Volume 222 — United States Reports

The facts are stated in the opinion. Even if the statute is constitutional as to provisions for receivership' and care of property of an absentee under Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U. S. 458, it is unconstitutional as to the provisions barring the absentee from recovering property after the expiration of fourteen years from the disappearance; the provisions as to the disposition of such property are unconstitutional, in that the notice which is required as the…

The facts are stated in tlie opinion. The Solicitor General for the United States: Section 5418, Rev.- Stat., prohibits -the false making of any writing which would yvork a fraud upon the United States in its- pecuniary or property rights or in the exercise of its governmental powers and duties,/ Untied States v. Lawrence, 13 Blatchf. C. C. 211; State v. Kimball, 50 Maine, 409; State v. Boasso, 38 La.

IN EQUITY. Motion to proceed with the further hearing and determination of the case. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Southern Railway Company v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court which held that under the Commerce Clause, the U.S. Congress can regulate safety on intrastate rail traffic because there is a close and substantial connection to interstate traffic.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of § 246 of the Penal Code of the State of California, are stated in the opinion. While the law with reference to classification within the constitutional meaning is well settled, the application thereof gives rise to question. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Board of Education v. Alliance Assurance. Co., 159 Fed. Rep. 994.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States in this case, are stated in the opinion. -

4.PPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY. The facts, which involve the question of whether the sum or value of the matter in dispute was sufficient to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction, are stated in the opinion.

Held: a discrimination. I am authorized to say that Me. Justice Hughes concurs in this dissent

<p>In the absence of fraud, ignorance of who the real vendee is does not relieve the vendor from specific performance of a contract to sell real estate.</p> <p>The vendor is not relieved of a contract to sell, absolute as to him, because he thought it gave the purchaser an option, but did not require him, to purchase.</p> <p>One who purchases from the vendee before completion of the contract to sell, not only the property but all rights of the vendee connected therewith, becomes the equitable owner of the property to the same extent as the original vendee and can compel specific performance of the original contract.</p> <p>The original vendee against whom no relief is asked and who has to the extent of his interest complied with the contract is not a necessary party to a suit brought by the subvendee against the original veñdor to compel specific performance.</p> <p>The contract to sell involved in this case being clear enough to indicate to lawyer and layman the purchaser, the seller, the land and the terms, it satisfies „the statute of frauds, Code, District of Columbia, § 1117.</p> <p>33 App. D. C. 7, affirmed.</p>

The- facts, which involve the power .of the State of Kentucky to tax steamships belonging to a corporation of that State but enrolled at the port of New York, aré stated in the opinion. Kentucky is the artificial situs of the ships of the Southern Pacific Company, New York their actual situs. They are therefore not rightfully subject to taxation in Kentucky. Taxation is imposed by a State in return for protection given.

The facts, which involve the validity of rules made by the Secretary of the Interior in regard to grazing cattle on private lands within the limits of Yosemite Park, are stated in the opinion. The Department of the Interior has no right to make, or enforce any rules respecting the use of prívate property or public toll roads within the State of California, for that State has not ceded to the United States its political jurisdiction over the Yosemite Park.

The facts, which involve the validity of a claim of title to property in California purchased and occupied by the United States, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the statutes limiting-liability of .vessel-owners, are stated in the opinion. The District Court of the United States has jurisdiction to entertain a libel or petition for limitation of liability of the owners of a vessel' against claims for non-maritime damages or any claim for any liability or debt, although not within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of such court.

The facts, which involve the validity of process of the District Court and the power and duty of the marshal thereunder, are stated in the opinion. The haurada was illegally detained by the collector. Section 5290, Rev. Stat., did not justify the detention.

Held: are hereby invested with appellate jurisdiction of controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings frqm the courts of bankruptcy from which they have appellate jurisdiction in other cases.

<p>Tefft, Weller & Co. v. Munsuri, ante, p. 114, followed to effect that the express provisions for review contained in the Bankruptcy Act-are controlling, and that review by this court under § 24b of an order disallowing claims is not authorized by the act.</p>

<p>Under § 10 of the act of July 1, 1902, e. 1369, 32 Stat. 695, this court can only review judgments of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands where the value in .controversy exceeds $25,000; and where only a half interest of property is affected, jurisdiction does not exist unless the value of such half interest exceeds that amount.</p> <p>An affidavit that the value of the real property involved in the action exceeds $25,000 is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction where only a one-half interest is affected and the context of the affidavit gives rise to the inference that the statements as to value relate to the entire property and not to a half interest therein.</p> <p>In this case resort to the record shows that the value of the interest in the property affected is less than the jurisdictional amount.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals, from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, are stated in the opinion.</p>

, The facts, which involve the correct classification, under the tariff act of 1897 of artificial horsehair, are stated in the opinion. The Government insists that no statutory similitude is established, and that the merchandise is therefore dutiable under § 6 of the tariff act of 1897 as an unenumerated manufactured article.

The facts, which involve the construction of subdivision 9, § 7 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, are stated in the opinion. Mr. John E. Partridge and Mr.-N. P. Bryan for Glickstein. The Solicitor General for the United States.

<p>.APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS ON RETURN TO MANDATE DIRECTING ADDITIONAL FINDINGS.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the sufficiency of findings of the Court of Claims, are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that .the assignment by the insured of a perfectly valid policy to one not having any insurable interest but who paid a consideration therefor and afterwards paid the premiums thereon was valid and the assignee was entitled to the proceeds from the insurance company ás against the heirs of the deceased.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>A principal betrayed by his agent into paying for property an excess over the price for.which the ágent obt¿ins it may declare in assumpsit without’ relying upon fraud and deceit in an action for damages.</p> <p>An agent who makes a secret profit in the execution of his agency may be compelled to disgorge in an action upon implied promise.</p> <p>Where one agrees to act as agent to purchase property at not exceeding a specified price, he cannot avail of an unexpired option antedating the employment to purchase the property at a less price, himself and make the difference.</p> <p>An agreement to sell at a price paid with right of redemption wi(thin a specified period with further- agreement not to redeem if an additional sum be paid within that period simply.amounts to an option. 11 Arizona, 371, affirmed.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. There was in this case a separable controversy between the Hammond Company and the original plaintiff, who is the plaintiff in error herein. Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205; Bacon v. Felt, 36 Fed. Rep. 871; Stanbrough v. Cook, 38 Fed. Rep. 369; Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 2; Bates v. Carpenter, 98 Fed. Rep. 452.

The facts, which involve the. construction of §§ 3894 and 5480,.Rev. Stát., and what constitute offenses thereunder, are stated in the opinion. Upon this writ of error the Government seeks only to have reviewed the correctness of the court’s ruling as to the scope of § 3894, and the validity of the first count. Section 3894 is not limited either in its terms or by necessary implication to lottery schemes.

. The facts, which involve the construction of statutes relating to location of coal lands in Alaska, are stated in the opinion. The Solicitor General for the United States.

<p>Unless it appears from the record that the judgment sought to be reviewed finally determines the cause this court is without jurisdiction.</p> <p>Where the judgment sought tó be reviewed affirms the judgment below but merely sustains the demurrer without dismissing the suit, so that the cause is left- standing in the lower court for further proceedings, it is not a final judgment reviewable by this court.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.’</p>

<p>Whether a state statute providing remedies for damages to property within the State includes thosé to specified classes of property is for the state court to determine, and this court accepts the construction so given. The Winnebago, 205 U. S. 354.</p> <p>Whether a tort be maritime or non-maritime must be determined by the character and locality of the injured thing at the time the tort was committed, and subsequent facts as to location furnish no criterion. Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 388.</p> <p>Where a vessel by its own fault collides with and injures a bridge which is essentially a land structure and which is maintained and used as,an aid to commerce on land, the tort is non-maritime.</p> <p>The remedy for a non-maritime tort provided by the state statute can be pursued in the state court against the vessel committing it, even though the statute gives a lien on the vessel.</p> <p>When the interruption of interstate commerce by reason of the enforcement of a state statute otherwise constitutional is incidental only, it will not render the statute unconstitutional under the commerce clause of the Constitution.</p> <p>A state statute which gives a lien upon all vessels, whether domestic or foreign and whether engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce, for injuries committed to persons and property within the State and providing that the lien for non-maritime torts be enforced in the state courts and which, is not in conflict with any act of Congress, does not offend the commerce clause of the Constitution because it incidentally affects the use of a vessel engaged in interstate commerce; and so held as to §§ 5953 and 5954 of the Code of the State of Washington.</p> <p>51 Washington, 85, affirmed.</p>

Held: not to have been in issue in the sense intended. On the other hand, in Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v. United States ex rel. Gibson, 213 U. S. 10 , a case closely in point here, the application of the same guiding principle operated to sustain our jurisdiction.

Held: that the Union Pacific Railroad Company could not refuse to pay, the owner of an elevator located on other railroads compensation for elevating grain similar to that paid to owners of elevators located on its own railroad on account of failure to return' cars within- an arbitrary and unreasonable time fixed by the Union Pacific; but also held that such cars should be returned within a reasonable time hi order to…

<p>The repugnancy of the Safety Appliance Law to the Constitution is not now open to controversy; it has been held constitutional. Southern Railway Co. v. United States, ante, p. 20.</p> <p>Wáere the constitutional question is not advanced by the defendant until the trial it does not give jurisdiction of an appeal to this court from the Circuit Court of Appeals. Macfadden v. United States,</p> <p>213 U. S. 288.</p> <p>Where the cause of action is based on a statute of the United States there-is an appeal to this court from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals.</p> <p>Although there may be jurisdiction because the cause of action rests on a statute of the United States, where none of the contentions directly invoke the interpretation of the statute, but merely the question whether, on the evidence, there was a right of recovery,' the case ■ is of the character of cases in which it was- the purpose of the Judiciary Act of 1891 to make the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals final, and this court will only examine the record to see if plain error has been committed; and if that is not apparent, it will, as in this case, affirm the judgment.</p> <p>169 Fed. Rep.-372, affirmed.</p>

The facts, which involve the validity under the Fourteenth Amendment of a statute of Massachusetts, in regard to assignments of wages as security for loans, are stated in the opinion. - Plaintiff does not deny the.right in the legislature to pass a law fixing the rate of interest that may be taken on a loan of a sum of money of less than two hundred dollars; nor the right to reasonably regulate such business, so. long as the statutes for that purpose do not violate…

The facts, which involve the construction of a decree of the Circuit Court in regard to the joint use of railroad tracks between Omaha and Council Bluffs, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality, under the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Arkansas Fellow Servant Law, are stated in the opinion. The a,ct of 1907 is unconstitutional because it denies to plaintiff in error the equal protection of the law and deprives it of its property without due process óf law.

Held: that the continuing necessity of prompt completion of the work on such levees cannot be classed as an extraordinary emergency within the meaning of the Eight Hour Law of 1892. Qucere, to what extent the court can take judicial knowledge of necessity for and conditions of a public improvement such as Mississippi river levees. ■ 180 Fed. Rep. 502 , reversed.

Held: not to be one in which either the lunacy or death of the former would amount to a dissolution or entitle the survivor to extra compensation for prosecuting the claims after such events to a successful conclusion, the partnership gains being payable in solido and dependent upon success, and the record showing that the deceased partner did not at any time aid materially in the prosecution of the claims and was not…

The defendants maintained an establishment in New York where, after filtering Croton water drawn from the city pipes, adding mineral salts' and changing it with carbonic acid, the water was bottled and sold as “Imperial Spring Water.” In October, 1908, a food and drug inspector applied to a druggist in Newark, New Jersey, for several bottles of this water.

The facts are stated in the opinion. It was error to overrule the discretion of the Court of Land Registration in declining to reopen the decree of 1858. The court then had jurisdiction, the case was decided on the merits, and, whether the decree was right or wrong, the decision is now stare decisis, and property rights have been built up on the faith of that decree. Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401.

The facts are stated in the opinion. A possibility of reverter is not an interést or estate in land that can be devised or assigned. Vail v. Long Island R. R. Co., 106 N. Y. 287; Towle v. Remson, 70 N. Y. 309; De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y. 506; Nicholl v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 131; Locke v. Hale, 165 Massachusetts, 20; Bouvier v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. R. Co., 67 N. J. Law, 281; Helms v. Helms, 137 N. Car. 206.

<p>The denial of a right claimed under the judgment of a Federal court lays the foundation for a review in this court, and where the state court proceeds to judgment on the ground that bankruptcy proceedings against the defendant had been concluded by denial of adjudication and the injunction against suits in the state court thereby dissolved this court has jurisdiction.</p> <p>A finding by the state court that bankruptcy proceedings had been concluded by denial of adjudication does not conclude this court on writ of error to review the judgment of the state court.</p> <p>Where the state court bases its jurisdiction entirely on the construction given, a Federal statute by it adversely to contention of plaintiff in error, this court has jurisdiction to review the judgment. Rector v. Bank, 200 U. S. 405.</p> <p>The filing of a petition in bankruptcy is á caveat to all the world, and,. in effect, an attachment and injunction. Mueller v. Nugent, 184 ü. S. 1, 14.</p> <p>It is the duty of the bankruptcy court to promptly determine the question of adjudication and to proceed with the selection of a trustee and administration of the estate; and it cannot, even if for the benefit of creditors, deny an adjudication and hold.jurisdiction over the estate for the purpose of allowing some of the creditors to effect- a reorganization and distribution of the property.</p> <p>With the denial of adjudication the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court ends and the property becomes subject to ordinary methods and jurisdiction of courts of competent jurisdiction.</p> <p>There is no power in the District Court to issue an ex parte injunction, without notice or service of process, attempting to restrain a creditor suing in a State outside the jurisdiction of the District Court. Ancillary jurisdiction in aid of the jurisdiction of the District Court exists under the act of June 25,' 1910, c.' 412,36 Stat. 838. Be Wood & Henderson, 210 U. S. 246, distinguished.</p> <p>215 Missouri, 221, affirmed.</p>

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of the mob and riot indemnity law of Illinois, are stated in the opinion. The statute denies equal protection of the laws. An arbitrary classification of persons or corporations to be affected does not render a law applying to one such class general in character.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court over direct appeals from the Circuit Court, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States on the question of the amount involved and also the validity of an act of the legislature of the Territory of Washington exempting property of an educational institution from -taxation, are stated in the opinion. The amount in controversy is the tax in issue and no more, and as that is less than $2,000, the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction.

Held: that Under the law of Illinois, delivery to the sheriff of the executions on the judgments operated without levy to create liens upon the property of the judgment debtor within .the county. Such lieps were paramount to rights in the property possessed by the vendor under contracts of conditional sale.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The record as a whole shows clearly that the claim of Federal rights was asserted from- the beginning by the plaintiff in error in such manner as to bring it to the attention of the lower court.

The facts are,stated in the opinion. In the absence of legislation by Congress the state statute would have been a valid exercise of the police power of .the State and free from constitutional objection, even as to railroad employés engaged in interstate commerce.

In the year 1909, North Carolina passed an act for the inspection, under the control of the Board of Agriculture, of all kerosene or other illuminating oils sold, or offered for sale, in the State. (March 8, 1909, Pub. Laws 1909, c. 554, p. 911.) The object of such inspection was'declared to be in order to determine the safety and value of such oils for illuminating purposes.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The panel of the jury summoned to try this cause was not drawn from a box containing the names of three hundred qualified jurors.

Th^j facts, which involve the construction of a will made by a resident of the District of Columbia, are stated in the opinion. Until the court below rendered the decision in this case, it was conceded that the “Rule in Shelley’s Case” was applicable to personal property in this jurisdiction. Garth v. Baldwin, 1755; 2 Vesey Sr., Ch. Rep. 646.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality, under the commerce clause of, and the Fourteenth Amendment to, the Constitution of the United States, of the statute of Kansas regulating the sale of black powder, are stated in the opinion. The. act is repugnant to the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits a State denying to any citizen the equal protection of the laws.

<p>There are three degrees to which the State exercises power over com- ■ merce. First exclusively; second, in the absence of legislation by Congress, until Congress does act; third, where Congress having ■ legislated, the power of the' State cannot operate at all.</p> <p>Although when Congress is silent, the State may legislate in' aid of, or without burdening, interstate commerce, there may at any time be Federal exertion of authority which takes that power from the State.</p> <p>Although where Congress and the State have concurrent power, that of thejf State is superseded when the power of Congress is exercised, the action of Congress must be specific in order to be paramount. Missouri Pacific By. Co. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 612.</p> <p>By the specific provisions of the act to regulate commerce, as amended, Congress has taken control of rate making and charging for interstate shipments, and in that respect such provisions supersede state statutes on the same subject; and so held that a statute of North Carolina requiring common carriers to transport freight as soon as received to interstate points under penalties for failure, conflicts with the requirement of § 2 of the Hepburn Act of July 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, forbidding transportation until rates had been fixed and published, and is therefore unenforceable.</p> <p>As between the Federal Government and the States one authority must be paramount and when it speaks the other must be silent.</p> <p>No essential power is taken from the States in preserving the balances of the Constitution and giving to Congress the power which belongs to it.</p> <p>Any middle ground on which state authority might still be preserved after Congress has spoken in regard to interstate commerce is passed when the state regulation burdens such commerce, and the imposition of penalties for failure to receive and transport freight does impose a burden.</p> <p>Quaere whether conceding that a State may impose a penalty does not concede the State to be competent.-to determine the amount. 153 N. Car. 490, reversed.</p>

The facts, which involve the validity of a statute of North Carolina affecting common carriers, are stated in the opinion.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The exemption laws do not amount to a contract protected by the constitutional guarantee. Wisconsin &c. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379.

The facts are stated in the opinion. It was error in law on the part of the trial judge to refuse to permit counsel for defendant below to state, while the jury was yet at the bar, his exceptions to such portions of the court’s instructions to the jury as seemed to him to be objectionable either in matter of law or in matter of fact.

The facts, which involve the liability of contractors and sureties upon a contract with the United States for dredging and a bond given for completion thereof, are stated in the opinion. The Solicitor General for the United States. The time of performance was extended without the consent of sureties, and thereby they, are discharged. Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wheat. 680; Reese v. United States, 9 Wall. 13; Fed. Cas. No. 9591; Driscoll v. Winters, 122 California, 66.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>. The courts of the United States should not take cognizance of an alleged cause of action for a foreign tort where the rights of the parties under the foreign law cannot be certainly and definitely ascertained, and where the foreign tribunal is equally available to both parties. Slater v. Mexican National R. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120, 129.</p> <p>The rule is that the lex loci delicti determines whether or not there is ,a cause of action. Machado v. Fontes (1897), L. R. 2 Q. B. 231; Phillips v. Eyre (1876), L. R. 6 Q. B. 1; Coyne v. Southern Pac. Co. (1907), 155 Fed. Rep. 683; Minor’s Conflict of Laws, § 202; Dicey on the Conflict of Laws; Moore’s Notes, 659, 667; Cooley on Torts, 3d ed., 900; Mexican Central Ry. Co. v. Chantry, 136 Fed. Rep. 316; Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Eckman, 205 U. S. 538.</p> <p>The last two cases dispose of the dictum in Scott v. Lord Seymour, 1 H. & C. 219, relied on by the,.Circuit Court, and by the majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals.</p> <p>Federal courts will not take cognizance of a common tort which arose in a civil law jurisdiction, unless the acts complained of gave rise to an obligation in the jurisdiction where the alleged cause of action arose.</p> <p>There can be no presumption that the common law extends to Cuba.</p> <p>In the case of a country not settled by England or English colonists there is no presumption that the common law prevails there or that rights given by the common law exist in such country; and our courts must take judicial notice that Cuba was not settled by England or her colonists, but that it formed part of the Spanish possessions and that the civil law obtains there, and that that law is wholly statutory. Davison v. Gibson, 56 Fed. Rep. 443; Savage v. O’Neil, 44 N. Y. 298; Aslanian v. Dostumian, 174 Massachusetts, 328; Mex. Cent. Ry. Co., Ltd., v. Chantry, 136 Fed. Rep. 316.</p> <p>There can be no presumption, nor any ruling in the absence of pleading or proof, that the act alleged gave rise to a cause of action in the foreign country. Evey v. Mexican Cent. R. R. Co., 81 Fed. Rep. 294; Slater v. Mexican Natl. R. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120; Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 168 U. S. 445; Atchison &c. Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55; Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rubber Tire Wheel Co. (1908), 164 Fed. Rep. 869; Farrell v. Farrell, 142 App. Div. 605; McLeod v. Railroad Company, 58 Vermont, 727.</p> <p>The plaintiff Crosby, having alleged a transitory action arising in a civil law country, but failing to plead or prove that the acts complained of gave rise to any obligatio, the judgments below were clearly erroneous. Mexican Cent. R. R. Co. v. Eckman, 205 U. S: 538; 156 Fed. Rep. 1023; Chouquette v. Mexican Cent. R. R. Co., 156 Fed. Rep. 1022; Slater v. Mex. Natl. R. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120.</p> <p>Where the act complained of happened in a foreign jurisdiction and a right of action is alleged to have arisen therefrom, the law of the forum and the remedy of the forum must in some degree resemble the law of the wrong and its remedy. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190; Herrick v. Minn. & St. L. Ry. Co., 31 Minnesota, 11; Parrot v. Mexican Central Ry. Co., 207 Massachusetts, 184; Story on Conflict of Laws, 7th ed., § 637.</p> <p>The precise presumptions requisite to sustain the judgments below have no proper legal basis. Andrecsik v. N. J. Tube Co., 73 N. J. Law, 664; District of Columbia v. McElligott, 117 U. S. 621.</p> <p>The rule applied by the courts below that the plaintiff was relieved from the assumption of risk of injury due to the defective machinery after he had noticed the defect and received from the superintendent a promise to remedy the defect, is not applicable, since that rule can properly be applied only to cases where the servant is necessarily exposed to the dangers of that particular machinery. Roccia v. Black Diamond Mining Co., 121 Fed. Rep. 451 (1903); Showalter v. Fairbanks Co., 60 N. W. Rep. 257; Cincinnati &c. v. Robertson, 139 Fed. Rep. 519; Crookston Lumber Co. v. Boutin, 149 Fed. Rep. 680; Cooperage Co. v. Headrick, 159 Fed. Rep. 680.</p> <p>If the law of the State or country in which the injury occurred is opposed to the public policy of the State or country in which the action is brought, that law will not be followed. Scott v. Seymour, 1 H. & C. 219; Morisette v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 76 Vermont, 267; Walsh v. N. Y. & N. E. Ry. Co., 160 Massachusetts, 571; Whitford v. Panama R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 465.</p> <p>It was immaterial that the plaintiff failed to prove his right of recovery under the Cuban law, as the court will presume, until otherwise proven, that the law of the place where the injury was inflicted, if such injury is predicated on the invasion of a generally known right, is the same as that prevailing in the trial forum. Jones on Evidence, 2d ed., § 84; Whart. Conflict Laws, §§ 778,1531; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. 1060; 9 Enc. Pl. and Pr. 543; Monroe v. Douglass, 5 N. Y. 447; Lloyd v. Guibert, L. R. 1 Q. B. 113, 129; Savage v. O’Neil, 44 N. Y. 298; Sokel v. People, 212 Illinois, 238; The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24. See also Brown v. Gracey, Dow. and Ry. N. P. 41; 16 Eng. Com. Law, 462n.; Linton v. Moorehead, 209 Pa. St. 646; Scott v. Lord Seymour, 1 H. & C. 219; The Halley, L. R. 2 P. C. 193; Whitford v. Panama R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 465; Hynes v. McDermott, 82 N. Y. 41; Mackey v. Mexican Central R. R. Co., 78 N. Y. Supp. 966; Pratt v. Roman Catholic Orph. Asy., 20 App. Div. 352; S. C., affirmed, 166 N. Y. 592; Carpenter v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 72 Maine, 388; Woodrow v. O’Connor, 28 Vermont, 776; McLeod v. Conn. R. R. Co., 58 Vermont, 727; State v. Morrill, 68 Vermont, 60; Loaziza v. Superior Court, 85 California, 11; Wickersham v. Johnson, 104 California, 407; Chase v. Alliance Ins. Co., 9 Allen, 311; Aslanian v. Dostumian,. 174 Massachusetts, 328; Mittenhal v. Mascagni, 183 Massachusetts, 19; Dainese v. Hale, 91 U. S. 13; Davison v. Gibson, 56 Fed. Rep. 443; Mexican Cent. R. R. Co. v. Marshall, 91 Fed. Rep. 933 Mexican Cent. R. R. Co. v. Glover, 107 Fed. Rep. 365.</p> <p>In the absence of proof to the contrary and until the foreign law has been actually shown, the law of the land is to be applied. Dicey, Conflict of Laws, 2d ed. (1908), 39; The M. Moxham, 1 P. D. 107; The Halley, L. R. 2 P. C. 193; Philips v. Eyre, 4 L. R. Q. B. 225; 6 L. R. Q. B. 1 (1869); Machado v. Fontes, 2 L. R. Q. B. 542 (1897), also cited as 2 Q. B. (C. A.) 231-233 (1897); Parrot v. Mexican Cent. R. R. Co., 207 Massachusetts, 184.</p>

<p>ERROR to the district court of the united states fob PORTO RICO.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction of sugar grinding contracts in Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion. Plaintiff in error was defendant below.</p>

Held: that as the objection that the balance due could not, in the absence of a counterclaim pleading, be offset' against the damages sustained by the Government had not been raised in the Court of Claims, that' • court rightly offset it, and the objection cannot be raised for the first time on appeal in this court.

<p>By the Act to Regulate Commerce, Congress has provided a system for establishing, maintaining, and altering rate schedules and of redressing injuries, and committed to a single tribunal authority to investigate complaints, enforce conformity to prescribed standards, and order reparation to injured parties for non-conformity with those standards.</p> <p>No action for reparation for exactions for railroad freight payments can be maintained in any court, Federal or state, in the absence of an appropriate finding and order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The rule laid down in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, as to Suits for recovery of unreasonable rates, applies also to suits for recovery of rates as discriminatory.</p> <p>Section 14 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, making decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission as published in the official reports competent evidence, dqes not relieve a party relying on a decision from putting it in evidence — or require courts to take judicial notice thereof — the statute relieves from expense and inconvenience in connection with producing evidence, but it does not otherwise change the rules of evidence.</p> <p>In this case held that an a'ction could not be maintained for discriminatory exaction on coal rates of fifty cents a ton when loaded from wagons and not from tipples, as the complaint had not shown that the schedule had been the subject of complaint to the Interstate Commerce Commission and held by it to be discriminatory.</p> <p>64 W. Va. 406, affirmed.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of the Oleomargarine Act of 1886, and the applicability of § 3177, Rev. Stat.', are stated in the opinion. Oleomargarine is an “article or object subject to tax” to which § 3177 of the Revised Statutes applies, and there is nothing in the Oleomargarine Act to warrant its exclusion.

<p>The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a State of the power to determine what duties may be performed by local officers, nor whether they shall be appointed, or elected by the people.</p> <p>The Fourteenth Amendment does not invalidate an act authorizing an appointed board to determine whether a proposed drain will be of public benefit, and to create a drainage district consisting of land which it decides will be benefited by such dram, and to make special assessments accordingly, if, as in this case, notice is given and an opportunity to be heard afforded the landowner before the assessment becomes a lien against his property.</p> <p>The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a State of the power to compel a township, as one of its political subdivisions, to levy and collect'taxes for the purpose of paying the amount assessed against such township for the public benefits accruing from the construction of the drain.</p>

On June 13, 1903, Susan A. Keeney, a resident of New York, , being in good health, executed in Bangs County a déed, whereby she conveyed a cattle ranch in Texas, and certain stocks and bonds to the Fidelity Trust Company of Newark, New Jersey, in trust, to hold the same during her-lifetime, and to divide the net income equally between herself and her three children, two of whom reside out of the State of New York.

M. B. Johnson, as executor, recovered judgment against B. T. Collier, in the City Court of Gadsden, Ala. Execution thereon was levied July 20, 1906, on certain personal property. Under a provision of the Alabama statute, Collier immediately filed with the sheriff .a claim of exemption. On the same day he filed, in the proper District Court of the United States, a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, including this property in his schedule of assets.

Held: as a matter of law, that the long continuance of the old rate, during a period when the carriers’ total income was sufficient to pay dividends, raised the presumption that the old rates were reasonable.

<p>Where the record plainly shows that to convert a party defendant' into- a party plaintiff would be wholly inconsistent with the relief • which it is the object of the suit to obtain, the court will not realign such defendant as a plaintiff so as to enable another defendant to remove the case to the Federal court.</p> <p>Where, as in this case, the plaintiffs charge one of the defendants with repudiation of obligations and ask his removal as trustee, the claim made at the instance of a co-defendant seeking to remove the case, that he should be realigned as a party plaintiff, is manifestly frivolous.</p>

Held: citing the case of The Venice. It may be said the indebtedness was not absolutely exempt from confiscation as enemy’s property, but only that it was not, under the particular circumstances, “subject to military seizure as booty of war.” And “booty of war” was distinguished from “a seizure for immediate use of the army.” This is a distinction important to observe, and is recognized explicitly or implicitly in all of…

<p>APPEAL FBlOM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the liability of the United States for the use of enemy vessels seized during the war with Spain, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The petitioner states in its petition that it is a corporation of the State of New York and “is composed of more than seventy-five business concerns engaged in the business of selling leaf-tobacco to manufacturers of tobacco products.

Motion for order to maintain the status quo pending appeal. The facts are stated in the opinion. The final decree dismissing the bill dissolved the preliminary injunction. 22 Cyc. 981; 1 Joyce on Injunctions, §§ 3306, 330c; 10 Ency. Pl. and Pr. 1029; Hovey v. MacDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 158, 161; Sweeney v. Handley, 126 Fed. Rep. 97, 99.