Volume 223 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a guilty plea entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (400 U.S. 25), of sexual assault in a cohabiting relationship, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by allowing him to enter a guilty plea while he was under the influence of prescription drugs that affected his ability to give a knowing and meaningful plea. At trial, when the petitioner's counsel attempted to call his first witness, R, to testify as to the petitioner's character for truthfulness, counsel for the respon- dent, the Commissioner of Correction, objected on the grounds of rele- vance. The court sustained the respondent's relevancy objection. The petitioner's habeas counsel never sought to recall R as a witness after the petitioner testified. The court rendered judgment denying the petition for habeas corpus and, thereafter, denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to show that there was an issue that was debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could have resolved the issue in a different manner or that the question was adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further: the habeas court properly determined that R's testimony, when R had no connection with the plea hearing, was not relevant to the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; moreover, at the time the petitioner's counsel called R to testify, the petitioner had not himself testified and, thus, his veracity had not been challenged or impeached and extrinsic evidence of his character for truthfulness was immaterial. Argued October 5, 2023—officially released January 2, 2024

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the revised financial orders issued by the trial court following its granting of the plaintiff's motion to open the dissolution judgment. In accordance with the parties' separation agreement, which was incorporated into the original dissolution judg- ment, the defendant was required to pay the plaintiff alimony in an amount equal to 30 percent of his gross earned income from work until he reached the age of sixty-five or, if he received veteran's disability income prior to turning sixty-five, 30 percent of his veteran's disability income plus 30 percent of any additional earned income. After the parties' marriage was dissolved, the defendant became disabled, stopped working, and began receiving Social Security disability benefits in addi- tion to payments from a veteran's disability policy and a MassMutual disability insurance policy. As a result, the defendant's earned income decreased, and he began paying the plaintiff significantly less alimony. The defendant did not pay the plaintiff any portion of the income he received from the MassMutual policy because he did not believe that it constituted earned income for purposes of the dissolution judgment. The plaintiff filed a motion to open the dissolution judgment, arguing that it had been secured by fraud on the part of the defendant or, in the alternative, that it was obtained by the mutual mistake of the parties regarding the defendant's income and assets. At a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to pursue discovery with respect to her fraud allegations, the plaintiff's counsel began questioning the defendant about the MassMutual policy. Following an objection by the defendant's counsel, the trial court started questioning the parties' attor- neys and did not allow either counsel to further question the defendant or to present other evidence. The trial court then stated that it found that the defendant had not committed fraud because the defendant had listed the MassMutual policy on his financial affidavit and issued an order from the bench opening the judgment of dissolution with respect to financial orders on the basis of mutual mistake and fundamental fairness. Following a trial held for the purpose of issuing new financial orders, the trial court, inter alia, rejected the plaintiff's claim that the MassMutual policy constituted property subject to equitable division because the defendant's entitlement to benefits under that policy was inchoate at the time of the original dissolution judgment. The plaintiff appealed, and the defendant cross appealed, to this court. Held that the trial court deprived the defendant of his due process rights by not allowing him to be heard in a meaningful manner on the plaintiff's motion to open the dissolution judgment: the trial court's actions prevented the defendant's counsel from examining his own client, who was the sole witness to testify at the hearing, and from introducing any evidence of his own in opposition to the plaintiff's motion; moreover, although the trial court stated that it was opening the judgment on the basis of a mutual mistake, it did not clearly identify the issue about which the parties were purportedly mistaken, and, due to its failure to provide the parties with a meaningful opportunity to introduce evidence, the record did not support a finding that the parties were mutually mistaken regard- ing whether the plaintiff was entitled to share in the value or proceeds of the MassMutual policy; furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff's asser- tion that the defendant's due process rights were not violated because there were no disputed issues of material fact concerning her claim of a mutual mistake, the transcript from the hearing at which the original dissolution judgment was rendered did not, by itself, establish that the parties were mutually mistaken about anything with respect to the MassMutual policy, an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve the plaintiff's motion to open, and, because the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing that comported with due process, it lacked the authority to issue the new financial orders that the plaintiff challenged on appeal; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case with direction to reinstate the original financial orders and to hold a new hearing on the motion to open. Argued October 11, 2023—officially released January 9, 2024

The plaintiff, who had sustained a compensable work-related injury during her employment, appealed to this court from the decision of the Compen- sation Review Board, which upheld the decision of the Workers' Com- pensation Commissioner granting the defendant employer's request to convert the plaintiff's benefits for temporary partial disability, pursuant to statute (§ 31-308 (a)), to permanent partial disability benefits, pursu- ant to § 31-308 (b), after medical examinations determined that the plaintiff had attained maximum medical improvement and had a light- duty work capacity. The plaintiff claimed that the board had improperly determined that, because she had reached maximum medical improve- ment, she could no longer receive temporary partial disability benefits pursuant to § 31-308 (a). Although the plaintiff contended that the Supreme Court in Osterlund v. State (129 Conn. 591) had recognized the discretion of a commissioner to award ongoing temporary partial disability benefits to a claimant who had reached maximum medical improvement, the board reasoned that, although the holding in Osterlund had been codified in § 31-308 (d), that statutory provision had been repealed by the legislature in 1993. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the board properly interpreted the authority afforded the commissioner pursuant to § 31-308 (a) and upheld the commissioner's determination: despite the plaintiff's claim that the commissioner had discretion pursuant to § 31-308 to award ongoing wage loss disability benefits in lieu of permanent partial disability benefits after she attained maximum medical improvement, this court determined that, although neither § 31-308 nor other provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.) expressly address whether a commissioner is authorized to continue to award temporary partial disability benefits in lieu of permanent partial disability benefits after the injured employee reaches maximum medical improvement, the legislature omitted such authority in 1993 when it revised § 31-308 to eliminate subsection (d) and has statutorily (§ 31-295 (c)) required that permanent partial disability benefits be paid after the date of maximum medical improvement; more- over, § 31-308 (a) limits the duration of disability benefits and § 31-295 (c) requires that permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to § 31- 308 (b) shall be paid after the date of maximum medical improvement; furthermore, prior decisions of this state's courts bolstered this court's determination that temporary partial disability benefits are available under § 31-308 (a) only until the claimant reaches maximum medical improvement. Argued September 11, 2023—officially released January 9, 2024

The plaintiff stakeholder, an attorney who represented the defendant V in a real estate transaction in which V sold two real properties to the defendant M Co., brought an action for interpleader to determine the rights of V and M Co. to funds held in escrow until V obtained certain zoning approvals for the properties. The properties, which were adjacent to each other, were located in a federal opportunity zone, which provided the opportunity for tax deferment. M Co. made clear its intent to V that it desired to continue mixed commercial and residential use for the first property and to convert the second property from a single-family residence to a two-family residence. Various zoning and use approvals were required from the city of Danbury in order to use the second property as a two-family property. In order to qualify for the tax benefits of the opportunity zone, V and M Co. were required to close on the transaction within a six month window. In order to ensure the closing could take place within the time frame needed to obtain the tax defer- ment, the parties entered into a contract for sale containing a rider to the contract that called for the creation of an escrow agreement to hold $75,000 of the purchase price contingent on the receipt of specified zoning and use approvals on or before February 1, 2020. M Co. designated V as its agent relative to any application for a variance for the second property. The zoning board granted the application for the variance for the second property with the stipulation that there would be no street access to the front of the second property, the driveway to the front of the second property would need to be removed and replaced with grass, and access to parking for the second property would be available only through an easement over the first property in favor of the second property. M Co. did not agree to the creation of the easement. After trial, the court rendered judgment awarding the escrow funds to M Co. On appeal to this court, V claimed that the trial court made erroneous factual findings and improperly concluded that he failed to satisfy the contingency set forth in the escrow agreement requiring that he obtain a use variance for the second property. Held: 1. M Co. could not prevail on its claim that V's appeal was moot because V did not challenge each independent basis for the trial court's judgment; if this court were to agree with V's claim that the trial court misconstrued the escrow agreement as a matter of law, there would be no other basis on which to affirm the trial court's judgment and this court could grant V practical relief by either directing judgment in his favor or by ordering a new trial. 2. V could not prevail on his claim that the trial court made clearly erroneous factual findings; even if this court assumed that the challenged findings were clearly erroneous, the trial court did not rely on either of those findings in reaching its conclusion that V failed to satisfy a condition of the escrow agreement and, thus, any alleged error was harmless. 3. The trial court properly concluded that V failed to satisfy a condition of the escrow agreement and awarded the escrow funds to M Co.: the contract for sale and the escrow agreement were connected by reference and subject matter and, when read together to determine the intent of V and M Co., were unambiguous that, although M Co. designated V as its agent to obtain a use variance for the second property, it did not grant V any authority that allowed him to encumber the first property in pursuit of a use variance for the second property; moreover, the use variance V obtained for the second property was conditioned on the granting of an easement over the first property, which did not satisfy the terms of the escrow agreement or the contract for sale, which expressly required that V convey the properties without private restric- tive covenants or easements; furthermore, V's reliance on the fact that there was no dispute that the only access to the additional parking spaces behind the second property was across the first property as support for his suggestion that M Co. knew that a permanent easement would be required for the use variance for the second property lacked probative force because, with M Co. as the owner of both properties, no easement would be required to allow such access. Argued September 18, 2023—officially released January 9, 2024

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of assault in the second degree, and, under a part B information, on a plea of guilty, of being a persistent serious felony offender, the defendant appealed to this court. The victim did not testify at the defendant's trial. Instead, the state introduced evidence of the victim's injuries through, inter alia, the testimony of S, the emergency room physician who treated the victim on the night of the incident. Over the objection of the defendant, two photographs of the victim were also admitted into evidence. These photographs were taken shortly after the assault occurred and depicted the victim with lacerations on her forehead and lips and with blood on her face and shirt. On the defendant's appeal, held: 1. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction of assault in the second degree: the jury reasonably could have concluded that the victim suffered a serious physical injury on the basis of the evidence regarding her loss of consciousness during the incident, as this court previously has held that loss of consciousness may constitute a serious loss or impairment of the function of a bodily organ; moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention, the jury was entitled to rely on S's testimony regarding the victim's statement to him that she had experienced a brief loss of consciousness because the hearsay was admitted without objection; furthermore, the evidence was not insuffi- cient merely because it was in conflict with or inconsistent with testi- mony that defense counsel elicited from S that certain medical records indicated that the victim had denied any loss of consciousness to the registered nurse who treated the victim on the night of the incident. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the two photographs of the victim: contrary to the defendant's assertions, the photographs were relevant because they were probative of the two statutory (§ 53a-60 (a) (1)) elements of assault in the second degree, namely, that the defendant intended to cause the victim serious physical injury and that he caused the victim serious physical injury, as the defendant's intent could be inferred from the type of wounds inflicted, and the photographs depicted the size and location of the lacerations, in addition to the resulting blood loss, which were indicative of the severity of the victim's injuries; moreover, the trial court properly con- cluded that the photographs were not unduly prejudicial, despite their graphic nature, because they tended to prove a material fact in issue, and the trial court reasonably determined that their probative value outweighed their prejudicial impact. Argued October 11, 2023—officially released January 9, 2024

The plaintiff, whose prior employment as a police officer with the defendant city of Hartford had been terminated, sought to recover damages from the city for, inter alia, its failure to rehire him as a police officer because of his disability, narcolepsy. The city had posted a job listing seeking applications from nonresidents of Hartford for a police officer position. Applicants were required to apply online and to include with their appli- cations a ''CHIP'' card signifying that they had successfully completed certain physical ability tests required of police officer candidates. The plaintiff, who was not a resident of Hartford, was among fifty-two appli- cants who did not submit a CHIP card with their applications and, thus, was determined by the city to be unqualified for the police officer position. In a two count complaint alleging violations of a provision (§ 46a-60) of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.), the plaintiff claimed that the city had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability and retaliated against him for having previously brought a lawsuit against the city in connection with the termination of his prior employment as a police officer. The city, which was aware at the time the plaintiff applied for the police officer position that he had been diagnosed with narcolepsy, moved for summary judg- ment, asserting that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to both counts of the plaintiff's complaint and that it was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court granted the city's motion, conclud- ing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of either disability discrimination or retaliation and that, even if he had established a prima facie case as to those claims, summary judgment was warranted on both counts because the city had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for its decision not to rehire the plaintiff, namely, his failure to submit the required CHIP card with his application, which he thereafter failed to establish was pretextual. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly rendered summary judg- ment for the city: the undisputed evidence in the record established that the sole reason for the city's decision not to rehire the plaintiff was his failure to submit a CHIP card with his job application and, although the plaintiff claimed that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the city's reason was pretextual because the job application did not identify a CHIP card as a document that needed to be submitted with the job application, whereas the job posting listed the CHIP card as a document required to be submitted with the job application, it would have been purely speculative for this court to infer from that inconsistency that the city was motivated to discriminate or retaliate against the plaintiff when that circumstance would have had the same effect on all applicants; moreover, the plaintiff did not provide any evidence to contradict the city's evidence that the city had conducted a screening process after which applicants, including the plaintiff, who had failed to submit CHIP cards with their applications were eliminated from consideration and not hired, nor did the plaintiff provide evidence of any connection between the city's determination that he was unquali- fied for the police officer position and his medical diagnosis or with his having previously filed suit against the city in connection with its termination of his prior employment as a police officer; furthermore, the plaintiff's disagreement with the city's requirement that he submit a CHIP card with his application was immaterial and did not render the city's reason for not rehiring him pretextual, there having been no genu- ine issue of material fact that all applicants were required to submit a CHIP card, regardless of whether they were certified police officers. Argued October 2, 2023—officially released January 9, 2024

The plaintiffs, F and V, sought to recover damages from the defendants for the alleged wrongful termination of their employment in violation of the statute (§ 31-290a) prohibiting discrimination against employees exercising their rights under the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.). The plaintiffs were two of five special police officers who worked for the defendant Board of Education of the City of Bridgeport (board), and their work included patrolling the neighborhoods around the schools. In 2012, the Bridgeport Police Department assumed author- ity over security for the public schools in Bridgeport, and the plaintiffs began reporting to G, a supervising officer with the Bridgeport Police Department. The plaintiffs then began performing duties outside of the school area, including handling regular police calls. In February, 2014, F sustained an injury to his back during the course of his employment for which he sought and received workers' compensation benefits. When F informed G of his need for back surgery, G made certain disparaging comments toward him. In November, 2015, V sustained a work-related injury to his wrist for which he sought and received workers' compensa- tion benefits. When he returned to work, he spoke with G about having surgery, but G turned the conversation to the topic of F's back surgery and again made certain disparaging comments. At a regular meeting of the board in June, 2016, the board voted to pass a motion to eliminate the five special police officer positions, along with 125 other positions, from the board's 2016-2017 budget, because the Bridgeport School Dis- trict was facing a financial crisis. The plaintiffs were laid off from their positions effective August 12, 2016. Following the elimination of the special police officer positions by the board in 2016, the plaintiffs' union filed a grievance against the defendant city of Bridgeport (city) and the board, alleging a violation of a no layoff provision in a memorandum of understanding between the parties. The matter went to arbitration before an arbitration panel, which determined, in July, 2018, that the memorandum of understanding had been violated, and ordered the rein- statement of the five special police officers. Subsequently, the plaintiffs were notified that when they returned to work, they would receive layoff notices, as funding had never been restored for the special police officer positions and the memorandum of understanding had expired in June, 2018, and was no longer applicable. The plaintiffs then commenced this action, and the trial court granted motions for summary judgment filed by the city and the board, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court declined to review the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly focused or limited its analysis of their discrimination claim to the 2016 layoffs because their claim encompassed the events related to the 2018 reinstatement order and the defendants' 2018 postarbitration conduct, as that claim was not properly before this court: in their appel- late briefs, the plaintiffs did not provide any argument or analysis or cite to anything in the trial court record that would demonstrate why the court was wrong in determining that the discrimination claim before it pertained only to the 2016 decision of the board to eliminate the special police officer positions, the plaintiffs never filed a motion for reconsideration or articulation of the court's decision on this issue, and it was not the responsibility of this court to search the record to determine whether the trial court's determination found support in the record; moreover, the trial court expressly stated in its decision that any claim concerning the 2018 reinstatement order was not before it and never addressed or decided any such claim, and it would be fundamentally unfair to the defendants for this court to review a claim that was neither addressed nor decided by the trial court; furthermore, the defendants objected to this court's consideration of the plaintiffs' discrimination claim as it related to the events in 2018, and the plaintiffs did not assert the existence of any exceptional circumstances to warrant this court's review of a claim not decided by the trial court and failed to raise any claim in their brief challenging the trial court's determination that the sole issue before it concerned the board's 2016 decision. 2. The trial court properly granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment because no genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiffs established a prima facie case that their positions were eliminated and they were laid off in 2016 in violation of § 31- 290a for exercising their rights to workers' compensation benefits and whether the alleged nondiscriminatory reason given by the defendants for the plaintiffs' layoffs was pretextual: a. Although the plaintiffs claimed that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether they met their burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination under § 31-290a, this court did not need to reach the merits of that claim, and, as was done by the trial court, this court assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs both met their initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. b. On the basis of this court's plenary review of the evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the motions for summary judgment, this court agreed with the trial court's conclusions that the defendants successfully rebutted the presumption of discrimination and that the plaintiffs failed in their burden of producing evidence to show the exis- tence of a genuine issue of material fact that the nondiscriminatory reason offered by the defendants was not worthy of credence or was pretextual: the documentary evidence submitted by the defendants in support of their motions for summary judgment provided substantial, uncontroverted support for the defendants' asserted nondiscriminatory reason for eliminating the special police officer positions and laying off the plaintiffs in 2016, namely, that the funding for the special police officer positions was eliminated due to financial considerations; moreover, the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by the defendants was not worthy of credence or was pretextual, as they provided no evidence contradicting, inter alia, the affidavits submitted by the defendants from five of the board members who participated in the vote to eliminate the positions that confirmed that the plaintiffs' workers' compensation claims were not a factor in their decision, no evidence showing any connection whatsoever between the board's deci- sion to defund and eliminate the special police officer positions and the plaintiffs' filing of claims for workers' compensation benefits, and no evidence providing evidentiary support for their assertion that the board's decision was retaliatory in nature and connected with their protected status under § 31-290a; furthermore, the plaintiffs' assertions were con- clusory and speculative, and were not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment, especially when it was undisputed that the defendants treated all of the special police officers the same. Argued October 11, 2023—officially released January 16, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 12-111 (a) (1)), ''[a]ny person . . . claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of the assessors of [a] town may appeal there- from to the board of assessment appeals. Such appeal shall be filed in writing or by electronic mail in a manner prescribed by such board on or before February twentieth. . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 12-112), ''[n]o appeal from the doings of the assessors in any town shall be heard or entertained by the board of assessment appeals . . . unless written appeal is made on or before February twentieth in accordance with the provisions of section 12-111.'' The plaintiff limited liability company appealed to this court from the trial court's judgment dismissing its municipal tax appeal brought pursuant to statute (§ 12-117a). In October, 2021, the defendant town assessed the plaintiff's property and set forth a valuation. The plaintiff mailed its petition to appeal the valuation to the town's board of assessment appeals on Friday, February 18, 2022, via commercial standard overnight shipping. The town's municipal offices were closed Saturday, February 19, 2022, through Monday, February 21, 2022, Washington's Birthday, a legal holiday. On February 22, 2022, the board received the plaintiff's petition and, on February 23, 2022, the board notified the plaintiff that its petition would not be heard because it was received after February 20, the statutory deadline set forth in §§ 12-111 (a) (1) and 12-112. The plaintiff then appealed to the trial court pursuant to § 12-117a, alleging, inter alia, that it had been aggrieved by the board under § 12-117a and that its appeal to the board had been timely. The town filed an answer and asserted several special defenses, including that the plaintiff's claim was barred under § 12-117a because the plaintiff did not file its petition before the statutory deadline. The town subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's appeal to the board was untimely. The trial court granted the town's motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed the relevant counts of the plaintiff's complaint, finding, inter alia, that the plaintiff's appeal was untimely because it was received two days after the statutory deadline set forth in §§ 12-111 and 12-112. On appeal, held that the trial court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's municipal tax appeal on the basis that the plaintiff's petition to the board was untimely: in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Brennan v. Fairfield (255 Conn. 693), which analyzed the statutory deadline for a claim under the municipal defective highway statute (§ 13a-149), this court similarly determined that the legislature did not intend for a taxpayer to have a shorter time period to file its petition to a town's board simply because the statutory deadline fell on a day that the municipal offices were closed; moreover, this court found persuasive the principle set forth in Brennan and in Lamberti v. Stam- ford (131 Conn. 396) that a plaintiff cannot effectuate notice on a board when a town's municipal offices are closed on weekends or a legal holiday because the designated town official is not available to receive the notice, the Supreme Court having determined that the legislature did not intend the alternative, that is, that either the town clerk's office would have to be open on those days in order to receive the notice or the designated official would have to be otherwise available to receive the notice, and this court similarly was not persuaded that the legislature intended to have municipal offices open on weekends or legal holidays in order for a taxpayer to satisfy the deadline set forth in §§ 12-111 (a) (1) and 12-112; accordingly, because the statutory deadline of February 20, 2022, was a Sunday and the following day was a legal holiday, this court concluded that the plaintiff's appeal, received by the board on February 22, 2022, was timely made. Argued November 8, 2023—officially released January 16, 2024

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the trial court's judgment granting the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for clarification and for postjudgment interest. In accordance with the dissolution judgment, the defendant was required to transfer $175,000 from the retirement funds of his choice to the plaintiff by way of a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). In its decision, the trial court indicated that such amount could be adjusted to reflect any gains or losses that occurred prior to the judg- ment. The defendant appealed from the dissolution judgment, asserting claims of error unrelated to the division of his retirement funds. The orders of the judgment were stayed during the pending appeal, and, consequently, the retirement funds were not transferred. This court affirmed the trial court's judgment, and our Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for certification to appeal. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion requesting that the trial court clarify whether the $175,000 award of retirement funds was to be adjusted for gains and losses prior to the time of transfer and, if it was not, that the court award the plaintiff statutory (§ 37-3a) interest. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 5 percent annual interest, pursuant to § 37-3a, for each of the three full years that the funds were not paid and for ten months of the fourth year. The trial court indicated that the accrual of interest would cease as of the issuance of its order and would begin to accrue again only if there was a delay beyond that which was necessary to prepare the QDROs. In his appeal, the defendant did not challenge the court's award of interest for the three year period during which his appeal from the dissolution judgment was pending but only claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly awarded interest for the ten month period of the fourth year. Held that the trial court's award of postjudgment interest to the plaintiff for the ten month period was not improper: contrary to the defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff postjudgment interest for the unpaid months of the fourth year because, during that time, the plaintiff and her counsel were responsible for the delay in the transfer of the funds, the trial court properly found that the defendant had wrongfully withheld the $175,000, as the parties disagreed as to whether the award was subject to adjustment for gains or losses, and the defendant did not claim, at any point during the hearing on the plaintiff's motion or during the additional time provided by the trial court thereafter for the defendant to respond to the plaintiff's request for postjudgment interest, that the plaintiff had prevented the execution of the QDROs nor did he seek to present any evidence contradicting the statement of the plaintiff's counsel that the QDRO company would not proceed with the transfer; moreover, the defendant conceded that, in arguing his appeal, he was relying on evidence that was not presented at the hearing on the plain- tiff's motion, and this court declined to conclude, on the basis of evidence not presented to the trial court, that the plaintiff had refused to accept the retirement funds and that, as a result, the trial court had abused its discretion in awarding postjudgment interest; furthermore, the trial court reasonably concluded that it would not be an abuse of its discretion to compensate the plaintiff for the inequity of being deprived of the $175,000 award for an extended period, which included the period that encom- passed the wrongful detention of the funds that continued until the court issued its decision on the plaintiff's postjudgment motion for clarification and interest, as such reasoning was consistent with the statutory purpose of postjudgment interest; additionally, contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court did not award the plaintiff interest for any period after the issuance of the trial court's order, but, rather, ordered that interest would accrue again only if there was an unneces- sary delay in the execution of the QDROs, which it had the authority to do. Argued October 12, 2023—officially released January 16, 2024

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property of the defendant, T Co. The plaintiff alleged that certain lenders entered into a credit agreement with G Co. as the borrower, T Co. and N Co. as guarantors, and the plaintiff acting as the lenders' agent. The credit agreement provided that the lenders would make certain financial accommodations to G Co. T Co., as a guarantor, was liable for all payment obligations if G Co. defaulted, and, subsequently, T Co. entered into a mortgage deed with respect to the subject property to secure its obligations under the credit agreement and guaranty. Following several events of default, the plaintiff commenced this action. The trial court granted the parties' motion for entry of a stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon. T Co. waived its rights to appeal and to an appraisal, and the parties stipulated to a fair market value of the property based on records of the municipal tax assessor. On the law day assigned by the court, S Co., a nonparty, filed a postjudgment motion to intervene as a party defendant, asserting that it was the plaintiff in a separate action against G Co., which owned T Co., and that it had filed an application for a prejudgment remedy seeking to attach T Co.'s assets, including the subject property. S Co. claimed that the property was substantially undervalued in the foreclosure judgment because the valuation was not based on an appraisal and that its ability to collect a judgment against G Co. would be impaired in the absence of its involvement in the foreclosure action. The trial court denied the motion to intervene after the law day had passed, and S Co. appealed to this court. The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. Held that, because the appeal was moot, this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed: there was no appellate stay affecting the running of the law days because S Co., as a nonparty, could not file an appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure, and, although S Co. filed a motion to intervene, it did not also file a motion that, if granted, would have rendered the judgment ineffective, such that a new appeal period from the judgment would have been created, and, therefore, the denial of S Co.'s motion to intervene, in the absence of the granting of a discretionary stay, which S Co. did not request, did not stay this foreclosure action; moreover, no practical relief could be granted to S Co. because title had already vested in the plaintiff by the time the trial court denied S Co.'s postjudgment motion to intervene, the right of redemption by T Co. had been extinguished, and the rare exception in which fact-specific relief could be granted to a would-be intervenor did not exist here, as the granting of the motion to intervene would have necessitated opening the foreclosure judgment, which would have required further proceedings by the trial court; fur- thermore, there was no colorable claim implicating this court's equitable authority to open the foreclosure judgment as established in U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Rothermel (339 Conn. 366), as S Co. did not file a motion to open the judgment along with its motion to intervene, and, even if it had, S Co. did not raise any colorable claims of the type that would have caused this court to determine that equity required opening the judgment after title had vested in C Co., and, notwithstanding S Co.'s argument that T Co.'s waiver of an appraisal and the parties' stipulated property value based on the tax assessor's records were improper and unlawful, the valuation was part of the stipulation, was based on a municipal tax assessor's valuation, and was accepted by the trial court in its order rendering the judgment of strict foreclosure, and, thus, T Co.'s waiver of an appraisal, without additional factual allegations to establish the rare and exceptional circumstances of fraud, accident, mistake or surprise, did not convert S Co.'s disagreement with the stipulated valuation of the property into a claim sufficient to invoke this court's continuing equitable authority, particularly given that S Co. had no direct interest in the property that could be foreclosed in the underlying action. Considered October 11, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment by the defendant, which she claimed was the result of pregnancy discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employ- ment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.). The plaintiff, who previously had worked for the defendant, was rehired in November, 2017, in a quality assurance position that required her to work on the defendant's manufac- turing floor. In January, 2018, the plaintiff notified the defendant that she was pregnant and, consequently, could no longer work in a manufac- turing position. Pursuant to the defendant's policy, as set forth in its employee handbook, any employee who was disabled as a result of pregnancy was entitled to an unpaid leave of absence and the defendant was required to make a reasonable effort to transfer the employee to any suitable temporary position that was available at the time it received notice of the employee's pregnancy. The plaintiff signed paperwork to take maternity leave on January 25, 2018. She alleged that, although there was an open administrative position in February, 2018, the defendant told her that no such position was available and encouraged her to ''stay home and take care of the baby.'' Between October, 2017, and October, 2018, the defendant experienced a significant downsizing of its business, reducing its workforce from approximately thirty-three employees to fourteen. In September and October, 2018, the plaintiff reached out to M, the defendant's chief executive officer, asking for a status update. M informed the plaintiff that the defendant was planning to hire a new administrative worker and that she could apply for the position, however, it was not yet being advertised. He encouraged her to reach out to her former supervisor, S, for additional information. In November, 2018, the plaintiff contacted S, who informed her that she could not return to her prior position, as the department it was in had closed and the position no longer existed. He noted, however, that an administrative position was available and that she could apply for it or meet with him to discuss it further. There was no evidence in the record indicating that the plaintiff thereafter applied to the position or contacted S for additional information. On May 31, 2019, the plaintiff filed an employment discrimi- nation complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportuni- ties. Thereafter, the commission issued a release of jurisdiction over the complaint, and the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant, claiming that it had discriminated against her by failing to transfer her to an administrative position in February, 2018, by termi- nating her employment effective October 30, 2018, and by failing to rehire her. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint was untimely pursuant to the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 46a-82 (f)) because none of the alleged acts of discrimination occurred within 180 days of the filing of the plaintiff's complaint with the commission. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant because it did not err in determining that the plaintiff's claims of three distinct acts of pregnancy discrimination failed: the plaintiff's claims that the defendant discriminated against her by failing to transfer her to an open administrative position in February, 2018, and by terminating her employment effective as of October 30, 2018, were barred by the statute of limitations because they were outside of the 180 day limitation period contained in (Rev. to 2017) § 46a-82 (f), as they occurred prior to December 2, 2018; moreover, although any claim that the defendant engaged in pregnancy discrimination by failing to rehire the plaintiff on or after December 2, 2018, was not barred by the statute of limitations, the trial court properly found that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff had met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to such failure in accordance with the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (411 U.S. 792), because, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, nothing in her email exchange with M, which she relied on to support her claim, demonstrated that she suffered an adverse employment action on or after December 2, 2018, as there was no evidence in the emails that the defendant had any open positions in January or February, 2019, or that the plaintiff had applied for any open positions with the defendant, and the plaintiff admitted that she had never asked M if she could return to work for the defendant nor did she apply for a job with any employer between October 30, 2018, and June, 2019, when she returned to school. 2. Contrary to the plaintiff's claim, the continuing course of conduct doctrine did not operate to toll the limitation period set forth in (Rev. to 2017) § 46a-82 (f) for the acts of discrimination that allegedly occurred prior to December 2, 2018: the doctrine did not apply to the plaintiff's claims that the defendant improperly failed to transfer her to an administrative position that was open in February, 2018, and terminated her employ- ment effective October, 2018, because that doctrine does not recognize an act or omission that is discrete and attributable to a fixed point in time and, accordingly, the plaintiff was required to file a complaint with the commission within the statutory limitation period that commenced after each act occurred; moreover, the doctrine did not apply to the plaintiff's failure to rehire claim, even though her pleadings relating to that claim were general in nature and, when broadly construed, encompassed conduct that transpired before and after December 2, 2018, because the failure to rehire was not a continuing violation and the plaintiff failed to establish that an adverse employment action occurred on or after December 2, 2018. Argued November 6, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the trial court's judgment dismissing its appeal from the decision of the defendant town planning and zoning commission denying the plaintiff's special permit application to con- struct a greenhouse on its farm property in Kent. Since 1939, the plaintiff has operated a residential treatment program for individuals with sub- stance abuse disorders, which includes a residential facility with an on- site kitchen, on real property located across the street from the farm property. In 2017, the plaintiff purchased the seventy acre farm property that had been used for farming at the time the plaintiff purchased it. Both the farm property and the residential property are located in the town's rural residential district. The regulations for the rural residential district in place at the time the plaintiff purchased the farm property in 2017 permitted, subject to special permit review and approval, a privately operated hospital, clinic, nursing home, or convalescent home. In early 2018, the plaintiff filed with the defendant a special permit application and a site plan application seeking approval to conduct therapeutic activities on the farm property in conjunction with the resi- dential treatment program, including equine therapy, a ropes course and climbing wall, and a therapeutic agricultural program and accompanying kitchen facility. The defendant subsequently approved the plaintiff's applications for the farm property for therapeutic activities in conjunc- tion with a privately operated hospital, clinic, nursing or convalescent home or similar institution. In February, 2020, the town's zoning regula- tions were amended to prohibit, by special permit, a privately operated hospital, clinic, nursing home or convalescent home in the rural residen- tial district. In August, 2020, the plaintiff applied for a special permit to add a hoop house style greenhouse to the existing garden/pasture area of the farm property in order to enhance its existing farming capac- ity. The plaintiff's application stated, inter alia, that the use of a green- house was consistent with its special permit application from 2018 and that the intention of the use of the greenhouse was not to expand its therapeutic work but to expand its capacity to provide fruits and vegetables to the residential facility. After a public hearing, the defendant denied the plaintiff's application, finding that the proposed greenhouse was an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming use. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, claiming, inter alia, that the proposed greenhouse was within the scope of the prior approved special use permit issued to the plaintiff in 2018, that the greenhouse was a permissi- ble intensification of that prior approved, but now nonconforming, thera- peutic agricultural or farm use, and that the substantial evidence in the record did not support the defendant's stated reasons for its denial. After briefing and oral arguments, the court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal, concluding that the nonconforming use of the farm property was limited to the precise terms of the 2018 special permit and the site plan that the plaintiff submitted in support of its application for that permit and that the plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, intensify the use of the farm property in accordance with the test set forth in Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals (218 Conn. 324), in which the Supreme Court set forth three criteria for determining whether a valid nonconforming use of property has been permissibly intensified or impermissibly expanded, including the extent to which the current use reflects the nature and purpose of the original use, any differences in the character, nature and kind of use involved, and any substantial difference in effect upon the neighborhood resulting from differences in the activities conducted on the property. The court also held that a reasonable interpretation of the defendant's first stated rea- son for its denial was that the greenhouse constituted an impermissible expansion of the nonconforming use, that, even if the use of the farm property could have been intensified, the addition of a greenhouse to an approved special permit accompanied by a site plan that did not include a greenhouse would be an impermissible expansion rather than a permissible intensification, and that the defendant's first stated reason for the denial was supported by substantial evidence in the record. After a grant of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the plaintiff's valid nonconforming use of the farm property could not be intensified in accordance with the criteria set forth in Zachs because it arose from a special permit: the case on which the defendant primarily relied in claiming that the unique nature of special permits supported the court's conclusion that the plaintiff could not intensify its valid nonconforming use of the farm property that was approved by the 2018 special permit, Barberino Realty & Development Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commis- sion (222 Conn. 607), did not involve a valid nonconforming use or discuss the interplay of a use approved by special permit and the important rights a property owner has in a use that later becomes nonconforming; moreover, a review of the case law addressing noncon- forming uses led this court to conclude that a use approved by special permit may be intensified in accordance with the Zachs criteria, as the Supreme Court has made clear that the right to continue a valid nonconforming use includes a right to intensify that use, and to limit a valid nonconforming use to the exact specifications of a site plan that was submitted with the application for the special permit approving what subsequently becomes a valid nonconforming use would invade the constitutional guarantees of due process that brought the noncon- forming principle into being; furthermore, the trial court's per se rule prohibiting any intensification of a valid nonconforming use that origi- nated from a special permit on the basis that the special permit was approved in conjunction with a site plan, if accepted, would prohibit the intensification of any nonconforming use that arose from any of the host of other uses approved in conjunction with a site plan, including any activity designated in the regulations as requiring site plan approval, whereas the very nature of the analysis required under Zachs, on the other hand, ensures that any proposed intensification of a valid noncon- forming use is consistent with the nature and scope of that nonconform- ing use, and, unlike a per se rule prohibiting the intensification of a use approved by way of a special permit, the Zachs approach balances an owner's protected interest in the reasonable use of his or her property with a local government's valid interest in ensuring that the property continues to be used in a manner that is consistent with the zoning regulations. 2. The trial court erred in concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the defendant's finding that the addition of the proposed greenhouse would constitute an illegal expansion of the plaintiff's valid nonconforming use of the property: a. On the basis of its review of the record, this court concluded that the use of the proposed greenhouse reflected the nature and purpose of the existing, original use of the farm property, given that it would be placed on the existing garden and pasture area on the farm property where plants were already grown, it would be in close proximity to the existing house and barn on the farm property, and it would permit the plaintiff to continue to grow fruits and vegetables in order to feed and support the residents and staff residing on the residential property, activities that it already performed. b. This court concluded that the proposed greenhouse simply provided an improved and more efficient way to grow fruits and vegetables and to provide therapeutic agricultural services, and the fact that the green- house may have increased the fruit and vegetable yield already used to support the residents and staff on the residential property could not reasonably be said to involve differences in the character of the noncon- forming use rather than increases in the volume of business within the scope of the original use; moreover, the defendant's argument that the addition of a structure to a nonconforming use was a per se change in the character of the use, constituting an illegal expansion, found no support in the case law, and, although some courts had concluded that the addition of a new structure or the expansion of an existing building constituted an illegal expansion of a nonconforming building or use, the legality of a proposed change to a nonconforming use was a fact intensive inquiry that must be conducted on a case-by-case basis; furthermore, although a proposal to extend a nonconforming use into an additional season or seasons may, under certain circumstances, constitute an illegal expansion of the nonconforming use, the defendant relied on a highly technical and overly narrow characterization of the existing use of the farm property in support of its argument that the proposed greenhouse would impermissibly allow activities over a substantially additional period of the year, and this court could not conclude on the basis of the record that the addition of the greenhouse, which would simply allow the plaintiff to increase its fruit and vegetable yield, constituted an illegal expansion when the farm property was already being used year-round for related activities. c. Contrary to the defendant's arguments, the plaintiff's proposed use of the greenhouse was consistent with the permitted as of right uses and accessory uses in the zoning district in which the farm property was located, and the relevant provisions of the town zoning regulations undercut the defendant's contention that there would be a substantial effect on the neighborhood by the use of the proposed greenhouse; moreover, there was no evidence in the record that the proposed green- house would be seen from the road, and, although the defendant made conclusory arguments on appeal suggesting that the greenhouse may be seen from the road and that the site plan showed that the proposed greenhouse would be quite close to surrounding properties, these argu- ments did not, without more, demonstrate that there would be a substan- tial effect upon the neighborhood; furthermore, although numerous neighbors spoke at the hearings held by the defendant and voiced their displeasure with the plaintiff's expansion in the town over the years, most of the statements were not specific to the application and site plan under consideration but, instead, constituted general grievances about the plaintiff and the construction on the residential property that the defendant had previously approved, and, because the comments by the neighbors amounted to general concerns, speculation, and mere worry, such comments did not qualify as substantial evidence and therefore provided little, if any, evidence concerning the proposal's effect on the neighborhood. Argued September 21, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024

The defendant J appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court, which found that J and his father, P, were jointly and severally liable for unpaid rent and other expenses in connection with the plaintiff landlord's lease of an apartment to P. J testified at trial that he had never resided at the apartment and had never seen or known of the lease until he was served with process when the plaintiff commenced suit. P testified that, after the plaintiff had informed him that his credit was insufficient to rent the apartment, he used J's Social Security number and identity to acquire the lease, told the plaintiff that J would also be a tenant at the apartment and forged J's signature on the lease and placed utilities in J's name, all without J's knowledge. The court, Spader, J., found that, although P and J were ''largely credible,'' it also stated that it did not believe J had known nothing about P's actions and credit issues. Judge Spader stated that, ''[s]peaking personally, as a son,'' he would have let his father use his name and credit in similar circum- stances, and that, even if J had not given explicit permission to P, ''as a dutiful son,'' permission to do so was implied. Held: 1. This court was unpersuaded by J's claim that newly discovered evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff had commenced this action with unclean hands and without probable cause under fraudulent premises: J's failure to raise those issues at the time of trial or by way of an appropriate posttrial motion undermined his ability to raise those issues on appeal; moreover, whether the plaintiff's conduct amounted to the misconduct J had alleged was an issue of fact that had to be decided by the trial court in the first instance, and, even if the court had found that wilful misconduct on the part of the plaintiff had been proven, the issue of an appropriate sanction had to be determined in the trial court's sound discretion and was not an issue for this court to decide in the first instance. 2. This court concluded that the trial judge's statements that he would have permitted his father to use his name and credit in similar circumstances and that doing so was the obligation of a dutiful son left it with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed: the trial judge appeared to have relied on those beliefs, rather than on the evidence, in finding that J had guaranteed the debt P incurred with respect to the lease; moreover, regardless of whether there was a rational view of the evidence that might have supported the court's findings of fact, the court's decision was difficult to reconcile in key respects, as the finding that P and J were largely credible was difficult to reconcile with the court's determination that it was ''hard to believe'' J's testimony as to whether he was aware that he was guaranteeing P's debts; further- more, because the court concluded that J acted both explicitly and implicitly, it was unclear what legal theory the court relied on to impose joint and several liability; accordingly, because the court's decision was apparently based in part on improper considerations, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. Argued September 20, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court awarding attorney's fees to the defendant, his former wife, in connection with a breach of contract action. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had breached their separation agreement by failing to disclose that she had liquidated two annuities prior to the commencement of the dissolution proceedings. The trial court, Hon. Gerard I. Adelman, judge trial referee, rendered judgment for the defendant, finding that the plain- tiff's action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant had breached the agreement, and that neither party had failed to disclose assets. The plaintiff appealed to this court, which dismissed the appeal as moot. The defendant filed a motion for attorney's fees, seeking to recover the costs she had incurred in defending against the breach of contract action and the subsequent appeal. The trial court, Hon. Constance L. Epstein, judge trial referee, granted the motion, concluding that the defendant was entitled to recover attorney's fees under the bad faith exception to the American rule, and awarded attorney's fees to the defendant. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the defendant attorney's fees: the trial court's memorandum of decision made clear that, in determining that the plain- tiff had acted in bad faith and did not have a colorable claim, the court relied exclusively on certain findings in Judge Adelman's memorandum of decision in the underlying breach of contract action rather than reviewing the record and making its own factual findings with the requi- site degree of specificity as to the relevant issues; moreover, Judge Adelman's decision did not include sufficiently specific factual findings to support an award of attorney's fees under the bad faith exception to the American rule because it did not include any express findings that the plaintiff's contract claim lacked color or that the plaintiff knew that there was no factual basis for his claim or otherwise acted in bad faith, the court observed that the contract language was ambiguous, which suggested that the plaintiff's claim had some color, the court's findings that the defendant did not own the annuity contracts in question when she filed her financial affidavit because she had liquidated them to fund her new home and that the home was constructed with the knowledge of the plaintiff who provided significant funds for the project, including the two annuity contracts, did not equate to a finding that the plaintiff's claims were without color and that he knew there was no factual basis for his claim or otherwise acted in bad faith, and the decision was silent with respect to whether and when the plaintiff knew that the defendant had properly disclosed the amount of the liquidated annuities by includ- ing them in the value of the real estate that she disclosed on her financial affidavit; furthermore, because the defendant's motion for attorney's fees included references to specific evidence in the record and the trial court failed to review that evidence, the defendant was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to present and have the court consider evidence of the plaintiff's bad faith; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new hearing on the defendant's motion for attorney's fees. Argued November 6, 2023—officially released January 30, 2024

The original plaintiff, H Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant T. Just before the commencement of the present action, H Co. recorded a lis pendens on the land records regarding the property. T died two days after he had been served with process commencing the present action. The court subsequently granted H Co.'s motion to cite in as defendants, inter alia, T's widow, heirs, beneficiaries, representatives or creditors, and H Co. filed an amended complaint to include these parties. Thereafter, H Co. moved for a judg- ment of strict foreclosure, and T's widow, R, filed an objection, claiming that she had notified H Co.'s counsel of her contact information but had not received any papers or notice in connection with the foreclosure action. R subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, alleging a lack of personal jurisdiction due to ineffective service of process, and the trial court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to T's estate but noted that the case remained pending as to the other parties cited in by H Co. Several months later, H Co. filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability, contending that the note and mortgage were in default by virtue of nonpayment. R objected to H Co.'s motion for summary judgment and filed an answer and special defenses, including, inter alia, unclean hands. Thereafter, the court granted a motion to substitute F Co. for H Co., as F Co. had acquired the right to collect the debt due on the loan. The court granted F Co.'s motion for summary judgment with respect to liability, determining that F Co. had demonstrated that it was the holder of the note and therefore was entitled to pursue this foreclosure action, that F Co. had established a prima facie case, that the note had been in default for nonpayment for more than three years, and that R failed to present evidence to support her special defenses. Two months later, the court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. F Co. subse- quently moved to open the judgment and extend the law days to allow for additional time to review a loss mitigation package, which the court granted. More than two years later, during which time a series of motions to open had been granted and R had produced a Probate Court order showing that she had acquired a 100 percent interest in the property pursuant to the laws of intestate succession, R filed a motion stating that she had complied with a court order to provide F Co. with certain documents and sought the enforcement of a new mortgage agreement. Specifically, she contended that she had submitted a completed assump- tion package, including the required documentation, executed a mort- gage in her name, and made a series of scheduled trial payments, which F Co. had failed to apply. F Co. objected, claiming that there was no settlement to enforce. It explained that, at the time R executed the loan modification agreement, she lacked legal title to the property, and F Co. rejected any settlement agreement on that basis. F Co. also asserted that after R had acquired the property, it had offered her a trial period plan, which required three payments. After R failed to make these required payments, F Co. denied R a permanent modification. The court sustained F Co.'s objection with respect to the motion to enforce the settlement and assigned the case to the foreclosure mediation program. More than one year later, R filed a motion for nonsuit, claiming that F Co. failed to abide by the terms of the parties' settlement agreement, to comply with a standing court order by filing a federal mortgage foreclosure moratorium affidavit within fourteen days, and to comply with a subsequent court order requiring the filing of that affidavit by a specific date. R also stated that F Co. had repeatedly returned her payments by issuing checks to T, rather than to R. One day later, F Co. filed the federal mortgage foreclosure moratorium affidavit. F Co. subsequently filed an objection to the motion for nonsuit, arguing that a nonsuit was not warranted because its delay in filing the federal mortgage foreclosure moratorium affidavit was not the result of any bad faith. The court subsequently denied R's motion for nonsuit. Thereafter, following several sessions, a premediation report was issued by a foreclo- sure mediator, terminating the mediation as a result of R's failure to submit certain documents. Several months later, F Co. filed a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure. R filed an objection, contending that the notice required pursuant to the state's Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program (EMAP) (§§ 8-265cc through 8-265kk) had not been provided to T prior to the commencement of this foreclosure action, and, as a result, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. R also iterated her claims that F Co. had returned payments she made via a check issued to T and that F Co.'s actions demonstrated an attempt to walk away from the settlement it had offered. R further maintained that F Co.'s conduct constituted unclean hands, and, therefore, it should be barred from seeking foreclosure, an equitable action. F Co. filed a reply to R's objection, in which it provided documents establishing that, although the trial period plan for the loan modification required pay- ments of $1750.36, R had made payments of only $943.35, argued that it was not required to accept insufficient payments, and claimed that, because R had failed to submit documents to the foreclosure mediator as requested, she had failed to provide any proof of compliance with the payment obligations to reinstate the loan. With respect to R's claim regarding the EMAP notice, F Co. indicated that proper notice had been sent to T prior to the commencement of this action, as demonstrated by the inclusion of this information in the materials attached to the motion for summary judgment. Finally, the plaintiff countered that R failed to substantiate her claims related to her unclean hands special defense or plead it properly, and it noted that, under Connecticut law, a lender has no duty to engage in settlement negotiations with a borrower. Following a remote hearing, the court granted F Co.'s motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon. On R's appeal to this court, held: 1. R could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly denied her motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as a result of improper service; pursuant to statute (§ 52-325 (a)) and the relevant Connecticut Standards of Title (13.7 (B) and 19.1), once H Co. recorded the lis pendens on the land records with respect to the property and properly commenced this action against T by way of abode service prior to his death, R, as the party who acquired T's interest in the property pursuant to the laws of intestate succession, was bound in this foreclo- sure action to the same extent as if she had been made a party to the action, and F Co., while free to do so, was not required to serve R. 2. R could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly denied her motion for nonsuit: the factual predicate underlying R's argument that the nonsuit should have been granted because F Co. breached the parties' modification agreement did not exist, as, contrary to R's insistence, the record did not show that the parties had, in fact, reached a binding settlement and/or loan modification; moreover, with respect to the claims regarding F Co.'s failure to timely submit the federal mortgage foreclosure moratorium affidavit, R failed to demonstrate how she was harmed by F Co.'s conduct or why the court's refusal to enter a nonsuit and dismiss the case, a remedy of last resort, amounted to an abuse of its discretion with respect to the delayed filing of that affidavit. 3. R could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly rejected her special defense of unclean hands and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure for F Co.; although R made bald allegations that F Co.'s conduct warranted the application of the unclean hands doctrine, she failed to provide evidentiary material to support her claim, including any evidence demonstrating that H Co.'s asserted lack of knowledge of her whereabouts when the foreclosure action was commenced was anything more than a mistake or that F Co. participated in wilful miscon- duct that rose to the level of unclean hands with respect to, inter alia, the return of R's partial payments during the loan modification trial period, its issuance of checks and correspondence to T after his death, and its purportedly improper refusal to process loan modification paperwork. 4. This court declined to address R's claims that the trial court improperly denied her motion to enforce a loan modification agreement, improperly granted F Co.'s motion for summary judgment, and improperly failed to dismiss the foreclosure action as a result of H Co.'s failure to comply with the EMAP notice requirement, R having failed to adequately brief these claims. Argued October 5, 2023—officially released January 30, 2024

The plaintiff landlord sought, by way of a summary process action, to recover possession of certain real property that had been leased to the defendant J. The parties thereafter entered into a stipulated summary process agreement, which provided that a judgment of possession would be rendered for the plaintiff, subject to a stay of execution and a use and occupancy fee. The agreement further provided that the stay of execution was final and that J agreed not to reopen, appeal, or request any further stay of execution. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the agreement. J subsequently filed a motion to open the judgment, seeking an extension of the stay of execution, which the trial court denied on the grounds that, inter alia, the parties had entered into the agreement with the assistance of a housing court specialist, the parties understood the terms of the voluntary agreement, and J had affirmed that she would not seek, inter alia, further extensions of time or motions to open. J then filed a second motion to open the judgment, again seeking an extension of the stay to allow J to secure housing, which the trial court denied on the same grounds as the first motion to open. J appealed to this court, challenging, inter alia, the trial court's denial of her second motion to open and claiming that the stipulated summary process judgment should be vacated. Held that, on the basis of its review of the record and having afforded every reasonable pre- sumption in favor of the trial court's action, this court could not conclude that the trial court acted unreasonably or in clear abuse of its discretion when it denied the second motion to open the stipulated summary process judgment; moreover, this court lacked subject matter jurisdic- tion over that portion of J's appeal that challenged the stipulated sum- mary process judgment, as J did not file her appeal within five days of the underlying stipulated summary process judgment as required by statute (§ 47a-35), and, accordingly, that portion of the appeal challeng- ing the underlying stipulated summary process judgment was dismissed. Argued November 16, 2023—officially released January 30, 2024

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant school district for her alleged constructive discharge from employment as a teacher. The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for approximately twenty-four years when she resigned from her position in August, 2019. On December 19, 2019, she filed an age discrimination complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). There- after, the CHRO issued a release of jurisdiction over the complaint, and the plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant, alleging a violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.), constructive discharge, and breach of contract. The plaintiff, who was seventy years old, claimed that she was forced to resign after the defendant created an intolerable work environment by marginalizing and unfairly criticizing her because it wanted to replace her with a younger teacher. The defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that it was untimely and failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and, thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging only constructive discharge. In that complaint, the plaintiff added allegations related to a report issued by the defendant on June 10, 2019, in which it acknowledged that an assistant principal had copied certain portions of the plaintiff's prior evaluations into her 2016–2017 school year evaluation and recommended a review of adminis- trators' practices of referencing evaluations from prior years. The defen- dant filed a motion to strike, which the trial court granted, finding that the plaintiff's complaint to the CHRO was untimely pursuant to the 180 day limitation period set forth in the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 46a-82 (f)), because the plaintiff had failed to identify conduct relating to an intolerable working environment that had persisted to June 22, 2019, or thereafter, and her allegations were insufficient to establish that the working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. Subsequently, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court did not err in granting the defendant's motion to strike because it properly determined that the plaintiff's com- plaint to the CHRO was untimely: the most recent alleged act of discrimi- nation in the present case occurred in May, 2018, which was not within 180 days of the plaintiff's filing of her complaint with the CHRO, as required pursuant to (Rev. to 2019) § 46a-82 (f); moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion that the 180 day limitation period did not begin to run until the date of her resignation, such an interpretation was contrary to the plain language of (Rev. to 2019) § 46a-82 (f), and the case that the plaintiff cited to support her claim, Green v. Brennan (578 U.S. 547), was inapplicable, as it was governed by a federal regulation (29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (2010)) that did not share the same language as (Rev. to 2019) § 46a-82 (f); furthermore, the plaintiff did not allege any ongoing discrimination that continued until her resignation on August 14, 2019, as she had not been working for at least several weeks prior to that date because school was not in session during the summer months, nor did she identify how the defendant's alleged inaction between June 22 and August 14, 2019, regarding the recommendations in the defendant's report perpetuated an intolerable working environment when school was not in session. Submitted on briefs November 15, 2023—officially released January 30, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder and robbery in the first degree, appealed to this court from the judgment of the habeas court, which dismissed his third petition for a writ of habeas corpus after he failed to establish good cause for its late filing. The petitioner filed his third petition in 2017 after having withdrawn a second habeas petition that he had filed in 2012 and nearly three years after judgment on his first habeas petition became final in October, 2014. Because the third petition was filed outside of the two year time limit for successive petitions set forth by statute (§ 52-470 (d)), the habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to § 52-470 (d) and (e) on a motion filed by the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, for an order to show cause as to why the third petition should not be dismissed as untimely. At a hearing on the respondent's motion, the petitioner testified that good cause existed because, inter alia, his counsel at the time the second habeas petition was withdrawn had rendered ineffective assistance by misadvising or failing to advise him of the time limit to file a new habeas petition if he withdrew the pending second petition. Relying on Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction (343 Conn. 424), which identified factors relevant to a habeas court's determination of whether good cause exists to excuse the untimely filing of a habeas petition, the habeas court concluded that a failure by counsel to advise a petitioner of the time limit in § 52-470 (d) was not an external factor that constituted good cause to excuse the untimely filing. Held that the habeas court did not apply the correct legal standard under § 52-470 (d) and (e) in deciding that the petitioner had not established good cause to excuse the late filing of his third habeas petition: the state of the law as to whether ineffective assistance of counsel is a factor that may constitute good cause to excuse a delay in filing was clarified by our Supreme Court in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction (348 Conn. 333), which was decided during the pendency of this appeal and which concluded that ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be imputed to the petitioner and is an external, objective factor under Kelsey that may constitute good cause to excuse a late filing under § 52-470 (d) and (e); moreover, although the court in Rose did not state that counsel's failure to advise a petitioner of the deadline necessarily constitutes ineffective assistance, it decided that such a determination is a fact specific inquiry that is left to the habeas court's discretion, taking into consideration all relevant Kelsey factors in light of the totality of the circumstances presented; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the habeas court for a new hearing and good cause determina- tion under § 52-470 (d) and (e). Argued January 2—officially released January 30, 2024

The plaintiff in error, C, the former attorney for the defendant in the underly- ing dissolution action, filed a writ of error challenging the order of the first defendant in error, M, a Superior Court judge, disbarring her from the practice of law. C had filed a motion to disqualify the second defen- dant in error, A, a Superior Court judge, from the underlying action on the ground of bias, and a hearing was held on the motion to disqualify. At the hearing, M asked C to indicate specific parts of the transcripts of the dissolution proceedings that explained her claims of bias. C stated that the record in its totality would show that A was biased against women who claim abuse, individuals with disabilities, and anyone not of the Jewish faith. In support of these claims, C provided only examples of A's rulings adverse to her client. M denied the motion to disqualify, reasoning that the claims of bias were unsupported and frivolous and finding that C had blatantly lied and made utterly empty claims. M further stated in his disqualification ruling that a hearing would be held on whether to act against C, and, if action was warranted, what action to take. At the disciplinary hearing, C made certain disparaging remarks against M. Subsequently, M issued a memorandum of decision disbarring C from the practice of law on the basis that she violated various Rules of Professional Conduct. Held: 1. C could not prevail on her claim that M violated her constitutional right to due process regarding the disciplinary hearing by failing to give her adequate notice and by limiting the hearing to the issue of sanctions: although M's procedure was unusual in that he made findings as to C's conduct in his ruling on the motion to disqualify A and then ordered a separate hearing on whether he should take action against C based on those findings, the disqualification ruling, which contained the notice for the disciplinary hearing, clearly stated that the disciplinary hearing would address the findings made in the disqualification ruling and ade- quately notified C of the parameters of the hearing, and it was sufficiently clear that the hearing was limited to the issue of whether the court would act, and, if so, what action to take against C for her conduct during the hearing on the motion to disqualify, leaving open the possibil- ity, however slight, that, following the disciplinary hearing, C would be found not to have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct; moreover, M did not unfairly limit the disciplinary hearing to the imposition of sanctions, C was provided with the opportunity to be heard prior to her disbarment, the transcripts having clearly shown that C had a meaningful opportunity to be heard at both hearings and to explain her claims of bias, and, although C was not under oath at either hearing, as an officer of the court, she had an obligation to tell the truth and to not make frivolous claims; furthermore, although M reminded C at the start of the disciplinary hearing that the purpose of that hearing was to give her a chance to be heard on the issue of whether he should act upon the findings he had made as to her conduct at the disqualification hearing, he allowed her the opportunity to challenge those findings and to explain why there was a good faith basis for her conduct before determining that she had violated several of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 2. C could not prevail on her claim that the sanction of disbarment for her conduct in connection with the motion to disqualify constituted impermissible punishment for her exercise of her first amendment right to free speech; C was afforded a sufficient opportunity to be heard and she directed this court to no law, nor was this court aware of any, providing either that she was entitled to additional process because her misconduct involved speech or that a different standard for the imposition of sanctions for attorney misconduct should apply when the misconduct involved speech. 3. C could not prevail on her claim that M's findings that she had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct were not factually supported by clear and convincing evidence, the record having contained sufficient evidence to support the decision under the requisite standard of proof: M's findings that C's allegations made in connection with the motion to disqualify were frivolous and intentionally inaccurate were supported by clear and convincing evidence, the transcript of the hearing on the motion to disqualify having shown that M admonished C not to say things for which she could not provide support and gave her opportunities to withdraw or temper her statements; moreover, instances cited in the disciplinary order, and apparent in the court file, provided clear and convincing evidence that C had failed to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of her own client, and M also found that C's arguments in furtherance of her allegations of judicial bias had the corrupt motive to cloud the truth for the perceived benefit of her client and that she acted with reckless disregard for the truth; furthermore, the transcript from the hearing on the motion to disqualify supported the findings that C disrupted proceedings and preju- diced the system of justice by hurling baseless accusations, harassing parties, and using the system of justice to punish a party opponent and legal professionals. 4. C could not prevail on her claim that disbarment was an excessive penalty because it was disproportionate in light of the conduct involved and her lack of disciplinary history; M's sanction of disbarment was not an abuse of his discretion, as C did not demonstrate that M acted arbitrarily in imposing the penalty of disbarment, but, rather, the disciplinary order demonstrated a careful consideration of the nature of the misconduct in light of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and this court deferred to M's determination of the appropriate sanction. Argued September 19, 2023—officially released February 6, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 50a-34 (b) (3)), a foreign judgment need not be recog- nized if the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state. The plaintiff bank, the majority of which was allegedly owned by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, sought to enforce a foreign judgment against the defendant B, a shareholder of the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a certification of the foreign judgment in the Superior Court, alleging that the judgment had not been satisfied, that the enforcement of the judgment had not been stayed, and that B owned property in Avon. B filed a motion to open and either dismiss or stay the enforcement of the certified foreign judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the issuance of a federal executive order and a United States Department of the Treasury directive related to, inter alia, certain transactions involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation prohibited the trial court from enforcing the foreign judgment pursuant to § 50a-34 (b) (3). The trial court denied B's motion to open, and B appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly denied B's motion to open: B did not challenge on appeal the court's determination that the cause of action on which the foreign judgment was based was not repugnant to the public policy of this state; moreover, this court rejected B's claim that this court should interpret § 50a-34 (b) (3) to apply to the foreign judgment itself and not merely to the cause of action on which the judgment was based, as that interpre- tation was inconsistent with the plain language of § 50a-34 (b) (3). Argued December 6, 2023—officially released February 6, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, S, had provided ineffective assistance during plea negotiations by, among other things, failing to adequately advise him to accept a plea deal and failing to adequately advise him regarding the strength of the state's case. The petitioner alleged that, but for his counsel's allegedly deficient performance, he would have pleaded guilty and received a more favor- able disposition. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the peti- tion, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the court incorrectly concluded that he had failed to prove that he was prejudiced by S's deficient performance because there was a reasonable probability that, but for S's failure to give specific and appropriate advice, he would have accepted the plea offer. Held that the habeas court's determination that the petitioner did not prove that he was prejudiced by S's allegedly ineffective assistance was not clearly erroneous: the habeas court found that the petitioner's testimony that he would have pleaded guilty instead of proceeding to trial was not credible and therefore concluded that the petitioner did not establish that he would have accepted a plea offer had S advised him any differently about the plea offer or the state's evidence, and the court's findings regarding whether the petitioner would have accepted the plea offer, which were made solely on the basis of the court's credibility determinations, were entitled to deference; moreover, the court did not single out the petitioner's testimony with respect to whether he would have accepted the state's plea offer but, rather, rejected his testimony as a whole, the court having heard the petitioner admit on cross-examination at the habeas trial that he had told the sentencing judge six times that he was innocent and that he would not admit to something that he did not do, and, accordingly, the court reasonably could have concluded that a petitioner who maintained his innocence so strongly on a felony murder charge was unlikely to plead guilty to the lesser charge of manslaughter offered by the state; furthermore, regardless of whether the court erred in its conclusion that there was no evidence that the trial court would have accepted the state's plea offer, and, although there was no dispute that the plea offer would have involved a conviction and a sentence that was less severe than that which was imposed, the petitioner's failure to prove that he would have accepted the plea offer was fatal to his appeal. Argued December 5, 2023—officially released February 6, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crimes of assault in the first degree and carrying a pistol without a permit, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, T, had rendered ineffective assistance because she failed to consult with and retain an eyewitness identification expert to testify at a pretrial hearing to suppress evidence and at his criminal trial. The habeas court rejected the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish that T's decision not to consult with or use an eyewitness identification expert constituted deficient performance. The court determined that, although T was aware that the petitioner's prior trial counsel, B, had intended to use an eyewitness identification expert at the criminal trial, there was no evidence that established what B's basis was for believing it necessary to retain such an expert. The court further determined that T had a reasonable strategic basis for concluding that there was nothing an identification expert would have contributed to the petitioner's defense. The court rendered judgment denying the petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to show that T's performance was deficient, the petitioner having failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that T's decision not to consult with or present the testimony of an identification witness expert was sound trial strategy: the habeas court credited the testimony of T, an experi- enced public defender who was familiar with eyewitness identification experts, that her review of the state's case, B's file and the identification evidence had led her to conclude that an eyewitness identification expert was unnecessary and that there was nothing such an expert would have contributed to the defense, as T's own investigation led her to conclude that the state's identification witnesses were sure that the petitioner was the gunman in the underlying shooting incident and that enhanced video evidence showed that the petitioner and the shooter had similar characteristics; moreover, T pursued other reasonable avenues of dis- crediting the state's case, including seeking an alibi for the petitioner, filing a motion to suppress the witnesses' identifications of the petitioner, and cross-examining the witnesses about weaknesses or discrepancies in their identifications; furthermore, this court found unavailing the petitioner's assertion that the fact that B, whom the petitioner had retained privately, had withdrawn specifically so that the defense would be able to afford an eyewitness identification expert should have prompted T to consult such an expert once she was appointed to repre- sent the petitioner, as that was not the standard to determine whether counsel performed deficiently, and, although B may have believed that an eyewitness identification expert was necessary, the fact that one attorney may have opted for an expert did not signify that another attorney's decision not to consult an expert constituted deficient perfor- mance. Argued September 18, 2023—officially released February 6, 2024

The defendant E, a former romantic partner of the decedent, M, appealed to this court from the judgments of the Superior Court approving a settlement agreement that resolved a dispute involving the beneficiaries of a contested will and M's heirs-at-law. Prior to the termination of their romantic relationship, E had been named a beneficiary in wills executed by M in 2003 and 2010. M died in 2016, and the plaintiff, a business partner of M, petitioned the Probate Court to admit M's 2014 will. E was neither a named beneficiary under the 2014 will, nor was she an heir-at-law. After the petition to admit the 2014 will was filed, certain of M's heirs-at-law objected to its admission and to the appointment of the plaintiff as the administrator of the estate. Thereafter, the Probate Court issued a written decree in which it concluded that, inter alia, M had been unduly influenced in executing the contested 2014 will and that, therefore, it should not be admitted to probate. The plaintiff and another named beneficiary of the contested will filed separate appeals to the Superior Court challenging this decree, which were subsequently consolidated. During the pendency of the claims in probate, E filed an appearance in the Probate Court as a creditor of M's estate on the basis of claims that she had unsuccessfully brought against M in a civil action while he was still alive. The Probate Court denied her creditor claims on the grounds that they were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, and she appealed to the Superior Court, which dismissed the appeal. E did not petition the Probate Court to admit either of the wills from 2003 or 2010 as the valid and operative will of the decedent. Instead, she filed a letter with the Probate Court and attached two Probate Court forms with copies of the 2003 and 2010 wills. Thereafter, all beneficiaries named in the 2014 will and the heirs-at-law who contested the will entered into an agreement in full compliance with the provisions of the applicable statute (§ 45a-434 (c)), which fully resolved all the issues between those parties with respect to the Probate Court decision on the application of the 2014 will and the resulting probate appeals. The Superior Court approved the settlement agreement over E's objection, in which she claimed, inter alia, that she was a ''[person] interested in the estate'' for purposes of settlement in accordance with § 45a-434 (c) and the agreement could not be approved without her participation and consent. Held that the trial court properly found that E had failed to establish any interest sufficient to require her participation in the agree- ment, as E was neither a named beneficiary of the only will that was sought to be admitted to probate and which was the subject of the probate appeals, nor was she recognized under intestacy statutes as an heir-in-law: contrary to E's claim that she attempted to have the 2003 and 2010 wills, in which she was named a beneficiary, admitted via her letter sent to the Probate Court, no other application to admit any other will of the decedent was before the Probate Court, the Probate Court did not treat the defendant's letter or its attachments as a petition to admit the wills to probate and E never raised a claim that the Probate Court improperly declined to consider her letter as a petition to admit one or both of the wills in any appeal from any of the relevant Probate Court decrees; moreover, E's failure to seek to admit any other will for probate rendered her related assertion that her pecuniary interest in the estate might have been established through application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation equally inapposite under the facts of this case, as the record was inadequate to have concluded that proper application of that doctrine would necessarily have revived any will in which E had any additional testamentary interest; furthermore, even assuming without deciding that persons interested in M's estate pursuant to § 45a-434 (c) could include an appearing creditor of the estate, E failed to establish such an interest in M's estate, as her civil action against the decedent, which was initiated prior to his death, was, with limited exception, fully and finally resolved against her, and her attempt to revive her claims or assert others before the Probate Court were rejected, her subsequent appeal from that ruling was dismissed, and, accordingly, principles of res judicata barred E from attempting to resur- rect her creditor claims via the arguments in this appeal. Argued October 5, 2023—officially released February 13, 2024

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant police officer for malicious prosecution arising out of the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff for a violation of conditions of release in the second degree pursuant to the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2011) § 53a-222a). The plain- tiff, C and G were all members of the same lake association. According to allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, in 2012, the defendant opened an investigation after C and G falsely stated that the plaintiff had violated a no contact order with C, by making an obscene gesture toward C and G while they were on the premises of the lake association. During his investigation, the defendant took sworn statements from C and G, spoke with another association member, D, regarding the incident, and obtained video surveillance footage from the association. The defendant reviewed the surveillance footage and made notes while doing so, which indicated that the footage did not capture the plaintiff communicating with C on the day of the incident. Thereafter, the defendant returned the video footage to the association, and it was later erased. The defendant submitted an arrest warrant affidavit that included the sworn statements from C and G, D's statements, and the defendant's notes regarding the surveillance footage. The plaintiff was arrested, and, in 2016, the charges against her were dismissed. The plaintiff commenced the present action in 2018. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the action was untimely, that there was probable cause for the challenged prosecution, and that the defendant had relied in good faith on the prosecutor's independent probable cause determination. In response, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that certain evidence submitted by the defendant contained inadmissible hearsay and that her complaint charged the defendant with malicious prosecution through intentional spoliation. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, concluding that the defendant met his burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact that the arrest warrant was supported by probable cause and, therefore, that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion, determining that she did not successfully assert a claim for intentional spoliation of evidence. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because it did not err in determining that the defendant met his burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact that the arrest warrant was supported by probable cause: contrary to the plaintiff's contention that the defendant improperly relied on the sworn statements of C and G, which she contends he credited over the statements of the plaintiff and D and the video surveillance evidence, the defendant was permitted to rely on the complaints of third parties to establish probable cause, in this case the putative victim and an eyewitness; moreover, the defendant considered the available exculpa- tory evidence and identified it in his arrest warrant affidavit, including D's statements that the plaintiff did not have contact with C and G and the defendant's surveillance video notes, which indicated that the footage did not capture the plaintiff communicating with C, and the plaintiff failed to submit evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the lack of probable cause; furthermore, whether the defendant acted with malice was not addressed by the trial court and was not at issue on appeal, and, contrary to the plaintiff's assertions, the defendant's state of mind did not negate the existence of probable cause. 2. The trial court properly rejected the plaintiff's arguments regarding spolia- tion of evidence: contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, her claimed entitle- ment to an adverse inference with respect to the surveillance video evidence was insufficient on its own to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the want of probable cause element for the purposes of defeating summary judgment, and, because the plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence to support want of probable cause, the trial court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to that issue; moreover, the plaintiff did not plead intentional spoliation of evidence as a separate cause of action in her complaint, and, even if this court were to construe her complaint as alleging such a separate cause of action, it failed as a matter of law on the first essential element of a claim for intentional spoliation, namely, that the defendant had knowledge of a pending or impending civil action involving the plaintiff, as the defendant returned the video to the association, its rightful owner, in 2012, and the plaintiff did not file her malicious prosecution claim until 2018; accordingly, no bona fide or rational argument could be made that, under the circumstances, the defendant knew or should have known that his return of the video in 2012 would be relevant to a malicious prosecution claim asserted by the plaintiff six years later. 3. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court should not have considered the defendant's notes relating to the surveil- lance video in addressing his motion for summary judgment because the notes did not satisfy the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule set forth in the Connecticut Code of Evidence (§ 8-3 (4)) and, as such, were inadmissible hearsay: the trial court determined that the notes satisfied the business records exception to the hearsay rule set forth in the applicable statute (§ 52-180), and the plaintiff abandoned any claim of error regarding the admissibility of the notes under that exception because she did not brief it; accordingly, it was uncontested that the notes were considered properly under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Argued October 10, 2023—officially released February 13, 2024

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and from certain orders finding him in contempt. The plaintiff commenced the dissolution action in November, 2019, and thereafter filed several motions for contempt pen- dente lite alleging, inter alia, that the defendant had violated the auto- matic orders through his financial transactions in October, 2019. During the pendency of the action, the parties executed a stipulation pendente lite providing, inter alia, that, following the sale of the marital residence, the defendant would make weekly support payments to the plaintiff and would also place $46,000 in escrow for the sole benefit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged in a separate contempt motion that the defendant had failed to make all of the agreed upon support payments. In dissolving the marriage, the court found that the primary causes of the breakdown of the marriage were the defendant's excessive drinking and abusive behavior toward the plaintiff and that the defendant was not credible. The court granted, inter alia, several of the plaintiff's motions for contempt and summarily denied the defendant's postjudg- ment motions to reargue. Held: 1. The trial court improperly granted certain of the plaintiff's motions for contempt insofar as the court adjudicated the defendant in contempt of the automatic orders for his conduct prior to the effective date of those automatic orders and abused its discretion in denying the defen- dant's related motion to reargue: as a matter of law, the defendant could not be adjudicated in contempt of the automatic orders for his actions in October, 2019, as, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of our rule of practice (§ 25-5), the defendant was not subject to the automatic orders until they had been served on him, through counsel, in November, 2019; accordingly, the case was remanded with direction to grant the defendant's motion to reargue and to deny the plaintiff's motions for contempt relating to any of the defendant's financial conduct in October, 2019. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court, in ordering him to pay $49,167 to the plaintiff as relief flowing from a contempt adjudication for his underpayment of required unallocated support, improperly failed to credit him for the $46,000 that he had escrowed, following the sale of the marital residence, in accordance with the parties' stipulation; the clear and unambiguous language of the stipulation demonstrated that the plaintiff was entitled to the $46,000 in addition to the weekly support payments, as the plain terms of the provision requiring the defendant to escrow $46,000 did not place condi- tions on the plaintiff's right to access those funds or minimize the defendant's obligation in a separate provision requiring him to make weekly support payments to the plaintiff, as those provisions imposed independent financial obligations on the defendant. 3. The trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for contempt alleging that the defendant's purchase of a motor vehicle during the pendency of the action violated the automatic orders: this court rejected the defendant's proposition that the purchase of the motor vehicle was a customary and usual expense authorized pursuant to the automatic orders, particularly in light of the trial court's finding that the defendant owned another vehicle; moreover, insofar as the defendant contended that his trial testimony established that his personal circumstances justi- fied this purchase, this court noted that the trial court repeatedly did not credit the defendant's testimony, including testimony concerning his finances. 4. This court concluded, after a review of the record, that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in distributing the parties' assets, particularly in light of the trial court's findings that the defendant was at fault for the breakdown of the parties' marriage and that he had engaged in financial maneuvers that dissipated the parties' funds and left the plaintiff with less funds available in her bank accounts. 5. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying three of his motions to reargue: the defendant's motions relating to the trial court's award of $49,167 to the plaintiff in unallocated support and its distribution of the parties' assets did not raise any viable claims entitling him to reargument, as the record did not reflect that the court overlooked any controlling principle of law or misapprehended the facts in relation to these orders. Argued October 16, 2023—officially released February 13, 2024

The plaintiff sought to foreclose on certain real property owned by the named defendant, a trust. R filed a self-represented appearance in the action on behalf of the trust, and the trial court sua sponte struck R's appearance as improper, finding that the trust could only be represented by counsel. The court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, and R appealed to this court, which dismissed the appeal on the basis that R was not a party to the action and could not file an appeal on behalf of the trust in a representative capacity. Thereafter, in the trial court, R filed two motions to dismiss the action against the trust, which the trial court denied. R subsequently filed a motion to substitute himself as the defendant, to which he attached a quitclaim deed that transferred the property from R as trustee to himself individually, which the court denied. The court then denied R's third motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and R appealed to this court. Held that this court dismissed the appeal because R, who was neither a party to the action nor an attorney, appeared without counsel on behalf of a trust and did not have the authority to represent the trust pursuant to statute (§ 51-88): to the extent that the appeal was brought by R in his individual capacity, the appeal was dismissed on the basis that R was not a party to the action, as the defendant in the action was the trust, and, although R filed documents indicating that the property had been transferred from the trust to himself, R had not moved to intervene in the action in his individual capacity, and the court had denied his motion to substitute himself in his individual capacity for the trust; moreover, to the extent that R, a nonattorney, appeared on behalf of the trust in a representative capacity, R was not representing his own cause in this appeal and, therefore, did not have the authority pursuant to § 51-88 (d) (2) to represent the trust. Submitted on briefs January 4—officially released February 13, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on pleas of guilty, of the crimes of capital felony, assault in the first degree and attempt to commit escape from custody, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, L and S, had rendered ineffective assistance. The petitioner, armed with a handgun, had entered a residence occupied by two women where he shot one of the women and sexually assaulted the other before driving her in her vehicle to a secluded location where he shot and killed her. The petitioner thereafter gave the police a detailed, written confession admitting his participation in the crimes. After investigating the viability of various defenses, including a potential mental disease or defect defense, and concluding that the success of a motion to sup- press the petitioner's confession was highly speculative, L and S advised the petitioner to enter into an agreement with the state, under which he would plead guilty and receive a sentence of life imprisonment with- out the possibility of release in exchange for the state's agreement not to pursue the death penalty against him. The court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition. The court concluded that the petitioner had failed to prove that his counsel had rendered deficient performance related to the motion to suppress claim or by failing to investigate and pursue a mental disease or defect defense. The court further held that the petitioner had failed to establish that he was prejudiced by demon- strating that he would have rejected the plea agreement and gone to trial had he been advised regarding the motion to suppress or the poten- tial mental disease or defect defense. The court thereafter granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improp- erly determined that L and S did not render ineffective assistance: a. The habeas court correctly determined that the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by any purported failure of L and S to advise him properly regarding a possible motion to suppress his confession: the petitioner presented no evidence that he was prejudiced, and the court based its determination on the undisputed factual circumstances of the petitioner's case, in which he faced a possible death sentence at the time he considered whether to plead guilty to crimes for which there was a surviving eyewitness, significant physical evidence and little hope of being able to raise reasonable doubt because of an eyewitness identifi- cation error or by asserting that he had been wrongly accused; moreover, the court credited L's testimony that it would have been very difficult to personalize the petitioner to a jury in light of the facts of the case and the petitioner's criminal history, and that, even if L and S had moved to suppress the confession, the success of such a motion was highly speculative. b. L and S did not render deficient performance, as the petitioner claimed, by failing to investigate and inform him about a potential mental disease or defect defense: L and S had no duty to inform the petitioner of a possible mental disease or defect defense because it was not established as a viable defense in the circumstances of the petitioner's case, as the court credited the testimony of L and S that they had investigated the petitioner's mental health and saw nothing to indicate that he was incom- petent or that he suffered from a mental disease or defect; moreover, it was sound trial strategy for L and S to negotiate a guilty plea for a sentence of life imprisonment in exchange for the state's removal of the possibility that the death penalty would be imposed, and, although the petitioner claimed that he was unable to make informed decisions about the objectives of his counsel's representation because they had not prop- erly informed him about the mental disease or defect defense, he provided no legal authority for the premise that counsel is required to fully inform a defendant of a factually unsupported defense that was never considered as a serious option except as a last resort if the state persisted in pursuing the death penalty. 2. This court did not need to reach the petitioner's claim that the habeas court abused its discretion when it sustained an objection by the respon- dent, the Commissioner of Correction, that prevented the petitioner from testifying that he would have rejected the plea agreement and insisted on going to trial had L and S more fully informed him of the possibility of raising a mental disease or defect defense; although the petitioner contended that the habeas court's evidentiary ruling was harm- ful because it left him without a way to establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance, there was no need for this court to adjudi- cate that claim, as the habeas court already had properly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that L and S rendered deficient performance with respect to the pursuit of a mental disease or defect defense, this court having repeatedly explained that ineffective assis- tance claims may be resolved under either the performance prong or the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. Argued October 25, 2023—officially released February 13, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court awarding sole legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child, O, to the plaintiff and imposing certain restrictions on his visitation with O. After the plaintiff initiated the underlying marital dissolution action, the parties filed numerous motions with the court, and, given the volume and nature of the motions, the court ordered that neither party could file any additional motions without first requesting leave from the court, with an exception for ex parte emergency requests approved by the guardian ad litem. The parties thereafter entered into an agreement to dissolve their marriage, which indicated that, although they agreed upon the division of their marital property and debt and the issue of alimony, they had been unable to resolve issues related to custody, access and care of O and that those issues should be resolved by the court in subsequent proceedings after completion of a custody evaluation by S, a clinical psychologist. The court subsequently rendered a judgment of dissolution of marriage that incorporated the parties' agreement. S filed her custody evaluation with the court, and the custody hearing was scheduled to commence in March, 2020, but, due to the COVID-19 pan- demic, it did not go forward as scheduled. When the trial ultimately commenced, the court heard testimony from L, a social worker from the Department of Children and Families, over repeated objections by the defendant. L testified that she had investigated an anonymous call made to the department concerning the plaintiff's purported physical removal of O from a baseball game in which he was participating. During L's testimony, a redacted version of the relevant department investigation protocol was admitted into evidence as a full exhibit. L testified that her investigation included, among other things, interviews with O and conversations with G, O's former therapist, and that, as a result of her investigation, the department discovered no concerns with the plaintiff's actions during the baseball game incident or her ability to parent O, but the department did develop concerns about O's emo- tional well-being with respect to the defendant. L also testified that the department subsequently substantiated emotional neglect of O by the defendant, and, in response to questions from the defendant on cross- examination, that she had reviewed an affidavit sworn to by G and that G's opinion, both as expressed in the affidavit and in interviews, was relied on by the department in its investigation. L's testimony did not disclose the actual contents of G's affidavit. The defendant later attempted to have a copy of G's affidavit admitted into evidence, but the plaintiff objected on hearsay grounds, and it was marked for identifi- cation purposes only. Several days into the trial, the defendant made an oral motion for a continuance, arguing that he would not go forward upon medical advice and indicating that, inter alia, his blood pressure that morning was at unacceptable levels and that he was disabled as a result of an auto accident. The court denied the defendant's oral motion, noting that he had filed several motions for continuance within the previous few days citing other reasons, all of which were denied. Later that day, after the defendant provided the court with a letter from his medical provider that indicated that the defendant suffered from angina and asked the court to adjust the trial schedule in an attempt to reduce the defendant's stress, the defendant indicated to the court that his stress was largely due to not having time between hearing dates to eat properly and prepare his case. The defendant did not refer to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) or clarify that he was seeking an accommodation under the ADA. The court reconsidered the defendant's oral motion for a continuance, stating on the record that it was going to adjust the court's schedule to accommo- date the defendant's health and to reduce his stress, and later issued a written order granting the defendant's motion for continuance and indicating that the remaining days of trial would continue in half day morning sessions. Approximately ten half day morning sessions were held. Thereafter, the court scheduled additional sessions for alternating full days. The defendant, with permission, filed a motion for a scheduling order in which he argued that the court previously had granted him an ADA accommodation limiting trial dates to half days and stating that the full day trial dates scheduled by the court were contrary to his medical provider's advice and contrary to the existing order of accommo- dation. The defendant requested that the court reschedule further ses- sions to half day morning sessions. The court denied the motion for a scheduling order on the record, and the next day the defendant filed a motion in which he indicated that he had filed a grievance with the ADA administrator for the Connecticut Judicial Branch. He asked the court to stay any further full day proceedings until the grievance matter was resolved, although he indicated that he was able to go forward with half day morning sessions pursuant to the original accommodation. The court denied the motion, and, at the next day's hearing, the defendant made an oral motion for a continuance that the court denied without prejudice to the defendant producing documentation from his physician regarding his health status. The defendant informed the court that he was not proceeding with his case and abruptly left the courthouse and did not return. The defendant appeared for the next scheduled court date. Before the lunch recess, the defendant informed the court on the record that he was not going to return to court for a full day trial until the court modified its order. The court informed the parties that the hearing would resume at 2 p.m. unless a written motion for a continuance was filed and granted. The defendant neither filed a motion for a continu- ance nor appeared for the afternoon session. Several days later, the defendant again appeared for the hearing in the morning but again failed to appear for the afternoon session and did not file a motion for a continuance. On the basis of the defendant's failure to appear, the court determined that the defendant had failed to present his testimony and evidence as set forth in the court's scheduling order, and, therefore, the court determined that the defendant's case was concluded. The court also denied all of the defendant's pending motions with prejudice for failure to present any testimony, evidence, and argument to the court. The plaintiff was permitted to provide rebuttal testimony. In the court's memorandum of decision, it set forth detailed findings with respect to the defendant's behavior generally, his parenting skills, and his difficult relationship with O, which contrasted with the healthy relationship that the court found O had with the plaintiff. The court noted in some detail the defendant's medical diagnosis by two separate doctors of narcissistic personality disorder and his failure to make or maintain any significant progress through treatment. The court ultimately awarded full legal and physical custody of O to the plaintiff. With respect to parenting time, the court ordered that the defendant was entitled to weekly supervised access to O via a third-party therapeutic supervised visitation agency, with the cost paid by the defendant. However, the defendant's parenting access would begin only after the defendant provided proof to the plaintiff and/or her counsel that he had engaged a clinician to address his narcissistic personality disorder, and such proof was required to be updated on a quarterly basis. The court also issued orders limiting the defendant's right to seek modification or expansion of his parenting access. The court further ordered that the defendant could not partici- pate in any of the child's extracurricular and sporting activities until he satisfied the conditions for seeking modification/expansion of the parenting access orders. Held: 1. The defendant's claims that the trial court violated his rights under the ADA were unavailing, this court having determined that, even assuming for purposes of argument that the defendant had a disability that entitled him to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA as a matter of procedural due process, he in fact received such accommodation and failed to demonstrate otherwise or to point to any evidence in the record from which it reasonably could be concluded that any of the trial court's adverse actions or rulings in the present matter were the product of retaliatory animus rather than a proper exercise of judicial discretion: a. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly refused to provide him with the same medical accommoda- tion granted to him earlier in the trial, as he did not make a formal ADA request prior to his oral motion to the court, and the letter from his medical provider did not suggest any particular accommodation but only recommended that the court adjust the hearing schedule, which at that time consisted of back-to-back full day hearings, so as to reduce the defendant's stress; moreover, nothing in the language of the court's order limiting the length of the remaining then scheduled hearing dates to half days rendered that accommodation nonmodifiable in the future, and, to the contrary, it could be reasonably inferred from the court's requirement that the defendant keep it apprised of any changes in his medical condi- tion that the accommodation was never intended to be permanent or to bind future courts in the event of a change in relevant circumstances; furthermore, the defendant provided no authority that stands for the proposition that once a public entity has provided an accommodation it is not permitted to adjust it under appropriate circumstances or to provide a substitute accommodation, and, in the present case, when it became clear to the court that continuing with half day sessions would be untenable and interfere with docket management and the fair adminis- tration of justice, it was well within the court's discretion to substitute the prior accommodation for one that was equally reasonable, and pro- ceeding with full day hearings on nonconsecutive days still allowed time for the defendant to rest and recover from the prior day's proceedings and reduced the stress of preparing for the next day, which was fully in accord with the recommendation of the defendant's medical provider and was, in fact, the exact accommodation the defendant originally requested. b. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the ADA by denying motions and prematurely resting his case; the defendant failed to point to anything in the record that would support his assertion that the trial court's actions were made with discriminatory animus rather than, as reflected in the record, as a response to the defendant's failure to appear, which was a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis for the court's actions for which the defendant failed to account. 2. The trial court properly considered the defendant's mental health diagnosis as a basis for determining custody and setting conditions regarding visitation: pursuant to the statute (§ 46b-56) governing orders regarding the custody and care of minor children in dissolution actions, one of the factors that a court may consider is the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interest of the child, and, in the present case, the court did not award the plaintiff sole custody of the parties' child solely on the basis of the defendant's mental health diagnosis but, rather, it was but one of a number of reasons provided by the court for its decision and, therefore, was not in and of itself determinative of the court's custody order; moreover, the court's focus was not on the defendant's mental health per se, but, rather, the court identified that it was concerned by the defendant's failure to make reasonable progress to address its harmful effect on his parenting of O; furthermore, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the court made any clearly erroneous factual findings regarding his mental health or to point to anything in the record that would support his assertions that the court's consideration of his mental health diagnosis amounted to retaliation or disability discrimination. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the custody evaluation prepared by S in determining the best interest of O: the court did not rely solely on S's custody evaluation but, rather, it had ample current evidence before it of the defendant's present ability to parent, and, although the court accepted S's evaluation into evidence, it consid- ered and evaluated it in light of the updated testimony from S and others, as well as evidence submitted by both parties regarding the child's and parents' current situations; moreover, although S's custody evaluation may have had some limitations due to the delay of the courts being closed due to COVID-19, this went solely to the weight the trial judge gave the report rather than to its admissibility. 4. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly required the parties to request leave of the court before filing trial and pretrial motions and improperly denied multiple such requests: although the defendant relied on language from Ahneman v. Ahneman (243 Conn. 471), in which the Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked the discretion to refuse to rule on certain motions filed by the defendant in that case, there was nothing in the decision in Ahneman curtailing a trial court's exercise of its considerable discretion over its docket or expressly barring the type of prohibitory order issued in the present case, and, to the contrary, the court in Ahneman acknowledged that exceptions to the general rule that a trial court must consider and decide on a reasonably prompt basis all motions properly placed before it may exist in an extreme, compelling situation; moreover, several years after the Ahneman decision, this court in Strobel v. Strobel (92 Conn. App. 662) opined that a prohibitory order essentially identical to the one at issue in the present case constituted a praiseworthy attempt by the trial judge to limit the parties' barrages of repetitive and abusive motions, and this court found that the record in the present case reflected no less a compelling reason for an order attempting to curtail the flood of repetitive and oftentimes frivolous motions filed in this matter. 5. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly awarded sole custody of O to the plaintiff even though the parties had always shared custody and the plaintiff made no showing of a change of circumstances; in the present case, the parties shared legal and physical custody of O until the time of the dissolution of marriage, and whether such joint custody should continue in the future was precisely the issue that the parties could not agree upon in their separation agreement and left for the court in the present action to decide, and, accordingly, the case law cited by the defendant holding that courts lack the authority to modify existing custody orders in the absence of a material change of circumstances was inapposite to the facts of this case. 6. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court errone- ously found that the defendant had narcissistic personality disorder; this court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that any mistake was made with respect to the trial court's challenged findings, as the evidence in the record, including testimony from S and her custody evaluation, adequately supported the court's findings that the defendant had been diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder and that this diagnosis constituted a long-term pattern of maladaptive behavior that was not amenable to treatment. 7. The defendant could not prevail on his evidentiary claims that the trial court improperly admitted certain testimony of L and improperly admit- ted and relied on an affidavit of G: on the basis of this court's thorough review of the transcripts of L's testimony and the many objections raised during her testimony by the defendant, this court concluded that the defendant failed to demonstrate how the trial court abused its broad discretion with respect to the admission of L's testimony; moreover, to the extent that the defendant attempted to raise additional objections that were not raised at trial, this court declined to review these unpre- served aspects of his claim, and, with respect to the objections he did raise at trial, this court concluded that the trial court properly ruled on them in the manner that it did for the reasons provided and that further explication by this court was unwarranted; furthermore, there was noth- ing in the record from which to conclude that the trial court improperly relied on G's affidavit in awarding custody to the plaintiff, as the court never stated in its memorandum of decision that it relied on G's affidavit, which was not in evidence, and the few references to G by the court in its memorandum of decision were incidental and did not reflect any error in the court's reasoning. Argued November 13, 2023—officially released February 20, 2024

The petitioner appealed to this court from the judgment of the habeas court denying his untimely motion to open and set aside the court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus. The petitioner was represented by assigned counsel, W, in his underlying habeas petition, filed in February, 2018. The petitioner was deported to Jamaica in June, 2020. Following the petitioner's deportation, the trial court granted W's caseflow request for a video status conference, in which W represented that his attempts to contact the petitioner had been unsuccessful. At the status conference, the court asked W to file a notice with the court detailing his efforts to communicate with the petitioner and his family. W filed the notice, in which he alleged that there had been a breakdown in his communications with the petitioner, that his efforts to contact the petitioner or members of the petitioner's family had been unsuccessful and that the case could not proceed without the petitioner. The court thereafter issued an order that the matter would be scheduled for a hearing on the court's own motion to dismiss the petition due to the petitioner's failure to contact and cooperate with W in prosecuting the petition with due diligence and provided notice that the matter could be dismissed for failure to appear if the petitioner did not appear for the scheduled hearing. The court dismissed the underlying habeas petition at a hearing held in February, 2021, at which the petitioner did not appear. The petitioner filed a motion to open the judgment of dismissal in May, 2022, alleging, inter alia, that W had failed to communicate effectively with him and had made material representations about his exercise of due diligence in locating the petitioner. The court denied the petitioner's motion to open on the basis that the petitioner had failed to establish a recognized basis to open the judgment beyond the four month period established by statute (§ 52-212a), and it declined to resolve factual disputes or make credibility determinations because there was no threshold showing of fraud, duress or mutual mistake. Held: 1. The habeas court improperly limited the scope of its authority to grant the petitioner's motion to open to a showing that the judgment was obtained by fraud, duress or mistake; the court's authority to grant a late motion to open a judgment was not exclusively limited to those three recognized exceptions, as both this court and our Supreme Court have recognized other equitable exceptions to the four month time limitation in § 52-212a in situations in which the protection of the finality of judgments must give way to principles of fairness and equity. 2. As an issue of first impression, this court held that, given both the signifi- cant liberty interests at stake in habeas proceedings and the importance of the right to counsel in such proceedings, the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel under Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668) is sufficient to invoke the habeas court's common-law authority to open a habeas judgment more than four months after it was rendered: barring a petitioner relief from a judgment that was rendered or not timely opened due to the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel on the sole basis that the statutory period had expired would undermine the funda- mental fairness origins underlying the common-law writ of habeas cor- pus and the very nature of the right to habeas counsel provided by statute (§ 51-296 (a)), and an equitable exception to the four month limitation period is warranted to avoid perpetuating the injustice of a judgment that was rendered or not timely opened due to the constitution- ally deficient performance of habeas counsel; moreover, as our Supreme Court recently held in Rose v. Commissioner of Correction (348 Conn. 333), ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute good cause to excuse the late filing of a habeas petition pursuant to statute (§ 52-470), and this court held that the same reasoning applied to a late motion to open based on a claim of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel; furthermore, this court declined to speculate as to how the habeas court, which explicitly stated in its memorandum of decision that it was not resolving factual disputes or making credibility determinations, would have resolved key factual issues and how it would have exercised its discretion had it not been operating under an unnecessarily limited view of its authority; accordingly, the case was remanded for a new hearing on the petitioner's motion to open. Argued October 10, 2023—officially released February 20, 2024

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, alleged assault arising out of a sexual encounter between the parties. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had not complied with the terms of the plaintiff's consent to the encounter because he did not wear a condom during the entirety of the encounter. The plaintiff brought two prior actions against the defendant, a small claims matter in which the court rendered judgment for the defendant, and an action in the Superior Court alleging breach of contract that resulted in a stipulated judgment for the plaintiff. The trial court in the present case held a pretrial confer- ence, during which it stated that the plaintiff could not continue retrying the case against the defendant. Thereafter, the court issued a written order dismissing the action sua sponte with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiff's claims involved the same parties and factual allegations as her two prior actions. In a subsequent articulation, the court compared the facts of the present case to those of the breach of contract action and explained that its dismissal was based on the prior pending action doctrine. The court also applied this court's holding in Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority (54 Conn. App. 164), and concluded that it could not afford meaningful relief to the plaintiff and that the action, therefore, was moot because both of the plaintiff's actions demanded the same relief, which was available to her via the stipulated judgment rendered in the ''prior pending action.'' On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court deprived the plaintiff of procedural due process by sua sponte dismissing her action without giving her notice and affording her an opportunity to be heard with respect to the grounds on which the court based its dismissal: the plaintiff was entitled to adequate notice of the issues that the court intended to address at the pretrial conference, and the court never gave the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on any of the grounds that it raised sua sponte and on which it based its dismissal of the action; moreover, a court does not have the right to raise sua sponte the prior pending action rule when a moving party has not done so and, accordingly, the court exceeded its authority by acting sua sponte on those grounds as a basis to dismiss the action; furthermore, once the court determined that the plaintiff's action might be moot, it was required to give the parties an opportunity to address the issue, so that they could be heard on the matter, which the court failed to do. 2. The trial court incorrectly concluded that, pursuant to this court's decision in Edgewood Village, Inc., it could not afford the plaintiff any practical relief and that her action was, therefore, moot: although the trial court's application of Edgewood Village, Inc., was premised on its determination that the present action and the plaintiff's prior breach of contract action demanded the same relief, which the court concluded was available to the plaintiff via her stipulated judgment in ''her prior pending action,'' namely, the breach of contract action, the breach of contract action had already concluded in a stipulated judgment, and, as a result, there was nothing pending before the court that would have rendered the present action moot; moreover, both actions, although related to the same underlying incident, did not involve identical allegations, and prac- tical relief could be afforded to the plaintiff if she were to prevail on her claims in the present action, so long as she could prove her damages in connection therewith. Submitted on brief November 14, 2023—officially released February 20, 2024