Volume 225 — South Western Reporter

<p>I. Pleading <&wkey;433(3) — Complaint stating facts'showing cause of action supports judgment, though proceeding on wrong theory.</p> <p>In an action by a surety who paid a balance due on notes, the complaint, which set out the facts of payment and the assignment of the notes to the surety, is sufficient to state a cause of action where not attacked by exception or otherwise, even though it proceeded on the erroneous theory that the sureties’ rights were based on the notes, and in such case a judgment in favor of the surety on account of his payment cannot be questioned on the ground of the insufficiency of the complaint.</p> <p>'2. Appeal and error &wkey;»IOIO(l) — Findings supported by evidence not disturbed.</p> <p>A fact finding by the trial court, supported by evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal.</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <&wkey;421(3) — Discharge not a bar to claim of surety who had no notice.</p> <p>Discharge in bankruptcy will not bar the right of a surety who paid a debt due from the bankrupt, where the surety was not given the required notice, and had no actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings prior to payment, even though the debt was scheduled and other creditors given notice.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; W. C. Kimbrough, Special Judge.</p> <p>Suit by B. E. Hudgins and others against J. C. Davis and others. From judgment for plaintiffs, certain defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Lubbock County ; W. R. Spencer, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Alfalfa Lumber Company against J. P. Hope and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Eayette County; M. C. Jeffrey, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Mrs. Alma Koy against William Schneider, Tax Collector. Judgment of dismissal, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Schools and school districts &wkey;>lll — Court erred in dissolving temporary injunction against removing building, after decision by school authorities against removal.</p> <p>Where taxpayer obtained temporary injunction restraining school trustees and others from tearing down and relocating a school building, on a petition praying therefor, pending an appeal by the taxpayer to the county school superintendent, and the county superintendent and county board of trustees decided in taxpayer’s favor, and trustees of the school district filed motion to dissolve the injunction, in answer to which taxpayer filed supplemental petition showing the decision in his favor, court erred in granting the motion and dissolving the temporary injunction; it being alleged in the supplemental petition that the trustees were threatening and preparing to remove the building, regardless of the decision of the county superintendent.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Marshall Thomas, Special Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the L. Wolff Manufacturing Company of Texas against J. M. Miller. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Bowie County; H. E. O’Neal, Judge.</p> <p>Action' by W. D. Sanders against J. D. Looney and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.</p>

Error from District Court, Brooks County; V. W. Taylor, Judge. Suit for partition between Juan Zarate and others and Marcello Cantu and others. To review judgment for the latter, the former bring error.

O. Beard, Judge. Action by Haywood Callicut against Pearl Wight, receiver, and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. The appellee and a fellow workman were directed by their foreman to fasten two cars together with chains, so that the switch engine could switch the same. The drawhead of one of the cars, which was in a line of ears, was gone.

<p>1. Appeal and error <&wkey;232(3) — Appellant not entitled to have review of charge on objection not made below.</p> <p>Where the specific objection to a charge urged on appeal that it was on the weight of the evidence was not made in the trial court, so that the trial court had no opportunity to cure the error, if any, appellant is not entitled to have the matter reviewed in the Court of Civil Appeals.</p> <p>2. Appeal and error <&wkey;231 (9) — Objection to whole charge too general.</p> <p>Objection to the “whole” of the charge of the trial court on the ground that “it is so framed that, when taken as a whole and considering each of the paragraphs and questions therein together, it is on the weight of the evidence,” was too general to be of any value in pointing out errors in the charge or in securing revision of any matter to which it related.</p> <p>3. Trial <&wkey;l94(!7) — Instruction in personal injury action held not on weight of evidence.</p> <p>In an action against the federal Director General of Railroads for injuries to a drayman whose ankle was crushed by a tombstone on a station platform, which fell on him as he, with others, was moving a cooking range to a car, instruction, after defining ordinary care and negligence, as to the duty of defendant, his servants and employes, to exercise ordinary care, etc., held not on the weight of the evidence.</p> <p>4. Trial <&wkey;>l39( I) — Evidence must leave no roam for difference to justify taking question from jury.</p> <p>To authorize the trial court to take a question. of fact from the jury, the evidence must be of such a character that there is no room for ordinary minds to differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from it.</p> <p>5. Railroads <&wkey;282(5) — Evidence held to establish negligence in placing tombstone on station platform.</p> <p>In an action for injuries to a drayman whose ankle was crushed by a falling tombstone on' a railroad station platform past which he and others were moving a stove toward a car, evidence ¡held to warrant findings of the jury that the stone which fell on plaintiff and injured him was not so placed on the platform as to be reasonably safe for persons to pass it, conveying freight. “</p> <p>6. Railroads <&wkey;282(8) — -Negligence in placing tombstone on station platform question for jury.</p> <p>The fact that heavy freight had been moved over a railroad platform before the time of injury to a drayman thereon through fall of a tombstone was not sufficient to establish as matter of law that the railroad was not guilty of negligence in the manner in which the tombstone was placed, or that the same was not the proximate cause of the injury; such matters being issuable facts for the jury.</p>

<p>I. Brokers <&wkey;54, 61(1), 63(1) — Broker entitled to commission on procuring ready and willing customer; commission for procuring customer not to be defeated by refusal to-convey or failure of title.</p> <p>Where an owner of land employs a broker to procure a purchaser for the land on stated terms, the broker is entitled to the agreed commission if he procures a customer ready, able, and willing to purchase on the authorized terms, and his right cannot be defeated by the refusal of the owner to convey or by the failure of the owner’s title.</p> <p>2. Brokers <&wkey;88( 14) — Finding that purchaser refused to purchase held not to defeat right to commission.</p> <p>Where the jury found that the purchaser procured by broker was ready, able, and willing to purchase on the terms stated to the broker, a subsequent finding that he refused .to purchase on terms agreed on with the owner evidently referred to additional terms agreed on between the parties, after the vendor’s failure to give possession as agreed because he had rented part of the land, and such finding does not prevent recovery by the broker of his commission.</p>

<p>1. Mines and minerals <g=o58 — Oil and gas lease held not void for want of consideration.</p> <p>Oil and gas lease, requiring lessee to begin drilling within one year and to prosecute work with reasonable diligence, Midi not void for want of consideration, such promise by lessee being a sufficient consideration for the rights and interest granted by lessors.</p> <p>2. Mines and minerals <&wkey;>58 — Failure to pay consideration immaterial in view of other consideration.</p> <p>Where inducing consideration for oil and gas lease to lessors was the development of the mineral resources of the' land in the section where lessors’ land is situated and the covenant on the part of lessee to drill well, lessee’s failure to pay the $1 named as consideration was immaterial.</p> <p>3. Mines and minerals <&wkey;58 — Lease not void for uncertainty as to where well was to be drilled.</p> <p>Where oil and gas lease referred to a number of similar leases contemporaneously executed, and required lessee to drill well in area of land covered by all leases, without designating particular land on which well was to be drilled, the uncertainty as to where well might be drilled did not render lease ineffectual, but could be explained by extrinsic evidence to show the meaning the parties placed on it.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Henderson County; John S. Prince, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by D. A. Tanner against the Athens Electric Light & Power Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; W. S. Anderson, Judge.</p> <p>Irwin Bailey, alias C. E. Bailey, was convicted of theft, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; W. S. Anderson, Judge.</p> <p>Irwin Bailey, alias C. E. Bailey, was convicted of theft, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Gray County; W. B.. Ewing, Judge.</p> <p>Action by G. C. Davis against C. D. Garner. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal fr.om Tarrant County Court; W. P. Walker, Judge.</p> <p>Action by C. T. Scott against the Texas State Bank of Ft. Worth. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

L. Manry, Judge. Action between Amos Burnett, as next friend of William Burnett, and Florence Adare Foster and others. Judgment for the latter, and the former appeals.

<p>1. Chattel mortgages <@=>229(3) — Evidence held to show mortgagee authorized mortgagor to sell cotton.</p> <p>In suit for the amount of promissory notes and to foreclose chattel mortgage lien on mules, automobile, and cotton raised by one defendant, and against the other defendant for conversion of the cotton, evidence held to show that plaintiff mortgagee authorized defendant mortgagor to sell the cotton and to receive the money therefor.</p> <p>2. Chattel mortgages <®=»136 —- Mortgagee may waive lien. •</p> <p>A mortgagee may by his words or acts waive his lien on the property covered.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Fannin County; Ben H. Denton, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Emma Morrow and others against R. L. Bright and another. Judgment for plaintiffs, and the named defendant appeals.</p> <p>Appellees Emma Morrow, J. B. Tanner, C. B. Tanner, and Jennie A. Goodwin, were the children and only heirs of J. N. Tanner, who died intestate August 24, 1918. Their suit against Ollie Bright and appellant R. L. Bright was to recover $1,500, the proceeds, they alleged, of a sale by the Brights of an interest said J. N. Tanner owned in a crop of cotton grown by him and Ollie Bright on land they rented of appellant for the year 1918. The theory on which said appellees sought the recovery was that the Brights had "unlawfully converted said proceeds to their own use. In his pleadings and in his testimony as a witness R. L. Bright denied that he rented the land to Ollie Bright and J. N. Tanner-join tly, but alleged and testified that he rented it to Ollie Bright alone. He was supported in his contention by both the pleadings and testimony of Ollie Bright, but the jury found to the contrary on special issues submitted to them, that is, they found that R. L. Bright rented the land to both Ollie Bright and J. N. Tanner, and further found that the latter were “partners in the crop.” On these findings and others he made himself the trial court rendered judgment in favor of appel-lees against R. L. Bright and Ollie Bright for the sum of $881.48.</p> <p>The appeal from the judgment is by R. L. Bright alone.</p>

<p>1. Vendor and purchaser @=5229(10), 235— One taking conveyance of undivided interest with power to recover held innocent ¡purchaser, although owner of other undivided interest had notice.</p> <p>Where R. gave plaintiff a power of attorney to recover and perfect the record title to land which had been sold under foreclosure and, in consideration of his services and expenses, conveyed him an undivided half interest in the land, and plaintiff performed such services and purchased the land from the mortgagee without knowledge of defendant’s claim under an unrecorded judgment of the United States District Court, such services were a sufficient consideration to support plaintiff’s claim of innocent purchase of one-half of the land, though the purchase from the mortgagee was also for R.’s benefit and R. had knowledge of the proceedings and judgment in the federal court.</p> <p>2. Vendor and purchaser @=3239(8) — Owner of undivided interest purchasing other interest held innocent purchaser.</p> <p>Where R. gave plaintiff power of attorney to recover and perfect title to land sold under foreclosure and convey him an undivided interest therein and plaintiff purchased the land from the mortgagee, his subsequent purchase of R.’s interest without knowledge of defendant’s claim under an unrecorded federal court judgment gave him title to all of the land as an innocent purchaser, notwithstafiding R.’s knowledge of defendant’s claim.</p>

<p>1. Witnesses <@=>160(1) — 'Testimony to conversation between defendant and deceased is incompetent.</p> <p>Testimony by an heir of deceased in an action by the administrator as to a conversation she heard between the deceased and defendant is incompetent, under Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 3690, excluding testimony as to transaction with or statement by deceased.</p> <p>2. Witnesses 139(9) — Heir is incompetent to testify in action by administrator.</p> <p>In an action by an administrator, an heir of deceased is essentially a party, though not nominally a party, and she is therefore incompetent to testify to a transaction with deceased, under Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 3690, forbidding such testimony by a party.</p> <p>3. Witnesses <@=>159(13) — Testimony by defendant as to payments to others for deceased is competent.</p> <p>In an action by an administrator to recover funds entrusted by deceased to defendant, testimony by defendant that he made payments to others to procure conveyances of property to deceased is competent, since such payments did not amount to a transaction with deceased.</p> <p>4. Witnesses <@=>126 — Statute excluding testimony of transactions with deceased not extended by construction.</p> <p>The terms of Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 3696, forbidding testimony of transactions with deceased, will not be so extended by judicial construction as to exclude testimony not expressly excluded by its provisions.</p> <p>5. Trial <@=>194(9) — Instruction as to settlement held erroneous as on weight of evidence.</p> <p>In an action by an administrator to recover funds intrusted by deceased to defendant, an instruction that, if the jury found from the evidence, taking into consideration the long lapse of time, the friendly relations between deceased and defendant, and the other circumstances, that there was a full settlement, they should find for defendant, was erroneous as on the weight of the evidence.</p> <p>6. Appeal and error <@=>1215 — Opinion on former appeal held not to authorize instruction.</p> <p>An opinion on a former appeal of a case which recited certain facts shown by the evidence as strongly tending to support the defense of settlement, but which stated in substance that the issue of such settlement was one of fact for the jury, did not justify the giving of an instruction on the issue of settlement which pointed out the circumstances so as to be on the weight of the evidence.</p> <p>7. Appeal and error <@=>1064(2) — Instruction on weight of evidence held prejudicial.</p> <p>Uncontradicted testimony that deceased had stated she had made full settlement with defendant in connection with lapse of time without demand for settlement does not establish conclusively that such settlement had been made, where there was other testimony that the statement referred to a different settlement and other circumstances negatived settlement,' so that an instruction on the issue of settlement which commented on the weight of the evidence was prejudicial to plaintiffs.</p> <p>8. Trial <@=>234(7) — Charge burden was on plaintiff erroneous, where disputed issues were on confession and avoidance. '</p> <p>In an action by an administrator on written instruments found in possession of decedent, whose execution, was not denied by defendant, where the only defense was in the nature of confession and avoidance, an instruction that the burden was on plaintiff to establish his right to recover by a preponderance of the evidence was misleading and erroneous.</p>

<p>Appeal and error <§=>387(3) — Appellants required to file bond within- 30 days after notice of appeal given.</p> <p>Where the term of court at which judgment was rendered might have continued more than 8 weeks, and did continue more than 8 weeks after trial was begun, and some of the defendants did not reside in the county, under Rev. St. 1911, art. 2084, defendant appellants were required to file appeal bond within 30 days after their notice of appeal was given to give the Court of Civil Appeals jurisdiction.</p>

<p>Error from Jones County Court; J. E. Lindsey, Judge.</p> <p>Action between J. M. Carter and the Wichita Valley Railway Company. Judgment for the former, and the latter brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Cherokee County; L. D. Guinn, Judge.</p> <p>Action by T. A. Arrant against Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads. From a judgment for plaintiff, < defendant appeals.</p>

A. Ward, Judge. Suit by Oscar M. Pynes and others against Mrs. Sallie Pynes and others, for partition. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

<p>Appeal from District Court, Harris County; Henry j. Dannenbaum, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by - Mary Belle Minor and another against Fannie Mott Hall and others. From judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>1. Death <@=58 (2) — Adult child’s loss of support not presumed.</p> <p>When a child reaches its majority, parent’s legal duty to support it ceases, and, in absence of proof, it cannot be presumed that such support will be continued so’as to justify recovery under the federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665) for loss thereof through the parent’s death.</p> <p>2. Death <©=>95(3) — Child’s damages under federal Employers’ Liability Act iimited to benefits expected during minority.</p> <p>Under federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), damages recoverable by deceased’s children are restricted to the benefits they might have expected to receive during minority, unless proof is made of unusual facts showing that child might reasonably expect support after reaching majority.</p> <p>3. Appeal and error <@=1064(1) — Too broad instruction on damages for death held prejudicial.</p> <p>In action under federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), for death of a fireman, an instruction, which did not restrict the jury to benefits that might have been expected during minority of children, held prejudicial error, where it was not dear that the jury did not go beyond the limits authorized by law.</p> <p>4. Death <@=67 — Probability of railroad em-ployé’s promotion admissible.</p> <p>In an action under federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665) for death of a fireman who had previously acted as locomotive engineer, evidence showing decedent’s probable chance of being again employed as engineer and the wages he would then receive is admissible.</p> <p>5. Master and servant <@=270(9) — Evidence of other defects in railroad track admissible.</p> <p>In action for death of- locomotive fireman caused by defects in a spur track, admitting proof of defects at other points than where the accident occurred, was not erroneous where it appeared the track was in the same condition throughout its entire length.</p> <p>On Motion for Rehearing.</p> <p>6. Appeal and error <@=719 (9) — Verdict unsupported constitutes fundamenta! error, reviewable without assignment of error.</p> <p>A verdict under the federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), which awarded deceased’s children damages for expected benefits, not alleged in the pleadings, nor supported by the evidence, constitutes fundamental error, which may be considered, although the assignment of error presented a question of law, and did not complain that there was no evidence supporting the verdict.</p> <p>Buck, J., dissenting.</p>

Jones, Judge. Suit by James Lafarelle against F. E. Gillett, A. A. Newell, and another, wherein, after plaintiff’s death, his widow, Concepcion Lafarelle, as executrix, intervened. From judgment for plaintiff executrix, defendant Newell appeals.

<p>1. Appeal and error >&wkey;97l(2) — Witness’ qualification to express opinion not reviewed except for manifest mistake.</p> <p>The trial court’s ruling regarding a witness’ qualification to express an opinion will not be reviewed except for manifest mistake or abuse of discretion.</p> <p>2. Evidence-&wkey;>491 — Witness qualified to state usual time of transporting cattle.</p> <p>A witness’ testimony that he annually shipped 30 to 100 carloads of cattle between certain points and had accompanied several horse shipments between such points qualified him to state the usual, customary running time between the points involved.</p> <p>3. Evidence &wkey;>472(I) — Opinion as to usual and customary time for cattle to be in transit admissible.</p> <p>Testimony regarding the usual and customary time for a cattle shipment to be in transit, between specified points held- admissible against the objection that it was an opinion on a mixed question of law and fact.</p> <p>4. Appeal and error <&wkey; 1070(1) — Verdict according to general charge, instead of erroneous special charge, not reversible error.</p> <p>The fact that a verdict was returned in accordance with the general charge, instead of an erroneous special charge tendered by appellant, does not constitute reversible error.</p> <p>5. Carriers &wkey;»228(3) — Evidence as to result of exposing cattle to ticks and fever admissible.</p> <p>Where plaintiff claimed his cattle had been depreciated in value during transit by defendant railroad exposing them to ticks and fever, testimony regarding the result of exposing cattle to such diseases is admissible.</p> <p>6. Carriers (&wkey;230(l) — Amount of depreciation in market value of cattle held for the jury.</p> <p>Evidence regarding the sales price of cattle transported by defendant railroad, the average excess shrinkage, etc., 'held to make the amount of depreciation in market value a jury question.</p> <p>7. Witnesses <&wkey;275(8) — Attorney called by adverse party may offer explanation on cross-examination.</p> <p>In action for damage to a cattle shipment where defendant required plaintiff’s attorney to identify a letter submitting a smaller damage claim than the amount sued for, the witness may explain on cross-examination that he subsequently received additional information regarding the amount of damage.</p> <p>8. Carriers <&wkey;230(3) — Delay in cattle shipment held for the jury.</p> <p>Evidence that it required 60 hours to transport cattle between specified points, whereas the usual and customary time was 25 to 30 hours, held- to make the issue of delay a jury question.</p> <p>9. Carriers <§=»228(5) — Evidence held to establish that carrier placed cattle in unclean pens.</p> <p>Evidence that cattle were delivered to defendant railroad and by it delivered to consignee in unclean pens sufficiently establishes that the railroad placed them in the pens, at least in the absence of an explanation by defendant.</p> <p>Harper, C. J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; J. T. Sluder, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Ernest Fellbaum against the American Indemnity Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Denton County ; C. R. Pearman, Judge.</p> <p>Action by C. F. Wakefield against the Avery Company of Texas and another. From a judgment denying the Avery Company’s plea of privilege, it appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Angelina County; L. D. Guinn, Judge.</p> <p>Action by H. C. Robinson against the Western Union Telegraph Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Eastland. County; E. A. Hill, Judge.</p> <p>Louis Fitzgerald entered into bail bond, which was forfeited, and from judgment for the State against him and his sureties, two of the sureties appeal.</p>

<p>Criminal law <&wkey;I094 — No questions presented in absence of statement of facts or bill of exceptions.</p> <p>In the absence of statement of facts or bill of exceptions, no questions for review are presented, and the judgment will be affirmed.</p>

<p>1. Corporations @=123(11) — A pledgee, having notice of rights of true owner of stock, can acquire no better title than apparent owner can transfer.</p> <p>When one dealing as pledgee with an apparent owner of corporate stock has notice ot rights of true owner, he can acquire no better title to the stock than the apparent owner can transfer.</p> <p>2. Appeal and error <©=>930(3) — .Questions not covered by special issues presumed to have been found by court in favor of judgment.</p> <p>In eases tried before a jury, questions not submitted to the jury will be presumed to have been found by the court in favor of the judgment, if there is any evidence to support such conclusion.</p> <p>3. Corporations <©=123 (17) — Evidence sufficient to support finding that bank was put on notice as to ownership ot stock.</p> <p>In an action against a bank for conversion of corporate stock pledged, evidence held sufficient to. sustain a finding that the bank had notice that plaintiff was the true owner of the stock, which was pledged as collateral by another.</p> <p>4. Corporations @=123(22) — Pledgee of stock delivering it to improper person guilty ot conversion.</p> <p>Where bank on payment of note delivered corporate stock held as collateral to the person who placed the stock with the bank, when it knew that the stock should be delivered to another, who was the true owner of the stock, it was guilty of conversion.</p> <p>5. Banks and banking @=l 16(1) — Notice to cashier notice to bank.</p> <p>Notice to a cashier of a bank is notice to the bank.</p> <p>'6. Banks and banking @=l 16(1) — Notice to officer having general supervision notice to bank.</p> <p>Notice to a bank officer or one having for the bank general supervision of the business embracing a certain transaction was notice to the bank.</p> <p>■ 7. Corporations @=123(17) — Measure of damages for conversion of corporate stock stated.</p> <p>In an action against a bank for damages for conversion of corporate stock placed as collateral to a note, the measure of damages was the value of the stock at the time converted, less‘the amount of the note.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Lipscomb County; W. R. Ewing, Judge.</p> <p>Action by R. P. Clay against Newton Peterson and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and •defendants appeal.</p>

Error from District Court, Nueces County ; W. B. Hopkins, Judge. Suit by R. H. Boatner against the Providence-Washington Insurance Company and others. To review judgment for plaintiff, defendants bring error.

<p>1. Receivers <@=»59 — Collateral attack on appointment improper.</p> <p>Where plaintiff receiver, suing a stockholder on a note for his stock subscription, was appointed in a former suit against the corporation, defendant’s plea that the suit against the corporation was collusively instituted to avoid frauds practiced on the stockholders was a collateral attack on the order of appointment, and could not be maintained.</p> <p>2. Judgment <&wkey;678(6) — Judgment in favor of receiver will bar creditors represented.</p> <p>Judgment rendered in favor of receiver of an insolvent corporation suing its debtor on a stock subscription will, when paid, be a complete bar to any further suit in behalf of the same creditors represented by the receiver.</p> <p>3. Corporations <&wkey;92 — Subscriber cannot escape liability on note given for stock where he participated in meetings.</p> <p>Subscriber to stock in a bonding and casualty insurance company whose subscription contract stipulated it was payable in moneys or securities satisfactory to the insurance department, and who gave his note therefor, cannot escape Eability thereon on the ground that by Const, art. 12, § 6, and Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1146, a corporation is forbidden to issue stock except for money paid, labor done, or property actually received reasonably worth the amount of the stock; such subscriber having participated in stockholder’s meetings, etc.</p>