J-S63020-19
2019 PA Super 370
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MATTHEW JEFFREY SIPPS :
:
Appellant : No. 1872 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 18, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-23-CR-0002590-2017
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 31, 2019
Matthew Jeffrey Sipps (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of concealment of the
whereabouts of a child, corruption of minors, and patronizing a victim of
sexual servitude.1 After careful review, we affirm.
On appeal, Appellant presents two issues for our review:
1. Whether the evidence at trial was insufficient to support
[Appellant’s] conviction of Count 3, Patronizing a victim of
sexual servitude [18 Pa.C.S. § 3013], where the government
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant]
engaged in a sex act or performance with another individual
knowing that the act or performance is the result of the person
being a victim of human trafficking?
2. Whether the evidence at trial was insufficient to support
[Appellant’s] conviction of Count 1, Concealment of
whereabouts of a child, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2909(a), where the
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2909, 6301, and 3013.
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government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Appellant] removed a child from her known place of residence
with the intent to conceal the child’s whereabouts from her
parent or guardian, caused the child to be removed from her
known place of residence, prevented the child from returning
or being returned to her known place of residence, or failed to
return a child to her known place of residence when the child’s
parent or guardian had a reasonable expectation that
[Appellant] would return the child?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.2
Preliminarily, we address the trial court’s contention that Appellant’s
sufficiency issues “should be deemed waived” because Appellant “has not
cogently identified the mandated elements of the crimes.” Trial Court Opinion,
12/26/18, at 7. Referencing both case law and Appellant’s “wholesale lack of
specificity,” the court stated that it “must guess” at Appellant’s “generalized
sufficiency claims.” Id. at 8. However, despite its consternation with
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) concise statement, the trial court authored a
comprehensive, articulate and impressive opinion, which we reference infra.
In response to the trial court’s assertion of waiver, Appellant also notes
that the trial court “addressed the merits of the question[s] at length.”
Appellant’s Brief at 17. For its part, the Commonwealth does not address
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2 Although Appellant raised seven issues in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement, we need only address the two issues presented in his appellate
brief. See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(Issues are waived when they are raised in a 1925(b) statement, but not
raised and developed in appellate brief).
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waiver, but argues against the merits of Appellant’s sufficiency claims. See
generally, Commonwealth Brief at 4-17.
This Court has held that we may find waiver where a concise statement
is too vague. See Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super.
2011). “When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that
is not enough for meaningful review.” Commonwealth v. Dowling,
778
A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted). “A Concise Statement
which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is
the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement.”
Id. at 686-87. We have
stated:
If Appellant wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was
insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the
element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.
This Court can then analyze the element or elements on appeal.
[Where a] 1925(b) statement [ ] does not specify the allegedly
unproven elements[,] ... the sufficiency issue is waived [on
appeal].
Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Here, although the trial court has advocated waiver, we find that the
two sufficiency issues Appellant raises on appeal were not so vaguely stated
in the Rule 1925(b) statement so as to compel waiver. For example, in his
first issue, Appellant’s assertion reflects his first question on appeal:
The evidence at trial was insufficient to support [Appellant’s]
conviction of Count 3, Patronizing a victim of sexual servitude
[18 Pa.C.S. § 3013], where the government failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] engaged in a sex
act or performance with another individual knowing that the
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act or performance is the result of the person being a victim of
human trafficking?
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 7/20/18, at 1.
While Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement may be flawed, the trial court
— after discussing waiver — has provided a thoughtful analysis rejecting the
sufficiency claims on the merits. On this record, we, like the trial court,
proceed to review the merits of Appellant’s sufficiency claims.
It is well-settled that:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted).
Appellant first claims the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction of patronizing a victim of sexual servitude. The relevant statute
reads:
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(a) Offense defined.--A person commits a felony of the second
degree if the person engages in any sex act or performance with
another individual knowing that the act or performance is the
result of the individual being a victim of human trafficking.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3013. By law, human trafficking occurs when a person:
(1) recruits, entices, solicits, harbors, transports, provides,
obtains or maintains an individual if the person knows or
recklessly disregards that the individual will be subject to
involuntary servitude; or
(2) knowingly benefits financially or receives anything of value
from any act that facilitates any activity described in
paragraph (1).
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3011.
Appellant argues that “the jury used surmise and conjecture to convict
because testimony from the witness stand did not support” his patronizing a
victim of human trafficking conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant
concedes that he had sex with the complainant, satisfying the first element of
the offense, but as to the second element, claims the evidence did not support
a finding that he knew the complainant was being trafficked. Appellant states
that the Commonwealth evidence “proved only at best [that Appellant]
engaged in sex with a young runaway.” Id. at 14. Appellant continues:
Nowhere in the record does evidence appear Appellant was aware
that complainant was from Rhode Island, that she met Ray Justis
through a website or that Justis transported her to New Jersey.
Testimony does not bear this out.
Appellant’s Brief at 15. This argument is specious.
As noted, the trial court addressed the merits of this claim. Although at
this writing there are no published decisions specifically discussing the
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sufficiency of the evidence as it pertains to a conviction of patronizing a victim
of sexual servitude, the trial court nonetheless offered a detailed record-based
analysis with citation to related legal authority. Specific to Appellant’s
contention that he lacked knowledge that the “young runaway,” i.e., the
complainant, V.M., was the victim of human trafficking, the court explained:
At trial, V.M. testified she had sexual intercourse with
[Appellant] on three (3) occasions stemming from her being a
“worker” for Ray Justis and these interactions were subsequent
and in response to Ray posting an advertisement for her on
Backpage.com, and in each such instance [Appellant] paid Ray
five hundred ($500.00) dollars per liaison. [Appellant], after
taking V.M. to his home, continued to have with [V.M.] repeated
sexual intercourse. N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 93-96, 99, 100, 114. See
also Commonwealth Exhibit C-1 – Backpage.com Advertisement
for V.M. There was clearly legally sufficient evidence for the jury
to have determined that [Appellant] engaged in sexual acts with
V.M. N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 99, 100, 114. See also 18 Pa.C.S. §
3013(a).
The sole remaining issue is thus whether the evidence at
trial was as a matter of law sufficient to demonstrate that
[Appellant] knew his repeatedly having intercourse with V.M. was
“the result of [V.M.] being a victim of human trafficking.” See §
3013. See also 18 Pa.C.S. 302(a)(2)(i)(ii).
The trial record on being viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, certainly contains more than sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s rational inferences drawn from the
circumstantial evidence, as well as the direct evidence, and
common sense that when having repeated sexual liaisons with
V.M., [Appellant] knew such was the result of V.M. being a victim
of human trafficking. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 24 A.3d
396, 401 (Pa. Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Wallace,
817 A.2d
485, 490 (Pa. Super. 2002); and Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911
A.2d at 564, quoting Commonwealth v. Alford, 880 A.2d at 671
quoting Commonwealth v. Gruff, 822 A.2d at 776 (“‘An intent is a
subjective frame of mind, it is of necessity difficult of direct
proof[.] We must look to all the evidence to establish intent,
including, but not limited to, appellant’s conduct as it appeared to
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his eyes[.] Intent can be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct or from the
attendant circumstances.’”).
[Appellant] came into contact with V.M. through an
advertisement posted on Backpage.com depicting the
complainant clad scantily in lingerie, posed provocatively and
which also provided, inter alia, as follows: “…I’m on spring break
looking to go wild. I am looking for an [sic] generous man to
make me got [sic] wild! Any men up for the challenge? I am
doing In calls/out calls [sic].” See Commonwealth Exhibit C-1 –
Backpage.com Advertisement for V.M. Responding to this ad’s
contact cellular telephone number (215-821-xxxx), [Appellant]
arranged per Ray Justis to meet with V.M., and he during their
“encounter” specifically inquired of her whether she was a “cop.”
N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 97, 100-01. N.T., 9/7/17, pp. 29, 31. For his
four (4) “visits” with V.M., [Appellant] on each occasion paid Ray
Justis five hundred ($500.00) dollars in exchange for which he on
the later three (3) encounters had with the minor complainant
sexual intercourse. N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 95-96, 99-103. When
interviewed by Special Agent Goodhue, [Appellant] characterized
Ray Justis as V.M.’s “pimp.” N.T., 9/7/17, pp. 37, 40, 42. See
also Commonwealth Exhibits C-8—Stipulation, C-10—Cricket Cell
Phone Subscriber Information for Ray Justis (215-821-xxxx), C-
11—Cricket Cell Phone Records for Ray Justis (215-821-xxxx), C-
12—Special Agent Jennifer Batish Summary of Contacts between
[Appellant] and Ray Justis, and C-13—FBI FD-302 Interview
Form-[Appellant’s] Interview on May 8, 2015.
[Appellant] was advised during his third encounter with V.M.
of her constraining situation. Although he then voiced the desire
to remove her from those circumstances, [Appellant] being aware
that Ray Justis was then outside the hotel room took no such
action. N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 99, 100, 102-03. It was only on his next
and fourth liaison with V.M. and learning from her that Ray Justis
was not then about the hotel area that [Appellant] ferreted [V.M.]
from the hotel room and took her to his Aston residence. N.T.,
9/6/17, pp. 103-05.
On consideration of the totality of the evidence presented at
the trial, both direct and circumstantial, the same when viewed
most favorably to the prosecution established that at those times
[Appellant] had sexual intercourse with V.M., he knew that the
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same was “. . . the result of [V.M.] being a victim of human
trafficking.” . . .
The jury as the “sole judge of the credibility and weight of
all testimony” was “free to believe all, part of none of the
evidence.”
Trial Court Opinion, 12/26/18, at 34-37 (footnote and some legal and record
citations omitted).
Upon review, the trial court’s analysis is factually and legally seamless.
As any further commentary by this Court would be redundant, we proceed to
Appellant’s second claim.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the evidence did not support
his conviction of concealing the whereabouts of a child. The statute reads:
(a) Offense defined.--A person who removes a child from the
child’s known place of residence with the intent to conceal
the child’s whereabouts from the child’s parent or guardian,
unless concealment is authorized by court order or is a
reasonable response to domestic violence or child abuse,
commits a felony of the third degree. For purposes of this
subsection, the term “removes” includes personally
removing the child from the child’s known place of
residence, causing the child to be removed from the child’s
known place of residence, preventing the child from
returning or being returned to the child’s known place of
residence and, when the child’s parent or guardian has a
reasonable expectation that the person will return the child,
failing to return the child to the child’s known place of
residence.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2909.
Appellant claims that he was wrongly convicted under this statute
because he “did not remove [V.M.] from her known place of residence or
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prevent her from returning there.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant
continues:
Appellant did not know her place of residence, her parents’ home
in Rhode Island, until they parted company. Complainant came
and went as she pleased while living at Appellant’s home in
Delaware County, Appellant gave her a cell phone, and she was
returned to her parents’ home one week after receiving the phone,
when she called her mother.
Id.
Although Appellant cites the relevant statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2909, he
fails to cite any other pertinent authority to develop his argument, and does
not offer a meaningful analysis as to why the evidence supporting conviction
was insufficient.3 Our rules require an appellant to provide in the argument
section of his brief “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed
pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). See also Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959
A.2d 362, 371-72 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“When an appellant fails to develop his
issue in an argument and fails to cite any legal authority, the issue is
waived.”); Commonwealth v. Beshore,
916 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Pa. Super.
2007) (failure to develop an adequate argument in an appellate brief may
result in waiver of the claim under Pa.R.A.P. 2119).
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3 At this writing, Commonwealth v. Slocum,
86 A.3d 272 (Pa. Super. 2014),
is the only published opinion discussing sufficiency relative to 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2909. However, Appellant, like the trial court, could have cited related case
law; he did not.
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Appellant’s argument primarily assails the factual narrative set forth by
the trial court in its opinion. Appellant further states:
The story of this case tells of bad judgment by [Appellant]
and ugly criminal conduct on the part of Mr. Justis, but the
Commonwealth fails to establish the nexus required to convict and
it seeks to convict by associating the two men. The record does
not contain proof beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant]
removed complainant from a known place of residence with the
intent to conceal her whereabouts from her parent or guardian.
Appellant’s Brief at 19-20. We disagree.
In the absence of waiver, Appellant’s claim lacks merit. Again, the trial
court has thoroughly and scrupulously explained why Appellant’s argument
lacks merit, stating:
During their fourth paid for sexual liaison at the motel, V.M.
informed [Appellant] of Ray Justis’s then not being about the
motel’s immediate vicinity, which prompted [Appellant] to voice
that the two (2) together flee the motel. N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 103-
04. [Appellant] told her “... I can take you away from this. I have
my own place. … Like I’m good. I’ll take care of you. You don’t
have to worry about anything.” N.T., 9/6/17, p. 104. V.M. in
response directly acknowledged to [Appellant], “I’m a runaway.
I’m 16 and I don’t live anywhere near here. I’m not from here. I
don’t know where to go.” N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 104, 142. Although
knowing she was an underage runaway and prostituting for the
pimp, Ray, [Appellant] then took V.M. from the New Jersey motel
room to his Aston, Pennsylvania residence. N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 87-
88, 89, 93-94, 95-96, 104-05.
While at his home for approximately a month and a half,
V.M.’s contact was restricted to just [Appellant] and his family,
who were purposely misled at [Appellant’s] urging to believe that
[V.M.] was his online girlfriend from out-of-state. N.T., 9/6/17,
pp. 105, 111, 115, 117, 145. V.M. when at [Appellant’s] house
was confined to eating her meals in the bedroom she shared with
[Appellant], her actions routinely monitored by his family, and was
also prohibited by him from going outside the residence. N.T.,
9/6/17, pp. 110-12.
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Over the course of a few weeks, V.M. “begged and pleaded”
with [Appellant] to be given a cell phone and he eventually
obliged. N.T., 9/6/17, p. 112. When asked why [Appellant]
adamantly refused for a number of weeks to give her access to a
cellular phone which she regularly implored him to provide, V.M.
replied “. . . [H]e knew that I was going to reach out to somebody
and that I was going to break free . . .” N.T., 9/6/17, p. 115.
Despite his full appreciation of her being an underage
prostitute so working for the pimp, Ray, and status as a “runaway”
from another state, [Appellant] neither undertook any efforts to
return V.M. home nor even once made contact with law
enforcement authorities. N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 104, 142. Rather,
[Appellant] kept the minor complainant in the house and not only
limited her contact to the outside, but “hid” V.M. at the residence
under the false pretenses that she was his adult, online girlfriend
visiting from out-of-town, while continuing with the child
complainant his sexual relationship and demanding she greet him
in the nude. N.T., 9/6/17, pp. 105, 111, 113-14, 117, 145.
Throughout her testimony, V.M. related she acceded to
[Appellant’s] constraining control “[b]ecause I was afraid of what
would happen if I didn’t. . . . That I’d be kicked out in the middle
of somewhere where I don’t know anything or, you know, I – you
never know what someone else’s intent is. I didn’t know if he
was, you know, going to be abusive or anything like that, you
know. I was just scared.” N.T., 9/6/17, p. 114.
On a review of the totality of the circumstances seen most
favorable to the Commonwealth, the trial evidence as a matter of
law established that [Appellant] intended to “. . . prevent the child
from returning or being returned to the child’s known place of
residence . . .” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2909(a). . . .
Having enticed the minor prostitute to flee from her pimp with
repeated promises that he would take care of her and she would
have no further such worries, [Appellant] simply replaced Ray
Justis’s direct control of the underage runaway’s life with that of
his own, albeit limiting the child’s sexual services just to him.
…
It was the jury’s task to consider the material testimony
however they reasonably saw fit. The jury’s conclusion that the
trial evidence established [Appellant], a Pennsylvania resident,
harbored V.M. in his home and did not return [her] to her mother
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is on the instant record aptly supported. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2909(a)(b) and Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275-
76 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Trial Court Opinion, 12/26/8, at 39-42, 45.
For the above reasons, and in agreement with the trial court, we affirm
the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/31/19
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