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22 N.J. 405

126 A.2d 161

State v. Brown

Supreme Court of New Jersey

Decided October 29, 1956

Supreme Court of New Jersey · decided 1956-10-29

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The sense of a law is to be gathered from its object and the nature of the subject matter, the contextual setting, and the statutes in pari materia. [State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405, 415 (1956); emphasis supplied].”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 233 N.J. Super. 559 - Levine v. Mayor of Passaic, 78 N.J. Super. 117 - In Re Adoption of D.

“are to be strictly read to avoid penalties by construction.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 273 N.J. Super. 450 - State in Interest of JS, 374 N.J. Super. 176 - State v. Solarski

Relies on State v. Bunk

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1956-10-29

How this case has been cited

Cited by 141 later decisions — most recently August 2017 · most notably Brewer v. Porch (1969), Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc. (1987)

3 federal appellate · 2 district · 136 state decisions

3301956196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Waoheneeld, J.

¶1(dissenting). I would affirm the judgment below principally for the reason recited by Judge *417Leonard at the trial level on the motion in arrest of judgment. The law as he states it, in my opinion, is clear, correct, and impressively expressed.

¶2I agree with the majority when it says “the sense of a law is to be gathered from its object and the nature of the subject matter, the contextual setting, and the statutes in pari materia.” I subscribe also to its pronouncement:

“While penal and criminal statutes are to be strictly read to avoid penalties by construction, and a statute of limitation is to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose and, corollarially, an exception to the general limitation is to be given a narrow scope, …

¶3How the majority can then jump from these basic interpretations to add something to the enactment in question in criminal procedure that was left out by the Legislature is beyond my comprehension.

¶4N. J. S. 2A:113-2 distinguishes and defines the degrees of murder, first-degree murder being “murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which is committed in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape, robbery or sodomy.” Second-degree murder is defined to be “any other kind of murder.”

¶5In addition to there being a difference in the crime itself as the elements are totally different, there is likewise a difference in punishment. State v. Bunk, 4 N. J. 461 (1950).

¶6Moreover, the existence of separate elements and that facts warranting conviction of one degree do not necessarily warrant a conviction of the other differentiates second-degree murder, as an “offense not punishable by death,” from the situation where the jury finds in the first degree but recommends life imprisonment. N. J. S. 2A:113-4. Clearly, in the latter situation the lesser degree of punishment is imposed as a pure act of clemency and not because the jury came to a factual conclusion not justifying the death penalty.

¶7*418The statute of limitations provides:

* 33 n0 person shall he prosecuted, tried or punished for any offense not punishable with death, unless the indictment therefor shall be found within 2 years from the time of committing the offense … (Subsequently enlarged to five years)

¶8There are only three offenses in our law punishable by death: ñrst-degree murder, kidnapping, treason, and the prisoner was not convicted of any of these.

¶9A statute enlarging liberty is to be liberally construed, but a statute restricting liberty is to be strictly construed.

¶10I would affirm the judgment below.

¶11For reversal — Justices Heheb, Oliphant, Bukliitg and Jacobs — 4.

¶12For affirmance — Justice Wacheneelb — 1.

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