Volume 221 — United States Reports

Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision that ruled that John D. Rockefeller's petroleum conglomerate Standard Oil had illegally monopolized the American petroleum industry and ordered the company to break itself up. The decision also held, however, that U.S. antitrust law bans only "unreasonable" restraints on trade, an interpretation that came to be known as the "rule of reason".

United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U.S. 106 (1911), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, which held that the combination in this case is one in restraint of trade and an attempt to monopolize the business of tobacco in interstate commerce within the prohibitions of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. As a result, the American Tobacco Company was split into four competitors.

Held: upon full consideration, that Congress had full authority, under the Constitution, to enact § 18 of the act of March 3, 1899, c. 425, 30 Stat. 1153 , and that the delegation to the Secretary of War of the authority specified in that section was not a departure from the established constitutional rule that forbids the delegation of strictly legislative or judicial powers to an executive officer of the Government.

Held: that where the Northern Pacific land grant had not.attached on account of actual occupation, delay on the part of the settler in filing after survey did not inure to the benefit of the company.

<p>Under the Desert Land Act of March 3, 1877, c. 107, 19 Stat. 377, as added to by the act of March 3, 1891, c. 561, 26 Stat. 1096, a desert land entry is assignable.</p> <p>Where a statute is so ambiguous as to render its construction doubtful the uniform practice of the officers of the Department whose duty has been to construe and administer the statute since its enactment and under whose constructions rights have been acquired is determinatively persuasive on the courts.</p> <p>There is confusion between the original desert land act of 1877 and the act as amended in 1891 as to whether entries can be assigned, and the court turns for help to the practice of the Land Department in construing the act, and that has uniformly been since 1891 that entries were assignable.</p>

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of Oklahoma restricting interstate commerce in oil and natural gas, are stated in the opinion. The act of 1907-1908, as well as the supplementary legislation of 1909, is within the proper police power of the State. The ruling principle is conservation, not commerce, and the due process clause is the single issue. Consumers’ Gas Co. v. Harless, 29 N. E. Rep. 1062; N. W. Tel. Ex. Co. v. St. Charles, 154 Fed.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts aré stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The right to use the name of Beecham is publici juris, andj defendant is. not guilty of unfair competition. Appellee has ho trade-mark. There can be no trade-jnark in a proper name. Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311; Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S. 540; Corbin v. Gould, 133 U. S. 308; LeClanche Battery Co. v. Western Elec. Co., 23 Fed. Rep; 276; Hopkins on Trade-marks, 2d ed., §§ 40, 53.</p> <p>No unfair competition has been shown. There is no evidence that defendant’s pills were inferior or dissimilar to complainants. The burden of proving such inferiority or dissimilarity, had it existed, was on complainantappellee, and in the absence of evidence thereon an injunction granted upon that ground would be unwarranted. Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 164 Fed. Rep. 25 (the Chartreuse case); Hostetter Co. v. Comerford, 97 Fed. Rep. 585; Goodyear’s &c. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U. S. 598. 604; LaMont v. Leedy, 88 Fed. Rep. 72.</p> <p>Appellant has not used the name “Beecham” in any manner whatever calculated to deceive the public into a belief that the goods offered for sale by him are those of the appellee. He sold pills designated as Beecham Pills, .manufactured by Mark Jacobs, Masneth, L. I., N. Y., U. S.A.,</p> <p>. If a secret process is unpatented anyone may use it and enter into competition with the original discoverer. Canham v. Jones, 2 Vesey & B. 218; Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U. S. 375; Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Massachusetts, 190; Watkins v. Landon, 52 Minnesota, 389.</p> <p>This principle is also upheld in Marshall v. Pinkham, 52 Wisconsin, 572; Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. Rep. 24, 29, 32, 33; Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Douglas, 293; Canham v. Jones, 2 Vesey & B. 218; Burgess v. Burgess, 17 Eng. L. & E. 257; James v. James, L. R. 13 Eq. Cas. 421; Massam v. Thorley’s C. F. Co., 6 Ch. Div. 574; and see where the secret process or formula was originally protected by letters patent, but the patent has expired, Singer Company v. June, 163 U. S. 169, 185.</p> <p>The only distinction between the cases where no patent ever existed and where a patent has expired, is in the method by which the right is obtained — in the one case, by dedication, and in the other by the acquisition of knowledge of the secret. The resulting right is the same, as was intimated by this court in the Hunyadi Case, 216 U. S. 381. Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 88, is distinguishable.</p> <p>Complainant has no exclusive right to the manufacture and sale of these pills, nor to the use of the word “Beecham” in connection therewith; that word being generic and the only designation of the product, is open to use by anyone who actually engages in the business of manufacturing and selling this commodity, care being taken to state by whom it is in fact manufactured. The false use of thé word “patent” disentitles complainant to equitable relief. Holzapfel’s v. Rahtjen’s Co., 183 U. S. 1; Oliphant v. Salem Flouring Mills, 5 Sawyer, 128; Consolidated v. Dorflinger, Fed. Cas. No. 3129; Leather Cloth Co. v. Am. Leather Cloth Co., 11 H. L. Cas. 523; Worden v. California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U. S. 516.</p> <p>Cases cited in 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 356, and Solez Cigar Co. v. Pozo, 16 Colorado, 388; Ford v. Foster, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 611, relate only to where there was a patent which had expired; but see Cheavin v. Walker, 5 Ch. Div. 850; Preservaline Mfg. Co. v. Heller Chemical Co., 118 Fed. Rep. 103; and § 4901, Rev. Stat. The English courts have established a similar doctrine.</p> <p>In the case at bar, complainant relied oil a secret process, and defendant used the name given to the article by the discoverer of the invention, adding, however, that it was manufactured by themselves. Cheavin v. Walker, 5 Ch. Div. 850; Pharmaceutical Society v. Piper, 1893, L. R. 1 Q. B. 686; Fulton on Patents, Trade-marks and Designs (London, 1902), 188; Consolidated v. Dorflinger, Fed. Cas. No. 3129.</p> <p>Complainant his been guilty of deceiving the public, and he now attempts to wash the stain of unconscionable conduct from his hands by a denial of misrepresentation. The case is unlike that of patent leather shoes, because the word “patent” as used by him is not descriptive.</p> <p>The misrepresentation of manufacture in England, and the continued use of the name. Thomas Beecham disentitle complainant to equitable relief. A complainant who has deceived the public by a false statement in regard to' the place of manufacture of his commodity is not entitled to relief in equity. Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U. S. 218, 222; Worden v. California Fig Syrup Co., supra, at 528; Palmer v. Harris, 60 Pa. 156.</p> <p>There is certainly enough in Joseph Beecham’s labels to convey to everyone who can read that the pills are still made in England, where the business was solely conducted until about 1890, particularly in view of the express statements on circulars used for years thereafter that the pills were prepared in that country. Saunion & Co., Cox’s Manual, case 625; Browne on Trade-marks, 2d ed., § 71, p. 78; Solez Cigar Co. v. Pozo & Suarez, 16 Colorado, 388, 394; Wrisley v. Iowa Soap Co., 104 Fed. Rep. 548. See also Kenny v. Gillet, 70 Maryland, 574; Prince M. Co. v. Prince’s Metallic Paint Co., 135 N. Y. 24; Hobbs v. Francis, 19 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 567; Millrae Co. v. Taylor, 37 Pac. Rep. 235 (Cal.); Coleman Co. v. Dannenberg Co., 103 Georgia, 784; Raymond v. Royal Baking Powder Co., 85 Fed. Rep. 231.</p> <p>Complainant’s failure to state, in his labels the change of manufacture after the assignment from Thomas Beecham is another'element of his inequitable conduct.</p> <p>The continued use of the name of Thomas Beecham by complainant should, therefore, disentitle him to the relief sought. Paul on Trade-marks, § 318, p. 543; Stachelberg v. Ponce, 23 Fed. Rep. 430 (affirmed on other grounds, 128 U. S. 686); Symonds v. Jones, 82 Maine, 302, 315; Hegeman & Co. v. Hegeman, 8 Daly (N. Y.), 1, 22; Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Raymond, 70 Fed. Rep. 376; S. C., aff’d 85 Fed. Rep. 231. See also Seigert v. Abbott, 61 Maryland, 276; Alaska Packer’s Assn. v. Alaska Imp. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 103 (even where labels corrected after suit brought).</p> <p>The court has. jurisdiction of the case at bar under § 6 of the act of March 3, 1891.</p> <p>The appellee has not represented that his pills are manufactured under letters patent by using the words "Patent Pills.”</p> <p>As to cases where the word "patent” was held not to indicate and did not in fact indicate that the article to which it was applied was in fact patented, see Cahn v. Gottschalk, 14 Daly, 542; Cochrane v. McNish, 1896, App. Cas. 225; Marshall v. Ross, L. R. 8 Eq. 651; Stewart v. Smithson, 1 Hilton, 119; Leather Cloth Co. v. Am. Leather Cloth Co., 11 H. L. 523; Ins. Oil Tank Co. v. Scott, 33 La. Ann. 946.</p> <p>The word "patent” is frequently used in.combinations not intended to indicate that the article has been in fact patented. See Century Dictionary; Murray’s Oxford Dictionary; Encyclopaedic Dictionary; Stormonth’s Dictionary; Brewer’s Etymological and Pronouncing Dictionary of Difficult Words.</p> <p>In many statutes in this country the word "patent” as applied to medicines is used as, interchangeable with "proprietary,” and such use of the word has, therefore, obtained a legislative sanction. The citations are so numerous that they can at best be merely classified.</p> <p>In the following statutes the phrase "patent or proprietary medicines” occurs in provisions-regulating their preparation and sale: Rev. Stat., § 3436; Arkansas Dig. of Statutes, § 5283; Dakota Territory Rev Stat., §§ 228, 229; Hawaii Territory Rev. Stat., § 1095; Illinois Rev. Stat., c. 91, § 30; Indiana Rev. Stat., § 5000¿; Maine Rev. Stat., c. 3Ó, §13; Michigan Rev. Laws, §5312; New Jersey Public Laws, 1895, p. 365, § 8; North Dakota Rev. Stat., §7281; Ohio Rev. Stat., §4405; Tennessee Code, §3635; Vermont Rev. Stat., §4663; Washington Codes and Statutes, § 2877; Wyoming Rev. Stat., § 2222.</p> <p>' In the following three statutes the phrase is "proprietary and patent medicines.” Colorado Rev. Stat., § 4909; Florida Rev. Stat., § 814; Oregon Codes and Statutes, §3811. See also Massachusetts Rev. Stat., c. 76, § 23; Utah Rev. Stat., § 1725; Kentucky Rev. Stat., § 2631; Delaware, c. 36, Vol. 18, § 1; South Carolina Civil Code, § 1126; Louisiana Laws of Í888, act 66, p. 74, § 3; Pennsylvania Public Laws, 189, §6 (1887, May 24); Rhode Island Rev. Stat., c. 152, § 8; South Dakota Political Code, § 281; West Virginia Code, c. 150, § 7.</p> <p>For legal construction see State v. Donaldson, 41 Minnesota, 74; Nordyke v. Kehlor, 155 Missouri, 643, 653; Palmer v. McCormick, 30 Fed. Rep. 82.</p> <p>The appellee has not been guilty of any false representations either as to the place of manufacture of his product or the person by whom the same is manufactured.</p> <p>Even if a statement as to place of manufacture were misleading, it has been abandoned for seventeen years and cannot be made the basis of successful piracy of the name "Beecham.” The discontinuance of a misstatement when made before suit brought relieves the complainant of the effect of the rule. Moxie Nerve & Food Co. v. Modox Co., 153 Fed. Rep. 487; Johnson & Johnson v. Sedbury & Johnson (N. J.), 67 Atl. Rep. 36; Symonds v. Jones, 82 Maine, 302.</p> <p>As to the alleged misstatement that the pills are prepared only and sold wholesale by the proprietor, Thomas Beecham, Lancashire, England, all of the forms used since 1902 are necessarily objectionable and under the authorities cited appellant cannot rake up the past to find in a long discontinued user, evidence of untrue statements. See “Moxie” and other cases, supra.</p> <p>Also the alleged misstatement is that the pills are specially packed for the United States of America, being covered with a quickly soluble, pleasant coating, completely disguising the taste of the pill. This was used while the pills were both packed and made in the United States, and the whole question is whether or not the clause is false, not by virtue of what it says, but of what it suggests. Wrisley Co. v. Iowa Soap Co., 104 Fed. Rep. 548, does not apply. The words here do not call for the interpretation that the pills are made in England, although packed for the United States. They are equally true wherever the pills are made. See Tarrant & Co. v. Johann Hoff, 76 Fed. Rep. 959; Clark Thread Co. v. Armitage, 74 Fed. Rep. 936; Societe Anonyme v. Western Distilling Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 416; Siegert v. Gandolfi, 149 Fed. Rep. 100; Gluckman v. Strauch, 99 App. Div. 361; aff’d 186 N. Y. 560.</p> <p>As to alleged misrepresentations as to the persons by whom the pills are manufactured, there was no misrepresentation. Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U. S. 218.</p> <p>The real proprietor of the trade-name used in connection with these pills has never , been the person of Thomas' Beecham as distinguished from Joseph, or any other person; but has always been and is ¿'Thomas Beecham of St. Helens, England,” a partnership formerly composed of both Thomas and Joseph to which the latter succeeded as sole surviving partner. The appellee is lawfully continuing the business under the old name, as he has done since 1895, and the statement that the pills were manufactured and sold "by the proprietor Thomas Beecham, St. Helens, England,” was strictly speaking as. accurate in point of fact after the transfer of 1895 as it was before. It cannot be regarded as a misrepresentation or a fraudulent statement.</p> <p>The appellee is not barred from relief because his pills happen to be made under a secret process or formula. The rule that an owner of a secret process, unpatented, may not enjoin another from manufacturing goods under that process and marketing them under the name used to describe them by the original manufacturer, and by which they have come to be known to the public, provided the latter comes to his knowledge of the process in good faith has no application to this case.</p> <p>Appellee’s right to relief does not depend in any way upon the fact of his goods being manufactured under a secret process. His right to relief depends. simply upon the fact of the appellant’s manufacturing and selling similar goods, calling them by his trade-name.</p> <p>There is no less right on the part of a manufacturer of goods made under a secret process or formula to protection of his trade-name than on the part of an ordinary manufacturer of goods.</p> <p>The rule is not that the owner of a valuable trade-name cannot enjoin the manufacturer of similar goods under the same name unless he can show that such goods are manufactured under a secret process other than that used by himself, but rather that he can enjoin such use of his trade-name unless the person attempting to use the same-, can justify his attempted use by showing similarity of secret process and good'faith in the acquisition of knowledge as to the same.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. Inasmuch as the books of account contain evidence which would incriminate the bankrupt, their delivery cannot be compelled, for to require such delivery would violate the bankrupt’s constitutional privilege against incriminating himself. Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COllftT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the oninion. .</p>

The facts, which involve the construction and. constitutionality of the provision of the act of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, requiring certain conveyances of full-blood Indians to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that while this fact did not deprive the State of the right of punishing crimes committed on such reservation by other than Indians or against Indians (Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240 ), that where jurisdiction and control over Indian lands remained in the United States, Congress had the right to forbid the intro *324 duetion of liquor into such territory, and to provide for the punishment of those found…

<p>Under § 5 of the act of July 1, 1902, c: 1369, 32 Stat. 691, unless action taken by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands to supply omissions in the record violates' the Constitution or a statute of the United States, this court cannot disturb the judgment.</p> <p>There is no valid objection based on the Constitution of the United States to the practice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands adopted in this case for determining in what form it will accept the record of the court below.</p> <p>The provision in § 5 of the Philippine act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, that.in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall meet '. the witnesses face to face is substantially the provision of the Sixth Amendment; is intended thereby that the charge shall be proved only by such witnesses as meet the accused'at the trial face to face and give him an opportunity for cross-examination. It prevents conviction by ex parte affidavits.</p> <p>The “face to face” provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights does not prevent the judge-and clerk of the trial court from certifying as additional record to the appellate court what transpired on the trial of one convicted of a crime without the accused being present when the order was made.</p> <p>Although due process of law requires the accused to be present at every stage of the trial, it does not require accused to be present in an appellate court where he is represented by counsel and where the only function of the court is to determine whether there was prejudicial error below.</p> <p>Objections as to form and verification of pleading must be taken by ¿ccused before pleading general issue.</p> <p>The Bill of Rights of. the Philippine Islands does not require convictions to be based on indictment; nor does due process of law require presentment of an indictment. Hurtado v. California, 110'U. S. 516.</p> <p>Iii the absence of legislation by Congress, there is no right in the Philippine Islands to require trial by jufy in criminal cases. Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138.</p> <p>11 Philippine Islands, 4, affirmed.</p>

Held: “Nothing can be more truly inconsistent with a contract of sale of" chattels purporting to be absolute than the existence of a right or interest in or a secret reservation to be evidence of collusion”; and see Farrow v. Hayes, 51 Maryland, 505; Main v. Lynch, 54 Maryland, 671, 672, 673; Whedbee v. Stewart, 40 Maryland, 414.

The facts, which involve the power of a State to tax premiums of insurance due by residents to a non-resident insurance company which have been extended but not evidenced by written instrument, and the constitutionality of a statute of Louisiana to that effect, are stated in the opinion. A State cannot legally impose an assessment and tax upon premiums due under open account by local policy holders to non-resident or foreign insurance companies.

The facts, which, involve the constitutionality and validity of tax assessments on a foreign insurance company in Louisiana, are stated in the opinion.

from pages 361-363 intentionally omitted] Messrs. John B. Stanchfield, Louis S. Levy, and William M. Parke for plaintiff in error and appellant. [Argument of Counsel from pages 363-365 intentionally omitted] Solicitor General Lehmann and Mr. Henry E. Colton for defendant in error and appellee. Mr. Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court: 1 The three cases involve the same question.

The facts, which involve the validity of a subpoena duces tecum issued to the custodian of the books of á corporation, and the right of such custodian to refuse to produce the documents required by such subpoena bn the ground that they would incriminate him, are stated in the opinion. Dreier had an absolute right to refuse to produce books for the consideration of the grand jury or to give testimony upon the ground that to do so might tend to incriminate him.

Under the contract, the Monon Railway Company is obligated to protect and guard the crossing; and the fact that the means and methods of protecting and guarding railroad crossings have changed since the contract was-entered into can make no difference and does not lessen or change the obligation.

The facts, which involve the right of a State to tax public lands located under warrant before substitution and payment of government price, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of certain acts of Louisiana, and their constitutionality under the contract clause of the Constitution and whether the courts of Texas, in construing them, had failed to give them full faith and credit as required by the Constitution, are stated in the opinion.

<p>Decided on authority of Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Miller, ante,, p. 408. '</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of § 8 of the Utah Enabling Act and the effect to be given to the words “and including all saline lands in the State” in connection with the grant of public lands for the University of Utah, are stated in the opinion. The State did hot take title to the saline lands in question by virtue of the Utah Enabling Act of July 16, 1894, without any act upon its part by way of selecting the same.

The facts, which involve the validity of an ordinance of the city of New York prohibiting the display of advertisements under certain conditions, are stated in the opinion. Plaintiff in error possesses a vested property right to rent space for the display of advertisements upon its stages, which is incidental to the ownership of the stages. The doctrine of ultra vires has no application.

<p>certiorari to the circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opiniori.</p>

In United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the misbranding provisions of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 did not pertain to false curative or therapeutic statements but only false statements as to the identity of the drug. In 1912, Congress responded with the Sherley Amendments, which addressed the perceived lack of enforcement of fraud related to therapeutic claims. The Act was amended to prohibit false and fraudulent claims of health benefits but enforcement under the amendment required proof of fraudulent intent, a difficult standard.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>THE,facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>A writ of habeas corpus cannot perform the functions of a writ of error; nevertheless this court will go behind the commitment to ascertain whether there was any legal evidence to give the Commissioner jurisdiction, since in tfie absence of some legal proof the Commissioner has no jurisdiction. Art. 1, Treaty with Russia; Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 541.</p> <p>The laws of the State where the fugitive is found arid not the acts of Congress are to govern in such cases. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U. S. 61; Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U. S. 205.</p> <p>In New York the magistrate has no jurisdiction and cannot act unless there is some competent legal proof to establish a probable cause. People v. Wells, 57 App. Div. 140; Church, Hab. Corp. p. 319; Ex parte Jenkins, Fed. Cas. No. 7259; In re Henry, 35 N. Y. Supp. 210; Perkins v. Moss, 187 N. Y. 410; Ex parte Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 75.</p> <p>The prisorier traversed the return and hence the court can properly review the evidence to ascertain whether there was any legal evidence upon which the Commissioner could act. There is no legal evidence in the case at bar to show that a crime has been committed.</p> <p>There is no legal proof in the case at bar establishing the identity of the prisoner, bjit on the contrary the evidence shows affirmatively that the prisoner is not the man who is alleged to have committed the crime.</p> <p>The photographs were not properly authenticated as evidence by certificates of the consul. In re Henrich, 5 Blatchf. 414; In re McPhun, 30 Fed. Rep. 60.</p> <p>Assuming that the evidence as to the criminality is sufficient the prisoner must be discharged because the complaint charges the accused with having forged and offered forged bills of exchange whereas the proof shows that he had forged notes. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U. S. 40, and Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U. S. 205. This case is to be governed by the laws of New York; and People v. Geyer, 196 N. Y. 367, is controlling on this point. See also People v. Poucher, 30 Hun (N. Y.), 576; Besck v. State, 44 Texas, 620; Bishop on Statutory Crimes, 3d ed., § 346; Hamilton v. State, 28 Am. Rep. 653; State v. Jim, 3 Murph. 3; Commonwealth v. Sweeney, 1 Va. Cas. 151; McAuly v. State, 7 Yerg. 526; Johnston v. State, Mart. & Yerg. 129; Johnson v. State, 11 Oh. St. 324; State v. Carr, 16 So. Rep. 155; State v. Cullins, 72 N. Car. 144.</p> <p>Under the treaty that requires an offense to be a crime in both countries, it is of course necessary that the laws of Russia should be proven to show that the forging or passing of a forged bill of exchange is a crime.</p> <p>The complaints in extradition cases must describe the crime with some degree of accuracy in order that the accused may avail himself of the benefit of the rule of law that he cannot be tried for any other offense than that charged in the extradition proceedings. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407; Ex parte Hibbs, 26 Fed. Rep. 431; Field, Extra., 107.</p> <p>The complaint is likewise bad because it fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute el crime. The complaint is insufficient and defective and should be dismissed under authority of Rice v. Ames, 180 U. S. 371; Ex parte Lane, 6 Fed. Rep. 38. Grin v. Shine, 187 U. S. 181, in no way qualifies or modifies the rule laid down. Rice v. Ames, supra. See Ex parte M’Cabe, 46 Fed. Rep. 368.</p> <p>■ Without a sufficient complaint on oath there is no jurisdiction to issue the warrant. In re Heilbonn, 1 Parker, Crim. R. 436. See also In re Farez, 7 Blatchf. 345; In re Henrich, 5 Blatchf. 414; Ex parte Lane, supra; In re Roth, 15 Fed. Rep. 507; Whart., Confl. Law, § 848; Spear, Extradition, 250; 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 623, and note.</p> <p>The marshal’s return to the writ, is insufficient because it shows that both the warrant and the final commitment are of no legal force inasmuch as no crime is recited therein. People v. Drayton, 168 N. Y. 12.</p> <p>This is an extraordinary proceeding and before a person within the jurisdiction of the United States is to be deprived of his liberty and sent four thousand miles away as a prisoner to stand trial upon a criminal charge the greatest caution should be exercised. In re Extradition of Wedge, 15 Fed. Rep. 866.</p> <p>The papers in this case show that the real purpose of this proceeding is not the forgery charge, but that it had been instituted by creditors as a matter of personal spite, malice and vengeance. Grin v. Shine, 187 U. S. 133, 134.</p> <p>The interpretation of statutes has always in modern times been highly favorable to the personal liberty of the subject, and should always remain so. Murray v. Reg., 7 Q. B. 707; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 95.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of § 5151^ Rev. Stat., and the liability of shareholders in national banks thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

Held: among other things, that the Buffalo River had been made a public highway by law; that for a large part of the distance through the city of Buffalo it is navigable to large boats from the lakes, and is a stream of much commercial importance. It held that the proceedings were under due authority óf law as enacted in the charter of the city of Buffalo.

Held: citing Beardsley v. Littel, 14 Blatch. 102, that § 724 did not permit an, examination of a party’s books before trial. Colgate v. Compagnie Francaise, 23 Fed. Rep. 82 ; and see also Guyot v. Hilton, 32 Fed. Rep. 743 . Thus the question seemed settled in the Southern District of New York that an inspection of books was not authorized under § 724 before the trial.

The facts, which involve the validity of a street opening assessment in the District of Columbia, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve questions of practice in connection with the probate., of wills in the District of Columbia, are stated in the opinion..

Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), was a Supreme Court of the United States case that held that the newly created state of Oklahoma was permitted to move its capital city from Guthrie to Oklahoma City, notwithstanding the Enabling Act provision that prohibited it from being moved from Guthrie until after 1913.

The facts, which involve the validity of the word “Chartreuse” as a tráde-mark and other questions in regard to the ownership thereof and the sale of cordials ■under that name, are stated in the opinion. The office of a trade-mark is to guarantee the origin of an article with which it has become identified in the public mind. Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U. S. 218, 223. Defendant’s use of the “Chartreuse” trade-mark violates the fundamental law of trade-marks.

American Lithographic Co. v. Werkmeister, 221 U.S. 603 (1911), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a corporation defendant in a suit to enforce copyright infringement penalties is not entitled to a Fourth or Fifth Amendment objection to the admission of its bookkeeping entries into evidence when they are produced under a subpoena duces tecum.

The facts, which involve the validity of an order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the construction of the Employé’s Act (hours of service) of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 1415, c. 2939, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of a grant of lands in the Philippine Islands, made prior to the cession to the United States, are stated in the opinión.

CAROLINA. In his complaint the plaintiff alleged that, he owned a valuable body of fertile bottom lands, on the west side of the Seneca River, on which he had raised large crops from the time of purchasing the farm in 1880 until 1895, when the defendant, by its trustees, erected and maintained a high embankment on the eastern side of the river. - This dyke was to protect the'lands of the college from overflow, but its construction so narrowed the channel of the river that it…

This case raises the question as to whether Cuban imports are entitled to a reduction of twenty per cent upon the rates charged on goods coming from the Philippine Islands, or only twenty per cent upon the regular tariff rates on goods imported from foreign countries.

<p>The State has power to legislate in regard to the preservation and disposition of abandoned property and to establish- presumptions of abandonment after lapse of reasonable period. Cunnius v. Reading, 198 U. S. 454.</p> <p>A statute directing that savings banks turn over to the proper state officers money in accounts inactive for thirty years and where the depositor cannot be found, with provisions for the payment over to the depositor or his heirs on establishment of right, does not deprive savings banks of their property without due process of law and. is not a denial of equal protection of the law because.it applies only' to savings banks, the classification not being unreasonable; and so held as to the statute of Massachusetts to that effect.</p> <p>The question of whether' a statute allows a depositor or his heirs a lower rate of interest on a deposit turned over to the State as aban- • doned than allowed by the bank amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law within the Fourteenth Amendment cannot-be raised by the bank as against the State.</p> <p>There is a special reason for protecting depositors of savings banks and there is a difference between them and deposits in other banks that affords a reasonable basis for classification in legislation.</p> <p>Whether the State can require payment of accounts in savings banks without production of the pass-book and the rights and relations of parties arising out of the charter and contract of deposit are to be determined by local law and do not present Federal questions giving this- court jurisdiction under § 709, Rev. Stat.</p>