¶2To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:
¶3The undersigned respectfully dissent to the opinion filed by the majority members of the Disciplinary Board in the above-captioned matter. The findings of fact and conclusions of law are not in dispute. The issue in dispute is the appropriate measure of discipline to be imposed. The following mitigating factors as set forth in said findings of fact are relevant to the issue of discipline:
¶4(1) The respondent has been admitted to practice and has practiced law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and State of Ohio for 19 years, and has never been the subject of any disciplinary action in either jurisdiction. (Finding of fact nos. 2 and 38.)
¶5(2) When confronted with the violations of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct which are the subject matter of this discipline, respondent admitted to his wrongdoing and has been extremely remorseful. (Findings of fact nos. 17, 37, and 40.)
¶6(3) In the course of his 19 year practice, respondent has been involved extensively in pro bono work for a variety of community and church organizations. (Findings of fact no. 39.)
¶7(4) Respondent provided character references of exceptional quality. These witnesses included fellow attorneys who had referred legal matters to him, clients who had intended to continue to consult him as their attorney, and his parish priest who testified concerning his pro bono legal work for the parish and his extensive involvement in church and civic-related affairs. (Findings of fact no. 41(a) through (d).)
¶8Moreover, even the majority finds that respondent did not intend to harm or injure his clients or to realize any benefit or gain from his conduct.
¶9Under the circumstances of this particular case, it is respectfully submitted that the appropriate discipline to be imposed is that of public censure.
¶10ORDER
¶11August 4, 1994 — The rule to show cause entered by this court on September 28, 1993, is discharged, and it is hereby ordered that [respondent] be and he is suspended from the bar of this Commonwealth for a period of two years, and he shall comply with all the provisions of Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E. It is further ordered that respondent shall pay costs to the Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 208(g), Pa.R.D.E.
¶12DISSENTING STATEMENT
¶13I must dissent to the majority’s imposition of a two year suspension from the practice of law of [respondent] for his deliberate and calculated falsification of a court subpoena, two court orders, a deed, a letter, a check and a release.
¶14We have already settled the question that it is illegal to forge court documents and that such conduct involves moral turpitude, is prejudicial to the administration of justice and adversely affects one’s fitness to practice *187law. Disciplinary Counsel v. Holston, 533 Pa. 78, 619 A.2d 1054 (1993). The deceit and dishonesty involved in forging a court document are self-evident and, in my view, indicate respondent’s unfitness to continue practicing law and call for his disbarment.
¶15In Holston, we disbarred an attorney for forging a court order and the majority attempts to distinguish that case from the facts before us because Holston also tried to cover up the forgery when questioned by a court. This is a distinction wholly without substance. The penalty in Holstonwas justified because of the presence of forgery and lying and I am of the view that either of these wrongs, standing on their own, injuriously affects the administration of justice and requires the imposition of disbarment. Respondent’s repeated acts of forgery show a callous disregard for the truth and honesty towards his clients. Such conduct is reckless and the antithesis of the allegiance and fidelity to truth that we expect from members of the bar and, in my view calls for respondent’s disbarment.