Volume 224 — United States Reports

Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), was a 1912 United States Supreme Court case which held that a patent owner could impose conditions on the use of a patented product even after its sale—therefore individuals who knowingly violated, or aided others in violating, these conditions could be held liable for contributory infringement of said patent. In 1917, the Supreme Court overruled Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.

The facts, which involve the liability of directors of a national bank for damages caused by a false statement of the condition of the bank, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the determination of whether certain classes of employés of railroad companies are fellow-servants, are stated in the opinion.

<p>Denial by the trial court of a motion to strike from the complaint allegations as to exemplary damages does not harm defendant if the court instructs the jury that only compensatory, and not exemplary, damages can be recovered.</p> <p>Where the parties, with the assent of the court, unite in trying a case on the theory that a particular matter is within the issues, that theory cannot be rejected when the case is in the appellate court for review.</p> <p>The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that when a thing which causes injury, without fault of the person injured, is shown to be under the exclusive control of defendant, and would not cause the damage in ordinary course if the party in control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of an explanation, that the injury arose from defendant's want of care.</p> <p>The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was rightly applied against defendant electric light company in the case of a person injured while adjusting an electric light in his residence by an electric shock transmitted from the outside wires of the defendant company entirely without fault on his part and in maimer which could not have happened had such outside wires been in proper condition.</p> <p>Although an instruction may be subject to criticism standing alone, it may be unobjectionable if read in the light of what preceded and what followed it.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. There was no jurisdiction in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals to review and reverse the judgment of the District Court.

The facts, which involve the extent of the right to appropriate water in Idaho, are stated in the opinion. Generally, the arid States and Territories, Idaho included, have adopted the rule that water may be appropriated for beneficial uses. Colorado — Hammond v. Rose, 7 Am. St. Rep. 258; Arizona — Austin v. Chandler, 42 Pac. Rep. 483; Idaho — Drake v. Earhart, 2 Idaho, 716; Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Co., 101 Pac. Rep. 1059; New Mexico—Trambley v. Luterman, 27 Pac.

The facts, which involve the rules governing appeals from the Supreme Court of Porto Rico and the District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the acts of Congress relating to pay of aids to the Admiral of the Navy, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of acts of Congress relating to pay of acting assistant surgeons in the Navy, are stated in the opinion.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of the charter of a'public service corporation in Idaho and its rights and obligations thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in regard to priority of claims of the United States against the bankrupt, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that a provision of a municipal ordinance limiting the use of streets for conduits under the terms imposed for fifteen years with .the right of the city to then order the conduits removed does not deprive the telegraph company of its rights under the act of July 24, 1866, the ordinance, itself providing that whatever rights the company has under that act shall not be affected. 178 Fed. Rep. 310 , affirmed.

The facts, which involve the construction of a contract for s§le of mines and what constituted breaches thereof, are stated in the opinion. The pleadings fully allege those conditions of the contract that the Arizona courts construed into a condition precedent, fully allege nonperformance, and fully allege excuses for nonperformance on the part of the plaintiff in error. If a party expressly avers or confesses a material fact omitted on the other side, the omission is cured.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction of the mining law of the United States, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings, as distinguished from bankruptcy proceedings, are appealable to the Circuit Court of Appeals under the Court of Appeals Act of March 3, 1891.</p> <p>A claim asserted against a bankrupt’s estate not only for the amount thereof but for a lien therefor on the assets of the estate is a bankruptcy proceeding, and not a controversy arising from the bankruptcy proceeding, and an appeal by the trustee from the order allowing the claim and lien is under § 25a to the Circuit Court of Appeals.</p> <p>Qne who is entitled under § 25a to an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, is not also entitled to a review in the Circuit Court of Appeals by petition under § 24b.</p> <p>Under § 24b, questions of law only are taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, while under § 25 controversies of fact as well as of law are taken to that court, with findings of fact to be made therein if the case is to be taken to this court. In re Mueller, 135 Fed. Rep. 711, approved.</p>

<p>ERROR to the court of appeals of the district of COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the constitutionality and construction of the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act in regard to accounts to be kept by carriers partly by land and partly by water, are stated in the opinion.

Held: after considering and construing the provisions of the act of 1907, that it was, upon its face, a law undertaking to prohibit the transmission or transportation in interstate commerce of natural gas to points beyond the State; that it was an unconstitutional interference with the rights of the complainants, who were legitimately engaged in that commerce, and that therefore the act was null and void.

The facts, which involve the construction of a will disposing of real estate in the District of Columbia, are stated in the opinion.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OP TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.'</p> <p>Appeal from decree dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP WISCONSIN.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the recognition to be given, under the full faith and credit clause, of the Federal Constitution,in the courts of a State of a receiver appointed by the courts of another State and the right of such receiver to enforce double liability against the stockholders in the former State, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>It was held by the Supreme Court of Minnesota that the manufacturing company was not exclusively a manufacturing or mechanical corporation, and hence the stockholders are liable. Merchants’ National Bank v. Minnesota Thresher M. Co., 90 Minnesota, 144; Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, 524.</p> <p>The plaintiff receiver under chapter 272 of the General Laws of Minnesota for 1899, and §§ 3184 to 3190, inclusive, of the Revised Laws of 1905, is a representative of the corporation' and of its creditors, and has title to the assessments sued upon and is authorized to enforce such assessments by proper proceedings either in that State or elsewhere. Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516; Converse v. Ayer (Mass.), 84 N. E. Rep. 98.</p> <p>Prior to the enactment of chapter 272, the receiver did not have such title/ being nothing but- the ordinary chancery receiver, and hence he could not maintain an action to recover stockholders’ liability outside the State of Minnesota. Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335; Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56; Finney v. Guy, 106 Wisconsin, 256.</p> <p>Chapter 272 and §§ 3184 to 3190, Revised Laws of 1905, merely changed and enlarged the remedy for the enforcement of stockholders’ liability, and did not change the substantive right, and hence the said laws are constitutional. Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516; Converse v. Ayer (Mass.), 84 N. E. Rep. 98; Straw & Ellsworth v. Kilbourne Co., 80 Minnesota, 125; London & Northwest American Mortgage Co. v. St. Paul Park Improvement Co., 84 Minnesota, 144.</p> <p>The judgment at law against the thresher company in the state court of Minnesota and the decree in the subsequent suit based thereon, by which decree the receiver was appointed, cannot be collaterally attacked. Cases supra and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Phœnix Ins. Co., 108 Michigan, 170; Bank v. Lawrence, 117 Michigan, 669; Hinckley v. Kettle River Co., 80 Minnesota, 32; Parker v. Stoughton Mill Co., 91 Wisconsin, 181.</p> <p>Chapter 272 and §§ 3184 to 3190, both declare that assessments levied pursuant to their provisions, which the demurrer admits were followed in this case, are conclusive upon stockholders wherever they may be. Straw v. Kilbourne Co., 80 Minnesota, 125, 136; The Bernheimer Case, supra; Converse v. Ayer, 84 N. E. Rep. 100.</p> <p>Under Bernheimer v. Converse and other cases decided by this court, full faith and credit must be given in all courts to the interlocutory decrees of the District Court of Washington County, Minnesota levying the assessments in question. Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. 319; Hancock Nat’l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, and cases therein cited.</p> <p>There is no question of comity in this case as in Finney v. Guy, 106 Wisconsin, 256; S. C., 189 U. S. 335; Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56.</p> <p>In Hunt v. Whewell, 122 Wisconsin, 33, the Wisconsin court erred in holding that the questions were settled by Finney v. Guy, and so the decision is contrary to Bernheimer v. Converse.</p> <p>In the case at bar the question is as to the credit and effect given in the courts of Minnesota in a like action to an assessment there ordered by interlocutory decrees such as those attached to the complaint. An approval of the position of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in this case would be a distinct disavowal of Hancock Bank v. Farnum, and the decisions in many other cases in which the constitutional provision requiring full faith and credit to be given to judicial proceedings of sister States, has been under consideration. It would mean that the right to recover in an action based upon such judicial proceedings would be determined not by the Constitution but by the whim or caprice of the courts of the State where the suit was brought. The law of this case is well stated in the dissenting opinion below of Mr. Justice Timlin.</p> <p>The question of “full faith and credit” is not involved in this case.</p> <p>An assessment made by the court Upon the stock of an insolvent Minnesota corporation and upon the stockholders thereof in an action to sequester the assets of the corporation is not such a judgment against the stockholders as to come within the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56.</p> <p>The corporation is not the representative of the stockholder in the sense that it can represent him in making an assessment upon his stock, so as to establish a personal liability. Hale v. Allinson, supra; Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minnesota, 454; Willus v. Mann, 91 Minnesota, 494; Lageman v. Casserly, 107 Minnesota, 491; Finney v. Guy, 106 Wisconsin, 256; Danforth v. Chemical Co., 68 Minnesota, 308; Schrader v. Manufacturers’ Bank, 133 U. S. 67.</p> <p>It has always been the law of Wisconsin, and was always the law of Minnesota until the enactment of chapter 272, Laws of 1899, that upon the insolvency of a corporation whose stockholders were subject to a double liability the only remedy the creditors had to enforce that liability was by an action brought by all the creditors or by one or more creditors on behalf of all against the corporation and all. of the stockholders to wind up the corporation, sequester its assets and enforce the double liability of the stockholders and that the judgment as to such double liability bound only such of the stockholders as could be personally served with process within the jurisdiction of the court or should voluntarily appear in the action and that no other action could be brought to enforce such liability either in the State in which the insolvent corporation was located or elsewhere. In re Martin’s Estate, 56 Minnesota, 420; Allen v. Walsh, 25 Minnesota, 543; Merchants’ Bank v. Bailey Mfg. Co., 34 Minnesota, 323; Minneapolis Base Ball Co. v. City Bank, 66 Minnesota, 441; Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minnesota, 454; Coleman v. White, 14 Wisconsin, 700; Cleveland v. Marine Bank, 17 Wisconsin, 545; Merchants’ Bank v. Chandler, 19 Wisconsin, 434; Terry v. Chandler, 23 Wisconsin, 456; Hurlbut v. Marshall, 62 Wisconsin, 590; Gianella v. Biglow, 96 Wisconsin, 185; Booth v. Dear, 96 Wisconsin, 516; Gager v. Marsden, 101 Wisconsin, 598; Foster v. Posson, 105 Wis consin, 99; Finney v. Guy, 106 Wisconsin, 256; Eau Claire Nat. Bank v. Benson, 106 Wisconsin, 624; Hunt v. Whewell, 122 Wisconsin, 33; Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56; Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335.</p> <p>Chapter 272, Laws of Minnesota for the year 1899, and the amendments thereto have not changed the legal aspect of this case.</p> <p>Whether or not a right exists depends on the law of the State where it was created; the remedy for enforcing such right depends upon the law of the forum where it is sought to be enforced. Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 31 Minnesota, 11; Northern Pacific Railroad v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190, 197; Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9; Leucke v. Treadway, 45 Mo. App. 507.</p> <p>A receiver has no extraterritorial jurisdiction or power of official action and is not entitled, as matter of right, to sue in a foreign jurisdiction; and the refusal of another State to entertain such suit does not amount to failure to give full faith and credit to the laws and judgments of the State of appointment within the meaning of the Federal ■ Constitution. High on Receivers, § 239; Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322; Filkins v. Nunnemacher, 81 Wisconsin, 91; Farmers’ & Merchants’ Ins. Co. v. Needles, 52 Missouri, 17; Brigham v. Luddington, 12 Blatchf. 237; Hagard v. Durant, 10 Fed. Rep. 471.</p> <p>The statutes of a State have no extraterritorial force. A foreign receiver cannot, as matter of right, maintain an action outside of the State of his appointment. He is often permitted through comity, or the courtesy of á sister State, to maintain an action therein; but never where the courts of such sister State have declared the maintenance of such action to be against the public policy of that State or that the rights of its citizens would be thereby jeopardized or impaired. High on Receivers, §241; Comstock v. Frederickson, 51 Minnesota, 350; Mercantile Bank v. MacFarlane, 71 Minnesota, 497; Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minnesota, 454 (455); Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 31 Minnesota, 11; New Haven Nail Co. v. Linden Spring Co., 142 Massachusetts, 349; Post & Co. v. Toledo &c. R. R. Co., 144 Massachusetts, 345; Higgins v. Central N. E. R. R., 155 Massachusetts, 176; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Massachusetts, 570; Smith v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 96 Massachusetts, 336; Rice v. Hosiery Co., 56 N. H. 114, 127; Nimick & Co. v. Mingo Iron Works Co., 25 W. Va. 184; Rover on Interstate Law, 167, 226; Foster v. Glazener, 27 Alabama, 391; Stevens v. Brown, 20 W. Va. 450 (460, 461); Gilman v. Ketchum, 84 Wisconsin, 60; Sobemheimer v. Wheeler, 45 N. J. Eq. 614; Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 127 Wisconsin, 651; Bagby v. A. M. & O. R. Co., 86 Pa. St. 291; Falk v. Jones, 49 N. J. Eq. 484; Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335 (345).</p> <p>Whether or not a complaint in a state court states a cause of action, no Federal question being involved, is exclusively for the state court to determine. Finney Case, 189 U. S. 335; Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 491, 496; Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U. S. 458; Kirtley v. Holmes, 46 C. C. A. 102; 107 Fed. Rep. 1; Lewis v. Clark, 64 C. C. A. 138; 129 Fed. Rep. 570; Rogers v. Riley, 80 Fed. Rep. 759; Burr v. Smith, 113 Fed. Rep. 858.</p> <p>The validity of chapter 272, Laws of Minnesota for 1899, and the amendments thereto are not drawn in question in this case; hence no Federal question is raised.</p> <p>Where a case turns upon the construction and not upon the validity of statute of another State it does not necessarily involve a Federal question. Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335, 340; Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 491, 496; Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U. S. 463; Lloyd v. Matthews, 155 U. S. 222; Banholzer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 178 U. S. 402; Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 491.</p> <p>Upon demurrer to a complaint alleging the law of another State the defendant is not concluded by such allegations; the court will examine the statutes and decisions of such State and determine for itself whether the law is as pleaded. Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335 (343, 344); Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Iselin, 185 N. Y. 54 (58).</p> <p>There is nothing in any of the cases arising under the amended Minnesota statute and decided by this court since the amendment to the Minnesota law in conflict with the decision of the Wisconsin court in Hunt v. Whewell.</p> <p>In First National Bank of Ottawa v. Converse, 200 U. S. 425; Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516; Converse v. First National Bank of Suffield, 212 U. S. 565, and Converse v. Stewart, 218 U. S. 666, no question was raised as to whether the action was against the public policy of the State where brought or whether a remedy was provided by the Minnesota law different from that of the lex fori, and which remedy was denied the citizens of the State where such action was brought, or whether this court would compel a state court to entertain such action against its solemn declaration that by so doing it would subject its citizens to great and manifold injustice and hardship. Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179; Post & Co. v. Toledo, Cincinnati & St. Louis Railroad, 144 Massachusetts, 341; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Massachusetts, 570; Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, distinguished. No case holds that the failure of a state court to permit such action to be brought is a violation of the “full faith and credit” clause of the Federal Constitution. The cases cited — several of which are from the Minnesota court and all from courts of the highest standing — uniformly hold that such receiver cannot maintain such action as a strict right, but only when the public policy of the sister State will permit.</p>

The facts, which involve priority of claims against the bankrupts’ estate, are stated in the opinion. The contest is a proceeding in bankruptcy between the holder of an unrecorded chattel mortgage, on one side, and the trustee in bankruptcy, on behalf of certain subsequent creditors, on the other side.

<p>The Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, c. 196, did not embrace all cars on the lines of interstate carriers, but only those engaged in interstate commerce. It did not, until amended by the act of March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943, c. 976, embrace all cars used on railroads engaged in interstate commerce.</p> <p>A declaration for injuries sustained prior to the amendment of March 2, 1903, which did not allege that the car involved was engaged in interstate commerce, was properly held defective.</p> <p>The rule that decisions of the state court on questions of pleading and practice under the laws of a State are not reviewable by this court held to include the denial, on the ground that the period of limitation ■ had expired, of an application made after trial to amend the declara^ tion, so as to state a cause of action. Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408.</p> <p>Although the petition may declare under a Federal statute, if it states no cause of action thereunder but at most a right of recovery at common law, rulings on the sufficiency of evidence do not involve Federal questions.</p>

Held: that in Missouri quo warranto might have been instituted for such acts of misuser, even though there had been no criminal statute on the subject. For this reason neither the validity nor invalidity of the anti-trust statute have any bearing on the case.

The facts, which involve the right of a patentee to enjoin an officer of the United States from using the patent, and the construction and effect of the act of June 25,1910, conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims in certain instances of claims of patentees against the United States, for use of patents, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims of claims of patentee of the De Bange gas check for use of that invention by the Government, whether there was such use and what the proper compensation should be therefor, are stated in the opinion.

<p>A provision in a state constitution that municipal corporations may establish and operate public utility plants, and that persons and corporations may establish and operate works for supplying public service upon such conditions and under such regulations as the municipality may prescribe, is a step towards municipal control or ownership, and is not a grant to others of a right to occupy streets without the consent of the municipality; nor does it limit the municipality to regulations under its police power. The'conditions are of general import; and so held as to the provision in Article XI, § 19, of the constitution of California as amended October 11, 1911.</p> <p>There is no sufficient reason why this court should not follow the highest court of California in construing “telegraph” corporations as used in § 536 of the Civil Code of that State as not including “ telephone ” corporations.</p> <p>Where a statute is amended so as to bring a certain class thereunder, the amendment to take effect at a subsequent date, before which date another act is passed relating to the same subject with a general repealing act enumerating exceptions, the amended statute is repealed, subject only to the exceptions before any rights .accrue under the amendment.</p> <p>In the absence of any apparent policy inducing it, it will be assumed that an exception to the repealing clause of an act to' regulate franchises of “lines doing an interstate business” was made unwillingly and because the legislature assumed it was bound to exempt such lines from regulations.</p> <p>In this case held that under the statutes of . California a telephone corporation operating interstate and local lines in Pomona, a city of the fifth class, obtained rights to maintain its main line in the streets but not its local posts and wires except' subject to regulations of the city. ,</p>

The facts, which, involve the liability of a surety company on a fidelity bond given to protect a bank against dishonesty of its cashier, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution of a statute of. the State of Arkansas imposing double liability in certain instances upon railway corporations, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the power of Porto Rico to tax machinery and vessels in the harbor of San Juan engaged in work in pursuance of a contract with the United States, are stated in the opinion.

United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), is the first case in which the United States Supreme Court held it a violation of the antitrust laws to refuse to a competitor access to a facility necessary for entering or remaining in the market (an "essential facility"). In this case a combination of firms was carrying out the restrictive practice, rather than a single firm, which made the conduct susceptible to challenge under section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1) rather than under the heightened standard of section 2 of that act (15 U.S.C. § 2). Even so, the case was brought under both sections.

Held: and in exchange the United States bound themselves to give to that branch of the Nation on the Arkansas as much land as they had received, or might thereafter receive, east of the Mississippi. 7 Stat. 156 (July 8, 1817). A further cession of land was made to the United States in 1819. 7 Stat. 195 (February 27, 1819).

The facts, which involve the validity of certain conveyances of allotted land made by Choctaw Indians and also the right of the United States to have such conveyances set aside, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of certain conveyances of allotted lands made by Seminole Indians and also the right of the United States to have such conveyances set aside, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of certain deeds and mortgages of allotted lands made by Seminole Indians and the right of the United States to have the same set aside, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, in regard to appeals to this court from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, are stated in the opinion. The saving clause of the Judicial Code, § 299, clearly preserves the right of appeal in this case. Its language would have to be wrested from its evident meaning to bar the appeal.

The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, in regard to appeals to this court from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, are stated in the opinion. The statute is, itself, an instruction to the jury, and the instruction objected to by defendants and the one asked by defendants, of necessity, drew in question the construction of the statute.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of .the Circuit Court of the Western District of Kentucky over the person of the defendant by reason of. service on defendant’s agent and whether defendant was doing búsiness in that District, are stated in the opinion.-.

<p>The county court in Texas, being the highest court of the State to which the case could be carried, considering the amount involved, held that a railroad company was hable mot only for the damages claimed, but also for an attorney’s fee under Chapter 47, Laws of Texas, 1909. The railroad company sued out a writ of error from this court, having insisted in the state court that the statute violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution. Before the case was reached in this court, the highest court of the State in another case adjudged the statute to be violative of a provision in the state constitution and void. That fact being brought to the attention of this court, held that:</p> <p>The case not having been finally terminated, the right to the attorney’s fee is still sub judice, and effect must be given by this court to the intervening decision of the highest state court and, as to dismiss the writ would leave the judgment to be enforced as rendered, the proper procedure is to vacate the judgment and remand the case to the county court so that it may give effect to the intervening decision of the highest state court.</p> <p>In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the courts of the several States, this court is not absolutely confined to the consideration and decision of the Federal questions, but may inquire whether, owing to any intervening event, such questions have ceased to be material, and dispose of the case in the light of that event.</p>

A statute of the State of Washington (March 7,1905, Sess. Laws, 1905, e. 81, p. 145, as amended March 16, 1907, Sess.

Held: in this case, that it is' reversible error where the Supreme Court of a Territory refuses to perform its legally imposed duty of making its own statement of facts or adopting that of the trial court.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA.</p> <p>The facts, which, involve the constitutionality of the statute of Nebraska of 1907 imposing liability on railway corporations for injury to employés, are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employés contributed to the injury or death of such employé.” A similar provision is made, in § 4 as to assumption of risk. These opposing contentions present a serious controversy. It is, however, really doubtful if they arise on .the record.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the due process clause of the Constitution of a statute of California, are stated in the opinion. By § 1384, Civil Code of California, the property of one who dies without disposing of it by will, passes to the heirs of the intestate, subject to the control of the probate court, and to the possession of any administrator ap-. pointed by that court, for the purposes of administration.

<p>CERTIORARI to the circuit court of appeals for the NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that there was no assumption of risk on the part of an employé working under a coal chute who was struck by a piece of timber falling from above him where other men had been put to work; even if the employé had knowledge of such overhead work, the duty of the employer to provide a reasonably safe place to work remained.

The facts, which involve the construction of the tariff acts and of the reciprocal agreement with- France of May 30, 1898, are stated in the opinion. Congress has referred to the Hawaiian treaty in two instances as a convention, and in two others as a treaty. Act Aug. 15, 1875, 19 Stat. 200; Act Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 844; Act Aug. 27,1894, par. 182), 28 Stat. 521; Act July 24,1897, par. 209, 30 Stat. 168.

<p>Congress has power to impose the liability on the employer defined in the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908. Second Employers’ Lia- ' bility Cases, 223 U. S. 1.</p> <p>Where Congress possesses the power to impose a liability it also possesses the power to ensure its efficaey by prohibiting any contract, rule, regulation, or device in evasion of it. • Second Employers’ Inability Cases, 223. U. S. 1, 52.</p> <p>Congress has power to enforce the regulations, validly prescribed by the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, by the provisions of § 5 of the act providing that exemptions from liability shall be void, and that the acceptance of benefits under a relief contract shall not be a bar to recovery.</p> <p>In framing the Employers’ Liability Acts of 1906 and 1908 Congress. well Understood the practice of maintaining relief departments, and by the statute of 1908 Congress enlarged the scope of the clause defining contracts for immunity which should not prevail, and included stipulations which made acceptance of benefits from such relief departments a release from liability.</p> <p>Congress has power, in regulating interstate commerce and commerce in the District of Columbia and in the Territories, to legislate unfettered by any existing arrangements or contracts in conflict with its policy. Prior arrangements are necessarily subject to the paramount authority of Congress. Louismlte & Naskille R. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467.</p> <p>The provisions of § 5 of the Employers’ Liability Act apply as well to existing as to future contracts.</p>

Held: upon whom rests the general sentence of the law of life imprisonment. . .• . The proceedings under the statute are for identification only. They are clearly not for the establishment of guilt. The question of guilt is not reopened,” State v. Graham, *625 68 W. Va. 248 , 251. Full opportunity was accorded to the prisoner to meet the allegation of former conviction.

<p>error to the supreme court of the state of LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF' COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction and validity of the statutes relating to allotment and distribution of Cherokee lands and funds and the right of children born after September 1, 1902, to participate therein, are stated in the opinion.</p>

APPEAL Prom the circuit court of the united states FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY. On April 3, 1886 (Laws 1885-6, c. 511, p. 1174), the legislature of Kentucky chartered the Ohio Valley Telephone Company, fixing no limit to its corporate existence.

The facts, which involve the taxability of Choctaw and Chickasaw Indian allotted lands in Oklahoma while in possession of the allottees, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR to the supreme COURT OP THE state op OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the taxability of- Choctaw allotments in Oklahoma, aré stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP' OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>-The facts, which involve the taxability of Creek allotments in Oklahoma, are stated in the opinion.</p>