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22 Me. 331

Varney v. Stevens

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Decided April 15, 1843

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · decided 1843-04-15

<p>Where a testator in his will, after having said that, “ as touching my worldly estate, I give, devise and dispose of the same in the following manner and form,” and after directing that his “debts and funeral charges be first paid,” without stating by whom or from what fund, proceeded thus: — “My will is, that my said wife Dorothy Varney, shall have the whole of my estate real and personal during her natural life,” and made no other devise or bequest in his will; it was held, that Dorothy Varney took but an estate for life in the land.</p> <p>It is the duty of a tenant for life to cause all taxes assessed upon the estate during his tenancy to be paid; and if lie neglects it, and thereby subjects the land to be sold to pay such taxes, and afterwards receives a release of the title acquired under that sale, it will but extinguish that title, and can give him no rights to hold under it against the reversioner.</p> <p>Where the occupant of land has a legal right to the possession thereof as tenant for life, he is to be considered as occupying according to his legal rights, and not as a wrongdoer, and he cannot establish any title therein by disseizin against tlio reversioner; his possession cannot be adverse ; and he cannot, therefore, bo entitled to “betterments” against the reversioner “by virtue of a possession and improvement” under the statute.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1843-04-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 1955

1 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1The opinion of the Court was drawn up by

Shepley J.

¶2— The last will of Jonathan Varney, deceased, contains this clause: “ My will' is, that my said wife Dorothy Varney shall have the whole of my estate, real and personal, during her natural life.” The general rule is, that a devise of lands without words of inheritance, gives only an estate for life. If the devise be accompanied by a personal charge upon the devisee, it is indicative of an intention to give a fee. And it has been decided, that a devise of uncultivated lands, without words of inheritance, gives a fee. In this case there was no personal charge imposed upon the devisee, and there was an express limitation of the devise by the words “ during her natural life.” And the introductory words, “ as touching my worldly estate,” “ I give; demise, and dispose of the same in the following manner and form,” cannot be considered as ex*334hibiting an intention to give a fee in contradiction of the express limitation. Crutchfield v. Pearce, 1 Price, 353.

¶3The tenant offered certain deeds, showing a sale of the premises by a collector of taxes, and a release of that title to himself. If it had been admitted, he would have taken under such a release according to his title; and the reversioners according to theirs. “ A release of a right, made to a particular tenant for life, or in taile, shall aid and benefit him or them in the remainder.” Co. Litt. § 453, and 267, b.

¶4It was moreover the duty of the tenant for life to cause all taxes assessed upon the estate during his tenancy to be paid; and by neglecting it, and thereby subjecting the estate to a sale, he committed a wrong against the reversioners. And when he received a release of the title, if any were acquired under that sale, he would be considered as intending to discharge his duty by relieving the estate from that incumbrance. To neglect to pay the taxes for the purpose of causing a sale of the estate to enable him to destroy the rights of the reversioners, would have been to commit a fraud upon their rights. This is not to be presumed. On the contrary he must be presumed to have intended by procuring that release to extinguish the title under that sale.

¶5Having a legal right to the possession of the estate during the life of his wife, he is to bo considered as occupying according to his legal rights, and not as a wrongdoer. “ His possession is to be construed according to his rights.” Liscomb v. Root, 8 Pick. 376. He cannot therefore establish any title as a disseisor against the reversioner; and for that purpose only could the deeds offered have been received as evidence. To have established a title under them superior to that of the reversion-er’s, it would have been necessary to make some proof of the preliminary proceedings so far at least, as they were to be derived from recorded and documentary evidence, even after such a lapse of lime. Blossom v. Cannon, 14 Mass. R. 177.

¶6As the tenant is considered as having during the life of his wife, occupied the estate according to his legal title, his possession could not be adverse to the title of the reversioners; *335and he cannot bo entitled to claim “ by virtue of a possession and improvement” under the statute, while he was thus occupying under a subsisting and valid title.

¶7 Judgment on the default.

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