221 Conn. App.
Volume 221 — Connecticut Appellate Reports
2 opinions
- 221 Conn. App. 294Williams v. Commissioner of Correction (2023)
The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crime of unlawful restraint in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that he had been deprived of his right to due process in violation of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83) when the state failed to disclose to him at his criminal trial a written, sworn statement the victim had given to the police in which she did not mention the incident that led to the petitioner's conviction. The petitioner allegedly had sexually assaulted the victim and, two weeks later, allegedly punched her in the face. Approximately two months after those incidents, the victim reported to the police the incident in which the petitioner allegedly punched her. At that time, she also gave the police the five page statement in which she identified the petitioner as her assailant and detailed the history of their relationship but did not mention the alleged sexual assault, which she did not report to the police until five months later. The petitioner was charged in connection with the first incident with two counts of sexual assault in the first degree and one count of unlawful restraint. A jury found him not guilty of the sexual assault charges. In his habeas petition, the petitioner claimed that the victim's undisclosed statement was material to his defense because the state's case against him rested entirely on the victim's testimony and credibility, the statement repre- sented a comprehensive history of their relationship, and the not guilty verdicts on the sexual assault charges indicated that the jury had rejected portions of the victim's testimony. The habeas court rejected the petition- er's claim that the state violated Brady by failing to disclose the victim's statement. The court determined, and the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, did not challenge on appeal, that the prosecution had suppressed the statement and that it was favorable to the petitioner. The court further determined, however, that the petitioner failed to establish that the statement was material to his defense, reasoning that the statement would have been cumulative of information that was available to the petitioner at his criminal trial and would not have resulted in a different outcome. The court therefore denied the habeas petition and denied the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner certifica- tion to appeal; the petitioner's Brady claim involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason and that could have been resolved in a different manner. 2. The habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the victim's statement to the police was material under Brady: the state's case against the petitioner hinged entirely on the victim's testimony, which the statement could have significantly under- mined had it been disclosed to the defense, as the statement was qualita- tively different from and thus not cumulative of other impeachment material that was available to the defense in that it described incidents of abuse the petitioner had perpetrated on the victim during a six year period both prior to and after the alleged sexual assault, the defense had no similar statement during the criminal trial that set forth a compre- hensive history of the victim's relationship with the petitioner, and, although the defense had other exhibits that detailed other specific incidents of abuse the victim had reported to the police, the utility of those exhibits to attack the victim's failure to report the sexual assault incident was less than the utility of the undisclosed statement; moreover, the petitioner's ability to attack the victim's credibility on other grounds did not undermine the importance of her omission of the sexual assault incident from her undisclosed statement, as, contrary to the respondent's assertion that the victim's statement was not material because the peti- tioner's counsel had argued to the jury that the victim's accusations were not credible, counsel's argument would have been materially enhanced had the jury known of the undisclosed statement; furthermore, despite the respondent's claim that the undisclosed statement was as inculpatory as it was exculpatory, the petitioner's criminal trial counsel testified that he would have cross-examined the victim only about her omission of the sexual assault incident had the victim's statement been disclosed to the defense; additionally, the jury's actions supported the conclusion that a reasonable probability existed that disclosure of the statement could have led to a different outcome for the petitioner, as the not guilty verdicts on the sexual assault charges indicated the jury's doubt about the victim's credibility, and the jury's note to the court during its deliberations asking whether unlawful restraint had to be related to the sexual assault charges indicated that the jury analyzed the victim's testimony closely as to each charge. Argued April 26—officially released August 22, 2023
- 221 Conn. App. 657Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC (2023)
The plaintiffs, owners of real property in Bridgeport that is benefitted by an express easement over a neighboring property, 145 Anchorage Drive, sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment defining the permissible uses of the easement and an injunction prohibiting the defendants, G Co., the owner of 145 Anchorage Drive; A Co.; E and A, individuals who owned or controlled G Co. and A Co.; and K Co., a building company, from interfering with their use of the right-of-way over 145 Anchorage Drive. The plaintiffs' property and 145 Anchorage Drive were originally part of a single parcel of land. In the 1920s, M, the then owner, subdivided the parcel into thirteen lots, as depicted on a map that was filed with the town clerk. Lot 13, now known as 145 Anchorage Drive, is a strip of land running from the end of Anchorage Drive to the waterfront. In 1927, M conveyed lot 4, now the plaintiffs' property, to F, the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, pursuant to a warranty deed that included express easements providing that ''the land designated as Lot No. 13 as delineated on [the] map shall remain open as a right of way for the use and benefit of the grantee'' and that ''the land on [the] map designated as Anchorage Drive shall remain open for appropriate street purposes . . . for the use and benefit of the grantee . . . .'' The easements granted in F's deed were referenced in all of the deeds thereafter con- veying ownership of the plaintiffs' property, and all of the deeds con- veying ownership of 145 Anchorage Drive indicated that the property was subject to certain easements appurtenant to the other lots on the map. For many years, the plaintiffs and other easement holders used the right-of-way to access the waterfront, including traversing the length of 145 Anchorage Drive on foot and in motor vehicles, to park vehicles on the property, and to store and launch boats, kayaks, and paddleboards. In 2017, G Co. purchased 145 Anchorage Drive and A Co. purchased the adjacent property, 141 Anchorage Drive. Thereafter, K Co. began to construct a large residence on 141 Anchorage Drive for E and A. In connection with the construction, K Co. erected a temporary fence and gate along the western borders of 141 Anchorage Drive and 145 Anchorage Drive, where those properties abut Anchorage Drive, which blocked the plaintiffs' access to the right-of-way. G Co. and A Co. indi- cated that, following the completion of construction, they intended to allow the plaintiffs and other easement holders to access the right-of- way through a pedestrian gate only and that access through a motor vehicle gate would be limited to E and A. The plaintiffs commenced this action, claiming that the defendants, by reason of their construction activities and the building of the fence and other improvements, unrea- sonably interfered with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of the easement. The trial court found, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' right-of-way was limited to foot passage only. It denied the plaintiffs' request for an injunction, concluding that, once the construction work was completed, the plaintiffs would have access to the entirety of 145 Anchorage Drive, and it further concluded that, because the easement was limited to foot passage, the fence and gate restricting motor vehicle access did not interfere with the plaintiffs' rights. On the plaintiffs' appeal to this court, held that, because the granting language used in F's deed was clear and unambiguous when considered in light of the situation of the parties, the properties, and the circumstances connected with the transaction, this court's standard of review of the plaintiffs' claim was plenary, and, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs' easement was not limited to foot passage only: F's deed and the map expressly granted the easement holders a general right-of-way in terms that were clear and unambiguous, as neither document contained any specifications regarding the manner in which 145 Anchorage Drive should be used or imposed any limitation on the scope of the easement; moreover, because the trial court's con- struction of the deed was incorrect as a matter of law, as that court failed to give effect to the language in F's deed that granted an open right-of-way in general terms without restrictions on its use, the trial court also erred in its determination of the scope of the easement as limited to foot passage, as the scope of the easement must be construed to include any reasonable use to which the land may be devoted; further- more, in determining the scope of the easement, the trial court erred in limiting its consideration to what it viewed as the circumstances that existed at the time the easement was granted, rather than considering whether the plaintiffs' use of the easement was reasonable in light of the broad language of the grant, and its conclusion as to the import of those circumstances was incorrect because the trial court's reliance on the right-of-way over Anchorage Drive for its conclusion that the grantor intended to permit vehicular traffic on Anchorage Drive but not over 145 Anchorage Drive was misplaced, as the grantor limited the scope of the use over Anchorage Drive but did not include such a restriction in the easement over 145 Anchorage Drive, the extratextual evidence of the surrounding circumstances that the trial court relied on, including photographs from the early 1900s of the area surrounding 145 Anchorage Drive, did not support its conclusion, as the fact that the photographs did not display any vehicles or evidence of their use was not proof that M intended to prohibit passage via motor vehicle and the plaintiffs were not restricted to the reasonable uses that existed at the time the easement was granted, it was undisputed that 145 Anchorage Drive was large enough to accommodate recreation and parking, the plaintiffs and others had been using the lot for such purposes for decades, and there was an inference that M understood the easement over 145 Anchorage Drive to include the right to travel by motor vehicle, as he granted himself the same easement appurtenant to 141 Anchorage Drive as the only means of accessing that property by motor vehicle; accordingly, a new trial was required because the trial court, in failing to give proper effect to the unrestricted language of F's deed, failed to consider whether the plaintiffs' use of the easement was reasonable. Argued May 8—officially released September 26, 2023