Volume 224 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of four counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child, sought a new trial on the basis of allegedly newly discovered evidence that, if credited by a jury, would support a finding that he was innocent of the charges against him. The petitioner was a rabbi, dean and teacher at a private, Orthodox Jewish school when he sexually abused the victim, E, a student at the school, on various dates in 2002 and 2003, when E was fourteen and fifteen years old. The purported new evidence came to light as a result of testimony given by H, a rabbi and an assistant dean at the school when E attended, during a deposition in a federal civil lawsuit that E had brought against the petitioner. H testified in his deposition that he had had a sexual relationship with the petitioner that started when H himself was a student at the school. H also testified that he was involved in a sexual relationship with the petitioner at the same time that the peti- tioner was abusing E. The petitioner argued that H's testimony at a new trial would establish with certainty that any sexual misconduct by the petitioner toward E could not have begun until after E's sixteenth birth- day. It was an essential element of the crime for which the petitioner had been convicted, risk of injury to a child under the applicable statute (§ 53-21 (a) (2)), that E had been under the age of sixteen at the time of the petitioner's sexual misconduct. The petitioner attached to his petition for a new trial an affidavit sworn by H that stated, to H's knowledge, no acts of misconduct by the petitioner toward E occurred prior to E's sixteenth birthday. At the trial on the petition, H testified, inter alia, that E had called him sometime during the winter of 2020 to 2021 to ask if he had been ''really under sixteen at the time.'' The court denied the petition for a new trial and, in its memorandum of decision, noted that the petitioner's defense strategy had changed since his crimi- nal trial, at which his primary defense had been to attack E's credibility and, by implication, the veracity of his allegations of sexual abuse. The court noted that the petitioner now conceded that some of the alleged sexual acts with E had occurred but only after E had turned sixteen years old. The court stated that H had admitted in his testimony at trial that he had not been present during any sexual acts between the petitioner and E. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the petitioner's purported new evidence, which con- sisted wholly of H's affidavit and testimony, would not, if introduced at a new trial, likely result in a different outcome, and, accordingly, properly denied the petition for a new trial: contrary to the petitioner's claim, the court gave due consideration to H's testimony regarding E's statement to him because the court specifically addressed that aspect of the new evidence in its memorandum of decision and concluded that the evidence would have done little to undermine the clear evidence in the criminal trial that E was indeed under the age of sixteen when he was sexually assaulted by the petitioner, and the court did not, as suggested by the petitioner, fail to recognize the significance of E's posttrial uncertainty as to how old he was when the sexual assault started, rather, the court simply was unconvinced that a jury hearing the evidence would have reached a different conclusion regarding the petitioner's guilt in light of the totality of the evidence presented, and the court's overall finding that H's testimony lacked credibility, and thus was unlikely to be credited by a jury, applied equally to his testimony regarding the alleged new statement by E; moreover, E's purported statement to H was vague, as E never affirmatively stated that he was sixteen years old or older when the petitioner first abused him, and, at best, his statement indicated possible confusion or doubt on E's part, but it certainly did not amount to a retraction of his trial testimony that helped to establish a timeline from which the jury reasonably could have found that his sexual abuse by the defendant started prior to E turning sixteen years old, and the only evidence before the court regard- ing the exact wording and context of E's purported posttrial statement to H was H's testimony, which the petitioner did not present any evidence to corroborate; furthermore, it was axiomatic that this court, in reviewing a trial court's decision on a petition for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence could not substitute its own assessment as to the proper weight, if any, to be given to any piece of evidence offered or to revisit a trial court's assessment regarding the credibility of a witness, and the trial court provided a number of reasons why H was not a credible witness, including that H admitted that he had evaded service of process in both the federal civil action and the criminal trial, further weakening the persuasiveness of H's testimony and making it less likely that a jury would find his testimony credible. Argued November 15, 2023—officially released February 27, 2024

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion for modification of unallocated alimony and child support. At the time of dissolution in 2010, the parties had two minor children. The judgment of dissolution incorporated a separation agree- ment, which provided, inter alia, that the plaintiff would have legal and physical custody of the parties' children and that the defendant would pay unallocated alimony and child support in the amount of $1000 weekly. In 2014, by agreement of the parties, the defendant's unallocated alimony and child support was reduced from $1000 to $900 weekly. The 2014 agreement did not specify the amount of child support due to the plaintiff as a portion of the defendant's unallocated support, nor did the agreement expressly prohibit the modification of alimony. The defendant sought modification of the unallocated alimony and child support after the plaintiff and the children moved to Tennessee. During the hearing on the motion, the defendant identified, as substantial changes in circum- stances, the plaintiff's cohabitation and the change in residence in 2021 of his older child, who was then eighteen years old, from the plaintiff's home to the home of the defendant. In support thereof, the defendant sought to have his older child testify as to his change in residence as well as to the plaintiff's cohabitation, which the trial court denied, stating that it did not need the older child's testimony. The trial court also heard the testimony of a private investigator as to the plaintiff's cohabita- tion, and the defendant entered exhibits in support thereof. The plaintiff was not present at the hearing. In denying the defendant's motion, the court found, inter alia, that the defendant had failed to prove a substantial change in circumstances and that the testimony of the private investiga- tor was insufficient and not credible to support a finding of cohabita- tion. Held: 1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for modification with respect to the child support component of the unallocated support obligation because the court's finding that the defendant failed to demon- strate a substantial change in circumstances was clearly erroneous: this court concluded, on the basis of the undisputed evidence in the record, that the change in residence of the parties' older child, from the home of the plaintiff to the home of the defendant, amounted to a substantial change in circumstances pursuant to statute (§ 46b-86 (a)); moreover, the trial court's finding to the contrary was not supported by the evi- dence, as the court did not have any evidence before it that the defendant was not providing for the older child's necessary expenses and it did not make any findings based on the undisputed evidence that established a change in the older child's residence. 2. The trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion for modification without determining the child support component of the unallocated order, and this court, having determined that the defendant was entitled to a new hearing with respect to his motion to modify the child support component of the unallocated order, set forth the procedure applicable to the financial aspects of the modification of child support in the context of an unallocated support order on remand; the trial court should first unbundle the child support from the unallocated alimony and child support by determining the parties' net weekly income with the assis- tance of the 2014 financial affidavits, which the trial court had access to as they were part of the record, second, the trial court must calculate the presumptive support amount for the two children who, at that time, were minors, using the 2005 Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines in effect at the time of the parties' 2014 agreement, third, the trial court must ascertain the intent of the parties as to how the $900 weekly sum was to be divided because the 2014 agreement was not clear, and, finally, the trial court must consider the newly determined 2014 child support award against the parties' current financial circumstances, which also must be determined due to the passage of time since the trial court initially addressed the defendant's request for modification. 3. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for modification with respect to the alimony component of his unallocated support obligation: under the totality of the circumstances in the present case, this court concluded that the trial court misapplied the law at the time of the hearing on the motion for modification, as the trial court was under the misapprehension that the separation agreement precluded the termination of alimony, including on the basis of cohabitation, until the death of either party, and, contrary to the trial court's remarks during the hearing, the separation agreement did not provide that the unallocated support obligation was nonmodifiable as to amount or term pursuant to statute (§ 46b-86 (a)); moreover, the trial court, having incorrectly expressed that cohabitation could not form a basis for modifi- cation of alimony, essentially misled the defendant in forgoing his oppor- tunity to present his older child's testimony, which the court had not precluded on evidentiary grounds, as additional evidence in support of the defendant's allegation of the plaintiff's cohabitation; furthermore, despite the trial court having determined that the defendant failed to provide satisfactory evidence of cohabitation, the trial court did not identify any particular aspects of the private investigator's testimony that it specifically discredited, nor did it offer any explanation of its determination that the private investigator's testimony, as a whole, was not credible; accordingly, the defendant was entitled to a new hearing on the motion for modification. Submitted on brief January 10—officially released February 27, 2024

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and ordering the plaintiff to pay him certain alimony and child support. At the time of trial, the defendant had been unemployed for approximately five years. On the basis of the defendant's past employment, the trial court found that he had an earning capacity of $350,000 per year. The plaintiff worked as an equity partner at M Co., an investment banking firm that she cofounded in 2012. As a partner of M Co., the plaintiff did not receive a base salary or a draw but, rather, received a percentage of the partnership's yearly net profits in the form of distributions. Each year, the partners of M Co. determine the percentage of yearly net profits that each partner will receive. The plaintiff's percentage of net profit had decreased each year from 2018 through 2021, when the trial began. Her distributions also fluctuated from year to year, and she received a total of $1.3 million in 2020 and $2.3 million in 2021. The distributions were received sporadically throughout the year, usually toward the end of the year or the beginning of the following year. The plaintiff received a Schedule K-1 (K-1) from M Co. every year, which she used to determine her net income. Prior to the commencement of the dissolution action, the plaintiff sent a text message to the defendant stating in relevant part that she was planning to reduce her participation in M Co. and was starting her ''exit plan.'' According to the plaintiff's testimony at trial, this text message was merely the result of her being frustrated and upset and she was not in an ''exit process.'' She also testified that she hoped that the text would persuade the defendant to begin seriously looking for employment. The defendant argued that there was a causal relationship between the plaintiff's suggestion that she would reduce her income and the reduction in her percentage of M Co.'s net profits in 2020, alleging that the plaintiff intentionally reduced her income to decrease the amount of alimony and child support she would have to pay to him. In February, 2022, the plaintiff filed a financial affidavit that reflected her 2020 partnership income as shown on her K-1, with a total gross income of approximately $1 million. The plaintiff testified that she relied upon her 2020 K-1 because she had not yet received the 2021 K-1 by the time of trial. Following the trial, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it found that the plaintiff utilized income for her February, 2022 financial affidavit from 2020, a year during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, and that the plaintiff had threatened to reduce her income and that her income was then reduced. The court indicated that it was unable to determine the plaintiff's current income based solely on her distributions from 2021 and year to date for 2022 based on the evidence presented, and, therefore, the court utilized the plaintiff's income from her Febru- ary, 2022 financial affidavit to determine alimony and child support amounts. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by basing its alimony and child support orders on the plaintiff's 2020 income rather than her 2021 partnership distributions: contrary to the defendant's argument that the trial court made a finding that the plaintiff intentionally had caused her income to be diminished in 2020, this court concluded that the trial court did not make such a finding, as, although the plaintiff's percentage of M Co.'s profit in 2020 was lower than in previous years, the court indicated that there were reasons for the reduction, including that additional partners had been added to M Co., that there had been a global pandemic, and that the plaintiff's economic participation at M Co. had decreased; moreover, the trial court was well within its discretion to base its financial orders on the plaintiff's 2020 income because it was unable to determine her current income based solely on her partnership distributions from 2021 and year to date for 2022 and to find that the distributions that the plaintiff thus far had received from M Co. in 2022 did not reflect her actual net income because such distributions were separate from what ultimately was shown on her K-1 as income; furthermore, although the defendant was correct that there was ample evidence of the distributions that the plaintiff had received in 2021, the court was not required to accept his position that the distributions were equal to the plaintiff's income, and the record supported a finding that the plaintiff could not accurately calculate her yearly income until she received a K-1, which reflected adjustments to the partnership distributions made by M Co.'s accountants, and, therefore, because adjustments were made to the total distributions that the plaintiff received from M Co., the amount of resources available for support purposes was not apparent from the partnership distributions alone. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his alternative claim that the trial court abused its discretion by basing the awards of alimony and child support on the plaintiff's income as reflected on her financial affidavit rather than on her earning capacity: this court concluded that, because the trial court properly relied on the plaintiff's February, 2022 financial affidavit in fashioning the support orders, the trial court properly exer- cised its discretion in declining to determine and rely on the plaintiff's earning capacity; moreover, although the court determined an earning capacity for the defendant, it appeared that the court did so because the defendant had not been recently employed, and the court was not required to determine the plaintiff's earning capacity given her continu- ous employment at M Co. since its creation in 2012 and income docu- mented by her K-1, on which the court could reasonably rely in crafting the support orders. Argued December 6, 2023—officially released February 27, 2024

The plaintiffs sought to quiet title by adverse possession to certain of the defendants' property that was adjacent to their own. The plaintiffs acquired title to their property in 2011 and claimed that they had used a portion of the defendants' property, which was located between the plaintiffs' home and a creek set inside of a shallow ravine, in various ways since that time. The plaintiffs also asserted that their predecessors in title had used the disputed area continuously from 1961 to 2011. The disputed area consisted predominantly of a grassy side yard, which the plaintiffs maintained, and included a small corner of the plaintiffs' paved driveway. Shortly after purchasing their property, the plaintiffs sought and received permission from the defendants' predecessor in title to install drains in the disputed area to divert water from the roof and foundation of their residence into the creek. The defendants purchased their property in 2017. Approximately one year later, they had the prop- erty surveyed and determined that they were the record title holders of the disputed area. Thereafter, the defendants began to use and main- tain the disputed area and asked the plaintiffs to stop entering it. The plaintiffs ignored the defendants' request and continued to use the dis- puted area until 2019, when the defendants erected a plastic fence along the border of their property as it was reflected in the survey. The plaintiffs commenced the underlying action, alleging that they and their predecessors in title had been in open, exclusive, hostile, adverse and actual possession under a claim of right of the disputed area for more than fifteen years, as required by the applicable statute (§ 52-575 (a)). The defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment affirming their ownership of the disputed area and to quiet title. There- after, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the essential elements of adverse possession had been met. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendants because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether privity existed between the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title: the plain- tiffs were required to demonstrate privity between themselves and their predecessors in title in order to tack the adverse use of their predeces- sors to their own use to satisfy the fifteen year period set forth in § 52- 575 (a) and to acquire title to the disputed area because they purchased their property and began using the disputed area only eight years prior to the commencement of the action; moreover, although the plaintiffs' predecessors in title never expressly conveyed the disputed area to the plaintiffs, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether privity existed between the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title under the theory of implied conveyance; furthermore, several courts in other juris- dictions have found an implied transfer of a disputed area on the basis of the existence of a natural boundary that appeared to enclose the property, and the disputed area in the present case was bounded by a ravine and a creek, and the plaintiffs' predecessors in title believed that the creek was the boundary line of their property and that they owned the disputed area until they sold their property to the plaintiffs; accordingly, whether an implied transfer could be inferred from the evidence raised a question of fact that could not properly be resolved by the trial court on a motion for summary judgment. 2. The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendants because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs recognized the defendants' superior title to the disputed area: although it was undisputed that the plaintiffs asked the defendants' predecessor in title for permission to install drains in the disputed area shortly after the plaintiffs had purchased their property, there was conflicting evidence regarding whether the permission sought was for the use of the disputed area or for the resulting increase in water into the creek, which the plaintiffs believed was owned by the defendant's predecessors in title and which marked the then supposed boundary line, and that factual dispute was required to be resolved by the fact finder, not by the trial court at summary judgment. 3. The trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendants because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the exclusiv- ity of the plaintiffs' use of the disputed area: there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether adverse possession had been established prior to the defendants' entry into the disputed area in 2018, as the plaintiffs presented evidence that they and/or their predecessors in title had used the disputed area continuously from 1961 until the defendants erected a fence around it in 2019; moreover, to the extent that the plaintiffs did not establish adverse possession prior to 2018, it was the role of the fact finder to determine whether the plaintiffs' use was sufficient to satisfy the exclusivity requirement needed to establish adverse possession despite the defendants' use of the disputed area beginning in 2018. Argued November 9, 2023—officially released March 5, 2024

The plaintiff, N Co., appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying its application for a prejudgment remedy pursuant to statute (§ 52-278a et seq.). N Co.'s proposed complaint alleged common- law and statutory vexatious litigation claims that arose out of an earlier action to which N Co. was not a party. The trial court in the earlier action had rendered judgment for H Co., the plaintiff in that action, and it awarded attorney's fees to H Co. H Co. thereafter changed its name to B Co., and B Co. assigned the judgment obtained in the earlier action and all related claims arising out of such litigation to N Co. The defen- dants named in the present action were either defendants in the earlier action or attorneys and law firms who represented those defendants. The court in the present action thereafter denied N Co.'s application, concluding that its proposed vexatious litigation claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and that the payment of any judgment rendered against the law firm defendants would be adequately secured by insurance. Held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over N Co.'s application for a prejudgment remedy, as N Co. lacked standing to bring the application predicated on its vexatious litigation claims: N Co.'s claims fell squarely within the category of tort claims that may not be assigned, as its alleged damages included, inter alia, claims of injuries to H Co.'s business reputation and attorney's fees necessary for the defense of claims against H Co., which were personal in nature and accrued only to H Co. and not to N Co.; accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and directed the trial court to dismiss N Co.'s application. Argued November 14, 2023—officially released March 5, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 1-200 (5)), '' '[p]ublic records or files' means any recorded data or information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 1-210 (b)), ''[n]othing in the Freedom of Infor- mation Act shall be construed to require disclosure of . . . communica- tions privileged by the attorney-client relationship . . . .'' The plaintiffs, the town of Avon and its town manager, B, appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their administrative appeal from the final decision of the defendant Freedom of Information Com- mission ordering the plaintiffs to disclose certain information to the defendant S pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 et seq.). A managerial level town employee met with B to seek his guidance on how to handle certain work-related incidents and events involving the town's chief of police, R, that the employee had observed. Following that meeting, B contacted the town's attorney, who asked whether the employee had any documentation of those incidents. B subsequently contacted the employee, who confirmed that he had created a log detail- ing incidents occurring over the course of more than one year. The employee provided the log to B, who made a copy of the log, provided the copy to the town attorney, and returned the log to the employee. Pursuant to a memorandum from the town, R was placed on administra- tive leave, pending an investigation. Sometime thereafter, the town and R executed a severance agreement, and R retired from his position as chief of police. A few months later, S submitted a request that the town provide him with any and all records relating to the accusations concerning R. In response to this request, the plaintiffs provided S with a copy of the memorandum placing R on leave and the severance agreement; however, neither document included the reason behind the decision to place R on administrative leave, and the plaintiffs did not provide S with a copy of the log that had been given by the town employee to B documenting that employee's observations of R's conduct. S filed an appeal with the commission alleging that the plaintiffs had violated the act by failing to provide him with the log. During the hearing on S's complaint before a hearing officer for the commission, the plain- tiffs' sole argument in opposition to S's request was that the log was exempt from disclosure due to the attorney-client privilege pursuant to § 1-210 (b). After the hearing officer issued her proposed final decision, finding that the log was not exempt from disclosure under the attorney- client privilege, the town responded to the proposed decision and, in addition to maintaining its argument that the log was protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege, also argued that the log was not a public record under the act because it consisted of the personal notes of an individual. In its final decision, the commission found that the log was a public record within the meaning of the act and concluded that the log was not a document protected by the attorney-client privi- lege, and, thus, it was not exempt from disclosure under the act. The commission therefore ordered that the log be disclosed to S. The plain- tiffs filed an administrative appeal with the trial court, which, after a hearing, issued a memorandum of decision in which it agreed with the decision of the commission and dismissed the plaintiffs' administrative appeal. On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the commission erred by not considering or applying the four part test for determining whether a communication between a public employee and an attorney is privileged set forth in Shew v. Freedom of Information Commission (245 Conn. 149), which provides that communications to an attorney for a public agency are protected from disclosure by privilege if the attorney is acting in a professional capacity for the agency, the communications are made to the attorney by current employees or officials of the agency, the communications relate to the legal advice sought by the agency from the attorney, and the communications are made in confidence. The commission, in turn, argued that the commis- sion properly determined that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate one of the three criteria set forth in State v. Kosuda-Bigazzi (335 Conn. 327) for establishing that a document is privileged, either by showing that the document is itself the record or memorialization of a communication between the client and the attorney, that the document was created with the intent to communicate the contents to an attorney and the client actually communicated the contents to the attorney, or that a preexisting document has been transformed into a communication for the purpose of seeking legal advice and that the document was communi- cated to or intended to be communicated to an attorney. Held: 1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the log was a public record pursuant to the act: a. Contrary to the plaintiffs' claim, this court concluded that the log included information relating to the conduct of the public's business under § 1-200 (5): there was no doubt that the public has an interest in the conduct of police, as public employees, and a log detailing concerns about the work-related conduct of the town's chief of police implicated the public's business and concern; moreover, § 1-200 must be construed in light of the overall purpose of the act, which favors disclosure of government records; furthermore, B conceded in his hearing testimony that the revelations in the log about the conduct of R were crucial to the decision to place him on leave, and the fact that the log triggered such an action, particularly against a high-level town official whose job involved public safety, supported the conclusion that the log included information relating to the conduct of the public's business, as the con- tents of the log provided a basis for understanding the town's investiga- tive process, its decision making and its overall handling of R's employ- ment, which eventually resulted in his resignation and a subsequent severance agreement between R and the town. b. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the log was not prepared, owned, used, received or retained by a public agency under § 1-200 (5), this court having concluded that the log was received by the town, which was dispositive of whether the log was a public record: it was undisputed that the employee, at the town attorney's request, gave the log to B, and, in light of the ordinary meaning of the word ''receive,'' this court concluded that, when B took possession of the log, the town received the log for purposes of § 1-200 (5); moreover, the plaintiffs provided no authority for their argument that ''received'' under the statute means that the document must be given to a public agency for the agency's retention, and, in fact, such a reading of the statute would be redundant, as the statute includes whether a document was retained by a public agency as a separate ground for finding that it is a public record, and statutes shall be interpreted, whenever possible, to avoid redundancy; furthermore, the plaintiffs' argument that the log was not received by the town because B merely served as a conduit to deliver the log to the town attorney was unavailing, as the plaintiffs cited no authority in their appellate briefs for this assertion, the town attorney in this case was an agent of the town, and towns cannot be permitted to circumvent their statutory obligations relating to the disclosure of public records by simply delivering the records to their attorney. 2. Contrary to the plaintiffs' claim, the commission did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion in concluding that the log was not exempt from disclosure under the act pursuant to the attorney-client privilege: on the basis of a thorough review of the record, including an in camera review of the log, this court concluded that the record contained substantial evidence to support the commission's findings that the log contained personal observations of the employee relating to the conduct of R, the employee created the log for his own personal use, the log was not created for the purpose of seeking legal advice or with the intent to communicate its contents to an attorney, the employee met with B, who is not an attorney, to discuss the employee's concerns about R's conduct and to seek guidance on how to deal with R regarding the incidents that the employee had observed, and the log did not constitute a record of communication between a client and an attorney, as there was no evidence in the record showing that the employee who created the log ever spoke with the town attorney, and, because those findings related to the second and third parts of the test in Shew, the trial court, in effect, applied the test in Shew when it analyzed the plaintiffs' claim of attorney-client privilege; moreover, those findings supported a conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that the log was exempt from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege, either under the test in Shew or the first two of the three ways to establish the attorney-client privilege with regard to documents as set forth in Kosuda-Bigazzi; furthermore, the commission's finding that the log was a preexisting document, in that it was in existence before B sought legal advice from the town attorney, was also supported by the substantial evidence in the record concerning the log, demonstrating that it was not a record of a communication and was not created for the purpose of seeking legal advice, and the commission specifically found that the employee did not later create a typed compilation and/or summary of the log for the purpose of securing counsel, and therefore there was no evidence in the record demonstra- ting a transformation of the log for the purpose of seeking legal counsel; additionally, although the plaintiffs argued that the log was provided to the town attorney solely for the purpose of seeking legal advice, this argument ignored the fact that the legal advice sought was for the town, not the person who created the log, and the log did not become a privileged document simply because B provided the log to the town attorney when he sought legal advice about how the town should proceed with respect to R. Argued October 19, 2023—officially released March 5, 2024

The plaintiff filed an application to compel arbitration pursuant to an agree- ment entered into by the parties. Following a remote status conference, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to commence arbitra- tion within thirty days, and the defendants appealed to this court. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to terminate the automatic appellate stay pursuant to the rules of practice (§ 61-11), and the defen- dants did not file a motion for review of that decision. During oral argument before this court, the parties represented that arbitration pro- ceedings were ongoing, including, inter alia, that a demand for arbitration had been filed and acknowledged and that an answer, counterclaim and special defenses had been filed, but shared the position that the appeal was not moot. Held that the appeal was dismissed as it had been rendered moot and, therefore, this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the defendants' claims; when the arbitration proceedings com- menced following the termination of the appellate stay, there was no practical relief that this court could afford the defendants because the trial court's judgment from which they appealed, ordering the parties to commence arbitration proceedings, had been executed and could not now be undone. Argued November 7, 2023—officially released March 12, 2024

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, an attorney and the law firm with which he was engaged in the practice of law, for their alleged legal malpractice in connection with their representation of her during certain postdissolution proceedings. The trial court had rendered a judgment of nonsuit in a prior action against these same defendants as a result of the plaintiff's failure to comply with certain discovery orders and thereafter denied the plaintiff's motion to open the judgment. The plaintiff commenced the present action pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute (§ 52-592), alleging, inter alia, that the defendants had entered into a stipulation with the plaintiff's former husband and his attorney that had been reached without her participa- tion and, as a result, she had incurred additional legal fees, loss of income and financial obligations. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's prior action against the defendants alleged nearly identical claims, and that her claims of legal malpractice and negligent misrepresentation were time barred and could not be saved by § 52-592. The defendants argued that the prior action had resulted in a judgment of nonsuit against the plaintiff for disciplinary reasons following her noncompliance with the court's discovery orders and, therefore, that judgment had not been rendered as a result of a matter of form. The trial court rendered judgment granting the defen- dants' motion for summary judgment, observing that it was undisputed that, at the time of the hearing on the motion to open the judgment of nonsuit, the plaintiff had still not disclosed an expert witness, and that the plaintiff's attorney, V, had claimed at the hearing that an expert had not been disclosed because he did not want to ask the plaintiff to pay for an expert witness after a judgment of nonsuit had been rendered. The court concluded that the failure to disclose an expert was a deliberate decision to avoid costs and that this failure constituted intentional, dilatory conduct and was clearly egregious. The court also noted that, although the plaintiff had averred that she experienced psychological stress and related mental health symptoms when she attempted to com- ply with her discovery obligations because they caused her to recall unpleasant facts related to her relationship with her former husband, these concerns did not constitute excusable neglect, inadvertence, or mistake. The court subsequently denied the plaintiff's motion to reargue and reconsider, and this appeal followed. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to the legal malpractice and negligent misrepresentation counts of her complaint, which was based on her claim that those counts were not time barred by the applicable statute of limitations (§ 52-577) because they were properly brought pursuant to § 52-592: the trial court correctly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the conduct that led to the judgment of nonsuit in the prior action was not a matter of form, it was undisputed that the plaintiff had failed to disclose an expert witness by the time of the hearing on the motion to open the judgment of nonsuit in the prior action, and the plaintiff's deliberate strategy of failing to retain an expert to avoid costs was contrary to her obligations pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 13-4) and the discovery deadlines imposed by the court in the prior action, and, thus, insofar as the judgment of nonsuit was based on the plaintiff's failure to disclose an expert, the judgment resulted from a deliberate disregard for the court's authority; moreover, the court considered the fact that the judgment of nonsuit in the prior action was based on the plaintiff's failure to respond to interrogatories and requests for production, and it was clear that the plaintiff had engaged in a pattern of missing dead- lines for compliance and, after the fact, having sought extensions of time in which to comply; furthermore, this court agreed with the trial court that the personal trauma experienced by the plaintiff when attempting to comply with the trial court's clear and unambiguous dis- covery orders, although difficult, did not amount to excusable neglect, and neither the record nor the plaintiff's affidavit suggested that V counseled the plaintiff with respect to the effect of her failure to comply with the court's orders. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to reargue and reconsider its ruling on the defendant's motion for summary judgment: the plaintiff's motion did not demonstrate to the trial court that there was some decision or other principle of law that would have had a controlling effect and had been overlooked or that there had been a misapprehension of facts but, rather, was the quintessential example of a party seeking the proverbial second bite of the apple, as the record reflected that the plaintiff used the motion to present a different argument than that on which she had relied in oppos- ing the motion for judgment of nonsuit in the prior action, when she sought to open the judgment of nonsuit, and in opposing the motion for summary judgment in the present action; moreover, the plaintiff submitted certain evidence in support of the motion to reargue and reconsider that contradicted the evidence on which she had relied pre- viously, and the nature of that evidence, which pertained to events that predated the judgment of nonsuit, compelled the conclusion that it was not newly discovered, and, under our rules of practice (§ 17-45), the time to submit relevant evidence in connection with a motion in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is before the motion is heard, not following an adverse ruling on the motion. Argued November 9, 2023—officially released March 12, 2024

The defendant judgment debtor, B, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his claim that certain bank accounts were exempt from execution pursuant to statute ((Supp. 2022) § 52-367b) because the plaintiff judgment creditors executed on accounts that did not belong to him but, rather, belonged to his mother, J. The plaintiffs had obtained an arbitration award against B arising from a default on a loan, and the award was confirmed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs then domesticated the judgment in the Superior Court. After the trial court granted an application for a bank execution to satisfy the domesticated judgment, the plaintiffs served the execution on T Co., a bank, which identified two bank accounts on which B was listed as an account owner along with J and his sister. In his claim of exemption, B did not identify any of the statutory bases for an exemption set forth in § 52-367b or on the form prescribed by the Judicial Branch pursuant to § 52-367b (k). Instead, B indicated on his claim of exemption form that the basis of his claim was ''[o]ther'' and included a handwritten notation stating ''[f]unds in these accounts are not my property.'' Following a hearing, the court denied B's claim of exemption. Held that the trial court did not improperly find that the accounts at issue were joint accounts and were not exempt from execution under § 52-367b, the court having correctly concluded that B's asserted exemption was not recognized or enumerated under § 52-367b: although B purported to claim an exemp- tion under § 52-367b, specifically, that the funds in the accounts were not his but, instead, belonged solely to J, both the plain language of § 52-367b and case law make clear that the only cognizable exemptions are those provided for by that statute or any other laws or regulations of this state or the United States which exempt such debts from execution; moreover, although B noted in a supplemental brief to this court that he had filed a claim in the trial court for determination of interests pursuant to statute (§ 52-356c), that claim was neither pursued by B nor adjudicated by the trial court, and, because only a judgment creditor or a third person may make a claim for determination of interests pursuant to § 52-356c, not a judgment debtor, unless acting in a represen- tative capacity for an appropriate third party with an alleged interest in the subject property, and B lacked any legal capacity to act on J's behalf, he was not authorized by statute to challenge T Co.'s determina- tion that he was a co-owner of the accounts by pursuing a claim for determination of interests. Argued October 16, 2023—officially released March 12, 2024

Pursuant to part I of chapter 909 of the General Statutes, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (§§ 52-407aa through 52-407eee) governs arbitration agreements made on or after October 1, 2018, subject to certain excep- tions. Pursuant further to part II of chapter 909 of the General Statutes, titled ''Other Arbitration Proceedings,'' the provisions of other statutes (§§ 52- 408 through 52-424) govern arbitration agreements made before October 1, 2018. The plaintiff city sought to vacate an arbitration award in favor of the defendants, P, a former police sergeant who was employed by the city, and a union, of which P was a member, arising from the termination of P's employment for allegedly violating the city's excessive force policy and related federal law. Pursuant to a municipal collective bargaining agreement, executed in 2020, the union submitted a grievance regarding P's employment termination to the state arbitration board. After a hear- ing, a three member panel of the board concluded that P's employment had not been terminated for just cause and that he should be reinstated with full back pay. The city filed in the Superior Court an application to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to the applicable statutes (§§ 52- 418 and 52-420), claiming, inter alia, that the arbitration panel exceeded its powers and misapplied the law. The defendants filed a combined objection and application to confirm the arbitration award. The Superior Court vacated the arbitration panel's award and remanded the matter to the arbitration board for a new hearing on the merits of the grievance, from which the defendants appealed to this court. The city filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the judgment of the Superior Court did not constitute a final judgment. The city, in relying on the statute (§ 52-407bbb (a) (5)) in part I of chapter 909 that provides that an appeal may be taken from an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing, claimed that, because the Superior Court expressly directed a rehearing, the defen- dants did not appeal from a final judgment. The defendants objected, claiming that, because they had filed a combined opposition and applica- tion to confirm the award, specific statutes (§§ 52-423 and 52-407bbb (a) (3)) provided them with the statutory basis to appeal from an order denying the confirmation of an award. Held that this court denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendants' appeal for lack of a final judgment: because this appeal arose in the context of a municipal collec- tive bargaining agreement and is governed by various provisions (§ 7- 467 et seq.) of chapter 113 of the General Statutes, one of the exceptions in part I of chapter 909 was applicable, specifically, the exception in the statute (§ 52-407cc) that provides that a proceeding under chapter 113 shall be subject to part II of chapter 909, regardless of the date the agreement was executed, and, under § 52-423, found in part II of chapter 909, and under Board of Education v. East Haven Education Assn. (66 Conn. App. 202), the defendants had a right to appeal from orders related to the judicial enforcement of arbitration awards and specifically provides a right of appeal from an order vacating an arbitration award. Considered December 13, 2023—officially released March 19, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 21a-408p), no employer may discharge an employee solely on the basis of such employee's status as a person qualified to use medical marijuana under the Palliative Use of Marijuana Act (§ 21a- 408 et seq.). The plaintiff, whose employment as a preschool teaching assistant with the defendant had been terminated, sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, its alleged discrimination against her because of her disability, epilepsy. At the time of her hire, the plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the defendant's drug free workplace policy and employee handbook, which included provisions stating that working while under the influence of drugs could result in the termination of her employment. She did not inform the defendant that she suffered from epilepsy until after she experienced a seizure while at work. The defendant thereafter adopted a medical alert protocol for the plaintiff, allowed her, in her discretion, to leave work for the day whenever she experienced a seizure, and transferred her to a different classroom to ensure she would be accompanied by another adult at all times for her safety and the safety of the students. In October, 2018, the plaintiff additionally requested that the nurse on site store Valium in her office and administer it to the plaintiff after she had a seizure. The defendant denied this request in part because the nurse was not permitted to administer medications to the staff, but the defendant did not prohibit the plaintiff from bringing Valium and using it in the workplace as needed. In January, 2019, an incident occurred during which the plaintiff called a child the wrong name in front of D, a teacher at the facility, and told D that she was a medical marijuana user and was feeling the effects from it. D reported this interaction to E, the defendant's education manager, and the defen- dant conducted an investigation into the plaintiff's purported drug use. During the course of the investigation, E and G, the defendant's human resources director, conducted an investigatory interview with the plain- tiff, in which the plaintiff admitted that she had reported to work while impaired, which she said was caused by taking too much medical mari- juana. As part of its investigation, the defendant also interviewed L, the teacher assigned to the plaintiff's classroom, who noted that the plaintiff had been droopy and unsteady on her feet in the weeks prior to the January, 2019 incident, and the defendant received a letter from B, an employee who stated that the plaintiff had informed him that she was taking medical marijuana. The defendant requested that the plaintiff submit to a drug test, which came back negative for marijuana. The plaintiff additionally submitted a physician's letter to the defendant stating that she was a medical marijuana user with a prescription to use a vape pen daily at 8 p.m. At the conclusion of its investigation, the defendant terminated the plaintiff's employment for reporting to work while impaired by marijuana. In a four count complaint alleging viola- tions of a provision (§ 46a-60 (b) (1)) of the Connecticut Fair Employ- ment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.), a violation of § 21a-408p, and wrongful termination in violation of a drug testing statute (§ 31-51x), the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had discriminated against her on the basis of her disability and her qualification as a medical marijuana user. The defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination, it had provided her with reasonable accommodations for her disability, it had a reasonable suspicion that she was impaired in the workplace before it directed her to submit to drug testing, and her discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims were time barred. The court granted the defendant's motion, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the count of the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the defendant violated § 21a-408p (b) (3) by improperly terminating her employment due to her status as a person qualified to use medical marijuana under the Palliative Use of Marijuana Act: no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant violated the statute, as its investiga- tion into the plaintiff's January, 2019 conduct originated in D's report that the plaintiff had been impaired in the workplace and was com- menced before the plaintiff informed the defendant that she was a qualified user of medical marijuana, thus, the plaintiff could not establish that the defendant discharged her solely on the basis of her status as a qualifying patient; moreover, the defendant's stated decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment for reporting to work in an impaired state was expressly permitted by § 21a-408p (b) (3). 2. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the count of the plaintiff's complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of disability: the court did not apply an improper legal standard in evaluating that claim, as it explicitly determined that the plaintiff had not met her burden under either the mixed-motive or the pretext model of analysis; moreover, the plaintiff did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her disability played a substantial role in the defendant's decision to terminate her employment, as notes from the investigatory interview indicated that G specifically asked the plaintiff if she understood that the defendant's alarm over the January, 2019 incident had nothing to do with the plaintiff's epilepsy, to which the plaintiff responded in the affirmative, the written disciplinary notice that the defendant furnished to the plaintiff made no mention of the plaintiff's disability, and the record indicated that the defendant proac- tively took multiple steps to accommodate the plaintiff's epilepsy once it learned of it; furthermore, the plaintiff could not satisfy her burden to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the real reason for her termination was membership in a protected class, as the defendant stated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to termi- nate her employment, and the plaintiff did not submit any evidence to demonstrate or argue on appeal that that reason was pretextual. 3. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the count of the plaintiff's complaint alleging failure to accommodate her disability in violation of § 46a-60 (b) (1): a. The plaintiff's claim with respect to the defendant's denial in October, 2018, of her request to store Valium in the nurse's office and have the nurse administer the Valium to her occurred more than 180 days before she filed a complaint of disability discrimination with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in May, 2019, and the plaintiff did not allege that waiver, consent, or another equitable tolling doctrine applied to the accommodation request, thus, the claim with respect to that request was time barred by the statute of limitations ((Rev. to 2017) § 46a-82 (f)). b. No genuine issue existed as to whether the plaintiff made a medical marijuana accommodation request or whether the defendant violated § 46a-60 (b) (1) by denying such a request: the record did not reflect that the plaintiff requested an accommodation for her medical marijuana use, as she did not disclose her use of medical marijuana to the defendant until after the January, 2019 incident, the letter she furnished from her physician did not request or recommend any accommodations regarding her use of medical marijuana, and she acknowledged during her deposi- tion that there was no reference to medical marijuana in her request for accommodation with respect to her use of Valium; moreover, the plaintiff provided no legal authority to support the proposition that the defendant should have allowed her to use her medical marijuana during the workday or to appear at the preschool facility in an impaired state; furthermore, the plaintiff never suggested that she could properly perform the job of a preschool teaching assistant while impaired by the use of medical marijuana. 4. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant on the count of the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the defendant violated § 31-51x by requiring her to take a drug test following the January, 2019 incident; no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant had a reasonable suspicion to require the plaintiff to take a drug test, as D and L had provided observations to the defendant of the plaintiff in the workplace that indicated a concern for the safety of the children in the plaintiff's care, B had informed the defendant by letter that the plaintiff claimed to use medical marijuana, and the plaintiff had admitted to E and G that she used medical marijuana and may have used too much, and a reasonable person armed with that information would have suspected that the plaintiff had been under the influence of drugs in the classroom, which could adversely impact her job perfor- mance. Argued October 19, 2023—officially released March 19, 2024

The petitioner sought relief in a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that P, his counsel during his second habeas action, had pro- vided ineffective assistance by failing to raise claims of ineffective assis- tance against G, the petitioner's criminal trial counsel, and D, his counsel on direct appeal from his conviction. The petitioner had been convicted, after a jury trial, of murder as an accessory as a result of a gang related argument during which he and another individual shot at the unarmed victim as he was attempting to flee. The petitioner gave a statement to the police in which he admitted shooting the victim and claimed that the victim had reached toward the front of his waist as if he were about to pull out a gun. The petitioner did not indicate in the statement that he saw an actual weapon. Having determined that the evidence was lacking to support a defense of self-defense and that the outcome of the trial hinged on the petitioner's statement to the police, G decided not to request a jury instruction on self-defense and instead employed a trial strategy of attacking the credibility of the police involved in the petitioner's arrest and discrediting the statement's reliability while highlighting facts about the petitioner that might appeal to the jurors' sympathy. Thereafter, the court instructed the jury on the charge of murder, a specific intent crime. Although the court initially read the murder statute (§ 53a-54a (a)), which contained language requiring the specific intent to cause the victim's death, it also read the entire statutory (§ 53a-3 (11)) definition of intent, which included language on both specific intent and general intent to engage in conduct. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that the petitioner had not established that either G or D had rendered ineffective assistance, and, thus, that he could not prevail on his ineffective assistance claims against P. The court granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that P rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to raise a claim that G had rendered deficient performance when she declined to request a self-defense instruction at the criminal trial: G's decision was a matter of sound trial strategy, as a defense of self-defense was inconsistent with the evidence that the unarmed victim was shot from behind as he was fleeing, and G was unable to find a witness or other evidence to corroborate the petitioner's belief that the victim was reaching for a weapon at the time of the shooting; moreover, G sought to have the jury consider only secondarily that the petitioner may have acted in self-defense and made the tactical decision to afford the jury two pathways to find the petitioner not guilty of murder without foreclosing the reasonable and well supported strategy of attacking the credibility of his statement to the police, as G's main objective was to discredit the statement in an attempt to persuade the jury to disregard evidence that was key to the state's case while her secondary objective was to suggest that, if the jury were to believe the petitioner's statement, it also might believe that he acted in self-defense when he shot at the victim. 2. The habeas court correctly rejected the petitioner's ineffective assistance claims against P concerning the trial court's jury instruction on the intent element of murder, as the petitioner was not prejudiced by G's failure to object to the instruction, and D did not improperly fail to raise the issue on direct appeal: a. Although G rendered deficient performance when she failed to object to the intent instruction, the record in its entirety, including the petitioner's incriminating statement to the police and the corroborating physical evidence presented by the state, showed that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the outcome of his criminal trial would have been different had G objected to the instruction: although the court incorrectly read the entire definition of intent in § 53a-3 (11), it repeatedly referenced the specific intent language when it thereafter instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm and on accessorial liability as it applied to the murder charge and to manslaughter; moreover, the court correctly distinguished the intent elements of manslaughter and accessory to man- slaughter from the specific intent language of the murder charge and accessory to murder, and, by stressing and emphasizing the differences between the elements of the offenses under which the petitioner could be found guilty, the court eliminated any risk of confusion that could have been caused by its improper prior instruction on intent to commit murder, and, thus, it was not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the incorrect instruction on the element of intent. b. P did not render ineffective assistance by failing to claim that D improperly failed to raise the issue of the incorrect intent instruction on direct appeal, this court having previously determined, on the basis of its review of the merits of the underlying claim, that it was not reasonably probable that the petitioner would have prevailed on direct appeal. Argued November 14, 2023—officially released March 19, 2024

The plaintiff, as parent and next friend of her minor son, C, sought to recover damages from the defendants, the city of Hartford and D, the city forester, for injuries sustained by C when a tree fell on him while he was playing at a basketball court located in a city park. Eleven days before C was injured, D had visually inspected the tree at issue, which was located approximately twenty feet from the basketball court at the park. She determined that the tree did not constitute an immediate public hazard but designated the tree for removal by posting a sign on the tree allowing ten days for public comment, pursuant to a city ordi- nance (§ 26-11) and the statute (§ 23-59) governing the duties of tree wardens. The plaintiff's three count complaint included allegations of negligence against the city and D. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants were negligent in failing to adequately inspect the tree at issue and remove it. In their answer and special defenses, the defendants alleged that the plaintiff's negligence claims were barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity. Several months later, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to governmental immunity on the negligence claims because all of the allegations involved public duties that were discretionary as a matter of law. More than two years later, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment wherein she argued that the defendants violated their ministerial duties as to the inspection and removal of the tree at issue. On that same day, the plaintiff also filed a request to amend her complaint, seeking to add one count asserting common-law recklessness, alleging the failure to conduct an inspection of the tree that fell on C. The plaintiff represented that her proposed new count of recklessness related back to her original complaint in that the factual basis for the claim of recklessness had not changed and the new claim merely amplified and expanded upon the allegations in the original complaint by setting forth an alternative theory of liability. The defen- dants filed an objection to the request to amend, arguing that, because their motion for summary judgment had been fully briefed and there was a trial date already assigned, granting the plaintiff's request to amend to include an additional count that raised a new basis of liability would prejudice them. The trial court denied the plaintiff's request to amend, finding that the amendment would considerably delay the proceedings, that it asserted claims not raised in the complaint that was the subject of the pending summary judgment motion, and that the plaintiff had offered no explanation or rationale for the delay in asserting a new claim. Approximately one month later, the court held a hearing on the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff's objection thereto, at which the plaintiff's counsel argued that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether D's duty to inspect was ministerial or discretionary. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for permission to file a supplemental brief to her objection to the motion for summary judgment to argue that the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied because the allegations of the original complaint were broad enough to state a nuisance claim and the alleged facts supported a nuisance claim not barred by governmental immunity. The defendants filed an objection arguing that the plaintiff had not, and could not, allege a public nuisance claim against them. Several weeks later, the trial date was continued to a date almost one year after the then scheduled trial date. The plaintiff filed a renewed request to amend her complaint, seeking to add one count for common-law recklessness and one count for public nuisance. In her request, the plaintiff reiterated that the new allegations related back to the allegations in the original complaint and asserted that the new trial date afforded ample time for the defendants to conduct any additional discovery that they deemed necessary. The defendants filed an objection, arguing that the trial date was continued only to provide the court with time to decide the pending motion for summary judgment and that there was no reason to revisit the trial court's prior ruling denying the plaintiff's first request to amend. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for permission to file a supplemental brief but rejected the argument therein, finding that the factual allega- tions of the operative complaint did not support a claim for public nuisance as an alternative to the negligence claims that had been clearly pleaded. On that same day, the court denied the plaintiff's renewed request to amend her complaint, ruling that the proposed new counts were filed beyond the applicable statutes of limitations (§§ 52-577 and 52-584) and that the new counts did not relate back to the allegations in the original complaint. The trial court subsequently issued a memoran- dum of decision granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment and concluding that the allegations of negligence in the plaintiff's com- plaint clearly related to discretionary functions and, therefore, the defen- dants were immune from liability both at common law and under the statute (§ 52-557n) providing governmental immunity. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly denied her first request to amend her complaint; when the plaintiff filed that request, the defendants' motion for summary judgment had been pending for more than two years, it had been briefed by both parties, and there was an upcoming trial date, and the trial court's ruling that permitting the amendment would considerably delay the proceedings in light of the upcoming trial date did not reflect an abuse of its discretion. 2. The trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's renewed request to amend her complaint on the basis that the proposed claims of recklessness and public nuisance were barred by §§ 52-577 and 52-584: neither § 52- 577 nor § 52-584 establishes a remedy that does not otherwise exist, and, because such statutes of limitations are procedural, not jurisdic- tional, and the periods of limitation set forth therein could be waived, a trial court may not raise the limitation on its own motion; moreover, because the trial court sua sponte raised the issue of the statutes of limitations and the defendants had not objected to the plaintiff's renewed request to amend her complaint on the ground that the new allegations did not relate back to the allegations of her complaint and were, conse- quently, beyond the applicable statutes of limitations, the court erred in denying the request. 3. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment for the defendants was unavailing: a. Contrary to the plaintiff's argument, the trial court did not err in concluding that her complaint failed to set forth a claim for public nuisance; although the plaintiff identified certain allegations in her com- plaint that she claimed set forth a claim of nuisance, specifically, that the defendants allowed C to use the basketball court in the park when they knew or should have known that the tree was rotted or dangerous and continued to maintain the tree with the same defects, those allega- tions, when read in the context of the entirety of the complaint, did not allege that the defendants created the condition that caused the tree to fall but, rather, that they should have recognized the hazard presented by the tree and remediated it, essentially alleging a failure to act on the part of the defendants, and a failure to act or remediate does not consti- tute a nuisance. b. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred in concluding that her claims against the defendants were barred by governmental immunity because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendants' alleged negligence constituted a violation of a ministerial or discretionary duty: because D determined that the tree at issue in the present case did not pose an immediate public hazard, the plaintiff's claim that § 23-59 imposes a ministerial duty when a tree poses an immediate public hazard was unavailing; moreover, although the plaintiff contended that D violated her ministerial duty to properly inspect the tree at issue, she failed to cite any authority to support her contention that D's duty to inspect the tree at issue was ministerial, and this court has previously held that § 23-59 provides that many, but not all, of the duties of a tree warden involve the exercise of discretion; furthermore, the defendants had not received a complaint or been other- wise notified that the tree at issue was potentially hazardous but, rather, the record reflected that D's inspection of the tree at issue was a matter of routine, there were no policies or regulations that set forth the manner in which the inspection of a tree must be conducted, and, in the absence of such guidelines, it was clear that the routine inspection involved D's judgment and discretion, and, therefore, the court did not err in conclud- ing that the allegations of the complaint challenged D's discretionary con- duct. Argued November 7, 2023—officially released March 19, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that both his trial counsel and prior habeas counsel were ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary in violation of his due process rights. In 2010, approximately two years after his conviction, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus, in which he was represented by D. In 2013, the petitioner withdrew his petition just prior to trial. In 2018, the petitioner filed the underlying habeas petition, which he amended in 2022. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a motion pursuant to the statute (§ 52-470) governing summary disposal of habeas corpus matters for an order to show cause as to why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely because it was filed more than five years after the petitioner's judgment of conviction became final in 2008. In response, the petitioner claimed that good cause existed for the delay in the filing of his petition because D failed to advise him of the time constraints outlined in § 52-470 for a subsequent habeas petition and, if he had been so advised, he would not have withdrawn his first habeas petition. The habeas court found that the petitioner had failed to show good cause for the delay in filing and dismissed the petition. Just prior to oral argument in the present appeal, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction (348 Conn. 333), which held that ineffective assistance of counsel is an objective factor external to a petitioner that may constitute good cause to excuse the late filing of a habeas petition under the totality of the circumstances pursuant to § 52-470 (c) and (e). Held that the habeas court did not apply the correct legal standard under § 52-470 (c) and (e) in deciding that the petitioner had not demonstrated good cause for the late filing of his habeas petition; although the habeas court did not expressly reject the petitioner's allegation that D's alleged ineffective assistance in not advising him of the deadline for filing a new petition caused the delay, the habeas court did not consider the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel as an external factor that caused the delay in filing the untimely petition, and, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rose, the petitioner was entitled to a new hearing at which the court applies the correct legal standard set forth by the Supreme Court. Argued January 10—officially released March 19, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted of several crimes committed in 2013, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the retroactive application to him of an amended administrative directive of the respon- dent, the Commissioner of Correction, violated the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution. The petitioner claimed that the amendment's change in the calculation of risk reduction credit he could earn toward completion of his sentence resulted in a longer period of incarceration for him and a postponement of his parole eligibility date to a time later than had originally been projected. Under the statutorily (§ 18-98e) created risk reduction earned credits program, the respondent had the sole discretion to award up to five days of risk reduction credit per month toward the completion of eligible inmates' sentences. Under the administrative directive in effect in 2013, the petitioner had been earning five days of risk reduction credit per month. In 2016, when the respon- dent amended the 2013 administrative directive to align the award of risk reduction credit with inmates' overall risk classification levels, the petitioner began earning risk reduction credit at a rate of three days per month due to his risk classification. The petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming, inter alia, that he had earned approxi- mately 104 fewer risk reduction credits from the time that the 2016 administrative directive was applied to him until the time of the habeas proceedings than he would have earned under the 2013 administrative directive. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the habeas petition, arguing that, pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-29 (1)), the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the habeas petition and, alternatively, that, pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (2), the peti- tioner had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The habeas court granted the petitioner's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the 2016 administrative directive was a law within the meaning of the ex post facto clause and that its retroactive application to the petitioner violated the ex post facto clause because it created a sufficient risk of prolonging his incarceration. The court rendered judgment denying the respondent's motion to dismiss and granting the habeas petition, from which the respondent, on the granting of certifica- tion, appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court improperly granted the petitioner's motion for summary judgment and improperly denied the respondent's motion to dismiss the habeas petition, as the 2016 amended administrative directive did not constitute a law within the meaning of the ex post facto clause, and, thus, the petitioner failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted: whereas the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes that disadvantage the offender affected by them, the 2016 administrative directive was not a law but an internal Department of Correction policy that the respondent adopted in his sole discretion, pursuant to § 18-98e (f), to determine the amount of risk reduction credit that inmates may earn according to their overall security risk level, as the adoption of the 2016 administrative directive was an Executive Branch function that was part of the respondent's responsibility to oversee the internal management of the correctional system; moreover, although the peti- tioner correctly asserted that administrative regulations may implicate the ex post facto clause, the respondent did not adopt the 2016 adminis- trative directive in the exercise of authority delegated to him by the legislature to promulgate rules, which are subject to the notice and comment procedures under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (§ 4-166 et seq.), as the 2016 administrative directive was not a regulation subject to legislative approval but was merely a notice regarding how the respondent chose to exercise his unilateral statutory discretion con- cerning risk reduction credit; furthermore, the petitioner's failure to demonstrate that the 2016 administrative directive was a law within the meaning of the ex post facto clause meant that his claim was legally insufficient; accordingly, the habeas court improperly failed to grant the respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground that the habeas petition failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (2). Argued November 6, 2023—officially released March 26, 2024

The plaintiff landlord sought, by way of summary process, to regain posses- sion of certain premises leased to the defendant tenant. The defendant filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a), arguing that the plaintiff violated his first amendment rights, right of association, and right to petition the government by filing a fraudulent and frivolous summary process action to evict him. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed to this court. The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the defendant's appeal, claiming that the trial court's denial of the defendant's special motion to dismiss was not an appealable final judgment. Held that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant's appeal, and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed: the defendant failed to assert a colorable claim that would entitle him to an immediate review of the trial court's denial of his special motion to dismiss pursuant to § 52-196a because none of the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint was based on the defendant's exercise of his right of free speech, to petition the government, or of association, as the complaint made clear that the summary process action was predicated solely on the defendant's alleged failure to pay rent owed to the plaintiff and the fact that the written lease agreement between the parties had lapsed and had not been renewed, and the complaint did not contain any allegations about things the defendant said or communicated or about other actions that would otherwise implicate the defendant's right of free speech, to petition the government, or of association, as those terms were understood under § 52-196a; moreover, the defendant's allegation that the summary process action was motivated by a complaint he had filed against the plaintiff with the state's Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities did not transform the action into a claim that was based on the defendant's exercise of his right of free speech, to petition the government, or of association, as required by § 52-196a. Considered December 6, 2023—officially released March 26, 2024

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia, their alleged legal malpractice in connection with their representation of the plaintiff during her prior marital dissolution proceedings. The plaintiff, who initially was self-represented, commenced the action in June, 2020. In September, 2020, the defendants served a set of interroga- tories and requests for production on the plaintiff and also filed a request to revise the complaint. In October, 2020, the defendants filed a motion for a judgment of nonsuit based on the plaintiff's failure to respond to their request to revise. In November, 2020, the defendants filed another motion for a judgment of nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to respond to their interrogatories and requests for production. In December, 2020, an attorney, M, filed an appearance on behalf of the plaintiff and requested a thirty day continuance to respond to the defendants' requests to revise and for discovery. The trial court granted the request. In February, 2021, the defendants again moved for a judg- ment of nonsuit in light of the plaintiff's failure to file a revised complaint and to respond to their discovery requests. The plaintiff did not file an objection to that motion. In March, 2021, the trial court issued an order in connection with the February, 2021 motion for a judgment of nonsuit, indicating that the plaintiff had thirty days to file a revised complaint and responses to the defendants' discovery requests or the defendants could file another motion for a judgment of nonsuit that would be granted by the trial court. In April, 2021, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint but did not file a notice of compliance with discovery. In May, 2021, the defendants filed another motion for a judgment of nonsuit, as the plaintiff had failed to respond to discovery pursuant to the trial court's March, 2021 order. The plaintiff filed a notice of compliance with discovery in June, 2021, which the defendants asserted was defi- cient. The following month, the defendants again filed a motion for a judgment of nonsuit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to fully respond to discovery pursuant to the trial court's March, 2021 order. The plaintiff did not file an objection to the motion, which the trial court granted, and the court rendered a judgment of nonsuit against the plaintiff. In September, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion to open and set aside the judgment of nonsuit, claiming that there was a bona fide reason for her failure to respond to the defendants' discovery requests. After the defendants filed an objection, arguing that the plaintiff could not establish that a good cause of action existed at the time the nonsuit was rendered or that she was prevented from prosecuting the action due to mistake, accident or other reasonable cause as required by the applicable statute (§ 52-212), M filed an affidavit in support of the plaintiff's motion to open the judgment of nonsuit, in which he asserted that the plaintiff did have good cause under multiple counts and that he had had various medical and veterinary appointments. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to open, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to open and set aside the judgment of nonsuit: the trial court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff failed to establish reasonable cause for her noncompliance with discovery under the second prong of the test set forth in § 52-212 because, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, the trial court did not find that her reasons for failing to prosecute were insufficient to constitute reasonable cause but, rather, concluded that she had not adequately substantiated her proffered reasons, as the affidavit she submitted in connection with her motion offered only general references to M's various medical and other issues, without any specific dates, circumstances or other substantiation as to what prevented him from fully complying with the trial court's March, 2021 order; moreover, although the plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly applied the law because the rule of practice (§ 17- 43) requires an affidavit to set forth particularized circumstances only if a plaintiff is nonsuited for failure to appear, not for failure to comply with discovery, she did not provide any legal authority for that proposi- tion, and a specific explanation was required to sustain her burden of demonstrating reasonable cause for noncompliance. Argued December 5, 2023—officially released March 26, 2024

Pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 10-44), ''[w]ithin fifteen days after the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been stricken may file a new pleading; provided that in those instances where an entire complaint . . . or any count in a complaint . . . has been stricken, and the party whose pleading or a count thereof has been so stricken fails to file a new pleading within that fifteen day period, the judicial authority may, upon motion, enter judgment against said party on said stricken complaint . . . or count thereof.'' The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court striking all counts of its complaint against the defendant insurance company, P Co. The plaintiff filed its original complaint against both P Co. and the individual defendant, B, alleging that B had set fire to a garage adjacent to a church owned by the plaintiff. In their efforts to contain and extinguish the fire, emergency personnel severely damaged portions of the church. The complaint alleged that, at the time of the fire and resulting damage, the plaintiff was insured against such damage pursuant to an insurance policy issued by P Co. The plaintiff filed a claim with P Co., and a dispute ensued when P Co. allegedly paid amounts that were inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for the actual costs of repairs. The plaintiff's complaint contained two counts against P Co., claiming breach of contract and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and one count alleging negligence against B. P Co. filed a motion to strike the two claims against it on the ground of misjoinder, arguing that the plaintiff's contractual claims against P Co. and its negligence claim against B were separate actions that did not arise out of the same transaction. The trial court granted P Co.'s motion to strike counts one and two of the complaint for misjoinder, concluding that, although the fire and its consequences were common facts to the plaintiff's claims against both defendants, that was insuffi- cient to characterize the claims as arising out of the same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action. The plaintiff subsequently filed a substitute complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44 that asserted only its two claims against P Co. P Co. filed an objection to the substitute complaint, arguing that P Co. had been dropped from the action and was no longer a party and that the plaintiff was therefore required to proceed only against B. The trial court sus- tained P Co.'s objection and, upon the plaintiff's motion, rendered judg- ment for P Co. on the two stricken counts against it. More than six months after the plaintiff had appealed to this court, the plaintiff filed an offer of compromise in the trial court offering to resolve the entirety of its claims against P Co. P Co. filed an objection, arguing that the plaintiff's purported offer of compromise was invalid because P Co. was no longer a defendant in the action, as judgment had been rendered in its favor and, accordingly, there were no claims pending in the litigation against it to settle. The court sustained P Co.'s objection, and the plaintiff subsequently amended its appeal to include the trial court's decision sustaining P Co.'s objection. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erroneously granted P Co.'s motion to strike certain counts of the plaintiff's complaint on the basis of misjoinder: the plaintiff waived its right to appeal the merits of the court's order on the motion to strike when it elected to exercise its right to file a substitute complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44; moreover, although the plaintiff argued that the waiver rule was inapplicable because the trial court rejected its substitute complaint and therefore prevented it from exercising its right to file a substitute pleading, once the plaintiff filed its substitute complaint, that pleading became the controlling complaint by operation of law, the plaintiff provided no precedent in support of the proposition that waiver occurs only if a court accepts a substitute pleading, and the plaintiff may instead challenge the court's ruling striking the substitute complaint. 2. The trial court improperly sustained P Co.'s objection to the plaintiff's substitute complaint and rendered judgment in favor of P Co.: contrary to P Co.'s unsupported argument that it was automatically dropped from the action upon the trial court's granting of its motion to strike, nothing in the court's order granting such motion suggested that P Co. had been dropped from the action altogether, that the court was exercising any authority under the statute (§ 52-108) governing misjoinder to drop P Co. from the action or that the interests of justice so required; moreover, P Co.'s argument that Practice Book § 10-44 precluded the plaintiff from filing a substitute pleading was unavailing, as such a rule, on the contrary, would operate to deprive a plaintiff of his or her right to file a new pleading pursuant to § 10-44 to cure the defects that served as the basis for striking the complaint; furthermore, although P Co. contended that there is no authority that permits a plaintiff to choose which defendants or causes of action to drop from the case when repleading pursuant to § 10-44 to cure misjoinder, this court's construction of § 10-44 was consistent with the bedrock principle that a plaintiff is the master of his or her own complaint, and allowing a plaintiff to file a substitute pleading against whichever defendant a plaintiff chooses after a com- plaint has been stricken for misjoinder properly affords the plaintiff the latitude to decide which theories of recovery to pursue against which defendants in that action and to weigh the risks of proceeding with certain claims in a separate action. 3. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly sustained P Co.'s objection to the plaintiff's offer of compromise: the statute (§ 52-192a) governing offers of compromise required the plaintiff to file its offer of compromise while claims remained pending against P Co. in the trial court and prior to the court rendering judgment for P Co., and, because judgment had been rendered for P Co. on all counts, the offer of compromise directed to P Co. was not capable of settling the claim underlying the action because that claim had already been resolved for P Co.; moreover, when the provisions of § 52-192a are read together and construed with reasonable strictness for the party to whom an offer of compromise has been made, such provisions clearly contem- plate a process of making and accepting offers of compromise in the trial court prior to a court's resolution of the claims that are the subject of the offer of compromise, and allowing plaintiffs to make offers of compromise to defendants after judgment has been rendered for those defendants and while the claims are on appeal does not serve the purpose of promoting the public policy favoring the pretrial resolution of disputes but, rather, such an interpretation would require a defendant who has already prevailed in the trial court to accept a postjudgment offer of compromise in order to avoid the punitive consequences of the statute, which would expose the party that actually prevailed in the trial court to the punitive effects of the statute; furthermore, where there is an ambiguity with respect to the provisions of § 52-192a, this court must interpret the statute in favor of the party who would be subject to the punitive consequences of the statute rather than in favor of the party who would benefit from those consequences, there is no language in the statute suggesting that the legislature intended to permit a plaintiff to file an offer of compromise directed to a defendant for whom judgment already has been rendered and while a plaintiff pursues an appeal of that judgment, and, in the absence of clear evidence that the legislature intended offers to be made in such circumstances, this court declined to interpret § 52-192a in such a manner. Argued January 10—officially released April 2, 2024

The plaintiff, C Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant, S. Thereafter, A Co. was substituted for C Co., and the trial court granted A Co.'s motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon, from which S appealed to this court, which reversed in part the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. Following the remand, A Co. filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability only, and, in support of its motion, submitted, inter alia, the affidavit of H, a litigation specialist employed by A Co.'s loan servicer. In her affidavit, H summarized the history of the assignment of the mortgage and further averred that C Co. had been the holder of the note at the time the present action was commenced and that A Co. was the current holder of the note and the mortgagee of record. After the deadline for filing a response to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment expired, S filed a document captioned ''Practice Book § 17-47 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Objection to Summary Judgment,'' which the court denied as untimely. S then noticed the deposition of a designee of A Co., seeking various documents, and A Co. filed a motion for a protective order on the grounds that S's requests were untimely and sought information to which he was not entitled, and the trial court summarily granted the motion for a protective order. When the parties appeared before the court, the court granted A Co.'s motion for summary judgment without a hearing, in the absence of opposition, after S's attorney acknowledged that he had not filed a response to the motion. Subsequently, A Co. filed a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure, which the trial court granted and rendered judgment thereon, from which S appealed to this court, which reversed in part the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. During the proceedings on remand, A Co. reclaimed for adjudication its summary judgment motion, and S issued notices of two depositions, seeking information nearly identical to the information he had previously sought, which was the subject of the protective order. A Co. then moved for a protective order barring S from deposing its corporate designee and keeper of records. S filed a memorandum of law in opposition to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that, because A Co. refused to produce H for a deposition, the court should deny the motion pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 17-47) that permits the court to deny summary judgment when appropriate documents are unavailable. S also filed an affidavit pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47 explaining why he should be granted a continuance to conduct discovery. After a hearing, the court granted A Co.'s motion for summary judgment as to liability and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, from which S appealed to this court. Held: 1. S could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to liability because it improperly relied on H's affidavit in determining that C Co. was the holder of the note at the time the action had been commenced: H averred that she had personal knowledge of the records pertaining to the note and mortgage in this case based upon her review of those records, which were received and maintained in the regular and ordinary practice of A Co.'s loan servicer, such that they constituted competent evidence of C Co.'s status as holder of the note when the action had been commenced; moreover, this court rejected S's claim that the trial court should not have relied on H's affidavit because she failed to attach to it the documents on which her averments were based, noting that our Supreme Court rejected virtually the same argument in RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller (303 Conn. 224), and reasoning that to be competent to testify, H needed only to have personal knowledge of the business records. 2. S could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to liability because it failed to give him, as the nonmoving party, the benefit of all favorable inferences to be drawn from the evidence by neglecting to draw an adverse inference from A Co.'s refusal to produce witnesses and documents requested by S: S failed to set forth any facts, other than A Co.'s filing of a motion for a protective order, which is permitted by our rules of practice, in support of his contention that A Co. had engaged in extraordinary measures to prevent S from deposing H or any other corporate designees of A Co.; moreover, S's claim that he was entitled to an adverse inference for A Co.'s failure to allow him to depose H on the basis of the missing witness rule adopted in Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co. (147 Conn. 672) was legally flawed in that the missing witness rule was significantly limited in civil cases by statute (§ 52-216c) after Secondino had been issued, and S failed, in his brief to this court, to acknowledge the abrogation of Secondino; furthermore, setting aside the fact that S's reliance on Secondino was misplaced, S was unable to demonstrate that he would have been entitled to the benefit of the adverse inference permitted by § 52-216c. 3. S could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it implicitly granted A Co.'s motion for a protective order, resulting in a complete denial of discovery and a denial of his ability to rebut A Co.'s claims: S's claim was belied by the fact that he neither filed a request pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47 with the court nor requested that the court rule on A Co.'s motion for a protective order; moreover, the trial court granted A Co.'s motion for a protective order as to S's request to depose a designee of the plaintiff after the first remand from this court and prior to S's second appeal, and S could have challenged the propriety of the protective order in his second appeal, but chose not to do so; furthermore, further discovery was beyond the rescript order of this court in the second appeal, as this court addressed the discovery issue because it was likely to arise on remand and determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that S's request for an extension of time to conduct discovery to respond to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment was untimely. Argued January 3—officially released April 9, 2024

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a judgment lien on certain real property of the defendant in 2018. After the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability, the plaintiff filed a motion for foreclosure by sale. The defendant objected and argued that the statutory homestead exemption ((Rev. to 2017) § 52-352) of $75,000 in effect at that time applied to preclude a judgment of foreclosure by sale of his primary residence. The court held a hearing on the plaintiff's motion in February, 2022, and rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which the defendant appealed to this court. After filing his appeal, the defendant discovered that the February, 2022 hearing had not been recorded. Pursuant to an order of this court, the trial court held another hearing in November, 2022, on the plaintiff's motion for a judgment of foreclosure by sale. At the November, 2022 hearing, the defendant's counsel argued, inter alia, that the legislature's amendment (P.A. 21-161, § 1) to the homestead exemption, effective October 1, 2021, and codified by statute (§ 52-352b (21)), which increased the homestead exemption to $250,000, applied to the defendant and precluded the sale of his primary residence. The plaintiff argued that it would be inappropriate for the court to apply the expanded homestead exemption because the statute had been revised after the commencement of the foreclosure action. The court issued an order affirming its rendering of a judgment of foreclosure by sale. Held: 1. This court concluded that the expanded homestead exemption of $250,000 pursuant to § 52-352b (21) applied retroactively to a postjudgment pro- ceeding in which a judgment lien was issued and recorded and an action to foreclose on the judgment lien was commenced at a time when the now repealed statute, § 52-352b (t), was in effect, but the judgment of foreclosure was rendered after the amended statute, § 52-352b (21), had become effective: the expanded homestead exemption could be applied retroactively because it was procedural in nature, as the legislature's intention in expanding the exemption was to focus on the exemptions available to debtors during bankruptcy or postjudgment proceedings and not to create, define, or regulate rights; moreover, the language of P.A. 21-161 did not indicate that the legislature intended to carve out preexisting or other debts from the exemption or to preclude P.A. 21- 161 from applying to a postjudgment proceeding in which the action to foreclose on the judgment lien was commenced before it became effec- tive, as the fact that the language of § 52-352b (t) included carve-outs for preexisting debts but the language of § 52-352b (21) did not include such carve-outs indicated a legislative intent not to exclude preexisting debts from the scope of the expanded homestead exemption. 2. The trial court improperly denied the defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the expanded homestead exemption applied to preclude the plaintiff from foreclosing on his primary residence: the defendant raised his homestead exemption claim multiple times before the court rendered a judgment of foreclosure and, although this court had yet to address the specific question of whether a defendant must be afforded an evidentiary hearing on a homestead exemption claim prior to a trial court rendering a judgment of foreclosure, this court concluded, on the basis of persuasive Superior Court cases, that such an evidentiary hearing should be held; moreover, during such an evidentiary hearing, at which the court affords the defendant the opportunity to present support for his claim that the homestead exemption applies, the proper procedure would be for the court to apply the definitions set forth in the statute (§ 52-352a) to the formula contained in § 52-352b (21) and decide, on the basis of the evidence before it, whether to render a judgment of foreclosure; accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing as to the applicability of the defen- dant's homestead exemption claim pursuant to § 52-352b (21) prior to rendering a decision on the plaintiff's motion for a judgment of foreclo- sure by sale. Argued November 13, 2023—officially released April 9, 2024

The plaintiffs, owners of certain real property in Easton that is benefitted by a right-of-way easement over the defendants' neighboring property, sought, inter alia, a mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to consent to the removal of a utility pole that provided electrical services to the defendants' property and obstructed the easement and to upgrade the electrical connection between the defendants' house and a new utility pole that had been erected on the plaintiffs' property so that the connection complied with the building code then in effect. Prior to the commencement of trial, the attorneys for the parties attended a pretrial conference before the trial court. Thereafter, pursuant to Audubon Park- ing Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc. (225 Conn. 804), the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement that they claimed the parties had entered into at the pretrial conference. In their motion, the plaintiffs asserted that the parties had discussed and orally agreed on the location of an underground conduit for the defen- dants' new electrical service at the pretrial conference and that, subse- quently, the defendants refused to allow the plaintiffs to perform the work that was agreed on or to implement the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs attached an exhibit to their motion, which they drafted after the pretrial conference to outline the terms of the parties' alleged agreement. The defendants objected to the plaintiffs' motion, asserting that, although the parties had attempted to reach an agreement at the pretrial conference, they never did so, as they failed to reach a consensus regarding the location and scope of the expected work and the length of time it would take. Following a remote status conference, the trial court went on the record to hear arguments from the parties' counsel and then incorporated the additional terms that were discussed by the defendants' counsel into the settlement agreement as it was outlined in the exhibit. The defendants' counsel discussed the modified settlement agreement with the defendants during a short recess and then informed the trial court that the defendants did not consider the modified settle- ment agreement to be agreeable. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement agreement, subject to the terms and conditions of the exhibit, as modified by the court and reflected in the transcript of that day's proceeding. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the plaintiffs' motion to enforce a settlement agreement because the parties did not reach a clear and unambiguous agreement either at or following the pretrial conference: the trial court treated the exhibit as an agreement binding on the parties despite the fact that there was nothing in the record, beyond the plaintiffs' reliance on the exhibit, to demonstrate that an agreement had been reached, the agreement was unsworn, and the defendants repeatedly disputed that they had entered into the agreement; moreover, even if the trial court had assumed that the exhibit memorialized an agreement between the parties, when faced with numerous issues concerning the adequacy of the agreement and after acknowledging that a material term of the settlement was not agreed on, the court failed to hold an Audubon hearing to determine whether the parties had a clear and unambiguous agreement and, instead, issued an order granting the plaintiffs' motion subject to the terms and conditions as modified by the court; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case with direction to deny the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement agree- ment. Argued October 3, 2023—officially released April 9, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 38a-336 (e)), an underinsured motor vehicle is a motor vehicle with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion of the policy against which the claim is made. The plaintiffs, who sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident, sought to recover underinsured motorist benefits under an automobile insurance policy issued to them by the defendant S Co. At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs' policy and the insurance policy of the defendant tortfeasors each provided liability coverage of up to $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. The tortfeasors' insurer thereafter made payments to the plaintiffs and to others injured in the accident that exhausted the $300,000 per accident limit of the tortfeasors' policy. After the plaintiffs settled their claims with the tortfeasors and withdrew their action as against them, S Co. moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs were not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits because, under our Supreme Court's precedent, their underinsured motorist cov- erage did not exceed the liability limits of the tortfeasors' policy. The plaintiffs contended that the tortfeasors' vehicle was an underinsured motor vehicle and that they were entitled to underinsured motorist benefits because a legislative amendment (P.A. 14-20, § 1) to the underin- sured motorist statute (§ 38a-336) had overruled that precedent. The trial court denied S Co.'s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs were entitled to underinsured motorist benefits because the total recovery they obtained from the tortfeasors was less than the $300,000 per accident limit in the tortfeasors' policy. The court reasoned that P.A. 14-20 required that the proper comparison of the applicable limits of the policies of the tortfeasor and the claimant must be between the amount of liability insurance actually available to a plaintiff under a tortfeasor's policy, after other claimants under that policy are paid, with the amount of a plaintiff's underinsured motorist coverage. The plaintiffs and S Co. then entered into a stipulation that reserved S Co.'s right to appeal the propriety of the court's denial of its motion for summary judgment and in which they agreed, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' policy and the tortfeasors' policy contained identical coverage limits and that the $300,000 per accident limit of liability coverage in the tortfeasors' policy had been exhausted. The court then rendered judg- ment for the plaintiffs in accordance with the parties' stipulation, from which S Co. appealed to this court. Held that the trial court improperly denied S Co.'s motion for summary judgment, as the tortfeasors' vehicle plainly was not an underinsured motor vehicle within the meaning of that term in § 38a-336 (e) because their underinsured motorist coverage was not less than, but identical to, the plaintiffs' liability coverage: although the language of § 38a-336, as amended by P.A. 14-20, was ambiguous as applied to the facts of this case, this court determined that the legislature, in P.A. 14-20, did not intend to alter the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle in § 38a-336 (e) or to overrule the precedent of our Supreme Court concerning that definition but, rather, intended to clarify that an insurer may offset from its insured's underin- sured motorist coverage, pursuant to § 38a-336 and the applicable regula- tion (§ 38a-336-4), only that amount their insured actually received from the tortfeasor's coverage for bodily injury; moreover, this court was hard-pressed to conclude that the legislature intended to amend the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle in § 38a-336 (e) and overrule sub silentio a substantial body of our Supreme Court's precedent per- taining to that definition, as this court was required to presume that the legislature was aware that the court repeatedly has held that the application of § 38a-336 involves separate inquiries involving, first, whether the tortfeasor's vehicle is underinsured pursuant to § 38a-336 (e), which requires a comparison of the coverage limits contained in the respective insurance policies of the tortfeasor and the claimant, and, if so, the calculation of the amount, if any, to be paid to the claimant; furthermore, the legislative history of P.A. 14-20 indicated that it was enacted to preclude the practice condoned by this court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lenda (34 Conn. App. 444) that an insurance carrier could offset underinsured motorist benefits owed to its insured by all amounts paid by or on behalf of the tortfeasor to the insured and others for bodily injury and property damage; additionally, although the plaintiffs contended that § 38a-336 is a remedial statute that must be construed liberally to protect people injured by uninsured motorists, our Supreme Court has expressly declined to apply that maxim to decide whether a vehicle met the statutory definition of an underinsured motor vehicle. Argued October 3, 2023—officially released April 9, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes pursuant to a plea agreement reached in accordance with State v. Garvin (242 Conn. 296), sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. In accordance with the Garvin agree- ment, the trial court agreed to a specific sentence for the petitioner as long as the petitioner, inter alia, was not arrested for any offense for which a court made a finding of probable cause while awaiting sentenc- ing. If there was a violation of the agreement, the petitioner would no longer be entitled to the agreed upon sentence and would face a longer period of incarceration. Before the petitioner was sentenced, he was arrested on subsequent charges. The sentencing court found a Garvin violation as a result and sentenced him accordingly. Before the habeas court, the petitioner alleged that his trial counsel performed deficiently by improperly advising him with respect to whether the sentencing court could deviate from the plea agreement, providing him with unrealistic expectations as to the sentence he would face, and that he was preju- diced by this advice because he would not have accepted the plea deal but for his counsel's deficient performance. After a trial, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court properly denied the operative petition as to the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel: the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance of his trial counsel in advising him of the remote possibility that the trial court could deviate from the plea agreement at the time of sentencing, as the trial court's swift response when this notion was raised by trial counsel made it clear that there was no real possibility of that outcome, and the petitioner's bald assertion in his appellate brief that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's improper advice, he would have rejected the plea agreement and proceeded to trial, without more, was insufficient to establish that the petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel's performance; moreover, the plea canvass conducted In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. by the trial court established that the petitioner understood the sentenc- ing possibilities and made the strategic decision to plead guilty to ensure that he would receive a shorter period of incarceration and to avoid the risk of being exposed to the maximum possible sentence for the charges if he went to trial; furthermore, the petitioner failed to present any credible evidence at the habeas trial that he would have gone to trial but for trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance in inducing him to plead guilty. Argued January 16—officially released April 9, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted, after a jury trial, of various crimes in connection with a home invasion and the shooting of two victims, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the state had suppressed exculpatory information in violation of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83) and that his trial counsel, K, had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to consult with or retain an expert on eyewitness identification and by failing to impeach P, one of the eyewitnesses who testified for the state. After an altercation with the two victims at a bar hours earlier, the petitioner and another man entered an apartment where a group of individuals had gathered, including the two victims, several of whom had known the petitioner for years. Both men were armed and had their heads and faces covered. When the petitioner reached the living room, he pulled down his mask and fired toward the window. He then fired two shots at the first victim, striking him. The two men chased the second victim out of the apartment, firing and striking him. At the apartment, P called 911 and stated that the first victim had been shot. After being transported to a hospital, the first victim died, and the second victim survived. After the police arrived on the scene, several people who were present during the shooting identified the petitioner as one of the shooters. At the petitioner's criminal trial in 2016, several witnesses testified that the petitioner was the shooter, and at least two witnesses testified that they had heard an eyewitness scream the petitioner's name during the shooting. A recording of P's 911 call, in which she identified the petitioner as the individual who had shot the first victim, was admit- ted at the petitioner's criminal trial. The spontaneous excited utterances identifying the petitioner as the shooter made by both an eyewitness when she phoned her mother shortly after the shooting and by the second victim, when he spoke to a police officer as he was being treated for his gunshot wounds in the hospital, were also admitted at the petition- er's criminal trial. Two years after the petitioner was convicted, in an appeal in an unrelated habeas case brought by T, this court held that the state's failure to correct the false testimony of P in T's 2009 criminal trial violated T's due process rights. At the habeas trial in the present case, K testified that he had requested that the state disclose all exculpa- tory material but did not recall whether the state had disclosed any exculpatory material related to P, and the prosecutor in the petitioner's criminal trial, R, testified that he believed that he had turned over all exculpatory material that was in his possession to the defense. The petitioner presented the testimony of B, a professor of psychology spe- cializing in memory and psychology in the legal system. In his testimony, B detailed factors that can reduce identification accuracy or impact memory and testified that he would have been able to assist the petition- er's trial counsel in connection with cross-examination and arguments and in pursuit of a motion to suppress. On cross-examination, B testified that an eyewitness' familiarity with a suspect would make an identifica- tion more reliable. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that his claims involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the questions raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improp- erly determined that he was not deprived of his rights to due process and to a fair trial in violation of Brady because the state failed to disclose that P had testified falsely in T's criminal trial: pursuant to State v. Guerrera (331 Conn. 628), R was not required to search the file in T's unrelated criminal case to exclude the possibility that the file contained exculpatory information; moreover, there was no evidence presented and no findings made by the habeas court that R had actual knowledge or cause to know of the existence of Brady material in T's file, R's lack of memory as to whether he had exculpatory information regarding P did not, without more, equate to affirmative proof of any fact, and there was no evidence at the habeas trial and the habeas court made no factual finding that K had made a specific request for that information, which was required in order to trigger the state's examination of that file under the circumstances of this case. 3. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improp- erly concluded that he had failed to establish that K rendered ineffective assistance during his criminal trial: a. Contrary to the petitioner's argument, the habeas court properly con- cluded that K did not render ineffective assistance by failing to consult with or call an expert on eyewitness identification to testify at the peti- tioner's criminal trial: K offered a legitimate strategic reason for his decision not to consult an expert on eyewitness identification in which he recognized that the primary concern with eyewitness identifications was not present because the eyewitnesses knew the petitioner prior to the shooting; moreover, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the result of his criminal trial would have been different if K had consulted such an expert, as the witnesses knew the petitioner and were therefore likely to identify him accurately, B testified on cross-examination that familiarity makes an eyewitness identification more reliable, the petitioner admitted that K had attempted to impeach all of the eyewitnesses by testing their credibility and the consistency of their accounts, and the petitioner offered no evidence to undermine the fact that the witnesses who identified the petitioner at his criminal trial knew him for a long time before the shooting occurred. b. The petitioner could not prevail on his alternative claim that, if the state had disclosed P's prior false testimony, then K rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach her concerning that false testimony; the evidence adduced at the habeas trial did not establish that the state failed to disclose P's false testimony in T's criminal case to the defense, and the petitioner failed to call P to testify at the habeas trial to offer the additional information he claims should have been elicited by more thorough cross-examination or to show how alternative cross-examina- tion questions would have impacted her credibility. Argued February 8—officially released April 9, 2024

The plaintiffs, B, E, and M Co., sought to recover damages from the defendant car dealership for alleged breach of contract, fraud, theft, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) in connection with the purchase and sale of a plow truck. B, the managing member of M Co., testified that, on January 21, 2015, he signed an instalment contract on behalf of M Co. for the purchase of the plow truck. E, who was not a member of M Co., cosigned the contract, and B drove the truck off the lot. The plaintiffs did not submit this purported contract as an exhibit in the trial court. A few days later, B returned to the showroom at the request of D, one of the defendant's salesmen, to return the purchase documents so that corrections could be made. B was assured that the terms of the documents would not change. B and E claimed that they never signed any other documents in connection with the sale of the plow truck. Both parties, however, submitted into evidence an instalment contract dated January 26, 2015, which identified the plow truck as the purchased vehicle and listed an increased sales price, a higher loan interest rate, and a longer loan period than that which the plaintiffs alleged had been quoted by D and incorporated into the original contract. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant forged their signatures on the January 26, 2015 contract documents. They also alleged that the window sticker on the plow truck, known as a Monroney sticker, did not reflect the vehicle's true price. D died sometime after the purchase of the plow truck and was never deposed in this action. G, the owner of the defendant, was called to testify at the trial by the plaintiffs. She stated that, although she did not have firsthand knowledge of the events surrounding the transaction, she had discussed it with D and there was no indication that there had been a deal or contract that reflected the terms the plaintiffs claimed were set forth in the January 21, 2015 contract. She stated that two contracts were signed in connec- tion with the sale of the plow truck, the first on January 21, 2015, and the second on January 26, 2015; however, she claimed that both contracts reflected the same cash price of the truck and the same amount financed. She stated that the January 26, 2015 contract was signed because the defendant was able to secure more favorable approval terms with a second lender, A Co., and that D had asked the plaintiffs to return to the defendant to rescind the January 21, 2015 contract so they could take advantage of those terms. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiffs failed to sustain their 224 Conn. App. 668 APRIL, 2024 3 Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc. burden of proof regarding their claims of breach of contract, fraud, and theft and that they failed to establish that the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiffs' claim that the trial court misinterpreted their legal claims was unavailing: to the extent the plaintiffs claimed that the trial court failed to make certain factual findings or that it overlooked claims made by the plaintiffs, this court did not agree with such claims, and the plaintiffs failed to file a motion to reargue, a motion for clarification, or a motion for articulation seeking to have the trial court address the alleged deficiencies; moreover, in its memorandum of decision, the trial court explicitly addressed each of the counts of the plaintiffs' complaint, and each of the claims B asserted at trial when the court asked him to summarize their claims, before holding that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof as to each count. 2. The plaintiffs' arguments challenging the trial court's credibility determina- tions were not convincing: contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, there was no indication that the trial court did not base its credibility determi- nations on the conduct, demeanor and attitude of the witnesses; more- over, after finding G's testimony credible, the trial court stated that her testimony was supported by documentary evidence and properly explained its determination by citing to various portions of her testimony and the other evidence admitted at trial, and it was not the role of this court to second-guess the trial court's credibility determinations. 3. The plaintiffs' claim that the trial court made findings contrary to the evidence that undermined appellate confidence in the trial court's fact- finding process and required a new trial failed: a. This court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court had erred in finding that there was no evidence to support the plaintiffs' claims and that the plaintiffs had signed the documents related to the sale of the plow truck: the trial court's finding that it ''defie[d] common sense'' that the defendant would allow the plaintiffs to drive the truck off the defendant's property without a deal in place was not clearly erroneous because the court explicitly credited G's testimony, which supported a finding that the defendant did not engage in a yo-yo scam and that the plaintiffs executed a contract for the purchase of a plow truck before leaving the defendant's premises on January 21, 2015; moreover, in asserting that the trial court erred in finding that the evi- dence did not support their claims because they had been forced to return to the defendant the only copy of the alleged original contract, the plaintiffs misapprehended the burdens of proof related to their com- plaint, implying that the defendant had the burden of proving that the plaintiffs had signed the documents in evidence when, in fact, the burden was on the plaintiffs to prove that the signatures were not genuine; furthermore, the plaintiffs did not submit any credible evidence that their signatures on the documents in evidence had been forged, that any 4 APRIL, 2024 224 Conn. App. 668 Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc. of the documents in evidence had been improperly fabricated or changed, that there was ever a January 21, 2015 contract with A Co., or that any of the defendant's behavior amounted to a CUTPA violation, and they offered only the testimony of B and E in support of their complaint, which the trial court found not to be credible. b. This court declined to review the plaintiffs' remaining challenges to the trial court's findings: in making their claims that it was clearly errone- ous for the trial court to find that it was not logical or reasonable that E would make payments to A Co. with respect to a January 26, 2015 contract that he had never signed and that the trial court could not reconcile the claim that someone else put E's name, as a member of M Co., on the January 26, 2015 documents with the fact that M Co. bought the plow truck, the plaintiffs were questioning the trial court's interpreta- tion of their claims at trial, which they should have addressed by filing a motion to reargue, a motion for clarification, or a motion articulation; moreover, the trial court's finding that the plaintiffs ratified the January 26, 2015 contract was unnecessary to its holding because the court had already found that M Co. agreed to the contract, and, as such, the plaintiffs could not have been aggrieved by any alleged error as to the court's finding; furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to preserve for appellate review their claim that the trial court erred in finding that the defendant's failure to supplement the Monroney sticker on the plow truck to reflect that the truck had been equipped with a plow was insignificant because, in the trial court, they did not cite to any law or make any argument to explain the significance of affixing an addendum to the Monroney sticker. Argued January 16—officially released April 16, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 16-244z (a) (1) (C)), the state Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (department) is required ''to develop pro- gram requirements and tariff proposals for shared clean energy facilities'' subject to the approval of the state Public Utilities Regulatory Agency (PURA). Pursuant further to statute (§ 4-176 (a)), any person may petition an agency for a declaratory ruling as to the applicability to specified circumstances of a provision of the General Statutes, a regulation, or a final decision on a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency. The plaintiff, a renewable energy developer, brought an action for a declara- tory judgment pursuant to statute (§ 4-175), seeking to have the Superior Court issue a ruling as to whether a bid submitted by the defendant F Co. in response to a 2020 request for proposals for shared clean energy facilities satisfied a site control program requirement developed by the defendant department pursuant to § 16-244z (a) (1) (C). I Co., an electric company, had issued the request for proposals seeking bids for shared clean energy facility projects in its service territory, and the plaintiff and F Co. submitted bids to I Co. Bidders were required by the department's program requirements to show that they had control of the generation site or an unconditional right to acquire control or an unconditional option agreement to purchase or lease the site. F Co.'s bid, which contained an option to lease agreement, was selected by I Co. and was ultimately approved by PURA. The plaintiff petitioned the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection to issue a declaratory ruling stating that the department erred in concluding that F Co.'s bid satisfied the site control program requirement and that the department's failure to remove the bid from the rankings was arbitrary and capricious. The commissioner declined to issue the ruling, stating that the plaintiff failed to identify any statute, regulation or final decision of the department to serve as a basis for the declaratory ruling and that the department lacked the authority to issue such a ruling on the basis of the specified circumstances laid out in the petition. The plaintiff thereafter initiated the underlying declaratory judgment action pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) (§ 4-166 et seq.). The department filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no statute, final decision, or regulation interfered with the plaintiff's legal rights. The trial court granted the department's motion, concluding that the department's 0 Conn. App. 688 ,0 3 Jefferson Solar, LLC v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection review of F Co.'s bid was not a final decision, that the program require- ments pursuant to § 16-244z were neither General Statutes nor regula- tions, and that it could not consider the program requirements pursuant to statute (§ 16-35), which barred appeals from PURA energy procure- ment processes. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff's action seeking a declaratory judgment under § 4-175, as the plaintiff's requested ruling did not ask the court to determine whether a regulation was valid or to determine the application to specified circumstances of a provision of a regulation, a statute, or a final decision: the legislature did not intend for the department's program requirements pursuant to § 16-244z (a) (1) (C) to be regulations subject to the rule-making process under the UAPA, as the language of that statute did not direct the department to establish regulations as the legislature expressly has done in other sections of the same chapter; moreover, the plaintiff did not have a right to judicial review, as the legislature directed the department to develop the program requirements under § 16-244z for PURA's approval, which implicated § 16-35, and that statute expressly provided that such procedures would be uncontested, and to conclude that the program requirements consti- tuted regulations subject to a declaratory judgment under § 4-175 would render meaningless the express language of both §§ 16-35 (c) and 16- 244z (a) (1) (C) exempting the procurement process from judicial review. Argued October 19, 2023—officially released April 16, 2024

The plaintiff, a renewable energy developer, brought a third action seeking to invalidate the winning bid by a competing energy developer, the defendant F Co. and its subsidiary, for a long-term clean energy contract with a utility company, the defendant I Co. The plaintiff and F Co. submitted bids in response to a request by I Co. for proposals to construct a shared clean energy facility that would sell energy to the public. Bidders were required to show that they had either control of the generation site, an unconditional right to acquire control or an unconditional option agreement to purchase or lease the site. F Co.'s bid, which contained an option to lease agreement, was selected by I Co. and ultimately approved by the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority. In a prior action the plaintiff brought against F Co., Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc. (213 Conn. App. 288) (prior action), the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the action, which this court affirmed on appeal. The trial court determined that the plaintiff's claims were moot and that it lacked standing to seek a declaratory ruling as to the viability of the option agreement. The court further determined that the plaintiff lacked standing as to its claims for tortious interference with prospective con- tractual relations and unfair trade practices. In the present action, the plaintiff claimed that F Co.'s bid did not meet the site control requirement and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to void F Co.'s bid and the contract it was awarded as well as damages based on various legal theories, including unfair trade practices. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue its claims. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue its claims against F Co. for declaratory and injunctive relief because the plaintiff was a disappointed bidder for a public contract that failed to demonstrate fraud, corruption or favoritism that undermined the integrity of the bidding process. The court further determined that the plaintiff lacked standing because the damages it sought, lost profits from the contract that was awarded to F Co., were indirect and too remote from the defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct in submitting and accepting F Co.'s bid. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. This court determined, consistent with its reasoning in the prior action, that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert its various causes of action for monetary damages because the injuries it alleged were indirect and too remote from F Co.'s alleged wrongdoing: the plaintiff's claimed 0 Conn. App. 710 ,0 3 Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc. injuries and the defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct were the same in both actions, as the plaintiff's appellate counsel stated during oral argument before this court that there was no meaningful difference between the unfair trade practices claims in both actions, and the plain- tiff's other counts that sought damages were based on the same allega- tion in the prior action that F Co.'s bid did not comply with the site control requirement because the option to lease was invalid; moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion that the trial court in the prior action based its decision on a different complaint with different allegations and lacked the benefit of F Co.'s concession in the present action that its bid certification was no good, the trial court's findings and ultimate conclusion in the present action regarding the remoteness of the plain- tiff's claimed injuries were consistent with this court's reasoning in the prior action, which applied with equal force in the present case; furthermore, the record supported the trial court's finding that the plain- tiff's claimed injuries were too speculative because there were too many links in the chain of causation for F Co.'s conduct to be the direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries and the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority retained discretion in awarding contracts. 2. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert its claims for declaratory and injunctive relief because it was a disappointed bidder on a public contract that failed to demonstrate fraud, corruption or favoritism that undermined the bidding process: the plaintiff's claim that the contract was not a public contract because the state was not a counterparty was unavailing, as the contract was awarded pursuant to competitive bidding in a public procurement pro- cess that was developed by and subject to the oversight of two state agencies; moreover, the plaintiff's reliance on the program requirements to challenge the award was no different from a disappointed bidder's reliance on state or municipal bidding statutes when challenging the award of a government contract, the program requirements, like compet- itive bidding laws, having been established for the benefit of the public, not bidders, and the trial court's application of standing rules regarding disappointed bidders on public contracts represented a proper balance between fulfilling the purposes of competitive bidding rules and pre- venting frequent litigation that might result in extensive delays in the commencement and completion of government projects to the detriment of the public; furthermore, even if, as the plaintiff contended, the contract were a public contract and the trial court improperly failed to find that F Co. knew its bid certification was false and that I Co. undermined the integrity of the bidding process by ignoring the program requirements, nothing in the record showed that F Co.'s bid did not conform to the site control requirement or that I Co. applied that requirement differently to other bidders, as I Co., which was permitted to select bids with option leases, applied the program requirements in a consistent, nondiscrimina- tory fashion. Argued October 19, 2023—officially released April 16, 2024 4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 710 Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

Pursuant to statute (§ 8-265ee (a)), ''a mortgagee who desires to foreclose upon a mortgage . . . shall give notice to each homeowner who is a mortgagor by registered, or certified mail, postage prepaid at the address of the property which is secured by the mortgage. No such mortgagee may commence a foreclosure of a mortgage prior to mailing such notice.'' In 2014, the plaintiff G Co. sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain residen- tial property owned by the defendant mortgagor. In 2015, G Co. filed its affidavit of compliance with the state's Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (EMAP), pursuant to § 8-265ee (a). W Co. was thereafter substi- tuted as the plaintiff. The court granted W Co.'s motion for summary judgment as to liability, and subsequently rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. The defendant filed an appeal, which was dismissed after he failed to file an appellate brief. The defendant thereafter filed a postjudgment motion to dismiss on the basis that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because G Co. failed to send an EMAP notice before commencing the action. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The court found that, although G Co. had failed to provide the defendant with timely notice of EMAP before bringing the present action in violation of § 8-265ee (a), the public policy of finality outweighed providing the defendant with a second opportunity to avail himself of EMAP, especially after he undertook to mediate the dispute for nearly one year before fully litigating the matter to a judgment and an appeal. The court further concluded that to allow the defendant to sit on his rights, only to collaterally attack the existing judgment, would have permitted a strategic delay of the proceedings. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held that this court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying the defendant's postjudgment motion to dismiss on the disposi- tive alternative ground that the defendant waived his right to raise a claim concerning G Co.'s compliance with EMAP: although G Co. had failed to timely comply with the EMAP notice requirement and the defendant's motion to dismiss was not an impermissible collateral attack on the foreclosure judgment, as the trial court retained jurisdiction to open the judgment at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss, this court concluded that the defendant had waived his right to raise a claim concerning G Co.'s EMAP notice compliance, as G Co. effectively alerted the defendant to an issue with compliance in its affidavit by averring that it had given the notice containing the information required by § 8-265ee to the defendant in 2015, more than one year after the 0 Conn. App. 740 ,0 3 Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Clark present action had been commenced, and, despite being made aware of this failure to comply with EMAP, at no point during the two years that passed between the filing of G Co.'s affidavit and the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure did the defendant raise G Co.'s noncompli- ance with EMAP by way of a motion to strike, in his answer, or in opposing W Co.'s motion for summary judgment, the defendant did not file any opposition to W Co.'s motion for judgment of strict foreclosure, and, although the defendant filed an appeal, that appeal was dismissed after he failed to file an appellate brief; accordingly, although W Co. failed to satisfy a mandatory condition precedent, no motion was filed challenging the action on that basis prior to the court's rendering judg- ment of strict foreclosure or the defendant's first appeal from that judg- ment. Argued December 6, 2023—officially released April 16, 2024

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and entering certain financial orders. Following a trial, the court granted the parties joint legal custody of their minor son, with the defendant having primary physical custody, and stated that ''[n]either party has asked for alimony or child support, so the court will order none.'' The court also granted three motions for contempt filed by the plaintiff based on its conclusion that the defendant wilfully had disobeyed court orders regarding the finances of the parties' business. As a result of the contempt, the court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $40,000 in attorney's fees. Held: 1. The trial court abused its discretion in the manner in which it addressed child support: although the trial court stated that it declined to award child support on the ground that it was not requested by either party, a review of the trial court file revealed that the defendant consistently had requested child support before, during, and after the dissolution trial as evidenced by his filing of completed child support guidelines worksheets, his compliance with trial management orders requesting child support and arrearage, and his motion for reconsideration after the court issued its memorandum of decision in which he pointed out that he had requested child support previously; moreover, even if child support had not been requested, the court improperly declined to award child support without considering the applicable statutes and child sup- port guidelines, and did not discuss whether the parties' son was a ''child . . . in need of maintenance'' pursuant to the criteria set forth in the relevant statute (§ 46b-84 (d)), or make a finding on the record, as required by statute (§ 46b-215b), that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate as determined under the deviation criteria established by the Commission for Child Support Guidelines, and this court was left to speculate both as to the presumptive child support amount and as to whether application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate in this case; accordingly, the case was remanded for a new trial on all financial orders because it was uncertain In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that party's identity may be ascertained. 0 Conn. App. 793 ,0 3 Y. H. v. J. B. whether the court's other financial orders would remain intact after reconsidering the child support order in a manner consistent with this opinion. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt but, to the extent the award of attorney's fees was imposed as a sanction for the defendant's con- tempt, the award constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion, which entitled the defendant to a new hearing as to the appropriate sanction for his wilful violation of the court's orders: on the basis of a review of the record, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the defendant had not complied with its orders and that his noncom- pliance was wilful, and, because the underlying findings were not clearly erroneous, the court properly exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motions for contempt; moreover, in awarding the attorney's fees to the plaintiff, the court did not cite any evidence in the record that the $40,000 in attorney's fees related to the three motions for contempt, instead making only general statements regarding the defen- dant's behavior and the amount of docket entries and the needlessly disorganized trial, and, although the plaintiff requested $40,000 in attor- ney's fees in her proposed orders, that amount was not tied to the plaintiff's request that the court find the defendant in contempt; further- more, because the trial court's financial orders will be reconsidered in their entirety on remand, to the extent that the award of attorney's fees was made pursuant to the statute (§ 46b-62) that provides for an award of attorney's fees in a dissolution action, the court may consider whether to award attorney's fees pursuant to § 46b-62 as part of the new finan- cial orders. Argued December 5, 2023—officially released April 16, 2024

The plaintiff motorist sought to recover damages from the defendant city for personal injuries she sustained and for damage to her vehicle allegedly resulting from a defective condition in a roadway that was owned and maintained by the defendant city. Pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 13a-149), the plaintiff sent a notice of claim to the defendant that stated the date, time and location of the incident, described her injuries and the losses she incurred, and provided that the cause of such injuries and losses was a ''defect in the roadway . . . .'' The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements of § 13a-149, as her notice did not identify the alleged defect in the road that caused her injuries and damages. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action, and rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: the language of the plaintiff's notice did not provide the level of specificity necessary to meet the requirements of § 13a-149 because it failed to describe the cause of the injury in any way beyond the assertion that there was a ''defect in the roadway,'' and, contrary to the plaintiff's argument, the use of the word ''defect'' did not provide any information as to the cause of the plaintiff's injuries nor did the fact that the notice provided that the defect was ''in'' the road rule out a long list of potential defects; moreover, the plaintiff's argument that the notice was sufficient in light of the complaints she had filed with the city's police department and public works department following the incident, which provided additional information, was unavailing because § 13a-149 provides that the notice must be given to a selectman or the clerk of a city and does not allow the court to consider additional notices filed with departments within the city; fur- thermore, the savings clause of § 13a-149, even if construed liberally, was inapplicable because it applied only in cases in which information in the notice concerning one of the statute's required elements was inaccurate or vague, not where the information was entirely absent, and, in the present case, the cause of the plaintiff's injury was completely, totally and unmistakenly omitted from the plaintiff's notice. Argued January 30—officially released April 16, 2024 0 Conn. App. 813 ,0 3 Cardoza v. Waterbury

The defendant, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crime of burglary in the first degree as a persistent felony offender, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motions to withdraw his guilty plea, which were filed nearly three months after he had begun serving his sentence. The defendant previously had been charged with several crimes in addition to burglary, including assault in the third degree and criminal mischief in the third degree. A jury found the defendant guilty on the assault count and not guilty on the criminal mischief count but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining charges. The trial court declared a mistrial as to those charges, and the state, in a new docket, subsequently charged the defen- dant with those crimes, including the burglary count, and with being a persistent felony offender. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly denied his motions to withdraw his guilty plea in which he challenged his conviction on double jeopardy grounds, namely, that his prior conviction of assault and acquittal of criminal mischief precluded the state from retrying him on the charge of burglary in the first degree: because the defendant already had begun serving his sentence at the time he filed his motions, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to decide the motions, which could not be construed as challenging the defendant's sentence, and the defendant did not claim, nor could this court conclude after reviewing the motions, that any legislative or constitutional grant of continuing jurisdiction applied that would have allowed the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the motions; accordingly, although the trial court properly rejected the defendant's postsentencing motions, the form of the court's judgment was improper, as the court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the motions, and the case was remanded to the trial court with direction to render judgment dismissing the motions. Argued January 29—officially released April 16, 2024

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendant insurance companies, G Co., S Co., L Co., and M Co., in connection with the denial of the plaintiffs' claim under a homeowners insurance policy. The plaintiffs sought to recover damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (§ 42-110a et seq.) and the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (§ 38a-815 et seq.), and viola- tion of the Connecticut Unauthorized Insurers Act (CUIA) (§ 38a-271 et seq.). The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to all counts of the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that the insurance policy did not provide coverage for the plaintiffs' claim and that the extracon- tractual claims were unfounded. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim: although the plaintiffs asserted that the policy issued by G Co. and appended to the defendants' motion for summary judgment was not the policy that was the subject of their contract claim, the trial court properly determined that there existed no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs' insurance policy had been issued by G Co. and that G Co. had denied the plaintiffs' insurance claim, as the materials appended to the defendants' motion for summary judgment included a copy of the policy that clearly states that it was issued by G Co., an affidavit of a claims team manager that stated that the policy was issued by G Co. to insure the plaintiffs' property and that G Co. was licensed to issue insurance policies in Connecticut, a policy renewal letter that identified G Co. as the issuer of the policy, and a letter stating that the claim submitted to G Co. for damages to the plaintiffs' property was denied; moreover, the plaintiffs did not submit evidence that created a genuine issue of material fact that the authenticated policy that was appended to the defendants' motion was not the policy at issue in the complaint, as neither their argument that the policy was issued by an entity named Safeco Insurance nor their statements in their affidavits that they did not interact with G Co. created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether G Co. issued the policy, and both the plaintiffs' argument that the affidavit submitted by the defendants contained false statements regarding the insurer of the policy and that they did not receive a copy of the policy were unmeritorious because the trial court did not find any affidavit submitted by the defendants to be false and 0 Conn. App. 838 ,0 3 Travinski v. General Ins. Co. of America the plaintiffs did not append to their opposition any evidence that they had asked for a copy of the policy and had been denied; furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to provide any legal authority for the proposition that any affiliation or involvement the other defendants had with G Co. as the underwriter of the policy could form a basis for liability under the terms of the policy. 2. The trial court properly rendered judgment in favor of S Co., L Co., and M Co. with respect to plaintiffs' CUIA claim: despite the plaintiffs' assertion that S Co., L Co., and M Co. had conducted an unlicensed insurance business in Connecticut in violation of CUIA under the name of Safeco Insurance, the trial court properly determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed that G Co., which was a licensed insurer in Connecticut, had issued the policy to the plaintiffs and that neither S Co., L Co. nor M Co. had issued the policy. 3. The plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly permitted S Co., L Co., and M Co. to file a motion for summary judgment without posting a bond pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 38a-27) was without merit: because there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs' policy had not been issued by S Co., L Co., or M Co., there was no evidence that these entities insured the plaintiffs' property; accordingly, S Co., L Co., and M Co. could not have acted as the unauthorized insurers at issue in § 38a-27 and were not required to post a bond. Argued January 8—officially released April 16, 2024

The plaintiff bank sought, by way of a summary process action, to recover possession of certain real property from the defendants. The property had been subject to a strict foreclosure action, and ownership became absolute in the plaintiff after the law day had passed. The defendant parents, the former owners of the property, the defendant C, their adult daughter, and their son, D, continued to reside at the property after the law day had passed. A notice to quit was served on the parents and C. D was not served with notice because he was a minor at the time of service and service of a notice to quit possession on a minor was not required under the applicable statute (§ 47a-23 (c)). After this court affirmed the trial court's judgment of possession for the plaintiff, the defendants moved to open and dismiss the judgment for mootness and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants claimed that, because D, who continued to reside at the property, had turned eighteen years old, the plaintiff was required to have served a notice to quit on him. Because the notice to quit could not be retroactively amended to include D, the defendants claimed that the judgment of possession became invalid, as all adults presently residing at the property had not been properly served pursuant to § 47a-23 (c) before the judgment of posses- sion had been executed. The trial court denied the defendants' motion, finding that the notice to quit had been properly served on all adult occupants and the fact that D reached the age of majority after the judgment had been rendered did not cause the notice to quit to become defective. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants' appeal as the defendants were not aggrieved by the denial of their motion to open and dismiss the judgment of possession: the defendants were not classically aggrieved by the trial court's decision denying their motion to open and dismiss the judgment as that motion was premised on their claim that D had not been served with a notice to quit as required by § 47a-23 (c), a claim that was based on a right or interest that allegedly belonged to a third party, D, who was a nonparty to the present action; moreover, even if the defendants arguably have a specific, personal, and legal interest in the subject matter of the judgment of possession to remain residing in the property, the defendants failed to identify a special, personal interest belonging to them that has been specifically and injuri- ously affected by the trial court's decision denying the motion to open and dismiss; furthermore, the defendants failed to demonstrate that they were statutorily aggrieved under § 47a-23 (c), as the defendants did not claim that they were not properly served with the notice to quit, rather, they claimed that D, a nonparty, was not properly served with notice, and there was no judicial relief that the defendants could seek under § 47a-23 (c), as the defendants' claim related to the plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with service under § 47a-23 as to D, a nonparty; accord- ingly, the appeal was dismissed. Argued January 8—officially released April 23, 2024