Volume 216 — United States Reports

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of certain features of the Bush act, which was under consideration in the preceding case, are stated in the opinion.

Held: construing the statutes of Georgia relating to attachments and the decisions of the highest court of the State that it was unnecessary to decide those questions, because they had. been waived by the conduct of the railway company in giving a replevy bond and answering &c., without protestation.

APPICAL FROM Til 10 CIliClUT COURT OP Till' UNITED STATES EOR THE DISTRICT OE KANSAS. The facts are stated in the opinion. The Circuit Court in dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction with costs erred. If it has not jurisdiction it cannot give costs. 2 Bates’ Fed. Eq. Pro, 873; Inglee v‘. Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363; Hornthall v. Keary, 9 Wall. 566; Blacklock v. Small, 127 U. S. 96; May’s U. S.‘Sup. Ct. Prac. 5; M,ayor v. Cooper, 6 •Wall. 247. ..

<p>ERROR. TO THE SUPREME COURT OP APPEALS OP THE STATE OP WEST VIRGINIA.</p> <p>The facts are stated.ill the opinion.</p>

Held: to . . . (7) cause the estates of bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money and distributed, and determine controversies in relation thereto, except as herein otherwise provided; . . . (15) make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this act; . . .

The facts are stated in the opinion. The Circuit Court had jurisdiction. The judgments against the corporation ón which the bill is’based were v valid under the state law and the assignee had title to all the judgments and could maintain an action against the directors therefor as in the aggregate the claims exceeded $2,000. Bowden v. Burnham, 59 Fed. Rep. 752; Chase v. Sheldon Roller-Mills, 56 Fed.

By the act of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, entitled “An Act to Regulate the Manner in which Common Carriers doing Business in this State shall Adjust Freight Charges and Claims for Loss of or Damage to Freight,” approved February 23,1903 (No. 50, Acts of S. C. 1903, p. 81), it was enacted: “Section 1.

Held: .by assignment from Bacon, 461 shares of the stock .of the Wagon Company and 253 shares of the Waterloo Bank, as continuing collateral security for any existing of future indebtedness of Bacon or the Wagon Company.

Held: and determined by the Supreme or other final appellate court of such State as the successor of said Territorial Supreme Court and appellate court, subject to the same right to review upon appeal or error to the Supreme Court of the United States now allowed from the Supreme or appellate courts of a State under existing larvs.

The facts which involve the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Wingo Act of Arkansas applicable to for- , eign corporations are stated in the opinion.' A State has plenary power to prescribe such terms as pleases it upon which foreign corporations may enter and do business..

<p>Individuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or a criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action; and such an action is not prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123.</p>

Claimant’s petition alleged a good cause of action. His office was property under the Spanish law. It was not impaired during the military' occupation of Porto Rico. The Treaty of Paris confirmed the claimant’s property. The United States deprived the claimant of his property after the Treaty of Paris and became liable to compensate him for the value thereof. O’Reilly v. Brooke, 209 U. S. 45, is not decisive of this case.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The court below-erred in refusing the offer of the Bridge Company to prove that the bridge was not an unreasonable obstruction to the navigation of the river, and that the changes in the bridge ordered by the Secretary of War were not necessary; and in also ruling that the proceedings before the Secretary of War were conclusive, and not subject to the examination of the courts.

The facts are stated in the opinion. ■ The rule, that corporations have no powers except those1, expressly conferred by law or incidental to the exercise of their express powers, is , peculiarly applicable to banks. Logan C-Qunty Bank v. Townsend, 139 TL S. 67; California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.. S. 362, 36.6.

Held: owned, or possessed by either eom-j >any. Both' companies made default in the payment of the indebtedness secured by these instruments and they were duly *219 foreclosed In the manner prescribed by law, John B. Barnes, for himself and associates, being the purchaser at the sale made, under the foreclosure as to the branch line.

Held: among other things, that the charter provisions of the old Minnesota and'Pacific Company, upon which the Great Northern Company relied, did not constitute an irrepealable contract which passed unimpaired to the successors of that company; and further, that the gross earnings tax system first came into Ipgal existence in this State by force of the consti *239 tutional amendment of 1871 (Laws, 1871, p. 41, c. 18), and…

' On June 22, 1906, the Central Trust Company, a corporation engaged in the mining, promoting, real estate and trust business, filed its bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois to compel the defendant, Frederick A. Busse, postmaster at Chicago, to deliver to it certain mail-matter which it claims it was entitled to receive and which he wrongfully delivered'to the defendant the Central Trust Company of Illinois.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a taxing law of the State of Maryland and the jurisdiction of this court to consider the same on writ of error, are stated in the opinion.

. This is an appeal from a decree of the District .Court of the United States for Porto Rico, upon a bill of review, vacating and annulling a decree entered by that court in an equity cause, and dismissing the bill of complaint in said causo without prejudice. The bill in the equity cause referred to was filed in Decém-ber, 1900. The present appellants were complainants. .

The facts aré stated in the opinion. The neglect or refusal of accused to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. Military Order, No. 58, of April-23, 1900,- 1 Pub. Laws Phil.

The facts, which involve the liability of a fire insurance company on a policy of insurance, are stated in the opinion. The action is governed by the law of Pennsylvania. 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1349; Mann v. Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 280; Musser v. Stauffer, 192 Pa. St. 398; Judiciary Act of '1789, c. 20, §34. The knowledge and.act of an insurance company’s local agent connected with the risk is the knowl- . edge and act of the company itself.

Thb facts are stated in the opinion. Under the bankruptcy. law of 1867 this court assumed jurisdiction, inter alia, of the following c,ases on writs of. error to state courts: Forsythe v. Vehmeyer, 177 U.- S. 177; Sharpe v. Doyle, 102 U. S. 686; Factors’ cfee. Co. v. Murphy, lll'U. S. 738, 741; Maysx\. Fritton, 131 U. S. cxiv; Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.-S. 513, 518; Williams v. Heard, 140 U. S. 529; Traer v. .

Held: following the decisions of the territorial court, that a statute! of New Mexico carving a new county out of an existing one did not create a vacancy in an office of the original county because the incumbent did not reside in that portion of the county which remained.

<p>API’10AIi FROM' THIO SUPREME COURT OF THIO TERRITORY OF NE\V MEXICO. ' ’</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

SEVENTH CIRCUIT. The facts are stated in the opinion. By the special -finding in this case palm oil is shown to be one of the unartificially colored legal component parts of oleomargarine referred to in the Treasury Department’s Regulations as to artificial coloration of June 2, 1902. This a fair and reasonable interpretation 'consistent with the 'language and purpose of the statute and should not be lightly departed from. United States v. 1412 Gallons, 10 Blatchf. 428.

The facts are stated in the .opinion. Thd ordinance is invalid because it goes., beyond the necessities of the case. The determination by legislative bodies as to the necessity of the exercise of the police power is hot final nor conclusive. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 592; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223; Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313.

<p>APPEALS PROM THE SUPREME COURT OE THE TERRITORY OE HAWAII.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The authority for cutting timber from the public domain under the act of June 3, 1878, c. 150} 20 Stat. 88, extends only to lands valuable for minerals.and not to lands adjacent thereto and not actually valuable for minerals. .</p> <p>Although the purpose of a statute may be defeated by its cualifica- ■’ lions, courts, in construing it, are bound by words that are explicit and -unmistakable- in meaning.</p>

The facts, which involve the right of the owners of the' Hunyadi Janos Springs to enjoin the sale of artificial Plunyadi water, are stated in the opinion. • Petitioner has always been solicitous in suppressing the use of the Hunyadi name on any artificial products. See Hunyadi Case, 179 U. S. 19; Flower Mills. Co. v: Eagle, 86 Fed. Rep. 608; Thackeray v. Saxlehner, 125 Fed. Rep. 911. Appellees’ manufactured product is not artificial Hunyadi water.

<p>Quaere, and not. decided, -whether under § 70e of the Bankruptcy -Act the suits therein referred to can be brought in the bankruptcy court without the consent of the defendant. See contrary views expressed In Hull v. Burr, 153 Fed. Itep. 945; Hurley v. Devlin, 149 ' Fed. Rep. 268,</p> <p>Section 70e of ■ the Bankruptcy Act provides for avoiding transfer of the bankrupt’s property which his creditors might have avoided, and for’recovery of such property, or its value from persons not bona fide holders for value. It does.not, either with or without consent of defendant, give the bankruptcy court jurisdiction of a suit to recover property held by defendant but which, if the allegations of the complaint áre true, belonged to the bankrupt and passed to the trustee.</p> <p>Thte bankruptcy court has not jurisdiction of a suit against a bank to ■ recover securities held by it for indebtedness of the bankrupt on the ground that the debt had been paid.</p>

<p>An attempt to introduce a Federal question into the record for the first time by petition for rehearing is too late unless the state court entertains and in fact passes upon it.</p> <p>A denial of a petition for rehearing by the state court “after mature consideration” does not amount to any more than a denial of the motion, and does not show that the Federal question was considered or passed on. It affords no basis for jurisdiction of this court on writ of error.</p>

<p>Equal protection- of the laws means subjection to equal laws applying alike to all in the same situation.</p> <p>A corporation is“a person within the meaning of the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> <p>A corporation which comes into a State other than that in which it is created, pays taxes thereto and acquires property arid carries on business therein, is within the jurisdiction of that State, and, under the Fourteenth Amendment, entitled to protection against any statute of that State that denies to it the*cqual protcctioh of the laws.</p> <p>Arbitrary selection cannot be justified by calling it classification in the absence of real distinction on a substantial basis; and a classifi-. cation for taxation that divides. corporations doing exactly the . same business with the same kind of property into foreign and domestic is arbitrary and a denial of équai.protection of the laws.</p> <p>Whatever power a State may have to exclude or determine the terms of the admission of foreign corporations not already within its borders, it cannot subject á foreign corporation which has already come into the State in compliance with its laws and has acquired property of a fixed and permanent nature to a new and additional franchise tax for the privilege of doing business which is' not imposed upon domestic- corporations. It would.be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the- laws under the Fourteenth Amendment; and so held as to the franchise tax on foreign corporations bf Alabama of 1907^ i_.-</p>

<p>.ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF ALABAMA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: either, that the whole of the capital was exempt in whatever form invested, or so much of the investment 'as coiTesponded in value to the authorized - capital stock. City of Augusta v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Company, 26 Georgia, 651, 662 et.seq.; The State of Georgia v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Company, 54 Georgia, 423; Goldsmith, Comptroller &c., v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Company, 62 Georgia, 485.

From the facts certified it appears that the Toxaway Hotel Company was, in May, 1905, duly incorporated under the laws of Georgia.

The Monongahela Construction Company, a corporation organized under the iaw of Pennsylvania, was, in an involuntary proceeding; adjudged a bankrupt in the District Cóürt .for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Upon a petition for review, filed by a judgment creditor, the adjudication was set aside upon the ground that the construction company was not “a "corporation -engaged principally in manufacturing,” as found by tl;ie bankrupt court.

<p>On the organization of a Territory into a State, Congress may — as it did by the Oklahoma enabling act- — transfer the jurisdiction of general crimes committed in districts over which the United States retains exclusive jurisdiction from territorial to Federal .courts, and may extend such jurisdiction to crimes' committed before and after the enabling act. See United States v. Brown, 74 Fed. Rep. 43.</p> <p>A statute creating a court to take jurisdiction of crimes will not be construed, if another construction is admissible, so as to leave a judicial chasm; and so held that under the Oklahoma enabling act the Federal court had jurisdiction of certain specified crimes committed after the enabling act was passed and before the State was admitted.</p> <p>The reason of a law as indicated by its general terms should prevail over its letter when strict adherence to the latter will defeat the plain purpose of the law.</p> <p>The granting or denying of a new trial is a matter not assignable as error. Bucklin v. United States, 159 U. S. 682.</p> <p>An assignment of error that is double is bad for that reason.</p> <p>Continuances are within the discretion of the trial court; and, in the absence of gross abuse, the action of the lower court will not be disturbed.</p> <p>Assignments of error based on overruling objections to sufficiency of the indictment and of admission of any evidence because thé indictment is bad cannot be made on writ of error for the first timé.</p> <p>Assignments of error for rejection or admission of evidence cannot be considered in absence of bill of exceptions. Storm v. United States, 94 U. S. 76.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The New York indictments are still pending; they have not been nolle prossed or quashed; they do not charge that the crime was committéd in one district and completed in another; or, in the District of Columbia and completed in New York; but each alleges that the completed acts of conspiracy took place within their respective jurisdictions.</p> <p>The conspiracy itself is the gist of the offense, and when the Government charged the commission of the offense in New York it elected its forum and the defendant is, constitutionally, entitled to be there tried.</p> <p>It has become quite the habit of late in criminal prosecutions for the Government to seek the trial in the District of Columbia, presumably because the defendants are taken to a foreign jurisdiction where they are unknown and subjected to enormous expense. This oppressive use of the criminal statutes invades the constitutional right of a citizen to a speedy trial in the district of his residence, provided, as in this case, the crime of which he stands accused was there committed.</p> <p>There is no reason why he should not, and every reason— both constitutional and statutory — why he should.be tried in New York. See Tinsley v. Treat, 205 U. S. 20; United States v. Marx, 122 Fed. Rep. 964; United States v. Sauer, 88 Fed. Rep. 249.</p> <p>The accused should not be.removed if the court to which he is to be removed has no jurisdiction, and in this case the courts of the District of Columbia have no jurisdiction as the Government alleges and has charged the same offense to have been committed and completed in New York. Nashville cfee. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96; In re Palliser, .136 U. S. 257; Horner v. United States, 143 U. S. 207; Hyde v. Shine, 199 U. S. 62; Georgia v. Bolton, 11 Fed. Rep. 217; United Stales v. Hacked, 29'Fed. Rep. 848; In re Rosdeitscher, 33 Fed. Rep. 657; Ex parte Pritchard, 43 Fed. Rep. 915; In re Kelley, 46 Fed. Rep. 654; In re King, 51 Fed."Rep. 434; United States v. Fowkes, 53 Fed. Rep. 13; United States v. Howell, 56 Fed. Rep; 21; 'United States v. Peterson, 64 Fed. Rep. 145; In re Huntington, 68 Fed. Rep. 881; Ex parte Ballinger, 88 Fed. Rep. 781 ¡ United States v. Murphy, 91 Fed. Rep. 120; In re Belknap, 96 Fed. Rep. 614; United States v. Alberty, 24 Fed. Cas. 765; United States v. Bickford, 24 Fed. Cas. 1144; United States v. Bird, 24 Fed. Cas. 1148; United States v. Britton, 24 Fed. Cas. 1239; United States v. Jackalow, 1 Black, 484.</p> <p>The indictments did not confer jurisdiction upon the commissioner to commit the defendant for removal, and there was an entire absence of probable cause as the indictments do not allege an illegal conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States.</p> <p>Only crimes and offenses specifically enumerated by statute are indictable.- United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168-174. When the crime charged is conspiracy to do a criminal act, it must be shown that the act which is the purpose and object of the conspiracy is itself a violation of law.- Conrad v. United States, 127 Fed. Rep. 798; United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. Rep. '425;' Rev. Stat., § 5440. Charging conspiracy to violate §5451 must charge'an intent to accomplish certain acts which when performed would violate § 5451.</p> <p>'There was no bribery as defined in § 5451 in this case. A conditional offer and promise based upon the success of a future event, where speculation was not successful and the prom-isee receives nothing is not a violation of § 5451. United States v. Greene, 136 Fed. Rep. .651; United States v. Grafton, 25 Fed. Cas. 681; United States v. Kessell, 62 Fed. Rep. 57.</p> <p>A conspiracy to do a lawful act is not an illegal conspiracy under § 5440. The conspiracy must be to commit an offense, punishable by statute. Goldfield Mines Company v. Miners’ Union, 159 .Fed. Rép. 500; United States v. Johnson, 26 Fed. Rep. 682; United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. Rep. 896; United States v. Benson, 70 Fed. Rep. 594; Drake v. Stewart, 76 Fed. . Rep. 142. The intent to violate the law is the gravamen of the offense, and must bé distinctly averred. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 558; United States v. Carll, 105 U. >S. 612; Bannon & Mulkey v. United States, 156 U. S. 466; United States v. Jackson, 25 Fed. Rep. 548; United States v. Van Lueven, 62 Fed. Rep. 69; McCarty v. United States. 101 Fed. Rep. 1Í3; United States v. Post, 113 Fed. Rep. 854; United States v. Greene, 136 Fed.’ Rep. 658; United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483, 486; Pettibóne v. United States, 148 U. S. 202; United States v. Fox,,95 U. S. 670; People v. Lohman, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 218.</p> <p>.The indictments do not allege an .illegal conspiracy “to defraud the United States-in any manner or for any purpose.” Curley v. United States, 130 Fed. Rep. 1;. United States v. Morse, 161 Fed. Rep. 429; Hyde v. Shine, 199 U. S’. §2) United States ,v. Keitel, 211U. S. 370, can be distinguished, as there the government policy was interfered with and acts were performed . directly- contravening the spirit and letter of the statutes.. To be á crime to deprive the- United States of a right or an official function, the right'must be one defined by law and the official function one imposed by law. ' See new Federal Penal Code, §§123 and 124. . .</p> <p>No case has yet applied the statute unless theraets complained of constituted the deprivation of a, right or duty imposed upon a department of-the Government by statute, or that the-acts operated to deprive the Government of property •of the right of property. United States v. Cruikshanlc, 92 U. S. 542; United States v'. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360; United States v. Hirsch, 100 U. S. 35; Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539; France V. United States, 164. U. S. 676; Re Wolf, 26 Fed. Rep. 611; United States v. Reichert, 32 Fed. Rep. 142; United States v. Milkier, 36 Fed. Rep. 891; United States v. Purchel, 116 Fed.' Rep.-142; United States v. Thomas, 145 Fed. Rep. 79; United States v. Taffe, 186 Fed. Rep. 113. •</p> <p>Penal laws must be strictly construed and if there is any doubt concerning the application of a criminal statute, it must be resolved in favor of the defendant. Williamson v.' United ■States, 207 U. S. 425; Hamilton v. United Stales, 26 App. D. C. 382. '</p> <p>■ - The indictments do not aver an illegal conspiracy to defraud' the United States in the matter of making the reports untrue and. inaccurate.</p> <p>It is not a crime or offense to violate a custom, practice or regulation of-the head'of a.department of the Government unless such custom, practice or regulation has been authorized by statute, and its violation made penal by some general or special law. . A charge , of crime .could not be predicated upon the violation of a rule to keep information regarding the cotton crop secret as there is no statute authorizing the Secretary to make such a rule, nor any statute making its violation a criminal offense. There a,re no common law' offenses against the United States. United States v. Baton, 144 U. S. 677. While by Rev. Stat.,. § 161, the head of a department may prescribe' regulations not inconsistent with law for the government of his department, it is likewise true that in order to constitute .any act or set of acts, an offense, the act must be made criminal by statute.' United States v: Sandefuhr, 145 Feld!'Rep. 49;' Morrill v.'Jones, 106 U. S. 466;. United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. Rep. 425; Wilkins v. United Stales, 96 Fed. Rep. 837;. United States v. Maid, 116 Fed. Rep. 650; United States y. Blasing'dme, 116 Fed. Rép. 654; United States v. Matthews, 146 Fed. Rep. 306. See also Caha v. United States, 152 U. S. 211; Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425.</p> <p>The violation of a custom, cannot be made the basis of a criminal prosecution in the absence of any statute imposing any duty.</p> <p>None of the counts allege that the defendants knew, or had' reason to know, of any alleged custom, practice, regulation or rule of secrecy in the department; and knowledge not being alleged, and there being no presumption of knowledge, they cannot be held liable for criminal wrong-doing. Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia . juris non excusat. ■ Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 197; Wilkins v. United States, 96 Fed. Rep. 837. 'Regulations to have the force of law must be made by an executive department in pursuance of authority delegated by Congress and only when so promulgated, will the-coiirts take judicial notice of their existence. The existence of such rule is a fact and must be pleaded and proven as any other fact. United States v. Matthews, 146 Fed. Rep. 306.</p> <p>■ Holmes was not an officer of the United States nor a person acting for or on behalf of the United States in’ an official function under or by virtue of any department or office of the Government thereof. Nothing .was pending in connection with the cotton crop reports, which could by law be brought before him in an official capacity, or upon which his decision or action could be influenced. He was not charged with any duty whatever in connection with reports upon the cotton crop. As to who is an officer of the United States, see United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508; United States v. Smith, 124 U. S. 525; Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S. 310; United States v. McDonald, 72 Fed. Rep. 295; United States v. Cole, 130 Fed. Rep. 614; United States v. McCrory, 91 Fed. Rep. 295; United States v. Schlierholz, 137 Fed. Rep. 616; United States'v. Gibson, 47 Fed. Rep. 833;' United States v. Haas, 167 Fed. Rep. 211; United States v. Ingham, 97 Fed. Rep. 935.</p> <p>The words “official function,” as used in §5451, mean a duty imposed by law, and a charge of crime cannot be predicated upon an act not made an official function, obligation or duty by express command of law. If Holmes was a public officer, the indictments are defective, because he could not conspire with himself to bribe, influence, or induce himself to commit the alleged offense of misconduct. United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. Rep. 664. See also 2 McClain’s Cr. L., § 959; Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. St. 226; Miles y. Butler, 8 Washington, 194; S. C., 35 Pac. Rep. 1093; S. C., 25 L. R. A. 434; S. C., 40 Am. St. Rep. 900; 2 Wharton’s Cr. Law, § 1339; Chadwick v. United Statesi 141 Fed. Rep. 225; United States v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, 146 Fed. Rep. 298.</p> <p>There was no proof of the issuance of bench warrants or that defendants were wanted within the District of Columbia. Removal proceedings must be based upon the fact that the accused is wanted in the demanding jurisdiction and the absence of such proof is a jurisdictional defect.</p> <p>The history of the act and adjudicated cases show that it was the intention of Congress in this provision to assimilate all the1 proceedings for holding accused peisons to answer before a court of the United States to the proceedings provided for similar purposes by the laws of the State where the proceedings should take place. United States v. Martin, 17 Fed. Rep. 150; United States v. Tureaud, 20 Fed. Rep. 621; Marvin v. United States, 44 Fed. Rep. 405; Re Gourdin, 45 Fed. Rep. 842; United States v. Sauer, 73 Fed. Rep. 671; United States v. Sapinkoiv, 90 Fed. Rep. 654; United States v. Rundlett, 2 Curtis (U. S.), 41; United States v. Horton, 2 Dill. (U. S.) 94; Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch, 448; United States v. Burr, 2 Whel. Crim. (N. Y.) 573; United Slates v. Insley, 54 Fed. Rep. 223; Re Dana, 68 Fed. Rep. 895; United States v. Collins, 79 Fed. Rep. 65; Re Price, 83 Fed. Rep. 830; United States v. Price, 84 Fed. Rep. 636; Johnson v. United States, 87 Fed. Rep. 187; People v. Cramer, 22 App. Div. 396; Comfort v. Fulton, 13 Abb. Pr. 276; Blodgett v. Race, 18 Hun, 132; Tracy v. Seamens, 7 N. Y. 146.</p> <p>The law of New York requires the issuance of a bench warrant for the arrest of one indicted, and also for the arrest of one' sought to be extradited to another jurisdiction.</p> <p>The crimes and offenses were all barred by the statute of limitations. If any conspiracy existed at all with relation to the report of June, 1905, it was entered into in 1904, so that the acts of May 31, 1905, now alleged in the indictments as separate conspiracies, were mere overt acts of the original conspiracy, and the statute of limitations became a bar in August, 1907. The indictments were found in May, 1908. Re Snow, 120 U. S. 282, and see United States v. Kessel and American Sugar Refining Company (not yet reported).</p> <p>A conspiracy formed' under § 5440, Rev. Stat., is a completed crime when an overt act has been committed to effect the object of the conspiracy. United States v. Irvine, 98 U. 8. 450; Pettibone v. United States, 148 U. S. 97; Dealy v. United States, .152 U. S. 539; United States v. Owen, 32 Fed. Rep. 534; United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. Rep. 896; United States v. McCord; 72 Fed. Rep. 159; Berkowitz v. United States, 93 Fed. Rep. 452; United States v. Greene, 100 Fed. Rep. 941; United Slates v. Biggs, 157 Fed. Rep. 204; United States v. Black, 160 Fed. Rep. 4.31.</p> <p>If the conspiracy is the' offense and it becomes complete upon the performance of the first overt act and the defendants are then at that time subject to indictment, the bar of the statute must apply after three years from the commission of that overt act. To hold otherwise is to read into § 5440 elements as to the renewal or continuance of a conspiracy which are not therein expressed. Ware v. United States, 154 Fed. Rep. 577; United Stales v. Londbough, 158 Fed. Rep. 014; Armour Packing Company v., United States, 209 U. S. 56. The general Statute of Limitations, Rev. Stat., § 1044, is applicable to the District of Columbia. United States v. Callan, 197 U. S. 477.</p> <p>The alleged Crime of conspiracy to bribe merged in. the completed offense.</p> <p>The overt act is made applicable to both counts of the ih-diclment so that the conspiracy to bribe merged in the specific offense of bribery at the time the money was paid to Holme's. United States v. Biggs, 157 Fed. Rep. 264; United States v. Black, 160 Fed. Rep. 401; Berkowitz v. United States, 98 Fed.. Rep. 452; United States v. Jones, 5 Utah, 552; 1 Bishop's Grim. Law, N. Gr. Law, § 787: 1 Whart. Cr. L. 27a; United States v. Melfi, 118 Fed. Rep. 900; 6 Am. & Eng. Kncy. of Law, 868. See also Thomas v. United States, 156 Fori. Rep. 902CClune v. United States,. 159 U. 8. 590-595; United Slates .v. Gardner, 42 Fed. Rep. 829; United States v. McDonald, 8 Dill. 545; United Stales v. Martin, 4 Cliff. 166; State v. Murphy, 6 Alabama, 765; Bise y v. State, 47 Arkansas, J572; Wright v. Stale, 5 Indiana, 528; Stale v. Lewis, 48 Iowa, 579; State v. Mayberry, 48 Maine, 288; Common wealth v. Kingsbury, 5 Massachusetts, 106; People v. Richards, 1 Michigan, 222; People v. Mc.Kane, 81 Abb. N. G. 176; 7 Mise. Rep. (N. Y.) 478; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 229; S. C., 21 Am. Dec. 122.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCÜIT COURT OP THE, UNITED STATES POR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

APPEAL’FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS. The facts are stated in the opinion. The contract did not obligate the claimant to relinquish the claim in suit, or any other claims that might accrue to it for breach of the contract by the United States. The contract itself was .not a release of such claims.

<p>In this case it was held that the averments set forth in the bill of fraud and perjury in ex parte proceedings before the land office were sufficient to give a court of equity jurisdiction of a suit brought by • the United States to cancel a patent.</p> <p>In this case the testimony sustained the averments of the bill that the patent was obtained by fraud. • .</p> <p>The rule that courts will not review decisions of the Land Department on questions of fact or reverse discretion properly exercised does not prevent the courts from setting aside a patent obtained by fraud upon the Department.</p> <p>The presumption that a corporation is, in law,-an entity distinct from its stockholders and officers cannot be carried so far as to enable the corporation to,become a means of fraud; and knowledge of fraud on the part of the officers, who are also the principal stockholders and whose interests are identical, is properly to be imputed to the corporation itself.</p> <p>In this case the testimony of an agent of the General Land Office as to conversations and admissions made by the entryman, with knowledge that he was a government officer seeking the facts as to the settlement of the land, was properly admitted,' as was also the report made by such officer who testified as to the facts recited therein.</p> <p>■yVhen testimony is admitted, but is not followed up by other testimony necessary to give it effect, this court will assume that the court below attributed to it no probative strength.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. The property here taxed falls under “credits” and “cash” to which the terms of the act apply. The case is on all fours with Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395; although complainant seeks to make a subtle distinction. The term “Joan” has not been applied to these transactions by the taxing power, but by complainant itself.

<p>In this case the charges of fraud and collusion on the part of the defendants are wholly unsupported.</p> <p>The rule that equity may convert into a trustee a co-tenant who attempts to buy an outstanding hostile title does not apply where the common property is sold at bona fide public sale under legal process or power in a trust deed. At such a sale, and in the absence of fraud or deceit, any. one of the co-tenants is as free to buy as any of the general public, and several of the co-tenants may combine without notice to the others to purchase for themselves.</p> <p>A judicial sale for inadequate price resulting from combination of bidders is voidable, not void, and one who would complain must after discovery seasonably elect whether he will avoid it or not. A delay of four years where the property is of speculative character and has largely increased in value meanwhile-is unreasonable.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. Congress had power to require connecting tracks to be installed. The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is as broad in its scope as the power of -the States in the regulation of their internal commerce. Wisconsin, Minn. & Pac. Railroad Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The mortgages were good against the bankrupt at the date of adjudication. The mortgagee had the. legal title from the date of execution. III. T. & S. Bank v. Stewart, 119 Wisconsin, 54. The mortgagee had the fight of possession after default. Smith v. Konst, 50 Wisconsin, 360'; Frisbee v. Langworthy, 11 Wis-' consin, 376.

TjyR.TÍ.OT?. TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP NEW YORK. Three indictments were returned against plaintiff in error by the grand jury in the Southern District of New York.

This was an action of ejectment to recover the southeast quarter of section 7, township 119, range 40, in Chippewa County, Minnesota. A jury was waived and the case tried by the court, which made a finding of facts upon which judg,ment was entered for the defendant. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the State this judgment was affirmed. 107 Minnesota, 568. Thereupon, in due course, this writ of error was sued out by the original plaintiffs.

The defendant in error commenced this action in the United States Court for the Southern -District of Indian Territory. The now plaintiffs in error were named as defendants. S. L. and S. T. Williams are brothers, And Jennie L. Williams is the wife of the defendant S. L. Williams.

<p>AI’I’BALR FROM TIIIC SUPREME COURT OF PORTO RICO.</p> <p>The facts arc stated in the opinion.</p>

The brief of the appellee contains the following statement: This is a bill in equity. The parties to the suit, plaintiff and defendants, are all residents of Missouri and of the same judicial district in that State.

The following statement of facts appears in brief of appellant: This is an appeal from a final decree in admiralty made by the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey. The appeal is solely upon the question of the jurisdiction of the- said District Court to render the decree.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p>

<p>A writ of error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia dismissed for want df jurisdiction without opinion on the authority of Frasch v. Moore, 211 U. S. 1, and other cases cited.</p>

<p>To give this court jurisdiction on a direct appeal from, or writ of error to, a Circuit Court on the ground of a constitutional question, such question must be real and substantial, and not a mere claim in words.</p> <p>The questions involved in this ease as to the right of thé Government to collect duties on merchandise coming into the United States from the Canal Zone, Isthmus of Panama,- under the act of March 2, 1905, c. 1311, 33 Stat. 843, have already been settled by the case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U: S. 244, and the writ of error is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.</p>

<p>One cannot complain until he is made to suffer, nor can one appeal from an order dismissing him from custody.</p> <p>Where the indictment has been dismissed and- no new indictment has been returned for the same offense and fjhe statutory period of limitations has elapsed, the question whether accused was entitled under the Constitution to a speedy trial becomes a moot one, and a writ of error to review an order dismissing the indictment under such circumstances will be dismissed.</p>

<p>Where no Federal question is raised in the state court it is too late to attempt to do so in the assignment of error in this court.</p>

These were writs of error to the District Court under the Criminal Appeals Aót of March 2, 1907,-as .defendants in error were indicted for gracing sheep upon the Sierra Forest Reserve without' a permit in violation of Regulation 45, established by the Secretary of Agriculture concerning stock grazing upon forest resérves under-the act of June 4, 1897, c. 2, 30 Stát. 11, 35.

<p>Writ, of error to review a judgment of the state court, in an action for personal injuries dismissed, without opinion, for want of jurisdiction.</p>

<p>Writ of error to review 201 Massachusetts, 444, dismissed, without opinion, for the want'of jurisdiction.</p>