Volume 227 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiffs and the defendants owned real property on Road A, which intersects with Road B in two locations. The northern intersection was north of the defendants' properties and south of the plaintiffs' properties and was known as the ''Y right of way.'' The only access to the southern intersection was obtained by traveling over an area between the defen- dants' properties (disputed area), which was rocky, wooded, and unpaved. The Y right of way, which provided the plaintiffs with access to Road B, was much closer to the plaintiffs' properties than the southern intersection. In 1908, before the Y right of way existed, the original subdivision map for the area was recorded on the land records. In 1958, the northern part of the subdivision was resubdivided into larger lots, some of which would later become the plaintiffs' properties, and the resubdivision map recorded on the land records shows the Y right of way. When the defendants purchased their property on Road A, the paving in front of their house that ran from the northern part of the disputed area to the Y right of way was not a road but a driveway nine feet in width, and there was no paving or other physical manifestation of a road in the disputed area. Since the defendants purchased the property on Road A in 1987, with the exception of a short period of time during a sewer project in late 2003 and early 2004, during which time the defendants granted to the town of Greenwich an easement for sewer installation, the disputed area had not been passable to traffic and the defendants had not observed anyone travel through the disputed area for any purpose, including to access the southern intersection. The plaintiffs filed on the town's land records affidavits of fact against the defendants' properties on Road A and Road B that falsely claimed an easement over the disputed area. The plaintiffs thereafter commenced the present action, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that they had an express or implied easement over the disputed area and a judg- ment quieting title to their alleged easement. The defendants asserted several counts in a counterclaim against the plaintiffs, including trespass, slander of title, and nuisance or disturbance of a right pursuant to statute (§ 47-41). Following a trial, the court rendered judgment for the defendants on all counts of the plaintiffs' operative complaint and the defendants' counterclaim. On the plaintiffs' appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly determined that the plaintiffs did not have an express easement over the defendants' properties for any purpose: the express language in the plaintiffs' deeds granted to them the right to use Road A from their lots southerly to Road B for the specific purpose of accessing Road B, and there was no express language in the plaintiffs' deeds granting them the right to travel on Road A south of the Y right of way, over and through the disputed area to access Road B at its southern intersection with Road A; moreover, even assuming that there was any ambiguity as to the scope of the plaintiffs' easement over Road A, the court's findings regarding the extrinsic evidence of the surrounding circumstances supported its conclusion that there was no express easement. 2. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claims that the trial court improp- erly determined that they did not have an implied easement over the disputed area and that any implied easement rights granted to them by the original subdivision map were extinguished pursuant to the Market- able Record Title Act (§ 47-33b et seq.): a. The trial court properly determined that there was no intent to create an easement by implication over the defendants' property when the plaintiffs' predecessors in interest conveyed to the plaintiffs their respec- tive properties, as there was nothing in the language of the plaintiffs' deeds nor in the maps referenced therein that expressly granted to the plaintiffs an easement over the defendants' property, and this court could not imply such intent from the language of the plaintiffs' deeds, from the maps referenced therein, or from the surrounding circumstances; moreover, the court determined that the Y right of way was sufficient for all access to the plaintiffs' properties and therefore that the plaintiffs' use of the disputed area was not reasonably necessary for the use and normal enjoyment of their properties. b. Contrary to the plaintiffs' claim, a reference in the defendants' deed to the original subdivision map could not reasonably be construed as granting the plaintiffs an easement to travel over the defendants' property and through the disputed area: to construe the defendants' deed as granting the plaintiffs an easement over all of the defendants' property, including the disputed area, would be contrary to the language of the defendants' deed, which does not mention the plaintiffs, their respective properties, or an easement over the disputed area; moreover, the original subdivision map does not depict Road A as a continuous street but, rather, depicts a stone fence that crosses and blocks the entirety of Road A just south of where the Y right of way would later be created, which is consistent with the court's finding that the northern portion of Road A is a dead end starting at the defendants' driveway and the southern portion of Road A is a dead end starting at the southernmost part of the disputed area; furthermore, on the basis of the record, the court's finding that there was no physical manifestation of a road was not clearly errone- ous and, therefore, the court properly determined that the exceptions to the act in § 47-33h did not apply and that any implied easement rights over the disputed area granted to the plaintiffs by the original subdivision map were extinguished by the act. 3. The trial court properly ruled for the defendants on the plaintiffs' claims of obstruction of an easement, as the trial court properly determined that the defendants were the owners of all right, title, and interest in the disputed area free and clear of any claim by the plaintiffs of any easement, right of way, or other right or interest to pass onto, over, or across the defendants' properties for any purpose, and there can be no impairment of an easement where no easement exists. 4. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improperly determined that one of the plaintiffs, F, trespassed on the defendants' property; in the plaintiffs' complaint and during trial, F admitted to entering the defendants' property to clean out the disputed area, and it was clear from the act of clearing out the debris in the disputed area that F had the intent to enter the disputed area, which was sufficient to satisfy the element of intent for the tort of trespass. 5. The trial court improperly rendered judgment for the defendants on the count of their counterclaim alleging slander of title: because the court's ultimate factual conclusion that the plaintiffs acted with malice was fatally inconsistent with the court's subordinate factual finding that the plaintiffs firmly believed the statements in the affidavits, the court's conclusion that the plaintiffs slandered the defendants' title could not stand; moreover, the court awarded no damages to the defendants on their slander of title claim, and pecuniary damages must be shown to prove a claim of slander of title. 6. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improperly found for the defendants on the count of their counterclaim alleging that the plaintiffs violated § 47-41: contrary to the plaintiffs' claim, § 47- 41 does not require evidence of harassment, negligence, or recklessness, the court made no findings of an unreasonable interference, and the plaintiffs cited no binding authority for their argument that harassment, negligence, or recklessness needed to be shown; moreover, the plaintiffs would have had to show an ownership interest in the land over which they claimed an easement, but the plaintiffs had no ownership interest in any of the land over which an easement was being claimed and the plaintiffs made no argument that filing affidavits on the land records claiming an easement over real property over which they had no owner- ship interest failed to constitute a disturbance of the rights of the defen- dants, the owners of the fee simple. Argued May 13—officially released July 30, 2024

The plaintiff subleased certain real property to the defendants. After the defendants failed to make a rent payment, the plaintiff sent the defen- dants a notice of cancellation of the lease and served them with a notice to quit possession on the ground of nonpayment of rent. When the defendants did not quit possession, the plaintiff served the defendants with a summary process summons and complaint. The sublease agree- ment contained a clause providing that the agreement could not be modified in any manner except by an instrument in writing executed by the parties. At trial, the plaintiff presented testimony from the plain- tiff's lease administrator, who testified that the defendants' rental pay- ments were habitually late, that she typically sent the defendants a notice of default with a ten day right to cure such default, and that she would routinely accept the late payments that followed but that she had lost patience with the defendants. The court found that the defen- dants had breached the sublease agreement by nonpayment of rent, rejected the defendants' argument that the sublease agreement required the plaintiff to provide the defendants with a pretermination notice and a ten day right to cure, and rendered a judgment of possession for the plaintiff. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court should have considered evidence of the parties' course of performance in its interpretation of the sublease agreement and improperly concluded that the language of the lease controlled; the plain and unambiguous language of the sublease agreement made clear that a pretermination notice and a ten day cure period were not required in the context of a default for nonpayment of rent and that such notice applied only to other specified events of default. 2. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the parties' course of performance modified the terms of the sublease agreement; the trial court properly relied on the written terms of the sublease agreement to conclude that the plaintiff was not required to provide the defendants with a pretermination notice and an opportunity to cure their default for nonpayment of rent, as any modification of the agreement by the parties' course of performance was barred by the contractual provision requiring that modifications be in writing. Argued May 13—officially released July 30, 2024

The defendant, who had previously been convicted, following a guilty plea, of the crimes of kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm, attempt to commit murder, robbery in the first degree with a deadly weapon, and two counts of risk of injury to a child, filed a motion for sentence modification pursuant to statute (§ 53a-39). In his motion, the defendant provided evidence of, inter alia, his completion of several rehabilitative programs during his incarceration. In denying the defendant's motion, the court stated that it had considered the factors set forth in the statute (§ 54-125a (f) (4)) governing parole eligibility and suitability and concluded that the defendant had not established good cause to modify his sentence pursuant to § 53a-39 when balanced against the facts and harm created by the serious crimes he had committed. On the defen- dant's appeal to this court, held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he had failed to establish good cause to modify his sentence pursuant to § 53a- 39: although the defendant argued that the weight and value that the court assigned to the statutory parole framework when assessing good cause pursuant to § 53a-39 was inappropriate, he conceded that the trial court was free to consider the factors in § 54-125 in arriving at its conclusion; moreover, the court did not limit its consideration of the defendant's motion to the factors enumerated in § 54-125, and, although the defendant argued that the court should have relied more heavily on his rehabilitation and certain other factors, he did not cite any legal authority that governs the degree of weight a court must afford factors that it considers in determining whether good cause has been estab- lished. Argued November 9, 2023—officially released July 30, 2024

P Co. and F appealed to this court from the judgments rendered by the trial court in four related civil actions that were consolidated for trial and that encompassed various claims by multiple entities concerning the sale of three businesses to P Co. and associated leases, notes, and guarantee agreements. Held: 1. This court dismissed the portion of the appeal related to P Co. and F's claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it precluded them from presenting certain evidence at trial; because P Co. and F failed to challenge on appeal each of two independent grounds on which the trial court excluded the evidence, this court could not grant them any practical relief. 2. This court declined to consider the merits of P Co.'s claim that the trial court erred in determining that P Co. failed to prove its breach of contract cause of action, as P Co. failed to provide an adequate record for review. Argued May 21—officially released July 30, 2024

Convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree, criminal possession of a firearm and carrying a pistol without a permit, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that his constitutional rights to confron- tation and a fair trial were violated as a result of misrepresentations made by the state in moving to join his case for trial with that of his codefendant, J. The defendant and J had entered an apartment in which C was staying and engaged in an altercation with him, during which the defendant shot C, and C stabbed J with a knife. A police detective, F, interviewed J twice. During trial, the state informed the court that it intended to offer as consciousness of guilt evidence against J a recording of only J's first interview with the police. That recording was admitted into evidence during the state's direct examination of F, and the state did not thereafter question F about the second interview or offer the recording of that interview into evidence. On cross-examination, in response to an open-ended question by defense counsel, F testified that, during the second interview, J had identified the defendant and had stated that the defendant was in C's apartment at the time of the shooting. The court denied the defendant's motion to strike F's answer but expressed concern about F's reference to the second interview, of which the jury previously had been unaware. The court then approved an agreement between the parties, under which they would each elicit limited testimony from F about the second interview. F further testified that J had later identified the defendant from a photographic array the police had prepared. During closing argument, the state relied on F's testimony as substantive evidence of the defendant's culpability. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the joinder of his case with J's case for trial was improper because the state had misrepresented that the evidence in the two cases was cross admissible: it was only after F had referenced J's second interview with the police in a truthful, responsive answer to defense counsel's open- ended question on cross-examination about the police investigation that the state relied on that interview as substantive evidence against the defendant; moreover, at no point prior to that cross-examination did the state use, or suggest an intention to use, the second interview against the defendant, and the defendant abandoned any challenge to the court's denial of his motion to strike F's testimony by failing to brief a claim of error as to that issue; furthermore, defense counsel expressly agreed to the procedure approved by the trial court that permitted the state to introduce limited portions of J's second interview through F's redirect testimony, and defense counsel failed to raise any objection to the agreement on the record. Argued March 6—officially released July 30, 2024

Pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 61-11 (g)), ''[i]n any action for foreclosure in which the owner of equity has filed, and the court has denied, at least two prior motions to open or other similar motion, no automatic stay shall arise upon the court's denial of any subsequent contested motion by that party, unless the party certifies under oath, in an affidavit accompanying the motion, that the motion was filed for good cause arising after the court's ruling on the party's most recent motion. . . .'' The substitute plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop- erty owned by the defendants W and J. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, which W appealed to this court. This court affirmed the judgment and remanded the case for the purpose of setting new law days. W then filed his first motion to open and vacate the judgment of strict foreclosure, which the trial court denied. J appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgment and remanded the case for the purpose of setting new law days. The trial court denied W's second motion, captioned ''Motion for Judgment of Dismissal for Lack of Stand- ing and Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction,'' and W appealed to this court, which dismissed the appeal. The trial court denied W's third motion, captioned ''Motion for Void Judgment,'' and reset the law days. W and J then filed a motion to set aside the judgment resetting the law days. On the date the law days were set to commence, W and J filed the present appeal from the trial court's inaction on their motion to set aside the judgment. The next day, the trial court denied that motion, and W and J filed an amended appeal from that decision. Held that this court could not grant W and J any practical relief, and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as moot: W's first, second and third motions constituted ''at least two prior motions to open or other similar motion'' under the plain meaning of Practice Book § 61-11 (g) and, accordingly, because no automatic stay arose on the trial court's denial of the motion to set aside the judgment and the filing of the appeal therefrom, the law days had passed, and title to the property had vested absolutely in the substitute plaintiff; moreover, the motion to set aside the judgment did not have an accompanying affidavit, as required by § 61-11 (g), that set forth that the motion was filed for good cause that arose after the trial court's ruling on W's third motion. Argued February 15—officially released July 30, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, for the defendant bank. Following certain litigation over two mortgages on the plaintiff's property, the parties executed a settle- ment and release agreement and a loan modification agreement. After the defendant commenced a foreclosure action against the plaintiff, claiming that he had defaulted on the modified loan, the plaintiff initiated the underlying action against the defendant, claiming, inter alia, breach of the loan modification agreement and settlement agreement, to which the defendant asserted the special defense of setoff. The jury returned its verdict, pursuant to which it found for the plaintiff on the count of his complaint alleging breach of the settlement agreement, and it awarded damages in the amount of $350,000. The jury also found that the defen- dant had proven that, due to the plaintiff's ongoing default in his loan obligations, the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant for more than $4 million. The jury subtracted the amount of the indebtedness from the damages award on the interrogatories form. The jury, however, returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Following clarifying instructions from the court, the jury returned a defendant's verdict on all counts of the complaint consistent with its responses to the interrogatories. The plain- tiff filed various postverdict motions, which the court denied. Held: 1. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claims that the trial court improperly denied his motions to set aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as those claims were unpreserved: the plain- tiff never sought to challenge the legal sufficiency of the defendant's setoff defense by filing a motion to strike in accordance with the rules of practice and failed to distinctly raise his claim that the setoff defense was invalid prior to the submission of the case to the jury; moreover, the plaintiff failed to preserve his claim that the defendant's material breach of the settlement agreement necessarily discharged his obliga- tions under the loan modification agreement by failing to submit a written request to charge or proposed jury interrogatories on the issue and by agreeing to the submission of interrogatories to the jury that plainly allowed it to find both that the defendant materially breached the settlement agreement and that the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant pursuant to his loan obligations; furthermore, because the plaintiff's trial counsel neither objected to questions about the debt posed by the defendant's counsel nor moved to strike the plaintiff's responses as to the amount of the debt, his claim that the court improp- erly concluded that his testimony as to the amount he owed the defen- dant was a judicial admission was unreviewable. 2. This court declined to review the plaintiff's unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly precluded him from presenting evidence relevant to the damages he incurred after he transferred title to the property to a trust; the record did not reflect that the plaintiff distinctly raised this claim in opposition to the defendant's motion in limine seeking to preclude the plaintiff from presenting evidence of such damages or at any other point during the trial. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motions to set aside the verdict as inadequate and for additur; because there was a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury's verdict and there was no evidence of mistakes or partiality, this court deferred to the jury's judgment. 4. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly denied his postverdict motion to consolidate the underlying action with the defendant's related foreclosure action against him: after the defen- dant initiated the foreclosure action, the plaintiff initiated the underlying action instead of asserting his breach of contract claims in a counter- claim in the foreclosure action; moreover, the court properly considered the belated nature of the plaintiff's motion to consolidate as well as the futility of doing so after a verdict had been returned and after the plaintiff's motion for a new trial had been denied. Argued March 12—officially released August 6, 2024

Convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crimes of reckless endangerment in the second degree, threatening in the second degree, and intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third degree, the defendant appealed to this court. His conviction arose out of an incident in which he aimed a shotgun at individuals renting his neighbor's property, called them racial slurs and told them to get out. The defendant was charged in a second docket with, inter alia, intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the third degree for his actions in calling his neighbor and leaving a voicemail message that intimated future violence if the neighbor again rented the residence to people of color. He elected to enter a plea of guilty to reckless endangerment and threatening in the first docket and intimida- tion based on bigotry or bias in the second docket. At his plea hearing, the trial court expressed doubt as to the sufficiency of the factual basis for applying the charge of intimidation based on bigotry or bias in the second docket. The state, with the agreement of defense counsel, added the intimidation charge to the first docket, and the defendant was put to plea only in the first docket. The court canvassed the defendant and accepted his guilty plea. The court thereafter denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea and rendered a judgment of guilty. Held: 1. The trial court correctly concluded that the plea canvass was sufficient; although the court did not restate each of the three constitutional rights delineated in Boykin v. Alabama (395 U.S. 238), namely, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to con- front one's accusers, the defendant was cognizant of those rights prior to entering his guilty plea because he affirmed during the plea canvass that his attorney had fully explained the constitutional rights he was waiving and, thus, his plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli- gently made. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that, prior to ruling on his motion to withdraw his plea, the trial court improperly failed to hold an evidentiary hearing sua sponte on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim; the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing a plausible reason for the withdrawal of his plea sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing, as the record of the plea proceeding demonstrated that the defendant had previously been presented with a plea offer that he accepted and that contained the same charges, and the defendant failed to allege that his counsel did not advise him on the charges when he was presented with the previous plea offer. 3. The trial court properly determined that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance, as the defendant failed to prove the performance prong of his claim; the defendant did not dispute that his counsel pro- vided him with adequate information and advice in connection with the previous plea offer, the record reflected that he understood the factual basis underlying his guilty plea and how those facts supported the charges against him, and the only change to the plea offer was the docket in which the intimidation charge was filed, and the defendant failed to present evidence that his counsel did not previously advise him on possible constitutional concerns of a guilty plea to the intimida- tion charge. Argued March 13—officially released August 6, 2024

Convicted of the crimes of, inter alia, possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant was arrested during an investigation and search of an apartment. When the police entered the apartment, the defendant turned and ran down a hallway, dropping six small bags of crack cocaine, which were individu- ally wrapped in plastic. He then fled to a bathroom, where he was found attempting to ingest narcotics, which the arresting police officer forced him to spit out. The narcotics that fell out of the defendant's mouth were six pieces of cocaine, each wrapped in plastic, and two glassine bags containing a mixture of heroin and fentanyl. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell: contrary to the defendant's argument, there was no requirement that an individual must have pos- sessed a certain quantity of narcotics to support a finding of an intent to sell; moreover, the fact that the state did not present any evidence establishing that the defendant had engaged in a sale of narcotics was not dispositive of a lack of intent to sell; furthermore, the state presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to support an inference that the defen- dant intended to sell the narcotics found in his possession, as it was undisputed that the defendant was present in a location known as a crack house that was associated with narcotics dealing and use, that he was in the company of four individuals known to law enforcement as drug users, and he was in the possession of fourteen individually packaged units of narcotics and $2126 in cash. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use: although the defendant claimed that the pieces of plastic surrounding the bits of crack cocaine were not ''bags'' and, thus, could not constitute drug paraphernalia as defined in the statute (§ 21a- 240 (2) (A)), the state repeatedly referred to the plastic wrappings as plastic bags throughout the trial, § 21a-240 (2) (A) does not require that the paraphernalia constitute a bag, and the plastic wrapping material in this case, which was tied in a knot at the top and used as a means to contain the bits of crack cocaine, constituted ''materials of any kind'' that contained a ''controlled substance'' pursuant to § 21a-240 (2) (A); moreover, even if this court assumed without concluding that the plastic did not constitute drug paraphernalia under the statute, the defendant's claim was unavailing as the defendant was also found in possession of two glassine bags, which he used to hold or contain narcotics and which fell within the definition of drug paraphernalia under § 21a-240 (2) (A); furthermore, contrary to the defendant's claim, the plain language of § 21-240 (20) (A) did not exempt from its coverage individual bags used to contain the very narcotics the defendant was found to have possessed. 3. This court concluded that the defendant's conviction of both possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell and possession of a controlled substance, violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy and deprived him of a fair trial: because possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, the charged crimes are the same offense for double jeopardy analysis; moreover, the conduct charged in those counts arose out of the same act or transaction, as the jury could not reasonably have found that the defendant committed a separate act of possession of controlled substances when he ran into the bathroom carrying some of the same narcotics that he had possessed in the kitchen/ hallway area; furthermore, the state, in its charging documents, its over- all presentation of the case and in the evidence adduced at trial, did not draw a distinction between the defendant's conduct inside and outside of the bathroom with respect to the defendant's possession of narcotics. Argued March 13—officially released August 6, 2024

The plaintiff, the city of New London, sought to recover a balance due for water and sewer services provided to the defendant's property. The defendant filed a counterclaim alleging that she was a debtor in a pending bankruptcy action at the time the underlying action was commenced, and sought damages for the plaintiff's alleged violation of the automatic stay imposed by the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 362). The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaim, finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held that the trial court improp- erly dismissed the defendant's counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: considering the express statutory language in 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) creating a right to damages for individuals injured by violations of the automatic stay, and consistent with federal precedent construing the same, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) authorized an independent cause of action for damages that survived the disposition of the underlying bankruptcy case; moreover, this court concluded, consistent with the majority of federal appellate courts, that the plain language of the federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1334) governing bankruptcy cases and proceedings grants federal district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over the bank- ruptcy petition only, and that a claim for damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) was not a bankruptcy petition and did not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district courts; furthermore, the clear statutory language in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b) distinguishing between the exclusive and ''not exclusive'' jurisdiction of the federal district courts reinforced the presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction over the federal claim for damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) and compelled the conclusion that an action for damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) is a civil proceeding arising under title 11 and, thus, is within the original but not exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b). Argued February 1—officially released August 13, 2024

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff and finding her in contempt for various violations of the court's automatic orders and pendente lite orders. During the pendency of the underlying action, the defendant executed a separation agreement with her employer and, approximately two weeks later, the parties signed a pendente lite agreement that pro- vided, inter alia, that the defendant would pay the first mortgage on the marital residence and automobile insurance premiums. The defendant subsequently withdrew almost $80,000 from her retirement accounts, which was not fully accounted for at the time of trial, and received more than $70,000 from her parents, which she used to pay off her personal credit card debt. The defendant also removed the plaintiff as an insured from the parties' automobile insurance policies and an umbrella policy covering the parties' vehicles and the marital residence, which were in place at the time the dissolution action was commenced. The defendant stopped making the monthly mortgage payments, and she sought and obtained a deferral of the mortgage payments in the amount of $87,961.45 without the written consent of the plaintiff or an order of the court. Two days before the final day of trial, the trial court denied the defendant's request for production of an appraisal of the marital residence completed by an independent appraiser, C, retained by the plaintiff. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for contempt alleging that the defendant violated the automatic orders when she removed the plaintiff as an insured under the parties' insurance policies: this court rejected the defendant's argument that the automatic orders did not clearly and unambiguously pertain to the umbrella policy, as the umbrella policy was, in substance, a policy that covered the parties' automobiles and marital residence; moreover, the trial court did not credit the defendant's testimony that she did not intend to remove the plaintiff from the automo- bile policies at issue but that she did so accidentally, nor was it required to do so. 2. This court could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the defendant in contempt for failing to pay the mortgage on the marital residence: the defendant entered the pendente lite stipulation assuming the responsibility of the mortgage payment with knowledge of her employment situation, she clearly knew that deferring the payments would increase the amount of marital debt, and she impermissibly resorted to self-help to avoid paying the mortgage on the marital resi- dence as ordered by the trial court; moreover, even if the defendant believed that the deferral excused her from paying the mortgage, a good faith dispute does not preclude a finding of wilfulness; furthermore, the funds that the defendant withdrew from her retirement accounts and that she received from her parents could have been used to pay the mortgage on the marital residence, but she chose not to do so. 3. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for contempt alleging that she violated the automatic orders when she withdrew funds from her retirement accounts: although the defendant testified that she made the withdrawals from her retirement accounts in order to pay necessary bills, her claim of necessity was undermined by the availability of the funds that she received from her parents, which she could have put toward uses other than paying off individual credit card debt, and the defendant's argument that the court erred by not considering the exception to the automatic order prohibiting the disposition of marital funds during the pendency of the dissolution action for the payment of household expenses was therefore unavailing; moreover, because the trial court determined that the defendant's violation of the automatic orders was wilful, this court could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by finding the defendant in contempt for withdrawing funds from her retirement accounts. 4. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly awarded the plaintiff his entire federal pension without assigning a value to it or recognizing that it had value and that it did not properly consider and weigh the pension's value when formulating its property distribution orders: neither party presented evidence as to the value of the plaintiff's pension in the form of expert testimony or otherwise, and it is not the function of the court to make calculations of that sort to fill evidentiary gaps; moreover, the defendant's claim that the court failed to consider the pension was without merit, as the court clearly classified and weighed it as a marital asset when it expressly ordered that the plaintiff retain his entire federal pension, and there was nothing in the record to suggest that the court did not consider the value of the pension when it divided the parties' assets. 5. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly denied her request for production of the appraisal prepared by C; on appeal, the defendant failed to challenge the basis of the trial court's ruling, namely, that the appraisal was not subject to disclosure under the rule of practice (§ 13-4 (f)) because the plaintiff had not disclosed C as an expert witness, he was not seeking to introduce the appraisal into evidence, and the defendant had not shown any exceptional circum- stance indicating that it was impracticable for her to obtain the facts or opinions contained in the appraisal by other means. 6. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly distributed the parties' property in a disproportionate and inequitable manner: because the court specified in its memorandum of decision that it considered the criteria set forth in the statute (§ 46b-81) governing property distribution in marital dissolution actions and the evidence before it, it was presumed to have properly performed its duty in distrib- uting the marital estate, and, given the entire mosaic of the court's judgment, the court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the division of the marital estate; moreover, although the defendant argued that she did not receive any of the parties' retirement funds, the defen- dant ignored the fact that she did, in fact, receive a large portion of her retirement funds when she unilaterally withdrew funds from her retirement accounts, and it was not improper or inequitable for the court to strive to offset the defendant's earlier withdrawals; furthermore, the court reasonably exercised its discretion in ordering that the pro- ceeds of the sale of the marital residence be split equally in light of the funds initially provided by the plaintiff for the purchase of the marital home and the defendant's unilateral decision to defer a significant amount of mortgage payments; additionally, the defendant's argument that the court inequitably ordered her to pay the remaining debt on the parties' two joint credit card accounts was unavailing, as the plaintiff's payments toward the accounts pursuant to the pendente lite orders significantly reduced the parties' joint debt. Argued April 22—officially released August 13, 2024

Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, the defendant appealed to this court. It was undisputed that the victim was killed by a gunshot wound to the head from the defendant's replica Civil War era revolver. When he was inter- viewed by the police, the defendant contended that the victim had been in the bathroom, using the toilet, while he was cleaning the revolver in the bedroom. He further contended that, when he was holding the revolver and walking into the bathroom for a napkin, he had tripped and fallen toward the victim. In falling, he lost control of the revolver, the barrel of which struck the victim's head, and it accidentally dis- charged. At trial, the state produced uncontested evidence that the fatal wound was inflicted by a single shot from the defendant's revolver, the revolver had an extremely light trigger pull, and the revolver had been pressed against the victim's head and behind her left ear when the gun discharged. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment of conviction: the evidence and the inferences that the jury reasonably could have drawn therefrom were sufficient to support the state's theory that the defendant intentionally placed the loaded revolver against the victim's head, including testimony by the state medical examiner that the gunshot that killed the victim was discharged while the muzzle of the revolver was flush against the victim's head, and the jury reasonably could have found that the likeli- hood of that occurring randomly or haphazardly, as the defendant claimed, was slight; moreover, there was evidence that the defendant and the victim had a volatile relationship, which was fueled by drug and alcohol use, and the defendant's actions with the revolver did not display sound judgment; furthermore, the jury could have doubted the veracity of the defendant's statements concerning his handling of the revolver the evening of the shooting, as the jury was not obligated to accept the defendant's version of the facts and reject the factual scenario advanced by the state. 2. The trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on the element of general intent, which was an essential element of the offense of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm: because the statements In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. the defendant made to the police, if credited by the jury, supported his contention that the revolver struck the victim's head accidentally, the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction that the state bore the burden of proving that he had placed the revolver to the victim's head intentionally; moreover, the consequences of the court's error were so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust under the circumstances of this case, as an instruction on general intent that fully explained the requirement of volitional or deliberate conduct as distinguished from conduct that was inadvertent or accidental was vital to a fair trial and a reliable verdict; accordingly, the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Argued January 11—officially released August 13, 2024

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for, inter alia, alleged negligent misrepresentation by the defendant insurance company related to a workers' compensation insurance policy. The defendant issued the plain- tiff a policy in September, 2015. In October, 2015, the defendant issued a cancellation notice of the policy with an effective cancellation date of November 3, 2015. After the November 3 date had passed, the defen- dant sent multiple letters to the plaintiff, some of which indicated that the policy may be cancelled and others of which indicated that the policy had been cancelled. An employee of the plaintiff, L, suffered a compensable injury in May, 2016, and filed a workers' compensation claim, and the defendant denied coverage on the basis that the policy had been cancelled on November 3, 2015. In 2019, following a formal hearing, a workers' compensation commissioner concluded that the policy was still in effect on the date of L's injury. The defendant appealed to the Compensation Review Board, which reversed the commissioner's decision. The plaintiff appealed the board's decision to this court, which affirmed the decision. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought the present case relating to the defendant's conduct after the cancellation of the policy. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff's action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for the defendant: the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the plaintiff's claims, which related to the defendant's conduct following the cancellation of the policy and, thus, did not fall within the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31- 275 et seq.) and could not have been litigated before the commissioner, whose limited jurisdiction did not extend to those claims; accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Argued May 22—officially released August 13, 2024

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the trial court's judgment granting certain postdissolution motions filed by the defendant. Held: 1. The record was inadequate to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to continue an emergency order of temporary custody regarding the parties' minor children, E and A; the trial court's order failed to include the factual or legal bases for its decision as required by the rule of practice (§ 64-1 (a)) and the plaintiff failed to file a notice pursuant to Practice Book § 64-1 (b) with the Office of the Appellate Clerk indicating that the trial court had failed to comply with § 64-1. 2. The plaintiff's claim challenging the dispositional portion of the order granting temporary custody of E and A to the defendant was moot because the defendant no longer had custody over the children; while the plaintiff's appeal was pending, E had reached the age of majority and the trial court had granted a motion filed by A's attorney seeking an order awarding the plaintiff sole legal custody and primary physical custody of A; accordingly, this court dismissed that portion of the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 3. The trial court abused its discretion in granting the defendant's motion for contempt in connection with the plaintiff's failure to comply with a court order requiring the plaintiff to transfer physical custody of A to the defendant: there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had wilfully violated the court order, as neither party presented any evidence that the plaintiff refused to transfer cus- tody of A to the defendant, that she encouraged A not to go to the defendant, or that she wilfully prevented A from going to the defendant, and there was evidence that the plaintiff had attempted to facilitate the transfer of physical custody of A to the defendant and that A had resisted her efforts. Argued January 17—officially released August 13, 2024 In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, her automobile insurance provider, claiming, inter alia, that the defendant's pleading conduct in a prior action involving the parties amounted to vexatious litigation. The plaintiff had been involved in a motor vehicle collision with S, who failed to stop his vehicle at a stop sign. During its yearlong investigation of the plaintiff's claim for underinsured motorist benefits, the defendant acquired the police report regarding the collision, the plaintiff's recorded statement and the recorded statement of a witness to the collision who was not listed in the police report. The defendant's claims specialists determined that S was 100 percent liable for the collision and noted their findings in the claim file. The plaintiff com- menced the prior action against S, who was underinsured. After citing in the defendant as an additional party, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, a breach of contract claim against the defendant for its failure to pay her underinsured motorist benefits, as well as claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) based on alleged violations of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Prac- tices Act (CUIPA) (§ 38a-815 et seq.). Before the defendant filed an answer, the plaintiff settled her claim with S for the limit of his insurance policy and withdrew the action against him. The defendant hired attor- neys to represent it in connection with the plaintiff's action but deliber- ately withheld from them its file notes, which included the recorded statement and the identity of the witness to the collision. In the defen- dant's initial answer to the complaint, which was filed one year after the conclusion of its investigation into the plaintiff's claim, the defendant denied or stated that it did not have sufficient information to admit the plaintiff's allegations regarding the cause of the collision and her injuries, and asserted a special defense of contributory negligence. The defendant provided false responses to the plaintiff's discovery requests, including that it did not know of the existence of a witness to the collision or whether any recorded statements of witnesses existed. In the plaintiff's deposition of the defendant, its designee admitted that the defendant had been aware of the witness to the collision and his recorded statement but failed to disclose that information in its interrogatory responses. Prior to trial, the defendant withdrew its special defense. The defendant then admitted liability at trial on the breach of contract claim, and a jury awarded the plaintiff damages. The trial court then granted in part the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's other claims. The court dismissed her claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on the ground that it was barred by the litigation privilege, as it was predicated on communications and statements filed in the course of and related to a judicial proceeding. The court also dismissed in part her claim for a violation of CUTPA based on the defendant's alleged violation of CUIPA, to the extent that the defendant had a business practice of responding falsely to discovery requests. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the breach of contract claim and for the defendant on the extracontractual claims, and our Supreme Court in Dorfman v. Smith (342 Conn. 582) affirmed the trial court's judgment. The plaintiff then filed the present action, alleging claims for common-law and statutory (§ 52-568 (1) and (2)) vexatious litigation and violations of CUTPA based on the defendant's alleged violations of CUIPA. Among other things, the plaintiff claimed that, in the prior action, the defendant had asserted its contributory negligence special defense and filed false pleadings without probable cause and with malice, and refused to admit certain allegations of her complaint, despite having had the information gathered during its investigation of the plaintiff's claim. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg- ment, in which it contended, inter alia, that all of the plaintiff's claims were barred by the litigation privilege and that its pleadings in the prior action were filed with probable cause and without malice. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court from the judgment of the trial court, held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that a vexatious litigation action cannot be premised on allegedly false answers to a complaint in a prior action, as, under the particular facts of this case, the plaintiff's allegations concerning the defendant's alleged bad faith pleading in the prior action properly asserted causes of action for vexatious litigation: a. This court determined that Connecticut case law has expressed agree- ment with § 674 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which permits such a cause of action for a party's conduct in continuing litigation without probable cause, and the plaintiff's allegations addressed the defendant's conduct that prolonged the Smith action with respect to the breach of conduct count against the defendant, for which the defendant eventually admitted liability; moreover, this court did not believe, con- trary to the defendant's contention, that, under the particular circum- stances at issue, its decision would open floodgates to litigation or impose unreasonable pleading requirements on parties, as vexatious litigation actions contain inherent safeguards, including a lower threshold to estab- lish probable cause and requirements that plaintiffs demonstrate a lack of probable cause for the prior proceeding, that the prior proceeding terminated in their favor and a showing of malice when treble damages are sought under § 52-568 (2); furthermore, the possibility that a vexatious litigation claim can be based on a bad faith denial in an answer did not mean that the ability of defendants to hold plaintiffs to their proof will be chilled or that an inartfully pleaded answer or mere denial of an allegation in a civil proceeding will subject individuals to vexatious litigation actions, as it typically will be difficult to establish a lack of probable cause when discovery in most cases is conducted after the filing of an answer, and the lack of probable cause requirement acts as a formidable barrier to baseless claims and serves to minimize any chilling effect on zealous advocacy. b. The defendant's claim that the plaintiff's remedy for untrue or unfounded allegations in a complaint was limited to sanctions under the applicable statute (§ 52-99) and rule of practice (§ 10-5) was unavailing; our Supreme Court in Smith stated that a vexatious litigation action was one of many remedies available to the plaintiff in challenging the defendant's conduct, which included a court's inherent authority to sanc- tion parties for litigation misconduct, and neither § 52-99 nor Practice Book § 10-5 include language indicating that they are the exclusive rem- edy for untrue pleadings. c. This court concluded that the defendant's denials of allegations in the prior action that it allegedly knew to be true constituted the assertion of a defense within the meaning of § 52-568: contrary to the defendant's claim that the phrase ''asserts a defense'' in § 52-568 should not be applied to a defendant's answer, denial or plea, this court determined that, although § 52-568 does not define ''defense,'' the commonly used dictionary definition of ''defense'' includes a denial and, thus, it would have been superfluous for the legislature to add ''denial'' to the statutory language; moreover, the general denial of a complaint's factual allega- tions is, in essence, the assertion of a defense to those allegations, and the defendant presented no authority suggesting the contrary or that ''defense'' in § 52-568 must be limited to special defenses; furthermore, to conclude that a denial in an answer is not a defense would contravene the purpose of § 52-568 in making clear that it is the strong public policy of the state to discourage dishonesty during the litigation process. 2. The trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's vexatious litigation claims, the court having applied an incorrect legal standard in making its probable cause determi- nation: the court focused on and limited its analysis to whether issues of material fact existed as to the cause of the plaintiff's injuries when it instead should have looked critically at each of the defendant's repre- sentations at issue, alongside the information within the defendant's knowledge at the time it made those representations, to determine if issues of material fact existed as to whether there was probable cause for the defendant's denials of allegations unrelated to the plaintiff's injuries and its assertion of contributory negligence as a special defense; moreover, the court did not take into account the defendant's denials of allegations pertaining to how the collision occurred and whether it was caused by S, as well as the assertion of contributory negligence, when the defendant's own internal investigation indicated that S was 100 percent responsible for the collision; furthermore, the court improperly concluded that the defendant met its burden of showing that no issue of material fact existed as to whether it had probable cause for pleading as it did, as the court did not consider that the defendant did not submit documentary evidence or affidavits in support of its summary judgment motion to demonstrate that it lacked knowledge of the contents of the documents and information gathered as part of its investigation, or that it had an objectively reasonable, good faith belief in the facts alleged in its answers and the validity of its special defense; accordingly, because the underlying facts that formed the basis for determining whether the defendant had probable cause to plead as it did were disputed, and the court failed to address the defendant's other arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment, the trial court's judgment was reversed as to the vexatious litigation claims and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 3. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment on the CUTPA and CUIPA counts of her complaint was unavail- ing; although the court applied an incorrect legal standard in concluding that its prior probable cause determination made it unnecessary to address those claims, this court upheld the summary judgment on the alternative ground that those claims were barred by the litigation privi- lege, as the CUTPA and CUIPA counts were based on the same conduct underlying the vexatious litigation claims, which the court in Smith determined were protected by the litigation privilege. (One judge concurring in part and dissenting in part) Argued September 12, 2023—officially released August 20, 2024

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the named defendant, E Co. E Co. executed a promissory note in the plaintiff's favor, which was secured by a mortgage on the property. E Co. subsequently entered into a modification agreement with the plaintiff that increased the amount of the principal in exchange for a six month extension of the maturity date. E Co. thereafter defaulted on the mortgage and the defendants requested a second extension, which the plaintiff refused. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant guaran- tors had breached their guarantees. The defendants asserted the special defense of unclean hands, claiming that the parties had negotiated for an additional extension of time regarding the maturity date, which the plaintiff refused to honor. In opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability, the defendants submitted an affidavit from the defendant S, who signed the modification agreement on E Co.'s behalf. S averred that E Co. entered into the modification agreement in reliance on the plaintiff's false promise to grant an additional extension of the maturity date. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Held: 1. The appeal was dismissed as to the guarantor defendants for lack of standing; it was undisputed that none of the guarantor defendants was a party to the note, mortgage or modification agreement, and neither the plaintiff nor the defendants alleged that the guarantor defendants had any interest in the property or a right of redemption. 2. The trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judg- ment as to liability: because the text of the modification agreement expressly addressed the question of further extensions, specifically pro- viding that the maturity date ''shall not be further extended'' past the initial six month extension, the trial court properly concluded that the modification agreement was integrated on this point; moreover, S's affidavit was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the defendants' unclean hands defense, as E Co. could not manufacture a material factual dispute as to the parties' intent by pointing to parol evidence of negotiations that contradicted the express written terms of the modification agreement, even by way of a sworn affidavit. Argued May 23—officially released August 20, 2024

The petitioner, who had previously been convicted, following a jury trial, of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the state had violated his right to due process during his underlying criminal trial by failing to disclose an alleged cooperation agreement with G, who had been with the petitioner on the day of the murder and who testified at the petitioner's criminal trial. At the petitioner's habeas trial, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, introduced testimony from G, G's former attorney, and three prosecutors who were involved in the petitioner's underlying criminal trial and sentencing, all of whom testi- fied that there was no formal or informal agreement or understanding between G and the state prior to or during the petitioner's trial. The habeas court denied the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus but granted certification to appeal. While the petitioner's appeal was pending, he filed a motion for rectification and/or augmentation of the record, seeking to include additional transcripts from the prosecution of G and G's court file. The habeas court denied the motion, finding, inter alia, that the petitioner was improperly seeking to create a record, rather than rectify the existing record. The petitioner filed with this court a motion for review of the habeas court's denial of his motion, and this court granted the motion for review but denied the relief requested therein. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court erred in rejecting his claim that the state violated his right to due process by failing to disclose an alleged cooperation agreement with G to the defense and by knowingly soliciting allegedly false and misleading testi- mony from G and allowing that testimony to stand uncorrected: contrary to the petitioner's assertions, the transcripts from G's sentencing hearing that the petitioner submitted as exhibits during his habeas trial did not contradict the testimony of the witnesses who testified at the habeas trial because, although the transcripts from that hearing revealed that the prosecutor informed the court that it was supporting a relatively lenient disposition in consideration for the testimony that G had given at the petitioner's criminal trial, he did not state or imply that the state had reached an agreement or understanding with G at the time of the petitioner's criminal trial; moreover, the habeas court was not required to infer such an agreement or understanding under the circumstances of this case and, on the basis of the record in this case, the habeas court's finding was not clearly erroneous. 2. This court declined to revisit its prior ruling on the petitioner's motion for review or to take judicial notice of certain materials that were never submitted to the habeas court: the petitioner's arguments on appeal were nearly identical to those he made before this court in his motion for review, and this court has made clear that it will order a hearing pursuant to State v. Floyd (253 Conn. 700) only in the unusual situation in which a defendant was precluded from perfecting the record due to new information obtained after judgment; moreover, if this court were to grant the petitioner's request and consider evidence that was not reviewed by the habeas court or by the state, even though the petitioner had the opportunity to present such evidence, the result would be trial by ambuscade. Argued April 15—officially released August 20, 2024

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus more than two years after the judgment had become final in the petitioner's previous state habeas action. The respondent, the Commis- sioner of Correction, sought an order to show cause pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (d) and (e)), asserting that the petition was untimely. At the show cause hearing, the petitioner testified that he had been diagnosed with dyslexia and attention deficit disorder and that he had reading and writing difficulties. The habeas court dismissed the petition as untimely and denied the petition for certification to appeal. On the petitioner's appeal to this court, held that the habeas court did not abuse its discre- tion in denying the petition for certification to appeal following its determination that the petitioner had failed to establish good cause to overcome the statutory presumption of unreasonable delay in the filing of his untimely habeas petition: the habeas court did not find the petition- er's testimony as to his alleged mental deficiencies credible for the purpose of establishing good cause, and this court must defer to the credibility findings of the habeas court based on its firsthand observation of a witness' conduct, demeanor, and attitude; moreover, despite the petitioner's attempt in his appellate brief to explain how his alleged mental deficiencies contributed to the delay in filing his habeas petition, he did not make such an attempt before the habeas court, asserting only that his alleged mental deficiencies affected his ability to read and write and to understand the legal process, and the record revealed that he was able to file both a first state habeas petition and a federal habeas petition as a self-represented party while struggling with the same alleged deficiencies; furthermore, although he testified that he had previously relied on certain fellow inmates acting as jailhouse lawyers to help with filing petitions, the record was devoid of evidence or explanation as to why his alleged mental deficiencies prevented him from utilizing these jailhouse lawyers to file the present petition earlier than he did. Argued May 16—officially released August 20, 2024

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the defendant and issuing various orders. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in awarding the defendant the entirety of his limited partnership interest in S Co., which had been issued to the defendant by his former employer as part of his compensation: the court expressly stated that it considered the factors listed in the applicable statute (§ 46b-81) in dividing the marital property, and it explained its consideration of several of those factors; moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's claim that the court treated the defendant's interest in S Co. as an ''income-producing asset,'' it was clear from the court's decision that it understood that the defendant's interest was comprised of his past earnings and it treated that interest as property; furthermore, the court was not required to evenly divide the marital property, and its other financial orders sufficiently provided for the plaintiff's future finan- cial support. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in establishing the parenting schedule for the parties' four minor children: contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the court was not required to adopt one of the parenting schedules proposed by the parties or the guardian ad litem, as the wishes and desires of the parties comprised only one factor for the court's consideration; moreover, it was evident that the court carefully consid- ered the proposed schedules and all of the testimony presented in estab- lishing a schedule that it deemed to be in the best interests of the children. 3. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in its orders concerning decision-making authority and expenses related to the extracurricular activities of the parties' children, the plaintiff having raised the claim for the first time on appeal. Argued May 23—officially released August 20, 2024

The plaintiff filed an application for a prejudgment remedy and a verified complaint in which she sought to recover damages from the defendant for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and intimi- dation based on bigotry or bias. The plaintiff, a Black woman who suffered from multiple sclerosis, was attending a protest at the Capitol building in January, 2021, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, to demonstrate her support of the Black Lives Matter movement. The defendant, a white woman, approached the plaintiff and, inter alia, asked her about ''Black on Black'' crime. After a brief exchange of words between the parties, the defendant spat directly into the plaintiff's face. During the hearing on her application, the plaintiff, inter alia, introduced testimony from G, a professor of criminology and social justice, as an expert on issues related to racism and social justice. The trial court granted the application, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in awarding the plaintiff a prejudgment remedy of $75,000 in emotional distress damages; the plaintiff's testimony that she experienced severe emotional distress and humiliation as a result of being spat on, that the experience reawakened trauma of a past sexual assault, and that she had increased concerns that she might contract COVID-19, which could worsen her multiple sclerosis symp- toms, afforded a reasonable basis for the prejudgment remedy. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting G's expert testi- mony: pursuant to the standard set forth in Weaver v. McKnight (313 Conn. 393) for the admission of nonscientific evidence, the court found that G had special knowledge that was directly applicable to the matter at issue, his testimony offered the court a historical and sociological perspective on race and racism that would not have been within the knowledge of the average person, and his testimony providing context for how the defendant's statements could be construed was helpful to the court in its determination of whether the defendant exhibited racial bigotry or bias; moreover, the defendant's challenges to the admission of G's testimony in part concerned the substance of G's testimony, which related to the weight his testimony should be given and not its admissibility. 3. This court concluded that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support its determination that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant's actions and/or statements were motivated in whole or substantial part by the plaintiff's race: G's testimony, which was properly admitted and was credited by the trial court, explained how some of the defendant's language could be interpreted as racist tropes indicating a racist attitude; moreover, the trial court reasonably could have determined that a person of ordinary judgment could con- clude that the white defendant's conduct in spitting on the Black plaintiff was motivated in substantial part by race, as evidence showed that the defendant moved toward the plaintiff after the plaintiff began chanting, ''Black lives matter,'' stood directly next to the plaintiff, and used the phrases ''Black on Black'' crime and ''all lives matter,'' which could suggest the defendant had a level of racial animus. 4. The defendant could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that the trial court committed plain error in granting the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy in a case involving freedom of speech and first amendment principles: this case involved allegations against the defen- dant for her conduct in spitting on the plaintiff, not for making a verbal threat, and the court used the defendant's statements made just prior to the spitting incident solely to help determine her intent and whether she was motivated in whole or part by the plaintiff's race; moreover, the defendant did not demonstrate that the claimed error was so clear, obvious, and indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal, as there are no exceptions within the statutes (§§ 52-278c and 52-278d) governing prejudgment remedies for cases involving first amendment principles. Argued February 6—officially released August 20, 2024

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant city for injuries she sustained in connection with a motor vehicle accident. On the night of the accident, after finishing their shifts, C and G, police officers employed by the defendant, drove separately to a restaurant, where C consumed alcoholic beverages. When they left the establishment, C was visibly intoxicated. As G was following C to his home, C's vehicle crossed into the plaintiff's lane of travel and collided with her vehicle. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was liable for G's allegedly negligent conduct in allowing C to operate his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-557n) and for failing to properly screen C prior to hiring him as a member of the police department. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly determined that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist as to whether G was acting within the scope of his employment or official duties so as to subject the defendant to a claim for the plaintiff's injuries pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (1) (A): the affidavits submitted by the defendant in connection with its motion for summary judgment demonstrated that G was not engaged in any official duty of his employment or doing something incidental to it at the time of his allegedly negligent conduct, as G and C had been off duty for approxi- mately four hours prior to the accident, they drove their personal vehi- cles to the restaurant, they were not in uniform and did not have badges, identifying insignia or service weapons on their person at the restaurant, they had not been attending a party sponsored by the police department, and they did not perform any police services while at the restaurant; moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's assertions, G's violations of the police department's policies and procedures did not constitute violations of his official duties pursuant to statute (§ 54-1f) but, rather, were viola- tions of his overall responsibility and ethical character. 2. The trial court properly determined that the plaintiff's claim regarding the defendant's negligent hiring of C was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (§ 52-584): because C was hired in 2011 and the present case was commenced in 2019, C was hired more than three years before the institution of the present action; moreover, the court properly deter- mined that the plaintiff had waived her claim that the continuing course of conduct doctrine tolled the statute of limitations as it was procedurally defective because, instead of affirmatively pleading the doctrine in avoid- ance of the defendant's statute of limitations special defense, she asserted it for the first time in her memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment; furthermore, the court properly rejected the plaintiff's continuing course of conduct argument on substantive grounds as the plaintiff failed to allege that she had a special relationship with the defendant or to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether the defendant committed some later, actual or affirmative wrongful act related to the initial hiring of C. Argued February 7—officially released August 27, 2024

The defendant guarantor appealed to this court from the trial court's granting of a motion for approval of trial and appellate court costs and attorney's fees filed by the plaintiff note holder pursuant to the terms of the promissory note, following judgment rendered in its favor on its breach of guarantee claim. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's motion was not timely filed pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 11-21) governing motions for attorney's fees and was made without any showing of excus- able neglect to permit the late filing. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that Practice Book § 11-21 did not apply to its motion for contractual attorney's fees, as opposed to statutory attorney's fees: the text of Practice Book § 11-21 makes it clear that the rule applies to attorney's fees sought postjudgment and not to those attorney's fees assessed as a component of damages, and to the extent there is ambiguity as to whether the rule governs contractual attorney's fees, the commentary to the rule and dicta in Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman (328 Conn. 586) support this court's construc- tion that postjudgment motions for contractual attorney's fees are sub- ject to the rule; moreover, to the extent that the plaintiff contended that the trial court's award of attorney's fees constituted an award of damages, the plaintiff did not identify any support in the record for that proposition, it did not suggest any legal theory that could support a postjudgment award of contractual attorney's fees incurred entirely in connection with the prosecution of the plaintiff's breach of guarantee claim as damages, and the fact that the plaintiff sought attorney's fees for the first time postjudgment and following an appeal without remand readily distinguished the court's award of attorney's fees from an award of attorney's fees assessed as a component of damages, and, accordingly, Practice Book § 11-21 applied, as a matter of fact, to the plaintiff's motion, such that the motion was untimely filed. 2. The trial court abused its discretion in entertaining the plaintiff's untimely request for trial court and appellate attorney's fees: although the plaintiff argued that the fact that the clerk of the trial court did not enter the judgment or a document titled ''judgment'' constituted excusable neglect for its late filing of its motion for trial court attorney's fees, that con- tention incorrectly articulated the relevant portion of Practice Book § 11-21 by substituting the entry of judgment for the rendering of judg- ment, and, regardless of whether a separate document titled ''judgment'' was entered, there could not reasonably be any ambiguity or confusion regarding the fact that the trial court had rendered a final judgment when it granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and the fact that the defendant took a timely appeal, in which the plaintiff participated, added further support to this conclusion; moreover, the plaintiff provided no additional reason for the untimely filing with respect to appellate attorney's fees and, because the plaintiff failed to present the trial court with any viable reason for its delay in moving for appellate attorney's fees it therefore made a legally insufficient show- ing to support an excusable neglect finding. Argued March 7—officially released August 27, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 53a-155 (a)), a defendant is guilty of tampering with evidence if, ''believing that a criminal investigation conducted by a law enforcement agency . . . is . . . about to be instituted, [the defendant] . . . conceals . . . [a] thing with purpose to impair its . . . availability in such criminal investigation . . . .'' Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of evading responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle and tampering with physical evidence, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident during which the defendant struck and killed the victim with the SUV he was driving, fled the scene, and thereafter left the SUV in a driveway. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of tampering with evidence: a. The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant believed that a criminal investigation was about to be instituted when he fled the scene of the accident and abandoned the SUV he was driving in a driveway; the jury was permitted to consider circumstantial evidence presented by the state to make reasonable infer- ences regarding the defendant's state of mind, including evidence that the defendant saw the victim on the ground when he returned to the intersection before fleeing the scene, or that the defendant must have known from the significant damage to the SUV that the victim had been injured, and the jury was free to credit or discredit the defendant's statements in his recorded statement to the police. b. There was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had concealed the SUV; a rational juror could consider and credit the context for the defendant's act of concealment, including evidence that the defendant likely knew he had seriously injured a pedes- trian, fled the scene, and needed to act quickly and temporarily abandon the vehicle, which had become disabled, and, in light of the defendant's exigent circumstances, a juror could conclude that he saw an opportunity to make the SUV less noticeable in a private driveway among several other vehicles. 2. This court did not reach the merits of the defendant's claim that the trial court's refusal to answer two questions submitted by the jury during its deliberations as to whether moving evidence equated to tampering or concealing evidence resulted in an unconstitutional enlargement of the charged crimes, as that claim was deemed waived pursuant to State v. Kitchens (299 Conn. 447): although the trial court did not inform the parties of the answer it intended to provide to the jury's questions, it invited counsel, outside the presence of the jury, to raise any issues before the answer was given, both counsel stated that they had nothing further to discuss, and counsel failed to object after the court responded to the jury's questions; accordingly, this court could not say that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial when the record indicated that the defense was provided a meaningful opportunity to propose an answer to the jury's questions and to object to the trial court's response to those questions, and, therefore, the defendant waived the right to chal- lenge that response on appeal. Argued May 15—officially released August 27, 2024

Convicted, following a jury trial, under two separate dockets, of five counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree and four counts of risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his right to due process under the federal constitution was violated by the trial court's preliminary instructions to the jury: by providing instructions that contained the language of the statutes that the defendant was charged with violating, the court properly informed the jury of the nature of the charges in accordance with the model jury instructions pertaining to preliminary instructions; moreover, the court included instructions regarding the state's burden to prove each element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, an instruction on reasonable doubt that was consis- tent with the model jury instruction for preliminary instructions, an explanation of the difference between preliminary instructions and final instructions and an instruction to the jurors that their verdict must be based exclusively on evidence presented at trial and on the principles of law in the court's final instructions; furthermore, because the court's final instructions covered all applicable legal principles, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the claimed errors regarding the trial court's preliminary instructions merited the extraordinary relief afforded under the plain error doctrine. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claims that the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process in its final instructions to the jury: a. The defendant's claim that the court erred in failing to include in its final instructions a limiting instruction regarding the use of nonpropensity evidence for propensity purposes was unavailing: the defendant con- sented to the joinder of the two underlying cases, and the court properly In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the defendant's full name or to identify the victims or others through whom the victims' identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. advised the jury in its final instructions that the jury must deliberate on each count separately and must make an independent determination as to whether the state satisfied its burden of proof as to each element of the charged offenses; moreover, although the court did not specifically instruct the jury that it could not use the evidence pertaining to one information as propensity evidence when considering the offenses charged in the other information, the defendant waived this claim and was not entitled to review under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) because he did not request such an instruction from the court and defense counsel stated that he had no objection to the court's proposed instructions and did not request any additions or modifications to this section of the instructions; furthermore, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the court committed plain error in the absence of his request for such an instruction. b. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the court erred in instructing the jury that it could use the victims' affidavits as substantive evidence rather than solely for impeachment purposes: defense counsel explicitly offered the affidavits as full exhibits and did not indicate at trial that the affidavits were introduced only for a limited purpose; moreover, defense counsel raised no objection during the charge confer- ence regarding the language permitting the jury to consider the affidavits as substantive evidence, nor did defense counsel take exception to the language after the court delivered its final instructions, and, accordingly, the defendant waived this claim and therefore was not entitled to Golding review; furthermore, it is well established that an exhibit offered and received as a full exhibit is in the case for all purposes and, accordingly, the court did not commit plain error by instructing the jury in the manner that it did. c. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court committed plain error in instructing the jury on the elements of fourth degree sexual assault: although the trial court erroneously omitted the word ''intentionally'' from its instruction on the elements of fourth degree sexual assault as to four of the five counts, the court's final instructions, when read as a whole, did not dilute the state's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally subjected the victims to sexual contact with respect to each of the five counts of fourth degree sexual assault and, accordingly, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the court's erroneous instruction resulted in manifest injustice. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claims that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial: a. This court could not conclude that the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victims at their ages when the defendant's abuse began: even assuming, arguendo, that the photographs would have been inadmissible if objected to at trial, the defendant cited no authority for the proposition that the trial court had an affirmative obligation to preclude the admission of certain evidence in the absence of an objection; moreover, it is well established that when opposing counsel does not object to evidence, it is inappropriate for the trial court to assume the role of advocate and decide that the evidence should be stricken; further- more, the defendant's unpreserved evidentiary claim did not present a truly extraordinary situation in which the alleged error was so obvious that it would affect the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings and this court therefore declined to afford the defendant relief under the plain error doctrine. b. This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court erred in admitting a photograph of the defendant's gun safe because it was not relevant and was highly prejudicial; because defense counsel objected to the photograph of the gun safe only on the basis of lack of a proper foundation, the defendant could not now chal- lenge its admission on other grounds. 4. The defendant could not prevail on his claims that various statements by the prosecutor were improper: defense counsel did not take exception at trial to any of the prosecutor's uses of the term ''sexual assault,'' nor did the trial court ever instruct the prosecutor to refrain from using the term, and, given the circumstances of this case, the relatively infrequent use of the term, and the context in which the term was used, the prosecutor's six uses of the term ''sexual assault'' when questioning the witnesses did not constitute prosecutorial impropriety; moreover, although the defendant claimed that the prosecutor improperly sug- gested that the defendant's abuse caused one of the victim's breast cancer, the prosecutor never claimed a causal relationship between the defendant's abuse and the victim's breast cancer, and the jury could not have reasonably interpreted the prosecutor's remarks as suggestive of such a connection. Argued May 21—officially released August 27, 2024

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for personal injuries he sustained in connection with an alleged slip and fall as a result of untreated ice on premises owned, controlled, and maintained by the defendant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the ongoing storm doctrine, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as it was undisputed that there was an ongoing storm at the time the plaintiff fell, the defendant satisfied its initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that it neither created the snow and ice condition nor did it have actual or constructive notice of the condition, and the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the icy condition existed prior to the storm that was ongoing at the time of his fall. Argued April 25—officially released August 27, 2024

The plaintiff father appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court awarding the defendant mother sole legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly awarded the defendant sole legal and physical custody of the children because it failed to consider the test set forth in the statute (§ 46b-56d) governing a parent's postjudgment relocation with a child: § 46b-56d was inapplicable to the facts of the case because it did not involve a postjudgment relocation, as the plaintiff filed an application seeking joint legal custody with a shared parenting plan, the defendant filed a cross complaint seeking sole legal custody, and, before a trial was held and a custody determination was made, the defendant relocated to South Carolina with the children, and, thus, the court was not required to perform the relocation analysis set forth in § 46b-56d; moreover, it was undisputed that the court applied the standard of the best interest of the child as set forth in the statute (§ 46b-56) governing the custody of minor children, the standard that governs a relocation issue that arises prior to the time a judgment is rendered awarding custody; furthermore, it was clear on the basis of the record and the court's factual findings, which were not challenged on appeal, that the court considered the impact of the children's relocation in its best interest analysis. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly issued orders that required him to be current with his child support obligation and to pay one half of the travel expenses for the minor children in order to receive parenting time with the children in Connecti- cut: this court concluded that the plaintiff's claim is an inaccurate recita- tion of the substance of the trial court's parenting time orders, as this In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the court. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. court construed the parenting time orders as providing that, if the plain- tiff is not current on child support, then he would bear the entire cost of the children's travel to Connecticut and, if he was current on child support, he and the defendant would share the costs equally, and the only circumstance in which the defendant was allowed to cancel a visit was if the plaintiff had not provided her with payment for his portion of the travel expenses, not if the plaintiff was not current on child support payments. 3. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly relied on the testimony of the guardian ad litem in its analysis of the best interests of the minor children: the fact that the guardian ad litem was unable to observe a visit between the plaintiff and his children, despite clear efforts made to do so, did not render the guardian ad litem unable to issue recommendations to the court, nor did it make it improper for the court to rely on those recommendations; moreover, the guardian ad litem investigated the facts necessary to make recom- mendations to the court related to custody and parenting time and received updates from a third-party supervisor who had observed the plaintiff's visits with the children; furthermore, given that the guardian ad litem testified at a hearing and was subject to cross-examination by the parties, the court was able to consider the basis for the guardian ad litem's observations and recommendations and to afford them whatever weight it deemed appropriate. Argued May 16—officially released September 3, 2024

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court finding him in violation of his probation and revoking his probation. The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly denied his counsel's motion to withdraw her appearance and failed to conduct an adequate hearing into his competency to stand trial and, thus, improperly denied his motion for a competency evaluation pursuant to statute (§ 54- 56d). Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw filed by the defendant's counsel: the court's ruling made clear that the timing of the motion was central to its determination because, although the court stated at a hearing more than one month before the scheduled violation of probation trial that it had no objection to counsel's proposed motion to withdraw, counsel indicated she would file that motion within one or two days of the hearing, and, at the time she ultimately filed the motion, it was only nine days before the trial date; moreover, the court properly concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist to justify granting the motion so close to trial, as the record reflected that the defendant had the capacity to communicate with the court and that it was the defendant's choice to refuse to communicate with his counsel. 2. The trial court properly evaluated the defendant's motion for a competency evaluation and, thus, did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion: although the defendant's counsel disagreed with the defendant's deci- sions not to accept a plea offer and not to attend the trial, it was the defendant's right to do so and did not reasonably suggest that he lacked an understanding of the facts of the case or the nature of the proceeding and there was no indication that he could not assist with his defense; moreover, the court observed the defendant's demeanor and conversed with him over the course of a lengthy colloquy regarding the defendant's participation in the hearing, and it reasonably could have determined that his statements did not reflect an inability to grasp the nature of the proceeding or the facts related to the case. Argued March 4—officially released September 3, 2024

Convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crime of strangulation in the second degree, the petitioner appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his petition for a writ of error coram nobis because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In his petition, the petitioner sought permission to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. Held that the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for a writ of error coram nobis; because the petitioner could have raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus during his period of probation, he failed to avail himself of an alternative legal remedy available to him; moreover, this court declined the petitioner's request that this court overrule State v. Stephenson (154 Conn. App. 587), which clearly held that the prior availability of a writ of habeas corpus defeats the jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, the petitioner having failed to file a motion requesting that this court hear his appeal en banc. Argued May 29—officially released September 3, 2024

The defendant, who had previously been convicted, following a guilty plea, of, inter alia, the crime of burglary in the second degree, filed a motion for sentence modification pursuant to statute (§ 53a-39 (a)). Although the defendant was living at a halfway house at the time he filed his motion, by the time of the hearing before the trial court the defendant was on special parole. The court dismissed the motion, finding that, because the defendant was on special parole, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the motion. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held that, although the trial court properly determined that the defendant was not entitled to a modification of his sentence pursuant to § 53a-39 (a) because he was no longer serving an ''executed period of incarceration,'' the form of the judgment was improper; because the language of § 53a-39 (a) providing that a trial court may act ''at any time during an executed period of incarceration'' is a limit to the court's statutory authority, not its subject matter jurisdiction, the court should have denied the defendant's motion rather than dismissed it. Argued May 30—officially released September 3, 2024

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, the city of Hartford and D, a police officer employed by the city, in connection with injuries he sustained when a motorcycle he was driving collided with D's police vehicle. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was driving through an intersection with a green light, and D, who was responding to an emergency call, accelerated his vehicle through the same intersection with a red light. D activated the lights and sirens on his vehicle pursuant to statute (§ 14-283) only as he entered the intersection, not before. The plaintiff alleged that D's negligence had caused his injuries and that the city was required to indemnify D pursuant to the municipal indemnification statute (§ 7-465). After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff against both defendants, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that it was plain error for the trial court to instruct the jury on common-law principles of negligence regarding the operation of a motor vehicle and to fail to instruct the jury that D, as an operator of an emergency vehicle, was permitted to disregard driving statutes, ordinances and regulations: recent decisions by our Supreme Court, including Adesokan v. Bloom- field (347 Conn. 416) and Daley v. Kashmanian (344 Conn. 464), sup- ported a claim that the law is unsettled with respect to whether common- law negligence principles apply in the context of § 14-283; moreover, the instructions to the jury regarding negligence in this case did not amount to an error so obvious on its face that it was undebatable, as the court's instructions adequately apprised the jury on the applicable exception to the ordinary rules of driving triggered on satisfaction of the requirements of § 14-283. 2. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court commit- ted plain error by failing to instruct the jury that § 14-283 (e) imposed a legal duty on the plaintiff to slow down, pull over and/or stop prior to entering an intersection when an emergency vehicle with its lights and sirens on approached the same intersection; the court's instruction to the jury on contributory negligence substantially complied with the language of § 14-283 (e) and adequately apprised the jury of the plaintiff's duty under § 14-283 (e), and the omission of a specific instruction was not so obvious an error as to constitute plain error. Argued May 16—officially released September 3, 2024

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant R Co. The defendant H Co. was a junior lienholder. The trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. Before the judgment of strict foreclosure was recorded in the trial court file and notice issued to counsel, H Co. filed a motion for judgment of foreclosure by sale, on which the trial court never ruled. Thereafter, the law days passed, and the plaintiff recorded the passing of title. More than two years later, H Co. reclaimed the motion for judgment of foreclosure by sale, which was eventually marked off short calendar. H Co. also filed a motion to open the judgment, which the trial court denied. On H Co.'s appeal to this court, held: 1. H Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court, in denying its motion to open, improperly concluded that it was not entitled to relief pursuant to statute (§ 49-15) because absolute title to the property had vested in the plaintiff: no appellate stay was in effect when the law days passed, such that the law days were legally effective, and, without redemption, absolute title to the property vested in the plaintiff, thereby precluding the defendant from obtaining relief pursuant to § 49-15; more- over, the filing of the motion for judgment of foreclosure by sale did not operate to extend the appellate stay vis-à-vis the judgment of strict foreclosure, which expired well before the law days passed, as the motion did not satisfy the requirements of the relevant rule of practice (§ 63-1 (c) (1)). 2. H Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court, in denying its motion to open, failed to consider that, even if absolute title to the property had vested in the plaintiff, the court had inherent, continuing jurisdiction to open the judgment as a result of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the court's Uniform Foreclosure Standing Orders; although H Co.'s claim for equitable relief in the motion to open was colorable, H Co. failed to demonstrate the existence of rare and exceptional circum- stances warranting the extraordinary equitable relief that it sought in the motion to open. Argued April 16—officially released September 10, 2024

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants M and J. After defaulting the defendants for failure to plead, the trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale. The property was then sold to the plaintiff, and the trial court approved the sale. M timely filed a motion to set aside the court's approval of the sale. The defendants, however, never marked the motion as ready for adjudication, and, accordingly, the court did not act on it. Thereafter, the case was administratively closed. Approximately three months later, the defendants filed a motion to open, requesting that the trial court vacate the administrative closure and open and vacate the judgment of foreclosure by sale. The trial court denied the defendants' motion to open and sustained the plaintiff's objection thereto, and the defendants appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court concluded that any error by the trial court in its misinterpreta- tion or misapplication of the applicable rule of practice (§ 63-1 (c) (1)) regarding the existence of an appellate stay following M's filing of the motion to set aside the approval of the sale was harmless and did not provide a reasonable basis for reversing the trial court's judgment on the defendants' motion to open: although, pursuant to Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1), M's filing of the motion to set aside the approval of the sale extended the appellate stay that was in effect as a result of the court's approval of the sale until there was a ruling on that motion and any resulting new appeal period expired, the court's decision to enter the administrative closure of the file either acted as an implicit denial of M's motion or served as notice to the parties that the court was declining to rule on that motion, which the defendants reasonably should have construed as an effective denial of the motion pursuant to Ahneman v. Ahneman (243 Conn. 471); moreover, to the extent that M's filing of the motion to set aside the approval of the sale created the potential for a new appeal period, it began to run with the entry of the administrative closure and, thus, terminated approximately two months prior to the defendants' filing of the motion to open; furthermore, M's motion to set aside the approval of the sale did not assert fraud, mistake, surprise or any other issue with regard to the judicial sale but, instead, asserted claims directed at the judgment of foreclosure, which the defendants had waived when they failed to timely appeal from the judgment of foreclosure by sale. 2. Contrary to the defendants' assertions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deciding the motion to open on the papers without a hearing: a motion seeking to open or set aside a judgment is not a motion for which oral argument is as of right; moreover, although the defendants requested oral argument, they did not identify in their motion or their supporting memorandum the existence of any disputed factual issues that required the taking of evidence; furthermore, although the defendants claimed that the lack of a hearing deprived them of the opportunity to contest one of the factual predicates underlying the court's rationale for denying the motion, namely, whether they diligently pursued M's motion to set aside the approval of the sale, that issue had no legal bearing on the existence of an appellate stay. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to open to the extent that it sought to set aside the administrative closure and properly determined that the defendants' request to open the judgment of foreclosure was untimely and, thus, that it lacked the authority to grant that aspect of the motion: the motion to open was filed nearly nine months after the court rendered the judgment of foreclo- sure by sale and, as such, was clearly outside of the applicable statutory limit (§ 52-212a); moreover, at the time the motion was filed, title to the property had vested in the plaintiff as the purchaser of the property because the time to appeal from the approval of the sale had long passed; furthermore, the motion did not raise a colorable claim that the foreclosure judgment was the product of fraud, duress or mutual mis- take. Argued April 22—officially released September 10, 2024

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his petition for third-party visitation with three minor children, with respect to whom his parental rights previously had been terminated. Held: 1. The trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdic- tion over the petition; it was not disputed that Connecticut was not the home state of the children pursuant to the applicable statutes (§§ 46b- 115a and 46b-115k) when the plaintiff commenced this child custody proceeding, as the children had lived with the defendant in North Caro- lina for more than six months before this proceeding commenced, and, because North Carolina possessed home state jurisdiction over visitation petitions involving the children, the trial court did not have jurisdiction pursuant to § 46b-115k (a) (3). 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his alternative claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the accidental failure of suit statute (§ 52- 592) did not apply in the present case; because § 52-592 operates to toll a statute of limitations, a necessary prerequisite to its application is the existence of a statute of limitations that would otherwise bar the cause of action at issue, and, here, the plaintiff did not identify any statute of limitations pertaining to petitions for third-party visitation and the defendant did not raise a statute of limitations defense. Submitted on briefs March 5—officially released September 10, 2024

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was actually innocent of the crimes of which he had been convicted. The petitioner had planned to steal property from the victim with two other individuals, M and T, although T ultimately did not participate in the robbery. During the commission of the robbery by the petitioner and M, M shot and killed the victim. After a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. In a subsequent trial, M was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of the crimes with which he was charged stemming from the robbery. In his habeas petition, the petitioner claimed that, as a matter of law, he could not have conspired with M or formed an agreement with him to participate in a robbery of the victim because M lacked the mental capacity to engage in the charged crimes. The habeas court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and subsequently denied the petition for certification to appeal. On the petitioner's appeal to this court, held: 1. The habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certifica- tion to appeal; the petitioner's actual innocence claim involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that could have been resolved by a court in a different manner, and that raised a question that was adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 2. Even assuming, as this court did, that the fact of M's incapacity was newly discovered evidence, which was essential for the petitioner's claim regarding actual innocence, the petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improperly concluded that he failed to prove that he was actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted: a. The petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving his actual innocence with regard to his conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree: although there was no question that M was unable to form any intent to conspire with the petitioner to rob the victim and that, therefore, no crime of conspiracy could have been committed with M, the aggregate evidence at the petitioner's criminal trial and his habeas trial, all of which was required to be considered by the habeas court, would not prevent a reasonable jury from finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner was guilty of conspiring with T to commit the robbery, and, as such, even if evidence of M's incapacity had been presented at the petitioner's criminal trial, there was still sufficient evi- dence from which the jury could have found the petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery. b. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that he was actually innocent of robbery in the first degree and felony murder because M's mental state prevented him from forming any intent to participate in the robbery, which was the predicate felony for the felony murder charge: because the plain language of the statute governing first degree robbery (§ 53a-134 (a) (2)) provides that an individual may be guilty of first degree robbery if he or another participant in the crime uses or threatens the use of a deadly weapon, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that, during the commission of the robbery, the petitioner acted in concert with M; moreover, because the petitioner never disputed that M shot and killed the victim, the petitioner's criminal liability as an accessory for acts perpetrated by M was inherent in § 53a-134 (a) (2), and the fact that M lacked the ability to form any criminal intent due to his mental disease or defect did not excuse the petitioner from liability; furthermore, the felony murder statute (§ 53a-54c) does not require proof of intent and, because the petitioner was criminally liable as a participant in the robbery and the homicide was committed by the other participant, M, in the execution of that robbery, he was also guilty of felony murder pursuant to § 53a-54c. Argued February 7—officially released September 10, 2024

The plaintiff, O, sought to recover damages from the defendant, L, arising out of a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, O was insured by N Co., and N Co. paid to repair the damage to O's vehicle that resulted from the accident. In O's action against L, O sought damages for, inter alia, the diminished value of his vehicle. L moved to implead N Co. as a third-party defendant and filed a third-party complaint against N Co., alleging that his insurer had tendered his full policy limit to N Co. O filed an amended complaint that purported to assert apportion- ment claims against N Co. The court granted N Co.'s motion for a judgment of nonsuit against L. Less than four months before jury selec- tion was scheduled, O requested leave to amend his complaint, which the court denied. Subsequently, the court granted N Co.'s motion to strike counts of the operative complaint, including a count sounding in unjust enrichment. On O's appeal to this court, held: 1. O could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly denied his request for leave to amend his complaint, O having failed to demon- strate that the court abused its discretion in denying his request: the court's denial did not prevent O from curing alleged pleading deficiencies with respect to the counts initially pleaded because O had the opportu- nity to cure such deficiencies when he filed a third amended complaint two months later; moreover, although O could not properly assert the additional causes of action in the subsequent amended complaints he filed, the court found that he had had an opportunity to assert those causes of action in prior requests to amend the complaint and failed to do so; furthermore, the court also found that permitting the proposed amendment would considerably delay the proceedings in light of the upcoming trial date, despite the fact that the parties were still in the pleading stage of litigation. 2. O could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly dismissed his unjust enrichment count against N Co. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: a. O's unjust enrichment claim against N Co. was not ripe for adjudication as it was contingent on whether and to what extent O could recover against L as well as whether L would be able to satisfy the hypothetical judgment; moreover, because O's claim against L has yet to be adjudi- cated and liability, if any, for the alleged loss determined, and there was no allegation that L was insolvent, it was impossible to ascertain whether O would sustain any compensatory injury as a result of N Co.'s alleged misconduct. b. The trial court properly decided the issue of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the operative complaint alone and did not improperly fail to consider evidence O presented regarding ripeness: O's proffered exhibits were copies of emails unaccompanied by any affidavit or other undisputed evidence as required by the applicable rule of practice (§ 10- 31); moreover, even considering O's exhibits, they were not sufficient to render his claim against N Co. ripe for adjudication, as O's claim against N Co. was wholly contingent on O obtaining a judgment against L and L being unable to satisfy the hypothetical judgment. Argued May 29—officially released September 10, 2024