Volume 226 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The respondent attorney appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court suspending him from the practice of law for a period of ninety days as a result of his inaction while representing a client that led to the dismissal, with prejudice, of the client's personal injury lawsuit. The petitioner, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, filed a presentment complaint against the respondent, alleging the misconduct at issue after a reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee conducted a hearing and concluded that the respondent had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the grievance complaint, in which he claimed that he was denied his right to due process and prejudiced as a result of numerous, extensive delays in the adjudication of the complaint. The reviewing committee denied that motion and then proceeded with the remainder of the hearing on the misconduct complaint. The reviewing committee found that there was no evidence that the respondent had suffered any prejudice and concluded that his violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct war- ranted a reprimand. The reviewing committee further determined that it was required to direct the petitioner to file the presentment pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 2-47 (d) (1)) because the respondent had received three disciplinary reprimands in the five years prior to the filing of the grievance complaint at issue. The Statewide Grievance Committee upheld the reviewing committee's decision. The respondent did not appeal from either of those rulings. At the presentment hearing, the trial court stated that it was bound by the findings of the reviewing committee and that, pursuant to Practice Book § 2-47 (d) (1), the hearing was limited to determining the penalty to be imposed. The court stated that it considered the totality of the circumstances in fashioning its penalty and noted the respondent's lack of a sense of responsibility for the behavior underlying the presentment and his lack of any expression of contrition. Held: 1. The respondent could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred when it failed to consider his assertion that his due process rights were violated and that he was prejudiced as result of the delay in the underlying disciplinary proceedings: the respondent had sufficient process available to him by way of an appeal from the reviewing commit- tee's denial of his motion to dismiss, but because he failed to appeal from that determination, he was precluded from raising his due process claim before the trial court; moreover, the respondent's assertion that he could not have appealed from the reviewing committee's ruling because the reviewing committee ordered presentment rather than imposing sanctions or conditions was unavailing, as the applicable rule of practice (§ 2-38) provides thirty days to file an appeal to the court, and Practice Book § 2-47 (d) (2) makes clear that a reviewing commit- tee's denial of a motion to dismiss is a final decision subject to appellate review; furthermore, any appeal from the denial of the respondent's motion to dismiss had to be taken before the matter was presented to the trial court, as Practice Book § 2-47 (d) (1) precludes the court from considering facts or evidence that do not directly address what action the court should take regarding the respondent's misconduct, which was the sole issue to be determined in the presentment hearing. 2. This court could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by suspending the respondent from the practice of law for a period of ninety days: a. The respondent's claim that the trial court improperly refused to consider the delay in the underlying disciplinary proceedings as a mitigat- ing factor in determining his punishment was not tenable: contrary to the respondent's assertion that the court's interruptions of his testimony indicated that it mistakenly believed it was precluded from considering his due process rights and the delay in the underlying proceedings as a mitigating factor, the court's statement that it was limited to determining the respondent's penalty was an attempt to redirect his testimony, as the respondent was attempting to make the very due process attack that the court had warned it would not entertain; moreover, the respondent was given ample time to testify about the delay as a mitigating factor, and both parties' counsel discussed aggravating and mitigating factors, some of which the court referenced in its written decision; furthermore, the court was free to credit or reject the respondent's testimony, and the absence of discussion of the delay as a mitigating factor in the court's decision was of no consequence, as the court was not required to set forth its express consideration of specific evidence. b. This court found unavailing the respondent's claim that the ninety day suspension imposed against him was excessive and out of proportion to the offense he committed: the respondent failed to demonstrate that the trial court acted arbitrarily by ordering the ninety day suspension, as it was required under Practice Book § 2-47 (d) (1) to consider the nature of the respondent's misconduct and the prior disciplinary mea- sures imposed against him during the five year period prior to the filing of the grievance complaint at issue; moreover, the record showed that the court heard evidence regarding relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, asked both parties questions regarding those factors and pro- vided ample time for their responses, and made specific reference to several of those factors in its decision; accordingly, this court could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the appropriate discipline for the respondent. Argued October 11, 2023—officially released June 11, 2024

The plaintiff, the executor of the estate of R, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Department of Social Services, denying R's application for long-term Medicaid benefits. R and the plaintiff estab- lished a trust for which they were both the grantors and the beneficiaries. Pursuant to the terms of the trust, R and the plaintiff retained the right to withdraw the trust property, which included certain real property in Old Lyme, and to revoke the agreement so long as they were not incapacitated. R was later admitted to a long-term care facility and applied for long-term care Medicaid benefits. The defendant sent a written request to R's authorized representative, indicating that the defendant had determined that the Old Lyme property was owned by the trust and asking for verification of ownership in the event that its determination was incorrect. R's representative did not provide any information in response to the request, either disputing the ownership of the Old Lyme property or arguing that it should not be included in the determination of R's Medicaid eligibility. R died, and, a few months later, the defendant denied R's application for Medicaid benefits because the value of his assets exceeded the program's eligibility limit. M, the plaintiff's attorney, filed an administrative appeal from the denial of the application, claiming that the defendant improperly had included the trust assets in its calculation of R's eligibility because R was incapable of revoking the trust to access its assets. At the administrative hearing, M testified and submitted an affidavit, the substance of which was that R was not competent to revoke the trust. The defendant's hearing officer concluded that M's affidavit was not sufficient evidence to make a determination regarding R's mental capacity and, accordingly, that the defendant properly denied R's application because, in light of the value of the Old Lyme property alone, R's assets exceeded the limit for Medicaid eligibility. The plaintiff filed an administrative appeal in the Superior Court, which dismissed the appeal. Held: 1. The trial court appropriately determined that the defendant's hearing officer did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of her discretion in determining that the Old Lyme property was an available asset for purposes of calculating R's Medicaid eligibility and that decision was supported by substantial evidence: the plaintiff's argument that the Old Lyme property was not ''actually available'' pursuant to the applica- ble statute (§ 17b-261 (c)) for purposes of calculating Medicaid eligibility because R was not legally capable of revoking the trust was not persua- sive, as the hearing officer determined that M's affidavit and testimony were not sufficient to establish incapacity, the plaintiff did not provide any other evidence to support R's alleged mental incapacity, such as medical evidence or third-party testimony or statements, and this court could not retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the hearing officer with respect to the weight of the evidence. 2. The defendant did not violate due process by failing to provide, in its written request for verification of ownership of the Old Lyme property, notice that the revocability of the trust was at issue in determining R's eligibility for Medicaid benefits: contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, the defendant's request for information did not qualify under the applicable federal regulation (42 C.F.R. § 435.917 (a)) as a decision affecting R's Medicaid eligibility because, according to the clear language of the request, the application remained pending and the defendant was requesting additional information in order to make a decision regarding R's eligibility; moreover, any argument that the defendant was required to request information from the plaintiff regarding R's mental capacity failed because the burden of establishing eligibility was on R; further- more, the defendant provided notice of its decision to deny Medicaid benefits once that decision had been made; additionally, at M's request, the plaintiff received a full hearing on the issue of R's incompetency following the denial of the application even though that issue had not been asserted previously. Argued November 7, 2023—officially released June 11, 2024

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia, breach of contract and unjust enrichment in connection with an alleged oral agreement pursuant to which the defendants agreed to sell to the plaintiff certain residential property after he performed repairs to it. The plaintiff claimed that he expended substantial funds and personal labor with the understanding that the agreed upon purchase price would be in compensation for the labor and materials he supplied. The defen- dants filed an answer to the amended complaint, asserting that they did not agree to sell the property to the plaintiff. At trial, the court admitted into evidence an exhibit offered by the plaintiff that documented the tasks that the plaintiff claimed to have performed at the property and his hours worked. The plaintiff testified that he used a project management software program to create the table of tasks in the exhibit from data that he contemporaneously entered as he worked. The court found that, although there was no agreement to sell the property, the plaintiff had incurred certain costs for materials and labor to rehabilitate the property and rendered judgment for the plaintiff on his unjust enrichment claim. In awarding the plaintiff damages for his labor, the court found that the plaintiff's evidence of his labor was unreliable, specifically, his exhibit documenting the number of hours he had worked, and, instead, relied on E's valuation of the plaintiff's services. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendants on his breach of contract claim because the court failed to consider judicial admissions allegedly made by the defendants in their original answers as to the existence of a contract: although the defendants' original answers asserted that they had agreed to sell the property for a reduced price because the plaintiff is the defendant E's son, the defendants' amended answer denied the existence of an agreement, which was consistent with E's testimony at trial; moreover, the amended answer had been filed more than two In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that party's identity may be ascertained. months before trial, and the plaintiff had filed a reply to the special defenses asserted therein. 2. The trial court, in ruling on the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, erred in finding that the plaintiff's evidence of his labor was unreliable: the court's decision rested on clearly erroneous factual findings as to how the exhibit depicting the plaintiff's logged work hours was created, as the plaintiff's uncontroverted testimony was that his hours were recorded contemporaneously and that he had entered his hours into the computer program, which recorded the hours over a period of time, not that the hours were based on the plaintiff's memory as to the number of hours worked, or that they were a product of computations created by the software; moreover, because the trial court's clearly erroneous factual findings as to the plaintiff's exhibit constituted harmful error, this court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial as to his unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims. Submitted on briefs February 13—officially released June 11, 2024

B Co., which held a note that was secured by a mortgage on the plaintiff's property, filed a motion to intervene in postjudgment summary process eviction proceedings for the limited purpose of asserting its rights with respect to use and occupancy payments made by the defendants and participating in any proceedings to determine the final distribution of those funds. The trial court held a hearing in accordance with the applicable statute (§ 47a-35b), and denied B Co.'s motion to intervene, determining that B Co. was not a proper party to the eviction action because it did not have a possessory interest in the real property. On B Co.'s appeal to this court, held that the trial court improperly failed to permit B Co. to intervene in the postjudgment proceedings as a matter of right, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant B Co.'s motion to inter- vene and for further proceedings in accordance with § 47a-35b: pursuant to the four factor test for intervention as of right, which the trial court improperly failed to consider, this court had jurisdiction over the appeal because B Co. demonstrated a colorable claim of intervention as of right, such that the denial of its motion for intervention was a final judgment for purposes of appeal; moreover, the trial court improperly denied the motion to intervene on its merits because the motion was clearly timely, as it was filed with the trial court during the pendency of the appeal from the judgment of possession for the express purpose of vindicating rights under § 47a-35b, pursuant to which the trial court was not required to hold a hearing until the final disposition of the appeal, B Co. had a direct right to the subject matter of the postjudgment litigation, as neither the plaintiff nor the defendants contested B Co.'s assertion that it had a contractual right to the use and occupancy pay- ments, that right was a substantial one, as reflected in the amount of the accumulated use and occupancy payments at issue, B Co.'s interest would likely be impaired by any disposition in which it was not permitted to participate because § 47a-35b expressly provides that the court's distribution of the accumulated use and occupancy payments is to be conclusive, and B Co.'s interest in the use and occupancy payments was clearly adverse to the interests of the plaintiff and the defendants, and, accordingly, the existing parties to the litigation would not ade- quately protect B Co.'s interest in obtaining the use and occupancy payments; furthermore, because the § 47a-35b hearing was separate and distinct from the underlying eviction action, whether B Co. had a possessory interest in the property that was subject to the eviction action was not a proper consideration for the trial court in determining whether to grant the motion to intervene, instead, the court should have determined whether B Co. had a sufficient interest in the § 47a-35b hearing, and such interest was apparent from the record. Argued March 11—officially released June 11, 2024

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision of the defendant board of assessment appeals, which upheld the revaluation of the plaintiff's residential dwelling and the declassification of his nonresidential land as farmland by the town tax assessor. During a trial to the court, the plaintiff presented testimony from H, a licensed appraiser, that the residential portion of the plaintiff's property was valued at $105,000, a valuation which exceeded the asses- sor's allegedly excessive valuation. The court thereafter suggested that it could rely on the $105,000 valuation given by H and issue a decision only as to the plaintiff's claim regarding the declassification of his nonres- idential property, and counsel for both parties agreed. Following trial, the court determined that the plaintiff had abandoned his claim regarding the valuation of his residential dwelling during the trial and that the nonresidential property was not currently being used as farmland in accordance with the factors set forth in the applicable statute (§ 12- 107c). Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in determining that he had abandoned his claim regarding the proper valuation of his residential dwelling; because the plaintiff's counsel agreed with the court at trial that it did not have to resolve the plaintiff's claim regarding the valuation of his residential dwelling and expressly assented to the court's suggestion that it needed to address only the claim regarding the declassification of the plaintiff's nonresidential property as farmland, the plaintiff had abandoned his claim regarding the valua- tion of his residential dwelling. 2. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly considered the factors set forth in § 12-107c (a) in determining whether the plaintiff's nonresi- dential property was still being used as a farm for purposes of the statute (§ 12-504h) governing the termination of a farmland classification was unavailing: this court determined that it was clear that, when §§ 12-107c and 12-504h are read together, the declassification of property previously classified as farmland occurs when the use of such land is changed or when the property is sold by the record owner, and the fact that an assessor makes no actual change in the classification of a property previously classified as farmland for many years after the occurrence of one of the triggering events in § 12-504h is irrelevant; moreover, in the present case, the assessor was required to conduct a townwide revaluation of all the properties for the town's grand list and, during the course of his townwide revaluation, the assessor conducted a field review of the plaintiff's nonresidential property, determined that it was not in actual use as farmland and declassified it as farmland, and the plain language of §§ 12-107c and 12-504h, read within the context of the overall statutory scheme affording favorable tax treatment to certain undeveloped property and case law applying that scheme, makes clear that it was proper for the trial court to consider the factors set forth in § 12-107c when it affirmed the assessor's determination. 3. The trial court's finding concerning the current use of the plaintiff's nonresidential property was not clearly erroneous as there was ample evidence in the record to support the court's determination that the current use of that property did not constitute farm use: in making its determination, the court relied on the assessor's examination of the plaintiff's nonresidential property and his testimony that, inter alia, he had not seen any farming activity on the nonresidential property and had seen sheep on such property on only one occasion when he observed a few sheep run out of the plaintiff's barn, and that he took into account the factors set forth in § 12-107c (a), including the acreage of the land, the portion of the land in actual use for farming or agricultural opera- tions, the productivity of the land or lack thereof, the gross income derived therefrom, or losses, as here, and the nature and value of the equipment, or lack thereof, used in connection therewith; moreover, although the plaintiff testified that his prior use of the nonresidential property consisted of raising multiple species and breeds of livestock and animals, he also testified that during the townwide revaluation he only had four female sheep on his nonresidential property and that he no longer had any farming equipment, such as a tractor or lifting equip- ment, on the nonresidential property. Argued November 13, 2023—officially released June 11, 2024

The plaintiff, an entity that collected taxes for the city of Torrington, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant's claim for an exemption from execution. In 2020, the plaintiff served a bank execution to secure funds from the defendant's bank account to collect on personal property taxes assessed against a business with which the defendant formerly had been involved. Although the defendant had previously provided the plaintiff with her address in California, the plaintiff did not send a tax bill or a personal written demand to the defendant at that address, as required pursuant to statute (§ 12-155 (a)). In 2021, the trial court granted the defendant's claim for an exemption from execution, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the § 12-155 (a) requirement to send notice of the tax debt to the defendant's last known address and that the bank execution was not properly issued because the plaintiff had failed to provide notice of the underlying tax bill to the defendant. The plaintiff appealed from that judgment to this court but later withdrew the appeal, abandoning any claim of error with respect to that decision. In 2022, the plaintiff mailed a personal demand to the defendant's California address and issued a new execution against her bank account to recover the same personal property taxes that it had attempted to recover with the 2020 execution. The plaintiff did not send a tax bill to the defendant's Califor- nia address in connection with the new execution. Thereafter, the defen- dant initiated the current exemption proceedings, arguing that the 2022 execution was precluded by the trial court's 2021 order granting her prior claim for an exemption from execution. The trial court granted the defendant's 2022 claim for an exemption from execution. Held: 1. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff was precluded from collecting on the tax pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel: the issue of whether the plaintiff could execute on the defendant's funds without first sending a tax bill to her California address was actually and necessarily decided in the prior exemption proceeding, even though it was not strictly essential to the final judgment of that action, because the issue was raised in the pleadings, the trial court heard testimony regarding the issue, the court specifically found that the tax bill had not been sent and relied in part on that finding in granting the defendant's exemption from execution, and the court treated the issue as essential and gave it thorough consideration; moreover, the issue was identical to the issue before the trial court in the present action, as the plaintiff Torrington Tax Collector, LLC v. Riley failed to send the defendant a tax bill at her California address before issuing the 2022 execution. 2. The trial court did not improperly fail to hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's exemption claim: the court held a hearing in which each party was given an opportunity to argue their position, and that hearing was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the applicable statute ((Supp. 2022) § 52-367b). Argued February 8—officially released June 18, 2024

The defendant, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of the crime of threatening in the second degree, appealed to this court, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in refusing to provide the jury with an instruction on defense of premises. The victim, P, was a state marshal who had entered the defendant's property to serve the defendant with court documents in a civil matter. P was accompanied by a state trooper, O, whose body camera recorded the interaction between the defendant and P. The defendant repeatedly told P that P had previously been told not to trespass on his property and, after P had returned to his vehicle, stood outside the vehicle door and stated, inter alia, that ''you're going to get a bullet in your head,'' and ''I'll go to jail. I don't give a shit.'' At trial, the state introduced testimony from O and P and O's body camera footage. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because his statements did not constitute true threats: a reasonable person would have foreseen that P would interpret the defendant's statements as a serious threat of harm or assault, as, inter alia, the defendant asserted during the interaction that he was willing to accept the consequences of carrying out his threats, and P's behavior in bringing O with him to serve the documents and in remaining in his car once the defendant became confrontational demonstrated that he took the defendant's threats seriously; moreover, the defendant's assertion that his threatened violence was allegedly not imminent and was premised on a contingent future event was unpersua- sive because those conditions are not a requirement for a true threat. 2. The trial court properly denied the defendant's request to provide the jury with an instruction on defense of premises; the defendant failed to meet his burden of production to provide evidence that P was criminally trespassing on his property, as the evidence adduced at trial would not have enabled the jury to reasonably infer anything other than that P believed that he was rightfully carrying out his duties as a state marshal when he entered the defendant's property to serve him with court docu- ments and that P was not aware of any alleged no trespassing signs or orders barring him from the property. Argued March 6—officially released June 18, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 54-280a (a) (1)), any individual who has been convicted of an offense committed with a deadly weapon and is released into the community on or after January 1, 2014, shall, following such release, register with the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Pro- tection. Pursuant further to statute (§ 54-280a (a) (2)), prior to accepting a plea of guilty from a person with respect to an offense committed with a deadly weapon, the court shall inform the person that he will be subject to the registration requirement of § 54-280a (a) (1) and understands the consequences of the plea. The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming his plea of guilty to the charge of murder, under the Alford doctrine, was obtained in violation of his due process rights under the state and federal constitu- tions because he was not canvassed about the requirement that he register, pursuant to § 54-280a, as an offender on the Deadly Weapon Offender Registry (DWOR) upon his release. The petitioner was not canvassed for the DWOR requirement because he was convicted in 2002, and the legislature enacted § 54-280a in 2013. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, admitted in his return the petitioner's claim that he would be subject to the registration requirement of § 54-280a upon his release. The habeas court, in denying the petition, found that the failure to advise the petitioner of a collateral consequence that did not exist at the time he entered his plea did not violate his due process rights. On appeal to this court, the petitioner raised the unpreserved claim that he was not required to register as a deadly weapon offender because § 54-280a did not apply to him in connection with his 2002 conviction for murder and sought a judgment declaring that he was not subject to registration on the DWOR on the basis of his underlying conviction. Subsequently, the respondent, despite admitting the petition- er's allegation that he would have to register on the DWOR upon release, deferred to the position of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (department), the agency tasked with establishing and maintaining the DWOR, which was that § 54-280a did not apply to the petitioner. The respondent claimed that the petitioner's appeal was not ripe because he would not likely have to register and that the petition should be remanded to the habeas court and dismissed on ripeness grounds. Held: 1. The petitioner's claim was ripe for review: there was a substantial question as to whether § 54-280a applied to the petitioner's 2002 conviction, and that determination would result in practical relief to the petitioner and guide the present conduct of the parties; moreover, the adversity of the parties' interests at the time of the amended petition and return evi- denced a justiciable controversy, which has not been rendered moot by the current position of the respondent that § 54-280a did not apply to the petitioner. 2. This court, exercising its supervisory authority to review the petitioner's unpreserved claim, concluded that the habeas court improperly denied the habeas petition because the entire premise of the habeas court's decision, that § 54-280a was applicable to the petitioner's 2002 convic- tion, was incorrect: the plain and unambiguous text of § 54-280a expressly limits the registration requirement set forth therein to offend- ers of eligible crimes who are both convicted of an offense committed with a deadly weapon and released into the community on or after January 1, 2014; moreover, the question of whether the phrase ''on or after January 1, 2014,'' applied to the petitioner's date of conviction or only to the petitioner's date of release, was resolved by reference to the requirement in § 54-280a (a) (2) that a court, prior to accepting a plea of guilty to an eligible charge, canvass a criminal defendant about the registration requirement of § 54-280a, and it necessarily followed that § 54-280a (a) (2) would be rendered meaningless in the context of an otherwise eligible conviction rendered prior to January 1, 2014; furthermore, this interpretation of § 54-280a was consistent with the department's interpretation of the statute, as represented to this court through the respondent's counsel, and its conclusion that the registration requirement of § 54-280a did not apply to the petitioner in relation to his 2002 conviction, a representation that the habeas court did not have the benefit of in making its determination; accordingly, the petitioner was entitled to the reversal of the habeas court's judgment. Argued January 11—officially released June 18, 2024

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment rendered for the defendant employer on the plaintiff's claim for employment discrimina- tion pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) (§ 46a-51 et seq.). The defendant terminated the plaintiff's employment shortly after the plaintiff took a leave of absence to be with his newborn son. The son suffered from various ailments, all alleg- edly serious medical conditions that rendered him physically disabled within the meaning of CFEPA. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant had violated a provision (§ 46a-60 (b) (1)) of CFEPA when it terminated the plaintiff's employment because of his association with a disabled individual, namely, his son. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike the operative complaint on the ground that § 46a-60 (b) (1) did not apply to claims of discrimination arising from an employee's association with a physically disabled individual. Held that the trial court properly concluded that CFEPA does not create a cause of action for associational discrimination: although the plain and unambiguous language of § 46a-60 (b) (1) clearly protects physically disabled employees from being discharged from their employment on account of their own physical disabilities, there is no language in § 46a- 60 (b) (1) or elsewhere in CFEPA that extends protection to employees who, though not physically disabled themselves, associate with physi- cally disabled individuals; moreover, although CFEPA is remedial in nature and, therefore, must be interpreted, whenever reasonably possi- ble, to effectuate the beneficent purpose of eliminating employment related discrimination, that principle of statutory construction did not authorize this court to ignore the plain language of § 46a-60 (b) (1) and the limits that the language places on achieving this purpose; further- more, the application of the plain and unambiguous language of § 46a- 60 (b) (1) does not lead to bizarre or unreasonable results and the statute as literally construed reaches the entire protected class of employees who have physical disabilities. Argued December 4, 2023—officially released June 18, 2024

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court rendered for the defendant on his claims of, inter alia, breach of contract. The plaintiff had been living with his grandfather, R, for approximately thirteen years prior to R's death, during which time he provided certain caregiving services to R. After R's death, the defendant was appointed the executor of R's estate. The plaintiff sent a claim to the defendant for compensation for his caregiving services, which the defendant rejected by filing a return of claims with the Probate Court and sending the return to the plaintiff in July, 2020. The plaintiff commenced this action in December, 2020, and the defendant raised several special defenses including, inter alia, that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations (§ 45a-363) because he did not commence this action within 120 days of receiving the return of claims. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the effect of the return of claims and the defendant's statute of limitations defense; this court concluded that, even if it assumed that the jury instruction should have been more detailed, any error arising from the jury instructions was harmless and did not affect the verdict, as the trial court instructed the jury to answer the interrogatories in the order in which they were presented on the jury form, and the jury found that the plaintiff had failed to prove an essential element of each of his claims prior to addressing the defen- dant's special defense. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence testimony regarding the fair rental value of R's real property and evidence of the emotional effect of the plaintiff's claims on the defendant and the plaintiff's mother: the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendant's testimony regarding the fair rental value of the property constituted hearsay, as the defendant, in describing his efforts to determine the fair rental value, did not testify to any specific out-of-court statements made to him, and, in his capacity as executor, the defendant was reasonably qualified to talk about the fair rental value; moreover, the court reason- ably could have determined that the testimony provided by the defendant and the plaintiff's mother regarding their reactions to the plaintiff's claim against R's estate was relevant because it was offered to assist the jury in determining whether it found credible the plaintiff's testimony that R promised to compensate him for his caregiving services. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the defendant to present the testimony of two ''surrebuttal'' witnesses during his case- in-chief; regardless of the descriptor attached to the witnesses' testimony by the plaintiff, the court's findings that it would allow the evidence so as not to delay the trial and because it did not surprise the plaintiff reasonably justified its decision to allow the defendant to present this evidence during his case-in-chief. Argued March 13—officially released June 25, 2024

The plaintiff sought injunctive relief and to recover damages from the defen- dant attorney for abuse of process. The defendant represented a third party, S Co., in a foreclosure action that related to the plaintiff's personal residence. In the present case, the plaintiff alleged that, inter alia, five years after S Co. was defaulted in the foreclosure action for failure to appear, the defendant filed an appearance in the foreclosure action on S Co.'s behalf and then proceeded to file numerous motions, notices, and objections for, inter alia, the purpose of causing annoyance and distress to the plaintiff. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to establish that she was aggrieved, and, therefore, she did not have standing to bring the action. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss because it improperly determined that it lacked sub- ject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's action: the plaintiff plainly alleged that the defendant had made use of a legal process, that she did so primarily to accomplish purposes for which the process was not designed, and that those purposes were detrimental to the plaintiff; moreover, the factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, when viewed in the light most favorable to her as the pleader and construed both broadly and realistically, sufficiently established classical aggrievement, as the allegations were sufficient to demonstrate both the possibility that the plaintiff had a specific, personal, and legal interest in the defendant's conduct in the foreclosure action and the possibility that such interest had been specially and injuriously affected by the defendant's conduct, and, consequently, the trial court incorrectly deter- mined that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Argued January 4—officially released June 25, 2024

The plaintiff, who commenced this action seeking, inter alia, to quiet title to certain real property in New Haven, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court awarding attorney's fees to the defendant, following a default judgment rendered against the plaintiff on the defen- dant's counterclaim. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court's award of attorney's fees was improper because the affidavit of the defendant's counsel in support of attorney's fees was filed beyond the thirty day deadline set forth in the applicable rule of practice (§ 11-21) and because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the untimely filing was the result of excusable neglect; because Practice Book § 11-21 does not govern awards of attorney's fees that constitute an award of punitive damages and the court stated that it was awarding attorney's fees as punitive damages, the defendant was not required to comply with the deadline in § 11-21 and the court was not required to determine whether the untimely filing was the result of excusable neglect. 2. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees for expenses incurred by the defendant in defending prior actions between the parties: the amount of attorney's fees awarded should have been limited to the fees incurred in the present case; moreover, the court did not state that the litigation expenses that the defendant had incurred over the course of the multiple actions between the parties were the basis for its award of punitive damages, and the defense did not provide any legal support for this claim; accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court to conduct a new hearing on the defendant's motion for attorney's fees. Argued February 7—officially released July 2, 2024

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court. Following an altercation in the parking lot of a bar, the defendant chased the victim approximately ninety feet and then stabbed the victim two times in the chest with a knife. The defendant then ran to his vehicle and quickly drove away from the scene. At trial, the defendant pursued the theory that the victim was the initial aggressor and that he had killed the victim in self-defense. At the state's request and over the defendant's objection, the trial court provided a consciousness of guilt instruction to the jury. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court's con- sciousness of guilt instruction implicated his constitutional right to due process of law: in its instruction, the trial court emphasized that any evidence of consciousness of guilt derived from the defendant's flight was circumstantial, which allowed for a permissive inference that did not unconstitutionally dilute the state's burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of self-defense, including the duty to retreat prior to using deadly physical force; moreover, the defendant did not drive away from the bar until after he had chased the victim and stabbed him in the chest two times and, as our Supreme Court instructed in State v. Luster (279 Conn. 414), flight that occurs after a defendant's use of deadly force does not logically compel a conclusion that the reason for the flight was self-defense nor does it entitle the defendant to present such evidence without permitting the jury to con- sider other possible reasons for the flight. 2. The defendant failed to demonstrate that the consciousness of guilt instruction violated his constitutional right not to testify as guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United States constitution: this court concluded that the defendant's claim was unpreserved because it was entirely distinct from his objection that was stated on the record follow- ing the charge conference, namely, that the instruction diluted the state's burden to disprove self-defense, and he did not raise an exception on the basis of his fifth amendment rights or on any other basis immediately following the charge; moreover, the defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) because he failed to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional right not to testify, as the trial court unequivocally instructed the jury that it could draw no unfavorable inferences from the defendant's decision not to testify and that, even if the jury did find that the defendant's flight from the scene and the washing of the clothes that he was wearing during the incident shortly thereafter were influenced by the criminal act, it could, but was not required to, infer consciousness of guilt from those actions. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt: although the defendant claimed that he fled the scene due to fear of a continued threat from the victim, the record demonstrated ample support for a consciousness of guilt instruction, including evidence that the defendant's flight occurred after he stabbed the victim and watched him fall to the ground and his misstatements to law enforcement, evidence that could have been relied on by the jury to find that the defendant sought to avoid detection of or responsibility for the crime and permitted an inference that he was acting from a guilty conscience. 4. This court declined the defendant's request to exercise its supervisory authority to prohibit courts from providing consciousness of guilt instructions to juries: our Supreme Court declined an identical request in State v. Coward (292 Conn. 296), and the defendant failed to present any authority that would allow this court to deviate from that precedent. Argued February 8—officially released July 2, 2024

The petitioner appealed to this court from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the court erred by declining to issue a capias for a witness at his habeas trial. The petitioner, who had previously been convicted, following a jury trial, of various crimes, claimed at his habeas trial that his criminal trial counsel, K, had rendered ineffective assistance by, inter alia, failing to call J, his former girlfriend, as a witness at his criminal trial. The petitioner subpoenaed J for both days of his habeas trial, but she did not appear on either day. On the second day of the habeas trial, the court denied the petitioner's request to issue a capias for J, finding that, although the petitioner had met the requirements for a capias for the first day of the habeas trial, he had not proved that J had actually received the subpoena for the second day, nor had he proved that J lacked a reasonable excuse for appearing in court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in declining the petitioner's request for a capias; the court's denial was not unreasonable or arbitrary and it did not base its decision on improper or irrelevant factors, as it made a thorough inquiry of the petitioner's counsel to ascertain whether the statutory (§ 52-143 (e)) factors for issuing a capias had been met, and counsel was unable to provide the court with any information as to whether J had received the subpoena or whether she had a legitimate reason for her failure to appear. Argued May 29—officially released July 9, 2024

The intervening plaintiff, C, appealed, and the plaintiff cross appealed, from the judgment of the trial court awarding C damages for the services that he provided as the plaintiff's attorney. The plaintiff hired C to represent him in a negligence action against the defendant and signed a retainer agreement entitling C to 33.33 percent of the plaintiff's recov- ery up to the amount of $300,000. Less than one week later, C procured a settlement offer of $100,000. The plaintiff did not authorize C to accept the offer and, instead, terminated C's representation and retained another attorney. The trial court granted C's motion to intervene in the plaintiff's case against the defendant to preserve his right to recover legal fees from the plaintiff. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. Subsequently, a trial was held with respect to C's intervening complaint. The trial court awarded C $9000 for the reasonable value of the services he provided and denied C's claim of unjust enrichment. Held: 1. The trial court properly applied Cole v. Myers (128 Conn. 223) to determine the proper measure of damages to award to C: C provided no authority for his proposition that the doctrine of substantial performance applied to contingency fee agreement cases in which an attorney was discharged by his client prior to settlement, and, pursuant to Cole, an attorney in such a case was permitted to recover only the reasonable value of the services he performed on his client's behalf; moreover, the trial court analyzed the work performed by C under the terms of rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and found that an award in the amount of $9000 constituted the reasonable value of the services he performed on the plaintiff's behalf. 2. The trial court's finding that C was entitled to the reasonable value of the services he performed on the plaintiff's behalf was supported by the evidence in the record and, therefore, was not clearly erroneous. Argued January 30—officially released July 9, 2024

The defendant, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of larceny in the third degree, assault of public safety personnel, and interfering with an officer, appealed to this court, claiming that his sixth amendment right to counsel was violated by the trial court's alleged inadequate response to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial. Held that the record was inadequate to review the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal to this court: the proper vehicle for the defendant to litigate his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and this court was unable to review, on the basis of the record before it, whether defense counsel's decisions not to object to the intro- duction of a police officer's body camera recording or to obtain a medical expert constituted ineffective assistance, as opposed to sound trial strat- egy, as the record did not reflect what other defenses or courses of action defense counsel considered, what options, if any, were available to him, how he concluded that a medical expert would not be helpful, or whether a medical expert's testimony would have, in fact, been helpful to the defense; moreover, because the defendant asked this court to review two specific allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, while maintaining that he was not waiving any other ineffective assistance of counsel claims that he might assert against his defense counsel in a later habeas corpus proceeding, a review of the defendant's claims at this stage would result in a piecemeal resolution of the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the event that the defendant pursued additional claims in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus; furthermore, the duty the defendant sought to impose on the trial court would have required the court to make a qualitative judgment of defense counsel's performance throughout the trial proceedings, and an inquiry into defense counsel's strategy for the matter proceeding before the court risked interfering with the defendant's right to counsel and the attorney-client relationship. Argued May 22—officially released July 16, 2024

The plaintiff landlord and the defendant tenant entered into a lease agree- ment that required the defendant to pay base rent on a monthly basis, as well as charges for real estate taxes and water and sewer assessments. After the defendant failed to make its rent payment in April, 2020, the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit for nonpayment of rent, which included a disclaimer stating that any payments tendered after the service of the notice to quit would be accepted as use and occupancy only. One day before the quit date on the notice, the defendant tendered payment for the April and May, 2020, base rent. Shortly there- after and for the next few months, the parties' representatives had discussions regarding the defendant's tenancy at the premises. The plain- tiff commenced the present action seeking to recover possession of the premises in October, 2020, when it became apparent that the defendant would not agree to a new lease. During the months when discussions were taking place between the parties' representatives, as well as after the underlying action was commenced, the plaintiff continued to send invoices to the defendant itemizing charges accruing under the lease, including rent, attorney's fees, real estate taxes, and late fees, while at times also requesting use and occupancy payments. The defendant made payments in response to each invoice. Following the plaintiff's case-in- chief at trial, the defendant's counsel made an oral motion to dismiss on the basis that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff's conduct after service of the notice to quit had rendered the notice to quit equivocal. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the summary process action: the plaintiff's inconsistent characterization of what the lease referred to as base rent, its requests for payment including additional charges that were purportedly due under the terms of the lease, and the delay in initiating the summary process action undermined the effec- tiveness of the use and occupancy disclaimer; moreover, the plaintiff's actions created reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable tenant as to whether the lease, in fact, remained terminated, and the trial court therefore properly concluded that the notice to quit was rendered equivo- cal by the plaintiff's conduct. Argued May 16—officially released July 16, 2024

The plaintiff landlord and the defendant tenant entered into a lease agree- ment with an option to purchase certain real property occupied by the defendant. Each party claimed that the other had breached the lease agreement, and the parties agreed to resolve their competing claims by way of a stipulated judgment, which provided, inter alia, that judgment of possession would enter for the plaintiff with a final stay of execution based upon certain conditions, including that the defendant could pur- chase the property if he deposited a certain sum into his attorney's trust account by an agreed upon deadline and that time was of the essence. Failure to make the deposit would void the defendant's right to purchase the property and the plaintiff could immediately obtain a summary process execution for possession without any additional court hearings. Shortly after the stipulated judgment was rendered, the plaintiff removed from an unoccupied accessory apartment several appliances that he believed he owned. The defendant complained about their removal and the plaintiff ultimately returned them. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed an affidavit of noncompliance in which he averred that the defen- dant had materially breached the stipulated judgment by not making the deposit in accordance with the terms of the stipulation, and he requested that the court issue a summary process execution. After a hearing, the court granted the plaintiff's request and ordered the clerk's office to issue the execution, finding that the removal of the appliances was not a material violation of the stipulation. On the defendant's appeal, held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly found that the plaintiff's removal of the appliances was not a material breach of the stipulated judgment that relieved him of his obligation to make the required deposit by the deadline: the court consid- ered and applied the standards for materiality set forth in § 241 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and approved by the Supreme Court in Bernstein v. Nemeyer (213 Conn. 665), and, although the court did not specifically identify the standards of materiality it applied when assessing the plaintiff's removal of the appliances, it did plainly state that it found no material breach under the cases cited by the defendant; moreover, under the facts and circumstances of this case, which included the undisputed fact that the appliances were not mentioned in the stipula- tion, and there was no evidence of their value, this court could not say that it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that the removal of the appliances did not materially breach the stipulated judgment, as the temporary removal by the plaintiff of appliances from the accessory apartment did not deprive the defendant of a substantial benefit for which he had clearly bargained and which he had every reason to expect, and the removal of a limited number of used appliances did not substantially impact the nature of the stipulation even if wrongful, and, as such, the defendant was not relieved of his obligation to deposit the funds by the deadline. Argued January 31—officially released July 23, 2024

The defendant appealed to this court from, inter alia, the trial court's judg- ment dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff. The court approved a pendente lite agreement in November, 2019, and, in April, 2021, the defendant filed an agreement for dissolution signed by both parties in which they agreed, inter alia, that the plaintiff would transfer twelve months of his G.I. Bill benefits to the defendant for her continuing education and pay 35 percent of his net military pension to her. The defendant thereafter withdrew her request for approval of the agree- ment, and the court found that the agreement was unenforceable. In October, 2021, the court ordered, inter alia, that the defendant should continue to receive 35 percent of the plaintiff's net military pension and 100 percent of his G.I. Bill benefits. At the time of the judgment in January, 2022, the parties' had one minor child, and they continued to live together in the marital home. The court awarded the parties' joint legal and shared physical custody of their child and ordered the plaintiff to pay $300 per week in child support, which was a downward deviation from the presumptive child support amount according to the child sup- port guidelines, and it further ordered that the child support obligation would not commence until one week after the sale of the marital resi- dence. Held: 1. The trial court abused its discretion in calculating the plaintiff's child support obligation: a. The trial court erred by decreasing the plaintiff's obligation based on the parties' shared physical custody of the minor child; the court failed to make the requisite findings as required by the applicable regulation (§ 46b-215a-5c (b) (6) (A)) that would support a deviation from the presumptive amount of child support, specifically, that the plaintiff or the defendant would have substantially increased or decreased expenses due to the shared parenting plan and that sufficient funds would remain for the parent receiving support to meet the needs of the child after deviation, or that both parties had substantially equal income. b. The trial court improperly delayed the commencement of the plaintiff's obligation to pay child support until after the sale of the parties' residence; Although Judge Prescott was not present at oral argument, he has read the briefs and appendices and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision. the court's order did not reference the child support guidelines or the dollar amount of any expenses to be paid by the plaintiff on behalf of the minor child during the indeterminate period of time until the sale of the residence, and the court did not make a finding on the record, as required by statute (§ 46b-215b), that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate as determined under the devia- tion criteria. c. This court remanded the case to the trial court to refashion the entirety of the mosaic of financial orders; because the trial court on remand may issue a child support order that is substantially different from the original order, such an order will necessarily impact the court's related orders pertaining to alimony and property division. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings on the defendant's motions for contempt: a. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to adjudicate the plaintiff in contempt for failing to comply with the November, 2019 pendente lite orders; the parties' April, 2021 agreement and the court's October, 2021 order rendered the plaintiff's obligation to comply with the prior pendente lite orders unclear and ambiguous. b. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the defen- dant's motion for contempt based on a violation of the automatic orders, as the court found that the plaintiff's practice of buying and selling motor vehicles was done in the usual course of business. c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the plaintiff to pay $1000 in attorney's fees to the defendant after adjudicating him in contempt for failing to comply with its discovery orders; although the defendant's affidavit reflected attorney's fees and expenses of more than $17,000, this affidavit included fees related to the motions for contempt that the court denied. Argued January 2—officially released July 23, 2024