Volume 222 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and making certain financial orders. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly failed to consider each factor set forth in the applicable statute (§ 46b- 81 (c)) when distributing the marital property: because the trial court expressly stated that it had considered all of the statutory criteria for marital property distributions in § 46b-81, it is presumed to have per- formed its duty unless the contrary appears from the record, and, in this case, the court provided a well reasoned analysis for the disparity in awards, which was based on the facts, including the origin of the assets, the parties' respective contributions, and their respective needs; moreover, it is well established that, in a case in which the court has considered all statutory criteria, the court need not make express find- ings as to each individual statutory criterion. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court applied an unreasonable amount of weight to his fault in the breakdown of the marriage in fashioning its orders distributing the marital property and awarding alimony: the court stated that it had considered all of the statutory factors for distributing marital property in § 46b-81 and for awarding alimony pursuant to statute (§ 46b-82), and this court deter- mined that the trial court properly considered fault in fashioning its financial orders and, in fact, was required to do so because the cause for the dissolution of the marriage is a statutory factor that the court must consider in distributing marital property and awarding alimony in a contested dissolution proceeding; moreover, contrary to the defendant's claim, a finding by the trial court of irretrievable breakdown, rather than intolerable cruelty, a ground also alleged by the plaintiff, does not preclude it from considering fault in fashioning its financial awards; furthermore, although it was not entirely clear from the memorandum of decision the precise amount of weight the trial court gave to fault, it was not necessary for this court to be able to discern this, as when it is evident from the decision that the trial court considered all of the relevant statutory criteria, the trial court is given broad discretion in determining the weight to be given to each individual factor, no single criterion is preferred over others, and the trial court is accorded wide latitude in varying the weight placed upon each item under the peculiar circumstances of each case, and the trial court's careful reasoning for its financial orders, which had a reasonable basis in the facts, reflected no abuse of the court's broad discretion in assigning the weight to be given to each statutory factor. Argued September 20—officially released October 31, 2023

Convicted, after a jury trial, of criminal violation of a protective order and of being a persistent serious felony offender, the defendant appealed to this court. The trial court issued the protective order prohibiting the defendant from contacting P, an individual with whom he had previously been in a relationship, following his arrest on various charges for inci- dents involving P. The protective order specifically prevented the defen- dant from contacting P's home or her workplace, which was a liquor store that she owned. The order did, however, permit the defendant to return to P's home one time, with a police escort, to retrieve his belong- ings. P moved the defendant's belongings to the liquor store and instead attempted to arrange for one of the defendant's family members to pick them up. Thereafter, the defendant contacted the local police department and requested a police escort to accompany him to the liquor store so that he could retrieve his belongings. The defendant arrived at the liquor store prior to the police escort. He entered the store and immediately turned off a security camera. He then took money out of the register, cigarettes from behind the register, and tools from a back room. He also took bottles of alcohol off the shelves and placed them into multiple bins. P was not at the store at this time and the defendant told R, P's employee, not to contact her or to try and stop him from removing the items he had collected. When the police escort arrived, the officer helped the defendant load the items into the vehicle in which the defendant had arrived, unaware that there was a criminal protective order in place. The defendant then left the liquor store. Shortly thereafter, P arrived at the store and was greeted by the police officer, who testified that P appeared to be angry and there was fear in her face and in her voice. P became very upset after entering the store and discovering the items that had been taken. She informed the police officer that everything that the defendant had taken, other than the box of his personal belongings, belonged to her. The police officer then called the defendant and instructed him to have a third party return the items to the liquor store. With the exception of one bottle of alcohol and a few packs of cigarettes, the items were returned. Held that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of violating the protective order: although the effective information charged the defendant with only one count of criminal violation of a protective order and the evidence presented at trial supported multiple, separate incidents of conduct in violation of the protective order, this court was not required to address whether a unanimity issue existed because the defendant did not raise such a claim at trial or in his appellate brief, nor did he ask this court to review the unpreserved claim pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233); moreover, contrary to the defendant's argument that he had complied with the protective order and did not voluntarily go to the liquor store because he necessarily had to go there to retrieve his belongings, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant was guilty of violating the protective order because he deliberately went to P's workplace, as criminal violation of a protective order is a general intent crime, and, accordingly, it was not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant knew that his conduct violated the protective order or to disprove his alleged subjective belief that his conduct did not violate the protective order; furthermore, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant was guilty of violating the protective order because he deliberately had contact with R in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm to P, as the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant, while in the presence of R, took items from the liquor store after turning off the store's security camera and, in a confronta- tional manner, warned R not to call P, contact that could cause P to fear that the defendant would continue to act in an angry and confrontational manner toward her and others associated with her. Argued September 7—officially released October 31, 2023

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on pleas of guilty, of two counts of larceny in the sixth degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, L, had provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise him about the immigration consequences of his pleas. The petitioner, who was a citizen of Jamaica and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was sentenced to two concurrent 364 day terms of incarceration, which L negotiated in an effort to alleviate adverse immigration consequences to the petitioner. A federal immigra- tion judge, however, charged the petitioner as removable and ordered that he be removed from the United States. The habeas court subse- quently rendered judgment granting the habeas petition, concluding that L had provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise the petitioner about the mandatory deportation consequence of his guilty pleas to two crimes of moral turpitude, irrespective of the sentence imposed. The court further determined that, but for that deficient advice, the petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and that he would have proceeded to trial. On the granting of certification to appeal, the respon- dent, the Commissioner of Correction, appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the court failed to make findings, pursuant to Budziszew- ski v. Commissioner of Correction (322 Conn. 504), as to what advice L actually provided, and then determine whether the petitioner met his burden to prove that counsel's advice failed to convey the information required under Padilla v. Kentucky (559 U.S. 356). Held: 1. The respondent could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court incorrectly determined that L had performed deficiently because the court did not determine what advice L actually provided, as required by Budziszewski: although the respondent emphasized the court's state- ment that the details of one conversation between the petitioner and L were unclear, the respondent ignored the court's numerous other find- ings, including that L inaccurately advised the petitioner that sentences of less than one year would protect the petitioner from immigration consequences; moreover, R, an attorney specializing in immigration law, testified that the petitioner's convictions in two cases for crimes of moral turpitude that did not arise out of the same scheme of conduct rendered the petitioner deportable, and the court found that the auto- matic deportation consequences resulting from the petitioner's guilty pleas were readily apparent and that the applicable federal immigration law (8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a) (2) (A) (ii) (2012)) was succinct and straightfor- ward, which was supported by R's testimony; furthermore, this court was not persuaded that the habeas court's decision failed to comply with Budziszewski, as the court discussed in its memorandum of decision its findings of fact as to the discussions between the petitioner and L and what transpired before the petitioner entered his guilty pleas, and its determination that L performed deficiently was based on its finding that L inaccurately advised the petitioner regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas due to L's misunderstanding that the length of the petitioner's sentences would have impacted whether depor- tation proceedings would be instituted against him. 2. The respondent could not prevail on his claim that, as a consequence of the habeas court's failure to make the requisite findings under Budzis- zewski, it failed to hold the petitioner to his burden to rebut the presump- tion that L's advice fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance: the court specifically found that L had discussed with the petitioner the difference between one and two convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude, and, although it did not set forth the specific advice given, as it was unclear from the record, that court also deter- mined that L had incorrectly advised the petitioner regarding the immi- gration consequences of his guilty pleas, thus necessarily determining that either the presumption of reasonable professional assistance had been rebutted or that it did not apply, and, even though it was unclear what L told the petitioner during that one conversation, the record reflected that L did not know and, therefore, failed to advise the peti- tioner that, by pleading guilty to two crimes of moral turpitude that did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal conduct, he was automati- cally subject to deportation; moreover, nothing in the record suggested that the court construed the lack of clarity in that one conversation against the respondent, rather, the court's determination that L per- formed deficiently was based on its finding, which was amply supported by the record, that L inaccurately advised the petitioner that a sentence of less than one year for each of his convictions could help protect the petitioner from deportation; furthermore, the fact that L had consulted with an expert on immigration law did not excuse L's failure to advise the petitioner accurately regarding the consequences of his guilty pleas, as required under Padilla, as this court was not aware of any exception to the requirement set forth in Padilla for such situations, and the petitioner was entitled under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution to be informed accurately of the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas. 3. Contrary to the respondent's claim, the habeas court did not apply a higher standard than what the law required when it based its finding of deficient performance on L's failure to advise the petitioner that his pleas would automatically subject him to mandatory deportation: the immigration consequences under federal law clearly mandated deporta- tion, and, this court, having reviewed the habeas court's memorandum of decision as a whole, was not persuaded that the habeas court deviated from the standard set forth in Padilla and Budziszewski by requiring the use of specific words or phrases, rather, the habeas court focused more broadly on whether L correctly conveyed to the petitioner the mandatory deportation consequences of the guilty pleas under federal law when he undercut the certainty of that result with clearly erroneous advice suggesting that deportation might be avoidable, and, to the extent that L gave advice casting doubt on the likelihood that federal authorities would actually apprehend and deport the petitioner despite the clarity of the law, it was incumbent on L to convey to the petitioner that, once apprehended, deportation would be practically inevitable under federal law, which he failed to do. (One judge concurring separately) Argued April 5—officially released November 14, 2023

In an action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the named defendant, who died subsequent to the commencement of the foreclosure action, the estate of the named defendant was cited in as a party, and service was made on the named defendant's son, R, in his capacity as executor of the estate of the named defendant. R then filed an appearance as executor of the estate of his father in a self-represented capacity. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike R's appearance on behalf of the estate on the ground that an estate may not be represented by a nonlawyer individual, which the trial court granted. The trial court denied R's motions to intervene and to open the judgment. On R's appeal to this court, he asserted that, because he was the sole beneficiary of his father's estate, he had a substantial interest in the foreclosure matter and should have been made a party thereto. Held that, pursuant to this court's decision in Ellis v. Cohen (118 Conn. App. 211) and for the reasons stated therein, the appeal was dismissed. Submitted on briefs October 16—officially released November 21, 2023