation because the only rea- sonable strategy was to advocate that the two punches were the cause of death insofar as they created a temporal distance between the fatal act and the victim's death that he could have relied on to demonstrate lack of intent. The petitioner further claimed that M never recognized or focused on the punches as being the cause of the victim's death and that he did not understand the relevant medical and forensic science. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal from the judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus; the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his claims involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve them in a different manner or that the questions were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 2. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to establish that M rendered constitutionally deficient performance regarding the two punch defense theory or that he failed to prepare sufficiently for trial, learn the relevant forensic science and adequately cross-examine witnesses: a. M presented a comprehensive, objectively reasonable theory of defense that addressed all the evidence at trial and focused on the petitioner's lack of intent to cause the victim's death: instead of relying exclusively on the punches in the parking lot as being the cause of death, M accounted for evidence that the two punch theory did not address, the most important of which was that strangulation, as C testified, was just as plausible as the cause of death as a head injury; moreover, M's decision not to link the victim's head injury to the punches in the parking lot was supported by the testimony of C and G, who stated that the victim may have experienced a lucid period before dying as a result of the head injury and, thus, that the fatal injury could have been inflicted later, after the parking lot incident; furthermore, M's defense strategy encompassed the general principle of lack of intent behind the two punch theory, as M testified that punching someone does not equate with an intent to kill and asserted during cross-examination of C and in closing argument to the jury that the possibility that the victim experienced a lucid period before dying as a result of the head injury demonstrated that the peti- tioner lacked the specific intent to cause her death. b. The record supported the habeas court's finding that M sufficiently understood the medical science at issue, adequately prepared for trial and presented a well thought out theory of defense: contrary to the petitioner's contention that M had ''no idea'' about certain medical princi- ples and was unfamiliar with much of the forensic science underlying his defense, M's testimony, which the court credited, demonstrated that he familiarized himself with the relevant medical science by meeting with C twice and taking notes and focusing on understanding what was being discussed before brainstorming with legal colleagues and deciding how to utilize C's testimony; moreover, although M did not ask C at trial whether an individual could experience a lucid interval following strangulation and then die, that did not compel an inference that M did not understand the medical science, and it was reasonable to present a theory of defense that relied not on the punches in the parking lot but, rather, accounted for strangulation and head trauma, both of which C and G agreed could have caused the victim's death; furthermore, M's decision to impeach F's testimony was not unreasonable, as the petitioner claimed, as M's inquiry about F's statement to the police that he saw one punch before changing his story to say that he saw two punches was an attempt by M to lower the number of punches that occurred so as to bolster the defense of lack of intent. Argued May 23—officially released September 13, 2022

The defendant, who had been on probation in connection with his conviction of larceny in the first degree, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation. As a special condition of his probation, the trial court ordered the defendant to make restitution for verifiable out-of-pocket losses of the complainants in the amount of $227,642. During the defendant's five year probationary period, the defendant paid a total of $2100 in restitution in $100 monthly payments only when he was working. Following a violation of probation hearing, the court found that the state had proved that the defendant violated the restitution condition of probation by wilfully failing to pay restitution, stating that the defendant intentionally delayed trying to repay the resti- tution in the hope that his probationary period would expire. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he wilfully failed to pay restitution: the trial court's finding that the defendant did not make sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to pay restitution was not clearly errone- ous, as there was ample evidence in the record to support such a finding; moreover, the court relied on the defendant's decision to strictly make $100 restitution payments and to do so only in the months that he was working, the defendant's testimony regarding his belief that he should not have to pay the restitution, the defendant's failure to apply to certain positions with potential employers because of his belief that he would not be hired there and testimony from a chief probation officer detailing meetings with the defendant regarding his restitution obligations, includ- ing the defendant telling him that he was going to apply for a loan and subsequently failing to provide any documentation showing that he had applied for such loan. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant's probation and sentencing him to a term of incarceration, this court having concluded that an abuse of discretion was not manifest or injus- tice did not appear to have been done: the trial court conducted the proper inquiry and found that the defendant wilfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay restitution prior to revoking his probation and sentencing him to imprisonment; moreover, the court's reasoning in revoking the defen- dant's probation and imposing an additional term of incarceration made it clear that it necessarily believed the defendant's behavior to be inimical to the goals of his probation and that the rehabilitative purpose of probation could no longer be served. Argued January 6—officially released September 20, 2022

The defendant appealed to this court from the trial court's judgment denying his application for reinstatement to the bar. The defendant had been suspended from the practice of law, upon presentment by the plaintiff, Disciplinary Counsel, following his conviction in federal court of obstruction of justice in connection with a public corruption scheme. The defendant also was convicted of other felony offenses, including racketeering, bribery and wire fraud, but those convictions were reversed on appeal. The defendant subsequently filed an application for reinstatement to the bar, and the trial court referred the application to the Standing Committee on Recommendations for Admission to the Bar for New Haven County pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 2- 53). The committee held an evidentiary hearing on the application, during which the defendant refused to answer direct questions regarding his conduct during and surrounding the events that resulted in the convic- tions that were reversed. The defendant also testified that he was inno- cent of any wrongdoing and that he had not committed the crime of obstruction of justice, focusing his testimony on multiple exhibits that he argued demonstrated his innocence. Following the hearing, the com- mittee issued a report in which it recommended that the defendant's application for reinstatement be denied on the ground that he lacked the requisite good moral character to practice law. In reaching its deci- sion, the committee found, inter alia, that the defendant's refusal to answer questions regarding the reversed convictions demonstrated a lack of honesty and candor, that his reinstatement could be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar and the administration of justice because he refused to accept responsibility for the obstruction of justice conviction, which strikes at the heart of the public trust in the legal profession, and that his failure to accept responsibility for his wrongdo- ing made rehabilitation impossible. A three judge panel of the Superior Court thereafter accepted the committee's recommendation and ren- dered judgment denying the defendant's application for reinstatement, concluding that the committee, in making its recommendation, did not abuse its discretion or act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without a fair investigation of the facts. Held: 1. The trial court correctly determined that the committee had the authority to question the defendant about his presuspension misconduct; pursuant to Practice Book § 2-53, the committee had the authority and duty to investigate conduct that could inform its assessment of the defendant's moral fitness, including not only the underlying facts of the defendant's obstruction of justice conviction but also all of the facts that the commit- tee believed could be relevant to the determination of the defendant's present fitness to practice law and moral character, and the defendant's argument that the committee had the authority to investigate only con- duct of which he was convicted conflated the attorney reinstatement process with the attorney grievance process. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the committee improp- erly found that he failed to accept his obstruction of justice conviction with sincerity and honesty because he plausibly reconciled his claim of innocence with that conviction before the committee; contrary to the defendant's contention, his claim of innocence did not render the other criteria set forth in Statewide Grievance Committee v. Ganim (311 Conn. 430), for evaluating an application for reinstatement inapplicable but, rather, was simply another piece of evidence for the committee to consider in conjunction with all of the other factors utilized in determin- ing whether the defendant met his burden to show rehabilitation, good moral character and a present fitness to be reinstated to the legal profes- sion. Argued March 9—officially released September 20, 2022

Convicted of the crime of assault in the first degree with a firearm as an accessory, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court's jury instructions improperly omitted an essential element of that offense, namely, the accessory's intent that the principal would use a firearm during the commission of the offense. The defendant had been dating A's sister, M. A suspected that the defendant had been beating M and drove with S to M's apartment building to check on her. The victim, G, drove to the apartment building separately and joined A and S inside the building. When the defendant arrived shortly thereafter, a physical altercation ensued between A and the defendant during which a gun fell out of the defendant's pocket. G, S and A then fled the building and entered G's car while the defendant ran to a parking lot across the street and conferred with another man. The defendant and the other man, who was armed with a gun, then ran to G's car, which G was unable to start, and, together, pulled on the handle of the driver's side door in an attempt to open the door and pull G out of the driver's seat. G attempted to flee when they were able to open the door but was shot by the defendant's acquaintance. At trial, the defendant contended that the court should instruct the jury on accessorial liability in accordance with the requirements for conspiratorial liability set forth in State v. Pond (315 Conn. 451), which held that a defendant must intend that every element of the planned offense be accomplished, even an element that itself carries no specific intent requirement. The trial court rejected the defendant's reliance on Pond and instead instructed the jury in accordance with State v. Gonzalez (300 Conn. 490) and State v. Artis (136 Conn. App. 568) that an accomplice may be held criminally liable for the principal's use of a weapon even when the accessory did not intend or even know that a weapon would be used to commit the crime. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, which was based on his assertion that his actions did not show that he intended to physically harm G or intended that his accomplice would use a firearm: the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant intended to cause physical injury, as he enlisted his acquaintance's aid to pursue G, A and S after the initial altercation with A ended, the defendant knew that his acquaintance had a gun while the two men forcibly tried to open the car door as G pleaded with them not to shoot, and the jury reasonably could have credited the testimony of G and A that, while inside G's car, they saw the defendant's acquaintance with a gun in his hand and the defendant pulling on the car door's handle, which was corroborated by video from a nearby surveillance camera, in an attempt to engage in a physical altercation with G; moreover, the state was not required to prove, as the defendant claimed, that he intended that his acquaintance use a firearm or that he knew his acquaintance had a firearm, as neither of those factors were elements of the offense with which the defendant was charged; furthermore, despite the defendant's contentions that it was speculative for the jury to conclude that he intended to harm G and that the jury reasonably could have drawn alternative inferences from the evidence, the fact that the jury might have reached one of the different conclusions the defendant proffered did not undermine the reasonableness of the conclusion that it did reach. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly declined to instruct the jury that he had to intend, or to know, that his acquaintance would discharge a firearm, was unavailing, as those criteria were not elements of accessorial liability under § 53a-59 (a) (5): a. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, a plain reading of § 53a-59 (a) (5) makes clear that it includes neither a specific intent nor a general intent requirement as to the discharge of a firearm, which is merely the means by which the injury must occur, and the defendant's claim that an accomplice should at least have knowledge of the firearm, as required under federal law, was unavailing, as this state's Supreme Court, having addressed a similar issue in Gonzalez, is the ultimate authority on the interpretation of Connecticut statutory law; moreover, there was no merit to the defendant's contention that, because he was unable to avail himself of the statutory (§ 53a-16b) affirmative defense regarding his knowledge that his accomplice had a firearm, § 53a-59 (a) (5) must include an intent or knowledge element with regard to the use of a firearm, as the legislature's exclusion of that crime from the list of crimes in § 53a-16b evinced its intent that lack of intent or knowledge of a firearm was not a valid defense; furthermore, there was no merit to the defendant's claim that the court should have instructed the jury in accordance with the allegation in the state's information that he intended that a firearm be used, as an information alters neither the statutory elements of the charged offense nor what the court must include in its jury instructions. b. This court rejected the defendant's request that it overrule binding precedent holding that an accomplice need not have knowledge of or intent regarding an aggravating factor that requires that the principal have only general intent, as this court, being an intermediate appellate body, was bound to follow the precedent from our Supreme Court and other panels of this court. Argued May 10—officially released September 20, 2022

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court, challenging certain postjudgment orders of the trial court. Under the parties' separation agreement, which had been incorporated into the dissolution judgment, the parties shared joint legal custody of their minor child, who resided primarily with the plaintiff, and exercised a two week, rotating parenting plan. The separation agreement also provided the plaintiff with a nonmodifiable right to claim the child as a dependent for income tax purposes. Within months of the marital dissolution, the parties embarked on three years of extensive litigation pertaining to custody of and visitation with the child, during which each party filed motions seeking sole custody of the child. After a fifteen day hearing, the trial court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff had a defiant and manipulative disposition, and had misrepresented facts and violated and made up court orders to support her long-standing desire to undermine the defendant's relationship with the child. The court further found that, although the defendant willingly encouraged the mother-child relationship, the plaintiff wilfully denied the defendant access to the child and repeatedly made insulting refer- ences about the defendant, which the child understood, as well as unsub- stantiated complaints to the police and to the Department of Children and Families. The court denied the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendant's motion, awarding him, inter alia, sole physical custody of the child. The court's order also set a visitation schedule for the plaintiff, and permitted the defendant to alter, change or modify that schedule and the location, dates and times the parties would exchange the child. The court further ordered the plaintiff to undergo a psychological evalua- tion and to provide a copy of the evaluation to the defendant. Held: 1. The trial court properly exercised its decision-making authority, pursuant to statute (§ 46b-56), in affording the defendant a limited amount of discretion to adjust the plaintiff's visitation schedule with the minor child: the court carefully considered the evidence, the unique circum- stances at issue, and the extensive, undisputed findings regarding the history of conflict between the parties in the parenting of the child, and made the requisite findings regarding the child's best interest in implementing a practical mechanism for the parties, short of returning to court, to deal with the conflicts in the parenting of their child that have resulted from the plaintiff's obstructionist conduct and consistent tendency to instigate that conflict; moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's contention that the court gave the defendant unbridled authority to suspend or terminate her parenting access to the child and unilateral authority to decide the nature and scope of their relationship, the court established a specific schedule of parenting access, which governed the defendant's exercise of discretion and permitted him to modify her visitation schedule but not to reduce, suspend or terminate her access to the child. 2. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering the plaintiff to undergo a psychological evaluation; the court's authority to order such an evalua- tion is restricted by statute (§ 46b-6) to pending matters to assist the court in the disposition of the issues presented therein and, because there were no further matters pending before the court, there was no statutorily valid reason to order a psychological evaluation. 3. The trial court erred in modifying the dissolution judgment to permit the defendant to claim the child as a dependent for income tax purposes; the separation agreement included a clear and unambiguous provision giving the plaintiff the nonmodifiable right to claim the child as a depen- dent. Argued May 10—officially released September 20, 2022

Convicted of several crimes after a shooting incident in which he wounded two police officers, J and O, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his trial, appellate and habeas counsel provided ineffective assistance and that the prosecutor at his criminal trial knowingly presented false testimony. The petitioner had approached an unmarked police vehicle in a parking lot and fired gun- shots at three undercover officers in the vehicle. As J got out of the driver's side of the vehicle, one of two gunshots the petitioner fired toward him struck the bulletproof vest J was wearing under his clothes. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the prosecutor knowingly pre- sented and failed to correct false testimony from the third officer, P, that one of the bullets the petitioner fired had lodged in or damaged J's bulletproof vest and that P had witnessed damage to the vest shortly after the shooting. The habeas court rejected the petitioner's claim, concluding that P had not intended to deceive the jury. In a subsequent articulation, the court affirmed its decision, relying on the fact that the petitioner's counsel had had an opportunity to examine the vest prior to trial. The court denied the habeas petition and thereafter denied the petition for certification to appeal to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal from the judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus; the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his claims involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve those issues in a different manner or that the questions they raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 2. The petitioner's claim that he was deprived of his right to due process when the prosecutor failed to correct P's testimony concerning the bulletproof vest was unavailing, as P's testimony was neither false nor substantially misleading: P's reference to the impact on J's bulletproof vest of one of the bullets the petitioner fired was incidental to P's description of the injuries he observed when he examined J in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, and P's description of those injuries did not convey to the jury that he had inspected or witnessed damage to the vest; moreover, even if P's testimony was false or substantially misleading, the petitioner was unable to demonstrate that the prosecu- tor's failure to correct the testimony was fundamentally unfair, as there was no reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury, the condition of J's vest was not relevant to any of the crimes of which the petitioner was convicted or to any material issue in the case, there was no evidence that something other than a bullet could have caused J's injury, and, in the context of the petitioner's defense of self-defense, it was inconsequential for the jury to determine what the petitioner struck when he used deadly physical force by discharging his handgun; furthermore, the petitioner's assertion that P's testimony about the vest was relevant to assessing J's credibility was unavailing, as the existence of damage to the vest would not have tended to undermine J's trial testimony, the jury reasonably could have found that one of the bullets that the petitioner fired caused J's injury, regardless of the existence of damage to the vest, and, although the court, in its initial decision and in its articulation, incorrectly failed to focus its analysis on the substance of the relevant evidence to determine if it was false or substantially misleading, this court concluded that the same result was required by law. 3. The petitioner's claim that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at his criminal trial was unavailing: a. Trial counsel's decision not to challenge the state's evidence that a bullet caused J's injury did not prejudice the petitioner, as counsel believed that the pursuit of such a strategy would detract from the petitioner's self-defense claim, that it would not have been beneficial with respect to the attempted murder or assault charges against the petitioner concerning J and that the presence of physical damage to the vest was not significant; moreover, the habeas court's focus on whether the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's performance was proper in light of testimony from the physician who treated J that a gunshot was the only way to explain J's injuries, and, as it was undisputed that the petitioner used a firearm during the shooting, whether J was struck by a bullet or whether the petitioner had assaulted O or attempted to assault P was unrelated to the petitioner's claim of self-defense; furthermore, even if the jury had found that the petitioner did not cause J's injury, the state would have been entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of attempt to commit assault, which carried the same penalty as a conviction of assault. b. There was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the petition- er's criminal trial would have been different, as he contended, if his counsel had investigated and presented certain evidence in support of his self-defense claim: although the petitioner claimed that testimony from a mental health professional would have been critical to the jury's understanding of his behavior, the petitioner's reliance on the opinions of a psychologist who testified at the habeas trial about his state of mind at the time of the shooting incident was undermined by the fact that the psychologist's evaluations of him occurred more than fifteen years after the shooting incident, and the petitioner's assertion that certain other testimony about a lethal threat that purportedly had been made to him on the day of the shooting would have corroborated his claimed belief that the police had come to carry out the threat would not have shed light on whether he subjectively believed at the time of the shooting that the threat was credible or that he actually feared for his life; moreover, the petitioner's attempt to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to present that evidence was hampered by the fact that, even if the petitioner had been able to demonstrate that he subjectively feared for his life at the time of the shooting, the evidence at trial did not support a conclusion that his use of deadly physical force was objectively reasonable; furthermore, even though the habeas court incor- rectly determined that trial counsel's failure to investigate and present the testimony of those witnesses in support of the petitioner's self- defense claim was not prejudicial because such evidence was to some extent cumulative of the petitioner's trial testimony, the court neverthe- less reached the correct result, as such evidence was unlikely to have swayed the jury to find that the petitioner's use of force was objectively reasonable. c. The petitioner's defense at trial was not prejudiced as a result of his counsel's failure to object pursuant to State v. Morales (232 Conn. 707) to the state's failure to preserve and make available to counsel the vehicle that the officers occupied at the time of the shooting incident: the petitioner failed to satisfy the requirement under Morales that the vehicle was material to his defense and that the result of his trial would have been different had it been available to him, as the evidence sup- ported the habeas court's determination that the petitioner failed to show what benefit further testing beyond that presented to the jury could have provided or that anything material was lost by virtue of the manner in which the police stored the vehicle; moreover, it was undisputed that the petitioner's trial counsel had observed the vehicle in a junkyard prior to trial and did not pursue testing of it at that time or make any further request of the court with respect to the vehicle, and, although the petition- er's forensic criminologist testified at the habeas trial that certain forensic testing could have been performed had the vehicle been stored in a different manner, the criminologist lacked any reliable data from which to draw conclusions and essentially speculated about what such testing might have entailed; furthermore, defense counsel's arguments at trial and cross-examination of the state's witnesses reflected counsel's belief that the forensic analysis of the crime scene and the vehicle that had been performed by the state provided the defense with ample fodder to undermine the state's theory of the shooting. 4. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that he was deprived of the effective assistance of his appellate counsel: a. Despite his contention that his appellate counsel should have chal- lenged the trial court's failure to instruct the jury regarding a witness who purportedly had threatened him on the day of the shooting and should have raised claims concerning the court's refusal to allow him to call the witness so that any invocation of the witness' fifth amendment privilege would occur on a question-by-question basis before the jury, the petitioner did not demonstrate that counsel's representation was deficient, as he failed to present any authority to support his assertions that the trial court had acted improperly, his claim amounted to little more than speculation that a reviewing court would have found error, and he merely asserted in conclusory fashion that raising those claims would have resulted in a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed in his direct appeal from his conviction. b. The petitioner's claim that his appellate counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to raise a Morales claim concerning the state's failure to preserve the police officers' vehicle was unavailing; contrary to the petitioner's contention, even if counsel had performed deficiently by not raising a Morales claim in the petitioner's direct appeal from his conviction, her performance did not prejudice the petitioner, as more than a reasonable probability existed that a reviewing court would have rejected a Morales claim under the first condition of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), the record having been devoid of an adequate factual record as to whether a Morales violation occurred. c. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that his appellate counsel per- formed deficiently by failing to raise an unpreserved claim that the prosecutor improperly vouched for J's credibility during closing argu- ment to the jury: the prosecutor did not improperly express a personal belief in J's credibility but, rather, invited the jury to infer that any inconsistencies in J's recollection of the shooting were the result of the emotional state he was in at that time; moreover, the petitioner's trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's argument, and the petitioner failed to cite any authority to support a conclusion that his appellate counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to raise the claim or that a reasonable probability existed that, had the claim been raised, it would have changed the outcome of the petitioner's direct appeal. 5. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improp- erly precluded the petitioner's counsel from questioning the trial prose- cutor about whether he should have known at the time of trial that certain of P's testimony about J's bulletproof vest was false: counsel's inquiry into what additional investigation the prosecutor could have undertaken regarding whether the vest had been struck by a bullet that the petitioner fired was not relevant to the allegation in the habeas petition that the prosecutor knew at the time of trial that P had provided false testimony; because the petitioner alleged in the habeas petition only that the prosecutor had knowingly presented false testimony but did not allege alternatively that the prosecutor should have known that P's testimony was false, what the prosecutor should have known about the vest and, thus, the veracity of P's testimony, was not material to the issue framed in the habeas petition. Argued November 9, 2021—officially released September 20, 2022

The plaintiffs, the administrators of the estate of the decedent, sought to recover damages from several defendants, including D, as a result of an airplane crash that killed the decedent, who was a passenger, and the pilot, C, D's eighteen year old daughter who had obtained her pilot's license about one month before the crash. C, who had no training or experience flying a Cessna 150H, was provided ground and dual flight instruction in the airplane approximately three weeks before the crash by E Co., a provider of flight instruction and airplane rentals, and its owner, B, after which B permitted her to fly the airplane without an instructor. C called E Co. to reserve a Cessna 150H airplane to fly on the day of the crash. The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that D had orally agreed with B prior to the crash that C would contact B about scheduling further training, which would include the rental of the airplane, and that D agreed to provide E Co. with a $1000 retainer, which D later paid, to cover the cost of its services and rental fees. Until the day of the crash, D was unaware that C had intended to fly that day, that she had rented the airplane or that she had flown it that day with the plaintiffs' decedent as a passenger. D filed a motion for summary judg- ment in which he claimed that he lacked the physical or legal control over the airplane that was required to establish liability under the doctrine of negligent entrustment. The trial court granted the motion, concluding, inter alia, that D lacked the requisite control of the airplane to be considered an entrustor or a supplier of it under a theory of negligent entrustment. On the plaintiffs' appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly granted D's motion for summary judgment, as there was no genuine issue of material fact that D's facilitation—monetary or otherwise—of C's access to the airplane was insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate the element of control necessary to find D liable under the plaintiffs' negligent entrustment cause of action: the plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that it was necessary to resolve the parties' dispute over whether D had arranged and paid for C's rental of the airplane before the court could determine whether D controlled the airplane or C's use of it, as that purported factual dispute did not raise any genuine issue of material fact that was relevant to the case insofar as access to and use of the airplane always remained exclusively within the power and control of its owners, B and E Co., and, even if D had acquired a right to use the airplane through an agreement with B and E Co., such interest never amounted to actual control of the airplane or control that was exclusive or superior to that of B and E Co., as D could never have had physical or constructive possession of the airplane without prior permission from B or E Co.; moreover, the undisputed evidence showed that B was responsible for deciding whether to rent the airplane and the terms and conditions of its rental, D had no right or ability to prevent other parties from leasing the airplane or to veto B's decision to allow C access to it on the day of the crash, and D was unaware on the day of the crash that C had flown the airplane or that the plaintiffs' decedent was a passenger; furthermore, contrary to the plaintiffs' unsupported contention, B and E Co. could not be considered, under the applicable provision (§ 390) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as third parties through whom D supplied C with the airplane, as the phrase ''third person'' in § 390 was construed to mean one who acts as a conduit for an entrustor, rather than one who exercises authority and control. Argued February 9—officially released September 27, 2022

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant H Co. for, inter alia, breach of contract, in connection with its construction of a new home. The jury returned a verdict in favor of H Co. on the breach of contract claim, indicating in interrogatories that H Co. had breached its contract with the plaintiff but that the plaintiff had waived that breach. After the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict, the plaintiff appealed to this court, which concluded that the trial court improperly denied the motion to set aside the verdict in favor of H Co. on the breach of contract count concerning the jury's verdict as to waiver. This court ordered the case to be remanded for a hearing in damages on the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff on her breach of contract claim. Following a hearing in damages on remand, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that she was entitled to actual damages on her claim and rendered judgment in favor of H Co. The plaintiff appealed to this court, which determined that, despite her failure to prove actual damages, the plaintiff was entitled to an award of nominal damages, and, therefore, the trial court erroneously directed judgment to enter in favor of H Co. This court nevertheless affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that that court's failure to award nominal damages and to render judgment in the plaintiff's favor did not constitute reversible error. Thereafter, H Co. filed a motion for attorney's fees, asserting that, as the prevailing party in the action, it was entitled under the parties' contract to an award of reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $305,533.75. The relevant provision of the parties' contract provided that the prevailing party in litigation enforcing the contract shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for attorney's fees pursu- ant to the statute (§ 42-150bb) that allows a consumer to recover attor- ney's fees from a commercial party when the consumer successfully defends or prosecutes an action based on a contract that provides for attorney's fees for the commercial party, seeking an award in the exact amount as H Co. had requested in its motion for attorney's fees. Alterna- tively, the plaintiff sought attorney's fees and costs under the parties' contract in the amount of $92,101. In support of her motion, the plaintiff appended her affidavit with accompanying exhibits comprised of a table detailing her attorney's fees and other costs, a copy of the contract, and copies of retainer letters from three law firms and a consultant, whom she averred worked on her case. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the parties motions, and the plaintiff appealed and H Co. cross appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly denied H Co.'s motion for attorney's fees, as H Co. was not the prevailing party for purposes of the attorney's fees provision of the parties' contract; although this court determined that the entry of judgment in favor of H Co. on the plaintiff's breach of contract claim did not constitute reversible error, it remained that the jury found liability on that claim in favor of the plaintiff, that she was entitled to nominal damages, and that the entry of judgment in the defendant's favor was in error, and this court would not countenance such an error yielding an unintended benefit to H Co. by way of an award of reasonable attorney's fees under such circumstances. 2. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in failing to award her attorney's fees pursuant to § 42-150bb in the exact amount of attorney's fees incurred by H Co. was without merit; even if it is assumed that § 42-150bb applied to the parties' contract, the statute does not contain language requiring an automatic or presumptive award of attorney's fees to a successful consumer in the amount incurred by the commercial party, but, rather, a consumer's award pursuant to the statute is limited to the terms of the contract, which, in this case, provided that the prevailing party in litigation enforcing the contract may recover reason- able attorney's fees. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to the parties' contract: although the plaintiff provided broad descriptions of the services rendered by her attorneys, she did not provide itemized invoices or submit any affidavits or other testimony from them to demonstrate with sufficient detail that they had provided particular services, and, therefore, she left the trial court to rely solely on her representations in her affidavit, her brief descriptions of the attorneys' services, and the retainer letters appended as exhibits, which evidentiary showing rendered her motion little more than a bare request for the fees listed; moreover, this court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in denying her request for costs, which was embedded in her request for attorney's fees, as it was inadequately briefed, the plaintiff having failed to include in her principal appellate brief any analysis as to the costs she was seeking to recover, the authority pursuant to which they are taxable, and how the documen- tation she submitted to the trial court was sufficient to support the requested award. Argued January 11—officially released October 4, 2022

The plaintiffs, who were allegedly victims of sexual contact with and exploi- tation by the defendant while they were minors, sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, assault and battery. Prior to trial, the parties entered into confidential settlement agreements, which included waiver provisions that provided that, in the event of a default by the defendant, the parties consented to the reinstatement of the action to the docket to enforce the agreements and waived any objection to the trial court's continuing jurisdiction beyond four months otherwise proscribed by statute (§ 52-212a). In accordance with the settlement agreements, the plaintiffs withdrew the action in November, 2019. In April, 2020, the defendant failed to make a payment pursuant to the agreements, and the plaintiffs filed a motion to restore the action to the docket. The defendant objected, claiming that his performance was excused due to breaches of the settlement agreements by the plain- tiffs and their counsel. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to restore and, thereafter, denied the plaintiffs' motions for reargument/reconsider- ation, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. The trial court thereafter marked off the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement agreements, stayed the proceedings, and denied their motion to reconsider, and the plaintiffs filed an amended appeal. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to restore the case to the docket: although the basis for the court's ruling was ambiguous, as it was not clear whether the court found that it did not have the power to grant the plaintiffs' untimely motion to restore because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate fraud or whether it exercised its discretion in denying the motion because it determined the matter was not amenable to summary disposition and should be adjudicated in a breach of contract action, the plaintiffs did not seek an articulation of the court's decision and, thus, this court assumed the court acted properly; moreover, contrary to the plaintiffs' claim that the court ignored the settlement agreements' four month waiver provisions in denying the motion to restore, the court specifically referenced that provision and never found as a predicate to the application of the waiver provisions that the defendant was in default; furthermore, the parties remained free to bring a separate action for breach of contract to address their claims. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' amended motion to reargue and reconsider its denial of their motion to restore the case to the docket, this court having determination that the trial court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion to restore; the court reasonably could have rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the waiver provisions applied, as both the plaintiffs and the defendant claimed a breach of the agreements by the other and the court had been presented with conflicting evidence and arguments on that issue. 3. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improperly failed to hold a hearing in accordance with Audubon Parking Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc. (225 Conn. 804), as that case was inapplicable to the facts of this case: as the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to restore the matter to the docket, its failure to conduct a hearing to make findings as to the enforceability of the settlement agreements was not improper, as the court could not have conducted a hearing on a matter that had been erased from the docket. 4. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court lacked the authority to refuse to rule on their motion to enforce the settlement agreements; the case had not been restored to the docket and, thus, there was no pending matter in which the plaintiffs properly could file a motion to enforce the settlement agreements. 5. This court declined to review the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly denied their motion to set aside the appellate stay and to order enforcement of the settlement agreements, as this court had denied the relief requested in the plaintiffs' motion for review of the denial of their motion to terminate the appellate stay. Argued May 16—officially released October 4, 2022

The plaintiff, the nephew of the decedent, appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant R, in her capacity as executrix of the estate of the decedent. The decedent left a detailed, unambiguous will in which she made specific monetary bequests to various individuals and entities. She also directed that R sell her real property and divide the net proceeds among certain of the defendants, namely, her surviving stepsons, S and W, and H, the wife of her deceased stepson. The decedent further specified that 10 percent of her residuary estate should go to the plaintiff and that the remainder should go to S, W, H, and their defendant children in varying percentages. The estate had insufficient funds to satisfy the specific monetary bequests and administrative costs, and, accordingly, the residual beneficiaries, includ- ing the plaintiff, did not receive residuary distributions. The decedent had an individual retirement account valued at more than $2 million that did not pass through the will because it named S, W, and H as designated beneficiaries. The plaintiff commenced this action, alleging that the decedent had mistakenly believed that the retirement account was a probate asset subject to distribution under her will, that she had relied on such mistaken assumption in making the numerous bequests in her will, and that the plaintiff was damaged by her mistaken belief. He argued that the provision of the will that provided for the distribution of the net proceeds from the sale of the decedent's real property should be subject to equitable abatement to fund his claim for monetary dam- ages. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court did not err in refusing to consider the plaintiff's request for an equitable remedy: the court did not err in failing to adhere to its prior denial of a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint filed by S, W, and H because, under the law of the case doctrine, the court's interlocutory order deny- ing the motion to strike did not bind the court in its ultimate adjudication of the plaintiff's claim on the merits, and the fact that the same judge ruled on the motion to strike and conducted the trial did not render the court's denial of the motion any more binding; moreover, the plaintiff's contention that the trial court should have considered intrinsic evidence within the will pointing to the decedent's intent failed, as the will did not reference the retirement account, the plaintiff failed to identify or explain with any specificity the alleged intrinsic evidence, and the plaintiff's argument that provisions in the will establishing residuary beneficiaries constituted intrinsic evidence because the decedent would not have constructed the will with such provisions if she did not believe that the retirement account was a part of her probate estate was akin to the argument that our Supreme Court rejected in DiSesa v. Hickey (160 Conn. 250); furthermore, the plaintiff's argument that the trial court erred in failing to consider extrinsic evidence when assessing the intent of the decedent was unavailing because the evidence that the plaintiff relied on, namely, the testimony of the attorney who drafted the will, did not support the plaintiff's contention that such attorney had stated that the decedent held the mistaken belief that the will would control the disposition of her retirement account; additionally, the equitable remedy of reformation requested by the plaintiff was unavailable as a matter of law and this court declined to recognize it because our appel- late courts repeatedly have refused to recognize reformation of a will as a remedy and the defendant failed to provide any Connecticut case law to the contrary. Argued February 3—officially released October 4, 2022

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court modifying the defendant's alimony obligation. The parties' separation agreement, which was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, required the defendant to make weekly alimony payments of $2769.23 to the plaintiff, an amount that was nonmodifiable downward unless the defendant earned less than $350,000 in annual adjusted gross earnings. Adjusted gross earnings was defined in the separation agreement, in part, as gross business receipts less business expenses. The defendant claimed that a substantial decrease in his annual income from his dental practice as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a change in circumstances that warranted a reduction in his alimony payments. The trial court heard expert testimony that the parties presented from accountants about the defendant's financial circumstances and his receipt of $159,000 in loans and grants the federal government distrib- uted in 2020 to businesses nationwide to help offset their loss of income during the COVID-19 pandemic. Both parties' accountants believed that the federal government would forgive the full amount of the loans. The plaintiff's accountant, T, determined that the defendant would not incur any federal income tax obligation due to the government's forgiveness of the loans and that the defendant would benefit from the deduction of payroll expenses on his corporate tax return. The defendant's accoun- tant, L, determined that the defendant had adjusted gross earnings of $240,123 in 2020, which did not include the funds received from the federal government, and that the proceeds of the loans would not reduce the defendant's expenses or be considered income or forgiveness of debt. The court concluded that the defendant had established a change in circumstances on the basis of L's determination that the defendant had adjusted gross earnings of $240,123 in 2020. The court reasoned that the federal funds were intended as one-time emergency loans that should not be considered as ordinary income. The court reduced the defendant's weekly alimony payment to $1038 and required the plaintiff to reimburse him for his overpayment of $34,853 in alimony. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court's conclusion that the defendant had established a change in circumstances was incorrect as a result of the court's failure to include the federal funds in its calculation of his adjusted gross earnings. Held: 1. The trial court improperly calculated the defendant's adjusted gross earn- ings by failing to include the federal funds he received, and, because the court's finding of a substantial change in circumstances was predi- cated on that incorrect calculation, the court's modification of his ali- mony obligation had to be reversed and the case remanded for a new modification hearing: the federal funds constituted gross business receipts within the separation agreement's definition of adjusted gross earnings and, thus, cash flow that was transferred into the defendant's business; moreover, the funds were virtually indistinguishable from ordi- nary business receipts, and the trial court understood that the federal government intended the funds to be essentially replacement business income; furthermore, despite the defendant's contention to the contrary, this court was not convinced that the funds should be excluded from gross business receipts merely because the federal government dis- bursed them for targeted purposes or intended them to be one-time or emergency disbursements. 2. The trial court's acceptance of L's calculation as to the defendant's $7974.18 tax deduction for disability insurance payments in 2020 was clearly erroneous, as that finding was not supported by the evidence: L testified that he did not know the exact amount the defendant spent on disability insurance as part of the defendant's business overhead, and both L and the defendant testified that some portion of the $7974.18 should have been added back into the defendant's adjusted gross earn- ings as defined in the parties' separation agreement. Argued May 12—officially released October 4, 2022

The defendant mother appealed to this court from the trial court's adjudica- tion of several postjudgment motions for modification of custody and visitation orders relating to the parties' minor child and its issuance of additional orders related to the same. After the plaintiff father filed a custody application, the trial court approved an agreement between the parties, who had never been married, which provided that they would share joint legal custody of the child, with the child's primary residence being with the mother, and set forth a parenting schedule. Approximately one year later, the father filed a postjudgment motion to modify, requesting an increase in overnight visits and that his residence be designated as the child's primary residence for school purposes. There- after, the parties executed stipulation agreements revising the parenting schedule, which the trial court approved. The mother then filed a post- judgment motion for modification, seeking to impose certain restrictions on the father's parenting time. The trial court heard evidentiary hearings on the parties' motions for modification. Thereafter, it filed interim orders indicating, inter alia, that the parties would continue to share joint legal and physical custody of the child and were required to comply with the applicable rule of practice (§ 25-26 (g)) in filing any future motions for modification. A few months later, in response to health concerns relating to the COVID-19 pandemic, the mother filed an applica- tion for an emergency ex parte order of custody, along with a second postjudgment motion for modification, which requested that the court temporarily deny the father visitation. The trial court declined to award ex parte relief but ordered a hearing to be held on the application and the motion. That hearing was postponed and never rescheduled. Thereafter, the trial court denied the mother's second modification motion and issued final orders relating to the parties' initial modification motions, which incorporated the interim orders. The final orders pro- vided, inter alia, that the parties would continue to share joint legal and physical custody of the child, with the father's residence serving as the child's primary residence for school purposes and required the parties to file a request for leave pursuant to Practice Book § 25-26 (g), in the event that they wished to modify the final orders. The mother appealed and, after being granted leave by the trial court, filed two additional postjudgment motions for modification, seeking to modify the final orders with respect to the parenting schedule and the child's primary residence for school purposes. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the mother's additional modification motions, and the mother amended her appeal to encompass that denial. Held: 1. The trial court did not commit error in issuing the interim orders or the final orders: a. The defendant mother's claim that the trial court improperly issued interim orders was moot: the interim orders ceased to exist after they were subsumed by the final orders, and, accordingly, there was no practi- cal relief that the trial court could afford the mother with respect to the interim orders; moreover, the ''capable of repetition, yet evading review'' exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply because the mother failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable likelihood that the issue presented would arise again in the future. b. The defendant mother's claim that the trial court committed error in issuing the final orders was unavailing: in issuing the final orders, the court considered the child's best interests as required by the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 46b-56), and such orders were not fatally flawed merely because they incorporated the interim orders, which the mother argued were defective; moreover, the mother's alternative argument that, even if it is assumed that the interim orders properly modified the prior custody and visitation orders, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in issuing the final orders was unavailing, as, at the time of issuance, the court plainly stated that the interim orders were temporary in nature and that final orders disposing of the initial orders were forth- coming, and, accordingly, the interim orders did not constitute prior court orders that required a material change in circumstances for modification; furthermore, the mother failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in transferring the child's primary residence for school purposes from the mother to the plaintiff father because, in issuing its orders, the court did not engage in speculation but, rather, properly considered the child's best interests, and its determination was supported by the guardian ad litem's testimony and was reasonable despite the amount of time between the issuance of the order and the start of the child's schooling in light of the history of extensive litigation between the parties; additionally, the mother failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the order pursuant to Practice Book § 25-26 (g), requiring the parties to seek leave of the court before filing motions for modification of the final orders for a period of five years because the order applied to both parties, the parties had filed numerous modification motions following the initial judgment, and the guardian ad litem had testified in favor of the order, considering it to be appropriate in light of the length of the litigation, the financial and emotional toll it was taking on the parties, and her belief that the child had been affected by the distress the litigation caused to the parties. 2. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant mother's two modifica- tion motions filed after the issuance of the final orders: that court applied the correct legal standard in denying the two modification motions, as it properly determined that there had been no material change in circumstances since the date the final orders were issued, and, in arguing that exigent circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic, war- ranted the court's consideration of circumstances prior to the issuance of the final orders, the mother was essentially attempting to use her motions to mount an improper collateral attack on the final orders; moreover, the mother's alternative argument, that the trial court improp- erly determined that she had failed to demonstrate that a material change in circumstances had occurred since the issuance of the final orders, was unavailing because the court was free to credit or reject all or part of the conflicting testimony regarding such change in circumstances that was presented by the parties. 3. The defendant mother's claim that the trial court improperly had denied her second modification motion, which she had filed between the issu- ance of the interim orders and the final orders, was moot: the only practical relief this court could have afforded the mother was a remand to the trial court with direction to conduct an evidentiary hearing, which would have been superfluous because the mother's second modification motion raised the same issues that were encompassed by one of the modification motions she filed after the issuance of the final orders, and the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on that motion, giving the mother the opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence as to those issues; accordingly, the mother already had received the relief that she was seeking. Argued March 7—officially released October 11, 2022

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the decision by the defendant board of assessment appeals upholding the denial of the plaintiff's appli- cation for a charitable organization real property tax exemption pursuant to statute (§ 12-81 (7)). The plaintiff, a tax-exempt charitable organiza- tion for federal tax purposes, used the subject property to engage in commercial lending, consumer lending, loan servicing and third-party contract administration. The plaintiff provided to developers and home- owners financial services, inter alia, to improve and increase the supply of affordable housing and, through a subsidiary, contracted with utility companies to administer energy efficient loan programs. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal from the board's decision, and the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly concluded that, because it is not organized exclusively and the property is not used exclusively for charitable purposes, the property is not tax-exempt pursuant to § 12-81 (7). Held that the trial court prop- erly dismissed the plaintiff's appeal from the board's decision: pursuant to § 12-81 (7) and as required by the test set forth in Isaiah 61:1, Inc. v. Bridgeport (270 Conn. 69), and further explicated in St. Joseph's Living Center, Inc. v. Windham (290 Conn. 695), for a property to receive a charitable tax-exempt status, it must be owned by or be held in trust for a corporation organized exclusively for charitable purposes and used exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes, and the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the subject property was not used exclusively for charitable purposes as the plaintiff's activities involved in administering energy efficient loan programs at the subject property, including marketing, intake and processing of applications, reporting to investors, and collecting delinquent accounts for utility companies, benefited consumers, commercial entities and industrial customers without the imposition of income limitations and any demon- stration of financial need and, thus, were not charitable. Argued May 25—officially released October 11, 2022

The plaintiff, P, sought to recover damages from the defendant, S Co., for S Co.'s breach of the parties' employment contract in connection with S Co.'s termination of P's employment. P was hired by S Co. in 2012, pursuant to an employment contract for a term of two years, and his contract was renewed in 2013 for an additional term of two years. In October, 2015, S Co. approved and executed a new employment contract with P for an additional term of two years, to begin on January 25, 2016. Although the 2015 contract was dated October 12, 2015, the board of S Co. approved the contract on October 13, 2015, at a special meeting. In December, 2015, S Co. notified P that his employment would be termi- nated as of January 25, 2016, the date his 2015 contract was to begin. Following a bench trial, the parties executed a joint stipulation providing for an extension of the statutory (§ 51-183b) 120 day deadline for the trial court to render a decision. The trial court issued its memorandum of decision past the agreed upon extended deadline, rendering judgment for S Co. P moved to open and vacate the judgment and for a new trial, which the trial court granted. A new bench trial was held, and the trial court rendered judgment for P. On S Co.'s appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly granted P's motion to open and vacate the judg- ment rendered in the first trial as that court's finding that P did not waive his right to object to the untimely decision was not clearly erroneous: P was under no duty to speak or to protest after the court failed to issue a decision by the agreed upon deadline, prejudgment silence alone was not sufficient to support a finding of waiver under § 51-183b, as there must have been some other act or conduct that either delayed the start of the deadline, created a duty to protest in the silent party or served as an affirmative act of waiver or consent, and S Co. was unable to identify any such act or conduct by P that supported a finding of waiver; moreover, S Co.'s attempt to draw a distinction between a party's silence after the statutory 120 day deadline had passed and after an agreed upon extension of that deadline had passed was unpersuasive, as the same considerations applied in either situation. 2. S Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court violated the parol evidence rule by relying on the testimony of witnesses rather than the written employment contract in finding that the 2015 contract was executed on October 13, 2015, and was valid and enforceable; because a party may use extrinsic evidence to prove that a purported contract never came into existence, it followed that a party may do so to prove that a contract, in fact, existed, and, because the date on which the contract was approved and executed was not a negotiated term of the contract, the evidence admitted was not used to vary or contradict any terms of the contract. 3. S Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly awarded prejudgment interest on P's award for back pay under the statutory (§ 37-3a) provision providing for an award of interest for the wrongful detention of money: S Co. breached the contract for the payment of wages by preventing P from performing fully under the contract, the damages awarded here were ascertainable at the time of S Co.'s breach pursuant to the terms of the 2015 contract, and, therefore, contrary to S Co.'s claim, the damages sought were not akin to damages in a personal injury action; moreover, although S Co. emphasized that P was not seeking liquidated damages under the contract and therefore § 37-3a did not apply, much like liquidated damages, the award for unpaid wages was determined by the terms of the contract governing the amount of P's salary, and the court awarded interest on P's weekly salary as each payment would have become due under the terms of the 2015 contract if P had been allowed to perform under it. Argued May 10—officially released October 11, 2022

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the named defendant, L. Following the trial court's rendering of a judgment of foreclosure by sale, L filed, with the consent of the plaintiff, a motion to open the judgment to convert it to a judgment of strict foreclosure pursuant to certain terms and conditions set forth in a stipulation filed by the parties with the court. The court granted the motion to open, approved the stipulation, and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. After the law days had passed without redemption and title to the property vested in the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed an application for an execution of ejectment, naming L and her two adult children as the persons in possession of the property. The court clerk issued an order rejecting the application on the ground that it included persons who were not named as parties in the foreclosure action. The plaintiff filed a motion to reargue the clerk's rejection of its application, which the court denied, concluding, inter alia, that permitting the ejectment to proceed against L's adult children would deprive them of due process. The plaintiff subsequently appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court erred in denying its motion to reargue the clerk's rejection of its application for an execution of ejectment. Following oral argument before this court but before this court rendered its judgment, the plaintiff obtained from the trial court an execution of ejectment in this action as to L and an execution of ejectment in an omitted party action as to L's adult children. This court thereafter ordered supplemen- tal briefing on the issue of mootness. Held that the plaintiff's claim was moot, and its appeal was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: because, during the pendency of this appeal, the plaintiff obtained the very relief it requested in its appeal, there was no practical relief that could be afforded to the plaintiff; moreover, the plaintiff's case did not fall within the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine because the challenged action, namely, the trial court's declining to eject nonparties from the subject property, was not, by its very nature, of limited duration, as the plaintiff's appeal was rendered moot not due to the inherently limited duration of the proceed- ing but due to the plaintiff's actions in pursuing its requested relief through the alternative avenue of an omitted party action. Argued February 9—officially released October 11, 2022

The acquittee, who had been found not guilty of the crime of murder by reason of mental disease or defect, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his application for discharge from the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. Held that the trial court properly denied the acquittee's application for discharge from the jurisdiction of the board, the record having contained evidence to support the court's finding that if the acquittee were to be discharged, he would constitute a danger to himself or others: in its memorandum of decision, the court indicated that it had considered the relevant evidence in light of the entire record available to it, including testimony of various medical professionals and the acquittee and the board's writ- ten report, evidence that chronicled, inter alia, the acquittee's history of rule breaking behavior, which contributed to his decompensation in supervised settings, and, in light of that evidence, the court reasonably could have inferred that, if the acquittee became noncompliant with his treatment plan, his mental illness likely would return to a florid state and he would present a danger to himself and others; moreover, even though the court expressly acknowledged testimony from certain wit- nesses that the acquittee willingly accepted treatment and acknowledged the importance of continuing to take his medication as prescribed, the court, as the fact finder, was free to find other testimony more compel- ling; furthermore, contrary to the acquittee's claims that the trial court relied solely on a misunderstanding in a treatment provider's testimony and improperly relied on the board's report, this court was not persuaded that the court's conclusion with respect to certain expert testimony violated law, logic, or reason, or otherwise was inconsistent with the subordinate facts of the case, and its reliance on the board's report was proper, as the report included a summary of the acquittee's status, treatment, and actions from the date of his initial commitment to the date the report was filed, a period of nearly twenty-seven years. Argued February 7—officially released October 18, 2022