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State v. Brelsford
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TIMOTHY BRELSFORD
(AC 46093)
Elgo, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant, who had previously been convicted, following a guilty plea,
of the crimes of kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm, attempt
to commit murder, robbery in the first degree with a deadly weapon,
and two counts of risk of injury to a child, filed a motion for sentence
modification pursuant to statute (§ 53a-39). In his motion, the defendant
provided evidence of, inter alia, his completion of several rehabilitative
programs during his incarceration. In denying the defendant’s motion,
the court stated that it had considered the factors set forth in the
statute (§ 54-125a (f) (4)) governing parole eligibility and suitability and
concluded that the defendant had not established good cause to modify
his sentence pursuant to § 53a-39 when balanced against the facts and
harm created by the serious crimes he had committed. On the defendant’s appeal to this court, held that the defendant could not prevail on
his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he had
failed to establish good cause to modify his sentence pursuant to § 53a-
39: although the defendant argued that the weight and value that the
court assigned to the statutory parole framework when assessing good
cause pursuant to § 53a-39 was inappropriate, he conceded that the trial
court was free to consider the factors in § 54-125 in arriving at its
conclusion; moreover, the court did not limit its consideration of the
defendant’s motion to the factors enumerated in § 54-125, and, although
the defendant argued that the court should have relied more heavily on
his rehabilitation and certain other factors, he did not cite any legal
authority that governs the degree of weight a court must afford factors
that it considers in determining whether good cause has been established.
Argued November 9, 2023—officially released July 30, 2024
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of kidnapping in the second degree with a
firearm, attempt to commit murder, criminal use of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, carjacking,
robbery in the first degree, and two counts of risk of
injury to a child, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of New Haven, where the defendant
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State v. Brelsford
was presented to the court, Devlin, J., on a plea of
guilty to kidnapping in the second degree, attempt to
commit murder, robbery in the first degree with a
deadly weapon, and two counts of risk of injury to a
child; judgment of guilty in accordance with the plea;
thereafter, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to the
remaining charges; subsequently, the court, Harmon,
J., denied the defendant’s motion for sentence modification, and the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
James E. Mortimer, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s
attorney, and Alexander Beck, senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
CRADLE, J. The defendant, Timothy Brelsford,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying
his motion for modification of his sentence pursuant
to General Statutes § 53a-39. On appeal, the defendant
claims that the court abused its discretion in finding
that he had failed to establish good cause to modify
his sentence. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
The following facts related to the defendant’s underlying conviction, as set forth in the trial court’s memorandum of decision on the defendant’s motion for a
sentence modification, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. ‘‘The defendant’s conviction stems
from an armed robbery in the town of Hamden, of which
he was also convicted. The defendant [fled to] . . .
New Haven, where a police officer observed the defendant on a corner talking to a young boy. When the officer
approached [the defendant], [the defendant] produced
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State v. Brelsford
a firearm and placed it to the head of the police officer,
[ordering] him to drive his motorcycle, with [the defendant] as a passenger, to Bridgeport in an attempt to
flee from the criminal activity and the pursuit of other
officers. The police officer rolled the motorcycle while
[the defendant] was a passenger. Both parties fell off
the motorcycle and a gun battle between [the defendant] and the police officer ensued. [The defendant]
fired shots at the police officer on a crowded street
and subsequently ran to a vehicle where there were two
adult females and two children [inside]. The defendant
ordered the two adults out of the vehicle and carjacked
the vehicle, [continuing] to fire shots at police officers
while the two children were in the rear seat of the
vehicle. The defendant subsequently crashed the vehicle and was apprehended when he attempted to flee
on foot. The two minor children suffered minor injuries
in the crash, [including] a bullet wound to the wrist of
one of the children.’’
The defendant subsequently was arrested and, on
September 15, 1995, pleaded guilty to kidnapping in the
second degree with a firearm in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-94a, attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a, robbery
in the first degree with a deadly weapon in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), and two counts of
risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes
§ 53-21. On November 20, 1995, the court, Devlin, J.,
sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence
of forty years of incarceration.1
1
The defendant is currently serving a sentence of forty-six years and six
months of incarceration. The record reflects that the defendant had other
cases pending at the time of his sentencing in the present case. At the
defendant’s sentencing hearing on November 20, 1995, State’s Attorney
James Clark noted that the defendant had ‘‘committed armed robberies in
Hamden on that same day . . . within an hour or so of the beginning of
this sequence of events, and a day earlier in Guilford. In addition to that,
he has pending, I believe, seven felony and two misdemeanor cases in other
jurisdictions, which we know as a practical matter are going to be wrapped
up into this sentence once this sentence is imposed . . . .’’
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State v. Brelsford
On November 16, 2021, the defendant filed the present motion for sentence modification as a self-represented party, seeking to suspend execution of the
remaining unexecuted portion of his term of incarceration. The defendant attached to his motion exhibits
highlighting his medical conditions and completion of
several rehabilitative programs. The state did not
oppose a hearing on the motion.
On August 30, 2022, the court, Harmon, J., held a
hearing on the defendant’s motion. The defendant, a
victim’s advocate, and the state addressed the court.
The defendant argued that, having been incarcerated
for almost twenty-eight years, he is ‘‘a changed person’’
and ‘‘a better person,’’ that he is ‘‘very, very sorry for
what happened back then,’’ and that ‘‘[d]rug addiction
[had] compelled [him]’’ to commit the crimes at issue
in this case. He explained that he now has various health
concerns and that he just wants to ‘‘finish this.’’
The victims did not take a position with respect to
the defendant’s motion for sentence modification. The
victim’s advocate, however, shared a statement from
the mother of the children in the car that ‘‘the carjacking
. . . had an effect on [her] entire family [and] on [her]
entire family’s lives’’ but that ‘‘[she is] a Christian and
believe[s] in forgiveness . . . .’’
The state highlighted the defendant’s extensive criminal history and asked the court ‘‘not to modify the
sentence . . . based on the seriousness of all these
offenses [at issue in the present case] and . . . the
long-term, lifelong effect upon the victims of these
crimes.’’
In its memorandum of decision, issued on September 16, 2022, the court,
Harmon, J., found that, at that time, the defendant had a maximum release
date of December 28, 2027, noting that the defendant earns statutory good
time credit, seven day job credit, and outstanding meritorious performance
award credit, all of which have reduced his maximum release date.
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State v. Brelsford
In a memorandum of decision dated September 16,
2022, the court denied the defendant’s motion for sentence modification. The court noted that, although
§ 53a-39 does not define ‘‘good cause,’’ it has been commonly defined as ‘‘ ‘a legally sufficient reason.’ ’’ The
court explained that ‘‘it is with this understanding and
standard, considering the accepted objectives of sentencing as well, that this court reviews the information
presented to determine whether good cause, ‘a legally
sufficient reason,’ has been established by the defendant to modify his sentence.’’ The court then reviewed
the evidence presented by the defendant, recounting
the age of the defendant when he was sentenced, his
current age, and the ‘‘training and efforts at rehabilitation’’ the defendant had made during his twenty-eight
years of incarceration. The court further noted that the
defendant personally addressed the court, apologized
to the victims for his actions, addressed his drug addiction and discussed ‘‘the good he could perform for the
community and his family if granted early release.’’
The court stated that, ‘‘[i]n analyzing whether ‘a
legally sufficient reason’ exists to warrant a modification of the defendant’s sentence, the court has considered whether the defendant has demonstrated substantial rehabilitation since the date the crime was
committed.’’ The court further reasoned that, ‘‘[w]hile
not directly applicable to . . . § 53a-39, the statute governing parole eligibility and suitability, General Statutes
§ 54-125a (f) (4),2 provides an instructive and useful
2
General Statutes § 54-125a (f) (4) provides in relevant part: ‘‘After [a]
hearing [to determine eligibility for parole release], the [Board of Pardons
and Paroles] may allow [a] person to go at large on parole with respect to
any portion of a sentence that was based on a crime or crimes committed
while such person was under eighteen years of age if the board finds that
such parole release would be consistent with the factors set forth in subdivisions (1) to (4), inclusive, of subsection (c) of section 54-300 and if it appears,
from all available information . . . that [among other things] . . . (C) such
person has demonstrated substantial rehabilitation since the date such crime
or crimes were committed considering such person’s character, background
and history, as demonstrated by factors, including, but not limited to, such
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State v. Brelsford
framework in assessing the existence of ‘good cause’
sufficient to modify a sentence . . . particularly since
the factors enumerated must be . . . evaluated with
the objective of being consistent with the factors set
forth in [General Statutes] § 54-300.’’3 (Footnote added.)
Accordingly, the court explained that ‘‘[f]actors that
have been examined include, but are not limited to: (1)
the gravity of his crime; (2) correctional record and
length of time incarcerated; (3) his age and circumstances at the time of the commission of the crime; (4)
whether he has demonstrated remorse and increased
maturity since the date of the offense; (5) whether he
has contributed to the welfare of other persons through
service while incarcerated; and (6) the degree [to]
which he has fully availed himself of opportunities for
growth, rehabilitation, and contribution within the correctional system considering the nature and circumstances of the crime he committed.’’
The court concluded that, ‘‘after a review and consideration of the information and material presented, and
person’s correctional record, the age and circumstances of such person as
of the date of the commission of the crime or crimes, whether such person
has demonstrated remorse and increased maturity since the date of the
commission of the crime or crimes, such person’s contributions to the
welfare of other persons through service, such person’s efforts to overcome
substance abuse, addiction, trauma, lack of education or obstacles that such
person may have faced as a child or youth in the adult correctional system,
the opportunities for rehabilitation in the adult correctional system, whether
the person has also applied for or received a sentence modification and the
overall degree of such person’s rehabilitation considering the nature and
circumstances of the crime or crimes.’’
3
General Statutes § 54-300 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(c) In fulfilling its
mission, the [Connecticut Sentencing Commission] shall recognize that: (1)
The primary purpose of sentencing in the state is to enhance public safety
while holding the offender accountable to the community, (2) sentencing
should reflect the seriousness of the offense and be proportional to the
harm to victims and the community, using the most appropriate sanctions
available, including incarceration, community punishment and supervision,
(3) sentencing should have as an overriding goal the reduction of criminal
activity, the imposition of just punishment and the provision of meaningful
and effective rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender, and (4) sentences should be fair, just and equitable while promoting respect for the law.’’
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State v. Brelsford
with contemplation of the proper standard,’’ the defendant had not established good cause to modify his sentence ‘‘when balanced against the facts and harm created by the serious crime he committed.’’ The court
went on to explain that its decision was ‘‘not meant to
lessen or nullify the positive steps the defendant has
taken during his period of incarceration or his ability
to succeed once he is released. However, the court felt
that, although the defendant showed remorse . . . the
gravity of the crime and harm to the victims and society
at large requires that the request for sentence modification be denied at this time.’’
On September 28, 2022, the defendant filed a ‘‘motion
for rectification,’’ in which he argued that the court, in
ruling on his motion for sentence modification, had
improperly failed to consider the fact that he had been
on mind-altering drugs at the time he committed the
underlying offenses. He further contended that ‘‘[a]
criminal’s state of mind . . . must be considered by
the court where [the defendant’s] motion for release is
at issue, and to leave it out is plain error.’’ On September
30, 2022, the court, Harmon, J., held a hearing on the
defendant’s motion, which the court treated as a motion
for reconsideration. In a memorandum of decision
dated December 2, 2022, the court denied the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, explaining that
‘‘when rendering its initial decision [on the motion for
sentence modification], [the court] was aware of the
drug dependency and the effect it may have had in
contributing to the illegal activity by [the defendant].
The court must still consider the gravity of the crime.
The offense put both police officers and innocent civilians at risk and resulted in an injury to a young child.
Based on the gravity of the offense, the court does not
believe a sentence modification is appropriate at this
time . . . .’’ This appeal followed.
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State v. Brelsford
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused
its discretion in finding that he had failed to establish
good cause to modify his sentence pursuant to § 53a-
39. We disagree.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review and
legal principles relevant to this claim. Section 53a-39
provides in relevant part that ‘‘the sentencing court or
judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown,
reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged,
or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to
which the defendant could have been originally sentenced. . . .’’4
‘‘[I]n arriving at its sentencing determination, the sentencing court may appropriately conduct an inquiry
4
General Statutes § 53a-39 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, at any time during an executed period
of incarceration, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing and for
good cause shown, reduce the sentence, order the defendant discharged,
or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge
for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been
originally sentenced.
‘‘(b) On and after October 1, 2021, at any time during the period of a
sentence in which a defendant has been sentenced prior to, on or after
October 1, 2021, to an executed period of incarceration of more than seven
years as a result of a plea agreement, including an agreement in which there
is an agreed upon range of sentence, upon agreement of the defendant and
the state’s attorney to seek review of the sentence, the sentencing court or
judge may, after hearing and for good cause shown, reduce the sentence,
order the defendant discharged, or order the defendant discharged on probation or conditional discharge for a period not to exceed that to which the
defendant could have been originally sentenced. . . .’’
We note that § 53a-39 has been amended since the events underlying this
appeal; see Public Acts 2023, No. 23-47, § 1; those amendments have no
bearing on the merits of this appeal. Accordingly, we refer to the current
revision of the statute.
We also note that the defendant, in his appellate brief, asserts that the
legislative intent behind earlier amendments to § 53a-39 in 2021 and 2022
‘‘appears . . . [to have been] largely directed at ushering the earlier release
of rehabilitated inmates.’’ We decline to opine as to the intent of the legislature in amending the statute because it is not necessary to the resolution
of the defendant’s claim on appeal.
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State v. Brelsford
broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind
of information [it] may consider or the source from
which it may come. . . . [T]his broad discretion
applies with equal force to a sentencing court’s decision
regarding a sentence modification . . . . Accordingly,
we review a court’s judgment granting or denying a
motion to modify a sentence for abuse of discretion.
. . . An abuse of discretion exists when a court could
have chosen different alternatives but has decided the
matter so arbitrarily as to vitiate logic, or has decided
it based on improper or irrelevant factors. . . . As
such, [i]n determining whether there has been an abuse
of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be
given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling.
. . . Generally speaking, under this deferential standard, [w]here the trial court has properly considered
all of the offenses proved and imposed a sentence
within the applicable statutory limitations, there is no
abuse of discretion.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Martin
G., 222 Conn. App. 395, 403–404,
305 A.3d 324 (2023),
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 944,
308 A.3d 34 (2024).
The defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that he had not established
good cause to modify his sentence, in that the court
improperly weighed certain factors and failed to consider others. First, the defendant contends that the
court improperly relied solely on the severity of the
defendant’s offense when denying his modification. The
court’s decision, which plainly reflects that it weighed
several factors, belies that contention and does not
merit further discussion.
The defendant also argues that ‘‘[i]t is inappropriate
for the courts to rely upon the statutory parole framework when assessing good cause pursuant to § 53a-
39’’ because that reliance necessarily ‘‘constrains the
‘unlimited’ nature of the appropriate inquiry espoused
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State v. Brelsford
[in our case law].’’ Although the defendant argues that
‘‘the weight and value that the court assigned to this
framework was inappropriate, particularly given the
different functions of the trial court and the Board of
Pardons and Parole,’’ he concedes that ‘‘the trial court
was free to consider [the § 54-125 (f) (4)] factors in
arriving at its conclusion . . . .’’ Indeed, this court has
held that, ‘‘in reviewing applications for sentence modifications of definite sentences, [the sentencing court]
performs a function similar to that of a parole board’’;
State v. Millhouse, 3 Conn. App. 497, 500–501,
490 A.2d
517 (1985); and has affirmed the consideration of § 54-
125 (f) (4) factors when considering sentence modifications. See State v. Martin G., supra, 222 Conn. App.
405–406. This is consistent with our well settled law
that a sentencing court’s broad discretion also applies
to its decisions regarding sentence modification and it
‘‘may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope,
largely unlimited either as to the kind of information [it]
may consider or the source from which it may come.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dupas, 291
Conn. 778, 783,
970 A.2d 102 (2009).5
Moreover, the court did not limit its consideration
of the defendant’s motion to the factors enumerated in
the parole statute. Although the defendant argues that
5
The defendant asks this court to ‘‘provide guidance to the lower courts
regarding proper considerations that should inform the [good cause] standard’’ in the context of § 53a-39. He cites Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 202 Conn. App. 21, 31–35,
244 A.3d 171 (2020), aff’d,
343 Conn. 424,
274 A.3d 85 (2022), as an example of the type of guidance this court should
provide. In response to the defendant’s concern, Martin G., and now the
present case, provide a nonexclusive list of considerations that may properly
inform a court’s ruling on a motion for sentence modification in similar
cases. We decline, however, to provide further guidance at this time given
the broad discretion of the courts in this area; see State v. Martin G., supra,
222 Conn. App. 404; and the ‘‘ ‘largely unlimited’ ’’ information a court can
consider in ruling on a motion for sentence modification. State v. Dupas,
supra,291 Conn. 783.
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State v. Brelsford
the court should have relied more heavily on his rehabilitation and certain other factors,6 he does not cite any
legal authority that governs the degree of weight a court
must afford factors that it considers in determining
whether good cause has been established, nor are we
aware of any. Here, the court expressly considered the
steps the defendant has taken toward rehabilitation
but concluded that those steps did not outweigh other
factors that it considered. The court’s consideration
of all of these factors was consistent with the broad
discretion afforded to courts in ruling on motions for
sentence modification.7 We therefore conclude that the
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
the defendant failed to establish good cause to warrant
a sentence modification.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
6
The defendant contends that the court should have considered: ‘‘(1)
whether the defendant’s sentence comports with contemporary norms in
sentencing, (2) whether and what goals of sentencing will be better met by
the defendant’s release or continued incarceration, (3) the defendant’s life
expectancy and ability to contribute to society upon reentry, (4) the likelihood of recidivism, (5) whether the court may impose supervision to better
assist with the defendant’s reintegration needs or to promote the safety of
society, (6) whether scientific advances since the time of the defendant’s
sentencing place the defendant’s original sentence in a different light, (7)
whether the ‘new’ information presented by the defendant since the time
that he was sentenced warrants a departure from the original sentence, and
(8) input from any victim(s).’’ (Footnotes omitted.)
7
The defendant also argues that the court abused its discretion because,
even if the court properly considered the factors it used in making its
determination as to good cause, those factors weigh in favor of his release
and the state’s arguments to the contrary are weak. It is axiomatic that, in
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, this court ‘‘[does]
not review the evidence to determine whether a conclusion different from the
one reached could have been reached.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Alder v. Alder, 60 Conn. App. 612, 613,
760 A.2d 1263 (2000).
